



PLATO'S
Apology of Socrates

A COMMENTARY

Paul Allen Miller and Charles Platter

Plato's *Apology of Socrates*

Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture

Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture

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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS : NORMAN

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Miller, Paul Allen, 1959–

Plato's Apology of Socrates : a commentary / Paul Allen Miller, Charles Platter.

p. cm. — (Oklahoma series in classical culture ; v. 36)

Includes Greek text of Plato's Apology with introduction, notes, and commentary in English.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8061-4025-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Plato. Apology. 2. Plato—Criticism and interpretation. 3. Socrates—Trials, litigation, etc. I. Platter, Charles, 1957– II. Plato. Apology. III. Title.

PA4279.A8M55 2010

184—dc22

2009010278

Plato's Apology of Socrates: A Commentary is Volume 36 in the Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

You see, I think that people today are so deeply asleep that unless, you know, you're putting on those sort of superficial plays that just help your audience to sleep more comfortably, it's hard to know what to do in the theater.

Andre Gregory and Wallace Shawn, *My Dinner with Andre*

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank the following people, without whose help this book would not have existed in its current form. Gratitude is first of all owed to Ellen Greene, editor of the Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture at the University of Oklahoma Press, to whom we first proposed this idea and who helped shepherd it through the approval process from beginning to end. Next we would like to thank our friends and colleagues, Mark Beck and Stephen Fineberg, each of whom read the complete manuscript and made numerous important suggestions and corrections. Invaluable assistance was also provided by Virginia Lewis, Deana Zeigler, and David Driscoll, graduate students at the University of Georgia who helped proofread and correct the manuscript, as well as Casey Moore, Leihua Weng, Travus Helmly, Janet Safford, Erik Heymann, and Cagney McGonegal, who as students at the University of South Carolina were the first group to use the complete text and provided important feedback and suggestions. All remaining errors are, of course, our own. Special thanks are due to Louise Kinman Platter for her work on the index.

Finally, we wish to thank the wonderful staff at the University of Oklahoma Press: our copyeditor, Sarah Nestor; Special Projects Editor Alice Stanton; Assistant to the Director and Publisher Astrud Reed; and Senior Associate Director and Publisher John Drayton.

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|--------------|
| acc. | accusative |
| act. | active |
| adj. | adjective |
| aor. | aorist |
| art. | article |
| compar. | comparative |
| contr. | contraction |
| dat. | dative |
| def. | definite |
| fem. | feminine |
| fr. | fragment |
| fut. | future |
| gen. | genitive |
| idiom. | idiomatic |
| imper. | imperative |
| impers. | impersonal |
| impf. | imperfect |
| indecl. | indeclinable |
| indic. | indicative |
| infin. | infinitive |
| intrans. | intransitive |
| lit. | literally |
| masc. | masculine |

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|-------------|
| mid. | middle |
| neut. | neuter |
| nom. | nominative |
| obj. | object |
| opt. | optative |
| part. | participle |
| pass. | passive |
| pers. | person |
| pf. | perfect |
| pl. | plural |
| pluperf. | pluperfect |
| prep. | preposition |
| pres. | present |
| sg. | singular |
| subj. | subjunctive |
| superl. | superlative |
| trans. | translation |

EDITORIAL NOTE

We have based the text for *Plato's Apology* on the 1900 Oxford Classical Text of John Burnet, noting departures from Burnet in the appendix. We have also divided the *Apology* into thirty-three chapters in order to include supplementary material in the introductions to each chapter and in the essays following the text.

The citations we have used in this commentary are traditional, based on the page and paragraph numbers from the edition of the French humanist Henri Etienne, often referred to by his Latin name, Stephanus. These numbers and letters (a–e) can be found in the margins of the text. The paragraphs are further subdivided into lines. The *Apology* thus begins at Stephanus page 17, paragraph a, line 1 (written 17a1). Our basic policy for expressions that spill over into the next line is to cite only the line in which the first word occurs. More complex phrases and long sentences are sometimes cited with inclusive page numbers.

For words quoted in isolation from their context we follow standard practice and convert all grave accents to acute. Thus, we print φροντιστής quoted in isolation (18b8) but in context κατὰ τούτους (17b6).

Because many readers will come to this book as intermediate students of Greek, we have tried to err on the side of generosity when providing assistance. It goes without saying that we have done far too much for some and nowhere near enough for others.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The running vocabulary presents less common words and expressions the first time they appear in the text. Readers should learn them at that time. We do not include in the running vocabulary words that are generally learned in first-year Greek, but all words can be found in the glossary (pp. 197–222). We give parsing help for verbs that use different stems to form their principal parts and for the less frequently encountered tenses and moods.

Plato's *Apology of Socrates*

INTRODUCTION

We have chosen not to produce a highly detailed survey of the historical and cultural contexts of Plato's *Apology of Socrates*. The amount of relevant material for such a study is vast, and much of it is collected usefully in works such as those by Brickhouse and Smith (1989) and Nails (2002).

Instead, we have tried to frame our task more simply with the needs of the intermediate Greek student in mind: what is the minimum amount of factual information necessary for someone encountering the work in the original language for the first time? To answer that question, we have divided what follows into two categories. Section I gives a basic outline of the historical context of Socrates' trial, focusing on the oligarchic revolution of 404 and the counterrevolution that followed. This section concludes with brief remarks about judicial procedure in Athens and the physical setting of the trial. Section II situates Plato and Socrates within fifth- and fourth-century Athenian society and emphasizes their place within the history of Western culture. It concludes with a discussion of what is sometimes known as the "Socratic question," the fact that Socrates wrote nothing and that much of what we know about him, including the *Apology*, comes through Plato.

In addition to this introduction, following the *Apology* text, we have supplied each of the chapters with short essays. There we introduce additional background information designed to clarify the points raised by Socrates and to encourage readers to

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think critically about them from a historically informed position. These essays can be assigned and used as the basis for class discussions, or they can be the starting point for paper topics or for general reflection.

I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The "Thirty Tyrants"

Socrates' trial took place in 399 B.C.E., after the end of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404). After the surrender of Athens, the Spartan victors chose a group of thirty citizens (the Thirty) to dismantle the democratic government and replace it with the "ancestral laws" (νόμοι πάτριoi), by which Athens was now to be governed (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.3.2). These men, led by Critias, Plato's uncle, used their authority to restructure the courts and purge the city of their opponents. Many of those who were not executed fled to the Piraeus, where they were joined by Thrasybulus and began to organize resistance under his leadership. In 403 they were attacked by the oligarchs, whom they defeated, killing Critias and also Plato's uncle Charmides, who had been an important collaborator of the Thirty.

Amnesty

Most of the oligarchs who survived fled to Eleusis, where they had prepared a refuge for themselves. The exiled democrats, who included in their number Socrates' close friend Chaerephon, as Socrates reminds the jury (*Apology* 21a), returned to Athens. An amnesty was negotiated (with the help of the Spartan commander Pausanias) that extended to all but the Thirty and a few others.

Aftermath

Socrates himself did not go into exile and was regarded with suspicion by some democratic leaders, although he was sixty-five at

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the time of the revolution. He makes it quite clear that he was no supporter of the Thirty and tells a story about a time when he explicitly disobeyed their orders (*Apology* 32c–d). Whatever doubts the democrats may have had about Socrates, the amnesty agreement prevented anyone from prosecuting him for having given even tacit support to the oligarchs. In 399, however, he was brought to trial on a charge of impiety (ἀσέβεια) by three Athenians: Meletus and Lycon, about whom little is known, and Anytus, a prominent democratic leader.

The Charges against Socrates

Socrates quotes the charges against him at 28b–c: “Socrates does wrong, both because he corrupts the youth, and because he does not recognize the gods the city recognizes.” At the beginning of the *Memorabilia* (1.1.1), Xenophon quotes a similar charge. Diogenes Laertius (2.40) repeats the charge and adds that the penalty sought by the prosecution was death. Religious offenses in ancient Athens were taken seriously, as the welfare of the city was understood to depend upon the continued support of the gods. At the same time, religious practice, so often an emotional issue, could be exploited cynically by one’s political opponents.

Pretrial Hearing

Following the accusation, a formal hearing was held before the King-Archon, the official responsible for cases involving violations of religious law.¹ If the King-Archon decided that there was sufficient evidence to bring the accused to trial, as he clearly did, the case was sent to the Heliaea, the court that heard cases regarding impiety.

1. This aspect of the process is tightly woven into the fabric of the Platonic dialogues. Socrates leaves the conversation at the end of the *Theaetetus* to go to the hearing, and he encounters Euthyphro, in the dialogue of the same name, as he leaves the meeting with the King-Archon.

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The Courtroom

The trial took place outdoors. The courtroom was a semipublic setting that allowed spectators to hear the speeches and react to them. At the same time, the court was physically separated from the public, probably by a low wall that allowed officers of the court to maintain order and to make certain that only actual members of the jury were allowed to vote.

The Jury

The pool of jurors was chosen annually. On any given day when the courts were in session, interested jurors assembled early and, through a complex procedure designed to guard against jury packing, received a token that gave them entrance to the appropriate court. Although precision is not possible due to the lack of evidence, Socrates' jury probably consisted of 500 jurors, or perhaps 501 to avoid the possibility of a tie.

The Trial

On the day of the trial, after the traditional prayers and sacrifices had been made, each side was given an equal amount of time to present its case. A vote was then taken to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If the vote was in his favor, he walked away a free man. Further, if the prosecutor did not secure one-fifth of the vote, the latter was subject to a fine for frivolous prosecution (cf. *Apology* 36b). But if the jury voted to convict, as was the case for Socrates, a second penalty phase ensued. The original indictment would have included the penalty proposed by the prosecution, and at this time the accusers justified their reasoning. The defendant then had the opportunity to suggest a different penalty, as Socrates does beginning at 35e1. After this speech, the jury voted again for one of the two alternatives. In the *Apology*, they accepted the proposal of the prosecution and sentenced Socrates to death.

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II. SOCRATES AND PLATO

In the *Apology*, we read the response of a philosopher on trial for his life. It is a work admirable for the luminosity of its writing, its depiction of the philosopher's reply to an uncomprehending and hostile public, its dramatization of a crucial moment in Western intellectual history, and its unwavering defense of the value of the philosophical life.

Plato's *Apology* is only one version of Socrates' defense. There were a number of different versions of this speech in circulation. Each portrayed Socrates' trial and conviction in a different light, depending on whether the writer was a supporter of Socrates or an opponent.² The fact that the trial had such a galvanizing effect on so many people indicates that Socrates was no ordinary man and that he remained a source of controversy and contention in death at least as much as in life.

To understand why Plato felt it necessary to produce his own version of Socrates' defense speech, we must first try to understand what has made Socrates such an object of fascination and controversy. There are many answers to this question, and we cannot possibly hope to cover them adequately in such a small space. Nonetheless, there are several points that the beginning reader needs to consider.

First Philosopher

Socrates was in a real sense the first philosopher of the Western tradition. While there were certainly men before him whom we now call pre-Socratic philosophers, the very fact that they are so labeled denotes that the arrival of Socrates marks a fundamental break in the history of formal thought in the West. The nature of that break, as it is presented to us by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 1) and by the fragments of those earlier thinkers, is as follows: while the

2. Danzig 2003 offers the most up-to-date account of this controversy and of Plato's and Xenophon's contributions to it.

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pre-Socratics were, by and large, concerned with cosmogonic and physical speculations, Socrates turned philosophical inquiry inward and asked “who am I?” and “how should I live?” He does not ask what the basic physical or metaphysical elements of the universe are, but what the nature of the self is, how one cares for it, and how one does so in the company of others.

The Socratic Method

Socrates’ “method,” at least as it is presented by Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and others, was to inquire into the nature of the good, the self, justice, wisdom, and so forth by asking his fellow citizens what they thought these things were. In so doing, he also asked them to defend their beliefs and assumptions, while demanding that they maintain a high standard of logical consistency. Such questioning often revealed the existence of unfounded or contradictory sets of beliefs, which could not be defended and hence demanded revision. Thus, Socrates was not a dogmatic philosopher or a builder of elaborate systems, nor did he present a series of abstract speculations as received truth or the product of his genius. Rather, he defined philosophy as an ongoing mode of inquiry into the foundations of our communal and individual lives—one that is undertaken in dialogue with others.

Philosophy’s Challenge

By demanding that individuals examine in a rigorous manner their beliefs and assumptions concerning the values they held most dear, Socrates was also necessarily a provocative figure, who often occasioned anger and resentment from those he questioned. His actions, which often cast him in the role of a dissident within his community, clearly made him enemies. He did not simply accept the received verities of Athenian ideology and religion, but demanded that his fellow citizens subject those “truths” to rigorous examination. Socrates, in effect, founded philosophy as a form of political and social criticism if not direct civil disobedience.

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The "Socratic Question"

Socrates was a philosopher who did not write. In fact, the memory of Socrates largely survives into the modern world owing to the works of Plato. The son of an aristocratic family that was deeply embedded in the politics of Athens, Plato was well placed to become one of the ambitious and cynical young men who populate his dialogues. Instead, he appears to have committed himself to Socrates and to philosophy at an early age. Plato was twenty-eight, according to Diogenes Laertius (3.6), when Socrates was executed. He devoted the rest of his long life (he died in 348 B.C.E.) to trying to understand what this formative influence on his life meant and how to live in accord with his understanding of it. Plato produced a large body of work, much of which is centered around the conversations of Socrates. While other portraits of Socrates were in circulation in antiquity, and especially in the immediate wake of his execution, Plato's became authoritative, and it is through Plato that the founder of Western philosophy has come down to us.

Platonic Writing

Plato's Socrates achieved preeminence for at least two reasons. First, Plato is a writer of extraordinary talent. His characters are drawn vividly; his language is clear and precise; his syntax is conversational and his wit brilliant. Every word in a Platonic dialogue is chosen for maximum impact. Indeed, Plato's attention to revision (*philoponia*) was legendary in antiquity.³ The result is that even when the language appears to be casual and improvised, we can assume that a great deal of labor has gone into making it appear that way.

Second, Plato was an original philosopher of genius. This description may seem a bit of a paradox for a man who devoted his life to

3. See, for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De compositione verborum* 25; Quintilian 8.6.64; Diogenes Laertius 3.37.

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conserving the memory of his teacher, but it is nevertheless true. Further, there is a great deal of debate in the scholarly literature about which dialogues are early and which are late, which dialogues are closer to the teachings of Socrates and which are more clearly the products of Plato's invention. The controversies here are many, and it is not necessary for the first-time reader of the *Apology* to feel a need to decide on such matters. What seems clear, however, and what nobody seriously denies, is that Plato does not simply set himself the task of recording Socrates' speeches and conversations. He is not a journalist. Rather, he strives from first to last to come to grips with both Socrates as a man and the challenge he offered to received modes of thought. To do that effectively, Plato was required to develop his own understanding of these matters, eventually writing long and complex works such as the *Republic*, *Symposium*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*. These could only have been produced through a process of considerable reflection and elaboration and not through the simple transcription of a set of conversations, no matter their brilliance, subtlety, or depth.

The result of this complex authorial situation is that we must always speak of Plato *and* Socrates when responding to the *Apology*. There is no doubt that Socrates was a very real individual, who provoked both fierce hostility and fond attachment among his fellow citizens. He stands at the head of a long list of truth tellers and inquirers who have challenged the received opinions of their governments and their peers in the name of the love of wisdom (*philo-sophia*). But the Socrates we have in the text of the *Apology*, although he exists in other recorded versions that have come down to us from antiquity, especially those of Xenophon, is largely a product of the literary and philosophical genius of Plato. With the *Apology*, then, we stand at the beginning of the Western literary, philosophical, and political tradition, and this is why no one can seriously call him- or herself educated who has not closely pondered the meaning and art of this seminal text.

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Apology of Socrates

CHAPTER 1

(17a1–18a6)

Socrates introduces two important themes for the rest of the dialogue in the first sentence: (1) the effect of speech on the hearer, and (2) the relation between what one *thinks* one knows and the truth. These topics, however, are introduced casually and seem at first to have no further significance than “what effect my accusers have had upon you, I don’t know.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 1.

Ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄ
 ἔμων κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ’ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
 ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι
 ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ

πεπόνθατε pf. act. indic. < πάσχω *experience*
κατηγόρων < κατήγορος, -ου, ὁ *accuser*
ὀλίγου *almost, just short of*
πιθανῶς *persuasively*
εἰρήκασιν pf. act. indic. < λέγω *say*

- 17a1 ὅτι = ὅτι “Whatever.”
 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι Although this is supposed to be a defense speech, in various places Socrates goes out of his way to antagonize the jury. One way he does this is by choosing to address jury members only as “Athenians.” He saves the commoner and more respectful form of address, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, “O judges,” for the jurors who vote to acquit him and pointedly adds that only they could rightly be addressed in this way (see 40a2–3). In another version of this same speech by Xenophon, Socrates is even more antagonistic.
πεπόνθατε The verb is essentially passive in meaning, so ὑπό + genitive commonly follows to indicate the person responsible.
- 17a2 δ’ οὖν “Anyway.” The particle intensifies the contrast signaled by μὲν . . . δέ.
καί Adverbial here, as often: “even.”
- 17a3 ἑμαυτοῦ Object of ἐπελαθόμην < ἐπιλανθάνομαι. Verbs of remembering and forgetting regularly take the genitive.
- 17a4 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν Unlike the English, “so to speak,” this idiom limits the scope of the statement. Translate “almost, practically.”

- 5 αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ
 ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε
 b ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα
 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μῆδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν
 φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυν-
 τότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν
 5 τάληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν
 ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ

ἐθαύμασα < θαυμάζω *marvel at*
 χρῆν = ἔχρην, impf. of χρέη *it is necessary*
 εὐλαβεῖσθαι < εὐλαβέομαι *beware, take care*
 ἐξαπατηθῆτε < ἐξαπατάω *deceive*
 αἰσχυνθῆναι aor. pass. infin. < αἰσχύνω *shame*
 ἐξελεγχθήσονται fut. pass. < ἐξελέγγω *examine closely, refute*
 ὅπωςτιοῦν *in any way at all*
 ἀναισχυντότατον *most shameless*
 ὁμολογοίην < ὁμολογέω *agree*
 ῥήτωρ, -ορος, ὁ *orator*
 ὥσπερ *just as*

- 17a5 αὐτῶν Agrees with πολλῶν.
 ὧν Genitive by attraction.
 τοῦτο "Of their many lies, I marveled at *this one* in particular."
 17a6 μὴ The negative introduces a clause of fearing dependent on εὐλαβεῖσθαι.
 17b1 ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος "On the grounds that [I] am (ὄντος) skilled at speaking (δεινοῦ λέγειν)." The genitives are governed by the ὑπό (ὑπ') in 17a6. The prosecutors have apparently warned the jurors that Socrates' speech will be full of deception. This was a charge often leveled at professional teachers of rhetoric (sophists) and their students. Athenian oratory is full of disclaimers designed to counter such attacks. Litigants often strike the pose of simple men who speak the truth (see Lysias 19.1.2; Isaeus 10.1). Like them, Socrates denies any particular eloquence. Nevertheless, his pause at 17b4 to consider ironically that he may have misunderstood what his accusers meant by δεινὸς λέγειν clearly illustrates his *skill at speaking*.
 17b1 τό . . . μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι "The idea that [they] would not be shamed . . ." The articular infinitive functions as the subject of ἔδοξεν (b3) and is the antecedent of τοῦτο.
 17b3 αὐτῶν "Of them" (the accusers).
 17b4 εἰ μὴ ἄρα "Unless, of course." ἄρα ironically draws attention to the special sense of δεινὸς λέγειν that Socrates pretends to discover.
 17b5 τάληθῆ = τὰ ἀληθῆ
 λέγουσιν "They mean."
 ὁμολογοίην Potential optative.
 17b6 οὐ κατὰ τούτους "Not after *their* fashion."
 μὲν οὖν οὖν ("so, . . .") resumes the discussion interrupted by Socrates' musing on what his accusers meant by δεινός. μὲν sets up a contrast with ὑμεῖς δέ (17b8).

ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκού-
 σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν—οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὧ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων,
 ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκού- c
 σεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεῦω
 γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω—καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω
 ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρόπει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῆδε τῆ
 ἡλικία ὥσπερ μεираκίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. 5

ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν *little or nothing*
 εἰκῆ *at random*
 ἐπιτυχοῦσιν aor. act. part. < ἐπιτυγχάνω *chance upon*
 ὀνόμασιν < ὄνομα, -τος, τό *name*
 προσδοκησάτω 3rd pers. aor. act. imper. < προσδοκάω *expect*
 πρόπει opt. < πρόπει (impers.) *be fitting*
 μεираκίῳ < μεираκίον, -ου, τό *youth*
 πλάττοντι < πλάττω *shape, fashion*
 εἰσιέναι < εἴσειμι *go into*

- 17b7–c5 From me, you shall hear the unvarnished truth; it is not fitting for a man of my age to play rhetorical games.
- 17b8 μου . . . ἀλήθειαν ἀκούω takes an accusative of the thing heard and a genitive of the person.
 μὰ Δία “No, by Zeus.” μὰ is a negative interjection, used with οὐ or independently.
- 17b9 κεκαλλιεπημένους . . . λόγους “Artful language . . . arranged with phrases and words,” that is, “with artfully arranged phrases and words.” The participles go with λόγους in form but with ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν in sense. Socrates’ diction parodies the type of speech he is imagining. Note the rhyming endings (*homoioleuton*), evocative of the style of Gorgias of Leontini, one of the most influential sophists of the fifth century. His visit to Athens in 427 B.C.E. provides the occasion for Plato’s dialogue *Gorgias*.
 οἱ τούτων Supply λόγοι.
- 17c2 ἐπιτυχοῦσιν The claim cannot be taken at face value. As we have already seen, Plato chooses Socrates’ words carefully. Note how the loose structure of this sentence gives the impression of improvisation.
- 17c3 δίκαια For the idea that simple words are inherently more likely to be trusted than clever ones, see on 17b1.
 ἃ λέγω The relative clause (antecedent omitted) functions as the subject of εἶναι.
- 17c4 οὐδὲ . . . ἂν . . . πρόπει Supply μοι with the potential optative, which also accounts for the case of μεираκίῳ below.
 δήπου “Surely.” The word is used ironically, as often in Plato.
- 17c5 τῆ ἡλικία, “At my age.”

- καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι
καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπο-
λογομένου δι' ὧν περ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν
d τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε
θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί.

δέομαι *ask*
παρίεμαι *beg*
εἴωθα pf. (with pres. meaning) < ἦθω *be accustomed*
ἄλλοθι *elsewhere*
θορυβεῖν < θορυβέω *make an uproar*
οὕτωςί *thus*

- 17c6 καὶ μέντοι καὶ “Yes, indeed, and.”
- 17c6–d1. The sentence raises the question of whether the jurors might wonder and create a disturbance because they are unused to hearing everyday speech in a court setting or because, as we see later in the speech, Socrates’ normal manner of speaking with his fellow citizens causes consternation and wonder.
- 17c7-8 διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων . . . δι’ ὧν περ “By the very same words which.” Socrates’ request is both conventional and idiosyncratic. Demosthenes 25.14 has a speaker making a similar plea. At the same time, Socrates’ lack of pretense and fondness for homely examples are axiomatic in both Plato and Xenophon (although generally understood to be ironic). Note that he makes a similar request prior to the conversation with Meletus (27b).
- 17c8 ἐν ἀγορᾷ The agora was the social center of Athenian public life. As Burnet (1924) notes, words such as ἀγορά, ἄστυ, and ἀγρός appear so commonly that they are treated as virtual proper nouns and thus appear without the article. ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν The variety of coined money circulating in Athens stimulated the development of private banks conducted at “tables” in the agora, where money could be exchanged and transactions could be witnessed by a third party.
- 17d1 θαυμάζειν . . . θορυβεῖν Both infinitives depend on δέομαι and παρίεμαι, above. Although the *Apology* is not a court transcript, Plato goes out of his way to include details that suggest otherwise. Unlike modern courtrooms, where extraneous noise is strongly discouraged, Athenian juries could be quite noisy. Burnet (1924) correctly notes that the verb θορυβεῖν can refer either to heckling or to applause. Although Socrates here refers to the former, his speech to those who vote for a lesser punishment after his conviction indicates the presence of hard-core supporters as well. Athenian rules of jury selection made jury-packing difficult, however, with potential jurors assigned randomly to courtrooms. Nevertheless, there were plenty of opportunities for spectators to make their opinions known, whether they were members of the jury or not.
οὕτωςί The adverb is made more emphatic by the addition of the deictic iota. Note that its accent is fixed and is not affected by the normal accentuation of the adverb.

νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γερονδῶς
 ἐβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως.
 ὡσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν, συνεγιγνώ- 5
 σκετε δῆπου ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ 18
 ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν
 δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως
 ἔαν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—αὐτὸ
 δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια
 λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ῥήτορος δὲ 5
 τᾶλθηθὶ λέγειν.

ἀναβέβηκα pf. act. indic. < ἀναβαίνω appear in court
 ἔτη < ἔτος, -ους, τό year
 γερονδῶς pf. act. part. < γίγνομαι attain, become
 ἐβδομήκοντα (indeclinable) seventy
 ἀτεχνῶς literally
 τῷ ὄντι really
 συνεγιγνώσκετε impf. act. < συγγινώσκω pardon
 φωνῇ < φωνή, -ῆς, ἡ voice, speech style
 τρόπῳ < τρόπος, -ου, ὁ manner
 ἐτεθράμμην pluperf. pass. < τρέφω raise, bring up
 ἔαν pres. act. infin. < ἐάω allow
 δικαστοῦ < δικαστής, -οῦ, ὁ judge, juror

- 17d2 ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα “I am appearing before the court.” ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβαίνειν is a technical legal term.
 ἔτη . . . ἐβδομήκοντα Later, Socrates, will say that such longevity would never have been possible had he not abstained from politics. The fact that he regards his complete absence from the courts as worthy of mention gives some indication of the litigious nature of Athenian society.
- 17d3 τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως “The style of speech here.”
- 17d4 ὡσπερ οὖν ἄν The condition is present contrary-to-fact. ἄν (both of them) goes with συνεγιγνώσκετε. The metaphor hinted at with ξένως (c3) now becomes a full-blown analogy.
- 18a1 καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν “And so, now.”
- 18a3 ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη “Perhaps it may be worse, perhaps better.” On one level, this sentence asks the jurors to withhold judgment on the untutored forensic oratory of Socrates. On another, it raises the possibility that his seemingly spontaneous style may well be superior to that of his rhetorically trained opponents.
- 18a5 αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο “This very thing,” referring to εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή below.
 αὕτη < οὗτος not αὐτός. ἀρετὴ is predicate, as omission of the article shows: “This is the virtue [i.e., the defining quality] of . . .”

CHAPTER 2
(18a7–19a7)

Overview of the defense: Socrates defends himself against the charges of his fellow Athenians, both those present in the court (οἱ ὕστεροι κατήγοροι) and those who have slandered him for a long time (οἱ πρόωτοι κατήγοροι). For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 2.

- Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγορούς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερον καὶ τοὺς ὕστερους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γέγονασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνωτον, καίπερ ὄντας

κατηγορημένα pf. pass. part. < κατηγορέω *accuse, charge*

- 18a7** **δίκαιος** “Justified,” a common usage. Note the recurrent use of vocabulary derived from δίκη (see, for example, 18a1, a4, and a5). As a result of their frequent appearances, these words come to have thematic connotations beyond their literal definitions. They remind the jury that their constant concern should be what is just. Moreover, the words are designed to spur a more general philosophical reflection on the nature of justice.
- 18a8** **μου** Genitive with a verb of accusation (κατηγορεῖν). Nouns derived from such verbs also take a genitive object. See 18b1 below.
- 18a9** **τὰ ὕστερον** “The later ones.” That is, the most recent false charges. Socrates decides to deviate from the accusation at hand to address charges made by an earlier set of accusers. This is perhaps not a good legal strategy and raises again a question alluded to earlier (see on 17a1) regarding Socrates’ attitude toward his judges and whether he is really trying to save his life. Xenophon writes in his *Apology* that Socrates had determined that it was time for him to die and so deliberately provoked the jury (4).
- 18b3** **τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνωτον** “Those around Anytus.” Anytus was a prominent leader of the democratic faction and is represented in Plato’s *Meno* as resentful of Socrates’ criticism of his associates. He was later exiled by the Thirty (see introduction), with whom some democrats may have associated Socrates, and lost most of his considerable inheritance. His coprosecutors may have

καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ
 ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν 5
 τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστιν τις
 Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ

παραλαμβάνοντες < παραλαμβάνω take in hand, take aside

- had similar motivations. Lycon's son was executed by the Thirty. For a discussion of the prosecutors, see on 23e3–24a1.
- 18b5** ἐκ παίδων “From the time you were children.”
- 18b5-6** ἔπειθον . . . κατηγοροῦν The imperfects suggest ongoing action.
- 18b6** ὧς Here introducing indirect statement after κατηγοροῦν.
 ἔστιν When ἔστιν signifies the existence of something, it is accented on the first syllable and appears at the beginning of the clause. Translate: “there is.”
- 18b6-7** μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές “Nothing very true.” μᾶλλον does not appear in all manuscripts.
- 18b7** σοφός Socrates imagines the term used contemptuously by his detractors. In traditional societies such as fifth-century Athens, terms that suggest innovation of any kind often appear suspect and lacking the proper respect for received wisdom. See, for example, the portrayal of Socrates' school in Aristophanes' *Clouds*; see also Places (1964, 3) on σοφός. Xenophon gives a pointed example at *Symposium* 6.6, where the Syracusan impresario says scornfully to Socrates: “Aren't you called ‘the thinker’ (φροντιστῆς)?”
 τὰ μετέωρα, “Middle air.” Close attention to the movements of heavenly bodies and to weather signs was well established in Greek culture and is abundantly demonstrated in the second half of Hesiod's *Works and Days*. Speculation about the mechanical causes of these phenomena was less well regarded and considered impractical. In *Clouds*, Aristophanes refers to people such as Socrates as μετεωροσοφισταί, “sophists of the middle air” (360). In fact, our first look at Socrates there finds him hanging in a basket “walking on air and investigating the sun” (225; cf. *Apology* 19c2–5).
 φροντιστής Derived from φροντίς, “thought,” and pejorative, like σοφός above. Mockery of intellectual activity was common in the late fifth century, especially in comedy. By putting such language in the mouths of the first accusers, Socrates also begins to introduce ideas that will culminate in the references to Aristophanes' famous play, *Clouds*, below. There Aristophanes imagines Socrates as not only making use of *phrontis*, but literally inhabiting it. His school is called a *phrontisterion*, a “thinking place.” Socrates was not the only philosopher to find himself the butt of a joke. Thales of Miletus was said to have fallen into a well while gazing at τὰ ἐν οὐρανοῦ (Plato, *Theaetetus* 174a; cf. *Apology* 19b5), and Anaxagoras was nicknamed *Nous*, “Mind,” after the principle that he had identified as organizing the universe (Diogenes Laertius 2.6). See also essay 14 (pp. 167–69).
 τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς The parody of philosophy students in Aristophanes' *Clouds* influences Socrates' language directly. In an early scene from the play, a student explains to Strepsiades, an old Athenian, the strange behavior of his fellow students: ζητοῦσιν οὗτοι τὰ κατὰ γῆς “They are investigating things underground.” Strepsiades replies, “Oh! You mean onions!” (188–89).

- ὕπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκῶς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω
 c ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, (οἱ) ταύτην τὴν φήμην
 κατασκευάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν μου κατήγοροι· οἳ γὰρ
 ἀκούοντες ἡγούνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν.
 ἔπειτὰ εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον
 5 ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες
 πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι

ἀνεζητηκῶς pf. act. part. < ἀναζητέω seek out
 φήμην < φήμη, -ης, ἡ report
 κατασκευάσαντες aor. act. part. < κατασκευδάννυμι spread
 νομίζειν acknowledge, believe in
 ἔτι δὲ καὶ moreover
 ἡλικία < ἡλικία, -ας, ἡ age, time of life

- 18b8-c1 τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν “Making the weaker argument the stronger.”
 Note the contracted masc. sg. acc. forms of the comparatives ἥττω and κρείττω (= ἥττωνα and κρείττωνα). As Socrates implies, the phrase is a cliché used unreflectively by opponents of the new education, with its emphasis on public speaking (cf. *Clouds* 112, where the same phrase occurs). Such criticism often attacked the sophists, a diverse group of men with widely different interests, united only, it seems, in their willingness to teach rhetoric for a fee. A possible implication of the representation of Socrates in *Clouds* is that he, too, is a sophist, a charge he strenuously denies. Such teachers were nevertheless in high demand by young men eager to gain influence in the Assembly and were resented by some of the entrenched elites. The beginning of Plato’s *Protagoras* captures the equivocal position of the sophists neatly. There we meet an ambitious young man, burning to become a student of Protagoras, but who blushes at the thought of being called a sophist (312a).
- 18c1 <οἱ> Bracketed text does not appear in the surviving manuscripts but has been restored by the editor, who thinks that it was there originally. The insertion allows us to take οὗτοι . . . οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκευάσαντες as the subject and οἱ δεινοὶ . . . μου κατήγοροι as the predicate: “these men who have broadcast this rumor are my dangerous accusers.” δεινοὶ preserves something of its original sense (< δέος, “fear”).
- 18c3 θεοὺς νομίζειν “Acknowledge the gods,” as is clear from Socrates’ remark at *Euthyphro* 3b describing to Euthyphro the charges of Meletus: “For he says that I am a maker of gods, and he brings charges because, in making new gods, I do not honor the old ones (τοὺς ἀρχαίους [θεοὺς] οὐ νομίζοντα). The phrase is therefore to be distinguished from νομίζειν θεοὺς εἶναι (26d2), “believe that the gods exist,” a charge Socrates takes pains to rebut.
- 18c4 κατήγοροι Subject of the sentence, agreeing with κατηγορηκότες (c5), λέγοντες (c6), and κατηγοροῦντες (c8).
- πολλοὶ Predicate adjective.
- 18c6 ἧ The antecedent is ἡλικία (dative of time within which).
 ἂν . . . ἐπιστεύσατε Here, with the aorist indicative, ἂν indicates potential in the past: “when you were likely to believe.”

ύμων καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολο-
 γουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ
 ὄνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις **d**
 κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὄν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ
 χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον—οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι
 ἄλλους πείθοντες—οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ

ἐρήμην < ἐρήμη, -ης, ἡ *undefended*
 κωμωδοποιός, -οῦ, ὁ *comic poet*
 φθόνῳ < φθόνος, -ου, ὁ *envy, resentment*
 διαβολῇ < διαβολή, -ῆς, ἡ *slander*
 χρώμενοι < χράομαι *use*
 ἀνέπειθον *impf. act. < ἀναπειθῶ try to persuade, seduce*
 ἀπορώτατοι *impossible to deal with*

- 18c7** **παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι** “When some of you were children.”
ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες Supply δίκην. A technical legal expression: “prose-
 cuting an undefended case.” The phrase is glossed by the genitive absolute
 that follows for the benefit of jurors less familiar with legal jargon than
 Plato’s Socrates, an irony that should not escape us, given his lack of court-
 room experience. The overarching issue, however, is that Socrates did not
 choose to leave his “case” undefended but was compelled to do so by the
 anonymity of his accusers.
- 18c8** **ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον** Supply τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ. *ἀλογώτατον* operates on both
 literal and metaphorical levels. In the most conventional sense, Socrates’
 situation is *ἄλογος*, that is, “unreasonable,” since it was not possible to
 make a reply, or *ἀπολογεῖσθαι*, to those who were not present. More liter-
 ally, *ἄλογος* (*ἀ-* + *λόγος*) means “without speech, unutterable.” Inasmuch as
 Socrates cannot name the accusers, their names are literally *ἀλογώτατα*,
 “most unutterable.” Finally, this kind of anonymous slander represents the
 opposite of the philosophical mode of life for which Socrates stands. It is
 without *λόγος* in its most profound sense, neither able to offer an account of
 itself (cf. 39c7), nor willing to submit to the process of questioning and
 examination of others in dialogue (*διαλόγος*).
- 18d1** **οἷόν τε** Supply ἐστὶ. Idiomatic: “it is possible.”
- 18d2** **κωμωδοποιός** Aristophanes (ca. 451–388) is the primary referent (see also
 19c2), and his *Clouds* (423) has just been alluded to at 18b7. Other comic
 poets, however, like Ameipsias (*Connus*, 423) and Eupolis (*Colaces*, 421), had
 also written about Socrates. In addition, Aristophanes rewrote *Clouds* around
 417 and mentions Socrates in *Birds* (414) and *Frogs* (405) just a few years
 before the trial.
- ὅσοι δέ . . .** The first accusers turn out to be extremely numerous: the origi-
 nal slanderers (ὅσοι δέ), those “of you” whom they persuaded (οἱ αὐτοί, in
 the next line), and a third generation of slanderers persuaded by the second.
ἀνέπειθον *Impf. of repeated actions.*

- 5 ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι
οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογού-
μενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε
οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοῦς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς
e γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ
πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον
ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν
ὑστερον.

- 19 εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρη-
τέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ

ἀναβιβάσασθαι < ἀναβιβάζω bring into court
ἐνταυθοῖ to this place
ἐλέγξαι aor. act. infin. < ἐλέγχω examine, refute
ἀξιώσατε < ἀξιόω believe, think
ἄρτι just now
οἰήθητε aor. pass. imper. < οἴομαι think
εἶεν very well then
ἐξελέσθαι aor. mid. infin. < ἐξαιρέω remove

- 18d5 ἀναβιβάσασθαι Supply εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.
ἐλέγξαι The verb and its compounded form ἐξελέγχειν (cf. 17b2) suggest
both examination and refutation. They occur frequently in Plato's dialogues
to describe Socrates' characteristic style of conversation.
- 18d6 ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ "Practically like."
σκιαμαχεῖν "Fight in the dark," and therefore "randomly" (as at *Republic*
520c). The verb can also mean "shadowbox," that is, practice fighting moves
without a partner. The first sense predominates. Note the parallelism cre-
ated by the two genitive absolutes: ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου and
κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογομένου οὐδενός (18c7).
- 18d8 οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς οὖν often signals the return of the discussion to the main
point after a digression. Translate: "So, you also . . ."
- 18d9 γεγονέναι The perfect aspect is relevant. The first accusers began their
work in the past, and its effects continue into the present.
- 18e1 τοὺς πάλαι Supply κατηγορήσαντας.
- 18e2 καὶ γάρ "In fact."
- 18e3 τῶνδε τῶν ὑστερον That is, Meletus and his crew. Supply ἠκούσατε κατη-
γορούντων from the first part of the sentence: "In fact, you heard them
accusing [me] earlier and much longer than [you heard] these men [accusing
me] later."
- 18e5 ἀπολογητέον . . . ἐπιχειρητέον These neuter verbal adjectives, like the Latin
gerundive, express necessity: "there must be a defense . . . and an attempt."
- 19a1 ἐξελέσθαι "Remove the slander from you." ἐξ- governs ὑμῶν.

ἔσχετε ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγω χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν
 ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί,
 καὶ πλεόν τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἶόν ἐστιν. ὅμως 5
 τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ
 ἀπολογητέον.

ἔσχετε aor. act. indic. < ἔχω *acquired*
 ὅμως *all the same, nonetheless*
 λανθάνει < λανθάνω *escape the notice of*
 ἴτω 3rd person imper. < εἶμι *go*
 ὅπῃ *where, in what way*
 πειστέον neut. verbal adj. < πείθομαι (+ dat.) *one must obey*

- 19a2 **ταύτην** The antecedent is διαβολήν: “this one which.”
μὲν οὖν This combination asserts the strong emotional interest of the
 speaker, here affirmative (and ironic). Translate: “I would *really* like . . .”
- 19a4 **πλεόν τί . . . ποιῆσαι** “Succeed,” literally, “do something more,” an exam-
 ple of rhetorical understatement (litotes). The infinitive is dependent on
 βουλοίμην.
- 19a5 **οὐ πάνυ λανθάνει οἶόν ἐστιν** Technically, the subject of λανθάνει is οἶόν
 ἐστιν, but the idiom does not translate literally into English. Try instead: “It
 doesn’t really escape me how it is.”
- 19a6 **τῷ θεῷ** No specific divinity is intended. The remark, coupled with a simi-
 lar statement at 35d7–8, works to undermine further the charges of atheism
 without committing Socrates to a very specific statement of belief.

CHAPTER 3

(19a7–d7)

Socrates defends himself against the old accusers' charge of being interested in science. The search for the causes of natural phenomena was considered suspect by many cultural conservatives in fifth-century Athens, inasmuch as such investigations sought to offer mechanical explanations for things that heretofore had been left to religion and mythology. As will become clear later in the speech, Socrates only had a very minimal interest in such speculations, preferring to concentrate on problems of self-knowledge.

Nonetheless, to many, Socrates' consistent questioning of all received notions seemed as corrosive to traditional morality as the natural philosophers' attempt to substitute rational causes for the explanations offered by poetry, religion, and myth. This critical approach to tradition was the basis, at least in part, of the charge that Socrates had corrupted the youth. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 3.

Ἄναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς
 b ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἧ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγρά-

ἀπολογητέον neut. verbal adj. < ἀπολογέομαι *one must make a defense*
ἀναλάβωμεν aor. act. subj. < ἀναλαμβάνω *resume*
ἐγράψατο < γράφω (mid.) *indict*

19b1 ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή The possessive adjective has the force of the objective genitive: "the slander against me."
 ἧ The antecedent is διαβολή. Socrates assumes that Meletus and his cronies would not dare bring him to trial without the implicit support of the older accusers, an impression strengthened by δὴ, which emphasizes

ψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον
οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀνωμοσίαν
δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· “Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται
ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω 5
ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτά ταῦτα διδάσκων.” τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν· c
ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδία,
Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν
καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε

ἀνωμοσίαν < ἀνωμοσία, -ας, ἡ formal charge, affidavit
ἀναγνῶναι aor. act. infin. < ἀναγνώσκω read
ἀδικεῖ < ἀδικέω do wrong
περιεργάζεται < περιεργάζομαι busy oneself
ἥττω (= ἥττονα) < ἥττων weaker
κρείττω (= κρείττονα) < κρείττων stronger
ἐωρᾶτε < ὁράω see
φάσκοντα < φάσκω assert

the relative. Meletus is said to have written the indictment on behalf of the poets Socrates has angered (23e). In the *Euthyphro* he is referred to as young and unknown, and this sense of his relative obscurity is echoed in the *Apology* (36a–b). In addition, see on 23e5–24a1.

ἐγράψατο γράφεσθαι takes an accusative of the charge and of the person charged.

- 19b2 τί δὴ λέγοντες “By saying what, precisely?” For the use of δὴ, see on 19b1.
- 19b3 ἀνωμοσίαν Literally, “the swearing against.” The formal charge was read aloud before the trial began. The thought here is compressed. The simplest approach is to take δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι both in the main clause and in the ὥσπερ-clause: “So it is necessary to read their (αὐτῶν) indictment just as [it is necessary to read] that of the prosecutors.”
- 19b5 ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποῖων See on 18c1. In *Clouds* Aristophanes had portrayed Socrates and his students as involved in both activities.
- 19c1 ἄλλους ταῦτά ταῦτα διδάσκων ταῦτά = τὰ αὐτά, “the same things.” διδάσκω takes a double accusative to indicate the recipient and the content of the lesson.
- 19c3 τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν “It’s something like this.” τοιαύτη agrees with ἀνωμοσία.
- 19c3 Σωκράτη τινὰ “Some Socrates.” Socrates distances himself from Aristophanes’ caricature of him in *Clouds*.
- 19c3 περιφερόμενον In *Clouds*, we first meet Socrates suspended in a basket so his thoughts can become as rarefied as the “middle air” that he proposes to study.
- 19c3 ἀεροβατεῖν Quoted from *Clouds* 225.
- 19c4 φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα Cognate accusative: “talk nonsense.”
ὧν The relative is governed by πέρι in the next line. The position of the accent on the first syllable indicates that the preposition follows its object (anastrophe). The word order is extremely disturbed here (hyperbaton).

- 5 μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίῳ. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω
τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός
ἐστίν—μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι—
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.
d μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτῶν ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ
ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε
ἀκηκόατε διαλεγόμενου—πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσιν—

ἐπαίῳ *understand*
ἀτιμάζων < ἀτιμάζω *treat with dishonor*
ἐπιστήμην < ἐπιστήμη, -ης, ἡ *knowledge*
ἀλλὰ γὰρ *but as a matter of fact*
μέτεστιν *have a share in*
μάρτυρας < μάρτυς, -υρος, ὁ *witness*
φράζειν < φράζω *point out*
διαλεγόμενου < διαλέγομαι *converse*

- 19c5 οὐχ . . . ἀτιμάζων In *Phaedo*, the dialogue where the death of Socrates is narrated, Socrates recalls that as a young man he was deeply interested in natural science and the structure of the cosmos, but that he later became disillusioned with it (96–97). In this passage, Socrates' appreciation of the sciences gives way to an ironic implication that these matters are unknowable (εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, etc.).
- 19c6 ἐπιστήμην The word is normally distinguished by Plato from δόξα, "opinion, belief." Here it is used ironically.
- 19c7 μή πως ἐγὼ . . . τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι Opt. of wish: "I hope I don't have to defend myself against such great charges."
- 19d2 διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν The logical order of the two events is inverted (hysteron proteron). The request that the jurors teach each other might look like a Socratic mannerism, but it is not. Compare this passage to Andocides' speech, *On the Mysteries* 46, where he, too, calls upon members of the jury to verify his version of events and to "teach" each other.
- 19d3 διαλεγόμενου On the most basic level, Socrates merely says that members of the jury have heard him in conversation. The end result of such conversations, as reported by Plato anyway, is often an exasperated ἀπορία, or perplexity, on the part of the interlocutor. The dialogues with politicians, poets, and craftsmen that Socrates summarizes a little later (21c5–22e6) seem definitely to have been of this sort. The recollection of these conversations would quickly disprove the charge that Socrates engaged in scientific speculations or taught rhetoric. Nonetheless, it is not clear that bringing to mind these conversations would have been effective in winning the jury over to Socrates' side.

φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ
 τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγόμενου, καὶ ἐκ 5
 τούτου γνῶσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ
 πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

19d4 **φράζετε** This extremely conversational sentence shifts its syntax midway through (anacolouthon). The original construction, based on ἀξιῶ + subject acc. and infin., breaks off in favor of the imperative.

19d6 **τοιαῦτ'** "Of such a sort," that is, "equally baseless" (Burnet 1924).

CHAPTER 4
(19d8–20c3)

Socrates answers the charge that he teaches for money, like the sophists. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 4.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδέ γ' εἷ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα
 e πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ
 καλὸν εἶναι, εἷ τις οἶός τ' εἶη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὡσπερ
 Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἴππίας ὁ

οἶός τ' εἶη (idiom.) *is able*

- 19d8 **τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν** “None of these things are [true].”
οὐδέ γε “Not even . . .”
- 19d9 **χρήματα πράττομαι** The Platonic dialogues highlight Socrates’ refusal to participate in the pursuit of wealth. Indeed, he is portrayed in the same light even in Aristophanes’ decidedly unfriendly portrait of him in *Clouds*. Elsewhere in the *Apology*, Socrates explicitly denies that he makes money by conversing with others (31c, 33b). Among some upper-class Athenians, there is a prejudice against working for another on the grounds that whoever does so is not really free (see Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.8). For such people, the accusation that Socrates took money for teaching would not sit well. In Plato’s *Apology*, the issue is different: the professed ignorance of Socrates means that there is nothing he is qualified to teach, and if he cannot teach, he certainly cannot teach for a fee. Moreover, as he later shows, even those who claim to have wisdom often do not, while the kind of self-knowledge Socrates has on offer cannot be reduced to a commodity. See on 20c1–3.
- 19e3–4 **Γοργίας . . . Πρόδικος . . . Ἴππίας** Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, Prodicus of the island of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis in the Peloponnese were famous sophists of the late fifth century (for more complete biographical information, see Nails 2002). They figure prominently in the Platonic dialogues. Gorgias is known to have visited Athens in 427 as an ambassador, and his visit is the dramatic occasion for Plato’s *Gorgias*, in which Socrates compares rhetoricians to flatterers and philosophers to doctors who prescribe a

Ἥλειος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν
 εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους—οἷς ἕξεισι τῶν ἑαυτῶν 5
 πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται—τούτους πείθουσι
 τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρή- 20
 ματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ
 ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα·
 ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς

προῖκα *for free*

συνεῖναι < σύνειμι *associate with*

χάριν προσειδέναι < χάριν πρόσσιδα (idiom.) *be grateful*

ἐνθάδε *here, now*

ἠσθόμην < αἰσθάνομαι *perceive*

ἐπιδημοῦντα < ἐπιδημέω *be residing*

ἔτυχον aor. act. indic. < τυγχάνω (+ part.) *happen to do something*

προσελθὼν aor. act. part. < προσέρχομαι *approach*

τετέλεκε pf. act. indic. < τελέω *spend*

σοφισταῖς < σοφιστής, -οῦ, -ὸ *sophist*

bitter medicine. Hippias appears prominently in two dialogues, *Hippias Major* and *Hippias Minor*. Both Prodicus and Hippias appear in the hilarious opening scene of *Protagoras*, which represents the house of Callias (see below) as virtually a camp for sophists.

- 19e4–20a2 **οἷός τ' ἐστὶν** This sentence is artfully constructed to mimic the organic, often ungrammatical quality of everyday speech and to suggest a contrast with the elaborate periods of the rhetorically trained speaker. We expect a complementary infinitive with οἷός τ' ἐστὶν, but the relative clause intervenes, and when Socrates returns to the main clause, he abandons the idiom and begins again with πείθουσι (agreeing in number with τούτων [e4] rather than ἕκαστος).
- 19e5 **οἷς ἕξεισι . . .** “who can associate for free with any fellow citizens they wish.”
- 19e6 **ᾧ** Dative following συνεῖναι. The second relative clause has been incorporated into the first (see trans. above).
- 19e6–a2 **συνεῖναι . . . προσειδέναι** Dependent on πείθουσι. Coordinate both with ἀπολιπόντας, the aorist participle here expressing prior time.
- 20a1 **ἐκείνων** That is, of their fellow citizens (obj. gen. with τὰς . . . συνουσίας).
σφίσιν Indirect reflexive, occurring in a subordinate clause and referring back to the subject of the sentence (i.e., to Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus).
- 20a2 **ἐπεὶ** Another elliptical use of ἐπεὶ. Translate “As a consequence.”
Πάριος Adj. Paros is an island in the northern Aegean Sea.

- 5 πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἔστων γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱεῖ— “ὦ Καλλία,” ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, “εἰ μὲν σου τῶ υἱεῖ πάλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθῶσασθαι ὅς

πλείω = πλείονα < πλέων more
 σύμπαντες < σύμπασι, -παν all
 ἀνηρόμην aor. mid. indic. < ἀνέρομαι ask
 υἱεῖ (nom. dual) < υἱός, -οῦ, ὁ son
 ἦν δ’ ἐγώ (idiom.) I said
 πάλω (nom. dual) < πῶλος, -ου, ὁ colt
 μόσχῳ < μόσχος, -ου, ὁ calf
 εἴχομεν < ἔχω (+ infin.) be able to
 ἐπιστάτην < ἐπιστάτης, -ου, ὁ overseer
 μισθῶσασθαι aor. mid. infin. < μισθῶ hire

- 20a5 **Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου** Callias was an Athenian nobleman from a distinguished family with an interest in intellectual matters, fabulous wealth, and a tendency toward self-indulgence. Plato’s *Protagoras* is set at Callias’s house, as is Xenophon’s *Symposium*. The education of his sons may have been a standard theme in Socratic literature, since the absence of a need to economize would have allowed the subject to be treated in the abstract. In addition to Plato’s use of the topic here, the lesser-known Socratic writer Aeschines of Sphettios wrote a dialogue (*Aspasia*) in which Socrates advised Callias to send his sons to Aspasia, the former mistress of Pericles, for their education. Callias was a fellow demesman of Socrates and related to Plato by marriage.

Socrates here poses a set of questions to Callias about his sons’ education. This is the first specimen in the *Apology* of the style of conversation for which Socrates was known. It has several features paralleled frequently elsewhere in the dialogues: the examination of someone who claims a certain expertise; argument from analogy; and the use of humble metaphors to discuss lofty matters.

- 20a6 **ἔστων** 3rd sg. pres. dual < εἶμι.
 20a7 **τῶ υἱεῖ** Dual nom. of the masc. def. art. and υἱός. Note that the same endings appear below with πάλω and μόσχῳ. Not much is known of the sons. One was named Protarchus and appears prominently in Plato’s *Philebus*.
ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν A mixed counterfactual condition. The aorist (middle dual) in the protasis suggests that we translate the verb as “had been born” rather than “were.”
 20a8 **αὐτοῖν** Dual dat. < αὐτός “For the two of them.”
ὅς ἐμελλεν “Who was going to . . .,” that is, “whose job it would be to . . .”

ἔμελλεν αὐτὸ καλῶ τε κάγαθὸ ποιήσῃσιν τὴν προσήκουσαν **b**
 ἀρετὴν, ἣν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵπικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν·
 νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις
 ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης
 τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι **5**
 διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑέων κτῆσιν. ἔστιν τις,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “ἢ οὐ;”
 “Πάνυ γε,” ἢ δ' ὅς. “Τίς,” ἣν δ' ἐγώ, “καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ
 πόσου διδάσκει;” “Εὐῆνος,” ἔφη, “ὃ Σώκρατες, Πάριος,

ἵπικῶν < ἵπικός, -ή, -όν *equestrian*
 γεωργικῶν < γεωργικός, -ή, -όν *agricultural*
 νῶ < νοῦς, νοῦ, ὁ *mind*
 ἀνθρωπίνης < ἀνθρωπίνος, -η, -ον *human, attainable by a person*
 πολιτικῆς < πολιτικός, -ή, -όν *of a citizen*
 ἐσκέφθαι pf. mid. infin. < σκέπτομαι *examine, consider*
 κτῆσιν < κτήσις, -εως, ἡ *possession*
 ποδαπός *from where*

20b1 **καλῶ τε κάγαθῶ** Predicate adjectives, agreeing with πῶλῳ (“colt”) and μόσχῳ (“calf”). The crasis in καλὸς κάγαθός (also present in the abstract noun καλοκάγαθία, the verb καλοκάγαθέω, etc.) suggests that the phrase had become a slogan to describe members of the aristocracy. It cannot have been common to apply the phrase to farm animals, and it was just this sort of undignified comparison that infuriated some aristocratic interlocutors of Socrates. At *Gorgias* 494d1, for example, Callicles tellingly accuses Socrates of being a “mob-orator” (δημηγόρος). On Socrates’ use of homely metaphors, see Alcibiades in the *Symposium* 221d7–222a6.

τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν “With respect to their appropriate excellence,” that is, with respect to whatever qualities make a calf or a foal good.

20b2 **ἣν δ' ἂν** “He would be.” The clause is the apodosis of a present counterfactual condition (impf. + ἄν) without a protasis.

20b3 **νῦν δ'** “As it is . . .”

20b6 **ἔστιν τις** Note the accent: “Is there anyone . . .?”

20b7 **ἢ δ' ὅς** Idiomatic: “he said.” So also ἣν δ' ἐγώ in the next line.

20b8 **πόσου** Genitive of price, as in Callias’s answer below. Note the contrast between Socrates’ careful and complete use of connectives (τίς . . . καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου) and Callias’s response, which leaves them all out (asyndeton).

Εὐῆνος Euenus of Paros is best known as an elegiac poet. Some fragments have survived. He is represented in Plato’s *Phaedo* (60d) as being curious about Socrates’ decision to write poetry after his condemnation and in the *Phaedrus* (267a3) as the authority for certain rhetorical terms.

- πέντε μνῶν.” καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 c ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ
 γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμεν ἂν εἰ ἠπιστάμην
 ταῦτα· ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

ἐμακάρισα < μακαρίζω *bless, deem happy*
 ἐμμελῶς *properly, at a reasonable price*
 ἐκαλλυνόμεν < καλλύνω (mid.) *be proud*
 ἡβρυνόμεν < ἄβρυνω (mid.) *give oneself airs*

- 20b9 πέντε μνῶν The sum looks modest in comparison to those commanded by celebrity teachers such as Protagoras, who in the previous generation were said to have charged one hundred minas. Nevertheless, such a price would have made Evenus’s instruction beyond the range of all but the wealthy. In Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* (2.3), five minas is estimated to be the total value of all Socrates’ estate, a modest but not insignificant sum.
 ὡς ἀληθῶς That is, if he “truly” had the ability and did not just claim to have it. The qualification, of course, negates the amazement that Socrates claims to have felt.
- 29c1 ἔχοι The εἰ-clause is the protasis of a future-less-vivid condition, emphasizing the unlikely (to Socrates) possibility that Evenus could make good on his claims to teach. The general thought of the sentences (expressed ironically) is: “I was amazed, first at the idea that Evenus should have this skill [optative], and second, that he teaches it [indicative] so cheaply.”
 τέχνην This is an important word in the Platonic lexicon, with many nuances and complexities. One common translation is “craft.” It refers to an “art” or a “skill” that can be reduced to a method, as opposed to an open field of intellectual and ethical inquiry (cf. *Phaedrus* 274d–e). It is at times contrasted with ἐπιστήμη and σοφία (see Places 1964).
- 20c1–3 Socrates here speaks less of his own ignorance than of his conviction that ἀρετή cannot be reduced to a τέχνη capable of being transferred to another in exchange for money (Nightingale 1995, 50). Further, by explicitly denying that he has any such knowledge, he implicitly shows that he is not a sophist who sells his services to the highest bidder
- 20c2 γοῦν = γε οὖν, a common crasis. The combination calls attention to the justification for a statement that is only partly valid and is sometimes referred to as the “γοῦν of partial proof.”
 ἐκαλλυνόμεν . . . ἡβρυνόμεν ἂν . . . εἰ ἠπιστάμην The present counterfactual condition has two apodoses, both coming before the protasis.

CHAPTER 5
(20c4–21a8)

“If you are not a teacher, where then do these rumors come from?” Socrates begins the exposition of his practice by addressing this question. Here we find the famous story of Chaerephon’s trip to the Delphic oracle. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 5.

Ἵπολάβοι ἄν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· “Ἄλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοὶ αὐταὶ γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί

ὑπολάβοι aor. act. opt. < ὑπολαμβάνω *understand, suppose*
πρᾶγμα, -τος, τό *thing, matter*
πόθεν *from where*
περιττότερον < περιττός, -ή, -όν *extraordinary, remarkable*
πραγματευομένου < πραγματεύομαι *be busy, conduct oneself*
ἄλλοῖον < ἄλλοῖος, -α, -ον *of another sort, different*

- 20c5 τὸ σὸν . . . πρᾶγμα “What, then, is your business?” The position of τὸ σὸν is emphatic.
- 20c6 οὐ Governs the main verb, γέγονεν (c7).
δήπου = δή (“Certainly”) + που (“I suppose”). The move from certainty to doubt in the word makes it natural in ironic or incredulous questions, as here.
τῶν ἄλλων Genitive of comparison after οὐδὲν . . . περιττότερον, which is the object of the genitive absolute σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου. The speaker implies that “Where there’s smoke, there’s fire”: it is probably not by chance that Socrates has this reputation.
- 20c8 εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες The protasis of a present counterfactual condition and equivalent in meaning to the genitive absolute above. The apodosis has to be inferred from the question in 20c5–6.

- d ἔστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.” ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ’ ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν
5 ὑμῶν παίζειν· εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποῖαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὔτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἄν, οὐς ἄρτι

αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν pres. act. subj. < αὐτοσχεδιάζω *judge carelessly*
πειράσομαι < πειράομαι *try, attempt*
ἀποδείξαι aor. act. infin. < ἀποδείκνυμι *show, demonstrate*
παίζειν < παίζω *play*
ἐρῶ fut. indic. < λέγω *say*
σοφίαν < σοφία *wisdom*
ἔσχηκα pf. act. indic. < ἔχω *have*
κινδυνεύω (+ inf.) *run the risk of, be likely to*
ταχ’ < ταχα *perhaps, possibly*

- 20d1 **ταυτί** The deictic iota added to ταῦτα strengthens it. Note the alliteration δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων.
- 20d2 **κἀγὼ** = καὶ ἐγὼ
- 20d4 **δὴ** This usage is colloquial with imperatives for emphasis: “So listen!”
καὶ . . . μὲν introduces a new point. Note the absence of a corresponding δέ. He begins as if he were going to say, “I may seem to be joking [μὲν], but [δέ] I am not.” Instead, he substitutes the imperative ἴστε for the δέ-clause and drives ahead.
- 20d6 **ἀλλ’** = ἄλλο
- 20d7 **σοφίαν** Socrates is σοφός because he is wise, not because he is a σοφιστής.
ποῖαν δὴ The δὴ makes the ποῖαν (the antecedent is σοφία) more specific: “Precisely what kind of . . . ?” ποῖαν anticipates ἥπερ in the next line: “The very kind which . . .”
- 20d8 **ἀνθρωπίνη** A split between human and divine wisdom is assumed in most Greek literature. Here the distinction reveals an important ironic dimension. As Socrates will go on to say, the only real wisdom belongs to the god, and human wisdom will consist of recognizing this limitation (i.e., “this ignorance”).
- 20d9 **ταύτην** Accusative of respect, referring to σοφία.
- 20d9–e1 **οὔτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἄν . . . σοφοὶ εἴεν** οὔτοι refers to the teachers of rhetoric just discussed (ἄρτι, see 20b9–c1). The unnatural word order (hyperbaton) is extreme, with subject οὔτοι and predicate σοφοὶ separated by twelve words. By pointing ironically to the fact that the wisdom the sophists lay claim to is superhuman (i.e., inaccessible to men), Socrates suggests that what they claim to teach is not wisdom at all. Thus Socrates’ modest claim to possess merely human wisdom turns out to be a boast of sorts, since his wisdom is real even if limited. δέ is strongly adversative here, even without μὲν: “But those men I just mentioned . . .”

ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ e
 οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ'
 ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ
 μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι
 ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, 5
 ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ
 ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν σοφία καὶ οἶα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι

ἀξιόχρεων < ἀξιόχρεως *responsible, trustworthy*
 ἀνοίσω fut. act. indic. < ἀναφέρω *refer*

- 20e1 μείζω (= μείζονα) Acc. of respect, agreeing with τινὰ . . . σοφίαν.
 20e2 ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω Translate: "Or I don't know how to express it." λέγω is
 deliberative subjunctive.
 δὴ "Certainly."
 ἔγωγε "I, in any case . . ."
 20e3 φησὶ Supply τοῦτο.
 ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ "To slander me."
 20e4 θορυβήσητε μή + aorist subjunctive in prohibitions. The imagined reac-
 tions of Socrates' audience are a centerpiece of Plato's dramatic recreation.
 Athenian trials are likely to have been boisterous affairs, anyway. The court-
 rooms were probably open air and surrounded only by low walls, except on
 the side of the entrance, where admission was restricted. Consequently, in
 addition to the jurors, bystanders were often present. Other orators make
 reference to this fact (see, for example, Demosthenes *On the Crown*, 196).
 τι . . . μέγα λέγειν "Boast."
 20e5-6 οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν . . . ἀνοίσω More colloquially: "The story I will tell is not my
 own, but the source is reliable."
 20e6 ἀξιόχρεων Masc. sg. acc., agreeing with τὸν λέγοντα in predicative position.
 τῆς ἐμῆς Supply σοφίας. The genitives are dependent on μάρτυρα.
 20e7 εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν σοφία καὶ οἶα "If, really, there is anything to it at all."
 παρέξομαι The verb takes two accusatives here ("supply the god as a
 witness").

- τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος
 21 ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε
 καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε.
 καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅτι ὀρμήσειεν.
 5 καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύ-
 σασθαι—καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες—ἤρετο γὰρ

ἐκ νέου *from youth*

συνέφυγε aor. act. indic. < συμφεύγω *flee along with*

κατήλθε aor. act. indic. < κατέρχομαι *return, come back*

σφοδρὸς, -ά, -όν *passionate, enthusiastic*

ὀρμήσειεν aor. act. opt. < ὀρμάω *rush into, undertake*

ἐτόλμησε < τολμάω *dare*

μαντεύσασθαι < μαντεύομαι *ask the oracle*

ἤρετο impf. indic. < ἔρομαι *ask*

20e8 Δελφοῖς Apollo's shrine in Delphi housed the Pythian priestess through whom he prophesied. People came from all over the Greek world and beyond to consult the oracle.

Χαιρεφῶντα (ca. 469–ca. 399) Apparently dead by the time of the trial, Chaerephon was well known as a great admirer and close friend of Socrates, as can be seen from references to the pair in comedy: for example, *Clouds* 104 (423 B.C.E.), and *Birds* 1553–64 (414 B.C.E.). In 404, with the Thirty in power (see introduction), he chose exile with the democratic faction and returned the next year when the democracy was restored (that Socrates did not join them may have seemed an act of disloyalty, despite his advanced age). Socrates thus assumes that the jurors will regard Chaerephon as one of their own and, therefore, worthy of trust. Xenophon also mentions Chaerephon's trip to the oracle in his *Apology*, but he reports a slightly different response from Apollo (14).

ἴστε που "I think you know . . ." που is common where speakers pretend to be unsure of the facts at hand.

21a1 ἐταῖρος In the first instance, the word means "companion." The word also has a political sense of "partisan supporter," however, the sense in which it is to be understood in the second instance. πλῆθος is a euphemism for the democratic faction opposed to the actions of the aristocratic clubs (ἐταπρείαι) from which the oligarchs drew support. See on 36b8.

21a3 ἐφ' ὅτι τοῦτο, the antecedent of the ὅ in ὅτι, has been incorporated into the relative clause: "how impetuous he was toward whatever . . ."

ὀρμήσειεν The optative here expresses a general occurrence in the past.

21a4 καὶ δὴ . . . καὶ "Moreover."

21a5 ὅπερ λέγω "With respect to the very thing I am saying." The present tense here suggests continuity in the sense of "keep saying." The precise reference, however, is to 20e4.

δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἶη σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσί μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

ἀνείλεν aor. act. indic. < ἀναιρέω (of an oracle) *respond*
μαρτυρήσει < μαρτυρέω *testify*
τετελεύτηκεν pf. act. indic. < τελευτάω *die*

- 21a6** The fact that Chaerephon thought to ask a question about the wisdom of Socrates shows that the tradition of Socrates as an ἀνὴρ σοφός (see, for example, 18b7) has a history outside of the *Apology*. This idea is corroborated by the language of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where the school of Socrates is referred to as a ψυχῶν σοφῶν . . . φροντιστήριον, a "thinkery of wise souls" (94). That Aristophanes' popular representation matches Chaerephon's "insider's view" is interesting, particularly considering the energy that Plato's Socrates expends in denying that he has any wisdom at all, at least as wisdom is popularly understood.
δὴ Emphasizes the γάρ.
εἶη The optative is common in indirect questions in secondary sequence. Translate: "was."
ἀνείλεν ἀναιρέειν This is the technical term for a reply from the Pythian priestess.
ἡ Πυθία The oracles of Apollo at Delphi were delivered by his priestess, the Pythia, so called from the cult title Apollo took on slaying the serpent that had previously held the site on which the shrine was built. They were then shaped into hexameter verse by the *prophetai* or resident interpreters.
- 21a8** **ἀδελφός . . . οὐτοσί** His name was Chaerecrates. The deictic iota implies that he is in the audience. Note how the postponement of οὐτοσί creates a sense of drama. If this incident was part of the actual trial, a statement by Chaerecrates might be read at this point to confirm Socrates' account.

CHAPTER 6

(21b1–e2)

Socrates claims to have been as puzzled as the jurors by this oracular statement, since he is convinced that he knows nothing. He thus sets out either to unravel its meaning or to disprove it by going about the city in quest of one wiser than himself. Wisdom, it will turn out, is not positive knowledge, in the sense of a τέχνη or the mastery of a set of facts, but self-knowledge. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 6.

- b Σκέψασθε δὴ ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδά-
 ξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας
 ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωςί· “Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε
 αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν σύνοιδα
 5 ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὧν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώ-

ὅθεν *from where*
 ἐνεθυμούμην *impf. < ἐνθυμέομαι consider*
 αἰνίττεται < αἰνίττομαι *speak in riddles*
 σύνοιδα *be aware*

- 21b1 ὧν ἔνεκα “Why.”
 21b3–4 ποτε . . . ποτε The parallelism is emphatic, followed up by an emotional γὰρ δὴ (a souped-up version of explanatory γὰρ), and climaxing with Socrates’ emphatic denial that he is wise.
 21b4 αἰνίττεται The tradition of riddling Delphic oracles was well established in Socrates’ time. The most famous is certainly the story of the Lydian king Croesus recounted in book one of the *Histories* of Herodotus. Already in the sixth century B.C.E., however, the pre-Socratic (and famously oracular) philosopher Heraclitus of Miletus had said of Apollo: οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει, “he neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign” (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1993, fr. 244).
 21b5 ὧν When forms of οἶδα introduce indirect statement, the main verb of the reported clause becomes a participle.

τατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.” καὶ πολλὸν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει· ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἴπερ που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ c χρησμῷ ὅτι “Οὔτοσι ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ’ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.” διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὄνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν,

ἠπόρουν < ἀπορέω *be at a loss*
 ζήτησιν < ζήτησις, -εως, -ῆ *investigation*
 ἐτραπόμην aor. mid. indic. < τρέπω *turn*
 ἀποφανῶν fut. act. part. < ἀποφαίνω *show, represent*
 χρησμῷ < χρησμός, -οῦ, ὁ *oracular reply*
 διασκοπῶν < διασκοπέω *examine, consider*

- 21b6** **θέμις** The noun is derived from τίθημι and glossed as “law” or “right,” but usually in the sense of something divinely ordained or “laid down.” The moral uprightness Socrates attributes to the gods is not consistent with their portrayal in Homer, Hesiod, and tragedy. The pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes of Colophon (sixth century B.C.E.) says: “Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is shame and reproach among men, stealing and committing adultery and deceiving each other” (Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1993, fr. 166). The fact that the gods themselves do not appear to agree on the nature of piety is also discussed in the *Euthyphro*, the dialogue that is set not long before the trial of Socrates (see introduction).
- 21b7** **πολλὸν χρόνον** Acc. of duration of time.
τί ποτε λέγει Note how the presence of the direct interrogative τί in place of ὅτι, together with the present tense λέγει, gives the impression that we are inside Socrates’ head as he ponders the meaning of the oracle.
- 21b8** **μόγις πάνυ** “With great difficulty.” “He would naturally shrink from the idea of proving the god a liar,” says Burnet, which is certainly the surface meaning of Socrates’ words. This sense is emphasized further by ζήτησιν . . . τοιαύτην τινὰ, where the vagueness of the expression suggests that the experience was so unusual for Socrates that he still does not really have words to describe it. Socrates’ *aporia* may have been genuine. Still, some audience members might have suspected that these expressions of confusion were feigned. The oracle as reported in Xenophon is a good deal less cryptic.
αὐτοῦ That is, Apollo.
- 21b9** **ἦλθον** Socrates’ dramatic rendering of his investigation begins abruptly, without conjunctions or particles.
δοκούντων “Reputed to be.” The distinction between appearance (δοκεῖν) and reality (εἶναι) is fundamental to the *Apology* and to the Platonic dialogues in general (see, for example, 21c6–7).
ὡς The future participle with ὡς is commonly used to indicate purpose.
- 21c3** **τοῦτον** The pronoun refers back to τινὰ (21b9). Why does Socrates not give the man’s name? Burnet thought that the line referred directly to Anytus, who is represented as having a testy exchange with Socrates in Plato’s *Meno*. There is no direct evidence for this claim, however.

- ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι
 5 ἔπαθον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ—ἔδοξε
 μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ· κᾶπειτα ἐπειρώ-
 μην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὐ.
 d ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων·
 πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν
 οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν
 5 οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα,

πολιτικῶν < πολιτικός, -ή, -όν *statesman*
 ἐπειρώμην impf. < πειράω *try*
 ἐντεῦθεν *from there*
 ἀπηχθόμην aor. mid. indic. < ἀπεχθάνομαι *become hated*
 ἀπιὼν part. < ἄπειμι *go away*
 ἐλογιζόμην impf. < λογίζομαι *reckon*
 εἰδώς part. < οἶδα *know*

- 21c4 σκοπῶν “In the course of my investigation.”
 τοιοῦτόν τι “A certain kind of thing.”
 21c5 διαλεγόμενος . . . ἔδοξε The syntax of Plato’s sentences frequently recreate
 oral mannerisms (see on 19e4–20a2). Here Socrates abandons the nominative,
 on the basis of which we should expect a verb in the first-person singular,
 and shifts the syntax mid-sentence (anacolouthon) to impersonal ἔδοξε.
 21c6–7 δοκεῖν μὲν . . . εἶναι δ' οὐ As mentioned above, it is difficult to overstate the
 importance of the contrast between seeming and being for Plato in general
 and for the *Apology* in particular. It is an idea that clearly sets him apart from
 those in the conformist mainstream, for whom appearance (“seeming”) is
 enough. Note the striking effect of the laconic δέ-phrase.
 21c7 ἐπειρώμην As Socrates will imply later, inadvertent ignorance is no crime,
 and the person corrected should naturally be grateful for the assistance.
 That the unnamed politician grew angry instead is shameful, if not particu-
 larly surprising.
 21c8 οἶοιτο . . . εἴη In indirect statement after ὅτι, verbs usually appear in the
 optative (as here) if they are introduced by a verb of saying, showing, and
 so forth in a past tense (ἐπειρώμην . . . δεικνύναι).
 21d2 δ' οὖν “And so.”
 ἀπιὼν “As I left.”
 21d4 καλὸν κἀγαθὸν Neuter. It goes without saying that anyone in fifth-century
 Athens who regarded himself as καλὸς κἀγαθός felt that his actions were
 similarly noble. Socrates’ most revolutionary act may have been to insist on
 evaluating the individual on the basis of his *deeds* rather than on the basis
 of wealth or inherited status.
 21d5 εἰδώς The participle is concessive.

οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ
 σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν
 ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι καί
 μοι ταῦτά ταῦτα ἔδοξε, καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις e
 πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

ἔοικα *I am likely*
 ἦα 1st sg. impf. < εἶμι go

- 21d6** γοῦν = γε οὖν “So, to that extent . . .”
 τούτου That is, the politician.
 σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ “By just this one small thing.” Dat. of degree of
 difference.
- 21d7** ἂ The antecedent of ἂ is an unexpressed ταῦτα that would be the object of
 εἰδέναι: “that what I don’t know I don’t think I know.”
- 21e1** κάκείνῳ (= καὶ ἐκείνῳ) The demonstratives are a little confusing here.
 ἐκείνου (d8) refers to the first of the politicians Socrates visited, ἐκείνῳ (e1)
 to the second politician.

CHAPTER 7
(21e3–22c9)

Socrates continues his examination of the oracle by speaking with the poets. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 7.

- Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ
 5 λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον
 οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι
 22 δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—
 δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθῆ λέγειν—ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι
 τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου

ἐφεξῆς *successively*
 αἰσθανόμενος < αἰσθάνομαι *perceive*
 λυπούμενος < λυπέω *cause pain, grief*
 δεδιώς < δεῖδω *fear*
 ἀναγκαῖον < ἀναγκαῖος, -η, -ον *necessary*
 ἰτέον neut. verbal adj. (impers.) < εἶμι *it is necessary to go*
 εὐδοκιμοῦντες < εὐδοκιμέω *seem good*

- 21e5 τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ Apollo's oracle (obj. of ποιείσθαι).
 περὶ πλείστου ποιείσθαι "Take very seriously."
 ἰτέον Supply μοι, agreeing with σκοποῦντι: "So I had to go investigate . . ."
 Note how Socrates emphasizes divine necessity over his own volition.
- 22e6 τι Obj. of εἰδέναι.
- 22a1 νῆ τὸν κύνα "Yes, by the dog!" This is a characteristic oath of Socrates, who also swears by the gods. However, it is not unique to him. The scholia on the *Apology* preserve a fragment from a comedy of Cratinus (fr. 249) in which a speaker refers to those who swear by the dog and the goose but not by the gods (see also Aristophanes *Wasps*, 83).
- 22a2 ἦ μὴν "Very truly."
- 22a3 μάλιστα The adverb is in the attributive position, modifying οἱ . . . εὐδοκιμοῦντες.
 ὀλίγου δεῖν "Almost," an idiomatic use of the absolute infinitive (Smyth 1956, 2012).

δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν,
 ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες 5
 πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην
 ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀν-
 ἔλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦα

πλάνην < πλάνη, -ης, ἢ *wandering*
 πονοῦντος < πονέω *work hard*
 ἀνέλεγκτος, -ον *thoroughly tested*

- 22a4 **τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς** “Most deficient” (lit., “lacking the most”). For Socrates, the world is upside down.
μοι . . . ζητοῦντι Note how the entire phrase is bracketed by the two datives.
κατὰ τὸν θεόν The evident simplicity of the expression obscures Socrates’ more controversial claim. Apollo did not *command* anything at all. He made a statement about Socrates’ wisdom that the latter decided to interpret in a certain way. ζητεῖν κατὰ τὸν θεόν is only an accurate description of Socrates’ activities if one accepts his less-than-straightforward interpretation of the oracle. Note also the imagery of philosophy as a pursuit rather than as a body of doctrine (see also on 21b8).
- 22a5 **ἐπιεικέστεροι** “More suitable,” the predicate of ἄλλοι: “and other men appearing more worthless (φαυλότεροι) appeared *more suitable* in regards to intelligent thought (τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν).” Note the effect created by placing side by side the antonyms φαυλότεροι and ἐπιεικέστεροι. Socrates here redefines terms commonly used in a social or class context in terms of moral and intellectual virtue.
- 22a6 **δὴ** The particle emphasizes δεῖ. Its effect is intensified by the fact that the two words are homonyms.
- 22a6–7 **πλάνην . . . πόνους . . . πονοῦντος** Socrates casts himself as a latter-day Heracles, whose labors are commonly described in Greek literature as πόνοι. Note the alliteration. The comparison to Heracles is important for the way that Socrates presents his quest. He could, after all, quit here, having asserted that in his experience, those with the best reputation for wisdom were frequently found wanting. By styling himself a Heracles, however, a single encounter will not be enough, and instead he presents his experience as a *series* of labors: politicians, poets (the traditional source of didactic moral reflection), and craftsmen (a group likely to have been well represented on the jury due to the proximity of their jobs in the agora to the court). The result of this series is that the critique of the politicians, traditional targets of invective in comedy and elsewhere, expands to include the entire city. Socrates will come back to this topic later in a famous metaphor in which he compares himself to a stinging fly that keeps a noble but lazy horse (Athens) from dozing its life away (30e).
- 22a7 **ἐπιδείξαι** Literally, “display,” but the verb and the related noun ἐπιδείξις are common for describing oratorical performances.
- 22a8 **ἀνέλεγκτος** Socrates’ mission, as he represents it, was undertaken to vindicate the words of Apollo, however implausible they seemed to him.

- b ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν,

καταληψόμενος < καταλαμβάνω *find, understand*

ἀμαθέστερον comp. < ἀμαθής, -ές *ignorant*

πεπραγματεῦσθαι pf. mid. infin. < πραγματεύομαι *work over*

διηρώτων impf. act. < διερωτάω *interrogate*

- 22a9 **τοὺς ποιητὰς** It is no longer conventional to assume a connection between poetry and wisdom. To an ancient audience, however, the association was very close, since poetry claimed its inspiration from the Muses, themselves the daughters of Zeus (see *Theogony* 22–34 for Hesiod’s description of his encounter with them). Both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* begin by asking the Muse to provide information about the subjects of their songs. Poetry’s divine origin allowed poets to claim that their songs were “true,” despite the fact that their subjects were set in distant times and places. From there it was a short step to the claim that poetry is the source of wisdom itself. For an amusing critique of the claim that poetry is knowledge, see Plato’s *Ion*, a conversation between Socrates and Ion. The latter is a genial but somewhat self-important rhapsode (professional reciter of Homeric poetry).
- τραγωδιῶν** The Greater Dionysia and the Lenaea, where tragedy was performed, were state-sponsored, communal, and highly ritualized events. Tragedy was thus not only an entertainment, but an important part of how the city represented itself, both to its own citizens and to the inhabitants of other Greek cities attending the festival.
- 22b1 **διθυράμβων** The dithyramb was a type of poetry, traditionally associated with Dionysus, that treated mythological themes. It was performed at civic festivals by choruses of boys or men.
- τοὺς ἄλλους** That is, writers of comedies, elegies, lyrics, and so forth.
- ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ** “Red-handed.” Note ὡς + fut. part. to indicate the *purpose* of Socrates’ visit. For φῶρ, “thief,” compare the Latin cognate *fur*.
- 22b2 **ἐκείνων** Genitive of comparison.
- 22b3 **ποιήματα** Socrates chooses a very neutral word here. ποιήματα (noun < ποιέω) simply identifies the poem as something created by artifice. By choosing it in place of words such as ᾠδὴ or αἰοιδή “song” (< αἰέδω, “sing”), which are associated with inspired song (cf. *Iliad* 1.1), Socrates tacitly undermines the claim that poetry has access to revealed wisdom. At 23c2, he will concede its divine origin but suggest that the poet, like the prophet, channels the word of the gods without understanding it.
- 22b4 **αὐτοῖς** A dative of agent is common with verbs in the perfect passive (πεπραγματεῦσθαι).
- διηρώτων ἂν** The imperfect + ἂν is used to express habitual action in the past.
- λέγοιεν** The optative appears frequently in indirect questions introduced by a verb in a past tense. Note that λέγω here means “mean.”

ἴν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν 5
 ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ᾧ ἄνδρες, τάληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος
 γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον
 ἔλεγον περὶ ᾧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν αὖ καὶ
 περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν
 ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ c
 θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοφοδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν

αἰσχύνομαι < αἰσχύνω *shame*
ῥητέον neut. verbal adj. *it must be said*
ἐπεποιήκεσαν 3rd pl. pluperf. act. < ποιέω *make*

- 22b6 **τάληθῆ** = τὰ ἀληθῆ. The object is dramatically postponed until the final position in the sentence.
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν See on 17a4.
- 22b7 **αὐτῶν** Gen. of comparison with βέλτιον.
οἱ παρόντες That is, at that time, not the present audience.
ἂν . . . ἔλεγον Past tenses of the indicative + ἂν can be used to indicate probability in the past: “[they] would probably speak . . .”
- 22b8 **αὐτοὶ** Like αὐτῶν above, referring to the poets.
ἐπεποιήκεσαν For poets as “makers,” see on 22b3.
αὖ καί “In turn also.” Socrates connects this experience with what he found to be the case with the politicians, then he goes on to distinguish the two by means of the ὅτι-clause.
- 22b9 **ἐν ὀλίῳ** Supply χρόνῳ.
σοφία Traditionally, σοφία was an attribute of poets, so Socrates makes a radical suggestion in denying it to them.
ποιοῖεν Optative in indirect speech after a past-tense verb.
- 22c1 **φύσει** “Inborn capacity, nature.” Here the word is understood in opposition to τέχνη and σοφία and locates the source of an ability for which the possessor cannot (and does not need to) give a rational explanation. If the composition of poetry is irrational, it is not surprising that the poets cannot give a coherent account of their work.
ἐνθουσιάζοντες The participle is related to ἐνθεος, literally “having a god inside,” and is used to describe both poetic inspiration and divine possession. Socrates’ treatment of the poets recalls that of the politicians; nonetheless, the participle, however ironic, betrays a certain respect for their work. The poets may not know what they are doing and so fall short of philosophy, but they are in some sense touched by the divine.
- 22c2 **θεομάντεις . . . χρησμοφοδοί** A θεομάντις is someone possessed by a god, which can be good or bad. A χρησμοφός receives, and possibly promulgates, the oracles of a god. They are also mentioned together in Plato’s *Meno* (99c), where Socrates cites them as examples of people who act without φρόνησις (“good judgment”) in language that is strongly reminiscent of the *Apology*.

- πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν
 τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες, καὶ
 5 ἅμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα
 σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ
 ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν
 πολιτικῶν.

ποίησιν < ποίησις, -εως, ἡ *activity of creating poetry*
ἀπῆα 1st sg. impf. < ἀπείμι *go away*
περιγεγονέναι pf. act. infin. < περιγίγνομαι *be superior to*

- 22c3 **πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ** = πολλὰ καλὰ, an example of *hendiadys*, a common rhetorical figure by which one idea is expressed through two.
ὧν The relative is attracted into the case of the implied antecedent τούτων.
τοιοῦτόν τι . . . πάθος "A similar experience."
 22c5–6 The key syntactic units of the sentence are: ἡσθόμην . . . οἰομένων . . . εἶναι. The basic grammatical principles are as follows: (1) verbs of perception typically have their objects in the genitive; (2) verbs of knowing, learning, and perceiving often use a participle to express indirect statement; and (3) οἶμαι uses a subject-accusative + infinitive construction to express indirect statement. Principles (1) and (2) explain the form of οἰομένων; (3) accounts for εἶναι.
 22c5 **καὶ τᾶλλα** "Also in respect to other things." τᾶλλα (= τὰ ἄλλα) is the antecedent of ἃ (also an accusative of respect) below.
 22c6 **σοφωτάτων** Predicate of οἰομένων.
 22c7 **τῷ αὐτῷ** "The same thing"; that is, by recognizing that I was not wise.
περιγεγονέναι Verbs that express superiority and inferiority typically take a genitive of comparison as their object. Here περιγεγονέναι goes with both the main clause and the relative clause, but only its genitive complement in the relative clause, is expressed (τῶν πολιτικῶν). For the main clause, supply τῶν ποιητῶν.

CHAPTER 8

(22c9–e5)

After being disappointed with the poets, Socrates goes to the craftsmen (*χειροτέχναι*), who, while certainly in possession of a *τέχνη*, irrationally use that expertise to claim a more general wisdom. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 8.

Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνους ἦα· ἐμαντῶ γὰρ
 συνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη **d**
 ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους, καὶ τούτου
 μὲν οὐκ ἐνύσθη, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην
 καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 ταῦτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ **5**

τελευτῶν < τελευτάω *come to an end*
συνήδη 3rd sg. impf. < συνοῖδα *be conscious, aware*
ἀμάρτημα, -τος, τό *error*

- 22c9** **τελευτῶν** “Finally.” The participle of *τελευτάω* sometimes functions adverbially, as here.
- 22d1** **συνήδη** When the subject of the participle is the same as the subject of the main verb, the participle can agree either with the subject (cf. 21b) *or* with the complement (as here).
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν The phrase emphasizes οὐδέν: “nothing, to put it in a word.”
τούτους Object of εὐρήσοιμι. The position is emphatic.
δέ γ' The combination is strongly adversative.
- 22d3** **ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην** Socrates’ claims about his ignorance of the crafts should probably be taken with some caution. Ancient tradition has Socrates following the craft of his father, Sophroniscus, who was said to be a stone-cutter. Socrates himself, in *Theaetetus*, refers to his mother, Phaenarete, as a midwife (149a), and he claims to have taken after her (metaphorically) by helping to give birth to the wisdom of others. For the ancient sources on the biography of Socrates, see Nails 2002, 263–69.

- οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι—καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν
- e ἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστε με ἑμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἂ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἑμαυτῷ
- 5 καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

δημιουργοί < δημιουργός, -οῦ, ὁ *craftsman*
 ἡξίου 3rd sg. impf. act. < ἄξιόω *believe, judge*
 πλημμέλεια, -ας, ἢ *error*
 ἀποκρύπτειν < ἀποκρύπτω *conceal something (acc.) from someone (acc.)*
 ὑπὲρ (+ gen.) *on behalf of*
 πότερα . . . ἢ *whether . . . or*
 δεξαίμην aor. opt. mid. < δέχομαι *take*
 λυσιτελοῖ pres. opt. < λυσιτελέω *be beneficial*

- 22d6 ἀγαθοί The distinction is puzzling, since distinctions in ability have played no role in Socrates' story to this point.
 διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι The articular infinitive is the object of the preposition: "by performing their art well."
- 22d7 τὰ μέγιστα That is, all the big questions about politics, ethics, and metaphysics, as opposed to the limited (and perhaps trivial) wisdom they possessed about their craft.
- 22d8 ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν "That wisdom they *did* have."
- 22e1 ἀποκρύπτειν Traditionally, there are two ways of construing this passage: (1) understand the infinitive as dependent on ἔδοξαν (d5), or (2) read ἀπέκρυπτεν, as the text appears in several manuscripts.
- 22e3 σοφίαν . . . ἀμαθίαν Accusatives of respect. ἐκείνων goes with both.
 ἀμφοτέρα That is, "both" their (limited) wisdom and their (appalling) ignorance.
- 22e4 ἔχειν Parallel with the ἔχειν at 22e2, dependent on δεξαίμην ἂν.

CHAPTER 9

(22e6–23c1)

These examinations explain how Socrates' reputation for wisdom, as well as the enmity against him, arose. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 9.

Ἐκ ταυτησί δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθεται μοι γέγονασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται 23
 καὶ βαρύτεραι, ὅστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι,
 ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι· οἴονται γάρ με
 ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἄν ἄλλον
 ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς 5
 εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ

ἐξετάσεως < ἐξέτασις, -εως, ἡ *close examination, scrutiny*

ἀπέχθεται < ἀπέχθεια, -ας, ἡ *enmity, hatred*

βαρύτεραι super. < βαρύς, -εῖα, -ύ *heavy, onerous*

ἐκάστοτε *each time*

- 22e6** **δὴ** δὴ of identity: “precisely this.” The particle is made more emphatic by the deictic iota on ταυτησί.
- 23a1** **μὲν** The particle stands in isolation (it is unrelated to the δέ at 23a3). It sets up the expectation of a δέ-clause, but the ὅστε-clause intervenes and the anticipated μὲν . . . δέ construction does not emerge.
- 23a3** **σοφὸς εἶναι** Note the case of σοφός. Names frequently are reported in the nominative (with a redundant εἶναι, on which see Smyth 1956, 1615). Burnett cites Aeschines’ speech *On the Embassy* (99), where he says of Demosthenes: προσεῖληφε τὴν τῶν πονηρῶν κοινὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, συκοφάντης (“He earned the generic name for worthless men—sychophant”). Here σοφός gets the same treatment.
- 23a3-4** **με . . . αὐτόν** “I myself” (in contrast to ἄλλον).
- 23a5** **τὸ δέ** “But in fact . . .” The τό is used as a weak demonstrative pronoun (lit.: “but with respect to this . . .”). Socrates now ventures a new interpretation of the oracle.

- ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεκρῆσθαι δὲ
- b τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὡσπερ ἂν <εἰ> εἶποι ὅτι “Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὡσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.” ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν
- 5 περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἂν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ

προσκεκρῆσθαι pf. mid. infin. < προσχράομαι use in addition
παράδειγμα, -τος, τό example, lesson
περιῶν < περιέμι go about
ἐρευνῶ < ἐρευνάω examine
ἀστῶν < ἀστός, -οῦ, ὁ townsman, citizen
ἐπειδὴν whenever
ἐνδείκνυμαι demonstrate

- 23a7 **ὀλίγου τινος . . . καὶ οὐδενός** Both terms are dependent on ἀξία. καὶ is used occasionally to express alternatives where we would expect ἢ (Deniston 1954, 292). Translate “even.”
- 23b1 **παράδειγμα ποιούμενος** The participial phrase explains in what sense Socrates meant προσκεκρῆσθαι τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι.
- 23b2 <εἰ> The brackets indicate that the editor feels the word needs to be added, despite the fact that it does not appear in any of the manuscripts. It was written in the margin of an early manuscript by an anonymous reader and included by Henri Etienne (Stephanus) in his early printed edition.
ὅτι Do not translate.
- 23b4 **τῇ ἀληθείᾳ** The noun is used adverbially.
ταῦτ’ οὖν = διὰ ταῦτα
ἔτι καὶ νῦν “Even still now.” In this sentence we get the full statement of what, for Plato’s Socrates, is the essential philosophical paradox: human wisdom deserving of the name consists in the recognition of human ignorance before the most important questions of human life.
- 23b5 **κατὰ τὸν θεόν** “According to the command of the god” (see on 22a4).
ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων Partitive genitives, depending on τινά.
- 23b6 **ἂν** = ἐάν
μὴ δοκῆ Supply σοφός εἶναι.
- 23b7–8 Socrates’ interpretation of the oracle completely shifts its original emphasis, with the result that his mission now takes on an evangelistic quality: everyone with any claim to wisdom, Socrates implies, needs to accept this conclusion about its limitations.

ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι
 σχολή γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν
 πενία μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. c

πενία < πενία, -ας, ἡ *poverty*
λατρείαν < λατρεία, -ας, ἡ *service*

- 23b8** **ἀσχολίας** The idea of leisure and its absence brings up the question of Socrates' vocation again. Note that by interpreting the oracle as a religious duty, he implicitly addresses the charge of atheism that Meletus will raise. Further, if assiduous service to the god produces ἀσχολία, it will leave no free time, or σχολή, for traditional adult male citizen activities such as politics and moneymaking. Finally, this particular idea of service inevitably puts Socrates in contact with wealthy youths, who, because of the position they occupy between childhood and adult life, have plenty of σχολή (23c3) to devote to Socratic conversation.
- τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως** "Any of the city's business." For Greeks, and in particular for Athenians, an individual was defined by his relationship to the polis. Socrates, in saying that he had accomplished nothing for the city, confesses to what many would have counted as a positive vice. The separation between public and private life, which we take for granted, was not generally admitted. For Athenian attitudes toward those who chose not to participate in public affairs, see on 31c5.
- 23b9** **ἄξιον λόγου** He will, however, mention a few examples of his civic behavior in the pages that follow.
- 23c1** **πενία μυρία** Xenophon (*Oeconomicus* 2.1–4) reports Socrates as saying that his property could be worth five minas. This would put him into the lowest of the property classes into which all Athenian citizens were enrolled, that of the *thetes*. This assessment does not accord with all of the evidence, however. In any event, he possessed sufficient wealth earlier in his life to outfit himself for service as a hoplite, and the fact that Socrates seems clearly to travel in the highest social circles may indicate that, despite his indisputable disdain for money, his family was well connected. Much of the evidence is collected by Nails (2002) in her entries for Socrates, Phaenarete (mother), Chaerodemus (stepfather), and Patrocles (half-brother).

CHAPTER 10

(23c2–24b3)

Over time resentment against Socrates increased, especially as his young companions began to imitate him and aggressively questioned their elders and those in positions of authority. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 10.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες—οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων—αὐτόματοι, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ
 5 πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα οἶμαι εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὐτοῖς,

ἐπακολουθοῦντες < ἐπακολουθέω *follow after*
πλουσιωτάτων super. < πλούσιος, -α, -ον *wealthy*
αὐτόματοι < αὐτόματος, -η, -ον *on one's own*
ἐξεταζομένων < ἐξετάζω *examine, scrutinize*
εἶτα *then, next*
ἐπιχειροῦσιν < ἐπιχειρέω *try*
ἀφθονίαν < ἀφθονία, -ας, ἡ *abundance*
εἰδόντων part. < οἶδα *know*
ὀργίζονται < ὀργίζομαι *grow angry*

- 23c5 **μιμοῦνται** It is clear that the motives of Socrates are different from those of the wealthy youths who “imitate” him, even if we think (reasonably) that his interpretation of the Delphic oracle is ironic and that he has chosen this vocation because *he* feels it is the best way to live. For the youths, Socratic testing is entertainment and an amusing form of rebellion against their elders. Socrates does not discount this motivation entirely (cf. ἀηδές 33c4).
- 23c6 **οἶμαι** Socrates’ words suggest that he is speculating, that is, that he has not witnessed these demonstrations personally.
- 23c7 **οἰομένων . . . εἰδόντων** The genitives are partitive and depend on ἀφθονίαν. **εἰδέναι τι** Here equivalent to “be wise,” as can be seen by the contrast with (εἰδόντων) ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν.
- 23c8 **αὐτοῖς** Note the rough breathing mark on the reflexive pronoun.

καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστὶ μιαρῶτατος καὶ δια- d
 φθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν
 καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν,
 ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσο-
 φούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι “τὰ μετέωρα καὶ 5
 τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς” καὶ “θεοὺς μὴ νομίζουσιν” καὶ “τὸν ἦττω
 λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.” τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ οἶομαι οὐκ ἂν
 ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιούμενοι
 μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν οἶμαι φιλότιμοι

μιαρῶτατος super. < μιαρός, -ά, -όν *impure, defiled*

διαφθείρει < διαφθείρω *corrupt, ruin*

ἀγνοοῦσιν < ἀγνοέω *be ignorant*

μετέωρα < μετέωρος, -α, -ον *midair, above the earth*

ἐθέλοιεν < ἐθέλω *wish*

κατάδηλοι < κατάδηλος, -ον *plain, obvious*

προσποιούμενοι < προσποιέω *claim, pretend*

ἅτε *since*

φιλότιμοι < φιλότιμος, -ον *ambitious*

- 23d1** **Σωκράτης τις** The words recall the accusation Socrates puts into the mouths of the “first accusers” (18b7).
- 23d2** **διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους** “Corrupts the youth.” This is the slander mentioned at 21b2. At the same time, Socrates implicitly argues that the charge is little more than a face-saving gesture on the part of those who resent having their ignorance exposed.
- 23d2-3** **ὅτι . . . ὅτι** In both cases the indirect interrogative is the object of the participle.
- 23d4** **δοκῶσιν** Here as elsewhere the difference between seeming and being is of crucial importance.
- 23d4-5** **τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα** “These stock charges against those practicing philosophy.” For a restatement of the charges, see 18b7-c4. It is important to note that the first time any form of the word *φιλοσοφία* is found in the *Apology*, it appears as a verb. For the idea of philosophy as something you do, see on 22a4.
- 23d8** **κατάδηλοι** The word is best translated here by an adverb such as “obviously.” It goes without saying that the statement is not calculated to win over anyone who has experienced this kind of treatment from Socrates or his imitators.
- 23d9** **εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν** This idea is stated in a less compressed form at 23c6-7. Note that the state of mind in such people is precisely the opposite of that of Socrates, who—although, like them, he knows nothing—nevertheless recognizes his ignorance.

- e ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ συντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὅσα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ

σφοδροὶ < σφοδρός, -ά, -όν *passionate*

συντεταμένως *vigorously*

ἐμπεπλήκασιν pf. act. indic. < ἐμπίπλημι *fill up*

ὅσα neut. acc., pl. < οὖς, ὠτός, τό *ear*

ἐπέθετο aor. mid. indic. < ἐπιτίθημι *set upon, attack*

23e3–24a1 Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon The three accusers are not well represented in the Platonic dialogues. Lycon appears nowhere else. There is a brief discussion of Meletus at the beginning of *Euthyphro*, where the point of the conversation is that no one knows who he is. Only Anytus has a prominent role. In *Meno* he warns Socrates, after they have a series of sharp exchanges, that his way of talking will get him into trouble (95a). Various ancient sources preserve the (unlikely) tradition that the Athenians later repented and avenged themselves upon the accusers (Nails 2002, 38).

Meletus is often confused with his father, who had the same name and may have been the poet mentioned by Aristophanes as early as the 420s (fr. 117) and as late as 405 in *Frogs* (1302). The name is not rare in Attic Greek, however, so speculation is hazardous.

Lycon was a contemporary of Socrates. His family had apparently attained some prominence, as he was regularly mocked in comedy, and his son Autolycus was the victor in the pancration at the Panathenaea in 422. Autolycus was later executed by the Thirty in 404/403. Xenophon portrays father and son as particularly close (*Symposium*). By the terms of the amnesty agreement (see introduction), Lycon would have been forbidden to mention his son's death at the trial, but he might nevertheless have joined in the prosecution if he thought that associates of Socrates were responsible for the death. He is by far the least prominent of the accusers.

Anytus is the most prominent accuser. An energetic man who had inherited a tannery from his father, he was general in 409 and supported the moderate oligarchic faction around Theramenes under the Thirty. He was later expelled by them and joined the exiled democrats at Phyle, where he was made a general again. With the fall of the Thirty, he returned to Athens with Thrasybulus and was a respected leader.

23e5 ὑπέρ The preposition should be understood loosely. Of course, we are not to imagine a conspiracy between these groups. Still, having accusers who could appeal to different constituencies would be part of a strategy to create a broad base of support. At *Apology* 36a8–b2 Socrates says that he would not have been convicted had this “alliance” not been in place.

τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ 24
 ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμι ἂν εἰ οἴός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ
 ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
 οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- 5
 ναῖοι, τᾶληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψά-
 μενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν
 ὅτι αὐτοῖς τοῦτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ
 λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμῆ καὶ τὰ αἷτια 6
 ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἄντε νῦν ἄντε αἰθίς ζητήσητε ταῦτα, 7
 οὕτως εὐρήσετε. 8

ἀρχόμενος < ἄρχω *begin*
 θαυμάζοιμι < θαυμάζω *wonder*
 ἐξελέσθαι aor. mid. infin. < ἐξαίρέω *remove*
 γεγονυῖαν pf. act. part. < γίγνομαι *exist*
 ὑποστειλάμενος < ὑποστέλλω *withhold*
 σχεδόν *nearly, almost*
 τεκμήριον, -ου, τό *evidence, proof*
 αἷτια < αἷτιον, -ου, τό *cause*

- 24a1 ὅπερ . . . ἔλεγον The allusion is to 19a.
 24a6 οἶδα σχεδόν "I'm pretty sure."
 24a7 τοῦτοις αὐτοῖς The antecedent of these pronouns is not at all clear, and commentators are divided; some understand them as referring to Socrates' habit of exposing intellectual pretence ("these same things"), others as referring to "these same men," that is, the accusers. Both are possible, but the first seems most relevant to the point Socrates is making.
 24b1 ἄντε . . . ἄντε ἐάν for εἰ, introducing a future-more-vivid condition (ἐάν with subj. + fut. indic.): "whether . . . or."
 24b2 εὐρήσετε Supply ταῦτα as the object of the verb.

CHAPTER 11

(24b3–c9)

Here begins the defense against the charges Meletus has brought: that Socrates has corrupted the youth and does not worship the gods of the city. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 11.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρου
 αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον
 5 τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους
 μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ,
 ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόνων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν

ἔστω 3rd imper. < εἰμί *be*
 ἱκανή < ἱκανός, -ή, -όν *sufficient*

- 24b3 μὲν οὖν As it often does, this combination of particles resumes the narrative interrupted by Socrates' digression on Apollo's oracle (20c3).
 24b4 ἔστω 3rd imper. < εἰμί: "let it be."
 24b5 τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησι Socrates is apparently quoting from Meletus's description of himself in his speech for the prosecution. His tone recalls the irony of Antony in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* III (ii): "And Brutus is an *honourable* man."
 24b6 γὰρ δὴ δὴ emphasizes γάρ, drawing attention to the beginning of a narrative, here the accusation of the prosecutors (Denniston 1954, 243).
 24b7 ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων In parallel with τούτων (b8).

τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ᾧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν
 ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις
 νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ c

καινά < καινός, -ή, -όν new, strange

- 24b8** **ἀντωμοσίαν** The formal indictment (also called an *ἐγκλημα*, “summons”) refers to a proceedings that took place prior to the trial at the office of the Archon Basileus, the official responsible for cases having to do with *ἀσέβεια* (“impiety”), before whom both parties swore (*ἀντ-ωμοσία* < ὄμνυμι, “swear”) to their version of the facts. It is precisely upon Socrates’ departure from that meeting that he encounters Euthyphro at the beginning of the dialogue of the same name. The *ἀντωμοσία* as given falls into three parts: (1) corrupting the youth, (2) failing to honor the gods of Athens, and (3) introducing new divinities. Plato’s description is in general agreement with the versions of Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 1.1.1) and Diogenes Laertius (2.40).
ἔχει . . . πως ᾧδε “It goes something like this . . .” If the actual words of the indictment had been crucial to Socrates’ case, he could have asked the herald to read from the official copy. He chooses not to make that request.
- 24b9** **διαφθείροντα** It is not clear that this was a common charge. The fourth-century orator Aeschines refers to legislation dating from the time of Solon (sixth century) and even earlier that was directed at ensuring the *σωφοροσύνη* of boys (*παῖδες*), youths (*μειράκια*), and on up, but he is not at all specific. At any rate, there are no other recorded prosecutions on this charge. Burnet thought the fact that Isocrates (fourth century) pretends to defend himself against this charge in his *περὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως* (“On the Exchange”) shows that it was a plausible accusation. That Isocrates’ model was Socrates himself, and not common Athenian legal practice, cannot be discounted, however. Note, for example, the reference to his age (*Antid.* 9) and the open legal fiction that structures the work (*Antid.* 14), as well as numerous other echoes. It should also be noted that *διαφθείρω* often has sexual connotations. See Lysias (1.92.8). The charge, therefore, suggests the possibility of corruption that is physical as well as moral.
- 24c1** **νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα** The participle agrees with Σωκράτη: “not honoring the gods the city honors.”
δαιμόνια Literally, “divine things.” The word openly alludes to Socrates’ well-documented belief in a divine sign (*δαμόνιον*) that guided his actions (see also 31c–d). Reference to it appears frequently in the dialogues, for example, in *Euthyphro* (3b5–6), where Euthyphro clearly associates the indictment with Socrates’ divine sign. Certainly one of the most striking things about the *daimonion* is the fact that, according to Plato, it only intervened to stop him whenever he was about to do something wrong (in Xenophon, *Apology*, it can be positive). Socrates credits it with his decision not to enter politics, for example (31d3–4). The negative force of the divine sign plays an important role later in the *Apology*. After the jury votes to convict him, Socrates consoles his supporters by telling them that the *daimonion* did not intervene to stop him when he left home that morning, and therefore everything that has happened is for the best (40a–b). For further discussion, see essay 15.

ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν.

- 5 Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῆ χαριεντίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πρόποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδειξάμι.

ἔγκλημα, -τος, τό *accusation*
 ῥαδίως *lightly, easily*
 ἀγῶνα < ἀγών, -ῶνος, ὁ *trial*
 καθιστὰς pres. act. part. < καθίστημι *bring*
 σπουδάζειν < σπουδάζω *take seriously*
 κήδεσθαι < κήδω (mid.) *have a care for*

24c2 ἐν ἕκαστον "Each part."

24c5 σπουδῆ χαριεντίζεται "He fools around in earnest." Socrates mocks Meletus in advance by suggesting that the prosecution's case is an elaborate (and inappropriate) joke. The notion of "care" embedded in σπουδῆ (and picked up a little later with σπουδάζειν [24c7] and κήδεσθαι, "care for" [24c8]) anticipates the relentless series of puns made by Socrates on the name of Meletus and its relationship to μελετᾶω, "care for" and related words: ἐμέλησεν (24c8, 26b2), μέλον (24d4), μεμέληκεν (24d9, 25c3), ἀμέλειαν (25c3). Yet Socrates' comment is also ironic, for the combination of serious and comic is often a characteristic of his own practice. See, for example, *Phaedrus* (234d7), *Gorgias* (481b7), and *Protagoras* (336d3), where Socrates' interlocutors cannot tell whether he's kidding or not. The same idea is implicit earlier in the speech, when Socrates begins to tell the story about the Delphic oracle (παίξειν 20d5).

24c7 ὧν Supply a word like τούτων, "these things" for an antecedent.

CHAPTER 12

(24c9–25c4)

Meletus is cross-examined about his claim that Socrates corrupts the youth. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 12.

καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ
περὶ πλείστου ποιῆ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; **d**
Ἔγωγε.

Ἴθι δὴ νυν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ;
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἴσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ δια-
φθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῆς, ἐμέ, εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατη- **5**

δεῦρο *come now!*
ὡς βέλτιστοι *as good as possible*
ἐξευρών aor. act. part. < ἐξευρίσκω *find out, discover*
εἰσάγεις < εἰσάγω *bring in (to court)*

- 24c9** **καί μοι δεῦρο** Athenian law allowed either party to question the other through a process called ἐρώτησις (< ἐρωτάω, “ask”) and required a response. By choosing to include this feature in his version of the speech of Socrates, Plato also recreates a specimen of the question-and-answer style that dominates the dialogues.
ἄλλο τι ἢ . . . Translate: “Isn’t it the case that . . . ?” (lit., “Is anything else the case, or . . . ?”)
- 24d1** **περὶ πλείστου ποιῆ** “You consider of the greatest importance,” that is, “you take care.”
- 24d1** **ὅπως** “That” (cf. Smyth 1956, 2211).
- 24d3** **Ἴθι** Sg. imper. < εἶμι, “go.”
- τούτοις** Understand τοῖς δικασταῖς.
βελτίους (masc. acc. pl.) Contracted form of βελτίονας.
- 24d4** **μέλον** Impersonal accusative absolute. “Since it is a concern . . .”
γε lays additional stress upon the word and thus emphasizes the pun on Meletus’s name. Socrates’ irony here is revealing: those who claim to have a care for virtue are generally not possessed of any real, testable knowledge but rely on conventional opinion, personal prejudice, and rote repetition.
- 24d5** **ἐξευρών** The participle has causal force: “since you have discovered.”

- γορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μῆνυσον
 αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστίν. — Ὅρᾱς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγῆς καὶ οὐκ
 ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν
 τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ’
 10 εἰπέ, ὦγαθέ, τίς αὐτούς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ;
 Οἱ νόμοι.
 e Ἄλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος,
 ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους;
 Οὔτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί.
 Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἰοί
 5 τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν;
 Μάλιστα.
 Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ’ οὐ;
 ἝΑπαντες.
 Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν
 10 ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δῆ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν

μῆνυσον aor. imper. < μινύω *disclose, indicate*
σιγῆς < σιγάω *be silent*
καίτοι *and yet*
αἰσχρόν < αἰσχρός, -ά, -όν *shameful*
μεμέληκεν pf. act. indic. < μέλει *it is a care*
παιδεύειν < παιδεύω *teach*

- 24d7 **σιγῆς** Silence on the part of the one being subjected to a line of Socratic questioning is a common sign of resistance to the *aporia* that inevitably follows. Socrates, or the audience, is usually able to cajole the reluctant responder into continuing, however. Compare Thrasymachus at *Republic* 350d and Callicles in the *Gorgias* 501c.
- 24d9 **οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω** “Of exactly what I am saying.”
- 24e7 **πότερον** Untranslated. As is common in replies, the language is abbreviated: “[Do you mean] everybody, or [is it the case that] some [educate] and some don’t?”
- 24e9 **νῆ τὸν Ἥραν** “Yes, by Hera.”
εὖ . . . λέγεις A colloquialism. Translate “Good answer!” (Weber 1986). Compare *Laches* 180b3. γε is emphatic. Note that λέγεις also modifies πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν.
- 24e10 **ὠφελούντων** “Benefactors.” The participle is used substantively and is dependent on ἀφθονίαν.
τί δὲ δῆ “What, then?” This is a very common transitional question in Plato.
ἀκροαταί “Listeners.” These should be imagined to include not just the jury, but the spectators as well. See on 17c10.

- ἢ οὐ; 25
- Καὶ οὗτοι.
 Τί δέ, οἱ βουλευταί;
 Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί.
 Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλη- 5
 σιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεῖνοι βελτίους
 ποιῶσιν ἅπαντες;
 Κάκεῖνοι.
 Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἄθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθούς 10
 ποιῶσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις;
 Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.
 Πολλὴν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπό-
 κρῖναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν
 βελτίους ποιῶντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ b

ἔοικεν *seems* (impers.)
κατέγνωκας pf. act. indic. < καταγιγνώσκω *recognize*
δυστυχίαν < δυστυχία, -ας, ἢ *bad luck*
ἀποκρῖναι aor. mid. imper. < ἀποκρίνομαι *answer*

- 25a3 **βουλευταί** The *boule* consisted of five hundred citizens, who prepared the agenda for the general assembly (*ecclesia*). Socrates will later tell a story about his own service on the *boule* (32b).
- 25a5 **ἄρα . . . μὴ** "Can it be that . . . ?" (Denniston 1954, 47).
ἐκκλησιασταί The *ecclesia* met on the Pnyx, a small, rocky hill southwest of the Acropolis, and in theory was composed of all citizens (i.e., all adult males with citizen parents). *ἐκκλησιασταί*, however, is an uncommon word, and Burnet (1924) may be correct that after the periphrastic οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, it appears as an afterthought ("You could call them *ecclesiastai*").
- 25a6 **κάκεῖνοι** = καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.
- 25a9 **ἄρα** "Evidently . . ."
- 25a12 **γε** "Certainly."
ἀποκρῖναι Meletus must pay now for his exaggerations and his shameless pandering to the vanity of the jury (e.g., ἅπαντες 24e8). If it is true that Socrates *alone* corrupts the youth and that everybody else improves them, then, as Socrates says, "That's a lot of benefactors!" But if caring for the young is like caring for horses (see 20a2–c3), it is hardly likely that one person alone hurts them and everybody else—whether or not they have ever been on a horse in their lives—improves them. It is typical of Socrates to argue that a job will be best performed by a trained expert. Such thinking also provides the basis for the division of labor in the ideal city described in the *Republic*.
- 25a13–b1 **μὲν . . . δέ** Supply in both clauses δοκεῖ from 24a13.

τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μὲν τις ὁ
 βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶν ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί, οἱ δὲ
 πολλοὶ ἄνπερ συνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθεύουσιν;
 5 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀπάντων ζώων; πάντως δήπου, ἔαντε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ
 φῆτε ἔαντε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ
 τοὺς νέους εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθεῖρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι
 c ὠφελούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι
 ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαί-
 νεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν περὶ ὧν
 ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

συνῶσι pres. subj. < συνειμί be with, associate with
 ὠφελούσιν < ὠφελέω aid, profit
 ἐφρόντισας < φροντίζω think, reflect upon
 σαφῶς clearly
 ἀποφαίνεις < ἀποφαίνω display, make known

- 25b2-3 εἷς μὲν . . . οἱ δέ There is a slight anacolouthon in this sentence, as it shifts from participial in the μὲν-clause (οἷός τ' ὢν) to indicative (διαφθεύουσιν) in the δέ-clause.
- 25b8 μόνος The word, together with εἷς, emphasizes the absurdity of Meletus' claim that every Athenian except Socrates benefits the young. Socrates' sarcasm is dependent on the validity of his analogy between training horses and training the young to be "as good as possible." A recurrent question in the Platonic dialogues is whether excellence (ἀρετή) is a kind of knowledge, in which case it should be teachable like any other subject. Here Socrates simply assumes the analogy to ridicule Meletus.
- 25c3 τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν "Your own lack of concern." Unfortunately, the English translation obscures an important pun on the name of Meletus, whose name suggests a connection with μελέτω "be concerned" (so also in the case of μεμέληκεν at 25c3), despite the fact that he does not seem to have cared enough to think much about the principles on which he claims to act. Also, by bringing up the "care of the self," Socrates sets Meletus up as the antithesis of his own thoughtful behavior and the moderation he attempts to encourage among all Athenians (compare, for example, his assertions at 30b and 31b). Note how Socratic questioning leads the interlocutor to convict himself of ignorance and/or bad faith.
- οὐδέν Adverbial, "not at all."
- περὶ ὧν The full form of the construction, shortened to avoid repetition, would be περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν.

CHAPTER 13

(25c5–26a7)

Socrates examines the argument that he is a bad influence on the young and finds it incoherent: “Why on earth would I willingly corrupt those in my company, since I would be among the first harmed by their corruption?” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 13.

Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν ἐστιν 5
οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν, ἀπό-
κριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ
κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ αὐτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ’
ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι;
Πάνυ γε. 10

πολίταις < πολίτης, -ου, ὁ *citizen*
χρηστοῖς < χρηστός, -ή, -όν *useful, good*
πονηροῖς < πονηρός, -ά, -όν *worthless, bad*
τοι *certainly*
ἐργάζονται < ἐργάζομαι *do something (acc.) to someone (acc.)*

- 25c5 **εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε** This is an example of interlaced word order. ὦ is an interjection, which normally accompanies the vocative and is untranslated. πρὸς Διὸς is an oath that calls upon Zeus to witness Meletus’s testimony and should be construed with εἰπέ. Translate “in the eyes of Zeus” or “with god as your witness.”
- 25c6 **ὦ τάν** Attic form of address, equivalent roughly to “O sir,” but the etymology is uncertain.
- 25c9 **οἱ δ’ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι** Supply ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ αὐτῶν.

- d Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων βλάπτεσθαι
 μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος
 κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;
 Οὐ δῆτα.
- 5 Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς
 νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
 Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε.
- Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλιη; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τη-
 λικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ
 10 μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον

βλάπτεσθαι < βλάπτω *harm*
ἀποκρίνου pres. mid. imper. < ἀποκρίνομαι *answer*
κελεύει < κελεύω *order*
ἐκόντα < ἐκόν, -ούσα, -όν *willing*
ἄκοντα < ἄκων, -ουσα, -ον *unwilling*
τηλικούτου < τηλικούτος, -αύτη, -οὔτο *of such an age*

- 25d1 Socrates employs here a version of an argument that appears frequently in Plato: no one ever does wrong willingly, because wrongdoing produces a chaotic society. In a chaotic society, one cannot be secure. Therefore, it is not in the interest of anyone to do wrong intentionally. One could act in error, thinking incorrectly that something was good when in fact it is bad, but one would not do it again once the mistake had been noted.
- ἔστιν . . . ὅστις "Is there anyone who . . . ?"
- 25d2 ἀποκρίνου Clearly we are to imagine a pause after Socrates' question during which Meletus attempts to avoid answering, another example of Plato's determination to create verisimilitude.
- 25d3 κελεύει A law purporting to establish this fact, and which may have been in effect at the end of the fifth century, is quoted by Demosthenes (*Against Stephanus* 2.10).
- 25d4 δῆτα The particle is emphatic, making Meletus's reply a strong denial. It is a common reply by speakers in Plato. In the context of Meletus's refusal to answer, however, the emphasis draws attention not to the certainty of his conviction, but to his evident irritation at having to answer to Socrates.
- 25d5 φέρε δὴ "Come then," a common phrase that marks the transition from one part of the argument to the next.
- πότερον Often, as here, the word indicates that alternatives will follow. In such cases πότερον itself is better not translated. See on 24e7.
- ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους "On the grounds that I am corrupting the young men."
- 25d6 ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα Both adjectives (here better translated as adverbs) agree with ἐμέ.
- 25d7 ἐκόντα ἔγωγε "Willingly, I tell you."
- 25d8–9 τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος . . . ὢν "Are you so much wiser at your age than I am at mine . . ."
- 25d10 τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν "The people closest to them."

ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμα- e
 θίας ἤκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν
 ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ,
 ὥστε τοῦτο (τὸ) τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σύ;
 ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον 5
 ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω,
 ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδη. εἰ δὲ ἄκων δια- 26
 φθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος
 εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νου-
 θετεῖν· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ.
 σὺ δὲ συγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ 5
 ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστίν εἰσάγειν τοὺς
 κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

μοχθηρὸν < μοχθηρός, -ά, -όν *worthless*

ιδίᾳ *privately*

νουθετεῖν < νουθετέω *admonish*

συγγενέσθαι aor. mid. infin. < συγγίνομαι *associate with*

οἱ *to which place, where*

κολάσεως < κόλασις, -εως, ἡ *punishment*

μαθήσεως < μάθησις, -εως, ἡ *instruction, learning*

- 25e1 οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ Supply ἐργάζονται.
 εἰς τοσοῦτον "To such a degree."
- 25e2 τοῦτ' The pronoun is explained by the ὅτι-clause that follows.
- 25e3 συνόντων The participle (masc. gen. pl. < σύνειμι) is partitive with τινά.
 μοχθηρὸν is the predicate.
- 25e5 οὐδὲ ἄλλον Supply σοι πείθεσθαι (in indirect statement after οἶμαι).
- 26a1 ἄκων Supply διαφθείρω a second time here.
 κατ' ἀμφοτέρα "Either way."
- 26a3 εἰσάγειν Dependent (with the infinitives that follow) on οὐ . . . νόμος . . .
 ἐστίν: "it's not customary . . ."
 λαβόντα The participle (masc. sg. acc.) agrees with the implied subject of
 the infinitives dependent on νόμος ἐστίν (repeated from the previous clause
 without the οὐ). Note the parallel between this sentence and 26a6-7.
- 26a4 δηλόν Supply ἐστί. The expression is impersonal.
 παύσομαι Supply ποιῶν.
 ὅ The antecedent (τοῦτο) has been omitted.
- 26a5 σὺ δέ The δέ is adversative: "but you . . ."
- 26a7 κολάσεως . . . μαθήσεως Both genitives are dependent on the participle
 δεομένους.

CHAPTER 14

(26a8–27a7)

“Meletus, do you say I corrupt the youth by teaching them not to believe in the gods? You must have me confused with a pre-Socratic philosopher.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 14.

- Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη
b οὐγὰρ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτωρ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν
 πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς
 διαφθεῖρουν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι
 5 κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἦν ἐγράψω θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν
 οὓς ἢ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα
 λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθεῖρω;
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.
 Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν
 ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀν-

| | |
|--------|--|
| 26a8 | μὲν Untranslated here. The strong adversative adverb ὅμως in the δέ-clause (strengthened by the δὴ) will supply all the contrast the sentence needs. |
| 26b1 | οὐγὰρ = ὃ ἐγώ. οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν The expression is adverbial: “at all” (literally, “neither in a big way nor a small one”). Note again the relentless punning on <i>Meletus</i> , whose name does not appear to fit him well. |
| 26b2 | ἐμέλησεν The subject is impersonal. πῶς Note the use of the direct, and therefore more forceful, interrogative in a place where the indirect form ὅπως would be equally possible. |
| 26b3 | ἢ δῆλον δὴ Supply ἐστὶ: “or is it perfectly clear that . . . ?” |
| 26b4 | νομίζειν The indirect statement continues to be dependent on φῆς (above): “that I teach them not to recognize . . .” |
| 26b7 | μὲν οὖν In replies, μὲν οὖν indicates a strong emotional response, positive or negative. Here, obviously, Meletus is made to express his emphatic agreement. |
| 26b8–9 | ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν “Who are now under discussion.” |
| 26b9 | ἔτι Used ironically. Socrates pretends that what Meletus says is <i>clear</i> to begin with. In fact, the claims of Meletus will not be clarified by the ensuing |

δράσιν τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον λέγεις c
 διδάσκειν με νομίζω εἶναι τινὰ θεοῦς—καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω
 εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικῶ
 —οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλὰ ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν 5
 ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους, ἢ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε
 αὐτὸν νομίζω θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν.

Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοῦς.

᾿Ω θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον d
 οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄν-
 θρωποι;

τὸ παράπαν *completely*

ἐγκαλεῖς < ἐγκαλέω *charge*

παντάπασι *completely*

θαυμάσιε *voc. < θαυμάσιος, -α, -ον wondrous, marvelous*

discussion at all, except to the extent that they are shown even more clearly to be incoherent.

26c2 The argument at this point turns on a difference between the original charge that declared Socrates did not honor the gods (νομίζω τοὺς θεοὺς, 24c) and a new possibility introduced by Socrates (and snapped up by Meletus) that he does not believe the gods exist at all (νομίζω τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι). While the latter possibility is certainly more dramatic (and perhaps even true), it will turn out to be fatal to the argument of Meletus, which accuses Socrates of introducing new gods. After all, says Socrates, a man who introduces new gods can hardly be an utter atheist, can he?

26c4 οὐ . . . οὔσπερ The antecedent is θεοῦς: “not the same ones.”
 μέντοι . . . γε “To be sure.” Socrates ironically pretends to accept the charge of neglecting the gods of Athens.

26c5 ἑτέρους Supply νομίζω.
 με . . . αὐτόν The pronoun is emphatic: “I myself.” Note that διδάσκω takes two accusatives, of the thing taught (ταῦτα) and of the persons taught (τοὺς ἄλλους).

26d1 ἵνα τί “Why?”
 οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην The divinity of the sun and moon, while probably assumed by most Athenians, did not play an important role in public cult. This question seems designed to introduce ideas attributed to Anaxagoras of Clazomene, Socrates’ older contemporary and an associate of the Athenian politician Pericles (495–429 B.C.E.). He is said to have been prosecuted for impiety (ἀσέβεια).

Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον
5 φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.

Ἄναξαγόρου οἶει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλιτε; καὶ οὕτω
καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι
ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἄναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομε-
10 ἔμου μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς

καταφρονεῖς < καταφρονέω *hold in contempt*
ἀπείρους < ἀπείρος, -α, -ον *inexperienced*
γέμει < γέμω *be full of*
ἐνίοτε *from time to time*

26d4 ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί Meletus uses the standard form of address for Athenian jurors, in contrast to Socrates. See on 17a1. In a spluttering outburst, he accuses Socrates of accepting the speculations of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Much of their work attempts to give a rational account of the physical processes (both celestial and terrestrial) that make up human life. See Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1993).

26d7 τῶνδε The pronoun is dependent on καταφρονεῖς and refers to the jurors. ἀπείρους γραμμάτων That is, “uncultured.” Burnet notes that this remark implies the existence of a reading public in Athens. This is certainly true to a degree. In Aristophanes’ *Frogs* (52), produced in 405, the god Dionysus talks about reading a tragedy of Euripides. See also Euripides, *Erechtheus* fr. 369 (422 B.C.E.?). Socrates’ remarks should not be taken at face value, however. The evidence for private libraries and a substantial book trade is scant before the end of the fifth century. See Harris (1989) and Thomas (1989, 1992). Whatever reading public there was in Athens at the time of Socrates’ trial, it certainly cannot be presumed to have included the entire jury.

26d8 ὥστε οὐκ ὥστε + infinitive normally takes μή, but οὐκ appears here because the clause is part of a larger indirect statement dependent on οἶει.
βιβλία Like other pre-Socratic philosophers, Anaxagoras supposedly wrote a book *περὶ φύσεως*. This would have been written on rolls of papyrus (imported from Egypt). The earliest surviving papyri date from the second half of the fourth century.

26d10 ἃ That is, the doctrines of Anaxagoras.
δραχμῆς The price Socrates mentions would not be high for the young men to whom Socrates alludes, whose families measured their wealth by the talent of silver (= 6,000 drachmas). Day laborers, for example, earned much less (1 drachma per day in the late fifth century, according to inscriptions). Presumably, the price of books would be more of an obstacle for them. It may have been for the jurors as well. They were paid 3 obols (1/2 drachma) per day. The reliance of jurors upon such subsidies had been mocked publicly in works such as the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, although the jury stipend was not necessarily their only source of income.

ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν e
 προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα;
 ἀλλ', ὧ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν
 εἶναι;

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

5

πριαμένοις < πρίαμαι purchase
 καταγελᾶν < καταγελάω laugh at

26e1 ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας “From the orchestra.” This is a much contested passage on which most commentators and translators simply pronounce without acknowledging the alternatives. These can be divided into three classes. First, ὀρχήστρα refers to a dance floor in the agora where books were sold (Dyer and Seymour 1908, Adam 1914, Grube 1988, Rose 1989, Helm 1997). Second, ὀρχήστρα refers to the dance floor at the front of the stage at the theater of Dionysus, where the chorus sang. Hence the reference is to plays by Euripides and others in which the doctrines of Anaxagoras were sung (Riddell 1973, Rose 1989). Third, ὀρχήστρα refers to the dance floor at the front of the stage of the theater of Dionysus where the chorus sang, which apparently during the majority of the year, when there were no performances, served as a book market (Croiset 1920–, Tredennick 1967, Nails 2002).

There are numerous objections to these interpretations, however. Briefly, with regard to the first, there is no evidence for a dancing floor in the agora beyond the dubious interpretation of this passage, nor any ancient source that refers to a part of the agora known as the ὀρχήστρα. As for the second, since there was an orchestra in the theater, commentators point to passages in tragedy that seem to echo Anaxagoras. None are simple transcriptions of the philosopher’s doctrines. Further, there is no record of theater tickets costing more than two obols, a third of the sum mentioned by Socrates. The main disadvantage of the third interpretation is that we must assume the existence of a book market—for which there is no corroborating evidence beyond the testimony of the present passage.

We are inclined to favor the third interpretation, since it requires the fewest assumptions. At the same time, it is worth noting that the word ὀρχήστρα is itself quite rare in our fifth-century sources (see Bosher 2007), and so all interpretations are bound to be somewhat speculative.

καταγελᾶν Dependent on ἔξεστιν above. The clauses, rearranged, go together as follows: “Do they learn these things from me, which if Socrates were to claim them as his own it is possible for the young men (who buy them from time to time in the orchestra—and for a drachma at most) to laugh at him?”

26e2 ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα “Especially since they [the ideas] are so strange.” In the *Phaedo* (98c2), Socrates again uses ἄτοπα to describe the ideas of Anaxagoras. Yet the same term is used of Socrates at *Symposium* 215a, *Theaetetus* 149a, and *Gorgias* 494d.

- Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γρα-
φὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι.
27 ἔοικεν γὰρ ὡσπερ αἰνίγμα συντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ “Ἄρα
γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ
ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλ-
λους τοὺς ἀκούοντας;” οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία
5 λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡσπερ ἂν εἴποι· “Ἄδικεῖ
Σωκράτης θεοῦς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦς νομίζων.” καίτοι
τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

ἀκόλαστος, -η, -ον *undisciplined*
νεότητι < νεότης, -ητος, ἢ *youthful recklessness*
χαριεντιζομένου < χαριεντίζομαι *make a joke*
ἐξαπατήσω < ἐξαπατάω *deceive*

- 26e6 **ἄπιστός γ' εἶ** “I don’t believe you.” It is hard to improve upon Riddell’s (1973) paraphrase of this sentence, “Very well; nobody else will believe that and I am pretty sure you do not yourself.”
- 26e9 **ὑβρεῖ . . . νεότητι** This is not the metaphysical ὑβρις of tragedy that brings about divine retribution, but a crime clearly recognized in Attic law, in cases as different as assault and adultery. Basically, ὑβρις is committed when someone blatantly disregards the rights of another citizen. Such acts are often perceived to be mitigated by their association with youthful pranks (see Demosthenes 54.13–14), an association that Socrates appears to make as well (νεότητι). Note also his repeated insinuations that Meletus is not serious (24c5, 27a3, 27a7). There is high irony here, as Socrates, who is being prosecuted for being a bad citizen, accuses Meletus of a crime that strikes at the heart of citizenship.
ἀκολασίᾳ One of the concepts that the Socrates of Plato regularly opposes to σωφροσύνη (“moderation”).
- 27a1 **ἔοικεν . . . διαπειρωμένῳ** “He seems like someone who composed a riddle as a test,” literally, “while testing” (διαπειρωμένῳ). A fine example of Socratic irony: a mistake on the part of the interlocutor is treated facetiously as a test of Socrates himself.
- 27a2 **σοφὸς δὴ** As Denniston (1954) notes, δὴ is often used in the manner of quotation marks: “the ‘wise’ Socrates.” Socrates imagines a Meletus resentful of Socrates’ reputation for wisdom and constructing his “riddle” to expose him. Of course, as has already been made clear, Socrates has a very low regard for Meletus’s abilities, so his scenario of a Meletus envious of Socrates’ “undeserved” reputation for wisdom is itself ironic.
- 27a3 **ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος** ἐναντί(α) is neut. acc. pl. The participle is genitive following γινώσκω. The Socratic dialogues of Plato are full of characters who, in the course of their conversations with Socrates, are forced to realize that different aspects of their beliefs are inconsistent and often in conflict.
- 27a7 **παίζοντος** Gen. of characteristic: “This, I tell you, is [the work of] a man who is joking.”

CHAPTER 15

(27a8–28a1)

Socrates demonstrates that Meletus contradicts himself in the indictment. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 15.

Συνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἣ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναί, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. b

Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ ἀύλητὰς μὲν οὐ 5

συνεπισκέψασθε < συνεπισκοπέω *examine together*

παρητησάμην < παραιτέομαι *ask earnestly, beg*

μέμνησθε pf. act. indic. < μιμνήσκω *remember*

εἰωθότι pf. part. < ἔθω *be accustomed*

ἀποκρινέσθω 3rd sg. imper. < ἀποκρίνομαι *answer*

ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα *one thing after another*

θορυβεῖτω 3rd sg. imper. < θορυβέω *make a racket, interrupt*

ἀύλητὰς < ἀύλητής, -οῦ, ὁ *flute player*

27a8 ἣ The relative pronoun is used adverbially: “how.”

27b1 κατ' ἀρχὰς . . . θορυβεῖν He alludes to the request he made at 17c–d. Again, Plato includes details to heighten the verisimilitude of the speech.

27b3 Socrates now proceeds to explain the contradiction in Meletus’s “riddle.” It contains two parts: first, that a belief in divine things (δαμόνια) implies a belief in divinities (δαίμονες); second, that divinities are gods (θεοί). This problem was not important for the original charge. Since then, however, Socrates has baited Meletus into accusing him of being a complete atheist (26c) and can now ignore the charge of religious nonconformism to concentrate on refuting Meletus’s latest claim.

νομίζει εἶναι, ἀϋλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι·
 c ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Ἦς ὠνησας ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά, ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δῆ·

ἀϋλητικά < ἀϋλητικός, -ή, ὄν *pertaining to flutes*
 ὠνησας aor. indic. act. < ὀνίνημι *profit*
 ἀπεκρίνω 2nd sing. aor. indic. < ἀποκρίνομαι *answer*
 διωμόσω aor. indic. mid. < διόμνημι *swear*
 ἀντιγραφῇ < ἀντιγραφή, -ῆς, ἡ *response to a charge, plea*

- 27b7 οὐκ ἔστιν Socrates answers his own question. We must assume a pause after *πράγματα*, during which Socrates waits in vain for Meletus's reply.
- 27b8 λέγω Hortatory subjunctive: "Let me say."
- 27b9 τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ "The next thing." τούτῳ (emphasized by γε) refers to the question Socrates has just answered.
- 27c1 δαιμόνια The introduction of "divine things" into the discussion is important for Socrates' argument. He has not yet mentioned the "divine sign" that regularly advised him to refrain from political life, but Socrates discusses it later (31d–e) and accuses Meletus of caricaturing it. Here, however, by linking *δαιμόνια* and *θεοί*, Socrates will lay the groundwork for his claim that there is nothing inconsistent (or illegal) about believing in both. *Euthyphro*, a dialogue that takes place before the trial, begins with a discussion of the charges brought by Meletus. There Socrates' interlocutor, Euthyphro, assumes that the reference to "introducing new divinities" in the indictment (*Apol.* 24c) is code for the *δαιμόνιον* of Socrates (2b).
 δαίμονας Gods are referred to as *δαίμονες*, particularly if the god's identity is unknown. In the *Iliad*, for example, the Greek warrior Teucer unexpectedly breaks the string of his bow and blames a *δαίμων*. The term is used more broadly, however. Hesiod's Golden Age men are called *δαίμονες* as well (*Works and Days* 122).
- 27c4 ὡς ὠνησας [Understand ἐμέ]: "how you benefited me!"
- 27c6 ἀλλ' οὖν . . . γε "Nevertheless, they're still . . . δαίμονας." As often, the γε (translated here as "still") follows the word it emphasizes.
- 27c9 ἔχει δῆ "It certainly does!" Socrates answers his own question. δῆ strengthens an affirmative response.

τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνη. τοὺς δὲ 10
 δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς **d**
 ἢ οὐ;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὥς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοί 5
 τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίτ-
 τεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγοῦμενον φάναι με
 θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι·
 εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι τινές ἢ ἐκ νυμ-
 φῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώ-
 πων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ 10
 ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο **e**

ἤτοι *surely*

αἰνίττεσθαι < αἰνίττομαι *speak in riddles*

ἄτοπον < ἄτοπος, -ον *strange*

-
- 27c10 **τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα** "I'll take it that you agree," lit.: "I put you down as agreeing."
- 27d1 **φῆς ἢ οὐ** Supply φης again with οὐ.
- 27d4 **θεοί τινές** "Gods of some kind."
- 27d5 **ᾧ** Accusative of respect.
- 27d6 **φάναι** The infinitive is equivalent to an articular infinitive and in apposition to τοῦτ': this is what I mean by riddling, "to say that . . ."
- 27d6-7 **θεοὺς . . . θεοὺς . . .** The syntax is deliberately complicated, mirroring what Socrates perceives as the latent incoherence of Meletus's charge. The first θεοὺς is the object of the participle ἡγοῦμενον, which modifies με, the subject of ἡγεῖσθαι. The second θεοὺς is the object of ἡγεῖσθαι. In each case, we must assume εἶναι.
- οὐχ ἡγοῦμενον . . . ἡγεῖσθαι** Note how the aspect of the (concessive) participle and the infinitive reinforce each other in describing two beliefs that are supposed to coexist at the same time: "that although I don't believe, on the other hand I do."
- 27d7 **ἐπειδήπερ γε** "Inasmuch as." Both -περ and γε qualify Socrates' statement and show that he is accepting Meletus's claims about him (for the sake of the argument) rather than expressing his own opinion.
- 27d8 **θεῶν παῖδες . . . νόθοι τινές** "certain illegitimate children of the gods."
- 27d9 **ὧν** = ἐξ ὧν For λέγονται, supply εἶναι.
- 27d10 **θεοὺς δὲ μή** "But no gods." The extreme brevity of the construction heightens the contrast.
- 27e1 **ὥσπερ ἂν** Supply εἴη. The phrase is coordinated with the ὁμοίως-clause above: "It would be equally odd, just as it would be if . . ."

- ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμίονους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν
 5 ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε
 28 δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

ὄνων < ὄνος, -ου, ὁ *donkey*
 ἡμίονους < ἡμίονος, -ου, ὁ *mule*
 ἀποπειρώμενος < ἀποπειράομαι *test*
 ἀδίκημα < ἀδίκημα -τος, τό *wrong, injury*

- 27e2 ἡμίονους The noun is in apposition to παῖδες. Just as the δαίμονες are the offspring of gods and mortal women, so mules are the offspring of horses bred with donkeys. ἡμίονους also puns on ἡμιθέους, “demigod.”
- 27e3 οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως . . . οὐχί “There is no way that . . . not,” a true double negative, since the negations belong to different clauses.
- 27e4 οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἐγράψω “That you didn’t bring this indictment as a test (lit. “testing”). ἡμῶν is the object of ἀποπειρώμενος.
- 27e5 ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι “Unless, at a loss as to what . . .”
- 27e7 ἐγκαλοῖς Optative in place of subjunctive in an indirect (deliberative) question after a verb in the past tense. ἀπορῶν, as a present participle, expresses time contemporaneous with the aorist ἐγράψω and thus is treated as though it were a past tense.
- ὅπως is introduced by οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν (28a2), which is postponed for maximum effect.
- 27e7 ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Gen. of characteristic: “that it is not [characteristic] of the same person to . . .”

CHAPTER 16

(28a2–d10)

Socrates moves from a refutation of Meletus's indictment to a general defense of the philosophic life. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 16.

Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ
κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπο-
λογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, 5
εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάν-
περ αἰρήῃ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δια-
βολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς
ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν 6
ἐμοὶ στῆ.

ἤρηκεν pf. act. indic. < αἰρέω *seize*
στῆ aor. act. subj. (intrans.) < ἴστημι *stop, stand*

- 28a3 **πολλῆς . . . εἶναι . . . ἀπολογίας** Lit. “be of much defense.” On the one hand, the weak accusations of Meletus do not *need* much defense in order for Socrates to dispatch them. On the other, Socrates' refutation of Meletus does not constitute much of a defense. Both senses are operative. Thus, Socrates justifies the relative shortness of his response to the actual indictment. At the same time, he prepares the way for a return to the topic of popular prejudice against him.
- 28a4 **ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα** Take with μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.
ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν Supply λόγοις.
- 28a8 **ἃ** That is, διαβολή and φθόνος. The difference in the genders of the two nouns causes the relative pronoun to shift to the neuter.
- 28b1 **δεινόν** The adjective is related to the noun δέος, “fear,” and so can introduce a clause of fearing.
μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ “that it will stop with me.”

- Ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· “εἶτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀπο-
 5 θανεῖν;” ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι “Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττη, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδिका πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι
 c γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου καταφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἢ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ

ἐπιτηδεύσας < ἐπιτηδεύω *pursue, practice*
 ἀντείποιμι aor. act. opt. < ἀντιλέγω *reply*
 κίνδυνον < κίνδυνος, -ου, ὁ *danger*
 ὑπολογίζεσθαι < ὑπολογίζομαι *take into account*
 ζῆν < ζάω *live*
 ὅτου = οὔτινος < ὅστις *whoever*
 ὄφελος, -ους, τό *use, good*
 φαῦλοι < φαῦλος, -η, -ον *worthless, insignificant*
 ἡμιθέων < ἡμίθεος, -ου, ὁ *demigod, hero*
 τετελευτήκασιν pf. act. indic. < τελεντάω *die*
 καταφρόνησεν < καταφρονέω *despise*
 προθυμουμένῳ < προθυμέομαι *be eager, zealous*

- 28b3 εἶτ’ = εἶτα The word appears frequently in Plato and comedy, often indicating real or feigned indignation.
 28b4 τοιοῦτον . . . ἐξ οὗ “Such a practice, from which.”
 ἀποθανεῖν Here, as often, ἀποθνήσκω is used as the passive of ἀποκτείνω.
 28b5 τούτῳ “To this man.”
 28b6 οὐ καλῶς λέγεις “You’re wrong.”
 28b7 τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι Both articular infinitives are dependent on κίνδυνον.
 ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν “Of whom there is even a small value,” that is, “who is worth anything at all.”
 28b8 σκοπεῖν Dependent on οἶε (28b6).
 28b9 φαῦλοι Predicate adjective; the subject is ὅσοι.
 28c2 οἳ τε ἄλλοι While English prefers to say “Achilles and the others,” Greek usually puts the emphatic term last.
 Θέτιδος Thetis is a minor sea goddess who married the mortal Peleus and became the mother of Achilles. She appears several times in the *Iliad* to advise and comfort her son.
 28c3–4 παρὰ τὸ . . . ὑπομεῖναι “As opposed to enduring anything shameful.”
 28c4–5 προθυμουμένῳ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτείνει In the *Iliad*, Achilles returns to battle in order to avenge the death of his friend Patroclus, who has been killed by Hector.

Ἔκτορα ἀποκτείνειαι, θεὸς οὐσα, οὕτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· 5
 ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον
 καὶ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῆ—αὐτίκα γάρ τοι,
 φησί, ‘μεθ’ Ἔκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος’—ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας
 τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλ-
 λον δεῖσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, d
 ‘Αὐτίκα,’ φησί, ‘τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεις τῷ ἀδικούντι,
 ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν
 ἄχθος ἀρούρης.’ μὴ αὐτὸν οἶει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ
 κινδύνου;” 5

Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις
 ἐαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγήσάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος
 ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν,
 μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ
 αἰσχροῦ. 10

ἀποκτείνειαι aor. act. infin. < ἀποκτείνω kill

τιμωρήσεις < τιμωρέω *avenge*

φόνον < φόνος, -ου, ὁ *murder*

αὐτίκα *right away, at once*

πότμος, -ου, ὁ *fate*

ὀλιγώρησε < ὀλιγωρέω *think little of*

τεθναίην pf. act. opt. < θνήσκω *die*

καταγέλαστος, -ον *laughed at, ridiculous*

κορωνίσιν < κορωνίς, -ίδος, ἡ *curved*

φροντίσαι < φροντίζω *think upon, reflect*

τάξῃ aor. act. subj. < τάττω *station*

ἄρχοντος < ἄρχων -ντος, ὁ *commander*

ταχθῆ aor. pass. subj. < τάττω

28c5 οὕτωσί πως “Something like this.” This phrase, along with the parenthetical ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, excuses any mistakes in advance. Socrates quotes from Thetis’s speech to Achilles in book 18 of the *Iliad*: αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ’ Ἔκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος, “Immediately after Hector your fate is prepared” (96).

28c8 ὁ δέ Pronominal use of the article: “And he . . .”

28d2 δίκην ἐπιθεις τῷ ἀδικούντι That is, to Hector. This formula for vengeance nicely encapsulates the traditional Greek understanding of retributive justice.

28d3 παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν The phrase is formulaic in Homer. Note the non-Attic ending for the dative plural.

28d4 ἄχθος ἀρούρης “A weight upon the earth,” a memorable Homeric phrase. μὴ Introduces a question expecting a “No” answer.

28d6 οὐ ἂν Take with ἐνταῦθα (d7): “Wherever . . . in that place . . .”

28d8 ταχθῆ The metaphor is from hoplite warfare, in which, for the survival of all, it is crucial that each man occupy the position to which he is assigned.

28d10 τοῦ αἰσχροῦ “Shame.” The neuter singular of the adjective is often used in place of an abstract noun.

CHAPTER 17

(28d10–30c1)

Socrates explains how he follows the maxim outlined in the previous chapter, not abandoning the philosophical post to which Apollo had assigned him. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 17.

- 10 ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες
 e Ἴ�θηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταπτον ἔμμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος

εἴλεσθε aor. mid. indic. < αἰρέω choose

28d10–

29a1

This elaborate sentence, in the form of an inverted condition (future-less-vivid: ἂν + opt., εἰ + opt), is Socrates' response to the imaginary questioner at 28b3 who said, "Aren't you ashamed to have followed a way of life that has gotten you into so much trouble?" The structure is as follows: δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος . . . εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με . . . ἔταπτον . . . τότε . . . ἔμμενον . . . τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος [gen. abs.] . . . λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.

εἶην εἰργασμένος Pf. optative middle. Trans.: "I would be acting terribly, if . . ."

28e1

οἱ ἄρχοντες Many offices in fifth-century Athens were chosen by lot. Indeed, this is how Socrates himself ended up as a member and perhaps the chief officer of the βουλή, the council of five hundred that prepared the business for the ἐκκλησία (see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.2; see also *Hellenica* 1.7). Military commanders, however, were elected, as can be seen from εἴλεσθε (below).

28e2–3

ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ . . . Ἀμφιπόλει . . . Δηλίῳ. Three battles from the Peloponnesian War, in which Socrates appears to have distinguished himself. At the Battle of Potidaea (432), Socrates rescued the wounded Alcibiades, as the latter describes in Plato's *Symposium* (219e–221b). Delium (424) was an Athenian defeat where Socrates' courageous retreat is praised by Alcibiades in the passage referred to above and by the commanding general, Laches, in the dialogue that bears his name (181b). Amphipolis (422), too, was an Athenian defeat (see Thucydides 5.6–5.11), but nothing is known about Socrates' exploits there.

τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ
 ᾤηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετά- 5
 ζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον
 ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεῖνόν τ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ 29
 ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον,
 ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντεία καὶ δεδιῶς
 θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὄν. τὸ γάρ τοι
 θάνατον δεδιέναι, ᾧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν 5
 σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί ἐστιν ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ

ᾤηθην aor. pass. indic. (act. sense) < οἶμαι *think*
ὑπέλαβον aor. act. indic. < ὑπολαμβάνω *suppose*
φοβηθεὶς aor. pass. part. (act. sense) < φοβέομαι *fear*
τάξιν < τάξις, -ιος, ἡ *station*
δικαστήριον, -ου, τό *law court*
ἀπειθῶν < ἀπειθέω *disobey*
δεδιῶς pf. act. part. < δείδω *fear*

- 28e3 **ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις** “Like anybody else.” Socrates represents his obedience as somewhat ordinary.
- 28e5 **δεῖν** Indirect statement, dependent on τάττοντος (e3). Note that Socrates sees philosophy not just as a process of examining others, but also himself.
- 29a1 **δεινόν τ' ἂν** (= τοι ἂν) . . . “It really would be terrible.” *δεινόν* recalls the point made at 28d9 (*δεινά*), which may have been forgotten in the intervening lines.
- 29a3 **ὅτι** “On the grounds that.”
ἀπειθῶν The participle is causal, as Socrates explains *why* minding his own business would be equivalent to atheism.
- 29a4 **εἶναι** Infinitive in indirect statement after οἰόμενος.
οὐκ ὄν Supply σοφός. The participle is concessive. The striking brevity of the construction (brachyology) recalls Socrates’ description of the attempt to disprove Apollo’s oracle (e.g., at 21c7).
τοι “I assure you.” *θάνατον* is the object of the articular infinitive *τό* . . . *δεδιέναι* (< *δείδω*). The fear of death is irrational, because it presumes that we have enough knowledge to know that it is something to fear. Persisting in this irrational fear, therefore, is another example of pretending to know things you don’t (i.e., it is identical to the experience of the politicians, poets, and craftsmen whom Socrates met).
- 29a5 **δοκεῖν** Treat as parallel with *τό* . . . *δεδιέναι*: “I assure you, Athenian men, that fearing death is nothing more than a man thinking himself to be wise, without being so.” The accusative participle and the accusative predicate adjective (*σοφόν*) agree with the implied subject of the infinitives.
- 29a7 **μὲν** Best left untranslated. The contrasting thought is expressed at *δεδίασι δ’* (29a9).

- πάντων μέγιστον ὄν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες
 b ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν
 αὐτῆ ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ
 δ', ὧ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν
 5 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ
 ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι
 οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ
 καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν
 κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα
 τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ
 c με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἄνυτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὅς ἔφη ἢ τὴν
 ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσηλθον, οὐχ

ἐπονείδιστος, -ον *shameful, reproachful*
 διαφέρω *differ from; be superior to*
 οὐδέποτε *not at any time, never*
 ἀφίετε pres. imper. < ἀφίημι *release, let go*
 ἀπιστήσαντες < ἀπιστέω *disbelieve*
 ἐπειδὴ *since, when*

- 29a8 ὡς “As if.” Supply τὸν θάνατον.
 29b2 ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι Supply ἀμαθία before the articular infinitive.
 29b3 τούτῳ Dative of degree of difference.
 τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων Genitive of comparison with διαφέρω.
 29b4 εἰ δὴ δὴ frequently appears after εἰ to soften the supposition, that is, “If I
 really am wiser [and it’s not just a mistake the god made]” versus “If I am
 wiser.”
 τῷ = τινι.
 τοῦ = τινος. Genitive of comparison.
 29b8 ὧν Relative pronoun attracted into the case of the antecedent.
 ἃ Object of φοβήσομαι and φεύξομαι.
 ὄντα Supplementary participle with τυγχάνει.
 29c1–30c1 A very complex sentence in the form of a conditional with a three-part pro-
 tasis, leading to an apodosis (εἴπομι’ 29d2) that introduces an extended
 hypothetical quotation (29d2–30c1).
 29c2 τὴν ἀρχὴν Accusative absolute: “at the beginning.”
 οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν Refusing to face the charges would have meant
 exile, a possibility that Socrates addresses in *Crito*. Burnet (1924) thought
 that this phrase represented an actual quotation from Anytus’s speech,
 which is possible. There is no evidence, however, that any such speech by
 Anytus was ever published, although among the pseudo-Socratic literature
 an “Accusation of Socrates” was written by Polycrates and is mentioned by
 Isocrates (*Busiris* 4). Plato could, of course, be quoting from memory and
 giving a general sense of Anytus’s remarks, and it is clear that he takes
 pains to make it *look like* Socrates is quoting. Socrates’ arrival at court, after

οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείνειν με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ
 διαφευξοίμην ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ ὑεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἅ Σωκρά- 5
 της διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν διαφθαρῆσονται, —εἴ μοι
 πρὸς ταῦτα εἶποιτε· “ᾧ Σώκратες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πει-
 σόμεθα ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι
 ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ
 ἀλῶς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῆ” —εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, d
 ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, εἶποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι “Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ
 θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἴός τε ᾧ, οὐ μὴ

διαφευξοίμην fut. opt. < διαφεύγω *be acquitted*
 ᾧτε < ὅστε, ἤτε, ὅτε *who, which*
 διατρίβειν < διατρίβω *spend time*
 ἀλῶς aor. act. subj. < ἀλίσκομαι *be caught*
 ἀσπάζομαι *embrace*
 ἕωσπερ (+ subj.) *so long as*
 ἐμπνέω *draw breath*
 οἴός τε ᾧ < οἴός τε εἰμί *be able*

- all, could have been perceived by supporters and defenders alike as an act of defiance in and of itself. Such an interpretation is certainly consistent with much of Socrates' behavior throughout the speech, from his persistent refusal to address the audience as “judges” to the “punishment” he will later propose for himself (37a).
- 29c3 οἶόν τ' εἶναι For the construction, see on 19e5. Note the change to neuter for the impersonal subject.
- μὴ Negates the articular infinitive (τό . . . ἀποκτείνειν).
- 23c5–6 εἴ μοι . . . εἶποιτε . . . The structure of the condition (future less vivid) is as follows: εἴ μοι εἶποιτε . . . εἰ με . . . ἀφοῖτε (29d1) . . . εἶποιμ' ἂν . . . There is a slight anacolouthon. The εἰ-clauses continue the construction begun at 29c1: εἰ ἀφίετε . . . (simple present).
- 29c6 ταῦτα That is, the claim that the failure to execute Socrates would lead to the corruption of the youth.
- 29c7 ἐπὶ τούτῳ “upon this condition . . . that” τούτῳ is the antecedent of the relative pronoun ᾧτε.
- 29d2 ἐπὶ τούτοις That is, on the conditions given in the ἐπὶ τούτῳ-clause above.
- 29d3–4 πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν This passage is one of the foundational Western texts for thinking about civil disobedience and, more generally, the conflict between public behavior and private beliefs (see also Sophocles, *Antigone*).
- 29d4 ἕωσπερ ἂν Emphatic version of ἕως ἂν (+ subj.), introducing an indefinite temporal clause.
- οἴός τ' ᾧ See on 19e5.
- οὐ μὴ The double negative is emphatic.

- 5 παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, e καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελήῃ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;’ καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,

παρακελεύόμενος < παρακελεύομαι *exhort*
ἐνδεικνύμενος < ἐνδεικνυμι *point out*
ἰσχύν < ἰσχύς, -ύος, ἡ *strength*
ἐπιμελούμενος < ἐπιμελέομαι *care for*
δόξης < δόξα, -ης, ἡ *reputation, opinion*
τιμῆς < τιμή, -ῆς, ἡ *honor*
φρονήσεως < φρόνησις, -εως, ἡ *thought*
ἀμφισβητήσῃ aor. act. subj. < ἀμφισβητέω *dispute*
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι < ἐπιμελέομαι *care for*

- 29d6 ὑμῶν Partitive with ὅτῳ.
 οἷάπερ “Just the kind of things.”
- 29d7–e3 If this is actually the way Socrates was accustomed to approach his fellow citizens, however deserving of his remonstrations they may have been, it is little wonder that he was the recipient of ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος (28a8).
- 29d7 εἶωθα Supply λέγειν.
 ὅτι Do not translate.
 ἄριστε Socrates turns this common and facile address into an ironic deflation of Athenian self-conceit. It is precisely their unwillingness to dedicate themselves to ἀρετή that has brought the criticism of Socrates upon them.
- 29d9 ὅπως Here introducing an indirect question and dependent on ἐπιμελούμενος, like χρημάτων above. Although common in Greek, this type of construction is archaic in English. See, for example, the King James translation of Matthew 6.28, which translates literally the *koine* of the original: “Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow” (= “Consider how the lilies of the field grow”).
- 29e1 δόξης καὶ τιμῆς These two terms are regarded with suspicion throughout the Platonic dialogues, and a critique of his fellow citizens’ excessive reliance on what *seems* best is implicit in Socrates’ account of his quest, during the course of which he spoke to many who *seemed* wise but were not (21c–22e). τιμή is a core value for the Homeric hero, representing acknowledgment of his value to the social group. In fact, the entire plot of the *Iliad* revolves around the loss of τιμή that Achilles suffers at the hands of Agamemnon. This sense is still visible in the fifth century, where the term often denotes public offices and civic distinctions. Such honors are harmless in themselves, but Socrates suggests that the unscrupulous use them as a means for creating the *appearance* of accomplishment, while neglecting excellence (ἀρετή) itself.

οὐκ εὐθύς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ
 ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἕαν μοι μὴ δοκῆ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετῆν, 5
 φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περι ἐλαχίστου ποι- 30
 εῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περι πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ
 καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ
 ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρῳ ἐστὲ γένει.
 ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω 5
 ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ
 ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδέν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ

ἀφήσω fut. act. indic. < ἀφήμι set free
 ὄνειδιῶ fut. act. indic. < ὄνειδίζω reproach
 πρεσβυτέρῳ < πρεσβύτερος, -α, -ον older
 ἐντυγχάνω pres. act. subj. encounter
 ἐγγυτέρῳ < ἐγγυς nearer
 γένει < γένος, -ους, τό kinship

- 30a1 φάναι δέ "But to say he does."
 περι ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται Idiomatic: "consider least important." The object
 of the verb is τὰ πλείστου ἄξια, "the most valuable things."
 30a2 περι πλείονος Supply ποιεῖται from above: "consider more important."
 30a2-4 "I shall test stranger and citizen alike." Socrates' refusal to show deference
 to his fellow citizens would have been viewed by many as a provocation.
 In fact, his only concession is to be even more exacting in his criticism of
 them. This novel behavior marks the beginning of a philosophical concep-
 tion of universal humanity.
 30a4 ὅσῳ Dative of degree of difference.
 γένει Dative of respect. Socrates here uncovers another paradox of philos-
 ophy, as he understands it, that philosophy's search for an absolute truth
 independent of history is nonetheless rooted in the local political condi-
 tions of the citizen-philosopher.
 30a7 ὑπηρεσίαν "Service." The metaphor derives from the subordinate position
 of the rowers on a ship, who sit at (lit., "under") their oars (ἔρητοι). It is inter-
 esting to note, however, that the rowers were the backbone of Athenian naval
 power. They were also among the most democratic factions in the city, since
 they were composed of citizens who lacked the wealth to serve as hoplites.
 While Socrates was no great lover of Athenian democracy, the decoupling of
 political power from the external markings of social status was among the
 first necessary steps on the road to a truly philosophical reflection on the
 nature of the state, its rulers, and its stakeholders. Thus, in his service to the
 god, Socrates, like the rowers, exercises a profession that is despised by those
 who represent the traditional ideology, which he calls into question, yet one
 which, as he sees it, is essential to the well-being of the polis and its citizens.

- πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμαίων
 b ἐπιμελείσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα
 ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι Ὅκ ἐκ
 χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
 5 εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 βλαβερὰ· εἰ δὲ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν
 λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, “ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ
 πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μή, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ
 c ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλακίς τεθνάναι.”

σωμαίων < σώμα, -τος, τό *body*
 δημοσίᾳ < δημόσιος, -α, -ον *of the people*
 βλαβερὰ < βλαβερός, -ά, -όν *harmful*

- 30a8 ὑμῶν Partitive with νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους.
 σωμαίων Note that “bodies” here are classified with external possessions
 and are contrasted with the soul.
- 30b1 ἐπιμελείσθαι Dependent on πείθων. Socrates here appropriates the vocabu-
 lary of public concern as it was employed in the institutions of fifth-century
 Athenian politics to describe the assumption of well-defined duties, for
 which one must be accountable after the term of office. Weber (1986) argues
 that this move is not accidental and insightfully connects it with Socrates’
 reformulation of citizenship in terms of individual ethics, with the result that
 “the ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς is, following Socrates, something just as natural as
 the assumption of public office.”
 πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς “Before, nor with as much eager-
 ness as for the soul.” The rejection of material goals and the exhortation to
 care for the soul is a crucial part of Socrates’ revolutionary approach to
 thought (see Hadot 2002, 22–38).
- 30b2 ἔσται The implied subject is ψυχή. Note the elaborate chiasmus of ἐκ
 χρημάτων ἀρετή . . . ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα, made more striking by the presence
 of the same words in different cases (polyptoton).
 ὄτι Do not translate.
- 30b8–c1 ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα ἂν with the future participle is unusual. Some
 editors consequently emend to ἂν ποιήσαντος, which would be equivalent to
 the apodosis of a future-less-vivid condition (optative + ἂν). There is no
 manuscript support for such a change, however. Translate: “since I will act
 no differently.”
- 30c1 οὐδ' εἰ “Even if.” μέλλω + infin. is equivalent to a future indicative.

CHAPTER 18

(30c2–31c3)

“My service to the god, far from being a liability, is a divine blessing on the city.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 18.

Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ’ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς ἂν λέγω ἀλλ’ ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐφ’ οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ 5
μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐάν με ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος

ἐμμείνατε < ἐμμένω stay with
ὀνήσεσθε ftr. indic. < ὀνίνημι profit, derive benefit
μηδαμῶς in no way
ἀποκτείνητε < ἀποκτείνω kill

- 30c2 ἐμμείνατε . . . ὑμῶν The metaphor is spatial. Socrates asks the jurors to “stay” with his previous request that they not interrupt.
- 30c3 οἷς Dative with ἐμμείνατε. The relative clause has been incorporated into the main clause by ellipsis of its antecedent. So also with ἐφ’ οἷς later in the line. The requests to which he refers were at 17d1 and 20e4.
- 30c4 γὰρ οὖν οὖν emphasizes the γὰρ in the manner of γὰρ δὴ and heightens the provocativeness of Socrates’ claim both to benefit the audience and to give them something to shout (βοήσεσθε) about.
- 30c5 ἅττα (= τινά) . . . καὶ ἄλλα Hendiadys: “certain others.”
- 30c7 οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω “Such as I claim to be.”
- μείζω Masc. acc. sg. (contracted form of μείζονα).
- 30c8 ὑμᾶς αὐτούς The reflexive pronoun for the first- and second-person plural is formed from the personal pronoun + the appropriate form of αὐτός, -ή, -ό. μὲν The clause begins as if Socrates were going to elaborate the contrast made in the previous sentence between the possibility that the jury members could injure him (μὲν) and that they might injure themselves in so doing (δέ). Instead, Socrates digresses briefly, and when he concludes he picks up the contrast with νῦν οὖν (δέ) and abandons the second part of the μὲν . . . δέ construction.

- οὔτε ἄνυτος—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο—οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν
 d εἶναι ἀμείνωνι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε
 μεντᾶν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος
 μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τις που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ
 5 οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὕτοσιν νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα
 ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνουσαι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις
 ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ
 e θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἑμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. εἰ γὰρ με ἀπο-
 κτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς—εἰ
 καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν—προσκειμένον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ

ἐξελάσειεν aor. act. opt. < ἐξελαύνω *send into exile*
ἀτιμώσειεν < ἀτιμώω *punish with the loss of citizen rights*
ἀποκτείνουσαι pres. act. infin. < ἀποκτείνωμι *kill*
ἐξαμάρτητε aor. act. subj. < ἐξαμαρτάνω *make a mistake*
δόσιν < δόσις, -εως, ἡ *gift*
προσκειμένον < πρόσκειμαι *be attached to*

- 30c9 **θεμιτὸν** The adjective is derived from θέμις, “that which has been laid down (< τίθημι),” and, by extension, “law, right.” It possesses a certain solemnity often associated with divine decrees. In Hesiod (*Theogony* 901), the Titan Themis is Zeus’s second wife and a personification of his divine authority.
- 30d2 **μεντᾶν** Crasis of μέντοι ἄν. μέντοι is condescending. See Denniston (1954, 402, iii). Translate: “He *could* perhaps . . .”
ἀτιμώσειεν This is the reading of Stobaeus in the *Florilegium* (fifth century C.E.). The manuscripts read ἀτιμώσειεν (< ἀτιμώω, “dishonor”). Both verbs make sense in the context, but ἐξελαύνειν refers to a specific legal procedure, so it is arguable that the other verb should as well. On this argument, ἀτιμώσειεν would have been an error made by an ancient copyist unfamiliar with the details of Attic law who substituted a more familiar (and less specific) word.
οὗτος Presumably he is referring to Meletus.
- 30d3 **που** “I suppose.” Take with ἄλλος τις.
- 30d4 **ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον** Supply οἴομαι and use μεγάλα κακά as the predicate of the indirect statement (subject = ἄ . . . ποιεῖ, in apposition with ἄνδρα . . . ἀποκτείνουσαι).
- 30d6 **πολλοῦ δέω** A common idiom. “I am far from.”
- 30d7 **ἐξαμάρτητε** Subjunctive in a clause of fearing, dependent on ἀπολογεῖσθαι.
- 30e1 **ἑμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι** “By convicting me.” The ψηφ- root in the participle refers to the bronze “pebbles” (ψηφοί) used by the jurors to cast their votes. For illustrations see Lang (1978).
- 30e2 **ἀτεχνῶς** “Truly,” adding emphasis to a striking expression. Weber (1986).

ὥσπερ ἵπῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθε-
 στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπος τινος, οἷον δὴ 5
 μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα,
 ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον
 οὐδὲν πάρομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. 31
 τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὃ ἄνδρες,
 ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ'
 ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες
 ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἄνυτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν 5
 λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ

γενναίῳ < γενναῖος, -α, -ον *noble*
 μεγέθους < μέγεθος, -ους, τό *greatness, size*
 νοθεστέρῳ comp. < νοθής, -ές *sluggish*
 ἐγείρεσθαι < ἐγείρω *be roused*
 προστεθηκέναι pf. act. infin. < προστίθημι *put beside*
 προσκαθίζων < προσκαθίζω *land on*
 φείσεσθε fut. act. indic. < φείδομαι *spare*
 νυστάζοντες < νυστάζω *doze*
 καθεύδοντες < καθεύδω *sleep*
 διατελοῖτε < διατελέω *continue*

- 30e4 **γενναίῳ . . . νοθεστέρῳ** The comparison of Athens to a horse that is noble but lazy is not flattering. It contrasts markedly with the famous eulogy of Athens as “the school of Greece” in Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Thucydides 2.41).
- 30e5 **ἐγείρεσθαι** Dependent on δεομένῳ.
μύωπος This is one of the best-known passages from the *Apology*, depicting Socrates as the annoying “fly” who continually pesters his fellow citizens. Many readers have seen a link between Socrates’ comparison and the genre of the Aesopic fable, which, to judge from references in Herodotus and Old Comedy, was well known in the fifth century. The connection is worth exploring. At the beginning of *Phaedo* (60d), the dramatization of his death, we learn that Socrates has spent some time in prison putting fables of Aesop into verse.
οἷον Untranslated predicate accusative of ἐμὲ, object of προστεθηκέναι. It anticipates τοιοῦτόν τινα in the next line.
- 31a2 **ὑμῖν** Dative of possession.
- 31a4 **ἂν** This ἂν, plus the two in 31a5, goes with ἀποκτείναιτε (optative in the apodosis of a future-less-vivid condition). The image of the stinging fly and the lazy horse is developed further, as the sentence subtly slides between the literal and the metaphorical.
κρούσαντες . . . με The image preserves the idea of Socrates as a fly but imagines him getting crushed not by an irritated horse, but by Athenians influenced by Anytus. The verb means “to strike” but also “to examine by tapping” when checking to see if a pot is cracked.

- θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω
 ὧν τοιοῦτος οἶος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε
 b ἄν κατανοήσαίτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν
 μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ πάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων
 ἀμελουμένων τσαυτὰ ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεί,
 5 ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὡσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύ-
 τερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπὸ
 τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκε-
 λευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοῖ

κηδόμενος < κήδω (mid.) care for
 δεδόσθαι pf. pass. infin. < δίδωμι give
 ἐνθενδε from what follows
 κατανοήσαίτε aor. opt. < κατανοέω understand
 ἡμεληκέναι pf. act. infin. < ἀμελέω neglect
 ἀνέχεσθαι < ἀνέχω hold up, bear up
 ἀπέλαυον < ἀπολαύω benefit from
 μισθὸν < μισθός, -οῦ, ὄ wage
 παρεκελευόμην < παρακελεύομαι urge

- 31a7 ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἄν Indirect speech introduced by ἄν κατανοήσαίτε.
 31b1 οὐ . . . ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε "Aren't natural for a man" (lit. "are not similar to a human thing"). ἔοικε has three articular infinitive subjects: τὸ . . . ἡμεληκέναι, [τὸ] ἀνέχεσθαι, and τὸ . . . πράττειν with ἐμὲ as their subject.
 31b2 ἡμεληκέναι This is one of a series of verbs derived from the same stem as ἐπιμέλεια, "care." Socrates here does not care for his χρήματα (30b1), but he neglects his worldly affairs so as to urge his fellow citizens to care (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 29e3–4, 30a9, 31b5) for their true selves, defined as their souls (ψυχή 29e1, 30b2).
 τῶν οἰκείων Neuter plural.
 31b3 τὸ . . . ὑμέτερον "Your business," as opposed to τῶν οἰκείων.
 31b4 ἰδίᾳ Socrates' public behavior is very different from that of Meletus mentioned at 26a3. Plato's use of ἰδίᾳ in both passages emphasizes the contrast. Socrates in effect establishes philosophy as an extrademocratic practice that takes place outside the realm of the δῆμος (cf. 30b4), which defined the center of civic life in democratic Athens. Socrates' activities might reasonably be viewed by some as a threat to the existing political order.
 προσιόντα Masc. acc. sg. participle < πρόσειμι, agreeing with ἐμὲ (b1).
 31b5 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς The infinitive is dependent on πείθοντα. Note the repeated focus on internal development characteristic of Socrates' approach to civic virtue.
 31b5–7 εἰ . . . ἀπέλαυον . . . εἶχον ἄν Present counterfactual condition.
 31b7 λόγον That is, some justification for neglecting my personal affairs. Socrates ironically adopts the thought patterns of his fellow citizens, who, he implies, only act for material gain.

ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντήσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν. c

ἀναισχύντως *shamelessly*

ἀπαναισχυντήσαι < ἀπαναισχυντέω *be shameless enough to say*

παρασχόμενοι aor. mid. part. < παρέχω *offer*

31b8 τὰλλα πάντα "In all other respects."

31c1 ὡς ἐγώ Introducing indirect statement after a noun of speaking (μάρτυρα).

31c3 τὴν πενίαν The poverty of Socrates is relative, though he clearly had no interest in accumulating money. For the value of his household, see on 20b8.

CHAPTER 19

(31c4–32a3)

“Why then have I preferred this private form of service to the more usual public show of devotion to one’s fellow citizens?” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 19.

- 5 Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβου-

δόξειεν aor. act. opt. < δοκέω *seem*
 συμβουλεύω *give advice*
 πολυπραγμονῶ < πολυπραγμονέω *be meddlesome*
 τολμῶ < τολμάω *dare*
 πλῆθος *multitude; democratic faction*

- 31c5 **πολυπραγμονῶ** Here Socrates appropriates a term with a well-established public meaning and gives it a new private one. πολυπραγμοσύνη, “over-busyness,” is a highly charged term within the political struggles between democrats and oligarchs that dominated Athenian life in the last part of the fifth century (see Carter 1986). Oligarchs who opposed what they saw as democratic interference in the affairs of other city-states styled themselves as ἀπράγμονες, by which they meant to suggest that they knew how to mind their own business, in contrast to the “busyness” of their enemies. In Aristophanes’ *Birds*, two citizens abandon Athens in search of a τόπος ἀπράγμων, where they can live in peace. In Pericles’ Funeral Oration, by contrast, Thucydides has the democrat Pericles say the following: “We alone consider that a man who has no share of public life is not someone who minds his own business (ἀπράγμονα), but worthless ἀχρηστόν” (2.40). Plato’s Socrates contests the view that πολυπραγμοσύνη can only exist as part of a public career and makes a case for his own version of “business.” In other passages, it is the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the philosopher that is worn (ironically) as a badge of pride. Compare *Gorgias* 526c4, with the accompanying commentary in Dodds (1966); compare also *Republic* 433a.
- 31c6 **ἀναβαίνων** That is, before the assembly. Note the skillful way Plato uses two participles derived from verbs of motion to contrast the actions of “going up” to address the assembly and “going about” addressing individuals.”

λεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ
 πολλαχῶς ἀκηκόατε πολλαχού λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ
 δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικω- **d**
 μωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδός
 ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀπο-
 τρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε.
 τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν, καὶ **5**
 παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες

πολλαχού *in many places, often*
ἀποτρέπει < ἀποτρέπω *dissuade from*
προτρέπει < προτρέπω *persuade to do*
ἐναντιοῦται < ἐναντιόομαι *oppose*
παγκάλως *absolutely, correctly*

- 31c8** **θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον** “Something holy and divine.” For the δαιμόνιον of Socrates, see on 24c1.
- 31d1** **ἐπικωμωδῶν** Although ἐπικωμωδέω appears only here in classical literature, the uncompounded form appears in oratory in the general sense of “mock.” See Lysias (24.18), where the context is also that of an accusation that one’s opponent is joking (see on 27a7). Within a speech that has already named Aristophanes’ *Clouds* as a prominent voice among the “first accusers,” however, Socrates cannot use comedy as a metaphor without also invoking the real thing and so binding together the two groups of accusers.
- 31d2** **ἐκ παιδός** See on 21a1: ἐκ νέου.
- 31d3–4** **ἀποτρέπει . . . προτρέπει** The effect of Socrates’ divine sign in Plato is completely negative. It cannot, therefore, be cited as in any way dictating the content or nature of Socratic philosophy.
- 31d4** **τούτου** Genitive of separation with ἀποτρέπει.
- 31d6** **παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι** Since the δαιμόνιον only says “No,” as opposed to more loquacious forms of divine signaling, Socrates can only speculate about the rationale behind its intervention. Here, however, he uses that speculation to justify his (relative) lack of civic involvement. This is similar to his behavior in the case of the oracle, where his practice of testing was only indirectly related to the god’s words. Taken together, these anecdotes help to identify Socrates’ approach to philosophy as a highly idiosyncratic reinterpretation of traditional piety.

- Ἄθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ
 πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη
 e οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῆ·
 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε
 ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων
 32 πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ'
 ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου,
 καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ
 μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

ἀπολώλη 1st sg. pluperf. act. < ἀπόλλυμι *be destroyed*
 ὠφελήκη 1st sg. pluperf. act. < ὠφελέω *help, aid*
 ἄχθεσθε < ἄχθομαι *be angry*
 σωθήσεται fut. pass. < σώζω *save*
 γνησίως *genuinely*
 διακωλύων < διακωλύω *hinder, prevent*
 παράνομα < παράνομος, -ον *unlawful*
 μαχούμενον fut. part. < μάχομαι *fight*

- 31d7–8 εἰ . . . ἐπεχείρησα . . . ἂν ἀπολώλη . . . ὠφελήκη (< ὀφείλω) Past counterfactual condition, with the pluperfect substituted for the aorist in the double apodosis.
 31d8–e1 ἂν Note the threefold repetition of ἂν, not at all necessary for the sentence to be intelligible but creating an emphatic tricolon, with which the sentence concludes. The rhetorical fireworks continue in the next sentence with a cluster of negatives: οὐ . . . οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . οὐδενί.
 31e4 γίνεσθαι Infinitive following a verb of hindering (διακωλύων).
 32a1 τὸν . . . μαχούμενον Subject of σωθήσεσθαι.
 32a2–3 ἰδιωτεύειν . . . μὴ δημοσιεύειν “To be a private citizen . . . not to be involved in politics.” Complementary infinitives with ἀναγκαῖον.

CHAPTER 20

(32a4–32e1)

“My past experiences substantiate this claim.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 20.

Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μοι τὰ 5
 συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκαθοιμι παρὰ
 τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα κἄν ἀπο-
 λοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ.

τεκμήρια < τεκμήριον, -ου, τό *proof*
 συμβεβηκότα pf. act. part. < συμβαίνω *occur*
 ὑπείκαθοιμι aor. act. opt. < ὑπέικω *yield*
 φορτικά < φορτικός, -ή, -όν *vulgar*
 δικανικά < δικανικός, -ή, -όν *pertaining to the law courts*

- 32a5–8 **ἀκούσατε δὴ . . .** The structure of this very complex sentence is as follows: imperative (ἀκούσατε), followed by a purpose clause (ἵνα εἰδῆτε . . .) and indirect statement (ὅτι . . . ἀπολοίμην) with a potential optative (οὐδ' . . . θάνατον), a negated participle in the nominative (μὴ ὑπέικων) reasserting Socrates' principled stand, and a final protasis (κἄν . . . ἀπολοίμην) that reiterates his willingness to die.
- 32a6 **ἐνὶ** “To even one man.”
ὑπείκαθοιμι The -θ- infix is characteristic of poetry and may give the passage a heroic flavor (Smyth 1956, 490), but the word is rare. Notice the chiasmic arrangement of the optatives and participles: ὑπείκαθοιμι . . . δεῖσας (concessive) . . . ὑπέικων . . . ἀπολοίμην.
- 32a8 **φορτικά . . . δικανικά** The anecdotes that Socrates tells support his claims, but since it is Socrates doing the telling, they could be viewed as boastful and hence “vulgar.” In addition, the lawcourts are full of defendants reminding the jurors of their many services to the city, and for this reason an uncharitable listener could regard his behavior as just the kind of thing you would expect from a defendant. Unlike much of what one hears under such circumstances, Socrates implies what he has to say is true. The stories are carefully chosen. The first shows Socrates standing by his convictions

- ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν
 b πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν
 ἢ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα
 στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας
 5 ἐβουλεύσασθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω
 χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων

ἀρχὴν < ἀρχή, -ῆς, ἡ office
 ἐβούλευσα < βουλεύω serve as a member of the boule
 φυλή, -ῆς, ἡ tribe
 πρυτανεύουσα < πρυτανεύω serve as a prytanis
 ἀνελομένους aor. mid. part. < ἀναίρεω pick up
 ναυμαχίας < ναυμαχία, -ας, ἡ sea fight
 ἀθρόους < ἀθρόος, -α, -ον all together
 κρίνειν < κρίνω judge, try

- against the angry democratic majority. The second takes place during the short-lived rule of the Thirty (see introduction). By choosing these two stories, Socrates effectively positions himself as politically nonpartisan in his pursuit of truth and his refusal to do wrong. In so doing, however, he can only count on the support of those jurors who are similarly above factional loyalty.
- 32a9 ἄλλην . . . ἀρχὴν The adjective anticipates Socrates' statement that he was once a member of the βουλή: except for this service, he held no other office.
- 32b1 ἐβούλευσα See on 25a3.
- 32b2 Ἀντιοχίς One of the ten tribes, named after Athenian heroes, into which the citizen body was divided.
 πρυτανεύουσα Supplementary participle with ἔτυχεν. Each of the tribes contributed fifty members annually to the βουλή, which prepared business for the assembly, and these groups rotated in turn as πρυτανεῖς, which formed the executive arm of the *boule*.
 τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς The reference is to the Battle of Arginusae, when the Athenian fleet was victorious over the Spartans. After the battle a storm prevented the Athenians from collecting the bodies of the fallen soldiers. The event produced great popular anger in Athens, as Xenophon describes (*Hellenika*, 1.7).
- 32b4 ἐβουλεύσασθε Some manuscripts have ἐβούλεσθε here, a reading that is perfectly intelligible but also a likely banalization from the more specific verb describing the official actions of the βουλή.
 παρανόμως "Illegally." Athenian legal practice did not permit defendants to be tried as a group on capital charges.
 ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ See Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 1.7.35. Their remorse did little for the unfortunate generals, who had already been executed.
- 32b5 ἐγὼ μόνος Xenophon says that a few others tried to intervene but that they eventually backed down, threatened with prosecution themselves, and that only Socrates held out to the end.

ἤναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία
 ἔψηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύμαι με καὶ ἀπάγειν
 τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ
 νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾧμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν c
 ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα
 δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης
 τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ
 μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν 5

ἤναντιώθην aor. pass. indic. < ἐναντιώω be opposed

ἐναντία on the other side

ἔψηφισάμην < ψηφίζομαι vote

ἐνδεικνύμαι pres. act. infin. < ἐνδείκνυμι indict

ἀπάγειν < ἀπάγω lead away, arrest

βοώντων < βοάω shout

ᾧμην impf. mid. < οἶμαι think

διακινδυνεύειν < διακινδυνεύω face all dangers

δεσμὸν < δεσμός, -οῦ, ὄ bond, imprisonment

δημοκρατουμένης < δημοκρατέομαι have a democratic constitution

ὀλιγαρχία, -ίας, < oligarchy

μεταπεμψάμενοι < μεταπέμψω send for

προσέταξαν < προστάττω command

- 32b6 ἐναντία "On the other side," that is, "against them."
 32b7-8 ἐτοίμων ὄντων . . . τῶν ῥητόρων Genitive absolute. So also, ὑμῶν
 κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων.
 32b8 ἐνδεικνύμαι Complementary infinitive with ἐτοίμων.
 ὑμῶν Socrates uses the second person to describe the actions of the βουλή
 since the body acts collectively on behalf of all Athenians, as does the court.
 32c2 φοβηθέντα The participle agrees with the με in c1. See on 28e for Socrates'
 willingness to endure danger. There he says that he would deserve to be
 prosecuted if he followed the orders of men but shirked his duty when the
 god commanded. In this passage, he shows one of the forms his under-
 standing of service to the god might take.
 32c3 δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως Genitive absolute. The Battle of Arginusae
 was fought in 406 B.C.E.
 32c4 οἱ τριάκοντα For more information, see introduction.
 32c5 με πέμπτον "Me and four others."
 θόλον Mention of the Tholos, a circular building in the agora, provides conti-
 nuity between Socrates' two stories, despite the change in government. The
 πρυτανεῖς with whom Socrates served in the aftermath of Arginusae met in the
 Tholos (also called the πρυτανεῖον), where they entertained foreign dignitaries.
 πρυτανεῖς took their meals and slept there as well, to ensure the presence of
 legally competent officials in cases of emergency. When the Thirty came to
 power, they too made use of the symbolic value of the Tholos in an attempt to
 legitimize their rule in the eyes of their fellow citizens.

- ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνιοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ
 d οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν

ἀναπλήσαι aor. act. infin. < ἀναπλήρημι fill up
 ἀγροικότερον rather vulgarly

- 32c6 **Σαλαμίνος** The island of Salamis, off the coast of Attica, famous from the naval victory of the Athenians against the Persians in 480, had been an Athenian possession since the sixth century.
Λέοντα The arrest and execution of Leon of Salamis is mentioned by various writers (Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, 1.94; Lysias 13.44; Xenophon, *Hellenika* 2.3.39). A general and a supporter of the democracy, he was said to be of impeccable personal character.
ἀποθάνοι Optative in a purpose clause in secondary sequence.
- 32c6–7 **οἷα . . . ἄλλοις . . . πολλοῖς πολλὰ** “Many such things to many people.” Note the elaborate chiasmic (a b b a) structure Plato uses for this clause. He clearly wishes to draw special attention to it, thereby distancing Socrates and himself from the excesses of the Thirty. This was necessary, since many might conclude from Socrates’ frequent criticisms of Athenian democracy that he was therefore a supporter (see on 20e8). Such a perception would have been reinforced by the fact that Critias, one of the leaders of the Thirty (and an uncle of Plato), had been one of the young men who gathered around Socrates. He is, in fact, portrayed as such by Plato in the *Protagoras* and the *Charmides*. He is not to be confused with his grandfather, who is the main speaker of the *Timaeus* and the eponymous *Critias* (for the family tree, see Nails 2002, 106–11).
 Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (1.2.30) likewise labors to show that Socrates was not a supporter of the oligarchs and claims that there was bad blood between Socrates and Critias even before Critias had come to power. To illustrate the basis of their hostility, he tells a story about Critias’s pursuit of Euthydemus, which caused Socrates to remark, “Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig: he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can keep from rubbing stones.” For the sources, see Nails 2002, 100.
- 32c8 **ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν** “Taint with guilt.” They wanted to dilute their own guilt by implicating as many citizens as possible in their crimes.
- 32d1 **αὖ** The repetition of the adverb emphasizes the degree to which Socrates’ actions were motivated by his sense of justice, not his attachment to one regime or another. When the democracy acted unjustly, he resisted. Then, *in turn* (αὖ c4), the oligarchy took power and he, *in turn* (αὖ again), showed that he did not fear death.
- 32d2 **ἀγροικότερον** The line of thinking seems to be that a cultivated person makes fine distinctions and articulates them, whereas another speaking ἀγροικότερον puts things baldly, as Socrates does here.

ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει.
 ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὐσα,
 ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου 5
 ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὄχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον
 Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὄχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ
 ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἢ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ
 τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες. e

ἀνόσιον < ἀνόσιος, -ον *impious*

ἀρχή, -ῆς, ἡ *regime*

ἐξέπληξεν < ἐκπλήττω *strike with panic*

ἰσχυρὰ < ἰσχυρός, -ά, -όν *powerful, strong*

ὄχοντο impf. < οἴχομαι *go, depart*

κατελύθη < καταλύω *destroy, dissolve*

32d2–3 τοῦ . . . ἐργάζεσθαι Articular infinitive dependent on μέλει.

32d3 τὸ πᾶν “Entirely.”

32d4 οὐσα The participle is concessive.

CHAPTER 21

(32e2–33b8)

“My only crime is to have been willing to discuss the right and the just with all who cared to listen, young and old, rich and poor.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 21.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι εἰ ἔπραττον
 τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πρᾶττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν
 τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην;
 5 πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος
 33 ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ
 τε εἰ πού τι ἔπραξα τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς
 οὔτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον
 οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ οὐς δὴ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ
 5 φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς

διαγενέσθαι aor. mid. infin. < διαγίγνομαι *pass through*
συγχωρήσας < συγχωρέω *go along with, collude with*
μαθητὰς < μαθητής, -οῦ, ὁ *pupil*
διδάσκαλος, -ου, ὁ *teacher*

- 32e3 **τὰ δημόσια** “Public business.”
 32e4 **τοῖς δικαίοις** Neuter abstraction: “justice.”
 32e5 **πολλοῦ γε δεῖ** “Far from it.”
ἂν In the apodosis of a past counterfactual condition. Supply the protasis and *τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι* from the previous sentence.
 33a1–3 The mixture of aorist (ἔπραξα) and future (φανοῦμαι) is odd. Two ideas seem to be conflated: the idea that Socrates’ public behavior has been consistent with his private actions, and the idea that this will continue to be the case in the future.
 33a2 **τοιοῦτος** Precisely *what* sort of men he means is explained by οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας . . . (below).
ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτος “The same person in private affairs.”
 33a5–b3 “I am not a teacher, but a conversationalist.”

πάποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ
 πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος,
 οὐδενὶ πάποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέ-
 γομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ **b**
 πένητι παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἕάν τις βούληται
 ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε
 τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν
 ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πάποτε μάθημα **5**
 μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πάποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ
 ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ
 ἀληθῆ λέγει.

ἐπιθυμῶ < ἐπιθυμέω *desire*
 ἐφθόνησα < φθονέω *begrudge*
 πλουσίῳ < πλουσῖος, -α, -ον *rich, wealthy*
 πένητι < πένης, -ητος, ὁ *poor man*
 ὑπέχοιμι < ὑπέχω *offer, incur (mid.)*
 μάθημα. -ατος, τό *lesson*

- 33a6–7 τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος . . . ἀκούειν “Listen to me practicing my way of life.” ἀκούω takes the genitive, but πράττω normally refers to the realm of action, not speech. Socrates’ ἔργον, however, is precisely his λόγος.
 33b1 μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ Supply χρήματα as the object of the participle and διαλέγομαι to go with οὐ: “Nor do I refuse to converse if I don’t get paid.”
 33b2 ἐρωτᾶν Infinitive of purpose: “for questioning.” Note again that Socrates offers himself for questioning, as well as questioning others. But as the next line makes clear, they must be willing to answer as well.
 33b3–8 “Anyone who says I ever taught him does not speak the truth.” On one level, this is absolutely true. The goal of Socratic conversation is not the transmission of preexisting information, but self-examination and testing. Thus, he cannot cause someone to become good or bad. Only the individual under “examination” brings about that change.
 33b5 ὧν The antecedent is τούτων.
 33b5–6 ὑπεσχόμην . . . μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα “I never offered a lesson or taught one.”

CHAPTER 22

(33b9–34b5)

“Nonetheless, young men congregate around me, because they enjoy hearing those who pretend to be wise interrogated.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 22.

- Ἄλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ’ ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν
 c χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πᾶσαν
 ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν
 ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐσι δ’ οὐ.
 ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἠδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέ-
 5 τακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων

διατρίβοντες < διατρίβω *consume, spend*

ἀηδές < ἀηδής, -ές *unpleasant*

προστέτακται pf. pass. indic. < προστάττω *command, assign*

- 33c2 ὅτι “It is because . . .” ὅτι picks up the τί from b9.
- 33c3 ἐξεταζομένοις . . . οἰομένοις . . . σοφοῖς, οὐσι The datives all depend on χαίρουσι. σοφοῖς is the predicate of τοῖς . . . οὐσι δ’ οὐ: “who think that they are wise . . . but are not.”
- 33c4 προστέτακται Socrates insists that his experience should be understood within the traditional patterns of Greek religious experience. He has already discussed the oracle from Apollo in detail. At the beginning of *Phaedo* (60e), Socrates describes a recurring dream that he interpreted as offering him encouragement to pursue a life devoted to philosophy. Note, however, that at c4 (οὐκ ἠδές), he appears to admit that there are fringe benefits to his way of life as well.
- 33c5 ἐξ ἐνυπνίων “In dreams.” Whereas there may be some irony in the story of Chaerephon’s consultation with the Delphic oracle (20e6–21e2), here the emphasis on repeated dreams seems to suggest that his philosophical inquiry is based on a desire that is deeply personal and in the end transrational. Although Socrates elsewhere mentions dreams that he interprets as divine instruction or encouragement (*Crito* 44a, *Phaedo* 60e), this is the only place where he mentions dreams as an impetus for his life’s mission.

καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ὧπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ ὅτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
καὶ ἀληθὴ ἔστιν καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων
τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω τοὺς δὲ διέφθορακα, χρῆν δῆπου, εἴτε **d**
τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν
αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πάποτέ τι συνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς
ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ
αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ **5**
ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι
κακὸν ἐπεπόνθησαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι καὶ
τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεσιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ
οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὕτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης
καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ **e**

μοῖρα. -ας, ἡ *fate*
εὐέλεγκτα < εὐέλεγκτος, -ον *easy to test*
διέφθορακα pf. act. indic. < διαφθείρω *corrupt*
συνεβούλευσα < συμβουλεύω *advise*
τιμωρεῖσθαι < τιμωρέω *take vengeance on*
οἰκείων < οἰκεῖος, -α, -ον *belonging to the household, family*
προσῆκοντας < προσήκω (here) *relatives*
ἐπεπόνθησαν pluperf. act. < πάσχω *suffer, experience*
πάντως (here) *at any rate*
ἡλικιώτης, -ου, ὁ *contemporary*
δημότης, -ου, ὁ *fellow demesman*

- 33d1 τοὺς μὲν . . . τοὺς δέ . . . "Some . . . others . . ."
χρῆν Imperfect of *χρήν*, here with *ἄν*, as frequently.
33d2 πρεσβύτεροι Take with *γενόμενοι*: "now that they're older."
νέοις οὖσι "When they were young."
33d4 κατηγορεῖν . . . τιμωρεῖσθαι Infinitives dependent on *χρῆν*. So also *μεμνήσθαι*
καὶ *τιμωρεῖσθαι* (d8).
33d6 τινὰς Subject of *μεμνήσθαι* and *τιμωρεῖσθαι*.
33d9–e1 Κρίτων . . . Κριτοβούλου Crito was a wealthy and well-connected friend of
Socrates. He plays a prominent role in both Plato's and Xenophon's accounts
of the Socratic circle. In the dialogue named after him, he is an emissary of
unknown well-wishers who want to persuade Socrates to accept their finan-
cial and logistical assistance in securing his escape from prison and flight
into exile. His son Critobolus is also one of the men present at the death of
Socrates (*Phaedo* 59b).

- Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι δ' Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ, ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὔτοι ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος
 5 Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελευτήκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδηθείη—καὶ
 34 Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὐτοσί Πλάτων, καὶ

διατριβῇ < διατριβή, -ῆς, ἡ *pastime, way of living*
καταδηθείη < καταδέω *beg, entreat*

- 33e1–2 **Λυσανίας . . . Αἰσχίνου** Not much is known about Lysanias of Sphettus, a deme of Attica, although his presence at the trial suggests that he was known as a supporter of Socrates. His son, Aeschines, is an important figure within the Socratic circle and also is part of the group mentioned in the *Phaedo*. He too was a writer of Socratic dialogues, including an *Alcibiades* and an *Aspasia*, of which some fragments remain.
- 33e2–3 **Ἀντιφῶν . . . Ἐπιγένους** Kephesia was a deme of northwest Athens. Of this Antiphon (not the well-known orator) little is known. His son, Epigenes, is similarly obscure, except for the reference here and his presence in *Phaedo*.
- 33e4–5 **Νικόστρατος . . . Θεοζοτίδου . . . Θεοδότου** Nothing much about Nicostratos is known. His father, Theozotides, was a democratic politician who proposed a decree extending pension benefits to the orphans of Athenian citizens killed in the war that drove out the oligarchs (Nails 2002, 283–84). Nothing is known of the son.
- 33e7–34a1 **Πάραλιος . . . Δημοδόκου . . . Θεάγης** Most of the manuscripts here read Πάραλος, but our text has been emended on the basis of an inscription that refers to a Paralius who served as treasurer in 390 B.C.E. (*Inscriptiones Graeci* II² 1400). The name is uncommon, however, and the emendation may well be incorrect. Demodocus may be the same general mentioned by Thucydides (4.75). In the *Theages* (a dialogue attributed to Plato but regarded as spurious by many), he seeks out the advice of Socrates to find a teacher for his son Theages, who is also mentioned in the *Republic*.
- 34a1–2 **Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος . . . Πλάτων** Plato's father, Ariston, is reported to have traced his ancestry back to Codrus, one of the legendary kings of Athens, and from there to Poseidon (Diogenes Laertius 3.1). His wife's lineage was equally impressive, for she counted Solon the lawgiver as one of her ancestors. Their three sons figure unequally in the Platonic dialogues. Adeimantus and Glaucon are the primary interlocutors of Socrates in the *Republic* and appear briefly at the beginning of *Parmenides*. Their brother, who actually wrote the dialogues, is shyer. In addition to this passage, he will be mentioned again at 38b as one of the friends of Socrates who have offered to contribute money to pay a fine. He is conspicuously absent from the execution of Socrates, and we learn from *Phaedo*, the narrator, that he was ill (59b).

Αϊαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός· καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ—καὶ λεγέτω 5
εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τὸναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὧ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον 6
ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι 5
συνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

παραχωρῶ < παραχωρέω *yield*
διαφθαρμένοι pf. pass. part. < διαφθείρω *corrupt*
ἀδιάφθαρτοι < ἀδιάφθαρτος, -ον *uncorrupted*
συνίσασι < συνοῖδα *be conscious*
ἀληθεύοντι < ἀληθεύω *tell the truth*

- 34a2** **Αϊαντόδωρος . . . Ἀπολλόδωρος** Aiantodorus is not known outside of this passage. Apollodorus, however, is mentioned by Xenophon as someone who followed Socrates assiduously (*Memorabilia* 3.11.17). He was present at the death of Socrates, according to the *Phaedo*, where his excessive emotionalism is assumed (59b1). He also narrates the *Symposium*, where he is accused of having scorn for everyone who has not, like him, abandoned all his business to follow Socrates (173d).
- 34a4** **Μέλητον** Subject of παρασχέσθαι.
- 34a5** **παρασχέσθω . . . λεγέτω** Third-person imperatives.
- 34a6** **τι . . . τοιοῦτον** For example, a disgruntled former associate or family member.
- 34a7** **πάντας** Subject of βοηθεῖν.
- 34b4** **τόν** Supply λόγον.

CHAPTER 23

(34b6–35b8)

Conclusion: “I have made my defense. I will not debase myself and the court with the usual histrionics.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 23.

Εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ’ ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστί ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ’ ἂν τις
 c ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ

σχεδόν nearly, almost
ἀγανακτήσειεν < ἀγανακτέω be angry
ἀγωνιζόμενος < ἀγωνίζομαι contend, fight
ἐδεήθη < aor. pass. indic. < δέομαι beg

34b6 ἃ The relative is dependent on ταῦτα in the next line.

ἔχοιμ’ Potential optative.

34c1 ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ “Remembering himself,” that is, his own behavior. Precisely *what* someone might remember and resent is explained by the μὲν . . . δέ clauses that follow. Socrates’ statement is not as far-fetched as it may sound to modern readers typically unacquainted with the inner workings of a court, except as represented by television drama. It was not uncommon for the kind of men who served as jurors (as opposed to the country folk who seldom came to town) to take part in legal proceedings at some time in their lives. Fifth-century Athens was a highly litigious society. Inheritance disputes were common, as were those involving business contracts. Perceived religious offenses, too, could land a citizen in court. The courts were also used as a tool of political warfare, as in the present case. Jurors who had been defendants themselves might have expected to find their own behavior vindicated, if “the wise Socrates” struggled to get himself off just as hard as they did. Socrates imagines that they may resent his refusal to beg for their mercy.

34c1–2 ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος “Contesting a lesser charge than this one.” This elaborate play on words, which is not reflected by the translation, uses both polyptoton (< πολὺ “many” + πτώσις “fall”), the use of a single noun in various cases (< πτώσις, *casus*, “fall, case”), and *figura etymologica*, the adjacent use of etymologically related words, to create a rhetorical tour de force, even as Socrates is also claiming to eschew the

ikéteuse touc dikacatác metá pollwñ daakrwñ, paidia te
 autou anabibasámenc ina óti málistá elētheiē, kai állouc
 twñ oikeiōn kai filwñ pollouc, egō dē oudēn ára toutwñ 5
 poiēsw, kai taúta kinδunēwñ, wc an dóxaiμi, twn éxchaton
 kíndunon. táx' an oún tic taúta ennoēcac aúthadēcτερον
 an próc me cχοiē kai óργιcθειc aútoic toucoic theiτο an μετ'
 óργηc tēn ψēφον. ei dh tic úmwñ outwc éxci—ouc áxiw d
 mēn gar éγωγε, ei d' oún—éπiciēkh an moi dokō próc tou-ton
 léγειν léγων óti “Éμοi, w áριcτε, eiicīn mēn pou tinec kai
 oikeiōi· kai gar touτο autò tò tou ‘Omhrou, oud' egō ‘apò

ikéteuse < iκετεύω *approach as a suppliant*
 daakrwñ < dáakrwon, -ou, τό *tear*
 paidia < paidion, -ou, τό *child*
 anabibasámenc < anabibázō *bring into court*
 óti málistá *as much as possible*
 elētheiē aor. pass. opt. < eleēō *pity*
 éxchaton < éxchatoc, -h, -on *extreme, last*
 ennoēcac < ennoēō *consider*
 óργιcθειc aor. pass. part. < óργίζω *be angry, grow angry*
 óργηc < óργē, -h, h *anger*
 éπiciēkh < éπiciēkhc, -éc *suitable, reasonable*

- trappings of traditional courtroom performance. An *elátτων áγων* would be one that is not a capital trial and hence would warrant even less the kind of courtroom histrionics Socrates here rejects.
- 34c6 **τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον** That is, death. Socrates contrasts both his behavior and (as he imagines) that of the jurors with the relative seriousness of their respective situations.
- ἄν** The particle anticipates the potential optative that follows (*σχοiē*). Note the repetition of *án* with the verb nevertheless.
- 34c7–8 **ἀυθαδέστερον . . . σχοiē** “Be remorseless.” *éxw* + adverb is frequently used idiomatically to mean “be in a condition.”
- αὐτοic toucoic** Causal, referring to *taúta* (c7).
- 34c8 **θειτο . . . ψēφον** “Vote.” For the procedure, see on 30e1.
- 34d1 **άξιw** “Expect,” but also “deem worthy.” Socrates ironically says that he does not think the jurors will react in such a fashion, because such behavior would be unworthy of them.
- 34d2 **ei d' oún** “But if he does . . .”
- án . . . λέγειν** Infinitive after *dokō*.
- 34d3 **óti** Do not translate.
- 34d4 **τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου** “As Homer says” (literally, “with respect to the thing of Homer”). He is quoting Penelope’s words to the disguised Odysseus at *Odyssey* 19.163: “You are not born from an ancient oak or rock.” Socrates’ refusal to seek pity from the jurors does not mean that he is a misanthropic loner without family, but simply that he is a man with high ethical standards.

- 5 δρυός οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης' πέφυκα ἄλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε
καὶ οἰκειοί μοι εἰσι καὶ ὑεῖς γε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς
μὲν μεράκιον ἦδη, δύο δὲ παιδιά· ἄλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν
δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι.” τί
δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ ἀθθαδιζόμενος, ὧ ἄνδρες
e Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ
ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ
ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ
τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα
5 ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος, ἄλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον
35 γέ ἐστι τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

δρυός < δρυός, -ός, ἡ oak
πέτρης < πέτρι, -ης, ἡ rock
πέφυκα pf. act. indic. < φύω be born
ἀποψηφίσασθαι < ἀποψηφίζομαι acquit
ἀτιμάζων < ἀτιμάζω dishonor
θαρραλέως courageously
δεδογμένον . . . ἐστι 3rd sing. pf. pass. indic. (periphrastic form) < δοκέω think

- 34d6 ὑεῖς . . . τρεῖς Their names were Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. They do not figure in the dialogues of Plato. In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (2.2), Socrates advises Lamprocles to get along better with his mother, Xanthippe.
- 34d9 ἀθθαδιζόμενος “Acting at my own pleasure,” that is, without regard for the expectations of the audience. The verb is formed from αὐτό (self) + ἴδομαι (enjoy). See on 34c8 for the virtually synonymous ἀθθαδέστερον . . . σοχίη.
- 34e1 θαρραλέως A recurring theme throughout the speech is mankind’s fear of death. Socrates recognizes its powerful force in determining human behavior and argues that it must be resisted. Later, in a speech of consolation to his supporters, he will envision two models of death that should not cause us to be anxious (40c–41c). For now, he pauses to consider that he has gone too far and that by forcing members of his audience to consider their own mortality and by facing death bravely himself, he may have alienated them further, making them even less receptive to philosophy. He refers to his personal bravery as irrelevant (ἄλλος λόγος) and continues by steering the speech back to something he feels they will understand—the reputation of Athens (δόξα e2).
- 34e3 ἐμοὶ . . . ὑμῖν . . . ὅλη τῇ πόλει Datives of possession.
- 34e4 τούτων The pronoun is neuter. He means things such as begging for mercy, parading one’s children before the jury, and so forth.
ὄντα . . . ἔχοντα Agreeing with ἐμέ.
τοῦνομα = τὸ ὄνομα. He refers to his reputation for wisdom.
- 34e5–35a1 δεδογμένον . . . ἐστι The subject is τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν (35a1): “The notion that Socrates is better than many men in some way is believed, anyway.”

εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία
 εἴτε ἄλλη ἥτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη·
 οἷουςπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας ὅταν κρίνονται, δο-
 κοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν 5
 τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων
 ἐσομένων ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν
 αἰσχύνῃν τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινὰ καὶ τῶν ξένων
 ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς b

ἀνδρεία < ἀνδρεία, -ας, ἡ *courage*
ἐώρακα pf. act. indic. < ὄρω *see*
πείσεσθαι fut. mid. infin. < πάσχω *suffer*
περιάπτειν < περιάπτω *attach*
ὑπολαβεῖν aor. act. infin. < ὑπολαμβάνω *understand, suppose*

- 35a1–b3 A complex sentence in three parts that marks the climax of Socrates' argument against the usual rituals of throwing oneself on the mercy of the court.
- 35a1–3 The first part.
- 35a3 **ἥτινιοῦν** Fem. dat. sg. ὅστις + οὖν.
τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται "Will be like that," that is, disgracing one's good name by engaging in unworthy acts. The future indicative in the protasis, as opposed to the subjunctive or the optative, connotes strong emotional involvement on the part of the speaker (cf. Smyth 1956, 2328).
- 35a4–7 The second part.
- 35a4 **οἷουςπερ . . . τινας** "Men of this very sort."
- 35a5 **δοκοῦντας τι εἶναι** "Seeming to be something"; that is, "having a good reputation."
θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζόμενος "But acting in an astounding way."
- 35a6 **δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι** Socrates brings the discussion back to the irrational fear of death.
- 35a7 **ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων** (< εἰμί) Genitive absolute. The subject is the same as that of ἀποθανοῦνται. It is unusual for the main verb and a genitive absolute to share the same subject and so draws the reader's attention with special emphasis to this phrase.
ἂν = ἐάν.
- 35a7–b3 The final part and climax of the sentence. By such behavior the Athenians shame themselves before others.
- 35a8–b1 **ὥστ' ἂν . . . ὑπολαβεῖν** ἂν + the infinitive expresses a *possible* result.
- 35b1 **οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν** "The Athenians who are most outstanding (lit. 'the ones superior with respect to excellence')."

- αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς
 προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. ταῦτα γάρ,
 ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκούντας
 5 καὶ ὀπιοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπι-
 τρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον
 καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλείναι ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ
 καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

προκρίνουσιν < προκρίνω *choose before others, prefer*

ὀπιοῦν *in any way whatsoever*

ἐπιτρέπειν < ἐπιτρέπω *permit*

ἐνδείκνυσθαι < ἐνδείκνυμι *demonstrate*

καταψηφιεῖσθε fut. < καταψηφίζομαι *vote against, condemn*

ἡσυχίαν < ἡσυχία, -ας, ἡ *peace, quiet*

- 35b2 **αὐτοί** "They themselves."
ἀρχαῖς . . . τιμαῖς Many offices in the fifth century were determined by lot, especially if they were thought to require loyalty rather than skill. Others, particularly military commands, were elective. See Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 61. ἀρχαί and τιμαί are probably synonymous here, as at Aristotle *Politics* 1281a31: τιμάς γὰρ λέγομεν τὰς ἀρχάς.
 35b3 **γυναικῶν** The casual misogyny is striking to modern readers but not exceptional for the time and place.
 35b4–5 **δοκούντας τι εἶναι** For the idiom, see on 35a5.
 35b5 **ἂν . . . ποιῶμεν** ἂν = ἔάν in the protasis of a future more vivid condition.
 35b6 **μᾶλλον** The comparative looks ahead to ἢ in b8. Translate as "rather."
 35b7 **τοῦ . . . εἰσάγοντος καὶ ποιοῦντος** Genitive of the person charged. εἰσάγειν is common in both forensic and dramatic contexts.
τὰ ἐλείναι ταῦτα δράματα "These pitiful scenes."

CHAPTER 24

(35b9–d8)

“Jurors swear to the gods to uphold justice, and those of us who truly believe in the gods should trust that they will honor their oath.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 24.

Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ
εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ c
διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικασ-
τής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν
ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῆ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ

ἀποφεύγειν < ἀποφεύγω *escape, be acquitted*
κάθηται < κάθημαι *sit as a judge*
καταχαρίζεσθαι < καταχαρίζομαι *do a favor*
ὁμώμοκεν pf. act. indic. < ὄμνυμι *swear*
χαριεῖσθαι fut. mid. infin. < χαρίζομαι *gratify*

- 35b9 **χωρίς δὲ τῆς δόξης** “Apart from the notoriety” (discussed at 35a4). Appeals to pity are also bad, because they corrupt the administration of justice and invite jurors to make decisions on the basis of sympathy rather than justice.
- 35c2 **ἐπὶ τούτῳ** “With a view to this.” The phrase anticipates the two articular infinitives below.
- 35c3 **ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια** “With the expectation of dispensing justice as a favor.”
- 35c4 **ὁμώμοκεν** The subject is ὁ δικαστής.
χαριεῖσθαι The tense of the infinitive indicates action subsequent to ὁμώμοκεν. So also δικάσειν (< δικάζω).

- 5 δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὐτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν
 ὑμᾶς ἐπιπορκεῖν οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν
 εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα
 δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν ἢ μήτε ἠγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε
 d δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσε-
 βείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ
 πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμομοκότας, θεοὺς
 ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἠγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολο-
 5 γούμενος κατηγοροῖην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ
 πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,

δικάσειν fut. act. infin. < δικάζω judge
 ἐπιπορκεῖν < ἐπιπορκέω break an oath
 ἐθίζεσθαι < ἐθίζω become accustomed
 εὐσεβοῖεν < εὐσεβέω be pious
 ὅσια < ὅσιος, -α, -ον holy
 ἀσεβείας < ἀσέβεια, -ας, ἡ impiety
 βιαζοίμην < βιάζω constrain, overpower by force

- 35c5 ἡμᾶς That is, those of us who are on trial and who might indulge in this kind of activity, if we thought it would be tolerated.
- 35c7 οὖν The particle indicates that Socrates is coming back to the point made about the presumed expectation that he will throw himself at the mercy of the court, make a display of his children, and other such things (τοιαῦτα c8). Translate “So, . . .”
- 35d1 ἄλλως τε “Especially,” made more emphatic by μέντοι νῆ Δία. By piling up particles and adverbs, Socrates postpones, and thus builds suspense for, the ironic paradox of defending himself impiously against a charge of impiety.
- 35d2 φεύγοντα “Since I am being prosecuted for,” agreeing with με (c7).
 σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν The sentence is a future-less-vivid conditional (opt. in the protasis, opt. + ἂν in the main clause. The words quoted go with the apodosis θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι . . .). Note the pleonastic repetition of ἂν at d4.
- 35d3 τῷ δεῖσθαι Articular infinitive, “by begging.”
- 35d4 μὴ ἠγεῖσθαι . . . εἶναι “Not to believe the gods exist.”
- 35d4–5 ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῖην ἂν “I would prosecute myself while attempting to defend.” There are no wasted words. Note how the economy of Plato’s style heightens Socrates’ paradox.
- 35d5 ὡς “On the grounds that . . .”
- 35d6 πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν “But this is far from the case.”
 νομίζω Supply τοὺς θεοὺς.

ὡς οὐδείς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

ἐπιτρέπω *trust in*

35d7 ὡς οὐδείς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν “As none of my accusers [do].”
 35d8 ὅπῃ μέλλει . . . ἄριστα “How it will be best.”

THE VERDICT

The ἀπολογία proper ends at this point. The jurors now proceed to vote. Ballots are then counted and the verdict is announced. It is determined that Socrates has been convicted by a small margin. Next comes the penalty phase. According to the process, after accuser and accused propose penalties, the jury votes again to choose between the two. They are not allowed to substitute a penalty of their own devising. The prosecution has recommended death as a punishment, and the speech resumes with Socrates’ counterproposal (ἀντιτίμησις).

CHAPTER 25

(35e1–36b2)

“The vote was much closer than I thought it would be.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 25.

- e Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ
 36 τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ
 συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς
 τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων
 τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ὥόμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ’
 5 ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ
 τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφεύγη ἄν.

ἀγανακτεῖν < ἀγανακτέω *be angry*
 συμβάλλεται *contribute*
 ἀνέλπιστον *unexpectedly*
 ἐκατέρων < ἐκάτερος, -α, -ον *on either side*
 μετέπεσον aor. act. indic. < μεταπίπτω *change*
 ἀπεπεφεύγη pluperf. act. < ἀποφεύγω *be found innocent*

- 35e1–36a4 The loose construction of the entire sentence mimics the syntax of extemporaneous improvisation.
- 35e1–2 τό . . . μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν The articular infinitive is used as an accusative of respect: “concerning my lack of anger.”
 τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι “At this turn of events.”
- 36a4 τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν “The total.”
 οὕτω παρ’ ὀλίγον “By so few.”
- 36a5–6 εἰ τριάκοντα . . . ἀπεπεφεύγη ἄν The condition is a variant of the past counterfactual, with the pluperfect indicative in the apodosis in place of the aorist indicative.
- 36a6 μετέπεσον Socrates’ statement is plausible. Juries in the fifth century often consisted of 500 jurors, and if the vote had been 280–220, a shift of 30 would have resulted in a tie and therefore an acquittal. For a summary of the sources, see Brickhouse and Smith (1992).

Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφυγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφυγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἄν ὄφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων. b

ἀνέβη aor. act. indic. < ἀναβαίνω *appear in court*

ὄφλε aor. act. indic. < ὀφλισκάνω *owe*

μεταλαβὼν aor. act. part. < μεταλαμβάνω *get a share of*

- 36a7** **καὶ νῦν** “Even now.” Socrates imagines that the votes that convicted him came in equal shares from the supporters of his three accusers. Thus Meletus’s share of 93.33 (the presumed 280 divided by 3) would not have been enough to convict him.
- 36a8–b2** **εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη . . . τῶν ψήφων** The condition is past counterfactual. Note the singular verb with the plural subject. Socrates appears to be thinking primarily of Anytus (thus the singular), then adding Lycon as an afterthought. Thereafter, he refers to them in the plural (κατηγορήσοντες). The inconsistency of number again gives the impression of off-the-cuff improvisation.
- 36b1** **τὸ πέμπτον μέρος** “One fifth.” Frivolous prosecutions were discouraged by a rule that required the prosecutor to get one-fifth of the vote or be subject to a fine. Meletus’s “share” would have fallen below that standard as Socrates reckons it.

CHAPTER 26

(36b3–37a1)

“I do not, in fact, deserve death but to be supported at city expense!” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 26.

- Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ
 τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι
 5 τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι
 μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὄνπερ
 οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν
 καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν καὶ

τιμᾶται < τιμάω (mid.) *propose a penalty*
 ἀποτεῖσαι aor. act. infin. < ἀποτίνω *pay*
 χρηματισμοῦ < χρηματισμός, -οῦ, ὁ *money making*
 οἰκονομίας < οἰκονομία, -ας, ἡ *household management*
 στρατηγιῶν < στρατηγία, -ας, ἡ *command*
 δημηγοριῶν < δημηγορία *political speech*
 συνωμοσιῶν < συνωμοσία, ἡ *conspiracy*

- 36b5–d2 Note the highly effective rhetorical contrast between the short, simple sentences that precede it and this complex period in which Socrates ironically enumerates his “crimes.”
- 36b3 ὁ ἀνὴρ Presumably he refers to Meletus.
- 36b4 τίνος Genitive of value. Note also the accent.
- 36b5 ἀξίας “An appropriate one.” ἀντιτιμήσομαι is understood. The gender of the adjective is determined by the implied noun τιμή.
 ὅτι μαθὼν A rare idiom: “because.”
- 36b6 οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον “I did not lead a quiet life.”
 ὄνπερ οἱ πολλοί Supply here something such as ἐπιμελοῦνται.
- 36b8 συνωμοσιῶν Political clubs (συνωμοσία < συνόμνυμι, “swear a pact”) had long been a feature of Athenian society, particularly among the aristocratic families. Such groups often fell under suspicion during the democracy, on the assumption that they were incubators of antigovernmental conspiracies. Such fears, though exaggerated at times, were not completely off base. The revolutionaries of 411 were closely linked with the clubs, and Thucydides

στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἑμαυτὸν
 τῶ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σφῶζεσθαι, c
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῶ ἔμελλο-
 ν μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργε-
 τεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα,
 ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν 5
 ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως

στάσεων < στάσις, -εως, ἡ *faction*
 ἦα 1st sing. impf. < εἶμι *go*
 οἱ *where*
 εὐεργετεῖν < εὐεργετέω *do good service*

(8.54) reports that there were frequent consultations between them and Peisander in the weeks leading up to the overthrow of the democratic government. They were also heavily involved in the short-lived reign of the Thirty Tyrants. Thus Socrates' mention of *συνωμοσία* here is not simply an expression of lack of interest in practical politics, but an indirect assertion that he did not align himself with the subversive groups that had actively worked against the democracy.

36c1 **ἐπιεικέστερον . . . ἢ** "More upright than," leading up to the result clause ὥστε . . . σφῶζεσθαι.

εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα "By doing these things." Socrates speaks of the political associations as if they were places, hence the minor awkwardness of the sentence. The spatial metaphor, however, is maintained throughout the sentence to contrast where Socrates chose not to "go" with his habit of "going" to everyone and urging them to strive after excellence.

36c3 **ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ . . . εὐεργετεῖν** The sentence begins with an articular infinitive that is the object of ἐπί ("with regard to") before coming to the main verb ἦα, "I went" (c5).

ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν is parenthetical.

36c4 **τὴν . . . εὐεργεσίαν** Cognate accusative.

36c5 **πρότερον** Do not translate.

τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενός "Anything of yours." τῶν is a partitive genitive coming off of μηδενός, the object of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Socrates here introduces a fundamental difference between the self and its possessions.

36c6 **ἐπιμεληθεῖν** Optative in a πρὶν-clause after a secondary tense (ἦα, c5).

Socrates again emphasizes the care of the self as the most crucial aspect of human life. The public activities rejected by Socrates are not intrinsically bad, provided that the pursuit of them is not just "résumé building," but the natural activity of a soul that has learned moderation. The problem is, however, that since the activities are public, their outcomes will depend in part on the immoderate behavior of others whose desires are out of control. Socratic moderation will not be enough to protect its possessor, as the present trial clearly shows. The only way out of this dilemma within a democracy is to persuade one's fellow citizens to act differently, to make the care of the self their concern as well. Socrates has devoted his career to that task.

- ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πό-
 λεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν
 d αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦ-
 τος ὧν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
 ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον
 5 ὅτι ἂν πρέπει ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη
 δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει; οὐκ
 ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν
 τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ
 εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγῃ νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπία-
 σιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ

φρονιμώτατος < φρόνιμος, -ον *wisest*

πρέπει < πρέπω *befitting*

σιτεῖσθαι < σιτέω *feed*

εὐδαίμονος < εὐδαίμων, -ονος *happy, fortunate*

- 36c7 ἔσοιτο Future optative in a relative clause of purpose after a secondary-
 tense verb. See Smyth 1956, 2554. The subject of the verb is the self (ἐαυτοῦ).
 τῶν τῆς πόλεως . . . πόλεως Supply πείθειν μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι from above.
 A state in which decisions are made in hopes of securing more wealth,
 goods, prestige, and so forth (τῶν τῆς πόλεως) will by its very nature show
 itself to be undeserving of those things. Just as in the case of the individual,
 possessions and honors will be bad for a city if they are not subordinated to
 higher moral ideals.
- 36c8 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον "In the same way," that is, caring for the attributes
 that make it truly excellent rather than for superficial qualities that only
 make it *seem* good.
- 36d3 ἀξίαν Supply δίκην.
- 36d5 καὶ ταῦτά γε "And indeed, with respect to these things."
- 36d5 ἄγειν Dependent on δεομένῳ.
- 36d6 ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει "To encourage you" (lit. "for your exhortation).
- 36d6 οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον . . . πρέπει ἔσθ' = ἔστι. Translate "There is nothing
 more fitting."
- 36d7 πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι For the Prytaneum, also known as the Tholos, see on
 32c5. Socrates' proposal is purposely outrageous.
- 36d8 συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγῃ "Two or four horse chariots." Chariot racing was argu-
 ably the most prestigious event at the Olympics and other major athletic
 festivals. For just that reason, it offered an opportunity to the wealthy and
 ambitious to display publicly their preeminence. Socrates seeks to under-
 mine the city's infatuation with successful athletes and suggests that it
 would be more fitting to honor him in their place.
- 36d9 εὐδαίμονας Pride in the accomplishments of a fellow citizen produces the
appearance of happiness in everyone.

εἶναι, καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ
 οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου
 τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως. 37

τροφῆς < τροφή, -ῆς, ἡ *sustenance*
 σιτήσεως < σίτησις, -εος, ἡ *feeding*

36e1 τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται Because he already possesses the extreme wealth necessary to race horses.

36e2 οὖν The particle has resumptive force, calling our attention back to the point Socrates made at 36d3.

CHAPTER 27

(37a2–e2)

“I am serious in my proposal. I would rather die than spend my life in prison or exile, and I do not have the funds to pay a substantial fine.” Xenophon argues that Socrates deliberately chose to die, since he had already lived a good life and would avoid the inevitable decline of old age (*Apology* 1–9). For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 27.

Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν
 ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος·
 τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ
 5 τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν
 ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον
 ἀλλήλοισ διειλέγεμθα. ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος,

παραπλησίως *similarly, in a similar way*
οἴκτου < οἴκτος, -ου, ὁ *pity*
ἀντιβολήσεως < ἀντιβόλησις, -εως, ἡ *entreaty, prayer*
τοιόνδε < τοιόσδε, -άδε, -όνδε *such a thing as follows*
πέπεισμαι pf. pass. indic. < πείθω *believe*
ἐκὼν *willingly*

- 37a3 ὡσπερ “Just as [I was doing].”
 οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως He refers to his statement at 34c.
 ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος See on 34d9.
- 37a4 τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν . . . τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον “It’s not like that, Athenians, but more like the following.”
- 37a5 ἔκων εἶναι “Willingly.” For the idea that Socrates might have misbehaved inadvertently (and so deserved a stern lecture in place of an indictment), see on 25d–26a.
- 37a6 ὀλίγον χρόνον For Socrates’ complaint about the short time allowed to correct the many slanders against him, see on 19a2.
- 37a7 ἐγῶμαι = ἐγὼ οἶμαι.
- 37a7–b1 εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος . . . ἐπέισθητε ἄν Mixed counterfactual condition.

ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν
μόνον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον **b**
ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμέ-
νος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν
καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ
τιμῆσεσθαι τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἑμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω **5**
τοῦτο οὐδ' Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ
ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὖ
οἶδά τι κακῶν ὄντων τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;
καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθη- **c**
σταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἑνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι
ἕως ἄν ἐκτείσω; ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν μοι ἐστὶν ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον·

ἔλωμαι aor. mid. subj. < αἰρέω *choose*
δεσμοτηρίῳ < δεσμοτηρίον, -ου, τό *prison*
δεδέσθαι pf. pass. infin. < δέω *bind, put in chains*
ἐκτείσω aor. mid. < ἐκτίνω *pay*

- 37a10 **μίαν ἡμέραν . . . πολλάς** Acc. of duration of time.
37b3 **ἀδικεῖν** Infinitive in indirect statement after πεπεισμένος.
πολλοῦ δέω "I am far from . . ." (+ infin.). Note the future tense of the two
infinitives dependent on the main verb (δέω) and indicating time subse-
quent to it.
37b4 **του κακοῦ** "Something bad."
37b5 **ἢ** "Introducing a suggested answer, couched in interrogative form, to a
question just asked" (Denniston 1954, 283).
μὴ πάθω The clause of fearing is dependent on δείσας in the previous
sentence
37b6 **μοι** Dative of disadvantage.
φημί He talks about the subject at greater length at 29a–b, and our lack of
knowledge about death forms the basis for his "mythologizing" at 39e5
and thereafter.
37b7 **ἔλωμαι** Deliberative subjunctive.
ὧν Partitive with τι.
37b8 **δεσμοῦ** The genitive continues to be dependent on τιμησάμενος. Imprison-
ment for debt was rare in Athens.
37c1-2 **τῇ . . . καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ** "To the officials who happen to be in power."
37c2 **τοῖς ἑνδεκα** "The Eleven." According to Aristotle (*Constitution of the Athe-
nians* 52.1), these officials had charge of all prisoners.

- οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὅπόθεν ἐκτείσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς
 5 τιμήσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλή
 μεντᾶν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως
 ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν
 ὄντες πολῖται μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς
 d διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν
 καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι·
 ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὧ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξεληθόντι τηλικῶδε

ὅπόθεν *from where*

ἀλόγιστος, -ov *unreasonable*

ἐνεγκεῖν aor. act. infin. < φέρω *bear*

ἐπιφθονώτεραι < ἐπίφθονος, -ov *rather hateful*

ἀπαλλαγῆναι aor. pass. infin. < ἀπαλλάττω *set free*

οἴσουσι fut. act. indic. < φέρω *bear*

- 37c4 ἐκτείσω Future indicative in a relative clause of cause.
 ἀλλὰ "How about . . . ?" In passages where a speaker proposes and
 rejects various suggestions, ἀλλὰ is used to introduce a new possibility.
 φυγῆς This is the penalty that Socrates probably was expected to offer,
 and Meletus's proposal may have been deliberately harsh to make sure
 that Socrates did not have the luxury of proposing a light penalty without
 risking his life. It seems plausible that in most cases (i.e., those without
 Socrates for a defendant), such a strategy would be effective.
- 37c6 μεντᾶν = μέντοι ἂν
 φιλοψυχία Some φιλο- compounds suggest not simply love, but *excessive*
 love. In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, men are described as φιλόκυβος, "addicted to
 gambling" (75), and φιλοπότης, "alcoholic" (79). Similarly, φιλοψυχία means
 (excessive) "love of life" and, by extension, "cowardice."
- 37d1-2 βαρύτεραι . . . ἐπιφθονώτεραι Agreeing with an implied διατριβαί.
- 37d1 γεγόνασιν Although γίγνομαι is frequently used as a synonym for εἶναι,
 here it is preferred because the emphasis is on *becoming*. The accumulated
 resentment produced by Socrates' speeches over time *has become* irritating.
 In *Gorgias*, Socrates' opponent Callicles urges him to abandon philosophy,
 which he admits is good in moderation but irritating and childish when
 continued into adulthood (485a-486c). Such a person, Callicles is made to
 say prophetically, will be utterly unable to help himself if he is dragged
 into court and forced to respond to a prosecutor who has called for the
 death penalty.
- 37d3 ἄρα "Therefore." The argument proceeds *a fortiori*, in which a more
 extreme example of an idea justifies in advance all less extreme ones: "If
 my fellow citizens, with whom I share so much, can't stand me, how will
 foreigners feel?"
 πολλοῦ . . . δεῖ See on 30d6.
- 37d4-6 Socrates shifts from irony to direct sarcasm.

ἀνθρώπων ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένω καὶ ἐξελαυνο- 5
 μένω ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἔμοῦ
 ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὡσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπ-
 ελαύνω, οὐτοί με αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους·
 ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες δὲ καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' e
 αὐτοὺς τούτους.

ἀμειβομένω < ἀμείβω *change, exchange*

ὅποι ἂν (+ subj.) *wherever*

ἀκροάσονται < ἀκροάομαι *listen*

ἀπελαύνω *drive off*

ἐξελῶσι fut. act. indic. < ἐξελαύνω *drive out, exile*

37d5 ἄλλην πόλιν is understood.

37d5–6 ἐξελαυνομένω ζῆν “Live as an exile.”

37d6 ἔλθω Subjunctive in an indefinite relative clause.

λέγοντος ἔμοῦ The genitives are dependent on ἀκροάομαι.

37d7 κἂν = καὶ (ἐ)άν.

37e2 δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους “On their behalf.” Supply ἐξελῶσι from above.

CHAPTER 28

(37e3–38b9)

The close of the penalty phase: “I cannot be silent without violating the command of the god.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 28.

- Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· “Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὃ
 Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ’ ἔσῃ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν;” τουτὶ δὴ
 5 ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαιί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάντε γὰρ
 λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνα-
 38 τον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάντ’
 αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ
 τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενου καὶ

-
- 37e3 σιγῶν . . . ἄγων Conditional participles.
 37e4 ἐξελθὼν The aorist participle is used to indicate time prior to the main verb: “once you’ve departed.”
 37e5–38a7 The successive future-more-vivid conditions (ἐάν + subj., fut. indic.) in these lines provide a dramatic moment in the speech as Socrates prepares to conclude. The passage offers several memorable phrases, including the famous assertion that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (38a5).
 37e6 τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν According to Socrates’ interpretation of the oracle, he is commanded to spend his life examining the opinions of those who have a reputation for wisdom. ἀπειθεῖν is used predicatively with τοῦτο.
 38a1 μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ “On the grounds that I am speaking ironically,” that is, by pretending to take seriously something he does not.
 38a2 ὃν Supplementary participle with τυγχάνω.
 38a3 τοῦτο The demonstrative pronoun here refers to the entire clause that follows.

ἐμαντὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ράδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαντὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρη- **b**
μάτων ὅσα ἐμελλον ἐκτεῖσαι, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι, **b**
τοσοῦτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκ-
τεῖσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσοῦτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. **5**

ἀνεξέταστος, -ον *unexamined*
βιωτός, -όν *livable*
εἴθισμαι pf. mid. indic. < εἰθίζω *be accustomed*
ἐβλάβην aor. pass. indic. < βλάπτω *harm*

- 38a5–6 ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνεξέταστος is etymologically related to ἐξετάζοντος, as βιωτός is to βίος. Socrates' juxtaposition of them in such quick succession is a mark of high rhetorical, perhaps even Gorgianic (see on 17b9–c1), style, as can be seen from Gorgias *Palamedes* 21: βίος οὐ βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένῳ. The βίος οὐ βιωτὸς formula predates the *Apology*, however (for example, at Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* 1692). See Slings 1994, 374–75. That the ultimate provenance of such phrases might be Gorgias, however, is worth considering.
- 38a6 ταῦτα δ' In Plato an “apodotic” δέ occasionally marks the beginning of the apodosis in a conditional sentence. Do not translate.
- 38a7 τά = ταῦτα.
- 38a8 κακοῦ οὐδενός Compare 36d2–3, where he says that an *appropriate* punishment would have to be something good.
- 38b1–2 The condition is mixed: present counterfactual (imperfect) in the protasis, past counterfactual (aorist + ἄν) in the apodosis: “If I had money, I would have proposed . . .”
- 38b2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην The condition gets a second apodosis (past counterfactual). Socrates again reasserts the distinction between the self and its possessions. He will admit to no wrong, but he will pay a fine because the loss of money is incidental to that “self” and so of no real consequence to him.
- 38b5 μνᾶν Equivalent to one hundred drachmas. The value of Socrates' entire household, according to a passage in Xenophon, was five minas, although Socrates' eccentricity and indifference to wealth makes it hard to know whether the offer he makes is sincere or insulting. Skilled workers on the acropolis received one drachma per day. Jurors received three obols (one-half drachma).

CHAPTER 29

(38c1–39b8)

Socrates addresses those who voted for his execution. They have done him no great harm, since he would have died soon anyway, but they have done themselves no favor. For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 29.

Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν—φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν— 5
εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισα- d
μένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τότε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ὄμην δεῖν

λοιδορεῖν < λοιδορέω *blame*
 περιεμείνατε aor. act. indic. < περιμένω *wait*
 πόρρω (+ gen.) *far along*
 ἐαλωκέναι pf. act. infin. < ἀλίσκομαι *be caught*

- 38c1 οὐ πολλοῦ . . . ἕνεκα χρόνου “For the sake of not much time,” that is, Socrates is already old and would die soon anyway.
- 38c2 ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν Equivalent to a passive “be blamed” and thus followed by ὑπὸ + genitive to express personal agency.
- 38c4 εἰ καὶ “Even if.”
- 38c5–6 εἰ . . . περιεμείνατε . . . ἂν . . . ἐγένετο Past counterfactual condition.
- 38c6 τοῦτο That is, his death.
- 38c7 πόρρω . . . τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς “That I am far along in life and near death.” Note the chiasmic arrangement by which Socrates juxtaposes βίου and θανάτου.
- 38d4 οἷς The antecedent is λόγων.
 ἂν . . . ἔπεισα The aorist indicative + ἂν here expresses potentiality in the past.

- 5 ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην.
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων,
ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν
πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν—
e θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος καὶ
λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, οἷα δὴ καὶ
εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήθη
δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν
μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησάμενος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
5 αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείως ζῆν. οὔτε
γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ

τόλμης < τόλμα, -ης, ἡ *daring*
ἀναισχυντίας < ἀναισχυντία, -ας, ἡ *shamelessness*
ἥδιστα super. < ἡδύς, -εῖα, -ύ *sweet, delightful*
θρηνοῦντος < θρηνέω *sing a dirge, lament*
ὀδυρομένου < ὀδύρομαι *moan*
ἀνελεύθερον < ἀνελεύθερος, -ον *inappropriate for a free man*
ὧδε *in this fashion*
ἐκείως *in that fashion*
δίκη < δίκη, -ης, ἡ *trial*

- 38d5 ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην “So as to get off.”
38d6 ἀπορία Socratic irony frequently makes use of the ambivalence latent in common words or phrases. Here ἀπορία, which refers to the confusion that results when someone does not know what to say (ἀπορία λόγων), comes to mean Socrates’ “inability” (i.e., his refusal) to do whatever is necessary, no matter how shameless, to avoid conviction (ἀπορία . . . τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας). In the *Gorgias*, Socrates is made to anticipate this very moment: “If I should meet my end on account of a lack of rhetorical flattery (κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία), I know well that I would bear death easily” (522d).
38d8 οἷ’ = οἷα. Here nominative.
ἦν Imperfect because it refers to the time while he was giving his speech.
38d9–10 θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος καὶ λέγοντος The genitives are dependent on ἀκούειν.
38e2 ἄλλων Object of ἀκούειν: “from others.”
38e3–4 οὔτε . . . μοι μεταμέλει “Nor do I regret.” The impersonal construction takes a supplemental participle agreeing with μοι.
38e5 οὔτε This negative and the ones that follow should be taken with the infinitive. The point is not that “it is not necessary to contrive,” but that “it is necessary *not* to contrive.” ὅπως (introducing a clause of effort) is dependent on μηχανᾶσθαι: “contrive that . . .”

τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. 39
καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε
ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετεῖαν
τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλάι εἰσιν
ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις 5
τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν,
ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονη-
ρίαν· θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδύς b
ὦν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ

μηχανᾶσθαι < μηχανάομαι *contrive*
ἀφείς aor. act. part. < ἀφίημι *release*
τραπόμενος aor. mid. part. < τρέπω *turn*
μηχαναί < μηχανή, -ῆς, ἡ *means*
πονηρίαν < πονηρία, -ας, ἡ *worthlessness*
θᾶττον *more swiftly*
θεῖ < θέω *run*
ἄτε *inasmuch as, since*
βραδύς, -εῖα, -ύ *slow*

- 39a2-3 τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι “You could certainly avoid dying.” The vocabulary of flight and pursuit found throughout this passage is also that of legal prosecution and defense. Socrates, then, is playing on both notions at once.
- 39a3 ὅπλα ἀφείς Throwing away one’s “weapons” or “shield” (to be able to retreat more quickly or surrender) was, unsurprisingly, regarded as a serious breach of good conduct for a soldier. Those convicted of doing so could forfeit their civic rights (Andocides 1.74), and to accuse someone of *ῥιψοσπία*, “shield throwing,” was to invite a lawsuit for *κατηγορία*, or “slander” (see *Lysias* 10.9). Thus, by casting himself as someone who will not metaphorically throw away his shield to save his life nor, both literally *and* metaphorically, abandon the post to which he was assigned, whatever the danger (28e), Socrates implies that his life has embodied the highest expressions of civic virtue.
- ἱκετεῖαν The concept of “supplication” is familiar to readers of the *Iliad*, where the typical form involves seizing the knees of an adversary and begging for mercy. It is also the pose Odysseus claims to have adopted in one of the Cretan tales after he throws away his own shield during a raid on Egypt (*Odyssey* 14.276ff.).
- 39a6 ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν “I don’t think it’s difficult.” Idiomatic use of the subjunctive in cautious assertions.
- 39b1 θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ Note the alliteration. The metaphor that has been implicit in the idea of *escaping* death now is developed explicitly in this complex personification, by which slow death finally catches an even slower Socrates and evil (*κακία*) runs down the accusers, speedy as they are.

κατηγοροὶ ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς
 κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην
 5 ὀφλῶν, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὀφληκότες μοχθηρίαν
 καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι.
 ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἕδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ
 μετρίως ἔχειν.

ὀξεῖς < ὀξύς, -εῖα, -ύ *sharp, clever, swift*
 ὀφλῶν aor. act. part. < ὀφλισκάνω *owe*
 ὀφληκότες pf. act. part. same verb
 μοχθηρίαν < μοχθηρία, -ας, ἡ *perversity*
 μετρίως *fairly*

39b5–6 μοχθηρίαν . . . ἀδικίαν The accusatives are the objects of ὀφληκότες.

39b6 καὶ οὗτοι Supply τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένουσι from above.

CHAPTER 30

(39c1–d9)

“You may think you have freed yourselves from my reproaches by condemning me, but you have merely traded one pest for many.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 30.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοφῆσαι, ὃ κατα- c
ψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα
ἄνθρωποι χρησμοφδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημι
γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθὺς
μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἶαν 5
ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἵργασθε οἴομενοι μὲν ἀπα-
λλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ

χρησμοφῆσαι < χρησμοφδέω *deliver an oracle, foretell the future*
εἵργασθε pf. mid. indic. < ἐργάζομαι *do*
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι fut. mid. infin. < ἀπαλλάττω *set free*

- 39c1 **τό . . . μετὰ τοῦτο** “Next.”
χρησμοφῆσαι The significance of oracles has been a recurrent theme in the *Apology*, as Socrates has consistently emphasized the connection between his chosen way of life and Chaerephon’s oracle. Now, ironically, it is he who will prophesy to those who just voted to condemn him. In his version of Socrates’ defense speech, Xenophon also uses this verb, but Socrates’ prophecy there is cruder and more direct (*Apology* 30).
- 39c3 **ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι** So the dying Patroclus prophesies to a skeptical Hector in the *Iliad* (16.852–61), as well as Hector to Achilles (22.358–60). See also Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 8.7.21.
- 39c5 **οἶαν** Understand *τιμωρίαν*. The relative is used as an accusative of respect: “more harsh than the one for which [οἶαν] you execute me.”
- 39c7 **τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον** The articular infinitive is dependent on *ἀπαλλάξεσθαι*. Socrates’ defense of his life and career, as well as his insistence on the need for everyone to be able to defend their actions and attitudes in conversation (*διδόναι ἔλεγχον*), puts him squarely at the beginning of the confessional tradition in Western literature. This autobiographical tradition has been followed by many, from St. Augustine in the *Confessions* through the works of Montaigne, Rousseau, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Adams, and others.

- ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς
 d οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἤσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσφ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσιν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ
 5 ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

ἀποβήσεται fut. mid. indic. < ἀποβαίνω *turn out*
 κατείχον impf. act. < κατέχω *restrain*
 ἤσθάνεσθε impf. mid. < αἰσθάνομαι *perceive*
 ἐπισχῆσιν < ἐπέχω *hold back, restrain*
 ὀνειδίζειν < ὀνειδίζω *rebuke, reproach*
 ζῆτε pres. act. indic. < ζάω *live*
 διανοεῖσθε < διανοέομαι *think*
 κολοῦειν < κολοῦω *restrain*
 μαντευσάμενος < μαντεύομαι *prophecy*

- 39c8 πλείους = πλείονες (masc. nom. pl.).
 39d1 κατείχον Note the unusual form of the augment. For the no-doubt irritating attempts on the part of Socrates' younger listeners to practice his techniques on their elders, see 33b–c. There are other, more serious, people in Athens having “Socratic” conversations as well, however. We should have in mind people like Apollodorus (see on 34a2; cf. also 38b8) and Aristodemus, the internal narrator of the *Symposium*, who copied Socrates to the point of going around barefoot like his idol. Most important, however, is Plato himself, whose dialogues, in addition to memorializing Socrates, frequently criticize Athens and its people.
 39d2 ὅσφ “To the degree that.”
 39d4 τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν The case is dependent on the idea of separation implied by the verb of hindering (ἐπισχῆσιν).
 39d6–8 ἀλλ' ἐκείνη (ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ) καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος “But that (relief) is very beautiful and easy, that of not repressing others, but instead preparing oneself to be as good as possible.” παρασκευάζειν is parallel with κολοῦειν, thus describing another type of ἀπαλλαγὴ. The determination to take all steps to become as good as possible *could* be called a “relief” or an “escape” from the pain of living an evil life. Socrates argues much the same thing in the *Gorgias*, when he tries to convince Callicles that the tyrant who lives without restraint is the most miserable man alive (see also the *Republic*, books 1 and 9). Socrates does not argue that point here, however, and it is better to understand a slight anacolouthon that allows Socrates to contrast the two infinitives.

CHAPTER 31

(39e1–40c3)

“To those who voted for my acquittal, do not be sad. Death is not a bad thing for me.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 31.

Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθεῖην ὑπὲρ τοῦ e
γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν
ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπὼ ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ
μοι, ὧ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ

διαλεχθεῖην aor. pass. opt. < διαλέγομαι *converse, talk with*
παραμείνατε < παραμένω *remain with*

- 39e1** **διαλεχθεῖην** It is fitting that Socrates concludes with a reference to *dialogue*, that characteristic feature of his life and philosophical practice.
- 39e2** **ὑπὲρ** “In regard to.”
ἄρχοντες The Eleven (see on 37c2).
ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι “Are busy.” Presumably they needed to make arrangements for the transfer of Socrates to the prison. If they had expected him to go quietly into exile, they might have been caught unprepared.
- 39e3** **οἱ** Note the accent.
ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι “I must go and be executed.” In fact, the execution of Socrates was delayed for a long time, as we learn from the *Phaedo* (58a–c) and *Crito* (43c9–d6). The Athenians annually sent a ship to the island of Delos in honor of Apollo and his role in the deliverance of Athens from King Minos and the Minotaur. During the time it took for the ship to go and to return, the execution of criminals was forbidden. As it turned out, the ship left Athens the day before Socrates’ trial, and so he remained in prison for some time. It is easy to forget that when the *Apology* was written, Plato of course knew that the execution would be delayed.
- 39e4** **τοσοῦτον** That is, as long as the archons allow.

- 5 κωλύει διαμυθολογήσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν
 40 γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι συμβεβη-
 κὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ
 δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν.
 ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ
 5 πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ
 μικροῖς ἐναντιομένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν.
 νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι ἄπερ ὀρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἄ γε δὴ
 οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι· ἐμοὶ δὲ

κωλύει < κωλύω hinder

διαμυθολογήσαι aor. act. infin. < διαμυθολογέω converse, exchange stories

ἐπιδείξαι < ἐπιδείκνυμι show

συμβεβηκός pf. act. part. < συμβαίνω happen

εἰωθυῖα pf. part. < ἔθω be accustomed

μαντική, -ῆς, ἡ prophetic sign

πυκνή < πυκνός, -ή, -όν constant, insistent

ἐναντιομένη < ἐναντιόμαι oppose

- 39e5 **διαμυθολογήσαι** This is a rare word in Plato, appearing only two other times, both in explicitly speculative contexts, once at the beginning of the *Laws* (632e4) and once in the *Phaedo* (70b6) in a discussion of proofs of the immortality of the soul. The shift from διαλέγειν (39e1) to διαμυθολογέειν signals the shift to a more speculative register as Socrates prepares to discuss his views on the afterlife with those he considers sympathetic (Weber 1986).
- 40a1 **τό . . . συμβεβηκός** “The thing that has happened to me.” Socrates’ understanding of the verdict is based on his prior experience with the divine sign, which always had interceded to prevent him from acting in error. The absence of the δαιμόνιον from the day’s proceedings offers Socrates indirect confirmation that he has acted in accordance with divine wishes. For a discussion of the δαιμόνιον, see on 24c1.
- τί . . . νοεῖ** “What it means.” Note that the direct interrogative τί replaces ὅτι in this indirect question.
- 40a2 **δικασταί** Socrates now uses, for the first time, the word he has studiously avoided in addressing the entire jury. He addressed them instead as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.
- καλῶν ὀρθῶς** “Calling you accurately” (i.e., by your right name).
- 40a6 **πάνυ ἐπὶ μικροῖς** “In even quite small things.” πάνυ may precede the preposition (Smyth 1956, 1663n).
- μὴ** Take with ὀρθῶς.
- 40a7 **συμβέβηκε** The subject is ταυτὶ below, after the first relative clause. The sentence sets the stage for a reappraisal of the “dire” circumstances in which Socrates finds himself. If they really were as dire as they admittedly seem, the δαιμόνιον would have dissuaded Socrates from pursuing the course he followed. Since it did not, he argues, the sequence of events and their results must not be bad.

οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, **b**
οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν
τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις
πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ **5**
περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ
ἠναντιώται μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ
ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν
γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν,
ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον **c**
τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ
εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

ἐξιόντι < ἔξιμι *go out*
ἔωθεν *early in the morning*
οἴκοθεν *from home*
ἠναντιώθη aor. pass. indic. < ἐναντιόομαι *oppose*
σημεῖον, -ου, τό *sign*
ἠνίκα *when*
πολλαχοῦ *in many places*
μεταξὺ *in the middle*
γεγονέναι pf. act. infin. < γίγνομαι *be, become*

- 40b3** μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν The participle agrees with ἐμοί. The δαιμόνιον might have restrained Socrates as he was about to go out, an experience he might have interpreted as a sign that exile was preferable to death. Its intervention could also have been focused more narrowly, at some point in the speech, to prevent Socrates from saying something particularly inflammatory.
- ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις Or it might have induced him to speak further. In *Phaedrus* (242d–244a), Socrates reports that he experienced the intervention of the δαιμόνιον as he attempted to depart from the conversation. He interpreted the experience as a sign that he had to recant his previous speech and start again. Similarly, at *Euthydemus* 272e, the sign delays the departure of Socrates; consequently, he is still present for the arrival of the irrepressible brother duo of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.
- 40b8** γεγονέναι Infinitive in indirect statement after κινδυνεύει: “It is likely that this thing that has happened to me is good.” Since the δαιμόνιον did not prevent Socrates from getting convicted, it may well be that death is a good thing. Socrates has already spoken forcefully against the commonly held view that death is an evil (29a–b), but there he argued as an agnostic. Now the absence of the δαιμόνιον has given him further reason to think that death might not be so bad.
- 40c1** ὅσοι οἰόμεθα “All of us who think.”
- 40c1** μοι Dative of possession, to be taken with γέγονεν (used impersonally).
- 40c2** οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ “There is no way that . . .” (introducing a past counterfactual condition).

CHAPTER 32

(40c4–41c7)

“Death might be either unending, dreamless sleep or some form of afterlife as the traditional stories say.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 32.

- Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν
 5 αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ
 οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι μὴδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν
 τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει
 οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς
 ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστὶν ἀλλ’
 d οἶον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μὴδ’ ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρᾱ, θαυ-

τῆδε *in this way*
 ἐλπίς, -ίδος, ἡ *hope*
 αἴσθησιν < αἴσθησις, -εως, ἡ *sensation*
 μεταβολή, -ῆς, ἡ *change*
 μετοίκησις, -εως, ἡ *change of habitation*
 ὕπνος, -ου, ὁ *sleep*
 καθεύδων < καθεύδω *sleep*
 ὄναρ, τό (no gen.) *dream*

- 40c5 δυοῖν . . . θάτερον δυοῖν is genitive dual; θάτερον = τὸ ἕτερον: “one of two things.”
- 40c5–6 ἢ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι . . . τὸν τεθνεῶτα “For either the dead man does not exist” οἶον = οἶόν ἐστι. Literally: “For either it is such a thing as for the dead man not to exist.”
- 40c6 αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενός “No feeling at all.” Note the accumulation of negations underlining the concept of absolute nonexistence.
- 40c8 μετοίκησις “A change of habitation.” Socrates uses the same metaphor to describe the afterlife in the *Phaedo* (117c2).
- τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε “From here.”
- 40d1 μὴδ’ “Not even.”
- ὄρᾱ Subjunctive in a general temporal clause.

μάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἶη ὁ θάνατος—ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα
 ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ἧ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν
 ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας
 τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι 5
 σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ
 νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι
 ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμή-
 τους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ e
 νύκτας—εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἕγωγε
 λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω

κέρδος, -ους, τό *profit*
 ἐκλεξάμενον aor. mid. part. < ἐκλέγω *pick out*
 κατέδαρθεν aor. act. indic. < καταδαρθάνω *fall asleep*
 ἀντιπαραθέντα aor. act. part. < ἀντιπαρατίθημι *compare*
 βεβίωκεν pf. act. indic. < βιώω *live*
 ἰδιώτην < ἰδιώτης, -ου, ὁ *private citizen*

- 40d2–e2 If someone counted up nights spent in pleasant, dreamless sleep, he would find them few in number when compared with all the other nights. The basic idea of this extremely complex sentence is that if death is like one of those restful nights, just longer, it would definitely be a good thing. Grammatically speaking, we have a future-less-vivid condition in indirect statement, introduced by ἐγὼ . . . ἂν οἶμαι (ἂν οἶμαι repeated at d8 for emphasis). The protasis remains unchanged, and the apodosis takes a subject accusative + infinitive construction.
- 40d2 ἐγὼ . . . ἂν οἶμαι ἂν here and at d8 should be taken with εὐρεῖν (e1), as we expect in the apodosis of a future-less-vivid condition.
- 40d3 δέοι Impersonal use of the verb.
- 40d3–4 οὕτω . . . ὥστε "In such a way that . . ."
- 40d8 τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα The king of Persia is regularly referred to simply as "the great king" or even more simply as ὁ βασιλεύς. Both ἰδιώτην and βασιλέα function as the subject of εὐρεῖν in e1.
- 40e2 εὐαριθμήτους "Rare," agreeing with νύκτας
- 40e2 κέρδος Supply εἶναι.
- 40e3 ὁ πᾶς χρόνος "All of time."

- δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ
 5 θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶν τὰ
 λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσι πάντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, τί μείζον
 ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἶη ἄν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις
 41 ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλλαγείς τουτωνῶν τῶν φασκόντων
 δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ
 καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ
 Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι
 5 ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἶη ἡ ἀποδημία;
 ἢ αὖ Ὅρφεϊ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ
 Ὅμηρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ

ἀποδημησαι < ἀποδημέω locate

ἀποδημία, -ας, ἢ relocation

- 40e4 ἢ Used here in a comparison with *πλείων*.
 εἰ δ' αὖ "If, on the other hand." αὖ, "again," refers back to the two possibilities suggested earlier. It is interesting to note that he does not mention here the doctrine of the transmigration of souls attributed to the Pythagoreans and (apparently) adapted by Plato in dialogues such as the *Meno*, which develops the idea of learning as the recollection of past lives, and the *Republic*, which ends with the myth of Er. The latter's near-death experience features souls in the process of choosing how they will spend their next incarnation.
 οἶον ἀποδημησαι "A kind of relocation."
 40e6 ὡς Introducing indirect statement after τὰ λεγόμενα.
 ἄρα "I suppose (now that I think about it)."
 40e7 τούτου Genitive of comparison.
 41a1 τουτωνῶν τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν Genitives of separation after ἀπαλλαγείς. Socrates gets in another dig at his opponents. A consideration of the traditional Greek view of the afterlife, according to which the souls of the dead continued to exist in a bodiless form, whether in Hades or in a more or less precisely defined paradise such as the Isles of the Blessed, leads Socrates to mention three groups of inhabitants: judges, poets, and heroes, all of whom have important symbolic roles in the *Apology*.
 41a3–4 Μίνως . . . Ῥαδάμανθυς . . . Αἰακός . . . Τριπτόλεμος Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aiakos are commonly represented as judges or counselors in the afterlife, the best-known example being the reference to Minos in book 11 of the *Odyssey* (568–69). The presence of Triptolemus, more closely associated with the Eleusinian Mysteries, is less explicable, although he is referred to as an "administrator of laws" (θεμιστοπόλος) in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (473).
 41a4 ἡμιθέων For demigods in the *Apology*, see 27d–e.
 41a6–7 Ὅρφεϊ . . . Μουσαίῳ . . . Ἡσιόδῳ . . . Ὅμηρῳ All four were regarded by the Greeks to have been historical figures, although most scholars now doubt the historicity of Orpheus and Musaeus. Within the *Apology*, poets such as Homer and Hesiod present a problem. Despite their enormous prestige,

πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ
 ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστή ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε **b**
 ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις
 ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαρα-
 βάλλοντι τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων—ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
 οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη—καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα **5**
 καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός
 ἔστιν καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστιν δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις,

αὐτόθι *right there*

παλαιῶν < παλαιός, -ά, -όν *ancient, old*

ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι < ἀντιπαραβάλλω *compare*

ἐρευνῶντα < ἐρευνάω *seek after, examine*

διάγειν < διάγω *live*

they represent a reliance on revealed wisdom that is fundamentally irrational and so inconsistent with philosophy as Socrates sees it. "They say many beautiful things," he says to the jury at 22c2-3, "but they do not know what they mean."

41a7 ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἀπὸ ὑμῶν; "What would you give?" Lit. "at what price would one of you accept that?"

41b2 Παλαμῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελεμῶνος Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, were both heroes who were victims of the unscrupulous Odysseus. During the courtship of Helen, her suitors swore an oath to defend her against abduction. After she was carried off by Paris and the Trojan War expedition was forming, Odysseus feigned madness to avoid service. His trick was discovered by Palamedes, however, and he was forced to fulfill his oath. Odysseus later framed Palamedes on a charge of treason and had him executed. Later in the war, after the death of Achilles, a dispute over the great hero's armor arises between Ajax and Odysseus. Through some underhanded machinations, the armor is awarded to Odysseus. Ajax is stricken with madness by Athena and eventually commits suicide. One of Gorgias's great set pieces was a defense speech of Palamedes, and many scholars believe that the *Apology* is in part a reaction to it.

41b1-4 ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ . . . ἐκείνων "Comparing my experiences with theirs."

41b5 οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη "It wouldn't be unpleasurable" (litotes).

41b5-c7 Socrates considers the possibility that if the traditional stories about death are true, he will be able to continue his investigations there with Homer, Hesiod, and the others (τοὺς ἐκεῖ), freed from the limitations of human life.

41b5 καὶ δὴ καὶ "Moreover." There is a slight anacolouthon after the dash, as the construction shifts to accusative + infin. after τὸ μέγιστον (ἔστι . . .). Supply ἐμέ as the subject of the impersonal construction and the antecedent of both ἐξετάζοντα and ἐρευνῶντα (b5-6).

41b6 τίς The direct interrogative takes the place of ὅστις in the indirect question introduced by ἐξετάζοντα and ἐρευνῶντα.

41b7 αὐτῶν Partitive with τίς.

τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστιν δ' οὐ "Who thinks he is (wise), but isn't."

- ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα
 c τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους
 μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ
 διαλέγεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη
 5 εὐδαιμονίας; πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ
 ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ
 τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ
 γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.

λοιπὸν < λοιπός, -ή, -όν remaining, rest of

- 41b8 τὸν . . . ἀγαγόντα “The one who led” (i.e., Agamemnon).
 41c1 Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον The pairing of the two is not accidental. The prospect of Socrates commiserating with Ajax and Palamedes has already prepared us for an unsympathetic treatment of Odysseus. This was not unheard of. Although his character is celebrated in the *Odyssey*, other parts of the tradition emphasized his self-serving duplicity, among them Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*. In the ethical context that Socrates develops in the *Apology*, Odysseus is the paradigm for speakers who are eager to *sound* good without really *being* good. He is appropriately linked with Sisyphus, who talked his way out of Hades for awhile before being assigned to his famous rock. A separate tradition, well represented in antiquity, has Odysseus as Sisyphus’s illegitimate son. For the sources, see Gantz 1993, 175–76.
 ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους Take the phrase as still the object of ἐξετάσαι (b8). οὓς needs to be supplied after μυρίους: “Or countless others whom one could mention. . . .”
 41c3–4 ἀμήχανον . . . εὐδαιμονίας “An inexpressible [amount of] happiness.”
 41c4 τούτου . . . ἕνεκα That is, for conducting Socratic conversations.
 41c5 οἱ ἐκεῖ “Those there.” Since they are dead, the punishments available to the authorities are presumably limited. Lucian’s send-up of Greek literature and philosophy, the *True History*, includes the author’s miraculous voyage to the Isles of the Blessed. Lucian, who is heavily influenced by the *Apology* here, imagines just the sort of place that Socrates describes. There, where historical and mythological figures exist side by side, Socrates spends his days talking with young men from mythology such as Hylas, Narcissus, and Hyacinthus, much to the annoyance of Rhadamanthus (the judge), who threatens to throw him off the island (2.17).
 41c6 τῶν ἐνθάδε Genitive of comparison.
 41c7 ἀληθῆ Socrates’ story is intended to console, but he is not willing to declare that it is true or even that *he* believes it. Here he makes the same qualification that he made at 40e5 and 41a8.

CHAPTER 33

(41c8–end)

“My last request, then, is that you treat my sons as I have treated you and rebuke them if they care for anything more than virtue.” For additional discussion of the chapter and questions for study, see essay 33.

Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἓν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πᾶνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ καταψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ’ οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν·

εὐέλπιδας < εὐελπισ, -ιδος, ὁ *hopeful*
 διανοεῖσθαι < διανοέομαι *suppose*
 ἀπέτρεψεν < ἀποτρέπω *turn away from, dissuade*
 χαλεπαίνω *be angry at*

- 41c9 ἓν τι τοῦτο . . . ἀληθές “This one thing is true,” in contrast to his colorful elaboration of τὰ λεγόμενα, which are only *possibly* true.
 41d2 ἀμελεῖται The subject is τὰ τούτου πράγματα (“his affairs”).
 41d3 τὰ ἐμὰ “My experience” (i.e., “what has happened to me”).
 41d5 βέλτιον ἦν “It was better.” Socrates treats his fate as having been preordained. He nevertheless distinguishes the divine decision from the human ill will that brought it about.
 41d6–7 καταψηφισαμένοις . . . κατηγοροῖς Datives following χαλεπαίνω.

- e τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν
 δέομαι· τοὺς ὑεῖς μου, ἐπειδὴν ἠβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὡ
 ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπου, ἐὰν
 5 ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπι-
 μελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες,
 ὄνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς ὡσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν
 42 ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός
 τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν
 ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν
 ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ
 5 τῷ θεῷ.

μέμφεσθαι < μέμφομαι *blame*

ἠβήσωσι < ἠβάω *grow up*

πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι fut. pf. pass. < πάσχω *be treated*

ὥρα, -ας, ἢ *hour, time*

- 41e1 τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι Supply ἐστὶ for the impersonal construction with ἄξιον: "They deserve to be blamed for this" (lit. "It is worthwhile to blame them for this"). τοῦτο is explained by οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν.
- 41e1 αὐτῶν Socrates ironically calls on his accusers to take responsibility for the moral development of his sons, since he will not be there to do the job.
- 41e3 ταῦτά = τὰ αὐτά
- 41e4-5 δοκῶσιν . . . ὄντες For Socrates' description of his exhortations to his fellow Athenians, from which he borrows these words, see 29d7–30b4 and commentary.
- 41e5 ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι "If they seem to be something." Even at the very end of the speech, Socrates continues to insist on the crucial distinction between seeming and being. So also at 41e6–42a1.
- 41e6 ὡσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν "Just as I did to you."
 ὧν The relative is attracted into the case of the unexpressed object of an assumed ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
- 42a2 ὥρα Supply ἐστὶ.
- 42a3 ἀποθανουμένῳ . . . βιωσομένοις Future participles expressing purpose.
- 42a4 ἄδηλον Supply ἐστὶ: "It is unclear."
- 42a5 τῷ θεῷ. As at 19a6, no specific divinity is meant. Nevertheless, by choosing θεῷ as the final word of the speech, Plato reiterates Socrates' characterization of his life's work as divine service (cf. λατρεία 23c) and tacitly again rejects the charge of impiety.

Essays

ESSAY 1

In this opening chapter, Socrates confronts the accusation made by the prosecution that the jurors should not believe him because he is “clever at speaking.” The concern with the deceptive qualities of speech and its ability to manipulate audiences was widespread at this time, owing to the growth of rhetorical education and to its being seen by adherents as a critical element in advancing one’s status both politically and socially in the *polis*. In Plato, Socrates often criticizes this rhetorical education, however, and he here announces that he will speak merely in his accustomed way.

This concern with rhetoric is far from unique in the work of Plato. His dialogues, taken as a whole, offer a broad critique of public speaking, and of rhetoric generally, as a practice that is content with making things *appear to be* a certain way but less interested in how they really *are*. The successful rhetorician attempts to persuade members of his audience, not necessarily to educate them. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates likens rhetoric to cooking and says that the rhetorician’s goal, like the cook’s, is to produce pleasure for the listener/diner. Whether a cake is healthy for the one who eats it, or a rhetorical position is good for the character of the person who hears and believes it, is another matter altogether. Philosophy, by contrast, claims to be interested only in things as they *are* and sees

ESSAY 2

rhetoric's preoccupation with pleasure as an indication that it is amoral and unscientific.

In the *Apology*, Socrates says that the job of a speaker is to tell the truth and that of a juror is to determine whether something has been said justly or not. To make that judgment might be harder than meets the eye, however. If rhetoric is like cooking, speakers will try to persuade by saying whatever they think will be most pleasurable for audiences to hear. It will take an extremely self-aware audience to distinguish the truth from something that has been manufactured to *seem like* truth, particularly if the speaker is unscrupulous about constructing a plausible falsehood based on his assessment of what he thinks the audience already believes.

What do you think Socrates expects from the jurors? How might they analyze the arguments so as not to be deceived by plausible lies and flattering rhetoric?

The problem is not simply an ancient one. Modern juries face the same problems, as do voters. How can juries best determine who is speaking τὰ δίκαια? And voters?

Further Reading

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Kerford, G. B. 1981. *The Sophistic Movement*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

ESSAY 2

The fifth century is often referred to as the Greek Enlightenment. It is characterized by the founding, growth, and systematization of the disciplines of history, mathematics, rhetoric, medicine, and moral philosophy. Yet, as this chapter makes clear with its references to the "old accusers," there was resistance to these new ways of thinking. Fairly or not, some of it targeted Socrates. He was seen as a person who challenged the traditional understanding

of what constitutes *arete* (excellence), and he caused irritation by asking pointed questions of people who had a reputation for virtue or wisdom, which he often revealed to be undeserved.

Athens was at the center of this cultural ferment, much of which was radically untraditional. The historians Herodotus and Thucydides, for all their differences, produced accounts of the past that, unlike Homer's epic, neither relied on the inspiration of the Muses nor portrayed the past as subject to divine decree. If they were right, what then was the value of traditional stories and the beliefs they implied? By the same token, if a sophist or teacher of rhetoric could teach you how to defeat your father in argument, as Aristophanes dramatizes in the *Clouds*, then why should you follow the traditional admonition to obey him unconditionally? If Socrates, finally, through his relentless questioning, could demonstrate that many of the men most honored by the community were blowhards and fakes, then why should anyone hold in high regard those men and the institutions they represent?

Such threats to the established order were deeply resented by some Athenians. They felt that their traditional way of life, the one that had forged men capable of defeating the vast forces of the Persian king at the battles of Marathon and Salamis, was under siege. The Platonic dialogues acknowledge the existence of these conservative forces, and some of their ideas make their way into Aristophanic comedy (see essay 3).

Are there contemporary parallels? Does the theory of evolution, and the position of science generally, play a similarly divisive role in contemporary life? Are there contemporary religious and intellectual movements that might be compared to the reaction of traditional Athenians to the intellectual advances of their day?

Further Reading

Aristophanes, *Clouds*.

Irwin, T. H. 1992. "Plato: The Intellectual Background." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, edited by Richard Kraut, 51–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ESSAY 3

Kennedy, George. 1963. *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Worthington, Ian, ed. 2007. *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*. Oxford: Blackwell.

ESSAY 3

In this chapter, Socrates directly references Aristophanes' comedy the *Clouds*, which had portrayed him in an unflattering light. Comedy, it should be understood, was a civic institution in fifth-century Athens, not just a form of private entertainment. Comedies were performed by publicly financed choruses at the City Dionysia and the Lenaia, both annual festivals in honor of Dionysus. These comedies are characterized by abundant personal attacks on prominent individuals. Most scholars believe that five comedies competed in the years prior to and after the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.E.), during which the number was reduced (for financial reasons) to three. The evidence, however, is both sketchy and contradictory.

Aristophanes, the foremost comic poet of fifth-century Athens and the only one for whom we possess complete plays, was born in the middle of the century and probably died in the late to mid-380s. He is believed to have been the author of forty plays, eleven of which survive. In the *Clouds* of 423, he portrays Socrates as an unprincipled sophist, although not one who seems to receive any money from his students. Incidentally, the *Clouds* that we have is not the original play, but one that has been rewritten substantially. There is no reason to doubt, however, that the representation of Socrates remained essentially the same.

From the *Apology* we might reasonably conclude that Socrates regarded the *Clouds* as an important part of the public slander that had resulted in his being brought to trial. It is all the more striking, then, that Socrates' great admirer, Plato, does not appear to hold Aristophanes in low regard. The latter appears prominently in the the *Symposium*, where he is represented by Plato as being on friendly terms with Socrates. There he spins an outrageous fantasy about the origin of gender and concludes the evening by

ESSAY 4

discussing the nature of comedy and tragedy with Agathon and Socrates (223d).

How might we understand the fact that Plato portrays Aristophanes as doing harm to Socrates' reputation while remaining his friend? What might his lack of obvious resentment tell us about the conventions and expectations of ancient comedy? What might it also say about the role of mockery in small, largely homogeneous societies such as that of Athens? To what extent should Aristophanes be seen as creating, and to what extent reflecting, an image of Socrates that was circulating among the larger Athenian public?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 4

In this chapter, Socrates begins the effort to establish a systematic contrast between himself and those who taught rhetoric and other subjects for pay. The sophists and itinerant teachers of rhetoric were in many ways the rock stars of their day. They traveled from city to city, could command princely sums, and often carried with them an air of scandal. The historical Gorgias first came to Athens as a diplomat from Syracuse. His style is characterized by a heavy use of balanced antithetical phrases, rhyme, and assonance. Its self-conscious flashiness and ornamentation reflect precisely the type of

ESSAY 5

speaking that Socrates contrasts with his own “plain” style at the beginning of the *Apology*, though Socratic conversation is in many ways no less self-conscious and, to judge by the capacity of Socrates to alienate his fellow citizens, equally unnatural.

Given the practices of such itinerant sophists and rootless cosmopolitans as Gorgias and Protagoras, is it ironic that Socrates is the one charged with corrupting Athenian youths, since he neither took money nor professed to teach? After all, while they were foreigners who owed no particular allegiance to Athenian society, Socrates was the equivalent of a decorated military veteran.

Both Socrates and the teachers of rhetoric could be seen as teaching skills and forms of thought that were corrosive to traditional values. The rhetoricians, however, at least taught a skill that could be useful in their students’ political advancement, whereas Socrates’ emphasis on the care of the self might have seemed simply perverse. Thus, wealthy citizens such as Callias were willing to spend vast sums to assure that their sons had every advantage in the competitive arena of Athenian public life. What was the skill Socrates had to offer? Would people normally be willing to pay for it? Would Socrates be more or less respectable if he were offering a concrete skill such as horse training or public speaking rather than the pursuit of wisdom (σοφία)?

Further Reading

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deRomilly, Jacqueline. 1992. Translated by Janet Lloyd. *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schiappa, Edward. 2002. *Protagoras and Logos*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

ESSAY 5

In the course of reading the *Apology*, it is sometimes useful to pull back from the text and try to put the issues in a larger context.

Plato was himself a rich man who traced his ancestry back to Solon the lawgiver on his mother's side of the family and to Codrus, the last of the legendary kings of Athens, on the other. It is therefore remarkable that from an early age he not only attached himself to Socrates, for whom pride in a noble lineage suggested spurious claims to ἀρετή rather than a social status to be admired. Moreover, he remained a loyal disciple long after the age when most of Socrates' other aristocratic followers, such as the brilliant Alcibiades, had given up philosophy to pursue their political and financial ambitions.

Plato, in fact, was uncommonly well connected. By his own testimony he appears to have had the opportunity to enter politics at an early age, during the oligarchic revolution of 404 B.C.E. and the subsequent reign of the Thirty Tyrants. In his *Seventh Letter*, regarded as authentic by most scholars, he says that some of the men involved in the revolution were relatives and that they invited him to join them. He says he decided to watch and see what they would do, but he was appalled by the abuses of the Thirty, including their attempt to involve Socrates in the crimes of the regime (see *Apology* 32c–e and notes). He withdrew from the political scene altogether at this point, never to enter Athenian politics again.

Throughout his life, however, he continued to ponder the meaning of the reign of the Thirty and the part played by his own family, a fact that he did not attempt to disguise. His uncles Critias and Charmides, leaders of the oligarchs, show up prominently in the dialogues as interlocutors of Socrates, as does Alcibiades, never a member of the Thirty but a wayward and dangerous force in the city.

Plato's interest in improving the function of government, however, never abated. He made several visits to Sicily in hopes of bringing about a government ruled according to philosophical principles. Most importantly, he composed lasting works of political theory, the *Republic*, and his final work, the *Laws*.

How should we interpret Plato's interest in good government in the light of his decision to abstain from politics? How should it be understood in light of Socrates' own claims? Is it morally incumbent

ESSAY 6

upon all citizens to participate actively in government? Read *Apology* 32e–33b in translation. What might Socrates have said in answer to that question?

Further Reading

Plato. *Seventh Letter*.

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ESSAY 6

Socrates, in this chapter, represents himself paradoxically as one whose superiority to most people is based on the recognition of his ignorance. By this, he appears to mean that human beings are ignorant about the most crucial aspects of their existence, which are known only to the gods. Any understanding short of that impossible divine standard may be better than total ignorance, but does not really qualify as wisdom.

The highest human wisdom is the recognition of the limits of human understanding, yet human beings frequently represent themselves differently, as though they know something more. Socrates' service to humanity, in his view, is his willingness to show them that this is not the case.

In the Platonic dialogues, this service often takes the form of conversations regarding simple, everyday topics in which his interlocutors attempt to defend the conventional opinions they have never before questioned. Subjected to the critical questioning of Socrates, however, they are reduced to a state of perplexity, or *aporia*. This process is demonstrated in a number of shorter dialogues such as the *Ion*, the *Euthyphro*, and the *Laches*. There Socrates successfully

ESSAY 7

demonstrates what he only asserts in the *Apology*, that those who pretend to knowledge are often unable to give a rational account of it. Many scholars view such dialogues as “protreptic” (< προ-τρέπω), a means of turning the interlocutor toward the pursuit of wisdom by making him aware of his ignorance.

Do you think such a strategy is typically effective? Are people whose ignorance is exposed grateful to those who compel them to acknowledge their lack of understanding, or are they resentful and sullen? Do they dedicate themselves to correcting their weaknesses, or do they attempt to disguise them more effectively? Further, what do you think the reaction of Socrates’ contemporaries would have been to his claim of both ignorance and superior knowledge?

Nonetheless, how are people to change if they do not become aware of their ignorance? Encouraging feelings of self-worth in fellow citizens and students is no doubt a good thing, but can it encourage them to become individuals who are genuinely thoughtful and capable of analyzing seriously their own thoughts and actions? How would you attempt to address the problem that Socrates encountered?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 7

To understand why Socrates went to the poets after the politicians—or perhaps why he went to them at all—it is necessary to have an understanding of the traditional place of poetry in Greek society. Poetry was not primarily an aesthetic phenomenon throughout much of archaic and classical Greece, nor was it considered effete or

elist, as it often is today. Instead, it was a means of education and communal acculturation for the Greeks. Children and adolescents memorized long passages of Homer, as well as the songs of the lyric poets. Further, they were expected to perform in choruses and to be able to sing at drinking parties (*symposia*) and on other occasions, both as children and as adults. In a society in which books were rare and expensive, this is perhaps not surprising. The Muses, Hesiod tells us, were considered the daughters of Memory, and as such functioned as the keepers of the culture's traditions, dominant narratives, and self-understanding.

Thus, when Socrates proposes to show that the poets only pretend to wisdom, he is calling into question one of the central assumptions of Greek society. He portrays poetry as a species of "automatic writing" in which the poet is a passive conduit for information that originates with the gods but is not himself wise. Their art is therefore the opposite of the philosophical drive for clarification and definition. Socrates wants to know what a virtue like courage *is* while the poet tells a story about courageous heroes.

Is such an absolute separation between abstract definition and concrete example necessary? After all, the work of Parmenides, Plato's great precursor, was written in verse. Is it possible to conceive of a poetry that approaches philosophical precision or a kind of philosophical approach that brings together the concrete and the abstract? Some of Plato's own dialogues make elaborate use of poetic myth, including *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, and *Timaeus*. Can these myths be viewed as Plato's attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to this question?

Further Reading

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Hesiod. *Theogony*, lines 1–33.

Havelock, Eric A. 1963. *Preface to Plato*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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ESSAY 8

Socrates proceeds through the groups of citizens (politicians, poets, craftsmen) who might claim knowledge or wisdom in descending order according to their prominence in the Athenian *polis*. What he discovered, however, was that the order appeared to be reversed relative to the degree of ignorance he saw in them (cf. 22a3–6). The politicians merely presumed a general wisdom but in fact knew nothing. The poets claimed a general wisdom based upon divine inspiration but were unable to give a rational account of the “many fine things” (22c3) they said or of the other matters they deemed themselves worthy to pronounce upon. Finally, the craftsmen had a genuine skill and knowledge in certain limited practical areas that even Socrates did not possess, but they erred when they presumed to claim a more general wisdom.

What does this order tell us of the relation Plato assumes between knowledge and social prestige? How does this ordering fit with Socrates’ earlier claim merely to speak whatever first comes into his mind? What effect does Plato achieve by ordering Socrates’ speech in this manner?

Is this classification of professions and relative degrees of wisdom accurate in your view? How do we determine intelligently whether a speaker should be taken seriously? What knowledge must engineers or artists possess to do their jobs well? Does that knowledge give them any special authority to speak about matters outside their narrow field of expertise? What about service workers and tradespeople? Does their position outside the margins of traditional elite groups make their opinions especially worthy of our consideration? Why or why not?

Further Reading

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- Crawford, Matthew B. 2009. *Shop Class as Soulcraft. An Inquiry into the Value of Work*. New York: Penguin.
- Mara, Gerald M. 1997. *Socrates’ Discursive Democracy: Logos and Ergon in Platonic Political Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

ESSAY 9

Socrates says that the demands of his service to the god have left him no time to spend on politics or personal enrichment. This statement is perplexing if his original intention was simply to understand Apollo's oracle; his experience with the politicians, poets, and craftsmen should have been sufficient to allow him to conclude that they were not wise and so settle the matter once and for all. "I am the wisest, because at least I know that I know nothing." Instead of providing a firm answer to the initial question, however, Socrates' experience with the three groups seems to have convinced him that he had not reached the end, only the beginning of a lifelong "quest for wisdom," or φιλοσοφία.

The decision to continue his quest is all the more remarkable in light of the considerable material and social disadvantages that accompanied it. Indeed, not only does philosophy fail to provide an income, unlike the teaching of rhetoric, but Socrates' rejection of politics and most other forms of civic duty also provoked suspicion in democratic Athens. Yet this renunciation of all of the elements of what was commonly considered a successful life is exactly what the pursuit of wisdom demanded, according to Socrates.

Indeed, philosophy, as Socrates understands it, is not so much a theory or an intellectual investigation as it is a particularly demanding mode of life, one fraught with self-imposed dangers. Indeed, if Socrates had rested complacent with the results of his initial set of inquiries, he would have been guilty of the same self-conceit as his interlocutors, who thought that their limited knowledge qualified them to be competent judges of everything. In contrast, for Socrates the only honest response to the recognition of one's own ignorance is the pursuit of wisdom. It is far superior to the complacent confidence of one who, as Socrates says, "thinks he is something but is not." Thus, Socratic φιλοσοφία is not the end result of the process of question, answer, definition, and refutation but is the process itself.

Can such a pursuit have an end? What does this say about the possibility of human beings' possessing genuine wisdom? If

ESSAY 10

Socrates is right, is it possible for anyone to make ethical decisions and act on them? Or must one suspend judgment on every occasion so as not to *seem to know*?

Further Reading

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- Plato, *Theaetetus*.

ESSAY 10

Why is Socrates on trial at all? In part, at least, it is because he appeared to have unusual religious beliefs. As this chapter indicates, the belief in Socrates' religious heterodoxy stemmed in part from the fact that many attributed to him the beliefs commonly associated with the materialist philosophers of the day who rejected traditional mythological explanations of the universe (23d4–7). Moreover, as Socrates makes clear, this charge cannot be separated from the political implications of corrupting the youth by teaching them how to question their elders and the traditional values they represent (23c2–d1; see essay 2).

In the early twenty-first century, when theocratic impulses are prominent both at home and abroad, such an example of religious persecution in ancient Athens might be unsurprising. Yet Athenians were not typically intolerant, and their religious life was hardly monolithic. In addition to the traditional pantheon, other exotic foreign cults had been brought to Athens with no more than moderate disapproval. Cybele, Isis, Sabezias, Asclepius, and Bendis were all worshipped in the time of Socrates.

At the same time, the ultimate authority of the *demos* in areas of religion was not seriously questioned. Nobody argued for a separation of church and state. This interpenetration of religion and politics can be observed in a number of ways. For example,

Socrates imagines his enemies referring to him as *μιαρώτατος*, “most foul” (23d2), a term of generic abuse often used without special religious implications. Nevertheless, the word derives from the same root as *μίασμα*, “pollution, ritual defilement,” suggesting that, on a certain level, to be tainted religiously was to be tainted sociopolitically, and vice versa.

This conflation of ideas could have real-life political consequences. Around 432, according to Plutarch (*Life of Pericles* 32.1), Diopieithes proposed a decree, in language that clearly anticipates the indictment of Socrates, making it possible to prosecute individuals “who do not acknowledge divine things” (τὸς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας). It seems that there was a political dimension to this legislation as well. Plutarch suggests that the bill was an attempt to attack Pericles via his friend, the philosopher Anaxagoras, a presumed atheist (see essay 14).

The trial of Socrates also appears to have had political overtones not strictly related to the ethical and religious issues mentioned in the indictment. The democratic faction may have seen an attack on Socrates as a way to get back at the oligarchs with whom he was linked by personal ties. Indeed, as Socrates mentions at the beginning of this chapter (23c3), many of his youthful followers were drawn from the upper reaches of Athenian society. However, the settlement between the democratic and oligarchic factions, which was imposed by the Spartan king Pausanias in 403, included an agreement that there could be no prosecution of individuals for offenses committed under the rule of the Thirty, with the exception of the Thirty themselves and a number of high officials (see introduction). Seen from this perspective, the trial of Socrates on a religious charge could have been one of the ways the democratic faction took revenge on their enemies without violating the amnesty.

What do you think are the most important issues in the trial? Is Socrates’ service to Apollo, as exemplified by his dogged pursuit of the proper understanding of Chaerephon’s oracle, qualitatively different from traditional civic religion? Does it have its roots in the status of philosophy’s critical approach to civic life?

ESSAY 11

Consider the relationship of religion to political authority. What kinds of religion are easiest to harmonize with a political regime? Is Socrates' philosophical "religion" one of them?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 11

In this chapter Socrates begins his defense by reciting the charges against him as if he were reading from a sworn affidavit. Such trial scenes were familiar to his Athenian audience both from their experience of actual trials and from the dramatic stage. The law courts were a primary arena in which the drama of civic life was played out in democratic Athens.

The *Oresteia* trilogy of Aeschylus thus describes the story of a family trapped in an endless cycle of revenge. The commander-in-chief of the Trojan expedition, Agamemnon, finds his fleet unable to sail from Aulis because of contrary winds. He learns from a prophet that Artemis is angry and will not allow them to proceed unless the king sacrifices his daughter Iphigeneia. After much turmoil, he finally agrees to do so. When the deed is done, the fleet sails to Troy. The trilogy begins ten years later, when Agamemnon returns from Troy and is immediately murdered by his wife, Clytemnestra, who is seeking vengeance for Iphigeneia. Clytemnestra, in turn, is murdered by her son, Orestes, who returns from exile to avenge his father's death. He is then forced to flee his homeland by the arrival of the Furies, goddesses of

vengeance who punish those who commit acts of violence against blood relations.

The *Oresteia* ends in Athens. Athena sets up a court, and there is a trial in which Orestes is acquitted. This action, in turn, serves as a foundation myth for the Athenian court system. Under the new dispensation, the old system of retributive justice (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) is abandoned and replaced by the verdict of citizen juries who punish according to the law and their best judgment but are not personally involved in the case.

Yet the Athenian system was never truly impersonal. There were no public prosecutors, for example. The legal process was set in motion only by the direct action of private individuals who would undertake to prosecute someone they believed guilty. Naturally, such a system offered many opportunities for settling private scores. The defendant, too, acted directly in the trial. He was not allowed to engage a lawyer to speak on his behalf. It was in part under such conditions that public speaking became so important in Athens, and this was one reason the sophists were able to charge such high fees for their lessons. Defendants with means but without rhetorical ability might hire a ghostwriter such as the famous Lysias, although they would still have to memorize and deliver the speech on their own.

All of these features of Athenian legal practice conspired to make trials in general, and the trial of Socrates in particular, highly charged personal confrontations. As Aeschylus had seen when he dramatized the trial of Orestes, and as Aristophanes had parodied in his *Wasps* (a satire on the Athenian courts and juries), these confrontations were highly theatrical by nature. Modern legal systems retain vestiges of this originary drama, and the trial has long been a staple of movies and television. Such spectacles allow the viewer, who occupies a position similar to that of the juror, to see the participants as unique individuals and the contested issues as arising from a context, not simply as a set of abstract hypothetical concerns.

How, then, do the dramatic aspects of the *Apology* shape our perception of the personalities and motivations of those concerned?

ESSAY 12

Is this linking of the issues at stake to particular, often flawed, individuals important or healthy for the effective administration of justice? If the trial of Socrates were taking place today, would a jury chosen according to the rules of modern jurisprudence have decided differently? What about a small judicial panel or a tribunal?

Further Reading

Aeschylus, *Eumenides*.

Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. 1989. *Socrates on Trial*, 24-37. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sealey, R. 1983. "The Athenian Courts for Homicide." *Classical Philology* 78: 275-96.

ESSAY 12

Socrates appears to assume that most Athenians would agree with his implicit contention that one can only accuse someone else of corrupting the youth if one has taken special care in these matters oneself, and that one can only claim to have taken special care if one has also undertaken a rigorous inquiry into who "improves" the youth and how? In short, Socrates' questioning of Meletus would seem to imply that in his view, questions about what is best for our children should be left to the discretion of experts.

Such an idea cannot have sat well with the audience, however, for it calls directly into question an idea central to Athenian democracy—indeed, to all democratic societies—that average citizens, who by and large are not specialists, have the capacity to make good judgments for themselves and their families. Socrates' position could certainly have provoked resentment. Many members of the jury would have been fathers who would have felt few qualms about making their own judgments about what they perceived to be nefarious influences on their sons. Indeed, most of us would say that it is a duty to protect our children from corrupting influences, as we see them. It is not simply the job of "experts" but a moral imperative for all parents, from the best educated to the worst. For

this reason, many in the audience would have found the standards to which Socrates holds Meletus as disturbing as any of the things with which he himself is charged.

The idea that common sense will always provide us with adequate solutions to the problems of daily life is one that few people question, for it affirms the basic egalitarian principles upon which modern democracies are founded. But there is another side to the issue that is less pleasant to consider. Common sense can also function as a screen, obscuring the hidden assumptions that many of us would be just as happy not to examine. This was certainly the case for many of Socrates' interlocutors, who grew angry at having their cherished beliefs questioned.

The issue is not simple, but let us return to this idea: what is required for a human being to live an ethical life as a responsible citizen in a democratic society? Is it enough simply to rely on common sense (or tradition, or public norms) in making the moral judgments that parents and citizens are required to make every single day? What are the costs of attempting to do so? Is there a middle ground between the rule of the experts and the appeal to unexamined traditional beliefs? Further, can questioning of the Socratic type play a positive role in making and disseminating these quotidian judgments, or by undermining traditional figures of authority does the Socratic approach threaten the ability of families to function as teachers of morality?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 13

Socrates implies strongly that his actions have been misunderstood and that he would never have intentionally corrupted the youth. Later he will assert openly that he has done nothing wrong (37a6–7).

In this chapter, however, Socrates makes a more dramatic claim that *no one* does wrong willingly. This argument can be found in a number of places throughout the Platonic corpus and seems to be one of the touchstones of both Socratic and Platonic ethics, although some scholars believe that in the later dialogues Plato is more pessimistic than Socrates was (Penner 1992). For various articulations of this argument, see, among other passages, *Meno* 77b–78b, *Protagoras* 345e, *Gorgias* 467c5–468e5, 509e5–7, *Republic* 438a3, 505d11, *Laws* 860d1–862a4.

The argument is based on two premises: (1) to do wrong to something, or someone, is to make it worse; and (2) when faced with a choice between things of varying qualities, one always attempts to choose the better and reject the worse. By doing wrong intentionally, however—and so making things worse (premise 1)—I am choosing to associate with that which is worse instead of that which is better. Therefore, either premise 2 is incorrect (an unlikely possibility), or I do not intend to do wrong. It may well be that I act *stupidly*, but it is out of ignorance and not from the desire to do wrong.

If we accept this argument, the appropriate response to “wrong-doing,” as Socrates states, is not punishment but reeducation or persuasion. Is this a rational argument? Is it practical? What are its potential dangers? Does it sufficiently account for evil done through weakness of will (ἀκρασία)?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 14

The sources on the life and philosophy of Anaxagoras are rich and merit scrutiny if we are to understand the intellectual context

informing the *Apology* and the specific difference Socrates introduces in turning from physical and cosmogonical speculation to the problems of moral philosophy and self-knowledge (see introduction). Anaxagoras is said to have been twenty years old when he came to Athens and began his philosophical career. He stayed for roughly thirty years, but he was later tried on charges of impiety due to his presumed atheism (see essay 10). It is said that he was assisted in his defense by Pericles, who was his student and friend, with the result that he was fined and exiled rather than put to death like Socrates (Diogenes Laertius 2.7).

The fragments of Anaxagoras present a cosmogony that begins with primal chaos in which each element (hot, cold, wet, dry, bright, dark) was mixed with every other. This confusion was bounded by the infinitely small on one side and the infinitely large on the other (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1993, fr. 472–74). For Anaxagoras, the principle that ordered this chaos into the cosmos of defined entities we all perceive was νοῦς or “mind” (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1993, fr. 476).

As Socrates recounts in the *Phaedo* (97b–99b), he was initially very much attracted to Anaxagoras’s theory of mind. Ultimately, however, Socrates found his explanations relied too much on physical causes and gave no real guidance on how this concept of mind might actually function in organizing the cosmos for the good or might lead a man to determine the best course of action. Socrates thus turned from seeking to know the external causes of natural phenomena to seeking a knowledge of the self, so that he might determine how best a man should live.

Socrates’ decision suggests a gap between technical knowledge of the external world and the depths of the human soul. Does his understanding of this separation continue to be valid today, in a world where science is generally regarded as the most reliable approach to gathering knowledge and making decisions about the world? What are the implications of science for ethics, anyway? Is a scientist bound by ethical principles in the pursuit of his or her research? If yes, on what are these principles based? Are they themselves scientific, or must scientists borrow them from elsewhere (religion, political theory, etc.)?

ESSAY 15

Further Reading

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ESSAY 15

Socrates begins his line of questioning by trying to establish the validity of an argument by categories. He asks Meletus to agree that there is no one who believes in human affairs (ἄνθρώπεια πράγματα, 27b), without also believing humans and, likewise, no one who believes in matters pertaining to horses without also believing in horses. In each case, the existence of the larger class is used to deduce the existence of the individual entity. According to the same logic, Socrates' well-known belief in a divine sign, literally a "divine thing" (δαίμονιον), must necessarily imply that he believes (like every other right-thinking Athenian) in the prior category of divinities (δαίμονες). Therefore, Meletus's accusation of atheism cannot be true.

Socrates' position on divinities may or may not be a ringing endorsement for traditional Athenian religious belief, but the argument by categories is an intrinsic part of his general approach to knowledge and is the basis for the Platonic Theory of Forms. The argument often goes as follows. A chair is an object fabricated expressly for sitting. Individual chairs may be of different colors and materials. They may or may not have legs and may have altogether different specific uses. Each chair, nevertheless, whether a camp stool or a La-Z-Boy, is part of a category that we could call "chairness" and that we appeal to, consciously or unconsciously, when we wish to distinguish a chair, say, from a hairbrush. Thus, the existence of a chair both implies abstract "chairness" and the fact of chairness implies the existence of individual chairs as a class. In a similar way, Socrates' belief in a δαίμονιον implies the existence of δαίμονες. This way of thinking has important implications for

ethics. For example, it is argued that good things of all sorts are good because they share in the category, or “form,” of goodness. The existence of acts called “just” similarly implies that there is a larger category of justice of which each just act is a part and from which each derives its name. By the same token, the category of justice necessarily implies the possibility of just acts and those which fall outside that category.

The Theory of Forms does not make a direct appearance in the *Apology*, although its seeds are definitely present. Its historical development marks an important attempt to understand the way we know about and act in the world by compelling us to ground our judgments in precise and universally applicable definitions. Socratic questioning often begins from the assumption that such categories and definitions exist and are themselves foundational for ethical reflection.

Nonetheless, is such a precise understanding of terms necessary for us to be aware of the abstract qualities of the world that link our separate existences? Can we recognize ideas such as goodness and virtue without rigorously defining them, or will definition be necessary if we are to have confidence that what we mean by justice is consistent with what our neighbors, rivals, and enemies imagine (or should imagine) it to be?

Further Reading

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“Someone will say” that Socrates should feel shame for acting in such a way as to bring a capital charge against himself. Socrates

responds to this imaginary critic by invoking the Homeric tradition. Achilles was told by his mother that if he avenged the death of his companion, Patroclus, by slaying Hector, he would win eternal fame but an early death (*Iliad* 18.70–104). If the knowledge that your course of actions will lead to personal destruction ought to produce a sense of shame, Socrates suggests, then by this same logic would not Achilles' decision to avenge Patroclus also be shameful rather than heroic?

By associating his defense with a defense of the *Iliad's* greatest hero, Socrates cleverly suggests that he is the true defender of traditional Hellenic values. The heroes of old held their honor more dear than life itself. So does he. In this way, Socrates effectively turns the tables on his accusers and judges by invoking the values of an epic poetry sanctified by time and affirmed by Athenian cultural norms. He becomes the defender of traditional values and urges his fellow citizens to live up to the models they revere, suggesting that it is *they* who should feel shame if they do not.

But is the fear of shame and the obsession with honor (τιμή) that motivates so many of Homer's heroes a good image for describing Socrates' service to Apollo? Does not the epic system of values presuppose the existence of a community that shares a similar ideological orientation to the world? What would be the place for Socratic questioning in such a world? Would Socrates be welcome there?

To return to the *Iliad*, does Achilles belong to such a community of values, or does the quarrel with Agamemnon that brings about his "destructive wrath" shatter his confidence in that community once and for all? Does the epic tradition provide alternative models to heroism as Achilles understands it? What would Agamemnon have done? Odysseus?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 17

The sentence οὐκ ἐκ χρημῆτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ is translated by Hugh Tredennick as follows: “Wealth does not bring goodness but goodness brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the state.” What does Socrates mean by this? Does he really believe that ἀρετὴ invariably produces wealth? What about his own case? After all, Socrates has already cited his poverty as the result of his dedication to examining the oracle and neglecting both his public and private life (23b–c). Or are we to believe that a man who spends all his days exhorting his fellow citizens to excellence does not himself possess it?

An alternate reading of the Greek text proposed by John Burnet in his commentary understands ἀγαθὰ not as part of the subject phrase, but as the predicate along with τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (see also Burnyeat 2003, 2004). The result is a translation of the second half of the sentence that seems more in line with the standard Socratic idea that the pursuit of wealth and public honor are impediments to true ἀρετὴ, not its result: “It is goodness that makes money and everything else good for men” (Burnet 1924).

Both ways of construing the passage are grammatically defensible and have appeared in print. The first version seems most natural given the word order but produces a reading that is philosophically puzzling. The second must assume a less natural word order, but the result is a sentiment that is consistent with many other passages in Plato, where wealth for its own sake is not valued highly and the pursuit of it is regarded as a symptom of an unhappy soul.

As readers, we have the luxury of considering both ways of construing the passage, but ultimately we must make a decision. How should we go about doing it? What factors should be most important in attempting to resolve the crux? The naturalness of the grammar? Consistency of philosophical doctrine?

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ESSAY 18

This chapter contains the famous comparison of Socrates to a biting fly who has been sent to rouse the great and noble "horse" of Athens from its torpor (30e2–5). This is no idle figure of speech. The metaphor of "awakening" (ἐγείρειν) is central to Socrates' philosophical mission. He seeks to rouse his hearers and us from the slumbers of our complacency. In this view, the positive conclusions we reach from our inquiries are less important than the process of rigorous and unrelenting self-inquiry. This metaphoric complex, in turn, is directly related to the recurrence of forms of ἐπιμέλεια ("care"). But the process is not entirely directed at others. As he makes clear later (38a9–10), Socratic conversation and testing is directed as much at himself as it is at his interlocutors. The philosopher's mission is to awaken both himself and others to the need to care for themselves and to seek excellence (*arete*).

The central point, then, of the fly comparison is that the activity of caring for the self presumes self-consciousness. Socrates cannot awaken others if he himself is in a state of spiritual sleep or unconsciousness. At the same time, his efforts may be resisted by those who are unwilling to change and "wake up." Indeed, as we see, the Athenians grow angry with Socrates when he attempts to

rouse them and, like a horse swatting a pesky fly with its tail, they strike at him in a variety of ways, literal and metaphorical.

Both Socrates' actions and those of the Athenians are aggressive: the one bites, the other swats. Yet where Socrates' badgering of his peers is part of a deliberate program of examining his fellow citizens and of seeking wisdom, their reaction is the product of resentment and annoyance. Despite the great gulf that separates them, the odd symmetry between Socrates' aggression and that of his fellow citizens is nevertheless striking. How should we account for it? Is a certain discomfort always part of any process of "waking up?" Is the possibility of provoking an angry response always the risk that "wakers" run, or could a gentler Socrates wake sleepers from their "dogmatic slumber" without provoking their wrath (see essay 6)?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 19

The precise nature of Socrates' divine sign (31d1), to which reference is made in a number of dialogues, is much debated (see essay 31). Plato gives us only a few details concerning Socrates' relationship to this peculiar being: it only works to discourage Socrates from pursuing a course of action he had otherwise determined to follow. Furthermore, its intervention is never accompanied by an explanation, leaving Socrates to speculate about what caused it. In some instances the reason for its appearance is clearer than for others. In the *Republic* (496c), Socrates talks about how the divine sign kept him from entering politics and concludes that the pursuit of the philosophic life requires one to keep clear of the inevitable

“dust and sleet” of political life. In the *Phaedrus* and the *Euthydemus*, on the other hand, Socrates’ decision to leave a particular place is checked by the intervention of the divine sign. In the first case, he interprets its appearance as a positive order to compose a speech opposite to the one he has just given. In the *Euthydemus*, he interprets (with presumed irony) the divine sign’s delay of his departure as having given him the opportunity to meet and converse with the unscrupulous sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. So there is no obvious pattern to the appearance of the δαιμόνιον, nor to its significance.

Yet the vocabulary Plato uses to describe the experience of Socrates has resonance in other dialogues outside references to Socrates’ personal sign, most famously the *Symposium*. There Eros (Love or Desire) is described as a δαίμων, a being defined as a mediator between the divine and human realms. In that role, Eros comes to stand for the desire for the Good that is most clearly instantiated by philosophy itself. It has also been remarked by a variety of commentators that Socrates himself resembles the physical description of Eros given in the *Symposium*. Thus understood, one interpretation of the Socratic δαίμων might therefore be as the expression of “desire” or “force” that turns Socrates away from actions that would contravene a philosophic life and hence toward the Good. At the same time, however, the δαίμων does not dictate what the nature of that life should be, just as Eros in the *Symposium* has no specific positive attributes in and of himself but merely functions as an emblem for φιλοσοφία, the desire for wisdom.

How do you interpret Socrates’ divine sign? Is it a supernatural being, the voice of conscience, or a convenient excuse to abstain from something that seemed contrary to reason? Can we use the *Symposium*’s theory of the δαίμων as a mediator between the human and the divine as a way to understand what is meant in the *Apology*? Why or why not?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 20

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ESSAY 20

In this chapter, Socrates recounts the risks he ran in standing up for justice against both the democratic regime and the rule of the Thirty in Athens. Socrates' democratic credentials have often been questioned, despite his well-attested military heroism in its defense.

Nonetheless, it is also clear from the beginning of the *Apology* and elsewhere that Socrates does not believe all people are equally qualified to do all things. Thus, in his opening conversation with Callias (20a7–b8), Socrates questions the wealthy Athenian about whether he has found someone properly qualified to educate his sons—in the same way that he might seek an expert in things equestrian to train his horses. Such a sentiment, which could be extended to argue that only some men are qualified to rule, while others are best suited to be ruled (see *Republic*, book 2), is clearly contrary to the principles of Athenian democracy, which was based on the concept of *ἰσωνομία*, or the radical equality of all citizens and their competence to participate directly in the legislative, executive, and judicial processes. Indeed, many Athenian political offices were filled by lot, a practice that Xenophon records Socrates as criticizing on the grounds that these offices require a certain expertise. By the same token, Socrates argues, no one would trust a ship's captain chosen by lot (*Memorabilia* 1.2.9). Similarly, in the *Gorgias* he implies that it is foolish for the assembly to pick public health officials or elect generals based on popular sentiment, which can be easily manipulated by a trained rhetorician (455a–d; see also

Dodds 1966). Such positions require a sober analysis of the relevant qualifications of the individuals by those capable of making such an evaluation.

It seems clear from a variety of sources, then, that Socrates was in fact critical of Athenian democracy and, as the outcome of the trial reveals, not without some reason. He was thus lumped by many with the supporters of oligarchy and the Thirty. Yet Plato is careful in this section to distance him from both groups. This rhetorical move, however, raises several important questions. Is it possible to be a critic of democracy without being a supporter of oligarchy or tyranny? Insofar as Plato attempts to portray Socrates as apolitical, in the sense of being a supporter neither of democracy nor of oligarchy, does that mean his thought has no political importance?

Many modern readers of Plato have portrayed him as an apostle of the modern authoritarian state. Are they right? What place, if any, does Socratic and Platonic thought have in contemporary politics?

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ESSAY 21

Socrates' statement in this chapter that he is the teacher of no man is in one sense true and in another obviously false. This passage has become a touchstone in scholarly discussions of Socratic irony. Most famously, Gregory Vlastos refers to it when he makes a distinction between "simple" and "complex" irony: "In 'simple' irony what is said just isn't what is meant: taken in its ordinary, commonly understood, sense the statement is simply false. In 'complex'

irony what is said both is and isn't what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in another" (31). Vlastos's distinction poses well one of the apparent paradoxes of the Platonic dialogues. On the one hand, the entire Platonic corpus would be senseless if Socrates had not been Plato's teacher. On the other, Socrates is clearly not a teacher as he defines the term: a professional who accepts money from students in return for transmitting positive knowledge to them. Socrates is not a sophist or a craftsman who claims to possess a defined τέχνη that he teaches others.

Further, the issue of whether or not Socrates teaches is tied to whether or not philosophy itself is teachable. Essay 18 discusses philosophy not so much as a set of skills that can be memorized, but as an approach to life that involves the careful examination of the self and its varying conditions in the company of others.

Is Socrates a teacher? If so, what does he teach? If you feel his disavowal of teaching is ironic, do you agree with Vlastos that there is a truth the irony disguises? If so, what is it? Or do you agree with Alexander Nehamas, who sees Socratic philosophy as an activity rather than a body of doctrine, and who regards Socrates' ironic approach as unlimited, even beyond the control of Plato himself?

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- Nehamas, Alexander. 1998. *The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault*, 46–69. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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ESSAY 22

Socrates here argues that he does not recruit the young men with whom he associates, but that in fact they congregate around him

because they love to hear the refutation of those who pretend to be wise.

This chapter acknowledges a range of attitudes. Socrates concedes that young men flock around him to enjoy the pleasure of watching their presumed elders and betters humbled. What young person does not enjoy the spectacle of authority being challenged and found wanting? For many an elder, however, this might seem a strong indication that Socrates encourages the youth of the city not to respect traditional figures of authority, in which case they might well believe that he is corrupting the young. Socrates, however, portrays the activity as part of his divine service, within which context the specific identities of the individuals with whom he converses are less important than their sincere dedication to the truth. Further, he justifies the contention that his behavior did not corrupt the youth by calling on the fathers and brothers of his associates present in the court to come forward and denounce him if he corrupted their relatives in any way.

Nevertheless, Socrates acknowledges that he also takes some pleasure in the activity (33e4). Thus, he is not motivated *simply* by truth or duty, but also by desire and enjoyment. Immediately after this surprising admission, Socrates reiterates his claim to be following a divine mandate (33c4–7), reinforcing it with claims of prophecies and dreams that go beyond the initial story of Chaerephon's consultation of the Delphic oracle.

What are we to make of this juxtaposition? What, then, does motivate Socrates? Are the claims of personal enjoyment and divine mandate contradictory or mutually reinforcing?

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ESSAY 23

Plato's choice to have Socrates use forms of the word ἀθαδής (34c8, 34d10) is significant thematically. Composed from a compound of αὐτός and ἴδομαι, the adjective covers a range of meanings from stubbornness to self-satisfaction, both of which imply an intellectual inflexibility that might be taken as the opposite of the quest for self-knowledge. Socrates concedes that on the basis of his actions, jurors might perceive this quality in him. Ironically, however, the rhetorical structure of the passage shows that it is the jurors who might rightfully be charged with self-satisfaction and stubbornness, while Socrates tries to persuade them to abandon these ways.

In refusing to abase himself before the court, as Socrates implies most of the jurors have done in their own trials, he offers a dramatic contrast to their self-conception as virtuous, brave, and honorable men. Socrates is quite aware that such a demonstration may cause more resentment than self-awareness. The more his listeners insist on being satisfied with their own behavior, the angrier they may grow at Socrates and the more they may want to condemn him (see essay 18).

Socrates' refusal to practice the traditional rituals that characterized the Athenian courtroom serves as a kind of test of the jurors—one quite similar, in fact, to the kind of testing practiced by Socrates in his everyday life and exemplified in his interrogation of Meletus, the politicians, the poets, and the craftsmen. As in those conversations, the juror will show by his response whether he actually "is something" or only pretends to be. He will show whether he lives smugly self-satisfied or practices the unending examination of self and others that constitutes the pursuit of virtue, and hence a real care of the self.

Consider the parallel between the speech Socrates gives in the *Apology* and the Socratic conversations that have led to this trial. Is the similarity superficial or profound? Are Socrates' goals in each the same or different? And what about the stakes? Does it matter that Socrates is talking to save his life here, or are the issues he

seeks to highlight for the jurors the same as those that have always driven his actions?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 24

In this chapter, the last one of his main speech, Socrates establishes a contrast between begging (δεῖσθαι) the jurors, on the one hand, and teaching (διδάσκειν) and persuading (πείθειν) them on the other. In so doing, he distances himself from what typically went on at an Athenian trial. This tactic is particularly apparent in the disdain he shows for the idea that he might beg for mercy: groveling would be an affirmation of the jurors’ power. Socrates, by declining to participate in this ritual, refuses to ratify that power. The jurors cannot dictate what justice consists of nor how it should be pursued.

For Socrates, the concept of justice is subject neither to the procedures that define the judicial system nor to the opinions of his fellow citizens. This idea, however strongly held, is not the only one at work in the passage. By recommending persuasion and teaching, he clearly acknowledges that there is a social dimension to the trial that should not be rejected entirely. This recognition leads to a question, however. At the beginning of the trial, Socrates had denied that he was skilled in speaking (δεινὸς λέγειν), yet here he says that the proper job of the defendant is to teach and persuade. What are we to make of these seemingly contradictory

statements? Are they merely a slip, or do they point to one of the basic paradoxes of Socratic philosophy? What must Socrates teach the jurors or any other interlocutor, and how does he seek to persuade them?

The idea of teaching is itself problematic. Earlier Socrates had denied that he taught anyone anything. Here he seems content with the idea that he could teach the jurors, provided that he had sufficient time. Does he contradict himself, or are two different meanings of “teaching” to be understood? If so, how can we determine which meaning is in play?

Further Reading

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ESSAY 25

This joke concerning the tabulation of the jurors’ votes is complex. As almost all the commentators note, Socrates’ calculations are part of a mathematical fantasy based on the assumption that each of the prosecutors was responsible for securing an equal number of votes. This would mean that Meletus’s “share” would have been less than the one hundred votes necessary to avoid the fine of one thousand drachmas assessed for frivolous prosecutions. Yet we in fact have no true way of knowing whether the prosecution might not have obtained a similar number of votes for conviction if Meletus had been alone. Indeed, Athenian legal procedures were designed to avoid the kind of jury packing that would have been necessary for Socrates’ fantasy to come true (see introduction).

In addition, Socrates’ jest recognizes that while the indictment was filed under Meletus’s name, he was in many ways the least

substantial member of the prosecution. Anytus was more prominent, and Lycon's resentments were much more well-founded, owing to the death of his son at the hands of the Thirty.

Like many jokes, however, this one succeeds in part by distracting the attention of the listeners from something the teller wishes them to ignore. Socrates' opponents, who are congratulating themselves on his conviction, are treated to what is virtually a denial that he has been convicted at all. His supporters are comforted not so much by the logic of Socrates' argument, but by his refusal to despair.

At the same time, Socrates' remark is strange. Why does he choose this critical juncture of the trial for a display of irony? In not accepting the verdict of the jury with the requisite gravity, does Socrates demonstrate his fearlessness before death, and hence a certain heroic virtue? Does he also reveal a certain nonchalance toward, if not contempt for, the entire procedure? How do you understand the purpose of this joke? How would you, as a member of the jury, have reacted to it?

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ESSAY 26

Socrates' great service to the city, he explains, is to persuade his fellow Athenians to care more for themselves than for their political offices, their possessions, and the other outer accoutrements of ἀρετή. Thus, as at numerous places in the work, he makes a distinction between "being" and "seeming," between the outward signs of virtue and its substantial reality.

Such a distinction between inner and outer worth is fundamental to modern thinking, thanks in part to the *Apology* itself.

The voice of Socrates telling the Athenians that he will obey his private convictions rather than the public voice of the δῆμος has contributed significantly to this development. It would be difficult to exaggerate either the importance of his stand or the personal courage it took to make it.

Athens, for all of its success in innovation in both politics and the arts, was a traditional society by modern standards, and it is no accident that the word νόμος in Greek comes to mean both “custom” and “law.” In the *Gorgias*, Callicles quotes Pindar’s statement that custom/law is the ruler of all (νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς).

Within such a society, the assertion of individual rights is no small matter. Indeed, from the perspective of the Homeric poems, whose ideological assumptions almost all Athenians would have accepted, it is clearly the individual who must be understood in terms of the group rather than the other way around. Achilles chooses to withdraw from the fighting rather than endure the loss of public esteem (τιμή) implied by Agamemnon’s decision to take away his war prize. He does not take solace in contemplating his superiority in isolation. Socrates’ decision to value inner over outer worth is no mere commonplace of moral consolation, but a radical break with the cultural values of his fellow citizens.

Like everything else about Socrates, this action takes the form that it does because of his idiosyncratic approach to life. But it is worth asking ourselves whether or not Socrates’ choice *also* leads us to a more general conclusion. Is it possible to adopt a philosophical approach to the world that is not ultimately hostile to tradition? Is there something about philosophy, as Socrates conceives it, that will always cause the philosopher to be a transgressive figure?

How does Socrates justify his decision to hold to his convictions in the face of the disapproval of many of his neighbors? What are his goals? What limitations, if any, should structure philosophy’s search for truth?

Further Reading

Dodds, E. R. 1951. *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 207–35. Berkeley: University of California Press.

ESSAY 27

Hadot, Pierre. 1997. "Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy," translated by Arnold I. Davidson and Paula Wissing. In *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, edited by Arnold I. Davidson, 203–24. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ESSAY 27

At the end of chapter 27, Socrates acknowledges that if he went into exile, the fathers of the young men in his new home would undoubtedly drive him away. This statement seems to contradict his earlier claim that if he had truly corrupted the youth, then these young men's fathers and older brothers would have been lining up to denounce him and Meletus would now be calling them as witnesses (33e8–34b5). In the earlier passage, he took the fact that Meletus had not done so as proof positive that he had the support of the fathers and brothers of his young associates. Yet even there, not all the fathers and brothers of men who associated with Socrates were present, and not all would have necessarily had the same feelings as those who were present at the trial.

Here as in many places, Socrates appears to be playing with the audience, amusing his supporters while infuriating his detractors by pretending to enlist them as witnesses for the defense.

In the *Crito*, however, Socrates takes the question of exile more seriously. In response to his friend Crito's repeated urgings that he accept the help of friends and escape from Athens, Socrates imagines the Laws of Athens rising up to challenge him should he decide to leave. They scornfully point out that he has lived with them for seventy years without objection, but now, when they have decided against him, he suddenly needs to find a new city. This, they say, will be more difficult than he imagines, however:

If you go to one of the neighboring states, such as Thebes or Megara which are both well governed, you will enter them as an enemy to their constitution, and all good patriots will eye you with suspicion as a destroyer of laws. You will confirm

the opinion of the jurors, so that they'll seem to have given a correct verdict—for any destroyer of laws might very well be supposed to have a destructive influence upon young and foolish human beings. Do you intend, then, to avoid well-governed states and the most disciplined people? And if you do, will life be worth living? Or will you approach these people and have the impudence to converse with them? What subjects will you discuss, Socrates? The same as here, when you said that goodness and justice, institutions and laws, are the most precious possessions of mankind? (53b–c, translation by Tredennick and Tarrant)

What do you make of the Laws' argument? Are the citizens of a state bound to submit to its law even if applied unjustly? Would you want to live in a community where they were not? What would life in exile be like for Socrates? Would he be able to integrate himself into a new community, or would he have to live quietly, something he has already said is impossible for him to do in Athens and still remain true to Apollo? Could this issue explain his provocative refusal to propose an acceptable counterpenalty?

Further Reading

Plato, *Crito*.

Allen, R. E. 1980. *Socrates and Legal Obligation*, 120–28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Stokes, Michael C. 2005. *Dialectic in Action: An Examination of Plato's Crito*, 125–86. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales.

ESSAY 28

Socrates was clearly a divisive figure. He called into question the existing constitutional order and criticized the institutions of Athenian democracy. While superficially orthodox in his religious

ESSAY 29

practice, his incessant questioning of all claims to knowledge, his tacit encouragement of the young to do the same, and his frequent mention of his personal δαίμων would certainly have been seen as undermining the received verities of Athenian civic religion. Moreover, his appeal to the young, who emulated his style of cross-examination with their elders, would naturally have been seen by many as encouraging disrespect and hence as corrupting the youth. Such a state of affairs is certainly implied by the representation of Socrates' student Pheidippides in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. In this light, Socrates' proposal that he be treated like an Olympic victor would have struck many as the height of impudence. It is little wonder, then, that an even wider margin voted for his execution than had voted for his conviction.

Given these circumstances, what do you think the jury should have done? How would we treat someone today whose intelligence we respected but who we sincerely believed was trying to overthrow the constitutional order, destroy our religion, and corrupt our young people? If that same person expressed a complete and utter lack of remorse, would we be more or less likely to vote for execution? Would we be willing to consider the possibility that he could be right and we might be wrong? Would we be willing to test ourselves and his line of reasoning by following it to its logical conclusion? Or would we rely upon the common sense of received opinion (see essay 12)?

Further Reading

King, Martin Luther, Jr. "Letter from the Birmingham Jail."
Thoreau, Henry David. "On Civil Disobedience."

ESSAY 29

Socrates here adopts the traditional position of the Greek hero: death before dishonor. Spartan mothers were said to tell their

sons before they went off to battle, “come home with your shield or on it.” Yet Socrates is no Homeric hero. The unquestioning adherence to the code of honor—which guides Achilles, Ajax, and Hector as members of an aristocracy based on the assumption that ἀρετή is transmitted genetically, not sought out—is not compatible with the Socratic dictum: ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ. Indeed, the Socratic emphasis on the care of the self takes what was an essentially other-directed ethos of honor and glory and transforms it into an internally directed commitment to moderation and self-examination.

Yet even the heroic tradition recognized a certain ambiguity in the range of ethical responses to a situation. As noted above, Odysseus, in one of the Cretan tales he tells Eumaeus the swineherd, portrays himself as one who threw away his shield. The story is a fiction, but it is told as truth and clearly was not unthinkable. Likewise Archilochus, a near contemporary of the Homeric poems, famously sang:

Some barbarian is waving my blameless shield, which
I left unwillingly under a bush. But I saved myself.
What does that shield matter to me? Let it go. I
will get another just as good. (fr. 5)

Archilochus is no Homeric hero either, but his iambic tradition is equally ancient and represents a comic and carnivalesque tradition that parallels and interacts with that of epic through such ambiguous figures as Odysseus and his Cretan persona. In this way, then, we can see that within the heroic world there is room for responses to a crisis that are virtually antithetical.

Socrates’ own position recognizes no such range of attitudes. In some ways its insistence on “death before dishonor” is even stricter than the formulations we find in the poets. How are we to understand this reformulation of the heroic code? Is Socrates trying to outdo Ajax, Achilles, and Odysseus? How do Archilochus and Odysseus, by saving themselves, exhibit a different conception of the self from that which Socrates professes to care for?

ESSAY 30

Further Reading

- Gentili, Bruno 1988. *Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece from Homer to the Fifth Century*, 179–96. Translated by A. Thomas Cole. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Miller, Paul Allen. 1994. “Epos and Iambos or Archilochus Meets the Wolfman.” In *Lyric Texts and Lyric Consciousness: The Birth of a Genre from Archaic Greece to Augustan Rome*, 9–36. London: Routledge.

ESSAY 30

In this chapter, we have what is in many ways the essence of Socratic philosophy, at least as presented by Plato. If we want to escape from the blame and censure of others (39d4–5), then we must live rightly (39d4–5). The problem, of course, consists in how one determines the right way to live. If it is Socrates’ position that no one does wrong willingly (37a6–7), then simply deciding to do the right thing is not enough to insure that one is actually doing what one should. We must first know what the right thing is. But how, if we do not already know it?

Socrates in the *Apology* presents no simple way around this dilemma (see essay 13). He offers no code, no law, no set of commandments one can follow to be sure of acting in a fashion that is beyond reproach. Instead, he presents us with something much more demanding: the proposition that each of us should be prepared at all times to present an examination of our lives, that we should be ready to undergo the crucible of Socratic interrogation (τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, 39c7). If our lives cannot stand up to this rigorous scrutiny, then we must change them or face reproach.

Would you be prepared to give such an account of your life? Should our leaders and those who claim to be wise be made to submit such an account? Would the heightened self-consciousness required to live up to such a standard improve our behavior or would it render us incapable of action as suggested by Callicles in the *Gorgias*? Could one be comfortable if one were actually to live

this way? Might a certain level of discomfort be a positive thing and even, ultimately, a truer gauge of our happiness?

Further Reading

- Foucault, Michel. 2005. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–1982*, edited by Frédéric Gros, 1–105. Translated by Graham Burchell. Series editors, François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana. English series editor, Arnold J. Davidson. New York: Picador.
- Kraut, Richard. 2006. "The Examined Life." In *A Companion to Socrates*, edited by Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kametkar, 228–42. London: Blackwell.

ESSAY 31

The nature of Socrates' δαίμων (40a5) has long been debated (see also essay 19). To many modern readers, it is easily assimilated to the voice of conscience. To those of us (unlike the ancients) who live in a world after the founding of the modern science of psychology and after Freud's analysis of the superego, ego, and id, the notion that there is an inner voice that warns us when we are about to do something wrong is anything but strange. Earlier writers have understood Socrates' δαίμων differently. The second-century-C.E. philosopher and biographer Plutarch, in *On the Personal Deity of Socrates*, actually posits a personal guardian deity who looks down on Socrates and other fortunate individuals from heaven and guides them (588b–593a). This is clearly a forerunner to the later concept of the guardian angel. Yet both the modern and the Plutarchan understandings may be seriously anachronistic. In Xenophon's version of the *Apology*, Socrates himself directly compares his δαίμων to other experiences of divination that were common at the time and attracted no special comment:

Do I introduce new divinities by saying that the voice of the god appears to me signifying what I should do? For some

men also conjecture the existence of voices using the sounds of birds, and others use the passing speech of men. Will anyone dispute that thunder, whether speaking or not, is a great omen? Does not the Pythian priestess at her tripod also announce things from the god with a voice? Furthermore, all say and believe, just as I say, that the god foresees what is to happen and foretells this to whom he wishes. Yet while they call these foretellings omens, voices, symbols, and prophecies, I call this thing the δαίμωνιον (12–14).

In short, Socrates here argues that his δαίμων is really nothing unusual.

How do you understand the δαίμων? Are the psychological, the angelic, and the divinatory explanations just different ways of describing what is essentially the same phenomenon? Or do these different ways of explaining assume fundamentally different conditions governing both the nature of the ψυχή or “soul” and its relation to what can be presumed to exist both within it and beyond it? Does Xenophon’s account, in which Socrates’ δαίμων becomes just another way of trying to tell the future, support or contradict that of Plato?

Further Reading

Plutarch, *On the Personal Deity of Socrates*.

Xenophon, *Apology*.

Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. 2004. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the Trial of Socrates*, 178–81. London: Routledge.

Destree, Pierre, and Nicholas P. Smith, eds. 2005. *Socrates’ Divine Sign: Religious Practice and Value in Socratic Philosophy*. Kelowna, B.C.: Academic Printing and Publishing.

ESSAY 32

This section constitutes a final mythological and poetic coda to the *Apology* as a whole. On the one hand, from the perspective of

the dramatic situation its purpose is to comfort Socrates' supporters: this is no disaster that has just occurred. On the other, from the perspective of the dialogue as a composition, this chapter clearly plays a role in the architecture of the work as a whole.

Socrates devoted his life to advocating a rational approach to inquiry. It may seem odd, then, that Plato has him introduce this lengthy mythological digression. In fact, Xenophon's account of the speech includes no such material. But whether or not the historical Socrates ever talked about such subjects at his trial or anywhere else, it is clear that Plato thought this was an appropriate way to end the *Apology*. In many respects, it is similar to the mythological postscripts about the afterlife that he uses to conclude the *Republic*, the *Gorgias*, and the *Phaedo*.

His motivation for adopting this tactic is unknown, and certainly these three dialogues are far too complex to analyze in detail here. Nevertheless, we can say something about how this mythological digression functions in the context of the *Apology*. In it we move from the mundane issues of the trial, with its focus on petty human fears, anxieties, and jealousies, to a transcendental plane where such limitations are, if not completely surpassed, not the primary constraints on the state of our souls.

The myth itself represents a particular species of Socratic irony. It is not a logical proposition to which the supporters must assent as part of the process of Socratic question and answer. In fact, there is no philosophical examination of the problem at all, as Socrates develops his image of the afterlife by appealing to hearsay (τὰ λεγόμενα), the truth of which the supporters are invited to consider without being asked to affirm. With this kind of latitude available to him, Socrates is free to imagine a Hades that is a paradise for philosophers (through perhaps less pleasant for his immortal interlocutors), unlike the Athens that will soon put him to death. Such a discourse, then, offers more an ironic perspective on the present than a demonstration of the nature of the unknowable future.

ESSAY 33

What do you think is the function of Socrates' speculations on the afterlife? Do you find them comforting? Do you think he believes them? How would the dialogue be different without them?

Further Reading

Brisson, Luc. 1998. *Plato the Mythmaker*. Translated and edited by Gerard Nadaff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Veyne, Paul. 1988. *Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?: An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*. Translated by Paula Wissing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ESSAY 33

We know that there were various versions of Socrates' defense speech in circulation after his death, including retellings by Plato, Xenophon, and Andocides, among others. Each of these versions was clearly based on a real historical event, but no one of them was an authentic journalistic account of that event. Some of them, such as Xenophon's, appear to have been written years later and based on secondhand accounts. The case is very similar to that of the Gospels, where there are four canonical versions of the life of Jesus, each with its own specific characteristics and date of composition, together with other noncanonical versions of his life, such as the recently discovered *Gospel of Judas*, that were also widely read.

Why do you think different versions of the same event were in circulation? Should any one of them be considered more historically accurate than the others? How could you make that determination? What do you think was Plato's motivation in producing *this* version of the *Apology*? Was he successful?

What is there about the death of Socrates that has inspired people for the past 2,500 years to try to understand it and to attempt to claim that their understanding is the correct or the preferred one?

What is at stake in those claims? Now that you have read the complete text in Greek, do you care? Should you?

Further Reading

Danzig, Gabriel. 2003. "Apologizing for Socrates: Plato and Xenophon on Socrates' Behavior in Court." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 133: 281–321.

Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1971. *The Development of Greek Biography: Four Lectures*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

APPENDIX

CHANGES TO BURNET'S OXFORD CLASSICAL TEXT

- 21e3 Remove brackets from καὶ.
24e10 For οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταὶ print οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ.
26a2 Delete [καὶ ἀκουσίων].
26a8 For ἤδη δῆλον print δῆλον ἤδη.
28a7 For αἰρεῖ print αἰρήσει.
29b1 For καίτοι print καὶ τοῦτο.
29c4 Remove brackets from ἄν.
28d10 Paragraph break after αἰσχροῦ.
30c1 For ποιησάντος print ποιήσοντος.
31d1 Delete [φωνή].
31d4 For τοῦτο print τούτου.
32a7 For ἀλλὰ κἂν print ἅμα κἂν.
32c6 After ἀποθάνοι print a raised dot instead of a comma.
32e4 Punctuate as follows: καὶ, ὥσπερ χρῆ.
33a7 For ἐπιθυμοῖ print ἐπιθυμεῖ.
35a1 Print the last part of this sentence as follows: γέ ἐστι τὸν
Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.
38c7 Print comma after βίου.
38d3 Delete Ἀθηναῖοι, retaining the comma thereafter so that it
now follows ἄνδρες.
41b5 For καὶ δὴ print καὶ δὴ καὶ.

GLOSSARY

A

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| ἀβρόνω | adorn; <i>mid.</i> give oneself airs |
| ἀγαθός, -ή, -όν | good, brave, capable, virtuous |
| ἀγανακτέω | be angry |
| ἀγνοέω | not know; be ignorant |
| ἀγορά, -ᾶς, ἡ | marketplace, city center |
| ἀγροικῶς | coarsely |
| ἄγω | lead, bring, carry off |
| ἄγών, -όνος, ὁ | contest, struggle, trial, lawsuit |
| ἀγωνίζομαι | contend, fight |
| ἀδελφός, -οῦ, ὁ | brother |
| ἀδιάφθαρτος, -ον | uncorrupted |
| ἀδικέω | act unjustly, do wrong, do evil, harm |
| ἄδικος, -ον | wrong, unjust |
| ἀεί | always, on each occasion |
| ἀηδής, -ές | unpleasant |
| ἀθάνατος, -ον | undying, immortal |
| Ἀθηναῖος, -α, -ον | Athenian, person from Athens |
| ἄθροός, -α, ον | all together |
| Αἴδης, -ου, ὁ | Hades |
| αἰνιγμα, -τος, τό | riddle |
| αἰνίττομαι | speak in riddles |
| αἰρέω | seize, take; convict |
| αἰσθάνομαι | perceive, learn |
| αἴσθησις, -εως, ἡ | perception, sensation, feeling |
| αἰσχρός, -ά, -όν | shameful, disgraceful |
| αἰσχύνη, -ης, ἡ | shame, dishonor |
| αἰσχύνω | shame, dishonor; <i>pass.</i> be ashamed |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| αἰτέω | ask, ask for |
| αἰτία, -ας, ἡ | cause, responsibility, blame |
| αἵτιον, -ου, τό | cause |
| ἀκολασία, -ας, ἡ | excess, extravagance; intemperance |
| ἀκόλαστος, -η, -ον | undisciplined |
| ἀκούω | listen to, hear |
| ἀκροάομαι | listen |
| ἀκροατής, -οῦ, ὁ | listener |
| ἄκων, -ουσα, -ον | unwilling, involuntary |
| ἀλήθεια, -ας, ἡ | truth; τῇ ἀληθείᾳ , in truth |
| ἀληθεύω | tell the truth |
| ἀληθής, -ές | true |
| ἀληθῶς | truly |
| ἀλίσκομαι | be taken, be caught, be convicted |
| ἀλλά | but |
| ἀλλήλους, ἀλλήλων | one another (<i>reflexive</i>) |
| ἄλλοθι | elsewhere |
| ἄλλοῖος, -α, -ον | of another sort, different |
| ἄλλος, -η, -ον | other; ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα , again and again |
| ἄλλως | otherwise; vainly; ἄλλως τε καί , especially |
| ἄλόγιστος, -ον | unreasonable |
| ἄλογος, -ον | unreasonable, unexpected |
| ἄμα | together, at the same time |
| ἄμαθής, -ές | ignorant, foolish |
| ἄμαθία, -ας, ἡ | ignorance |
| ἄμάρτημα, -ματος, τό | error |
| ἀμείβω | change, exchange |
| ἀμείνων, -ονος | better |
| ἀμέλεια, -ας, ἡ | neglect |
| ἀμελέω | neglect, be careless about |
| ἀμήχανος, -ον | impossible, inconceivable, inexpressible |
| ἄμφι | around, about (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| ἀμφισβητέω | dispute |
| ἀμφοτέρως, -α, -ον | both; κατ' ἀμφοτέρω , in both cases, in either case |
| ἄν | <i>indefinite particle</i> |
| ἄν | if (<i>contr. of ἔάν</i>) |
| ἀναβαίνω | appear in court |
| ἀναβιβάζω | bring into court |
| ἀναγιγνώσκω | read |
| ἀναγκάζω | compel |
| ἀναγκαῖος, -α, -ον | necessary |
| ἀνάγκη, -ης, ἡ | necessity; binding law |
| ἀναζητέω | seek out |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| άναιρέω | pick up, take up; (of an oracle) respond |
| άναισχυντία, -ας, ή | shamelessness |
| άνάισχυντος, -ον | shameless |
| άνάισχυντως | shamelessly |
| άναλαμβάνω | resume |
| άνάξιος, -α, -ον | unworthy |
| άναπειθω | try to persuade, seduce |
| άναφέρω | refer |
| άνδρεία, -ας, ή | courage |
| άνέλεγκτος, -ον | not refuted, irrefutable |
| άνελεύθερος, -ον | not fit for a free man, slavish |
| άνέλπιστος, -ον | unexpected |
| άνεξέταστος, -ον | unexamined |
| άνέρομαι | ask |
| άνερωτάω | question, ask again |
| άνέχω | bear up |
| άνήρ, άνδρός, ό | man |
| άνθρώπινος, -η, -ον | human, attainable by a person |
| άνθρώπιος, -α, -ον | human |
| άνθρωπος, -ου, ό | human being, person |
| άνόσιος, -ον | impious |
| άντί | instead of, in place of (+ gen.) |
| άντιβόλησις, -εως, ή | entreaty, prayer |
| άντιγραφή, -ής, ή | response to a charge, plea |
| άντιλέγω | reply |
| άντιπαραβάλλω | compare |
| άντιπαρατίθημι | compare |
| άντιτιμάομαι | propose a counterpenalty |
| άντωμοσία, -ας, ή | formal charge, affidavit |
| άξια, -ας, ή | worth, value |
| άξιος, -α, -ον | worthy of, deserving of, fitting, worthwhile |
| άξιόχρεως, -ων | responsible, worthy of credit, trustworthy |
| άξιόω | believe, consider, think |
| άπάγω | lead away; arrest |
| άπαλλαγή, -ής, ή | release |
| άπαλλάττω | free from, release from; mid. depart |
| άπαναισχυντέω | be shameless enough to say |
| άπας, άπασα, άπαν | all |
| άπειθέω | disobey |
| άπειμι | (will) go away |
| άπειρος, -α, -ον | inexperienced |
| άπελάυνω | drive off |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| ἀπεχθάνομαι | make oneself hated, become hated |
| ἀπέχθεια, -ας, ἡ | enmity, hatred |
| ἀπιστέω | disbelieve |
| ἄπιστος, -ον | unconvincing, not believing |
| ἀπό | from (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἀποβαίνω | turn out |
| ἀποδείκνυμι | show, demonstrate |
| ἀποδημέω | relocate |
| ἀποδημία, -ας, ἡ | relocation |
| ἀποθνήσκω | die, be put to death |
| ἀποκρίνομαι | answer, reply |
| ἀποκρύπτω | conceal something (<i>acc.</i>) from someone (<i>acc.</i>) |
| ἀποκτείνω | kill |
| ἀποκτείνω | kill |
| ἀπολαύω | benefit from (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἀπολείπω | desert |
| ἀπόλλυμι | destroy, lose; <i>mid.</i> be destroyed, die |
| ἀπολογέομαι | defend oneself |
| ἀπολογία, -ας, ἡ | defense |
| ἀπορέω | be at a loss |
| ἀπορία, -ας, ἡ | lack |
| ἄπορος, -ον | difficult, without resources |
| ἀποτίνω | pay |
| ἀποτρέπω | turn away from, dissuade |
| ἀποφαίνω | show, display |
| ἀποφεύγω | escape, be acquitted |
| ἀποψηφίζομαι | acquit |
| ἄρα | so, then, accordingly, as it seems |
| ἄρα | <i>untranslated adverb, introduces a question</i> |
| ἀργύριον, -ον, τό | silver, money |
| ἀρετή, -ῆς, ἡ | excellence, virtue |
| ἀριθμός, -οῦ | number |
| ἄριστος, -η, -ον | best, noblest, most excellent |
| ἄρουρα, -ης | ground, earth |
| ἄρτι | just now |
| ἀρχή, -ῆς, ἡ | beginning; government; office; κατ' ἀρχάς from the beginning; τὴν ἀρχήν, in the beginning, in the first place, at all |
| ἄρχω | begin; lead, command, rule (+ <i>gen.</i>); hold office |
| ἄρχων, -οντος, ὁ | commander; οἱ ἄρχοντες, the rulers, magistrates |
| ἀσέβεια, -ας, ἡ | impiety |
| ἄστός, -οῦ, ὁ | townsman, citizen |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| ἀσχολία, -ας, ἡ | lack of leisure, occupation |
| ἅτε | inasmuch as (+ <i>part.</i>) |
| ἄτεχνῶς | literally, completely |
| ἀτιμάζω | slight, dishonor |
| ἀτιμῶ | deprive of citizen rights |
| ἄτοπος, -ον | out of place, eccentric, extraordinary |
| ἄττα | = τινά (<τις, τι) |
| ἀῖ | again, in turn, on the other hand |
| ἀυθάδης, -ες | stubborn, headstrong |
| ἀυθαδίζομαι | be stubborn, headstrong |
| ἀῖθις | again, later, hereafter |
| ἀυλητής, -οῦ, ὁ | flute player |
| ἀυτίκα | right away, at once |
| ἀυτόθι | there |
| ἀυτόματος, -η, -ον | on one's own |
| ἀυτόν, -οῦ | himself, oneself; him, her (<i>reflexive</i>) |
| ἀυτός, αὐτή, αὐτό | same |
| ἀυτοσχεδιάζω | judge carelessly |
| ἀυτόφωρος, -ον | caught in the act |
| ἀφθονία, -ας, ἡ | abundance |
| ἀφήμι | let go, release |
| ἀφικνέομαι | come, arrive |
| ἄχθομαι | be angry |
| ἄχθος, -ους, τό | burden |
| B | |
| βαρύς, -εῖα, -ύ | heavy, onerous |
| βασιλεύς, -έως, ὁ | king |
| βέλτιστος, -η, -ον | best |
| βελτίων, -ονος | better |
| βιάζομαι | constrain, overpower by force |
| βιβλίον, -ου, τό | book |
| βίος, -ου, ὁ | life |
| βιώω | live |
| βιωτός, -όν | livable |
| βλαβερός, -ά, -όν | harmful |
| βλάπτω | harm |
| βοάω | shout |
| βοηθέω | help |
| βουλευώ | serve as a member of the βουλή; <i>mid.</i> plan |
| βούλομαι | wish |
| βραδύς, -εῖα, -ύ | slow |

GLOSSARY

Γ

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| γάρ | for, since |
| γε | at least, indeed |
| γέμω | be full of |
| γενναῖος, -α, -ον | noble |
| γεωργικός, -ή, -όν | agricultural |
| γῆ, γῆς, ἡ | earth |
| γίγνομαι | become, happen; exist, be |
| γιγνώσκω | come to know, learn, recognize |
| γνησίως | genuinely |
| γούν | now, at least, at any rate (γε + οὔν) |
| γράμμα, -ματος, τό | thing written, letter; <i>pl.</i> letters, literature |
| γραφή, -ῆς, ἡ | writing; formal charge, indictment |
| γράφω | write; <i>mid.</i> present in writing, indict |
| γυνή, γυναικός, ἡ | woman |

Δ

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| δαιμόνιον, -ου, τό | divine thing, divinity |
| δαιμόνιος, -α, -ον | divine, supernatural |
| δαίμων, -ονος, ὁ | divine being, divinity, god |
| δάκρυον, -ου, τό | tear |
| δέ | and; but; μεν . . . δέ , on the one hand . . . on the other |
| δεῖ | it is necessary, one ought (+ <i>infin.</i>) |
| δείδω | fear |
| δείκνυμι | point out, show, make clear |
| δεινός, -ή, -όν | terrible, to be feared; marvelous, strange; clever |
| δέκα | ten (<i>indecl.</i>) |
| δεσμός, οὔ, ὁ | bond; imprisonment |
| δεσμοτηρίον, -ου, τό | prison |
| δεῦρο | to this place, here |
| δέχομαι | accept, take |
| δέω | need, lack; <i>mid.</i> ask, beg |
| δέω | bind, put in prison |
| δή | clearly, apparently, manifestly, so, now, really |
| δήλος, -η, -ον | clear |
| δημηγορία, -ας, ἡ | public speaking |
| δημιουργός, -οῦ, ὁ | craftsman |
| δημοκρατέομαι | have a democratic constitution |
| δημόσιος, -α, -ον | of the people; δημοσίᾳ , in public |
| δημότης, -ου, ὁ | resident of the same deme |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| δήπου | surely, no doubt |
| δήτα | certainly, of course; τί δήτα , what then? |
| διά | through; by means of (+ <i>gen.</i>); because of (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| διαβάλλω | slander |
| διαβολή, -ής, ἡ | slander |
| διαγίνομαι | pass through |
| διάγω | live |
| διακινδυνεύω | face all dangers |
| διακωλύω | hinder, prevent |
| διαλέγομαι | converse with, talk to |
| διαμυθολογέω | converse, exchange stories |
| διανοέομαι | think, consider |
| διάνοια, -ας, ἡ | thought, intention |
| διασκοπέω | examine, consider |
| διατελέω | continue |
| διατριβή, -ής, ἡ | pastime, pursuit, mode of living |
| διατρίβω | spend time |
| διαφέρω | be different from; be superior to (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| διαφεύγω | flee, escape; be acquitted |
| διαφθείρω | destroy; lead astray, corrupt, ruin |
| διδάσκαλος, -ου, ὁ | teacher |
| διδάσκω | teach, instruct |
| δίδωμι | give, offer, present |
| διερωτάω | interrogate thoroughly |
| δικάζω | judge |
| δίκαιος, -α, -ον | just, right |
| δικαίως | justly, with good reason |
| δικανικός, -ή, -όν | characteristic of the law courts |
| δικαστήριον, -ου, τό | law court |
| δικαστής, -ου, ὁ | judge, juror |
| δίκη, -ης, ἡ | case, charge, trial, judgment, justice |
| διόμνυμι | swear |
| διττός, -ή, -όν | double, two-fold |
| διώκω | pursue, follow |
| δοκέω | think, think good; δοκεῖ μοι , it seems to me |
| δόξα, -ης, ἡ | reputation, glory, honor, opinion |
| δόσις, -εως, ἡ | gift |
| δουλεύω | be a slave to |
| δραχμή, -ής, ἡ | drachma |
| δρῦς, δρυός, ἡ | oak |
| δύναμαι | be able, can (+ <i>inf.</i>) |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| δυνατός, -ή, -όν | strong, powerful, effective |
| δύο, δυοῖν | two |
| δυστυχία, -ας, ή | bad luck |
| E | |
| ἐάν | if (= εἰ ἂν) |
| ἐάνπερ | if in truth |
| ἐαυτόν, -ήν, -ό | himself, herself, itself (<i>no nom.</i>) |
| ἐάω | allow |
| ἐβδομήκοντα | seventy |
| ἐγγυάω | promise; <i>mid.</i> give a guarantee |
| ἐγγυητής, -οῦ, ὁ | guarantor |
| ἐγγύς | near (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἐγείρω | rouse, wake |
| ἐγκαλέω | charge, accuse |
| ἐγκλημα, -ματος, τό | charge, accusation |
| ἐγώ, μου, μοι, με | I |
| ἐθέλω | be willing, wish |
| ἐθίζομαι | be accustomed to |
| ἔθω | become accustomed |
| εἰ | if, whether |
| εἶεν | very well then, okay |
| εἰμί | be, exist |
| εἶμι | come, go, will go; ἴθι, come! |
| εἰρωνεύομαι | dissemble, feign ignorance, speak ironically |
| εἰς | into, to, for, as regards, in regard to (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| εἷς, μία, ἓν | one |
| εἰσάγω | bring in (to court), bring to trial |
| εἴσειμι | go into |
| εἰσέρχομαι | come in, enter |
| εἶτα | then, and then, next |
| εἴτε . . . εἴτε | whether . . . or |
| εἶωθα | be accustomed, be in the habit |
| ἐκ | out of, from (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἕκαστος, -η, -ον | each, every one |
| ἐκάτερος, -α, -ον | each of two, each singly, on either side |
| ἐκεῖ | in that place, there |
| ἐκεῖνος, -η, -ο | that |
| ἐκεῖνος | in that way |
| ἐκκλησία, -ας, ή | assembly |
| ἐκκλησιαστής, -οῦ, ὁ | member of the assembly |
| ἐκλέγω | pick out |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| ἐκπλήττω | drive out of one's senses, strike with panic |
| ἐκτίνω | pay in full |
| ἐκφεύγω | flee, escape |
| ἐκόν, -ούσα, -όν | willingly, intentionally |
| ἐλέγχω | examine; refute |
| ἐλεινός, -ή, -όν | pitiful, wretched |
| ἐλεέω | have pity on; show mercy |
| ἐλπίς, -ίδος, ἡ | hope |
| ἐμαυτόν, -ήν | myself |
| ἐμμελῶς | properly; at a reasonable price |
| ἐμμένω | stay with, abide |
| ἐμός, -ή, -όν | my, mine |
| ἐμπίπλημι | fill up |
| ἐμπνέω | breathe, live |
| ἔμπροσθεν | earlier, in front of |
| ἐν | in, among, in the midst of (+ <i>dat.</i>) |
| ἐναντιόομαι | oppose |
| ἐναντίος, -α, -ον | opposite, contrary |
| ἐνδείκνυμι | demonstrate, point out; indict |
| ἔνδεκα | eleven (<i>indecl.</i>) |
| ἕνεκα | for the sake of, because of (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἐνθάδε | here, now |
| ἐνθένδε | from this place, from here |
| ἐνθουσιάζω | be inspired |
| ἐνθυμέομαι | consider |
| ἐνίοτε | from time to time |
| ἐννοέω | consider |
| ἐνταῦθα | here, there, at this point |
| ἐνταυθοῖ | here, to this place |
| ἐντεῦθεν | from there; from this, as a result of this |
| ἐντυγχάνω | happen upon, meet |
| ἐνύπνιον, -ου, τό | dream |
| ἐξ | out of, from (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἐξαιρέω | take out, remove |
| ἐξαμαρτάνω | err |
| ἐξαπατάω | deceive |
| ἔξειμι | go out |
| ἐξελαύνω | send into exile, banish |
| ἐξελέγχω | examine closely, test |
| ἐξεργάζομαι | bring to perfection |
| ἐξέρχομαι | go into exile |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| ἔξεστι | it is possible to; ἔξόν , it being possible (+ <i>infin.</i>) |
| ἔξετάζω | examine, probe |
| ἔξετασις, -εως, ἡ | close examination, scrutiny |
| ἔοικα | be likely, seem (+ <i>infin.</i>) |
| ἐπαίω | understand |
| ἐπακολουθέω | follow after (+ <i>dat.</i>) |
| ἐπεί | since, because; when |
| ἐπειδή | since, when; ἐπειδάν , whenever (= ἐπειδή ἄν) |
| ἔπειτα | then, next |
| ἐπέχω | hold back, restrain |
| ἐπί | toward, at, near (+ <i>gen.</i>); to, toward (+ <i>acc.</i>); with a view to, on the condition that (+ <i>dat.</i>) |
| ἐπιδείκνυμι | show |
| ἐπιδημέω | reside |
| ἐπικίης, -ές | good, suitable, reasonable |
| ἐπιθυμέω | desire |
| ἐπικωμῶδέω | mock, caricature |
| ἐπιλανθάνομαι | forget (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἐπιμελέομαι | care for (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ἐπιορκέω | swear falsely |
| ἐπίσταμαι | know, understand |
| ἐπιστάτης, -ου, ὁ | trainer, master |
| ἐπιστήμη, -ης, ἡ, | knowledge |
| ἐπιτηδεύω | pursue, follow, practice |
| ἐπιτίθημι | place upon, put upon; <i>mid.</i> attack |
| ἐπιτρέπω | permit; trust in |
| ἐπιτυγχάνω | chance upon |
| ἐπίφθονος, -ον | hateful |
| ἐπιχειρέω | try (+ <i>infin.</i>) |
| ἐπονείδιστος, -ον | shameful, reproachful |
| ἔπος, -ου, τό | word |
| ἐργάζομαι | work, do, accomplish; do something (<i>acc.</i>) to someone (<i>acc.</i>) |
| ἔργον, -ου, τό | employment, work, deed |
| ἐρευνάω | seek after, examine |
| ἐρῆμος, -η, -ον | undefended |
| ἔρομαι | ask, inquire |
| ἔρχομαι | come, go |
| ἐρωτάω | ask, inquire of |
| ἔσχατος, -η, -ον | extreme, last |
| ἑταῖρος, -ου, ὁ | companion |
| ἕτερος, -α, -ον | one or the other of two, other |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| ἔτι | besides, still, further, in addition, again |
| ἔτοιμος, -ον | ready, prepared |
| ἔτος, -ους, τό | year |
| εὖ | well |
| εὐαριθμητος, -ον | easily numbered |
| εὐδαιμονία, -ας, ἡ | happiness, good fortune, joy |
| εὐδαίμων, -ον | happy, fortunate |
| εὐδοκιμέω | seem good |
| εὐδόκιμος, -ον | renowned |
| εὐέλεγκτος, -ον | easy to test |
| εὐελπής, -ιδος | hopeful |
| εὐεργετέω | do good service |
| εὐθύς | right away, at once |
| εὐλαβέομαι | beware, take care |
| εὐρίσκω | find |
| εὐσεβέω | be pious |
| ἔχω | have, possess, hold; be able (+ <i>inf.</i>) |
| ἔωθεν | early |
| ἕως | until, as long as |
| ἕωςπερ | so long as, ever |
| Z | |
| ζάω | live |
| ζεύγος, -ους, τό | pair of horses; chariot drawn by a team |
| Ζεὺς, Διός, Δί, Δία | Zeus |
| ζητέω | look for, seek into, investigate, search out |
| ζήτησις, -εως, ἡ | a seeking, search, inquiry, investigation |
| H | |
| ἢ | either, or; than |
| ἦ | truly, really |
| ἡβάω | grow up |
| ἡγέομαι | consider, believe, think |
| ἡδέως | sweetly, gladly, pleasantly |
| ἦδη | already, by this time, now, at once, from now on |
| ἡδύς, -εῖα, -ύ | sweet, delightful, pleasant |
| ἦκω | have come |
| ἡλικία, -ας, ἡ | age, time of life |
| ἡλικιώτης, -ου, ό | contemporary, one of the same age |
| ἥλιος, -ου, ό | sun |
| ἡμεῖς, ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν, ἡμεῖς | we |
| ἡμέρα, -ας, ἡ | day |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| ἡμίθεος, -ου, ὁ | demigod, hero |
| ἡμίονος, -ου, ὁ <i>or</i> ἡ | mule |
| ἡσυχία, -ας, ἡ | peace, quiet; ἡσυχίαν ἄγω , live quietly |
| ἥτοι | surely |
| ἥττων, -ον | weaker, worse |
| Θ | |
| θάνατος, -ου, ὁ | death |
| θαρραλέως | courageously |
| θάτερον, -ου, τό | one thing of two |
| θάττων, -ον | swifter, quicker |
| θαυμάζω | marvel at, be surprised |
| θαυμάσιος, -α, -ον | wonderous, marvelous, amazing, strange |
| θαυμαστός, -ή, -όν | wonderful, marvelous |
| θεῖος, -α, -ον | divine |
| θέλω | wish |
| θέμις, θέμιτος, ἡ | divine law, right |
| θεμιτός, -ή, -όν | lawful, righteous |
| θεόμαντις, -εως, ὁ | soothsayer |
| θεός, -ου, ὁ <i>or</i> ἡ | god, goddess, divinity |
| θέω | run |
| θνήσκω | die |
| θόλος, -ου, ἡ | Athenian public building also called the Prytaneium |
| θορυβέω | make a racket; interrupt; <i>pass.</i> be thrown into confusion |
| θρηνέω | lament |
| Ι | |
| ιδία | in private, privately |
| ἴδιος, -α, ον | private |
| ιδιωτεύω | live as a private man |
| ιδιώτης, -ου, ὁ | a private citizen |
| ικανός, -ή, -όν | sufficient, enough; competent |
| ικετεία, -ας, ἡ | supplication |
| ικετεύω | approach as a suppliant |
| ἵνα | where; in order that; ἵνα τί , for what reason? |
| ἵππικός, -ή, ὄν | equestrian |
| ἵππος, -ου, ὁ <i>or</i> ἡ | horse |
| ἰσχύς, -ύος, ἡ | strength |
| ἰσχυρός, -ά, -όν | strong, powerful |
| ἴσως | perhaps |

GLOSSARY

Κ

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| καθεύδω | sleep, slumber |
| καθήμαι | sit (as a judge) |
| καθίστημι | establish, set forth, bring |
| καί | and, even, also; καί . . . καί , both . . . and; καὶ δὴ καί , and moreover, what is more |
| καινός, -ή, -όν | new, strange |
| καίπερ | although |
| καίτοι | and yet |
| κακία, -ας, ἡ | evil |
| κακός, -ή, -όν | bad, cowardly |
| καλέω | call, summon |
| καλλύνω | beautify; <i>mid.</i> be proud |
| καλός, -ή, -όν | beautiful, excellent, noble |
| καλῶς | well, excellently |
| κατά | against (+ <i>gen.</i>); after, at, down, according to (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| καταγέλαστος, -ον | ridiculous |
| καταγελάω | laugh at |
| καταγιγνώσκω | recognize |
| καταδαρθάνω | fall asleep |
| καταδέομαι | beg, entreat |
| κατάδηλος, -ον | manifest, plain |
| καταλαμβάνω | find, seize upon, understand |
| καταλύω | destroy, dissolve |
| κατανοέω | perceive, understand |
| κατασκεδάννυμι | spread |
| καταφρονέω | despise, hold in contempt |
| καταχαρίζομαι | gratify, do a favor |
| καταψηφίζομαι | vote against, condemn |
| κατέρχομαι | return, come back |
| κατέχω | restrain |
| κατηγορέω | accuse, charge |
| κατηγορία, -ας, ἡ | accusation |
| κατήγορος, -ου, ὁ | accuser |
| κελεύω | order, command |
| κέρδος, -ους, τό | profit, advantage |
| κήδομαι | have a care for (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| κινδυνεύω | run the risk of; be likely (+ <i>inf.</i>) |
| κίνδυνος, -ου, ὁ | danger, chance |
| κόλασις, -εως, ἡ | punishment |
| κολούω | restrain, repress |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| κορωνίς, -ίδος | curved |
| κρείττων, -ον | stronger, better |
| κρίνω | judge, try, decide |
| κρίσις, -εως, ἡ | judgment, condemnation |
| κρούω | knock, crush |
| κτάω | acquire; <i>mid.</i> possess |
| κτήσις, -εως, ἡ | possession |
| κυών, κυνός, ὁ <i>or</i> ἡ | dog |
| κωλύω | hinder |
| κωμωδία, -ας, ἡ | comedy |
| κωμωδοποιός, -οῦ, ὁ | comic poet |
| Λ | |
| λαμβάνω | take, seize |
| λανθάνω | escape notice |
| λατρεία, -ας, ἡ | service |
| λέγω | say, tell, mean |
| λείπω | leave, abandon |
| λέξις, -εως, ἡ | speaking, manner of speech |
| λίθος, -ου, ὁ | stone |
| λογίζομαι | reckon, calculate |
| λόγος, -ου, ὁ | word, story, speech; discussion, argument; principle |
| λοιδορέω | blame, abuse |
| λοιπός, -ή, -όν | remaining, rest of |
| λυπέω | cause pain |
| λυσιτελέω | be beneficial |
| Μ | |
| μά | no, by . . . ! (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| μάθημα, -τος, τό | knowledge, instruction |
| μάθησις, -εως, ἡ | instruction, learning |
| μαθητής, -οῦ, ὁ | pupil |
| μακαρίζω | bless, deem happy |
| μάλα | much, greatly |
| μάλιστα | most of all, especially; certainly, yes |
| μᾶλλον | more, rather |
| μανθάνω | learn, be taught, understand |
| μαντεία, -ας, ἡ | power of divination; oracle, prophecy |
| μαντεῖον, -ου, τό | oracular response, oracle |
| μαντεύομαι | consult <i>or</i> inquire of an oracle |
| μαντική, -ῆς, ἡ | art of divination |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| μαρτυρέω | testify |
| μάρτυς, -υρος, ὁ | witness |
| μάχη, -ης, ἡ | battle |
| μάχομαι | fight |
| μέγας, μεγάλη, μέγα | great, large, powerful, important |
| μέγεθος, -ους, τό | greatness, size |
| μέγιστος, -α, -ον | greatest, largest, most |
| μείζων, -ονος | greater, larger, more |
| μειράκιον, -ου, τό | youth, boy |
| μέλω | be an object of care |
| μέλλω | intend to, be about to |
| μέμφομαι | blame |
| μέν | indeed, on the one hand |
| μέντοι | but, however, in truth |
| μένω | remain, be unchanged |
| μέρος, -ους, τό | share, part |
| μετά | together with, with (+ <i>gen.</i>); after (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| μεταβολή, -ῆς, ἡ | change |
| μεταλαμβάνω | obtain a share of |
| μεταμέλει | change one's mind |
| μεταξύ | between |
| μεταπέμπω | send for |
| μεταπίπτω | change |
| μέτειμι | have a share in |
| μετέωρος, -ον | in midair, above the earth |
| μετοίκησις, -εως, ἡ | change of habitation |
| μετρίως | fairly |
| μή | not, lest |
| μηδαμῶς | in no way |
| μηδέ | and not, nor, not even |
| μηδείς, μηδεμία, μηδέν | no one, nothing |
| μηκέτι | no longer |
| μήν | truly |
| μηνύω | disclose, indicate |
| μήτε . . . μήτε | neither . . . nor |
| μήτηρ, -τρος, ἡ | mother |
| μηχανάομαι | contrive |
| μηχανή, -ῆς, ἡ | means |
| μιαρός, -ά, -όν | impure, defiled |
| μικρός, -ά, -όν | small, little |
| μιμέομαι | imitate, mimic |
| μιμνήσκω | recall |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| μισθός, -οῦ, ὁ | pay, wage |
| μισθόω | hire |
| μνᾶ, -ᾶς, ἡ | mina, sum of money equivalent to a hundred drachmas |
| μόγισ | with difficulty, reluctantly, barely |
| μοῖρα, -ας, ἡ | fate |
| μόνος, -η, -ον | only, alone |
| μόσχος, μόσχου ὁ | calf |
| μοχθηρία, -ας, ἡ | wickedness |
| μοχθηρός, -ά, -όν | bad, worthless |
| μυρίος, -α, -ον | without number, boundless |
| μύωψ, -ωπος, ὁ | horsefly |

N

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| ναυμαχία, -ας, ἡ | sea-fight |
| νάυς, νέως, ἡ | ship |
| νέος, -α, -ον | new, young |
| νεόττης, -ητος, ἡ | youthful recklessness |
| νή | indeed, yes |
| νικάω | win, be victorious |
| νόθος, -η, -ον | bastard, illegitimate |
| νομίζω | acknowledge, believe in |
| νόμος, -ου, ὁ | law, custom |
| νουθετέω | admonish |
| νοῦς, νοῦ, ὁ | mind |
| νυμφή, -ῆς, ἡ | nymph |
| νῦν | now |
| νύξ, νυκτός, ἡ | night |
| νυστάζω | doze |
| νοθής, -ές | sluggish |

Ξ

| | |
|---------------|---|
| ξένος, -ου, ὁ | stranger, foreigner, one from out-of-town |
| ξένως | strangely, as a stranger |

O

| | |
|----------------|---|
| ὁ, ἡ, τό | the; οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δέ some . . . others |
| ὅδε, ἧδε, τόδε | this, this here |
| ὀδύρομαι | moan |
| ὅθεν | from where |
| οἷ | to which place, where |
| οἶδα | know |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| οἴκαδε | homeward, to one's home |
| οἰκεῖος, -α, -ον | belonging to the household, family; οἱ οἰκεῖοι relatives, kinsfolk |
| οἰκέω | dwell |
| οἰκοθεν | from home |
| οἰκονομία, -ας, ἡ | household management |
| οἶκτος, -ου, ὁ | pity |
| οἶομαι (οἶμαι) | think, suppose |
| οἶος, -α, -ον | such as, what kind of |
| οἶόςπερ, οἶαπερ, οἶονπερ | just such as |
| οἶχομαι | go, depart |
| ὀλιγαρχία, -ας, ἡ | oligarchy |
| ὀλίγος, -η, -ον | small, little |
| ὀλιγορέω | think little of |
| ὅλος, -η, -ον | whole, entire |
| ὄμνυμι | swear, take an oath |
| ὁμοίως | similarly, in the same manner |
| ὁμολογέω | agree to, promise, acknowledge, confess |
| ὅμως | all the same, nonetheless |
| ὄναρ, τό | dream (<i>only in nom. and acc.</i>) |
| ὄνειδίζω | rebuke, reproach |
| ὀνίνημι | help; <i>mid.</i> derive benefit |
| ὄνομα, -ματος, τό | name; word |
| ὄνος, -ου, ὁ σρ ἡ | donkey, ass |
| ὄξύς, -εῖα, -ύ | sharp, clever, swift |
| ὅπη | where; in what way, how |
| ὅπηοῦν | in any way, whatever |
| ὄπλον, -ου, τό | weapons, shield |
| ὅποι | to where |
| ὀπόθεν | from where |
| ὀπότε | whenever |
| ὀπότερος, -α, -ον | which of the two |
| ὅπως | how, in what way; in order that; ὀπωστιοῦν, in any way at all |
| ὄραω | see |
| ὀργή, -ῆς, ἡ | anger |
| ὀργίζω | provoke, aggravate; <i>mid.</i> be angry, grow angry |
| ὀρθός, -ή, -όν | straight, right |
| ὀρθῶς | rightly |
| ὀρμάω | rush into |
| ὅς, ἥ, ὅ | who, which, what |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| ἅγιος, -α, -ον | holy |
| ὅσος, -η, -ον | as much as; <i>pl.</i> as many as, all who |
| ὅσπερ, ἥπερ, ὅπερ | whoever, the very one who |
| ὅστε, ἥτε, ὅτε | who, which |
| ὅστις, ἥτις, ὅτι | whoever, whatever; who, what |
| ὅστισοῦν | anyone at all |
| ὅταν | whenever |
| ὅτε | when |
| ὅτι | that; because; whatever |
| οὐ (οὐκ, οὐχ) | no, not |
| οὐδ | where |
| οὐδαμοῦ | nowhere |
| οὐδέ | and not, but not, nor, not even; οὐδέ . . . οὐδέ, neither . . . nor |
| οὐδεὶς, οὐδεμία, οὐδέν | no one, nothing |
| οὐδέποτε | not at any time, never |
| οὐδεπώποτε | never in the world |
| οὐδέτερος, -α, -ον | neither of two, neither |
| οὐκέτι | no longer |
| οὐκουν | and so . . . not, not therefore |
| οὐκοῦν | therefore, then, accordingly |
| οὐν | and so, then, therefore, accordingly |
| οὐράνιος, -α, -ον | heavenly |
| οὖς, ὠτός, τό | ear |
| οὔτε | and not, but not, neither, nor; οὔτε . . . οὔτε, neither . . . nor |
| οὗτος, αὕτη, τοῦτο | this, that |
| ὀφέλλω | help, be a benefit |
| ὄφελος, -ους, τό | use, good |
| ὀφλισκάνω | owe |

Π

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| παγκάλως | absolutely, correctly |
| πάθος, -ους, τό | experience; bad experience, suffering |
| παιδεύω | teach, educate, train |
| παῖδιον, -ου, τό | child |
| παίζω | play, jest |
| παῖς, παιδός, ὁ <i>or</i> ἡ | child; servant |
| πάλαι | formerly, long ago |
| παλαιός, -ά, -όν | ancient, old |
| παντάπασι | completely, absolutely |
| πάντως | wholly, altogether; at any rate, at least; by all means, certainly; yes |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| πάνυ | entirely, completely, very |
| παρά | from, by the side of, by (+ <i>gen.</i>); with, at the side of (+ <i>dat.</i>); along, during; by the side of, to the side of; by; contrary to (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| παράδειγμα, -ματος, τό | example, lesson |
| παραιτέομαι | ask earnestly, beg, entreat |
| παρακελεύομαι | urge, exhort |
| παρακéléυσις, -εως, ή | exhortation |
| παραλαμβάνω | take in hand |
| παραμένω | remain with |
| παράνομος, -ον | lawless, unlawful |
| παράνομως | illegally |
| παράπαν | absolutely, entirely |
| τὸ παράπαν | completely |
| παραπλήσιος, -α, -ον | similarly |
| παρασκευάζω | prepare, get ready |
| παρατίθημι | compare |
| παραχωρέω | yield, withdraw from |
| πάρειμι | be present |
| παρέχω | supply, offer |
| παρίεμαι | entreat |
| πᾶς, πᾶσα, πᾶν | all, every; the whole |
| πάσχω | experience |
| πατήρ, -τρός, ὁ | father |
| παύω | stop, cease |
| πείθω | persuade, convince; <i>mid.</i> obey |
| πειράομαι | try to (+ <i>inf.</i>) |
| πειστέον | one must obey |
| πέμπτος, -η, -ον | fifth |
| πέννης, -ητος, ὁ | poor man |
| πενία, -ας, ή | poverty |
| πέντε | five |
| περί | about, around, concerning, with regard to (+ <i>gen.</i>); near, concerning (+ <i>dat.</i>); around, with regard to (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| περὶ πολλοῦ (πλείστου) | |
| ποιεῖσθαι | to set a high (the highest) value on |
| περιάπτω | attach |
| περιγίγνομαι | be superior to (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| περίεμι | go around |
| περιεργάζομαι | busy oneself |
| περιμένω | wait |
| περιττός, -ή, -όν | remarkable, strange |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| πέτρι, -ης, ἡ | rock |
| πιθανῶς | persuasively |
| πιστεύω | believe, trust, have confidence in, rely on |
| πλάνη, -ης, ἡ | a wandering |
| πλάττω | shape, fashion |
| πλείστος, -η, -ον | greatest, very great; <i>pl.</i> most, very many |
| πλείων, -ονος | more |
| πλήθος, -ους, τό | multitude; democratic faction |
| πλημμέλεια, -ας, ἡ | error |
| πλήν | except, but (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| πλησίον | near |
| πλούσιος, -α, -ον | rich, wealthy |
| ποδαπός, -ή, -όν | from where |
| ποιέω | make, act, do; compose |
| ποίημα, -τος, τό | poem |
| ποίησις, -εως, ἡ | activity of creating poetry |
| ποιητής, -οῦ, ὁ | creator, poet |
| πόλεμος, -ου, ὁ | war |
| πόλις, -εως, ἡ | city, city-state |
| πολίτης, -ου, ὁ | citizen |
| πολιτικός, -ή, -όν | of a citizen, political; <i>as a noun</i> , statesman |
| πολλάκις | often, frequently |
| πολλαχού | in many places, often |
| πολυπραγμονέω | be meddlesome |
| πολυπραγμοσύνη, -ης, ἡ | interference, meddling |
| πολύς, πολλή, πολύ | much, great, large, long; <i>pl.</i> many; οἱ πολλοί, the many, the masses; τὸ πολὺ, the greater part |
| πονηρία, -ας, ἡ | worthlessness |
| πονηρός, -ά, -όν | evil, worthless |
| πόνος, -ου, ὁ | labor, toil, task |
| πῶρρω | far, further, in (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| πόσος, -η, -ον | how much, how great? <i>pl.</i> how many? |
| πότε | when? |
| ποτέ | at one time, once |
| πότερος, -α, -ον | which of two; whether |
| πότμος, -ου, ὁ | fate |
| που | somewhere, anywhere; somehow |
| πρᾶγμα, -ματος, τό | thing, matter; <i>pl.</i> affairs, business, trouble |
| πραγματεύομαι | work over |
| πρᾶξις, -εως, ἡ | action, business, matter |
| πράττω | act, do, make, attend to, fare; <i>mid.</i> earn |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| πρέπω | fit, suit, be proper |
| πρεσβύτερος, -α, -ον | older |
| πρίαμαι | purchase |
| πρίν | before |
| πρό | before, in preference to; in place of, instead of (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| προθυμέομαι | be eager, zealous |
| προίκα | for free |
| προκρίνω | choose before others, prefer |
| πρός | from the side of (+ <i>gen.</i>); at, in addition to (+ <i>dat.</i>); toward, against, with reference to (+ <i>acc.</i>) |
| προσδοκάω | expect |
| πρόσειμι | go up to |
| προσέρχομαι | come to, approach, meet |
| προσέχω | apply |
| προσήκω | be near; be appropriate; οἱ προσήκοντες, relatives |
| προσκαθίζω | land on |
| πρόσκειμαι | settle upon |
| πρόσοιδα | know besides |
| προσποιέομαι | claim, pretend |
| προστάτω | command, assign |
| προστιθῆμι | place before; set as penalty |
| προσχράομαι | use in addition (+ <i>dat.</i>) |
| πρότερος, -α, -ον | former; πρότερον, earlier, formerly |
| προτρέπω | urge on, persuade to do |
| πρυτανεῖον, -ου, τό | Athenian public building also called the Tholos |
| πρυτανεύω | hold office as a <i>prytanis</i> (member of the execu- tive counsel of the <i>boule</i>) |
| πρῶτος, -η, -ον | first, earliest |
| πυκνός, -ή, -όν | constant, insistent |
| πῶλος, -ου, ὁ | foal |
| πῶποτε | at any time |
| πῶς | how? πῶς γὰρ οὐ, certainly, how could it be otherwise? |
| πως | somehow |
| P | |
| ρήδιος, -α, -ον | easy |
| ρήδιως | lightly, easily |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| ῥῆμα, -τος, τό | word |
| ῥητέον | it must be said |
| ῥήτωρ, -ορος, ὁ | orator |
| Σ | |
| σαυτόν | yourself |
| σαφής, -ές | clear, distinct, definite |
| σαφῶς | clearly, distinctly |
| σελήνη, -ης, ἡ | moon |
| σημεῖον, -ου, τό | sign, token |
| σιγάω | be silent, be still |
| σιτέομαι | feed |
| σίτησις, -εως, ἡ | feeding |
| σκέπτομαι | consider, examine |
| σκιαμαχέω | shadowbox |
| σκοπέω | examine, look at |
| σ μικρός, -ά, -όν | small, little |
| σός, -ή, -όν | your, yours (sg.) |
| σοφία, -ας, ἡ | wisdom |
| σοφιστής, -ου, ὁ | sophist |
| σοφός, -ή, -όν | wise |
| σπουδάζω | take seriously |
| σπουδή, -ῆς, ἡ | haste, earnestness |
| στάσις, -εως, ἡ | faction |
| στρατηγία, -ας, ἡ | command; generalship |
| στρατηγός, -οῦ, ὁ | general |
| στρατία, -ας, ἡ | army, expedition |
| σύ, σοῦ, σοῖ, σέ | you (sg.) |
| συγγίνομαι | be with, associate with, converse with |
| συγγιγνώσκω | forgive |
| συγχωρέω | go along with, collude with |
| συμβαίνει | happen, occur |
| συμβάλλω | put together; <i>mid.</i> contribute |
| συμβουλεύω | give advice |
| σύμπας, πασα, -παν | all |
| συμφεύγω | flee with |
| σύνειμι | be with, associate with, have to do with; οἱ συνόντες , companions, associates |
| συνεπισκοπέω | examine together with |
| συνοῖδα | be conscious, be aware |
| συνόμνυμι | swear along with, conspire |
| συντεταμένως | vigorously |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| συνωμοσία, -ας, ἡ | conspiracy; confederacy; one linked by an oath |
| συνωρίς, -ίδος, ἡ | two-horsed chariot |
| σφεῖς, σφῶν | themselves |
| σφόδρα | enthusiastically, exceedingly |
| σφοδρός, -ά, -όν | enthusiastic, passionate |
| σφοδρῶς | enthusiastically, exceedingly |
| σχεδόν | nearly, almost |
| σχολή, -ῆς, ἡ | leisure |
| σφύζω | save |
| σῶμα, -ατος, ὁ | body |
| σωφροσύνη, -ης, ἡ | moderation, self-control |

T

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| τάξις, -εως, ἡ | battle station, post |
| τάττω | station |
| τάχα | perhaps, possibly |
| τάχος, -ους, τό | speed |
| ταχύς, -εῖα, -ύ | swift |
| τε | and, both; τε . . . καί , both . . . and |
| τεκμήριον, -ου, τό | evidence, proof, indication |
| τελευτάω | die, come to an end |
| τελέω | spend |
| τέτταρες, -α | four |
| τέχνη, -ης, ἡ | art, craft |
| τῆδε | here, in this way |
| τηλικόσδε | of so great an age |
| τηλικούτος, -αύτη, -οὔτο | of such an age |
| τίθημι | place, set, count; cast (<i>of a vote</i>) |
| τιμάω | honor, value; <i>mid.</i> propose a penalty |
| τιμή, -ῆς, ἡ | honor, respect |
| τίμημα, -τος, τό | penalty |
| τιμωρέω | take vengeance on |
| τιμωρία, -ας, ἡ | punishment |
| τίς, τί | who? what? |
| τις, τι, | someone, something, a certain one; <i>pl.</i> some |
| τοι | you know; doubtless |
| τοίνυν | well then, well |
| τοιόσδε, -άδε, -όνδε | such a thing as follows |
| τοιούτος, -αύτη, -οὔτο | such, of such a kind |
| τολμή, -ῆς, ἡ | daring |
| τολμάω | dare |
| τόπος, -ου, ὁ | place, region |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| τοσόσδε, -ήδε, -όνδε | so much, so great; <i>pl.</i> so many |
| τοσοῦτος, -αύτη, οὕτω | so great, so heavy, so much; <i>pl.</i> so many |
| τότε | then |
| τρέπω | turn |
| τρέφω | raise, bring up |
| τριάκοντα | thirty (<i>indecl.</i>) |
| τρόπος, -ου, ὁ | manner, mode |
| τροφή, -ῆς, ἡ | nurture, sustenance |
| τυγχάνω | chance, happen; happen to be (with part.) |

Υ

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| ὑβρις, -εως, ἡ | insolence, violence |
| ὑβριστής, -οῦ, ὁ | an insolent or violent man |
| ὑμεῖς, ὑμῶν, ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς | you (<i>pl.</i>) |
| ὑμέτερος, -α, -ον | your, of you (<i>pl.</i>) |
| υῖός, -οῦ, ὁ | son (also ὑός, -οῦ, ὁ) |
| ὑπείκω | yield |
| ὑπέρ | on behalf of (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ὑπέχω | offer |
| ὑπνος, -ου, ὁ | sleep |
| ὑπό | because of; by (+ <i>gen.</i>) |
| ὑπολαμβάνω | understand, suppose |
| ὑπολογίζομαι | take into account, calculate, consider |
| ὑπομένω | endure |
| ὑποστέλλω | withhold |
| ὑστερος, -α, -ον | later |

Φ

| | |
|------------------|---|
| φαίνω | show; <i>pass.</i> appear, be found, seem |
| φάσκω | say, assert, claim |
| φάυλος, -η, -ον | worthless, insignificant |
| φείδομαι | spare |
| φέρω | bear |
| φεύγω | flee, be a defendant |
| φήμη, -ης, ἡ | report, saying, rumor |
| φημί | say, assert |
| φθονέω | begrudge |
| φθόνος, -ου, ὁ | envy, malice |
| φιλέω | love |
| φιλόπολις, -ιδος | patriotic |
| φίλος, -η, -ον | dear, pleasing, friendly |
| φιλοσοφέω | love wisdom, seek truth |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| φιλότιμος, -ον | ambitious |
| φλυαρέω | talk nonsense |
| φλυαρία, -ας, ή | nonsense |
| φοβέω | frighten, terrify; <i>mid.</i> fear, be afraid of, dread |
| φόνος, -ου, ό | murder |
| φορτικός, -ή, όν | vulgar |
| φράζω | point out |
| φρονήσις, -εως, ή | thought |
| φρόνιμος, -η, -ον | intelligent, wise, thoughtful |
| φρονίμως | wisely, sensibly |
| φροντίζω | think, reflect upon |
| φροντιστής, -οῦ, ό | thinker |
| φυγή, -ής, ή | flight, exile |
| φυλή, -ής, ή | tribe |
| φύσις, -εως, ή | nature |
| φύω | be born |
| φωνή, -ής, ή | voice, speech style |

X

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| χαίρω | rejoice, fare well |
| χαλεπαίνω | be angry at |
| χαλεπός, -ή, -όν | difficult, hard |
| χαριεντίζομαι | joke, jest, make fun |
| χαρίζομαι | gratify |
| χάρις, -ιτος, ή | grace, gratitude |
| χειροτέχνης, -ου, ό | artisan |
| χείρων, -όνος | worse |
| χίλιοι, -αι, -α | thousands |
| χράομαι | use (+ <i>dat.</i>) |
| χρή | it is necessary (+ <i>inf.</i>) |
| χρήμα, -ματος, τό | thing; <i>pl.</i> property, money |
| χρηματισμός, -οῦ, ό | moneymaking |
| χρησμός, -οῦ, ό | response of an oracle, oracle |
| χρησμοδέω | deliver an oracle, foretell the future |
| χρησμοδός, -οῦ, ό | purveyor of oracles |
| χρηστός, -ή, -όν | excellent |
| χρόνος, -ου, ό | time |
| χωρίς | apart from (+ <i>gen.</i>) |

Ψ

| | |
|------------------|----------------|
| ψεύδος, -εος, τό | falsehood, lie |
| ψεύδομαι | lie, deceive |

GLOSSARY

ψηφίζομαι
ψηφος, -ου, ή
ψυχή, -ής, ή

vote
pebble; ballot, vote
soul

Ω

ὧδε
ώρα, -ας, ή
ὧς

thus, in this way
hour, time
as, how, that, since; as ___ as possible (*with
superl.*)

ὥσπερ
ὥστε
ὠφελέω

as, like, just as, in the very way as, as if
so that, thus
aid, profit

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