LITERATURE AND THE VISUAL ARTS IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

1

Introduction

Most serious students of ancient literature and ancient visual art will know that Greek and Roman writers tended to compare the two. Horace's phrase from *Ars Poetica* 361, "*ut pictura poesis*," which I would translate literally "as painting, poetry," has given its name to this tendency, although even Horace's comparisons have not been well understood. Similarly, most will be familiar with Plato's comparison of literature to the formal aspects of the visual arts, wherein he reduces literature to mimetic representation, and with Aristotle's conclusion that literature and the visual arts differ in respect to the media they employ (*Poet.* 1.1447a.18–28). But scholarly attention to this ancient comparison has been limited, focussing especially on Aristotle and Horace, with the latter generally misunderstood, and this narrow perspective has prevented scholars from examining many interesting details and ramifications of the ancient comparisons.

There is in the ancient texts no coherent *doctrine* of *ut pictura poesis* that all writers understood and followed, no single aesthetic or literary theory that might explain all of the

comparisons. In examining the statements of ancient writers on literature and the visual arts, one notices that sometimes they empasize the similarities, sometimes the differences. During the Renaissance, artists and writers were certain that they could find in Aristotle and Horace a single doctrine that would provide aesthetic principles for their work. But they had difficulty doing so, since the various passages in the ancient texts cannot be harmonized into a coherent set of ideas. In fact, the ancient comparisons present philosophical doctrines, such as Aristotelian mimēsis, but these are met elsewhere by contradictory doctrines. Moderns have looked so hard for a doctrine of *ut pictura poesis* that it has escaped many that the ancient texts offer several different traditions, almost doctrines, appearing sometimes in isolation and sometimes in combination with each other. Henry Nettleship's conclusion is representative of the disappointment resulting from this oversight: "We must not look to these ancient writers for any profound analysis, such as Lessing attempted, of the difference between the two forms of art." In fact, we will discuss some anticipations of Lessing's "profound analysis" that appear in Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom.[1] However, this study will not attempt to create such a doctrine. Rather, the ancient statements will be examined in chronological order and the issues allowed to unfold and develop as historically happened.

Important issues that have controlled the line of inquiry ever since were first raised by the Greek lyric poets Simonides, Bacchylides, and Pindar, who in some ways saw the differences between literature and the visual arts more clearly than anyone else in the ancient world. Their ideas were picked up by the Sophists Alcidamas, Gorgias, Isocrates, and Pseudo-Demosthenes (*Or.* 61, the *Eroticus*), only to be overshadowed by the mimetic doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. Between the times of Aristotle and Horace, Peripatetic mimetic doctrine influenced Demetrius, Cicero, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who made interesting

applications of art criticism to rhetorical criticism. After Horace, Peripatetic notions began to weaken, and new, creative ideas appeared in the ancient critic known as "Longinus," as well as in Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom. Even later, Philostratus advocated an apparently new doctrine, *phantasia,* as a replacement for *mimēsis.* These various comparisons between literature and the visual arts are not facile themes thrown in for rhetorical purposes but, at least some of the time, serious attempts to grapple with serious issues. But to understand them we must also examine the context, the various issues that generated these ideas.

Naturally, a study of comparisons between literature and the visual arts will reflect larger cultural transformations. The change in taste from geometrical, paratactic art and literature to the organic, hypotactic art and literature we call *classical* was one facet of a larger cultural transformation from an oral to a written culture. This transformation profoundly influenced ancient theory and practice of art and literature, as Bruno Gentili's detailed study of Greece in the sixth century B.C. shows. As the genre of dance performance began to split into the two genres of literature and visual art, a process begun but not yet complete in the *Odes* of Pindar, poetry began to lose its visuality and visual art its orality.[2] Consequently, the lyric poets began to assess the differences between literature and the visual arts. This assessment led to four separate but interrelated ways of thinking about the relationship between the arts. These four themes will be considered in detail in the chapters below, but a brief summary here might provide some contextual understanding.

First, the poets, especially Pindar, liked to compare their poems—commissioned to celebrate an athletic victory, as dedication to a god, and so on—to sculptures created for much the same purposes.[3] In these comparisons, statues come off the worse. Statues, the poets note, are fixed in space and time, whereas poems can move through the four dimensions. This

idea—with its concomitant suggestion that literature's subject should be human character, while the subject of the visual arts should be physical beauty—appears again in the fifth-century Sophists Alcidamas, Isocrates, and pseudo-Demosthenes. In spite of all the attempts by Plato and Aristotle to blur this distinction, the tradition survived in the Pindaric imitations by Horace in the first century B.C. The tradition resurfaced at the end of the first century A.D. in the theoretical discussions of Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom, who saw problems in the Peripatetic formulation, and again later in Philostratus' doctrine of phantasia. Needless to say, the issue also formed the core of Lessing's discussion in *Laocoön* in the eighteenth century.

Second, the tendency of ancient writers to compare literary works to architectural styles also stems from the Greek lyric poets, again in response to the larger cultural change. These comparisons began as analogies of poetry to building and were extended to other literary genres as well. One of many such passages in Pindar is his famous comparison of his poem to a temple in *Olympian* 6.1–4. These architectural metaphors, emphasizing the solidity and durability of the poems, appear also in the comparison by the late fifth-century Sophist Alcidamas between the structure of a speech and the structure of a building. More elaborate versions of the analogy appear in the Hellenistic period, in Demetrius and in the rhetorical terminology of the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian. In Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing shortly after Cicero, the analogy to architecture controls not only the terminology but also his very conception of the various rhetorical styles.

Third, the change from oral to written culture also led to the increasing awareness that both poetry and the visual arts can be thought of as mimetic or imitative. The doctrine of mimēsis encouraged critics to argue that poets and visual artists were engaged in similar activities. This way of analogizing appears in its first clear form in Plato. The mark of the mimetic

doctrine is the equation of literary and artistic media: the words of poets are equated with the colors of painters. This assumption is at work in the rhetoricians and especially in Cicero and Quintilian, although the argument is not explicitly stated until the seventeenth century.[4] Mimēsis became the core of Renaissance and neoclassical applications of *ut pictura poesis*. At the end of antiquity, however, problems in the doctrine of mimēsis had become apparent and a neoplatonic concept of phantasia or "imagination" arose to challenge it.

Finally, the change from oral to written culture engendered the notion that there are two artistic styles, a *forensic* and a *political* style, which can be seen both in literature and in the visual arts. The most famous presentation of this theory is in Horace's discussion of *ut pictura poesis*. J. D. Meerwaldt saw Horace making a distinction between the old artistic style of Polygnotus, which was more basic in scheme and color and bore close inspection—the forensic—and the more developed style of Apollodorus, Zeuxis, and Apelles, with its greater use of color and chiaroscuro, creating dimensionality and bearing inspection from afar—the political. Meerwaldt also saw the distinction in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (3.12) and in the works of several other authors. Wesley Trimpi, working independently, elaborated and clarified these distinctions and showed the influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.12 on subsequent comparisons between literature and the visual arts. Aristotle had distinguished between the "spoken" and "written" styles, but within spoken styles he distinguished also the forensic from the political. In Horace, a forensic style characterizes works of the schools, to be examined up close and pleasing only once. A more oral, open-air, and political style characterizes works that are to be examined from afar and not to be judged on detail. Homer is the best exponent of this latter style for Horace, but for later authors such as Strabo, Longinus, and perhaps Martial (*Ep.* 2.77, 9.50) the model for this style becomes not Homer but the sculptural colossus.[5]

This distinction is also present in the terms *skiagraphia* and *skēnographia*. Trimpi defines the two terms as referring respectively to the political and forensic styles. Agatharchus in the fifth century apparently coined the term *skēnographia* to refer to stage scenery. By Roman times it became a technical optics term meaning "perspective." *Skiagraphia*, attributed in antiquity to Apollodorus or Zeuxis, both of the late fifth or early fourth century, described the use of color, hence attaining in Longinus (*Subl.* 17.1–3) and other writers of the Roman period a meaning something like our *chiaroscuro*, or use of shadow within color. The identification of chiaroscuro, of course, depends on how strictly the term is defined. Eva Keuls, for example, argues for something akin to the modern word impressionistic. Barbara Hughes Fowler applies the terms *skiagraphia*, *skēnographia*, and even *phantasia* to pictorialism in literature and to works of visual art in the Hellenistic period, while Agnès Rouveret characterizes skiagraphic art as private and static art, and skēnographic art as public and theatrical, and tries to trace their development from classical Greek art to Roman wall painting. All of this complication should not obscure the essential distinction between the political and forensic styles, both in the visual arts and in literature, that Horace identified in the phrase "*ut pictura poesis.*"[6]

The ancient discussions should be of interest to today's audiences for a number of reasons. To begin with, only in the twentieth century has it been discovered that the developments of both ancient literature and visual arts were remarkably similar. The Homeric poems, for example, resemble the large, intricately designed geometric pots produced at the same time; the organic construction of Greek tragedies resembles the organic structures of the sculpture and architecture of the classical period and is also reflected in Aristotle's *Poetics*; and the various stylistic extremes in Hellenistic visual arts can be seen also in Hellenistic literature and rhetorical theory.

Perhaps even more significant from a historical standpoint is the domination of both artistic and literary criticism by these issues throughout the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. One contribution might be singled out. Leonardo da Vinci saw problems with the doctrine of *ut pictura poesis* as it then was being promulgated and commented that the motionless moment portrayed by the painter is more capable of conveying descriptive detail than are the sequential moments portrayed by the poet. This observation seems obvious to us and it was obvious to many ancients, as we shall see. But it was lost between Dio Chrystostom and Leonardo, who tried to argue that painting is greater than the other arts because it is more scientific. Poetry imitates words, themselves imitative of the reality directly imitated by painting. Furthermore, Leonardo believed that poetry is a language- and culture-specific set of signs, whereas painting is available to all cultures. As a consequence, poetry can more successfully imitate the mental world, painting the physical—an argument developed further by Benedetto Varchi, Lodovico Castelvetro, and Jonathan Richardson. Most of their discussions are derivative, however, and the source passages will be discussed below.[7]

But most important of all, the twentieth century has revived the analogy between literature and the visual arts. I select four sample phenomena. First, such well-known critics as René Wellek and Mario Praz have tried to apply the principles of art criticism to literary criticism and vice versa, Praz on a more practical and extended level and in spite of the popular and discouraging *New Laocoon* by Irving Babbitt. Second, some modern psychological and phenomenological theories have asserted a fundamental similarity between reading and the aesthetic experience of visual art. Roman Ingarden, for example, has been interpreted as comparing reader response to the process of scrutinizing a physical object, then reflecting upon the absent object, and, finally, rescrutinizing the object.

Similarly, Plato's comments on literature have been explained in terms of the imagist psychology popular in the early twentieth century. In another example of this sort of theoretical application, Fanklin R. Rogers has argued that Lessing was wrong to separate literature and the visual arts on the basis of their respective temporal and spatial media. Rather, when models from mathematics and psychology are applied, both can be seen as spatial. Another modern theorist, Murray Krieger, sees the central difference in comparisons between literature and the visual arts, not as one of time versus space, but of "conventional sign" versus "natural sign," a distinction-reminiscent of Leonardo. Third, the twentieth century has witnessed the visual poetry of Ezra Pound and the temporal experiment of Marcel Duchamp's painting entitled *Nude Descending a Staircase*, to cite only two extreme examples of attempts to build both space and time into one artistic medium.[8]

Finally, poststructuralist theory has given rise to a school of art historians who "read" works of visual art according to narratological principles, as the viewer of a work generates a narrative text (and, in the case of the modern viewer, an audience as well), a process Richard Brilliant calls "sight reading." From the large number of studies available, I might cite as exemplary Norman Bryson's Philostratean reading of Roman still-life murals as exhibiting a "social code" of the guest-host relationship and as exploring issues of gender and class, analogously to Petronius' *Satyricon*; Andrew Stewart's reading of the Hellenistic Nike of Samothrace and the Great Altar of Pergamum in terms of ancient rhetorical theory, Greek poetic metaphor, and historical citation; Valérie Huet's reading of Trajan's column; and Jas̀ Elsner's study of Roman reading from the "literal," "natural," and "deconstructionist" Augustan period to the "symbolic" Justinianic. But here the ancients and the moderns part company. Modern scholarship tends to see Greek art and literature

as similar because they are products of the same cultural milieu. How the ancients viewed literature and the visual arts as similar is the subject of this inquiry.[9]

This book will examine all of these issues in more detail, chronologically, from the early lyric poets and Sophists, through the formulation of a theory by Plato, to an important reformulation of Plato's concept of mimēsis by Aristotle, to the application of the doctrines to rhetorical theory in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, to the final collapse of the doctrines under philosophical examination. A pendulum effect will be noticed as we move from periods that view the visual arts and literature as fundamentally the same (Homer, Plato, and Aristotle) to those that view them as fundamentally different (lyric poets and Sophists, Hellenistic and Roman literary theorists). The result of this survey will be a better understanding of the implications of the asserted differences between literature and the visual arts, not only for critics of art and literature but for practitioners, and an awareness of the difficult expectations aroused, especially for the latter. But the primary goal here is to show that it is not correct to speak of "the doctrine of *ut pictura poesis*" in the ancient world. There is no one, uniform doctrine. Rather there is a multiplicity of doctrines, manifesting themselves in critical discussions of art or literature and in a critical vocabulary that ultimately was applied to both arts, as happened again in the Romantic period. That there is, or should be, a uniform doctrine reconstructible from our sources is yet another misreading of Aristotle and Horace inherited from the Renaissance.

Early Comparisons

LYRIC POETS, SOPHISTS, AND ION OF CHIOS

The comparisons between literature and the visual arts most familiar to us are those appearing in Plato, Aristotle, and Horace. But Plato did not himself initiate the analogy. There are many statements on this subject by lyric poets and Sophists, some a century or so before Plato. Many of these statements demonstrate sophisticated thinking; indeed, some of these issues that would dominate the discussions of literature and the visual arts were clearly formulated in the early fifth century B.C.

LYRIC POETS

The earliest cited authority on the relationship between literature and the visual arts is Simonides, a lyric poet (as well as epigrammatist and elegist) from the island of Ceos who lived from 556 to 468 B.C. Simonides wrote for wealthy patrons and attained considerable fame. Plutarch interrupts his essay *De gloria Atheniensium* to quote Simonides and then comment on the truth of Simonides' statement (3.346F–347A):

Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting: for the actions which painters portray as taking place at the moment literature narrates and records after they have taken place. Even though artists with colour and design, and writers with words and phrases, represent the same subjects, they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation; and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his narration like a painting.

Simonides' actual words, if he in fact made this statement either in poetry or in prose, have been lost, and we must be content with this paraphrase by Plutarch. As I have suggested elsewhere, this passage has two parts: everything after the first clause is a layer of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian theory certainly not implicit in Simonides' statement and probably not well understood by Plutarch; the first clause is possibly Simonidean and definitely early in the history of criticism. The most striking assertion in Plutarch's statement is that literature is more vital than visual art: poetry can both speak and visually depict; painting can visually depict but cannot speak. Leonardo da Vinci, a man with a much more visual sensibility than Plutarch's, countered this point with the witty rejoinder: "And if you call painting dumb poetry, the painter may call poetry blind painting." Whatever the overlay of later material, Simonides' statement is a remnant of the early, oral, pre-Socratic period of Greek culture.[1]

That Simonides made the statement is less certain than its antiquity. But the visuality of Simonides' poetry is certainly apparent as in fragment 543 (Page) on the mythological Danae. As Albin Lesky has noted, Longinus (*Subl.* 14.7) also admired Simonides' visuality. H. S. Thayer sees a pictorial quality, with

emphasis on color, throughout Simonides' poetry and even argues that Plato specifically is thinking of Simonides' visual notion of mimēsis when he criticizes poetry in the *Republic* and elsewhere. Anne Carson also uses Simonides' style to illuminate the Plutarchan passage, but she sees Simonides in the idealizing tradition extending from Polygnotus to Gorgias: Simonides is able to transcend "to a world beyond 'what is visible to each person,'" even using syntactic Impressionism, in the nineteenth-century sense. Rosemary Harriott compares Simonides' statement to a similar dictum attributed to Simonides by Psellus: "the word is an image of the actions" (ὁ λόγος τῶν πραγμάτων εἰκών ἐστίν) (Migne, *PG* 122.81, translation mine), and argues that when the two statements are put together, a mimetic theory of the arts can be ascribed to Simonides. J. M. Bell goes further, suggesting that in these statements and also in Plutarch *Moralia* 15D, Simonides anticipates theories later espoused in Plato's *Cratylus* and even Gorgias' theories. Simonides' visuality cannot be questioned, but the attribution of these later theories to Simonides is very doubtful, since truly mimetic theories of art and literature only appear in the texts of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and their successors.[2]

Several factors argue against attribution of this statement to Simonides. When Plutarch uses virtually the same quotation in *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* 3 (17F: "And let him not merely be acquainted with that oft-repeated saying that 'poetry is articulate painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry'"), in *How to Flatter a Friend* 15 (58B) and in the *Ad Herennium* (4.18.39), Simonides is not mentioned, although he is mentioned in Plutarch's *Table Talk* 9.15 (748A). Moreover, all sorts of unusual things were attributed to Simonides in antiquity, including the invention of the "art of memory" (Cicero, *De Or.* 2.352–54; Quint. 11.2.11–16, etc.) and the invention of his mnemonic system following the collapse of a building on the Scopidae, the latter now generally disbelieved, although parts

of the story have recently been defended. More serious is the observation that in Simonides' time, the idiomatic use of λαλεῖν to mean "says" cannot be attested, although in the anonymous attribution of the dictum in *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* (3.17 F), a different word is used (φθεγγόμεναν instead of λαλοῦσαν). Finally, the dictum is quoted in indirect discourse and is not metrical, whereas Simonides wrote in poetry. All of this makes attribution to Simonides risky, especially since there is little or no evidence of a pre-Platonic tradition linking literature and the visual arts as mimetic, or imitative, arts with methodological affinities.[3]

It has been fashionable to compare a passage in the *Cratylus* (especially 424c–433e) to the statement attributed to Simonides. In this passage Socrates suggests that, just as an artist's picture is composed of one or more colors, a word is composed of one or more letters. At least to the inventors of language, the letters represent the essences of the objects named. That is, words imitate the things they name. Some imitations are excellent, but some painters and some namers make mistakes or lie. Furthermore, like pictures, names do not reproduce all the attributes of the object imitated; if they did, they would *be* the object imitated. Therefore, an image—a name or a picture or any other imitation—must contain elements of truth but also elements of falsehood. The passage ends with Socrates and Cratylus agreeing that language must be natural rather than conventional (although Socrates ultimately renounces this position).[4]

Although there are similarities between the two statements, it is rash to conclude that Simonides developed a theory such as Plato's, even if we attribute to Simonides the statement that words are images of actions. More relevant is Jesper Svenbro's interpretation of Simonides' poem for Scopas, a very early poem dated to around 600 B.C. and discussed by Socrates in the *Protagoras* (338a–47a, frag. 542 Page). The poem is not well

discussed by Socrates, and there may not be enough remaining of the opening lines to reach a final interpretation of the poem. It opens with the assertion,

> Hard is it on the one hand to become
> A good man truly, hands and feet and mind
> Foursquare, wrought without blame.

Svenbro discards the traditional, ethical (that is, Socratic) interpretation, and argues that the man for whom "Hard is it . . . to become / A good man truly" is the man celebrated in poetry. Svenbro argues that the words used by Simonides to describe the ideal human (τετράγωνος, "squared," and τεύχειν, "to create") are derived from the terminology of visual art.[5]

Jeffrey Hurwit suggests that Simonides used τετράγωνος to refer to the style of kouroi statues and hence to the archaic and aristocratic culture then being replaced by the more democratic and classical culture. Andrew Stewart has observed that the kouroi preserve the "four square" stone from which they were cut. This is because grids and dimensional drawings on the stone were used to govern the carving. An excellent example would be the kouros in the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art (32.11.1) from Gisela and Irma Richter's "Sounion Group," here reproduced as plate 1. The Richters date the statue to between 615 and 590, roughly contemporary with the Scopas poem. They also note this "squarish" look and explain that the kouroi were cut from drawings, arguing that these early attempts at anatomical naturalism exhibit a tension between "two kinds of unity, organic and spatial," the first coming from the artist's conception, the latter from the stonecutter's work on raw stone; bronzes, built from clay models, consequently show more naturalism because their spatial unity is organic. But, they add, the Renaissance idea of perspective is based on spatial unity, so in essence this tension never disappeared from

artistic theory. The "four-square man" envisioned by Simonides and the kouros sculptors endured.[6]

The Scopas poem, then, as Svenbro argues, would be analogous to the other passages of Simonides discussed above, as well as to his poem about Cleobulus, which raises a theme that will become central in Pindar:

> Who that hath understanding would praise Cleobulus the man of Lindus for his putting of the might of a gravestone against the ever-running rivers and the flowers of the Spring, against the flame of sun and of golden moon, and against the eddies of the ocean-wave? All these are subject to the Gods; but a stone, even mortal hands may break it. This is the rede of a fool.

Hermann Fränkel, whose analysis Svenbro developed, puts this fragment in the context of other Simonidean and Pindaric passages and suggests on the basis of fragments 522 and 594 that Simonides may have gone on to compare poetry to monuments of visual art: poems are more durable but even they ultimately are lost. Svenbro's thesis connecting the poem to Scopas to visual art is as suggestive as it is speculative. If Simonides had a coherent theory, it must remain somewhat in the dark, especially given that the passage quoted by Plutarch is so overladen by later Peripatetic doctrine. But it is no doubt safe to conclude that Simonides thought of poetry as highly visual and mnemonic, especially when thought of in the context of performance.[7]

Greek tradition, then, traced the comparison between poetry and the visual arts back to the lyric poetry of the Persian War period. The existence of this tradition is confirmed by other pre-Platonic texts. One strand of this tradition possibly predates Simonides. Several scholars survey the change from a Homeric view of poetry as divine inspiration to a more philosophical view

of poetry as "craft," Gentili even linking the change to the development of a mimetic notion of literature and the arts. One of the crafts used as a metaphor for poetry is sculpture. Bacchylides, a lyric poet contemporary with Simonides, often refers to his poems as ἀγάλματα, a term that in his *Epinician* 5 Harriott reads as meaning both "what someone delights in" and "statue" (*Ep.* 5.1–6): "Blest leader of armies unto the chariot whirlèd men of Syracuse, thou if any man in this present world wilt judge truly of a joy bestowing gift (ἄγαλμα) that is offered unto the muses of the violet wreath." It is hard to see a specific allusion to sculpture here, although Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott would seem to support Harriott's interpretation. They describe the linguistic development thusly: (1) In the Homeric period ἄγαλμα means "glory, delight, honor." (2) In Homer, Herodotus, Simonides, and later, the meaning is extended to "pleasing gift, esp. for the gods." I would suggest that Bacchylides wrote as this meaning was being extended, from Herodotus on, to mean (3) "statue in honor of the gods." Karl Kerenyi notes that referring to statues in honor of the gods as ἀγάλματα implies that such statues are expected to provide "joy of the god" ("gioia di dio"). (4) Finally in the late fifth century the word can mean "statue," "picture," or "image." Thomas B. L. Webster even finds one nonliterary instance of this final meaning in the "early sixth century."[8]

The poems of Pindar are even more revealing of the comparisons between literature and the visual arts in this period. Pindar, from Thebes, wrote in the first half of the fifth century B.C. Most of the remains of his considerable body of work are *epinikia* or odes commemorating victories at the athletic games. These poems are classified as *Olympian, Pythian, Nemean,* or *Isthmian,* depending on where the competition celebrated was held, and were written under the patronage of the victor. Like Simonides, Pindar finds poems superior to statues or tombstones.[9]

Pindar specifically comments at the beginning of *Nemean* 5 that statues do not surpass poems:

NEMEA 5

I am no maker of images, not one to fashion idols
    standing quiet
on pedestals. Take ship of burden rather, or boat,
    delight of my song,
forth from Aigina, scattering the news
that Lampon's son, Pytheas the strong,
has won the garland of success at Nemea, pankratiast,
showing not yet on his cheeks the summer
of life to bring soft blossoming.

He has done honor to the fighting heroes descended of
    Zeus and Kronos, and the golden
Nereids, the Aiakidai; he has honored the city his
    mother, a land beloved of strangers
that once they prayed might be famous for ships and for
    men,
standing before the altar of their father, Zeus Hellanios,
and spread their arms in the air
together, the renowned sons of Endais,
with the man of great strength, Phokos

the goddess' son, that Psamatheia
brought forth on the beach where the sea breaks.
I take shame to speak of a thing done
monstrous, adventured against justice,
how they left their island of fair fame,
how some god drove
these mighty men from Oinona. I stop there. Not every
    sheer truth

is the better for showing her face. Silence also
many times is the wisest thing for a man to have in his
     mind.

But if it is prosperity, or strength of hand, or the iron of
     war we must praise, let them
dig me a long pit for leaping. The spring in my knees is
     light.
The beating wings of eagles carry them over the sea.
On Pelion was sung before these generously the song
from the Muses' splendid choir, and among them
Apollo, stroking the seven strings
of his lyre with the golden plectrum,

was leader of the changing melody. The song in the
     beginning was Zeus; they sang of proud Thetis
and Peleus; how Kretheus' daughter, Hippolyta the
     luxurious, sought to ensnare him
by craft, beguiling her lord, king
of the Magnesians, by the subtlety of her designs.
She fabricated a story that was a lie,
how Peleus had sought to be with
her, a wife, in the bridal bed of Akastos.

It was the other way.
Over and again with all her heart
she had entreated him with her persuasions.
Indeed, the abrupt words had troubled his passion;
but he denied the girl forthwith,
fearing the anger of our Father
the Hospitable. And Zeus, who ranges the clouds, king
     of the immortals, was pleased
and from the sky bent his head to will that without delay
some Nereid of the sea, one of those who work with a
     golden spindle, should be his wife,

prevailing upon her kinsman, Poseidon, who many
    times fares over the sea from Aigai
to the great Dorian Isthmos, where the glad companies
    meet the god with a clamor of reed flutes
and dare the strength of their limbs in contest.
Destiny in the blood decides all
action. Euthymenes, twice at Aigina you
were folded into the arms of victory
and given formal glorification in song.

Now again, Pytheas, your uncle's pride is in your feet
    that go in the track of his blood.
Nemea was his and the month in the land Delphinios,
    Apollo's beloved.
You at home defeated all comers of your age
and at the fair curve of the hill of Nisos. All your city
is a contender in lordly deeds, and I am glad.
Know that in success you have repaid
delight to Menandros, your trainer, for hard work

given. (A smith to mold
athletes must come from the city of Athens.)
If, my song, you adventure
into the presence of Themistios, fear not.
Speak out, run the sails aloft
to the crossbar at the masthead.
Speak of him as pankratiast and boxer, who achieved at
    Epidauros
twofold success, and now before the doors of Aiakos
wears the wreath luxuriant with flowers, a gift of the fair-
    haired Graces.

The significance of the opening passage comparing poetry to
statues is well understood by Basil Gildersleeve: "The opening

stanza is very famous, and is an anticipation of Lessing's
Laocoön.[10] The comparison to Lessing is not as extravagant as
it may seem. Here, in one of the earliest passages comparing
the arts, Pindar characterizes sculpture as an art form limited
by its spatial medium. Poetry, on the other hand, is temporal
and can move through space. This primary distinction of
medium was subsequently ignored by Plato and especially by
Aristotle, and consequently was lost to most of antiquity.

Harriott comments that "[a] writer like Pindar uses analogies
with the visual arts in order to fill the minds of his hearers with
splendid pictures: his interest in the relationship between a
poem and a statue has different motives from those of the prose
writers." This may be true—at least one author has seen the
irony in the highly visual Pindar stating that he is not a
sculptor—but Pindar is in fact initiating a bold and complex
comparison. This comparison is apt, for as has been observed,
victors were commemorated in sculpture as well as song, and
so sculptors provide a natural artistic rival to poetry. Pindar can
point to special advantages for his art form, which unlike the
statue is not fixed in space or in time, especially since a choir
can reenact a poem in all four dimensions, visually and aurally,
in song and dance at any place or time. Gentili adds that this
advantage would have been most marked prior to the ability to
reproduce works of art in any form, and that Pindar's assertion
that the poet was a greater "communicator" than the visual
artist was apparently socially accepted, judging from the fees
charged for commissions. The Pindaric allusion to the problems
of space and time was especially apt given that the same sort of
events (victory, death, and so on) occasioned both poems and
statues; both celebrated the virtues we associate with what
Stewart calls the "competitive system."[11]

Furthermore, as Mary Lefkowitz and Charles Segal argue,
the comparison between poems and statues dominates the
entire ode. The statue cannot move, but the poem, like a sailor,

can travel the world and tell of Pytheas' victory. Like a human but unlike the statue of a human, the poem walks and talks; this shows, in Lefkowitz's words, "the difference between the motive, living song and the immobile, lifeless statue." For Segal, the opening comparison establishes the primary themes of the poem, as successive scenes expand on "the interplay between the positive and negative poles of movement and finity." Poetry is more appropriate than sculpture for portraying both the vigor and the ephemerality of life.[12]

In the center of the poem Pindar declines to tell the myth of Peleus, Telamon, and Phocus (spelled "Phokos" by Lattimore) and suggests that he will become motionless (στάσομαι, line 16) like the statue (ἑσταότ', line 2). Instead, he decides (lines 19–21) to fly like the sailors. This conscious choice to remain silent represents yet another superiority of poetry over sculpture: the poet can make such a choice and reveal it to an audience—mentioning a story but not telling it—but one cannot imagine how a visual artist could do so. Furthermore, the poet refers also to the motion of an athlete, comparing the long jumper to the bird in flight. But he needs the help of trainers to prepare the "pit" for him. At the end of the poem, in the archaic ring-compositional style, Pindar again compares his poetry to sailors (lines 49–56). J. B. Bury further notes the echoes of sound (ἀγάλματα and ἀγγέλει, lines 2 and 43 Snell-Maehler) and of a sculptural theme ("idols standing quiet on pedestals" and "A smith to mold athletes," lines 2 and 49, Snell-Maehler) at the beginning and end of the poem. The reference to the sailors is preceded again by a reference to the trainer, now named as Menandros. Like statues, athletes are "mold[ed]" by the trainer, but they must move to win the contest. For the kind of excellence celebrated here there must be motion and a human trainer. The ode, then, contains a complex of imagery that emphasizes the mobility and endurance of poetry, as opposed to the stationary and temporary nature of sculpture.[13]

The same imagery and the assertion that poetry is less limited than sculpture appear also at *Isthmian* 2.45–48, often compared to *Nemean* 5 and written approximately ten years later. Again Pindar notes that poems, unlike statues, are able to move in space (οὐκ ἐλινύσοντας). Kevin Crotty comments that the emphasis in *Isthmian* 2 is on the relationship between poet and patron, and so the contexts of the two poems are quite different. To be sure, Pindar does not mention statues in *Isthmian* 2. But as William Race points out, he uses the same vocabulary as in *Nemean* 5 (ἐλινύσοντας . . . ἐργασάμην in *Isth.* 2, ἐλινύσοντα εργάζεσθαι in *Nem.* 5.1). Gentili adds that the verb ἐργάζεσθαι "belongs properly to the vocabulary of the crafts." The similarity between *Isthmian* 2 and *Nemean* 5 allows one critic to refute the common argument that ἐργάζομαι at *Nem.* 5.1 and ἐργάτις at *Isth.* 2.6 refer to prostitutes. At *Isthmian* 2.8 Pindar compares the poem to the face of a building (πρόσωπα); architectural comparison is common in Pindar, as we shall soon see.[14]

Nemean 5 probably was written before the poems of Simonides and Bacchylides discussed above. In Bacchylides, poems are eternal; statues are subject to destruction by weather and time. This is similar to a series of comparisons between poetry and architecture in Pindar: A poem can be like the solid base of a building (κρηπῖδ' in *Pyth.* 7.3, also used at *Pyth.* 4.138 and fragment 194.1) for Apollo's house (δόμον in *Pyth.* 7.11, a reference to the temple built by the Alkmeonids for Apollo). A porch is to a building as an opening stanza is to a poem (προθύρωι, κίονας in *Ol.* 6.1–4). Or a poem is like a treasury (θησαυρός), immune to the ravages of bad weather because it is "walled" (τετείχισται, *Pyth.* 6.7–14, also at fragment 104.2). As Thomas Hubbard observes, "Pindar's frequent architectural metaphors for poetry usually emphasize 'words' (λόγοι, ἔπεα, or ῥήματα) as the material building-blocks out of which the poetic structure is joined together."[15]

The comparison that opens *Olympian* 6 is especially famous, and scholars have emphasized that here can be seen Pindar's view of the opening of a poem. "As a general rule," writes Charles Billson, "the first triad of an Ode, compared by Pindar to the facade of a Greek building, introduces the victor." Nineteenth-century scholars compare Pindar's odes to Greek buildings: Bury, for example, criticizes comparisons to pediments and, basing his interpretation in part on *Olympian* 3.4–9, argues instead that the odes are constructed like "palaces." According to C. M. Bowra, Pindar felt that a poem needs a κρηπίς (foundation) like that described in fragment 194, but Bowra also warns against overinterpreting Pindaric structure by using such analogies. At *Pythian* 3.113, Pindar refers to poets as "builders" (τέκτονες); the word is also used at *Nem.* 3.4, where, as Bury and Svenbro point out, the word refers to the chorus itself. Similarly, Democritus used the verbal equivalent to describe Homer's compositional process (ἐτεκτήνατο, Democr. B21 Diels and Kranz), although there, as Bowra himself suggests, the Homeric notion of "inspiration" may still be at work. Somewhat related is *Nemean* 8.47, where Pindar treats the poem as an inscription on a stele, calling it a "Muses' stone" (λίθον Μοισαῖον), and *Nemean* 4.81, where the image is a gravestone (στάλαν . . . Παρίου λίθου λευκοτέραν). Here Bowra observes that these two passages allow Pindar to assert "two main aspects of his art, its enduring permanence and its impalpable sprightliness." The same two ideas are of course present in Pindar's comparisons of poetry to sculpture discussed above. Once again the analogies are natural outgrowths of the tendency to view the creation of poetry as a "craft."[16]

Pythian 6 is worthy of examination in more detail. The poem, like *Isthmian* 2 mentioned above, is dedicated to Xenocrates, a victor at the Pythian games, and his son Thrasybulus:

PYTHIA 6

Listen! It is the field of Aphrodite
with the fluttering eyes or the Graces
we labor now. We approach the templed
centerstone of the thunderous earth.
There stands builded for the glory of Emmenos'
    children
and Akragas of the river, and for Xenokrates,
a treasure house of song
for victory at Pytho in Apollo's
glen, with its burden of gold.

Neither rain driven from afar on the storm,
not the merciless armies
of the crying cloud, no wind shall sweep it, caught
and stricken with the blown debris into the corners
of the sea. The front shines in the clear air,
Thrasyboulos, on your father announcing
for you and yours the pride
of a chariot victory in the folds of Krisa—
a tale to run on the lips of men.

You, keeping Victory erect beside your right hand,
bring home the meaning
of the things men say once on the mountain Chiron,
Philyra's son, urged on strong Peleiades
left in his care: *First of all gods, honor*
the deep-voiced lord of the lightning and thunderstroke
Zeus Kronides;
next, through all their destiny never deprive
your parents of such reverence even as this.

In the old days mighty Antilochus proved one
who lived in that word.

He died for his father, standing up
to the murderous onset of the Aethiop champion,
Memnon; for Nestor's horse, smitten by the shaft of
    Paris,
had fouled the chariot, and Memnon attacked
with his tremendous spear.
And the old Messenian was shaken
at heart and cried aloud on his son's name.

And the word he flung faltered not to the ground, in
    that place
standing, the young man
in his splendor bought by his own death his father's
    rescue,
And of those who lived long ago men judged him
pre-eminent among the youth for devotion
to those who begot them, for that terrible deed.
All that is past.
Of men living now, Thrasyboulos
comes beyond others to the mark in his father's eyes,

and visits his father's brother with fame complete.
He carries wealth with discretion.
The blossom of youth he gathers is nothing violent,
but wise in the devious ways of the Muses.
To you, Poseidon, shaker of the earth, lord
of the mastering of horses, he comes, with mind to
    please you.
Also his heart, that is gentle
in the mixing of friends,
passes for sweetness the riddled work of the bees.

This early poem has been dated to "about 490 B.C., when Pindar was probably twenty-eight," and consequently would predate

Nemean 5 and *Isthmian* 2. Simonides supposedly wrote a poem for the same victory, a story preserved only by a scholiast (513 Page), and doubted by some. In a stimulating interpretation of Pindar's poem, Race has shown that the opening procession past the "treasuries," which held the offerings of various cities, foreshadows the comparison of the poem to a "treasury of hymns," (ὕμνων θησαυρός, lines 7–8). Pindar then levels the criticism that will appear again later in *Nemean* 5 and *Isthmian* 2: these treasuries will fall to ruin, like the dedicatory sculpture, while his poems will survive. But here, as in *Nemean* 5, Pindar makes use of the analogy with architecture later in the poem. As Race points out, "In the following lines Pindar continues the metaphor of the poem as a building and says that its 'porch' announces the victory of Xenocrates with the chariot at Delphi." (The word that Race translates as "porch," πρόσωπον in line 14, Lattimore translates as "front"; the same word appeared describing the front part of the building at *Ol.* 6.3, as noted above.) Leslie Kurke takes the argument a step further. The "treasure" in the building is the poem itself, which is given by the poet to the family of the patron; at the end of the poem the treasure is stored "in the hollows of the Pierides" (as Kurke translates ἐν μυχοῖσι Πιερίδων, line 49, translated by Richmond Lattimore above as "in the devious ways of the Muses"). This word, μυχοῖσι (hollows) is also used earlier in the poem to refer to the place where the poem will *not* be taken, "into the corners of the sea" (ἐς μυχοὺς ἁλός, lines 12–13). The analogy of poem as treasure, then, stored in a physical location, dominates the poem.[17]

An examination of lyric poetry must include Berlin papyrus 9571, one of many papyrus fragments surviving from antiquity. Its text is in Greek, and like many such fragmentary remains from the ancient world, it is difficult to decipher and assess; according to Wilhelm Schubart, who edited the papyrus in 1941, the German philologist Wilamowitz thought it in too

poor a state for editing. Schubart thinks it to be either a commentary on Pindar or a discussion of dithyrambs. After quoting lines from a dithyramb by Pindar (2.8–18-frag. 70b8–18 Snell-Maehler), the anonymous ancient author cites another, unnamed author, perhaps Simonides or Ammonius, who refers to "shaping harmony" and quotes the author "I sculpt[ing] poetry" (ἁρ[μονία]ν ἀναπέπλακε . . . μέ]τρον δ(ια)γλύφω, lines 54–55). These anonymous phrases are both references to the visual arts, as Schubart observes in his commentary. François Lasserre argues that the fragment can probably be attributed to Pindar, and that like Simonides in the Scopas poem discussed above, Pindar here claims that poetry, through the symmetry bestowed by sculpture and music, can effect ethical improvement. (This recalls the athlete of *Nemean* 5, "mold[ed]" into action by the trainer.) In this view, μέτρον has the same moral force as the word *measure*. According to this view, the Aristotelian doctrine of mimēsis had its beginning in the comparison between literature and the visual arts found in Pindar and in Simonides as quoted by Plutarch (*De glor. Ath.* 3.346F–347A, discussed above).[18] These suggestions are stimulating, and if we could date the reference in the papyrus and attribute it securely, the passage would fit more appropriately into our analysis here. But it should be emphasized that since Simonides (except in the passage from Plutarch), Pindar, and Bacchylides reject the notion that the visual arts can equal literary production, perhaps μέτρον διαγλύφω should not be attributed to any of them.

If the poem on Cleobulus and the famous statement in Plutarch are both by Simonides, then the Plutarch passage should probably be reinterpreted. Poetry is superior to painting in Simonides' estimation. Poetry is both oral and visual, but the visual arts are mute and so less expressive and also less durable in composition. Clearly the comparison of poem with sculpture, both sacred objects offered to the muse, was "in the air" in the

early fifth century at the time of Simonides, Bacchylides, and Pindar. Even Aeschylus knows how to employ the theme, if a late anecdote can be trusted. Aeschylus compared his own work to that of Tynnichus with an analogy to statues: his poetry and older statues were inspired, while contemporary poetry and statues were more impressive technically.[19]

SOPHISTS

The lyric poets were not the only early writers comparing literature and the visual arts. The theme also appears in the prose works by the authors we lump together under the designation, "Sophists." One comparison between literature and the visual arts, appearing in the *Dissoi Logoi*, can be dated with reasonable certainty by internal evidence, but it cannot be ascribed to any author or geographical region. It was written around 400 B.C. by an unknown author in a dialect primarily Doric, which would indicate authorship or at least oral delivery in the Peloponnese (perhaps Megara), the southeastern coast of modern Turkey, or southern Italy, including Sicily; T. M. Robinson suggests Megara and Tarentum due to the West Doric forms.[20]

In chapter 3 of this work, the author defends the view that "the same thing is just and unjust" (3.1); deceiving, stealing, and so on are just when the end is just, as for example stealing a rope from a potential suicide (3.4). So also in literature and the visual arts: "I shall turn to the arts—particularly the compositions of poets. For in the writing of tragedies and in painting the best person is the one who deceives the most in creating things that are *like* the real thing" (3.10).[21] Most interesting here is that the comparison between poetry and painting has become by 400 B.C. so conventional that it can be used as a rhetorical commonplace, indicating that the author surely expects the reader to be familiar with it.

Scholars have rightfully pointed to Gorgias as the originator of this notion that literature is an art of deception.[22] Gorgias, from Leontini in Italy, was employed by the wealthy to teach public speaking to their children. He is known from fragments and also appears in the *Gorgias* of Plato. His comments are reported again by Plutarch in chapter 5 of *De gloria Atheniensium* (348C, Diels and Kranz[8] B 23; a shorter version is given at *Quomodo adul.* 1.15D):

> But tragedy blossomed forth and won great acclaim, becoming a wondrous entertainment for the ears and eyes of the men of that age, and, by the mythological character of its plots, and the vicissitudes which its characters undergo, it effected a deception wherein, as Gorgias remarks, "he who deceives is more honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not deceived." For he who deceives is more honest, because he has done what he promised to do; and he who is deceived is wiser, because the mind which is not insensible to fine perceptions is easily enthralled by the delights of language.[23]

That this remark by the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* alludes to Gorgias is clinched by the repetition: tragedy is deception (ἀπάτη) with justice (δίκαιος). The latter word is treated also in Gorgias' *Helen* (8, 10–11). The author of the *Dissoi Logoi* expands the Gorgian argument to include the familiar comparison of painting and the visual arts.

Wilhelm Nestle has also seen in the *Dissoi Logoi* passage a possible direct allusion to the statement attributed to Simonides by Plutarch, which would show that Gorgias knew Simonides. "It would be possible," Nestle suggests, "that here the famous saying of Simonides has an influence, 'painting is a dumb poetry, poetry a speaking painting.' . . . As in the case of tragedy,

so to Gorgias pleasure (ἡδονή) serves as goal in the case of pictorial art. The governing organ is the visual (ὄψις), which draws the pictures into the consciousness." But the argument is not compelling, since there is no verbal similarity between the two passages; other scholars who know Nestle's argument are noncommittal. In fact, Nestle's suggestion that Gorgias created a mimetic theory of literature and the visual arts is based primarily on the allusion in the Dissoi Logoi.[24] As to the Dissoi Logoi, the safest conclusion is that the author refers to a well-known tradition comparing poetry and the visual arts and expands the tradition into the realm of sophistic argumentation.

Scholarly opinion of Gorgias has varied. Some have seen him as a rhetorician without a serious theory. Nestle sees him as the inventor of aesthetics, whose theory described both literature and visual art as activities of imitation for the purpose of enjoyment through deception. To argue that Gorgias developed a comprehensive mimetic theory goes beyond the evidence, but his familiarity with comparisons between poetry and sculpture is clear from Helen 11: ψεύδη λόγον πλάσαντες, "sculpting a false account." Also, Nestle correctly argues that Gorgias' theory of the λόγος consciously uses the visual arts as an analogy to explain the effect of literature: The logos affects the soul through images (ὄψις, εἰκόνες) in a fashion similar to the effect of visual art on the eyes (Hel. 15–18). But since Gorgias denies the possibility of knowledge, in his theory art cannot "imitate" the perceptible world. Rather, perceptions of the world are polarized into antithetical positions or propositions, and art can, via the λόγος, select and justify (by ἀπάτη or deception) a pole of experience as appropriate (καιρός) in the immediate context. Consequently both art and life will be tragic. One can immediately see why such a theory is of use to Plato and Aristotle only as a straw man.[25]

The Sophist Alcidamas, having studied with Gorgias, lived at the same time as Plato, but he will be treated here because his

ideas, like those of his comtemporaries Isocrates and pseudo-
Demosthenes, do not reflect the radical transformations of
thought to be seen in Plato and Aristotle. In his *De Sophistis*, a
response to Isocrates' *Contra Sophistos*, Alcidamas defends extem-
poraneous speaking, as practiced by himself and by earlier
Sophists such as Gorgias. Alcidamas applies a comparison from
architecture (*Soph.* 25):

> It is otherwise as regards those who contend with pre-
> pared discourses in suits, for, if any argument not pre-
> viously thought of occurs to them, it is a difficult matter to
> fit it in and make appropriate use of it; for the finished
> nature of their precise diction does not permit improvised
> interpolations, so that either the new arguments which
> fortune gives them cannot be used at all, or, if they are
> used, the elaborate edifice of their speech (τὴν τῶν
> ὀνομάτων οἰκονομίαν) falls to pieces and crashes to the
> ground. And, since part of the speech is delivered after
> careful preparation, and part is spoken at random, a
> confused and discordant style results.[26]

Here Alcidamas compares a written or memorized speech to
a building. The analogy also appears in Pindar, as we have
seen, and like Pindar, Alcidamas uses it to criticize the archi-
tectural product rather than praise or explain the literary
analogue to the work of visual art. A written speech is like a
building in that it cannot be modified without destroying the
overall aesthetic. We can see Pindar's influence, direct or
indirect. The written or memorized speech, like the building,
is locked into a space and time. It cannot be revised or modi-
fied without risk of destruction. Only the extemporaneous
speech is fully moveable and adaptable, like the poem in
Pindar.

A second analogy quickly follows (*Soph.* 27–28):

Written discourses, in my opinion, certainly ought not to be called real speeches, but they are as wraiths, semblances, and imitations (εἴδωλα καὶ σχήματα καὶ μιμήματα λόγων). It would be reasonable for us to think of them as we do of bronze statues, and images of stone, and pictures of living beings; just as these last mentioned are but the semblances of corporeal bodies, giving pleasure to the eye alone, and are of no practical value, so, in the same way, the written speech, which employs one hard and fast form and arrangement, if privately read, makes an impression, but in crises, because of its rigidity, confers no aid on its possessor. And, just as the living human body has far less comeliness than a beautiful statue, yet manifold practical service, so also the speech which comes directly from the mind, on the spur of the moment, is full of life and action, and keeps pace with the events like the real person, while the written discourse, a mere semblance of the living speech, is devoid of all efficacy.

Attention has been called to the similarity between this passage and Plato's attack on writing in the *Phaedrus*, where the analogy to visual art is also drawn,[27] but more significant is its relationship to the Pindaric tradition. Again for Alcidamas the written speech is bound in space and time, as the statue is for Pindar, and again the extemporaneous speech is like a living person, as Pindar's chorus singing the ode. (Pindar's odes were of course written, but like the extemporaneous speech, they give the impression of spontaneous movement and change.) The written speech is more beautiful, perhaps, because designed for the eye, but the extemporaneous speech is alive; it is useful. It can expand and change within space and time, as the situation requires. Alcidamas does not comment here on poetry, but the similarity to Pindar is noticeable.

A similar comparison is present in Isocrates' speech *Evagoras*. Isocrates instructed students in public speaking in Athens in the time of Plato and Aristotle. The texts of many of his speeches have survived. This speech was given in honor of Evagoras, the late king of Cyprus, for the king's son Nicocles, probably between 370 and 365 B.C. Here Isocrates compares literature with the visual arts, granting greater mobility and durability to literature. Such comparisons will not be used again until the Roman imperial period.[28]

The speech opens with a discussion of the value of words commemorating deeds (*Evag.* 1–4). Praise of mythological people is common in poetry, but praise of a near contemporary is uncommon in prose (5–11). The majority of the speech then praises Evagoras' family and life (12–72). But then Isocrates turns to a comparison between literature and the visual arts (*Evag.* 73–75):

> For my part, Nicocles, I think that while effigies of the body are fine memorials, yet likenesses of deeds and of the character are of far greater value, and these are to be observed only in discourses composed according to the rules of art. These I prefer to statues because I know, in the first place, that honourable men pride themselves not so much on bodily beauty as they desire to be honoured for their deeds and their wisdom; in the second place, because I know that images must of necessity remain solely among those in whose cities they were set up, whereas portrayals in words may be published throughout Hellas, and having been spread abroad in the gatherings of enlightened men, are welcomed among those whose approval is more to be desired than that of all others; and finally, while no one can make the bodily nature resemble moulded statues and portraits in painting, yet for those

who do not choose to be slothful, but desire to be good
men, it is easy to imitate the character of their fellow-men
and their thoughts and purposes—those, I mean, that are
embodied in the spoken word.

Several observations bear recording here. First, Isocrates
clearly differentiates the goals of literature from those of the
visual arts. The visual arts create "effigies of the body" (τὰς τῶν
σωμάτων εἰκόνες), literature creates "likenesses of deeds and
of the character" (τὰς τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας); both arts
produce images (εἰκόνες), but the objects of imitation are
quite different. Furthermore, both arts reflect well on the
subject, but visual arts give "pride" (σεμνυνομένους) in
"beauty" (κάλλει), whereas literature bestows "honor"
(φιλοτιμουμένους) for "their deeds and their wisdom" (ἐπὶ
τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῆι γνώμηι). Isocrates repeats the argument of
Pindar's *Nemean* 5 and *Isthmian* 2, that statues are frozen in
space and time, while literature can travel. Race, who has also
published a book on Pindar, compares *Evagoras* 73–75 to
Nemean 5.1–5 and *Isthmian* 2.43–48, showing similarities
between the structure of *Evagoras* and *Isthmian* 2 and noting
a reference to *Nemean* 5.3 (διαγγέλλοισ') in the word
διαδοθέντας (*Evag.* 74). Finally, Isocrates adds a unique
criticism of the visual arts: they can less easily be imitated by
the listener/viewer. As Gentili observes in comparing *Evagorus*
with *Nemean* 5, there is an ethical dimension here. Words, not
pictorial images, convey men's "deeds and character"; hence
"there is a mutual *mimēsis* between speech and action." This
point nicely rounds off, in ring-compositional form, the
speech of praise for Evagoras, which began with an explana-
tion of the novelty of the new literary genre upon which
Isocrates is embarking.[29]

One apparently post-Platonic discussion that clearly differ-
entiates visual art from literature appears in the *Eroticus*, or

"Erotic Essay," transmitted in the manuscript tradition as speech 61 in the corpus of Demosthenes but written by someone in the style of Isocrates, apparently around 355 B.C. The author describes the physical appearance of the subject of the speech, Epicrates, noting that his moral qualities and even character can be seen from his eyes by signs (διὰ τῶν τῆς ὄψεως σημείων), whereas in others these qualities are sometimes invisible even when they perform actions (πραττομένων). The speaker then offers an unusual justification for changing the discussion from Epicrates' body to his character (*Erot.* 15–16). Readers might be put off by further discussion of his physical appearance and miss the ethical praise that follows, since not even visual artists could adequately describe his appearance, which so harmoniously fits his character (*Erot.* 16): "Nor is this astonishing; for works of art have a motionless aspect (ἀκίνητον ἔχει τὴν θεωρίαν), so that it is uncertain what they would look like if they possessed life (ψυχῆς), but your personality (τὸ τῆς γνώμης ἦθος) enhances in your every action the superb comeliness of your body." The argument is full of difficulties; in fact, the style of this section has been cited as evidence that the speech is not by Demosthenes. The author's style here, where the languages of literary and art criticism are applied to Epicrates, is strongly reminiscent of that in Isocrates' *Evagoras* and passages by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plutarch. The author knows that because they present actions, literary works excel at portraying character, and that works of visual art excel at portraying physical appearance because of their "motionless aspect," that is, the objects in paintings and sculptures do not move. But Epicrates transcends both media. His beauty cannot be described in words, nor his character in visual art. This problematic passage encapsulates many issues that trouble not only Plato and Aristotle but also later aesthetic thinkers up to Lessing and the modern period.[30]

ION OF CHIOS

One more passage will illustrate the breadth of the comparison
between literature and the visual arts in the pre-Platonic period.
Ion from the island of Chios, a poet whose work survives in
fragments from the mid–fifth century B.C., narrates the fol-
lowing story of Sophocles (*Ion* frag. 8 von Blumenthal):

> "The boy blushed even deeper, and Sophocles said to his
> neighbor at dinner:
>   'How right Phrynichus was:
>   "One red cheek of love shines the light of love."'
> The Eretrian, who was a schoolmaster, took this up. 'Of
> course, Sophocles, you are an expert in poetry. But
> Phrynichus was surely wrong in calling the boy's jaws
> "red." If a painter were to colour this boy's jaws red, he
> wouldn't be beautiful any more. It's not right to liken the
> beautiful to what isn't beautiful.' Sophocles laughed.
> 'Then I take it sir,' he said, 'that you don't approve either
> of Simonides' much-admired line:
>   "the maid from red lips speaking"—
> or of Homer's "gold-haired Apollo." For if the painter had
> made the god's hair gold and not black, the painting
> would have been worse. And what about "rosy-fingered"?
> If you dipped your fingers in rose colour, the result would
> be a dye-worker's hands, not a beautiful woman's.'"[31]

Whether or not the story is true, it tells us something about
the tenor of discussion, prior to Plato's analysis, on the similarities
and differences between poetry and the visual arts. We know
from elsewhere (Soph. frag. 162 Nauck) that Sophocles was
aware of at least some of Pindar's terminology, namely the
architectural analogy, as was Aristophanes (*Ran.* 820). And as
Hagstrum notes, this passage from Ion emphasizes the difference

between painting and poetry: "The point was that color in poetry was something different from color in painting."[32] In other words, the mimetic notion, which emphasized the similarities between painting and poetry, had not yet assumed a dominant role. There is no sophisticated theory lurking behind the conversation.

CONCLUSIONS

We should pause to assess what we can learn from the diverse passages discussed above. First, it is clear that as the fifth-century poets and prose writers looked for ways to explain the poetic product, they naturally turned first to religious statues and to tombstones, then to the visual arts generally. Second, many found fault with the treatment of poetry as analogous to painting or sculpture, either as aesthetically inappropriate (Sophocles' companion) or as simply untrue (Pindar and Simonides). Third, I think it fair to conclude that all of the ancient authors discussed here, including Simonides in the various statements attributed to him, considered the visual arts less effective and lasting, especially for recording human action, than is literature. Andrew Stewart, an art historian, capsulizes the impact of this inferiority in the period of lyric poetry: "in a society where speech and action were all, these were critical failings indeed."[33] After Isocrates and pseudo-Demosthenes, however, these ideas went underground. The new and rising tradition of mimēsis, which describes both poetry and the visual arts as species of imitation, became the dominant tradition as Plato and especially Aristotle transformed the discussion. We have noted the argument that in the fifth century a view of literature as craft tended to replace a view of literature as divine inspiration. Both Plato and Aristotle developed mimetic theories that equated the processes and products of literature with those

of the visual arts, but Aristotle inclined to the general view of literature and the arts as crafts, while Plato criticized literature and the arts even as he revived the older view of them as divinely inspired. In the early *Poetics*, Aristotle, perhaps because of Platonic influence, was unfortunately unable to apply the useful distinctions between literature and the visual arts developed by the Greek lyric poets and Sophists.

3

Mimetic Doctrines

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Until the end of the fifth century B.C., comparisons between literature and the visual arts tended to favor literature without assuming that works of both literature and the visual arts imitate reality. This situation changed drastically with Plato and Aristotle. Plato assumes that literature and the visual arts are both mimetic arts, and he draws from this some rigorous principles for any potential aesthetic theory and some severe criticisms of literature. Aristotle tries to maintain the rigorous principles, the mimetic approach, and the assumption of similarity between literature and the visual arts. The result is confusion, as well as influential ideas.

PLATO

Plato's views on literature and art are complex; the emphasis of his discussion differs from passage to passage, and indeed sometimes Plato's concerns are ethical, sometimes aesthetic. A broad review of his views can easily be found elsewhere.[1] Here, I would

like to focus on a few critical discussions of literature by Plato and see how his assumptions about the visual arts and on art generally exert certain pressures on the conclusions he reaches.

The *Ion* is a good place to begin. The central point of the dialogue is to determine if Ion, a professional rhapsode, is able to perform successfully through inspiration rather than art. Socrates first brings Ion to realize that the rhapsode, who is interested in and able to speak concerning Homer alone, cannot have "art and knowledge" (τέχνηι καὶ ἐπιστήμηι) of literature: "If it were art that gave you power, then you could speak about all the other poets as well" (532c). Socrates then turns to a more specific question: "There is an art of poetry as a whole? Am I not right? . . . And is not the case the same with any other art you please, when you take it as a whole? The same method of inquiry holds for all the arts?" (532c–d).[2] Socrates responds to Ion's quite understandable confusion with analogies to the arts of painting, sculpture, playing of musical instruments, and even rhapsodic recital of poetry. In each of these cases Ion knows of no one who can judge and speak regarding only one artist, as is the case with Ion regarding Homer (532e–533c). Socrates explains the apparent paradox with another analogy, this time to iron rings and a magnet. Literature is not art (τέχνη) but divine inspiration (θεῖα δύναμις), and the Muses inspire Homer and then Ion rather like the magnet attracts the rings (533c–534e). The audience, inspired by the performance, becomes the last ring in the chain (534e–536d).

Socrates continues to probe Ion's artistic ignorance in ways not pertinent here. But two points should be emphasized about Plato's characterization of the arts. First, to know an art one must know the principles of the art as a whole (τὸ ὅλον). Second, to qualify as an art, the principles of an art form must be analogous to the principles of another art. That is, a principle involved in poetics should have an analogous principle in sculpture or lyre playing. Ion's rather miserable attempt to

explain the poetic art aside, these two artistic axioms set extremely high standards for qualification as an art. Some of the peculiarities in the *Poetics* are due to Aristotle's attempt to meet these rigorous Platonic criteria. And elsewhere in the Platonic corpus we can see Plato himself trying to meet them.

Before turning to these attempts, we should consider a similar discussion in the dialogue *Gorgias*. Here again, literature is not the primary target. In the *Ion*, Socrates had aimed his logic at rhapsodic performance and only hit the writing of literature by implication; in the *Gorgias*, the primary target is rhetoric, a phenomenon kindred to poetry. Once again Socrates attempts to show that literature is not an art, this time by criticizing rhetoric. Here literature is not characterized as "divine inspiration," but rather as a "routine" (ἐμπειρία), like cookery. The discussion at this point reproduces more concisely the discussion at 462c–465d. First art is distinguished from routine, using the examples of medicine and cookery (500e–501a): "the other, that is medicine, has investigated the nature of the subject it treats and the cause of its actions and can give a rational account of each of them, whereas its counterpart [sc., cookery], which is exclusively devoted to cultivating pleasure, approaches it in a thoroughly unscientific way (ἀτέχνως) without once having investigated the nature of pleasure or its cause." Practices that look not to the ultimate good of the soul but only to please it are then classed as "flattery" (κολακεία, 501b–c). Socrates helps his interlocutor Callicles to classify music and literature as flattery, and then equates literature and rhetoric ("if you should strip from all poetry its music, rhythm and meter, the residue would be nothing else but speech?") and so classifies rhetoric also as flattery rather than art (502c). It seems that the art of literature or painting must meet even more exacting standards than those laid down in the *Ion*: it "has investigated the nature of the subject it treats and the cause of its actions and can give a rational account of each of them"

(501a).[3] That is, a fine art must meet rigorous "scientific" standards such as those established for medicine.

In the *Philebus* Plato provides a sense of what this standard must be (51a–57d). First, Socrates defines a category of pleasures that are "pure," that are "unmixed" with "pain." As examples, Socrates points to pleasures "that attach to colors that we call beautiful, to figures, to most odors, to sounds, and to all experiences in which the want is imperceptible and painless, but its fulfillment is perceptible and pleasant" (51b). Socrates' specific example is "whiteness" (53a). He then makes a distinction between pure pleasures—such as those based on mathematics, like carpentry—and pleasures based on "lucky shots of a practiced finger" (56a), like music. Socrates again distinguishes two sciences of mathematics, that of the artisan and that of the philosopher, something like our distinction between applied and pure mathematics. Socrates' conclusion: "L]et our statement be that the arts which we have had before us are superior to all others, and that those among them which involve the effort of the true philosopher are, in their use of measure and number, immensely superior in point of exactness and truth" (57c–d). The elements of the pleasures involved in literature and the visual arts are not classified in this scheme, but could have been. Plato would most likely have considered literature to be, not an art, subject to measuring, but a "knack" or "routine" like music (Plato clearly here means the performance, not the theory) or rhetoric. But painting might well have been considered an art or craft, subject to verification by measurement, albeit of the "applied" rather than the "pure" type.[4] Because of his assumption that they are similar phenomena, Plato has missed a chance to separate literature from the visual arts by recognizing the spatiality and hence quantifiability of the latter. In his characterization of arts or crafts, Plato has also set up impossibly high standards. The crux of his distinction between art and "knack" or "routine" is the use of mathematics. A

scientific treatment of literature and the visual arts must take this into account.

The nature of this scientific application is suggested in the *Laws*, where one of the dialog's three participants, the "Athenian," asks about "the various arts of imitation which work by producing likenesses," asserting that "the rightness of such products, speaking generally, depends not on their pleasantness, but on accurate correspondence in quality and magnitude" (τοῦ τε τοσούτου καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου, 667d). In such an art, mathematics can be used in determining this "accurate correspondence." Needless to say, the role of art critic is fairly limited in such a context. As the Athenian states (667e–668a): "Then surely it follows from the argument that a man's feeling of pleasure, or his erroneous belief, is never a proper standard by which to judge of any representation . . .; no, we should judge by the standard of truth, never, on any account, by any other." Or further (669a–b): "Then must not one who is to be an excellent judge of any representation, whether in drawing, in music, or in any other branch of art, have three qualifications? He must understand, first, what the object reproduced *is*, next, how *correctly*, third and last, how *well* a given representation has been effected, in point of language, melody, or rhythm." Most important for our topic, however, is the implication that mathematics and measurement can be used in the criticism of art. In the Renaissance, Leonardo used this same criterion, that vision is more reliable than hearing or smell, as one of his arguments to claim the highest position in the arts for painting. Painting then is more "scientific," closer to reality. Painting imitates the visible world, while poetry imitates words, a human by-product (or sign) of the visible world. Poetry better imitates the mental world, painting the physical. In addition, Leonardo claims that painting is more powerful than literature because it generates visual images directly, while poetry requires the hearer's imagination to generate images that will be less vivid.

The visual artist, moreover, generates a pattern which can be perceived at one moment, while the poet's pattern must develop over time.[5]

As a natural consequence of the belief that art and literature are essentially imitative or representational, Plato reduces art and literature to spatial terms. A graphic illustration of this reduction is the passage in *Phaedrus* where Plato determines that a literary work should have the same spatial proportions as a living natural animal, a concept that, as we shall see, plays an even greater role in Aristotle's theory. James Notopoulos has shown that Plato's comparison of artwork to animal (*Phdr.* 264C) comes from medicine and reflects the fundamental change of mind from the archaic, paratactic view of things to the classical, organic, hypotactical view seen especially in Aristotle. This issue has generated modern discussion, not surprising in view of the return of "organic" views of literature such as Neoaristotelianism and the New Criticism. Joseph Maguire has shown that in terms of the various aesthetic pronouncements made by Plato a work of art can be beautiful either in terms of its function or in terms of its internal structure. Perhaps most significantly, early in the twentieth century, J. A. Stewart was able to interpret Plato as in essential agreement with the newly emerging field of imagist psychology, a line of argument since pursued by Gerald Else (although not in the direction of psychology). Krieger argues that the visuality of Plato and Aristotle, most apparent where they compare literature and the visual arts, gives rise to both their emphasis on drama, as the most visual literary art, and their tendency to view literature as "static."[6] A literary work, like a work of visual art, should bear a measurable relationship to reality, and at least one task of the critic is to make the measurement. Very few critics of art would describe their task in such terms.

In two passages of the *Republic,* Plato answers his own challenge to assess poetry as art rather than divine inspiration or

routine. These much discussed passages reach slightly different conclusions, and scholars have worked hard to reconcile them into a consistent statement about art. Most of the discussion has focused on Plato's hostility to poetry, although in this century voices have come to Plato's defense. The respected aesthetician Robin G. Collingwood originally argued that Plato cast out all poetry from his utopian republic. In his later book, *Principles of Aesthetics*, however, Collingwood modified this view of Plato to fit his own theory of art. According to this theory, representative art (which for Collingwood is not art) is of two types: amusement art and magical art. Plato wished to eliminate the former type while encouraging the latter, but since he did not understand Collingwood's distinction, he criticized all representative art. As a consequence of this limitation in Plato, Aristotle's *Poetics* is a defense of amusement art and hence, to Collingwood, of non-art. With this distinction, Collingwood marginalizes the *Poetics* as irrelevant to serious discussion of art and literature.[7]

Less oriented toward modern aesthetic theory and more oriented toward Plato's text is J. Tate's defense of Plato. Tate distinguishes two types of imitation in Plato: one should not imitate other people, but one should imitate virtues. Hence narrative poetry is acceptable, for there is little imitation in the bad sense, as long as the poet is also a philosopher with knowledge of "the good." Poetry that imitates the person is like realistic painting, far removed from the forms, but poetry that imitates virtues will resemble "genuine painting," which imitates reality rather than images of reality. Perhaps Tate's formulation is stated in extreme form and works too hard to make loose ends fit. This and similar approaches have been the basis of subsequent defenses of Plato's aesthetic.[8] But let us examine the two discussions in the *Republic*, specifically on the issue of the relationship between literature and the visual arts.

In *Republic* 2, Plato turns to the topic of the education of the guardians (376c). In early youth, the guardians will learn

gymnastics and, even earlier, poetry and music, which consist of two types: true and false, or fables. These must be censored, and the false—including Homer and Hesiod—disposed of. When pressed, Socrates likens Homer and Hesiod to poor painters, arguing that a story is not well told "[w]hen anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models" (377e).[9] Hesiod's stories of Uranus and Cronus are cited as examples. In this focus on imitation and faithfulness to the model, Plato's concern is ethical: models of bad behaviors should not be glorified to the young. That any interest in aesthetics is at once reduced to serving the purposes of epistemology and ethics should not surprise us when we consider the basic Platonic doctrine that "knowledge is virtue." Socrates proceeds to cite numerous examples from Homer and Aeschylus of falsehood regarding the gods. In *Republic* 3 the issue turns from falsity regarding divine deception to falsity regarding death and the underworld, which makes people cowardly, and falsity regarding laughter, insubordination, lust, lucre, and so on. Such wrong statements about gods and heroes are bad for the hearer and cause bad behavior; similarly, tales of ordinary people would need to promote justice rather than vice.

At this point (392c), the discussion turns from content to form (λέξις, "diction"): "So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech." Socrates distinguishes three kinds of portrayal: "either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation, or by both" (392d). That is, he makes a generic distinction between narrative, dramatic, and mixed (epic) poetry, and the dramatic is characterized "by pure imitation" (διὰ μιμήσεως). Here the word *mimēsis*, or "imitation," begins to take on its controlling role in the discussion. Hermann Koller and Gerald Else have described the metamorphosis of its meaning in this passage. (One can derive profit from Koller's argument without accepting

his somewhat eccentric thesis that the word originated as a
description of ritual dance and was transformed in Plato into
the now conventional sense). Initially, *mimēsis* signifies "repre-
sentation," "likening oneself to another in speech or bodily
bearing" (393c). At 395b the shift begins: guardians should not
imitate anything inappropriate, for "imitations . . . settle down
into habits" (395d). Socrates considers the imitation of noises
and animals, and only here does the word properly mean
"imitation." The good man or philosopher will properly employ
narration or the mixed manner; the base man, however, will
narrate little and will be prone to imitation of base men,
animals, noises, and so on. So also with music, the guardians
should employ "a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction," so
"the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one
cadence" (397b), and should not employ mixed rhythms. Inap-
propriate music should be banned; likewise with the other
crafts (398e–402a).[10]

Book 10 of the *Republic* returns to the same issue, but this
time a new perspective on imitation is provided by the theory
of the Forms. Again the question is, "Could you tell me in
general what imitation is?" (595c). As William Chase Greene
has noted, Plato illustrates his ideas here with objects of human
artisanship because in his argument, the visual artist becomes
an imitator at third hand, and poetry is then criticized for its
similarity to painting. An artisan creates an object based on the
idea corresponding to the object. To take Socrates' example, a
cabinetmaker creates a couch based on the idea of "couchness";
in turn, the painter makes an appearance of the couch made by
the cabinetmaker: "The producer of the product three removes
from nature you call the imitator?" (597e). Painters are able to
deceive children with their visual effects, and likewise poets,
"For it is phantoms, not realities, that they produce" (599a).
Moreover the imitator has no contact with the "user" of the
objects he imitates, and so "the imitator will neither know nor

opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations" (602a). At this point, Socrates applies the criteria developed in the *Philebus*. Sense perception, and hence visual art, is subject to distortion and illusion. The scientific "check" on this distortion is measurement, or mathematics. Art is not an exact mathematical copy but a copy designed to *look* like an exact copy. Hence, illusion will be revealed by measuring the subject and object of art and determining that the art is not drawn, as we would say, "to scale."[11]

Yet humans are attached to art because of their nature: "poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend for no sound and true purpose" (603a–b). Gentili has remarked that Plato, while lumping poetry and visual art together as mimetic, here distinguishes them as being aural and visual respectively. Plato concedes that poetry is a temporal art, painting a spatial one, but he still emphasizes their similarity. This is a watershed moment in the history of comparisons between literature and the visual arts. As seen in the previous chapter, virtually all writers before Plato took for granted the fundamental differences between literature and the visual arts, the one exception being the Simonidean comparison quoted by Plutarch (*De glor. Ath.* 346F–47A), which seems to be overlaid with later Peripatetic doctrine. This passage in the *Republic* shows how the earlier distinctions were confused by Plato, resulting in further confusions. The reason is clear: Plato wishes the arts to be similar so that he can apply the criteria of judgment for visual art (measurable space, or mathematics) to poetry. This is, as Hagstrum comments, "guilt by association"; illusionism (skiagraphia) in art is the equivalent of falsehood in poetry.[12]

At this point we would expect Socrates to argue that the audience of mimetic poetry would also be vulnerable to the

poet's intentional deception. But rather he suggests that the same confusion felt by the viewer of an optical illusion will be felt by the writer of tragedy, who pretends to be one thing while really being another, so that a tension develops between artist as person and artist as artist. We see here the reverse shift of the term *mimēsis* from that in *Republic* 2–3; the meaning is once again "represent," or almost "impersonate." We could say that Plato is unable to separate poetic process from poetic product. Poets imitate the subject of their art in a different way than the object of art "imitates" the subject of art. Plato easily shifts from one to another. He believes, in a sense, that the artist actually becomes identical with the object of art. The result, for Plato, is that the poet is governed by the powers of emotion, rather than by knowledge of the good (605a–b): "This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart of the painter, for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality, and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance."[13] Socrates closes with the familiar charge that poetry corrupts its hearers (605c–608b).

One very interesting assessment of Plato's conceptions of imitation, deception, and the arts is presented by Armando Plebe. Plebe argues that the ideas of poetic imitation presented in Books 2 and 3 are Plato's responses to various current theories of poetic "deception" (*inganno*), only directed at dramatic poetry and even there only to issues of style. However, in Plebe's assessment, Book 10 views all poetry as mimetic, with regard to content as well as style, and characterizes poetry as the representation of things that do not exist, rather than, as in Books 2 and 3, as the inaccurate representation of things that do exist. Plebe, then, sees Book 10 as a response to critics of Books 2 and 3. Of even more interest here is Plebe's detection of a later view in the dialogues after the *Parmenides*, especially the *Cratylus*,

Laws and *Timaeus*. In the *Cratylus* (423b–c), Plato argues that non-poetic language imitates things directly, and poetry imitates the qualities of things. In the *Laws* (798d, 655d, and 664e) and *Timaeus* (17d), music can imitate the ideas themselves and so human character, but poetry and painting cannot. Plebe sees this notion as Pythagorean in origin, like the notion that music can imitate emotions. In one passage, not noted by Plebe, Plato does suggest that painting, as well as music, can imitate character (*Plt.* 306c). Plebe realizes that this same issue will turn up in Aristotle; in fact all of the issues in this discussion of Plato will reappear there.[14]

The term *mimēsis* in Plato is shifting and inconsistent; that is to say, he does not distinguish between meanings of the term that are obvious to us. In *Republic* 3, the concept of imitation as "acting" seems to conflict with the meaning of the same word in *Republic* 10, although the *Sophist* can be seen, in part at least, as an attempt to reconcile these two notions. But in any case, the term nearly always incorporates a *visual* aspect, especially in Plato's later work. Even the divine creator in the *Timaeus* created our world like the painter copying the forms. This aspect of creation will be amplified by later Platonists, as we shall see. Keuls suggests that Plato finds analogies of knowledge and vision most useful because light makes vision possible in the same way as "the Good" makes knowledge possible. Richard McKeon summarizes the visual aspect of Platonic doctrine well: "Imitation is the making of images (εἴδωλον). The art of image-making may produce copies (εἰκών) or phantasms (φάντασμα), the difference between the two being that a copy is like its object, a phantasm is not." This visuality, when applied to the arts, is much more suitable to the visual arts than to literature, and this probably limited Plato's approach to poetry. In any case it was this visuality that resulted in the condemnation of poetry in *Republic* 10.[15]

One further charge against poetry escapes discussion in the *Republic* but is mentioned in the *Phaedrus*, where Plato criticizes

poets and artists for their lack of knowledge (249b). The charge is of special interest to us because once again poetry, here including written documents in general, is equated with painting in a comparison that reverses the traditional formulation: "You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing about writing, which makes it truly analogous to painting. The painter's products stand before us as though they were alive, but if you question them, they maintain a most majestic silence. It is the same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever" (275d). It is as though Plato is consciously playing off Simonides' statement, quoted in the previous chapter: "Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting."[16] From an initial comparison in which poetry has much greater artistic power in that it can imitate sound as well as image, whereas painting can only imitate image, Plato has reduced poetry to the level of painting.

ARISTOTLE'S *POETICS*

The similarity between poetry and the visual arts is so engrained in the tradition by the time of Aristotle that the visual arts are used to illuminate a distinction in the opening chapter of the *Poetics*. After an introductory sentence, Aristotle states that literary genres can be distinguished in three respects: media of imitation (τῶι . . . ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι), objects of imitation (τῶι ἕτερα) and mode or manner of imitation (τῶι ἑτέρως, *Poet.* 1447a.16–18). The media are discussed first (*Poet.* 1.1447a.18–28):

> . . . in some cases where people, whether by technical rules or practical facility, produce various *mimēseis* by portraying things, the media are colours and shapes, while in others

the medium is the voice; similarly in the arts in question, taken collectively, the media of *mimēsis* are rhythm, speech, and harmony, either separately or in combination.

For example, harmony and rhythm are the media of instrumental music, rhythm alone without harmony the medium of dancing, as dancers represent characters, passions, and actions by rhythmic movement and postures.

Hagstrum has made probably the most important observation on this passage: that here Aristotle emphasizes the difference between the two arts (that they employ different media), while elsewhere the similarities are emphasized. In fact, the "means of imitation" become a fundamental distinction in Aristotle's theory, causing him to arrive at an aesthetic rather than functional theory of art—in distinction to Plato, who emphasizes the functional approach. The visual arts are brought in for the sake of illustration probably because, as had been the case for Plato and will be the case for Horace, the media used by visual artists are easier to classify than those used by poets.[17]

It would seem that for Aristotle those who imitate "with colors" (χρώμασι) are the painters, those "with shapes" (σχήμασι) the sculptors, but this is not so. In fact, some have argued against the familiar notion that Aristotle included painters alone in these categories, and it is often noted that painters and sculptors both use shapes and colors, although Leon Golden and O. B. Hardison point out that "form is essential to sculpture, whereas color is accidental." Others would add that σχήματα may be a term from dancing, which also would involve shape and color, as well as movement. Hence in the words καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι, Else reads the first καί as adverbial ("also") and the second as conjunctive ("and"); he further points out that Aristotle mentions elsewhere that sculptures were painted (*Part. An.* 1.5.645a11–13). But Aristotle does not seem to have attempted to distinguish painting from sculpture based on medium, or

even on the number of dimensions used (two for painting, three for sculpture), although such a distinction seems obvious to us. Apparently, the first attempt to differentiate the two arts in this way is in Dio Chrysostom, who will be discussed in chapter 6. Perhaps the first serious modern discussion is by Galileo, who argues that the restricted dimensionality of painting makes it a greater art than sculpture, since perceiving the dimensionality of sculpture depends on external light.[18]

In any case, we can be certain that the phrase καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι refers to visual arts in general. Else has illuminated this difficult passage, relying on his own theory that like many other parts of the treatise, part of this discussion is a later addition by Aristotle. Else's interpretation reveals that in this one sentence Aristotle makes several important strides over his predecessor, Plato. In the beginning of the passage quoted above, Aristotle dispenses with one problem that had preoccupied Plato. Aristotle knows that some imitate without a knowledge of the principles of art, but he is not interested in their products or processes of imitation. Aristotle is only interested in poetry and the visual arts in so far as they are arts. Else concludes that the phrase is here only to answer Plato. In fact, the entire sentence responds to Platonic issues and concerns. The clause opening the passage (introduced by the word ὥσπερ) distinguishes two types of imitations, those that use shapes and colors, and those that use the voice; Else points out that the latter group, the vocal arts of singing, pantomime, and so on, is similar to the visual arts in that both involve visual images (ἀπεικάζοντες).[19]

It has been pointed out that here, as in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.10.1), the word εἰκάζω makes it clear that artists (and poets) must imitate both the visible world (εἰκόνες) and the invisible character of humans. As we have seen, Plato tended toward the view that literature functions imagistically, and this among other things prevented him from attaining a satisfactory

view of literature. Aristotle states here that the visual and vocal arts imitate the invisible as well as the visible, but that the musical and literary arts do not. These nonimagistic arts imitate using rhythm and either melody (music) or speech (literature). The arts can be distinguished, then, according to means of imitation. The imagistic arts would be the visual arts, which use shapes and colors, and singing, pantomime, and/or animal sounds, which use the voice. The nonimagistic arts would be nonvocal music, which uses rhythm and harmony, dance, which uses rhythm, and literature, which uses speech. We shall see that Aristotle is by no means consistent about the use of images in literature. It is safe to conclude with Else that Aristotle "*has established for the first time in classical Greece a partial distinction between poetry and music*," but that the passage leaves dancing as somewhat of a problem and also may have suffered textual corruption.[20]

The problems raised by Plato have not all been solved, but Aristotle has made a good beginning at distinguishing the arts according to the artist's medium. He has also refused to become mired in the Platonic issues of whether literature is visually imagistic (Aristotle suggests that it is not, although in other passages he will clearly tend toward such a view) or of whether the arts are "arts" (τέχναι) in the technical sense. And he has done this without breaking the Platonic ground rules discussed above: that the arts be analogously discussed and be subjected to the principles of science. In fact, the arts can be reduced to extremely formal principles of measurement or mathematics: either spatial (image) or aural (rhythm).[21]

When Aristotle turns from the "means" of imitation to the "object" of imitation in chapter 2, he again introduces the visual arts for analogous discussion and illustration (*Poet.* 2.1448a.1–9):

> The objects of this *mimēsis* are people doing things, and these people [as represented] must necessarily be either

good or bad, this being, generally speaking, the only line of divergence between characters, since differences of character just are differences in goodness and badness, or else they must be better than are found in the world or worse or just the same, as they are represented by the painters, Polygnotus portraying them as better, Pauson as worse, and Dionysius as they are; clearly therefore each of the varieties of *mimēsis* in question will exhibit these differences, and one will be distinguishable from another in virtue of presenting things as different in this way.

Once again, visual arts are introduced to exemplify and clarify, once again with the same Greek word (ὥσπερ). In fact, scholars point out that the structures of these sections in chapters 1 and 2 of the *Poetics* are nearly identical, and that the second passage refers back to the first. Here again, Aristotle apparently thinks his point—that artists imitate actions of men either better or worse than the norm—can be grasped more easily in the case of the visual arts. (The argument of R. P. Hardie that to Aristotle, visual artists represent characters rather than men acting seems to be in error; the word translated as "the imitators" (μιμούμενοι) here seems to refer to *all* imitators, visual as well as auditory.)[22]

The distinction between better and worse objects of imitation is an important one, as it allows Aristotle to distinguish literary genres that cannot be distinguished by the criterion of medium: tragedy from comedy, epic from iambic, and the like. The implication is that, like literature, visual arts can reveal character in their imitations and that hence they can be generically divided into tragic painting, comic sculpture, and so on. This was momentous for subsequent discussions of the relationships between literature and the visual arts. The confusion it caused in the Renaissance, for example, was great. But before discussion of the larger issues, it is necessary to look at the text itself.

The passage begins with a distinction between people acting (πράττοντας) who are serious (σπουδαίους), or "good," and not serious (φαύλους), or "bad." But a third type appears: men are better, worse, or "the same" (τοιούτους). When the painters are introduced, Polygnotus exemplifies the first type, Pauson the second, and Dionysius the third. Polygnotus painted in Athens in the second quarter of the fifth century and made innovations in facial expression and clothes. His work is lost, and modern scholars study him from his apparent influence on vase painters. He was also part of what Jerome Pollitt calls the "movement to develop pictorial space," and he became later known (as in Pliny) as the best at revealing character. Incidentally, Pollitt and Rouveret agree with Aristotle's assessment of Polygnotus here. There is much less information on Pauson. Dionysius of Colophon also painted in the fifth century, although whether he is the Dionysius of the text and whether the text is sound are disputed, as we shall see.[23]

Else presents six good arguments for removing the phrase about the third type of imitation, τοιούτους, and the phrase pertaining to Dionysius: that the division into better and worse is similar to other passages in Aristotle and consonant with the aristocratic worldview of Greek thought generally; that ὁμοίους, "just the same," would refer in Aristotelian usage to the process of imitation, unlike the other two categories, which are ethical; that the reference to Dionysius is actually to a painter who lived much later than Aristotle (Pliny *HN* 35.148 and perhaps 35.113); that Polygnotus and Pauson also appear together in the *Politics* without Dionysius (8.5.1340a.36); and finally, that Aristotle returns to the two-fold division in the sentence following our passage. These are strong arguments, if not completely compelling. Donald Lucas, for example, finds Aristotle's extra category "wholly superfluous," but not interpolated, and identifies Dionysius as a "fifth-century painter." Else himself suggests Aristotle may have added the material later. We shall return to

the issue of the artistic portrayal of character below. For now, we can conclude that if the words criticized by Else are not interpolated they are at least "superfluous" in terms of the rest of Aristotle's argument.[24]

At the end of the passage quoted above, Aristotle describes the painter's activity as "presenting" (εἴκαζεν), which emphasizes the pictorial aspect of the imitation. Again, Aristotle apparently makes the distinction between literature and the visual arts, although he is not always careful in maintaining the distinction; for example, at *Poetics* 25.1460b.8–9, the two are equated: "Since the poet produces *mimēseis*, just like a painter or other visual artist" (τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός). Whether or not Aristotle intended such a distinction between visual artists and nonvisual artists (presumably painters are also εἰκονοποιοί, since the term should be all-inclusive of artists), his successors tended to miss the point. This is understandable since, as we shall see, Aristotle gives us further tools to make this (mis)interpretation.[25]

One interesting implication of this passage is that the visual arts can be divided into genres based on the object of imitation: artists can imitate serious objects (tragic-epic art) or ignoble objects (comic-iambic art). Although this distinction resulted in a confinement of subject matter during the Renaissance, it is perhaps not as silly as it might seem. Andrew Stewart, in his thorough study of Greek sculpture, takes it very seriously, finding examples of all three styles, not only in Greek sculpture, generally, but among a single collection—the Parthenon sculptures. At least for this respected historian of ancient art, comic-iambic sculpture, imitating those less noble than we, is a hallmark of the Hellenistic period.[26]

Even more confining to later followers of this passage was the implication that visual art should be limited not only to portraiture but to the portraiture of humans in action (πράττοντας). The distinction between literature as temporal and the visual arts as spatial is often associated with Lessing, but

even in antiquity, perhaps even before Aristotle, doubts about the unity of the arts were expressed. Hardie argues that Aristotle's distinction between poetry and visual art involves motion: "For πρᾶξις is a kind of κίνησις, κίνησις = κίνησις - ἕξις. And we may reasonably conjecture that the use of κίνησις as a medium is peculiar to ποίησις and differentiates it from other kinds of μίμησις—κίνησις being taken to mean sensations of sight or hearing, that are successive in time." Unfortunately, as we have seen, Aristotle is pretty clear that visual artists imitate πράττοντας and hence that painting and sculpture also imitate πρᾶξις. Augusto Rostagni points out that Aristotle would emphasize the acting before the people acting, hence the "primacy of plot" over character." Hardie's argument must be dismissed as the first of several attempts we shall witness to save Aristotle from error by reading into his works the corrections of others. Most likely, Aristotle himself did not agree with these ideas in their more extreme formulations, and his comments on visual art are brought in to illustrate his remarks on poetry rather than as rigid and well-considered statements on visual art.

Aristotle does commit himself to an even more interesting implication—that the visual arts can depict human character. In Aristotle, character necessarily involves action. As he states in the Nichomachean Ethics: "[B]ut the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. . . . Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities" (EN 2.1.1103a3–b2, 1103b21–22). A poet can portray a certain character only through action or the plot. Hence, the proper object of poetry is not men but men in action (πράττοντας); here Aristotle's ethics are completely consistent with his view in the Poetics.[28] Similarly, a painter must have

some means of revealing character. Aristotle suggests what these means might be in a passage in the *Politics*, which we shall examine below.

The results of these implications will be discussed in the following chapters. At this point, it is enough to say that in this very influential passage Aristotle places limitations on his theory by implying that he expects visuality (εἴκαζεν) in literature and by stating outright that he expects action (πράττοντας) in visual art. In assessing this and similar passages, however, we must remember that both ancient drama and ancient visual art were far less expressive than modern art and literature. Although with Euripides there was a trend toward greater expression which had developed even further by Aristotle's time, the arts remained relatively restrained. For instance, in drama the use of masks must have limited the facial expressions of the actors.[29]

Ingram Bywater has raised an interesting point on a phrase elsewhere in the *Poetics* (1.1447a.19): "imitate many things" (πολλὰ μιμοῦνταί). Bywater's note merits repetition: "πολλά is not otiose. The art of the painter or sculptor has certain limits; it can represent many things; but there are some (e.g. character and feeling) that it can only or indirectly express (Pol. 8.5, 1340a32; comp. Xenophon Mem. 3.10.1). The theory in Lessing's *Laocoon* is based on an idea already in Aristotle." These intelligent comments, here attributed to Aristotle, are by no means "already in Aristotle." Nowhere does Aristotle state that poets, as *opposed* to visual artists, can "imitate all things." When discussing the passages from Xenophon and the *Politics*, we will see that the passage in the *Politics* clarifies rather than contradicts the statements in the *Poetics*—all of which maintain that visual artists do depict character. There is a problematic passage in the *Metaphysics* (13.1078a.31–b.6) where Aristotle seems to say that goodness can be revealed only by action, while beauty is revealed through mathematics (τὸ [sc. αγαθὸν] μὲν γὰρ ἀεί ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καί ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις). The

natural interpretation of the word καί (also) here suggests that beauty can be seen in moving and nonmoving entities, but goodness only in moving (i.e., in actions). Aristotle subsequently states that mathematics involves "the beautiful", but here, unlike in Plato, mathematics probably has no application to "the good." Similarly, Xenophon's passage reveals that in Aristotle's time, some had doubts about the ability of visual artists to convey character. But outside the *Metaphysics* at least, Aristotle does not share these doubts. Bywater's argument is accepted by J. W. H. Atkins; the other commentators I have been able to consult seem neither to refute nor to mention it.[30]

The consistency of Aristotle's views may be confirmed if we take the passages from the *Poetics* slightly out of order. A similar assertion that, whether or not they *do*, the visual arts *can* depict character appears in *Poetics* 6, as Aristotle deduces an argument in favor of the "primacy of plot": "[By definition] a work could not be a tragedy if there were no action. But there could be a tragedy without *mimēsis* of character, and the tragedies of most of the moderns are in fact deficient in it; the same is true of many other poets, and of painters for that matter, of Zeuxis, for instance, in comparison with Polygnotus: the latter is good at depicting character, while Zeuxis' painting has no *mimēsis* of character to speak of" (*Poet.* 6.1450A.23–29). Here again Aristotle mentions Polygnotus, this time comparing him not to Pauson and Dionysius but to the later Zeuxis, an early fourth-century artist who is associated with the development of *skiagraphia* and is said to have had a difficult personality. Aristotle clearly states here that painting can depict character, an argument that has been taken seriously even in our time. Rouveret again agrees with Aristotle, although she points out the obvious absurdity of the second sentence in this passage: every play must have character, since character distinguishes comedy from tragedy. Rostagni notes that since elsewhere in the *Poetics* (2.1448a and 25.1461b) both Polygnotus and Zeuxis are characterized as "idealizers" of

their subjects, only "character" can be at issue here, the distinction being described by Alfred Gudeman as one between "inner beauty" (Polygnotus) and "outer beauty" (Zeuxis). As an example, Lane Cooper suggests that in portrayal of character Rembrandt surpasses Rubens, while Chaucer and others surpass Dryden and others.[31] The argument is that plot must be more essential to tragedy than character is, in that tragedies with plot but not character are written. Similarly, Polygnotus depicts character but Zeuxis does not. Aristotle opens issues here but does not close them. At *Politics* 7.15.1336b.15–16, Aristotle specifically censors mimetic visual art, which "imitates such actions." Painting and sculpture, in Aristotle, clearly imitate actions of men. Action without character may seem odd and would seem to be a problem for Aristotle's ethical doctrine, but it would probably not be inconceivable for Aristotle's audience. We must keep in mind such works as Myron's *Discus Thrower*, clearly a work of action but not character.

Aristotle makes a similar, but not so bold, claim when discussing character in chapter 15 (*Poet.* 15.1454b8–15):

> Since a tragedy is a *mimēsis* of people better than are found in the world, one ought to do the same as the good figure-painters; for they too give us the individual form, but though they make people lifelike they represent them as more beautiful than they are (καλλίους). Similarly the poet too in representing people as irascible and lazy and morally deficient in other ways like that, ought nevertheless to make them good (ἐπιεικεῖς), as Homer makes Achilles both good (ἀγαθὸν) and an example of harsh will.

This passage is corrupt in the manuscripts. This translation by Margaret Hubbard follows Edgar Lobel in transposing "an example of harsh will" (παραδείγματα σχληρότητος) from the

beginning of the clause to the end. Some editors either obelize the last clause as hopelessly corrupt or remove it entirely. Else omits the words transposed by Lobel, leaves ἀγαθόν in the text, and adds before the word *Homer* the word ὅμοιον (likeness). This emendation fits the context quite well. Else views the passage and many others in the *Poetics* as later additions, perhaps by Aristotle himself. In fact, he sees this passage, along with the passages we have discussed regarding the painter Dionysius and other characters "like us" in chapter 2 of the *Poetics*, as part of a change in Aristotle's thinking, toward "the suggestion of a new approach to character-drawing, starting from the ordinary man—ὅμοιος, 'like' (us)—instead of the superior one."[32]

Most agree that καλλίους means "better looking" or "more beautiful," that the term refers to physical appearance rather than character. The argument over the subsequent reference to the poet's art became a central part of the debate between realism and idealism. Here again, Bywater interprets Aristotle along the lines of Lessing, accepting the physical nature of καλλίους but seeing also a useful analogy: "He shows that the corresponding difficulty (sc. of a character being 'good' as well as 'lifelike,' to use the terms from Hubbard's translation above) has been solved in a sister art, that of the portrait-painter, who without sacrificing the likeness makes a man look handsomer than he is . . .; so that, if the painter can do this, there is no reason why the literary artist also should not be able to represent a tragic personage truthfully, with any infirmities of character which form part of the received idea of him . . ., and at the same time as a good man." Stephen Halliwell, in spite of his translation ("improve on their subjects' beauty"), actually finds Aristotle's comparison illuminating. In his understanding of Aristotle the poet attributes "virtues and vices," or "moral states," to the stage character. Thus Polygnotus apparently "specialized in scenes (such as a panorama of the Underworld on the

occasion of Odysseus' visit) where marks of moral states could be permanently incorporated." Yet a third critic, S. H. Butcher, identifies the goal of art in Aristotle as an aesthetic idealizing. In this passage, he sees "the suppression of accidental features, and the ideal form that results will have added elements of beauty . . . just as, by the art of the portrait-painter, a likeness is reproduced and yet idealized."[33]

But as Else argues, Aristotle's point is that just as the painters paint natural subjects, or people "like us," but make them "more beautiful," so poets should depict characters "like us" but also "morally good" (ἐπιεικεῖς). Aristotle's assertion here is less aggressive than in the previous passages. He does not say that painters depict character. Rather he asserts that what poets do when they depict character is analogous to what painters do when they idealize their subjects (make them "more beautiful"). Aristotle here thinks of the depiction of "tendencies"; Achilles, to use his example, tends toward irascibility. If Else is right that this is a later passage by Aristotle—in which he recommends that the poet begin with characters "like us" and improve them, rather than, as elsewhere in the *Poetics*, begin with characters who are good and make them "like us"—then we can conclude that Aristotle has now transcended the view that visual artists depict character. We shall soon see that by the *Politics* Aristotle has again altered his views on this issue.[34]

Golden and Hardison, however, take a different approach. After translating καλλίους as "better than they are," with the concomitant implications that the painter is portraying character, they ask, "A]fter a character has been framed in general terms, what is the dramatist's next task? It is to particularize the character, to give him idiosyncrasies that soften—without obscuring—the general outline." If this were Aristotle's meaning, the passage would be compatible with the other passages in the *Poetics* that Else sees as contradictory. The comparison to painting, then, tends to support Else's position (although Golden and

Hardison in a second discussion see the process as "universal-izing," rather as Else does). Else is content to mark the passage as a later addition. In any case, as Else adds, the reader is forced to fill in how the poet is to accomplish this combination of goodness and naturalism. Aristotle gives no details. It seems that Aristotle has not yet thought through the analogies between literature and the arts.[35]

Let us turn now to the passages cited by Bywater as evidence that Aristotle prefigures Lessing in suggesting that the visual arts cannot reveal character. At *Politics* 8.5.1340a, Aristotle asserts that music transcends pleasure and can influence character. Music can create in the listener emotional states, but the effect is less direct in other sensual perception (*Pol.* 8.5.1340a28–42):

> The objects of no other sense, such as taste or touch, have any resemblance to moral qualities; in visible objects there is only a little, for there are figures which are of a moral character, but only to a slight extent, and all do not participate in the feeling about them. Again, figures and colours are not imitations, but signs, of moral habits, indications which the body gives of states of feeling. The connection of them with morals is slight, but in so far as there is any, young men should be taught to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus, or any other painter or sculptor who expresses moral ideas. On the other hand, even in mere melodies there is an imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently affected by each.

Here Aristotle describes the auditory sense as the most receptive of character. Objects of touch and taste do not imitate character; Aristotle does not commit on smell, but most likely it belongs with touch and taste. The sense of sight can perceive

character, although it is limited. The objects of sight are not imitations of character (ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἤθεσιν) like music, but are only shapes and colors (σχήματα καὶ χρώματα) coming to be (γιγνόμενα) as signs of the character (σημεῖα . . . τῶν ἠθῶν) materializing in the body (ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος) through the emotions (ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν). In other words, visual art is more limited in expression of character in that it can only reflect indirectly through the spatial medium of the body. But some shapes can convey character, and clearly some artists are so skilled (ἠθικός); so Polygnotus is preferable to Pauson. The similarity of this position, in essence and in language, to that of the *Poetics* should be obvious. In fact, this passage may explain, among others, *Poetics* 17.1455a29–34, where Aristotle recommends that the poet feign the character's physical movements (σχήμασι). In the discussion of style in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle seems to associate moral character with the narration and hence with action ("The narration should depict character"), but he associates *emotion* with physical gestures (3.16.1417a.16–17b.6). Furthermore, in his logical treatise *On Interpretation*, Aristotle finds words to be only symbols of psychic emotions (τῶν ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι παθημάτων σύμβολα, 1.1.6a3), language remarkably close to the concepts expressed here. Aristotle has distinguished the processes involved in perceiving character through the various media, but we are a long way from Lessing or indeed from a resolution of the inherent inconsistency between Aristotle's ethics and his aesthetics.[36]

Material relevant to this discussion has also been preserved by Xenophon, a soldier and writer who wrote in the early fourth century B.C. Xenophon's *Anabasis* has served for centuries as a textbook on Attic Greek style. His *Memorabilia* presents incidents in the life of Socrates. At *Memorabilia* 3.10, Socrates discusses art theory with two artists, Parrhasius and Cleiton. With Parrhasius, Socrates argues that painting is mimetic and imagistic (ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε), depicting "bodies" (σώματα). This

is done through generalized selection from models. At first Parrhasius thinks that character cannot be represented (μιμητόν), but Socrates argues that one can imitate the emotions and even mental states of others through eyes and facial expressions alone, and Parrhasius agrees. Socrates even gets him to concede that no motion is needed to depict character (καὶ ἑστώτων καὶ κινουμένων). Finally, Parrhasius agrees that it is better to depict good men (τὰ καλά τε κα'ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαπητὰ ἤθη) than bad (αἰσχρά τε καὶ πονηρὰ καὶ μισητά). Socrates similarly approaches Cleiton the sculptor and persuades him that his sculptures of athletes are successful because they represent the physical traits that reveal emotions, given that emotions have discrete physical manifestations (τὰ πάθη τῶν ποιούντων τι σωμάτων ἀπομιμεῖσθαι). Socrates and Cleiton conclude that the sculptor "represents the actions of the soul" (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῶι εἴδει προσεικάζειν).

This passage is relevant not only to the issue in Aristotle but also to the subsequent devaluation of sculpture relative to painting; as Andrew Stewart observes, painting can portray "the character [ethos] of the soul," sculpture only "the workings [erga] of the soul," by implication leaving painting on the level of literature but not sculpture. Stewart also describes a number of examples of ancient sculpture, such as the Athenian statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the "Zeus" from Artemision, Cephisodotus' statues of Menander, Epicurus, and Demosthenes, and' the "Portrait of 'Sulla'?," in all of which the character of the subjects is truly conveyed. The last of these is seen in plate 2. The subject of this bronze piece, which is now in the J. Paul Getty Museum (73.AB.8), has been identified from coins as Sulla. Stewart's description is apt: "The inspiration is basically Lysippic, but the structure has been simplified into a massive cube, into which the features have been abruptly implanted. With the impatient turn of the head, the tight bulge of the brow, and the short, roughly chiseled hair this suggests a

ruthless, even brutal character completely at variance with the heroic charisma of Mithradates." That the subject is Sulla may be doubted, but the portrayal of *ēthos* is not.[37]

We can now assess Aristotle's position on character. It would be a mistake to agree with Bywater that Aristotle prefigures Lessing. Aristotle consistently states in the *Poetics* that artists imitate actions and hence can imitate character. In the *Politics*, he agrees that artists imitate actions, but his position on character is revised to argue that artists imitate the bodily "signs" of character and so imitate character only indirectly, as opposed to the direct imitation of character achieved by musicians. Xenophon's discussion may be interpreted to indicate that, although there was some disagreement over this issue among Aristotle's contemporaries, perhaps even among practicing artists, Socrates developed a position surprisingly similar to Aristotle's. Art is imagistic, but imitates character, even where no action is involved. Similarly, the emotions of the soul can be depicted, as the emotions result in and are revealed in certain bodily indications. Hence, artists can make images of the actions of the soul. Aristotle's aesthetic views are more consistent with Xenophon's than with his own ethical doctrines, and they are not a peculiar outgrowth of Aristotle's system. In fact, they are slightly inconsistent with it, and seem to have been modified slightly in the *Politics* and, if Else's theory is correct, in Aristotle's redaction of the *Poetics* itself.[38]

Keuls has argued that the early conceptions of mimēsis were "dramatic," and that prior to Plato the term should be translated as "enactment." Pollitt has shown that at around this time the concept of "character" (*ēthos*) appeared in sculpture and painting as well as in theory (although the term came into art criticism "at a rather late stage"). Keuls responds that like *mimēsis*, the term *ēthos* was "dramatic" (rather than "static"): "The *ethos* of a representational artist must be in his skill in capturing, snapshot-like, a moment of dramatic interaction in

a still image." This sort of ēthos she finds in Polygnotus and surviving painting contemporary with him; she finds both "static" and "dynamic" senses of the term in Xenophon's passage.[39] Aristotle's ideas must therefore be at least in part a systematic explanation of slightly contradictory views in mainstream circulation.

The visual arts do not figure in Aristotle's treatment of the "manner of imitation" in chapter 3 of the *Poetics*, although we shall see that a connection has been made there as well. When Aristotle turns in chapter 4 to the origin of drama, however, again an analogy to the visual arts seems to appear, this time in support of a general statement regarding the pleasure that arises from imitation, or better, from viewing an imitation (*Poet.* 4.1448b4–17):

> *Mimēsis* is innate in human beings from childhood— indeed we differ from the other animals in being most given to *mimēsis* and in making our first steps in learning through it—and pleasure in instances of *mimēsis* is equally general. This we can see from the facts: we enjoy looking at the most exact portrayals (εἰκόνας) of things we do not like to see in real life, the lowest animals, for instance, or corpses. This is because not only philosophers, but all men, enjoy getting to understand something, though it is true that most people feel this pleasure only to a slight degree; therefore they like to see these pictures, because in looking at them they come to understand something and can infer what each thing is, can say, for instance, 'This man in the picture is so-and-so'.[40]

Most scholars have seen this as a reference to the visual arts; Else, however, thinks it refers rather to "*drawings, models, or sections of animals and human cadavers, ie. reproductions used for biological teaching or research.*" His argument is twofold: that "from

the facts" (ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων) is "a stock phrase . . ., meaning 'in practice,' 'in actual experience,'" and that depictions of ugly scenes had not yet been introduced to artistic practice. Lucas accepts the first argument, yet believes εἰκόνας to refer to visual art, citing mythological scenes such as Circe's animals as possible subjects. While Aristotle's example does seem odd, perhaps he is looking for the worst case scenario: that learning from imitation is pleasurable is proven if even disgusting scenes, not involving the actions of better men, can be pleasurable. Hence, the pleasure must come from something other than enjoyment of beauty. At *Rhetoric* 1.11.1371b, Aristotle explains this thesis in expanded form and with similar language. There, as also at *De Partibus Animalium* 1.5.645a.11, the reference is clearly to visual art rather than to anatomical illustrations: γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, translated for example by Cooper as "painting, sculpture, and poetry." Else cites both passages but uses them to date the passage in the *Poetics*, which he considers an addition by Aristotle.[41]

Oddly, what the nature of this learning might be has not been discussed very much. In a pair of articles treating this passage and others in Aristotle (*Rh.* 1.11.1371b and *Part. An.* 1.5.645a11, both mentioned above), as well as passages from Pseudo-Aristotle (*Probl.* 19.5 and 19.40), Plutarch (*Mor.* 188 and 674A) and Cicero (*Orat.* 134), H. L. Tracy concludes that pleasure comes from the critical activity of the viewer/reader, who must compare the imitation to the object of imitation. Tracy's goal is to explore the philosophical ramifications of such a theory rather than to detail Aristotle's view, but nonetheless, the analysis should be considered. Intellectual "resolution" of an "enigma" is definitely involved in aesthetic appreciation. But Tracy is wrong in this comparison with mathematics: "When a logical integration has been made the thinker looks forward to the wider application of his conclusion. The aesthetic integration is complete in itself; the situation that has presented itself

is unique. The artist is concerned with the particular and not with the general: the aesthetic satisfaction also consists in the integration of a particular situation without further reference or implication." As Else points out, to be consistent with Aristotelian doctrine, the learning here would have to be learning about the universal. Learning "that 'this individual is so-and-so'" means placing the particular into its proper category or class. But the viewers/auditors do more than place the particular objet d'art into the appropriate class; with good art, they also learn something new about the class itself. Else suggests a connection with *Poetics* 9.1451a.36–b.11, on the universality of poetry, concluding that one implication of this greater universality of literature and the visual arts in Aristotle is that literature and the visual arts, both less tied to images in the world, would be less tied to each other as well. We should remember, however, as Birmelin reminds us, that in any case, both the imitation and the knowledge must be visual.[42]

In chapter 6 of the *Poetics* there are two passages in rapid succession that compare literature and visual art. The first of these (*Poet.* 6.1450a.23–29) has been discussed above. Some textual critics shift the second passage from its place in the manuscripts, with serious implications for our discussion; consequently this controversial passage will here be quoted and italicized in both places scholars have placed it:

[By definition] a work could not be a tragedy if there were no action. But there could be a tragedy without *mimēsis* of character, and the tragedies of most of the moderns are in fact deficient in it; the same is true of many other poets, and of painters for that matter, of Zeuxis, for instance, in comparison with Polygnotus: the latter is good at depicting character, while Zeuxis' painting has no *mimēsis* of character to speak of.

If you put down one after another speeches that depicted character, finely expressed and brilliant in the *mimēsis* of intellect, that would not do the job that, by definition, tragedy does do, while a tragedy with a plot, that is, with an ordered series of particular actions, though deficient in these other points, would do its job much better, *a relation similar to one we find in painting, where the most beautiful colours, if smeared on at random, would give less pleasure than an uncoloured outline that was a picture of something.*

The most attractive things in tragedy, *peripeteiai* and recognition scenes, are parts of the plot.

Novices in poetry attain perfection in verbal expression and in the *mimēsis* of character much earlier than in the ordering of the particular actions; this is also true of almost all early poets.

The plot therefore is the principle, or one might say the principle of life, in tragedy, while the mimēsis of character comes second in importance, *a relation similar to one we find in painting, where the most beautiful colours, if smeared on at random, would give less pleasure than an uncoloured outline that was a picture of something.* A tragedy, I repeat, is a *mimēsis* of an action, and it is only because of the action that it is a *mimēsis* of the people engaged in it.[43]

The comparison of Zeuxis and Polygnotus was treated above with other passages involving character. The second passage presents a problem.

It is difficult to determine what is meant by the words λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα, here translated as "an uncolored outline that was a picture of something." Some identify the subject as *chiaroscuro*, some as a monochrome technique, still others as a preliminary sketch designed to be painted. The issue has not

been clarified by the context, as even the placement of the passage has been questioned. In the manuscripts it appears in the second position printed above. Castelvetro transposed it to 1450a.33, the first position printed here, after the words here translated as "would do its job much better." This transposition was generally accepted until the 1885 edition of Johannes Vahlen, which restored the passage to the position in the manuscripts. Vahlen's restoration was particularly persuasive, since it represented a movement away from his previous defense of Castelvetro's transposition. In that defense, Vahlen had presented two arguments, one from the sense of the passage and one from the style. Plot and character, he argued, correspond to the lines in a painting, thought and diction to the color; Vahlen supported the argument with an analogous quotation from Lessing. Furthermore, in Castelvetro's version, the words translated by Hubbard as "the most beautiful colors, if smeared on at random" (ἐναλείψειε ... χύδην) balance those translated as "If you put down one after another speeches that depicted character" (ἐφεξῆς θῆι ῥήεις) in the sentence that precedes it. The good painter must plan (sketch) and then fill in (color), just as the good poet must plan (compose plot with character) and then fill in (add thought and diction). The passage also sheds light on the preceding comparison between Zeuxis and Polygnotus. If, as Vahlen suggests, Zeuxis was known for his "lines" and Polygnotus for his "colors," then we can see how Zeuxis could be described as "characterless": his figures possessed no thought and no diction. The line-versus-color distinction was destined to play a large role in later art history, as we have seen.[44]

Vahlen's arguments are repeated by Lucas, who rejects the transposition, and by Else, who alone among post-Vahlen editors joins Castelvetro in moving the passage. If the transposition is not accepted, then the comparison again treats character as distinct from plot, and in this position and with this inter-

pretation the passage has been defended and has been very influential. Character alone would be equivalent to random colors, and an uncolored outline would be equivalent to plot alone. This is a possible interpretation, but not compelling. If the transposition is accepted, however, then we have an illustration of speeches without plot rather than character without plot, as Else recognizes. Plot, with character imbedded perhaps, is like drawing. Then the visual arts would have "primacy of shape." Form, in literature as in the visual arts, including both plot and character, takes precedence over the means of expression, either color or words. The speech is added on like color.[45]

There is nothing strikingly novel about this view. Plato nearly expresses it in *Republic* 10, where Socrates compares the poet to a painter, who "will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colors (ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων)"; after an affirmative reply by Glaucon, Socrates adds "that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases the colors (τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι ἐπιχρωματίζειν) of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words, will deem his words most excellent." (10.600e–601a).[46] In chapter 4 we shall see that this distinction came to dominate rhetorical theory as developed in Cicero. Shape (σχῆμα) indicates structure or, to use Cicero's term, *res*; χρῶμα represents the surface expression, the *verba*.

In chapter 7 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle turns to plot, which he asserts must have appropriate size (τὸ μέγεθος) and structure (τάξις, *Poet.* 7.1450b34–51a.6):

> It is not enough for beauty that a thing, whether an animal or anything else composed of parts, should have those parts well-ordered; since beauty consists in amplitude as well as in order, the thing must also have amplitude—

and not just any amplitude. Though a very small creature could not be beautiful, since our view loses all distinctness when it comes near to taking no perceptible time, an enormously ample one could not be beautiful either, since our view of it is not simultaneous, so that we lose the sense of its unity and wholeness as we look it over; imagine, for instance, an animal a thousand miles long. Animate and inanimate bodies, then, must have amplitude, but no more than can be taken in at one view; and similarly a plot must have extension, but no more than can be easily remembered.

This passage and the similar *Poetics* 23.1459a17–18, where ζῷον also appears, have generated a great deal of controversy. The argument that the analogy here to a "living creature" actually refers to a work of visual art is dismissed by Else as "inappropriate and unnecessary," since such analogies to human (or other) bodies goes back to Plato; other scholars agree, also comparing the image of those in the sophistic writings of Alcidamas in *De Sophistis* 27–28, discussed above in chapter 2, and Isocrates' *Contra Sophistas* 16–18. Butcher admits to having changed his mind twice, reading it first as a reference to an animal, then to a picture, and finally to an animal again. Hardie, who defends the interpretation of ζῷον as referring to a painting (also based on Plato's *Phaedrus* 264C), makes an interesting observation: "We might expect the fact that painting does not involve movement to appear. But on the contrary we find that Aristotle reduces the μέγεθος of painting to terms of time, to the length of time occupied by the κίνησις of which the perception (αἴσθησις or θεωρία) of the picture consists"; just as the attention span of a viewer is stretched when the animal (or picture of an animal) is too big, the tragic appreciation can also be stretched when the plot is too long, as in the case of epic.[47]

Actually Hardie's point is significant even if we are discussing animals rather than pictures. The same "organic unity" needed for an animal (or picture of an animal) is now required of the literary object. The tragedy is treated like a biological specimen. In fact this concept of a work of art, literary or visual, as a functioning biological organism dominates the *Poetics*, especially chapters 7–9. (At least one modern critic finds these chapters to be particularly Platonic and in fact not generated by the definition of tragedy in chapter 6). Plato's notion of beauty had been two-fold, encompassing both an ethical and an aesthetic position: the beauty of works of art can reside either in their function or in the proportions of the imitated object. In the *Poetics*, attention to the latter cause predominates, owing especially to the biological analogies applied. It is noteworthy that a similar view underlies the comparison at *Poetics* 8.1451a.28–29, although few point out the analogy to the visual arts made in that passage.[48]

The visual arts disappear for most of the rest of the *Poetics*. Andrew Stewart has suggested a possible reason for this disappearance: "In general, Aristotle's parallels with the visual arts, frequent at first, lessen and then disappear as the time-dependent elements of tragedy come to the fore." Aristotle revives the comparison, however, at the beginning of chapter 25 (25.1460b.8–11): "Since the poet produces *mimēseis*, just like a painter or other visual artist, the object of his *mimēsis* must always be one of three things, that is, what was or is, what is commonly said or thought to be the case, and what should be the case." This short passage opens all sorts of problems. First, the word εἰκονοποιός, here translated as "visual artist," is literally "image-maker," a category from which Aristotle has already excluded poets—although not entirely successfully, as we have seen. We might also wonder about "other visual artist." Does it simply mean "sculptors," or "the sculptor as well as the painters of portraits"?[49] Or is Aristotle positing a general class of "artists"

or "image-makers," which includes poets, painters, sculptors, dancers, and others? If so, then this passage represents a significant change from the other passages discussed, although, as we shall see, there are other very visual passages in the *Poetics*.

Halliwell believes that in this chapter Aristotle is trying to define a new type of mimēsis, that is reducible neither to ethics nor to epistemology—that is, a response to Plato's challenge. Else, who views all of chapter 25 with suspicion, comments that here Aristotle "opens up a considerably wider focus on the objects of imitation than we found at the beginning of Aristotle's theory, in chapter 2," where the comparison to visual arts had also appeared. It is strange that the comparison to visual arts appears in so many important and controversial passages. While chapter 25 is really an oddity in the *Poetics*, in that it is designed to help formulate criticisms and defenses of passages in epic poetry, still the passage does seem to hint at a broader notion of poetry as imagistic and imitative of various types of "reality." It is not clear whether this passage is early or late, or represents a collation of redactions. But it should exemplify once more the ambiguity of Aristotelian mimēsis.[50]

There is only one more direct allusion to the visual arts in the *Poetics*, a fragmentary reference at 25.1461b.11–13: "By 'the demands of poetry' I mean that a convincing impossibility is preferable to something unconvincing, however possible; again it is perhaps impossible for people to be as beautiful as Zeuxis painted them, but it is better so, as the ideal should surpass reality." Some scholars accept the lacuna proposed by Vahlen; Halliwell even speculates that "in the lacuna at this point Ar. appears to have moved from 'impossibilities' to the issue of artistic idealisation of character." Perhaps the entire passage is interpolated from similar passages discussed above. Else suggests that the passage should be interpreted along with the reference to Zeuxis in chapter 6 (1450a.28–29): one should begin with a portrait such as Zeuxis would have painted ("we

remember that he was a realistic painter, without character")
and then *improve* the figure, idealizing it. In any case, Zeuxis
and his idealization will become a commonplace of the Neo-
platonic tradition, which will be examined below.[51]

In other parts of the *Poetics*, without specifically mentioning
visual arts, Aristotle drops hints about why the visual arts are so
suggestive for his theory of literature. In chapter 17, for
example, he suggests that the poet should visualize the scene,
advice that appears even in modern writers of drama (*Poet.*
17.1455a.22–27): "In composing plots and working them out
so far as verbal expression goes, the poet should, more than
anything else, put things before his eyes, as he then sees the
events most vividly (ἐναργέστατα ὁ ὁρῶν) as if he were actually
present, and can therefore find what is appropriate and be
aware of the opposite." As has been seen throughout this sec-
tion, Aristotle tries to banish visuality from the poetic art, but it
keeps resurfacing. As Lucas has commented, this visuality is
more applicable to tragedy and comedy than to narrative or
mixed genres. The poetic plot must have proper size, shape,
and proportion, just like an animal or a picture of an animal;
the literary work must be εὐσύνοπτος, capable of being viewed
as a whole (23.1459a33).[52]

In chapter 25, when speaking of poetic errors, artistic and
inartistic, Aristotle again seems to be thinking of the visual arts
(25.1460b18–22): "If the error arises through the poet's setting
out to represent something incorrectly, for example, representing
a horse with both its right legs forward, and this is the reason
why we find in a poem either a mistake with reference to any
particular art (for example, medicine or some other art) or,
more generally, any other impossibility, this does not involve
the essential nature of poetry." Several scholars have seen this
as a reference to painting or the visual arts in general, as also at
25.1460b30–31: "Secondarily, one should consider whether the
error involves the essential nature of poetry or something

incidental, as it is a lesser fault not to know that a hind has no antlers than to paint it in a way that is not adequate to *mimēsis*." Again for this passage ancient examples from both literature and the visual arts are adduced, this time by Bywater, who revealingly speaks of a "poetic picture."[53]

Clearly, the poetic process envisioned here is highly imagistic, and these comments are at least as appropriate to painting as they are to poetry. Halliwell, troubled by the apparent contradiction, comments that "we find a recurring acknowledgement of the potentially enhancing role of the visual in the final realisation of the playwright's aims (see esp. chs. 14, 17 and 24)." In chapter 26 we learn that, among the advantages of tragedy (and, we might add, of comedy) over epic, "it also has the element of vividness (ἐναργές), in reading as well as performance" (1462a17). This is surprising, since, as we have seen, this vividness comes from its dramatic "manner of imitation." This adjective, along with its noun form, *enargeia*, becomes key in the doctrines discussed in the succeeding chapters, where it refers to an author's ability to make the reader mentally view the scene. Keuls has shown that in Aristotle, *enargeia* is distinct from the similar term *energeia*, the former connoting "visual vividness," the latter "movement" or "forcefulness"; it was not until later that the terms were collapsed. There is no need to trace the history of the word *enargeia*, here, since this has been done by others and will be discussed again below, but it is noteworthy that at the word's first appearance in Plato (*Plt.* 277e) and in Aristotle elsewhere (*Sens.* 440a.10), it refers not to pictorialism in literature but to painting. We will also see *energeia* used in Aristotle's *Rhetoric.* As a term in literary criticism, *enargeia* appears much later; at this point it does not yet have a technical meaning, but Aristotle clearly has visuality in mind.[54]

It turns out that even though plot is the most artistic part of tragedy, and spectacle the least, Aristotle reveals a very visual view of literature, much as Plato did. Even in the area of spectacle it

has been observed that the gestures of the characters and even their masks were designed to be consistent with the "character" of the *dramatis personae*. These factors might help to explain Aristotle's fascination with the visual arts and might also shed light on Aristotle's fascination with drama, both tragedy and comedy, above epic poetry, suggesting that drama appealed to Aristotle for the same reason as it appealed to Lessing. It is the most visual of poetic genres; as L. J. Potts states, "he [Aristotle] explicitly includes music, rhythm (and therefore dancing), and even scenery, costume, and the actor's art, among the media of poetry." The visuality of drama is such that Froma Zeitlin has been able to treat the tragedies of Euripides as *ekphrasis* by pointing to junctures between pictorial, *ekphrastic* language and theatrical scenic effects—including effects of Polygnotus' painting and skiagraphia. Along the same lines, Allison Sharrock opens a study of metamorphosis in literature and art with a discussion of a passage from Dio Chrysostom on literature and visual arts (*Or.* 12.70, to be discussed in chapter 6) and a citation of *Poetics* 1459b emphasizing the "synchronicity" of theater and visual art. Sharrock concludes: "Drama seems to stand on the boundary between verbal and visual art."[55]

Furthermore, as we will see in chapter 6, visual sense impressions are the basis for Aristotelian psychology and hence also must be at the basis of his aesthetic. Rostagni has gone so far as to suggest that in his lost dialogue *On the Poets*, Aristotle treated this problem and indeed the entire doctrine of *ut pictura poesis* as it surfaces in Horace. While this is not likely, it will be seen momentarily that the beginnings of Horace's ideas can be seen elsewhere in Plato and Aristotle. Tragedy for Aristotle is not only the most inclusive art; it is the art that most requires oral/visual performance. Francesco Robortello overinterprets this element of the *Poetics* when he suggests that the visualization of the action by the audience results in their ethical improvement. For Robortello, the Aristotelian spectacle is the

most important part; he even goes so far as to derive plot from the "manner of imitation." Hence, "one of the kinds of moral utility derived from poems—the lessons learned from the actions of men—is a result of the plot of the poem. Since this plot is really the actor's, rather than the poet's, province utility of this kind is essentially a product of the histrionic art." Robortello applies here doctrines not yet known to Aristotle.[56]

EPIDEICTIC AND FORENSIC/DELIBERATIVE THEORY OF STYLES IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Before leaving Aristotle, we must consider a reference to visual art that appears in the *Rhetoric.* At first glance it seems marginally related, perhaps even unrelated, to the issues discussed here; the reference does not even seem to be a reference to visual art. But, as Meerwaldt and Trimpi have shown, this passage, *Rhetoric* 3.12, is more influential than the *Poetics* to subsequent discussions—in antiquity, if not in the Renaissance—of literature and the visual arts. The passage will be crucial to our understanding of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Horace, and Longinus.[57]

The chapter begins with a fundamental distinction between spoken and written style (*Rhet.* 1413b2–11):

> It should be observed that each kind of rhetoric has its own appropriate style. The style of written prose is not that of spoken oratory, nor are those of political and forensic the same. Both written and spoken have to be known. To know the latter is to know how to speak good Greek. To know the former means that you are not obliged, as otherwise you are, to hold your tongue when you wish to communicate something to the general public.

The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery—alike the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that reflects emotion.

This distinction between written and spoken style is that between epideictic rhetoric on the one hand and political and forensic rhetoric on the other, the latter two both included under "spoken oratory," as W. Rhys Roberts indicates in his note to this translation. It is tempting to add that the "oratory that reflects character" is forensic, and "the kind that reflects emotion" is political, although this is not completely clear. After a digression on theatrical plays, Aristotle resumes (*Rhet.* 3.12.1413b15–22):

> Compared with those of others, the speeches of professional writers sound thin in actual contests. Those of the orators, on the other hand, are good to hear spoken, but look amateurish enough when they pass into the hands of a reader. This is just because they are so well suited for an actual tussle, and therefore contain many dramatic touches, which, being robbed of all dramatic rendering, fail to do their own proper work, and consequently look silly. Thus strings of unconnected words, and constant repetitions of words and phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches; but not in spoken speeches: speakers use them freely, for they have a dramatic effect.[58]

So much for the difference between written (epideictic) rhetoric and spoken (political and forensic) rhetoric. After a long series of examples of repetitions and "unconnected words," Aristotle uses an analogy from visual art to make a further distinction between the two types of spoken oratory, the political and the forensic (*Rhet.* 3.12.1414a8–19):

Now the style of oratory addressed to public assemblies (δημηγορικὴ λέξις) is really just like scene-painting (σκιαγραφίαι). The bigger the throng, the more distant is the point of view: so that, in the one and the other, high finish in detail is superfluous and seems better away. The forensic style (ἡ δικανική) is more highly finished; still more so is the style of language addressed to a single judge, with whom there is very little room for rhetorical artifices, since he can take the whole thing in better, and judge of what is to the point and what is not; the struggle is less intense and so the judgement is undisturbed. This is why the same speakers do not distinguish themselves in all these branches at once; high finish is wanted least where dramatic delivery is wanted most, and here the speaker must have a good voice, and above all, a strong one. It is ceremonial oratory (ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις) that is most literary (γραφικωτάτη), for it is meant to be read; and next to it forensic oratory.

Trimpi has shown that the word here translated as "scene-painting" actually means "shadow painting" (*skiagraphia*), or something like what Keuls means by an "impressionistic" use of color. The meaning of this word is controversial. Rouveret sees spatial elements in the term, not color. The actual term for "scene painting," *skēnographia*, refers to a technique attributed to Agatharchus of Samos, that is often associated with the first attempts at what we call "perspective." The technique may in fact have developed from the use of scenery in the theater. In any case, here Aristotle describes a spectrum of styles, from most literary to most theatrical. At the former extreme is epideictic rhetoric or written discourse. Next comes forensic oratory "addressed to a single judge," who can consider the case best without rhetorical theatricality. Next comes forensic oratory addressed to a crowd, and finally the most theatrical, political

oratory, in which the effects look good from a distance and before a large crowd, but lose their effect when inspected by a singe judge or up close.[59]

Trimpi rightly sees the genesis of this distinction in Plato's *Critias*. Critias begins by apologizing in advance for the inadequacy of his presentation. Although Timaeus, in his dialogue, had spoken of divine matters, Critias will speak on the more difficult subject of human matters. In reference to painting, he asserts that our lack of knowledge makes us less exacting of landscapes than we are of human portraiture; similarly, we expect more from the treatment of human matters than of divine matters because we know more about the former (*Crit.* 106b–108a). As Trimpi realizes, this is the first manifestation of a specific and technical doctrine of *ut pictura poesis*, and this doctrine is further developed in the passage just discussed from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (3.12) and most developed in Horace (*Ars Poetica* 361–65). The clinching point is the reference to landscape painting as skiagraphia: some works of literature or visual art are best examined from afar (skiagraphic ones), others are best examined closely.[60] To the development of this rather different doctrine we shall turn again in chapter 5.

CONCLUSIONS

Few critics, ancient or modern, would accept Plato's doctrines on art and literature. Some would say that even Plato would not accept them. Ultimately, the doctrines are precisely that, several doctrines that coexist uneasily, rather than one consistent doctrine. As E. R. Dodds comments on *Gorgias* 501, "Neither here nor in my opinion anywhere else does Plato try to present a 'theory of art', though his admirers have often constructed one for him." Plato's contribution was not to offer new and original ideas on art and literature. Many of the views he

expressed were current in his day. For example, the doctrine
of imitation as "impersonation" was applied to drama by Aristo-
phanes (*Thesm.* 148–55).[61] Nor was his contribution in discov-
ering the pieces of a puzzle so that Aristotle could assemble it.
Rather, his contribution was to determine what sort of issues
must be addressed by an adequate critical theory. Such a theory
must assume that the arts are mimetic or representational; it
must assume that the various arts possess, *mutatis mutandis*,
analogous principles of explanation; it must accommodate the
laws of mathematics and "science"; its criteria must be based on
the relation of artifact to model rather than on the practical
effect on an audience (although Plato sometimes expresses the
opposite view). Although Plato's conclusions have been only
rarely accepted, these parameters dominated ancient discus-
sions and in fact continue to influence academic discussions
today. The first to rework these issues into a coherent theory
was Aristotle.

Aristotle applies comparisons to the visual arts at critical
junctures of the *Poetics*, especially when illustrating the differen-
tiation between the arts by "means of imitation" and when
defining tragedy. He seems to take the fundamental similarity
of literature to the visual arts for granted. In the process he lays
open several issues to potential confusion, especially the issue
of character. After Aristotle's death the *Poetics* moved into
obscurity, and although we shall see evidence that the treatise
was known in at least derivative form to Philodemus, Horace,
and Plutarch, we shall also see that the *Rhetoric*, especially Book
3, chapter 12, was much more influential.[62] What will finally
emerge from the rhetorical and philosophical schools of the
Hellenistic period will be a rhetorical blending of ideas, and
this blending reaches maturity in the anonymous author known
as Longinus. This rhetorical tradition will be the subject of the
next chapter.

The Philosophical and Rhetorical Schools

THE PERIPATETICS, DEMETRIUS, CICERO, AND DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

In the Hellenistic period, literary criticism tended to be discussed in the various philosophical schools that developed out of the philosophies of the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. Among the schools most amenable to literary theory were the Peripatetics, who followed the teachings of Aristotle; the Academics, who followed the teaching of Plato; the Stoics, who followed the teachings of Zeno; and the Epicureans, who followed the teaching of the atomists Democritus and Epicurus. The Skeptic and Cynic schools probably contributed little to literary criticism.

THE PERIPATETICS

The Stoics may have been "[o]f all ancient philosophies . . . the most favorably disposed toward poetry," as Phillip de Lacy claims, but there is not a great deal of indisputable evidence regarding their literary criticism. There is evidence that the Stoics prized art that was balanced throughout its parts and

exhibited harmony and rhythm. This was as true of literature as of music and the visual arts. De Lacy probably goes too far in attributing to the Stoics the concept of *decorum* (τὸ πρέπον) which permeated the *Ars Poetica* of Horace; as we will see, that theory is most conveniently ascribed to the Peripatetics, although perhaps the Stoics adapted elements of it. The Academics may have also adopted and developed the argument, although attempts to Platonize the *Ars Poetica* and so attribute the ideas there to the Academics have been unsuccessful. The Academics, if the dialogues of Cicero are any indication, probably did not develop a doctrine of the similarity of art and literature, outside of the sort of criticism in Cicero's *Orator*. Our knowledge of the ideas of both the Peripatetics and the Epicureans has been increased dramatically by Christian Jensen's collection of large fragments of Philodemus' book *On Poems*, translated into English by Nathan Greenberg. Philodemus, an Epicurean whose personal library was uncovered at Herculaneum, attacked some opposing positions, including that of Neoptolemus, that formed the basis of Horace's *Ars Poetica*. There is little evidence that the Epicureans gave much thought to a comparison between poetry and the visual arts. In fact, they tended to devalue poetry as pandering to the emotions. In this sense, Lucretius and Philodemus are somewhat unorthodox; Philodemus held, with implications, that remain significant today, that in poetry one cannot separate form (the emotions) from content (the reason).[1]

It is with the Peripatetics, the followers of Aristotle, that the comparison between literature and the visual arts flourished. A number of traits can be associated with the Peripatetic school, which began with Aristotle's student Theophrastus and influenced many critics of the Hellenistic and Roman world whose works are extant. Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the Peripatetics is the definition, following Aristotle (*Poetics* 1.1447b.13–21), of poetry as a species of imitation rather than

as metrical language. Second is the doctrine of "appropriateness" (*decorum*, τὸ πρέπον), which holds that language should be appropriate to content, character, and so on. This doctrine was apparently adopted in modified form by other schools. It appealed to the Peripatetics especially because it fits the Aristotelian doctrine of the "golden mean." A third characteristic is the adoption of a generic hierarchy, which places tragedy at the top as the most important genre, followed by epic. Many critics of the Hellenistic era preferred shorter works to epic and tragedy, and this gave them more opportunity for revision and development of the significant detail. We associate this anti-Aristotelian attitude primarily with the Alexandrian school and especially with Callimachus. Another trait of the Peripatetics is the doctrine of unity, familiar to us from the passages of the *Poetics* discussed above in chapter 3. According to this doctrine, a literary work (or a painting) should be complete and harmonious in the relationship among its parts and should be appropriate in its size and structure. Finally, the Peripatetics adopted the Aristotelian notion of universals; as Aristotle states, poetry is more philosophical than history, as poetry imitates universals and the history imitates particulars. This doctrine developed primarily in two directions, the rhetorical and the poetic. The former led to doctrines found in Cicero and Horace, for example, the latter to the doctrines in Plutarch.[2]

The Peripatetic school begins with Theophrastus, who wrote at least one treatise on literary style. The fragmentary nature of this work leaves many uncertainties and no clear comparison between literature and the visual arts. Demetrius informs us that Theophrastus believed that words can have visual attributes: "This is Theophrastus' definition: 'There is beauty in a word if it is attractive to the ear or eye or has inherent nobility from its meaning'" (*Eloc.* 3.173). It is possible that the subsequent discussion in Demetrius on the "beauty of words" exhibiting visuality (ὄψις) is also from Theophrastus. Some have attributed to

Theophrastus the theory of the three styles—plain, middle, and high—popular in Roman rhetorical theory. This has been disputed, but apparently he did play a middle role between Aristotle and this theory as it appears in Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus; he certainly delineated the "four virtues."[3]

DEMETRIUS

Scholars have not agreed upon the date and authorship of the treatise *On Style* (in Greek, Περὶ 'Ερμενείας, in Latin, *De Elocutione*) attributed by the manuscript tradition to Demetrius (I will refer to the author as Demetrius, without presuming authorship). It seems to be the oldest treatise on rhetoric that postdates Aristotle and the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*, but such a claim needs serious qualification. Reputable scholars have dated Demetrius as early as the early third century B.C., and as late as the second century A.D. But few would dispute that the *ideas* presented by Demetrius are early, showing little of the sophisticated development found in Cicero and in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. G. M. A. Grube argues that Demetrius knew Aristotle firsthand and hence must have been quite early. Even if Demetrius wrote after Cicero, the ideas he presents are the oldest that postdate Aristotle.[4]

References to the visual arts in Demetrius are sparing. Two passages occur together early in the treatise. Demetrius has been discussing the "periodic" style, and how it developed out of the "disjointed" (διῃρημένηι) style. The first is represented by Hecataeus and Herodotus, the latter by Isocrates, Gorgias, and Alcidamas. The ideal, as we would expect from a Peripatetic writer, is a "mean" between the two (1.12–15). In the middle of this discussion, Demetrius makes two analogies to the visual arts (13–14): "Periodic clauses are in fact like stones which uphold rounded domes by their mutual support and dependence,

while the clauses of the disconnected style resemble stones which are merely thrown down near one another and not fitted together. It is this characteristic which gives early style the sharp outlines and neatness of early statues, when sculptors strove for compactness and spareness, while later style corresponds to the works of Ph[e]idias in the combination of nobility and finish."⁵

The first, architectural reference provides a preview of a complex of architectural metaphors that will appear in Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus: a good sentence is built solidly, like a good house. Grube compares this reference to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *De Compositione* 22, to be discussed below, and says that it is "probably a commonplace." However, Demetrius' analogy also represents a significant development, in that the pejorative connotations of the comparison, as they appeared in Alcidamas, are no longer present. The reference to domes (περιφερεῖς στέγας) has been used in an attempt to date the treatise to the first century A.D.⁶

The second reference, to sculpture, is more interesting and at the same time more problematic. It is a badly formulated example of a different theoretical complex that will be more clear in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and will ultimately result in Horace's doctrine of *ut pictura poesis*. Literature and the visual arts are developmentally related here, as they will be in Dionysius, Cicero, and Quintilian; the older arts are described as less detailed and hence better viewed from afar, and the newer, as more artistically perfect and hence worth close viewing. Roberts observes that Demetrius was aware of the distinctions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.12—in two places (*Eloc.* 193 and 226) he distinguished between the oral and the written styles—and there is no reason why he should not have also recognized Aristotle's distinctions between the forensic and the political styles.⁷

But D. M. Schenkeveld has shown clearly that Aristotle's analysis of the periodic style differs from Demetrius'. For

Aristotle, clauses are based on prose rhythm; for Demetrius, they are based on the "thought" involved. Further, J. F. Lockwood has shown that the words here translated as "sharp outlines and neatness" must refer to lack of artistry; he proposes "clean-cut and trim," in which case the first word (περιεξεσμένον) suggests "having had all technical detail polished away," and the second term (εὐσταλές) suggests "that it appears to be free of what might be conceived to be hampering refinements." Lockwood adds that words related to ξέω (polish) tend to appear in architectural analogies to the visual arts, reflecting that stones must be "polished" to fit together well. So perhaps this is the connection between the two analogies, that just as stones are polished in order to fit together well, details in the disjointed style are trimmed away. Aristotle had suggested (*Rh.* 3.9) that diction had proceeded from a loose style to a periodic style. But here the archaic style in art is one not of looseness but of what we might call sketchiness. The connection is not as clear as one would like; perhaps the two analogies are put together here only because they both compare literary style to the visual arts.[8]

Another comparison by Demetrius does not put either literature or the visual arts in a very favorable light. When discussing "the epiphoneme," which "may be defined as added ornamentation and is the highest form of grandeur in prose," Demetrius compares it to the effect in architecture: "To speak generally, the epiphoneme resembles conspicuous displays of wealth like cornices, triglyphs, and broad bands of purple: for it is itself a sort of verbal mark of wealth" (*Eloc.* 2.76). The emphasis here is on simplicity and decoration, rather than artistic conception. Two commentators on Horace, Adolf Kiesling and Richard Heinze, have suggested that the reference is to the "purple patches" of Horace (*Ars P.* 15–16, to be discussed in the next chapter), a possibility that has been adopted by a few others, as we shall see. Oddly, this passage has also been used to date the

work to a later period, as some have found the "broad bands of purple" to refer to Roman patrician dress."[9]

One point at which the criticism of the visual arts touches rhetorical criticism is in the use of the term *vividness* (*enargeia*). Demetrius has quite a bit to say on this concept, which also appears in Aristotle as *energeia* (*Rh.* 3.10.1410b.33–3.11.1413b.2) but is associated more with Isocrates. For Demetrius, vividness should be postponed to later in a sentence in order to make a more elevated style (*Eloc.* 2.50–52). Vividness is essential to the plain style, where clarity and persuasiveness are important, although it is not limited to that style (4.208–20). Although in later writers, vividness comes to be characteristic of the middle style, as we shall see, Demetrius has no middle style, but rather four good styles, to which he contraposes four bad styles; when Demetrius speaks of a middle style he means an Aristotelian mean, not a middle style between a high style and a low. We would probably disagree with Demetrius when he argues that enargeia results from sheer accumulation of detail (4.209–210), and agree with Longinus (*Subl.* 10) and Grube that the details chosen are what is important. Demetrius does not emphasize the visual aspect of vividness, although he does see that is has an imitative aspect. For instance, onomatopoeia is vivid because sound imitates meaning (4.219–220). Complete narration of detail also creates vividness, we might suspect for the same reason (4.209–210). Here, as Grube astutely notes, "There is again some confusion of thought where vividness is said to require putting in all the details whereas the examples show that it is the selection of significant detail which is required."[10] Demetrius explicitly compares literature and the visual arts when he states that the elevated style should choose elevated subject matter. So Nicias recommends that exciting, narrative scenes should be chosen in painting just as in narrative literature (*Eloc.* 2.76).

CICERO

Roman literary criticism in general, and Cicero's work in particular, has met with mixed reviews among modern critics. "We must not look," wrote Nettleship with regard to statements comparing art and literature, "to these ancient writers for any profound analysis, such as Lessing attempted, of the difference between the two forms of art." Nettleship saw Cicero's comparison between oratory and pictorial art, along with a new terminology of rhetorical criticism, as purely derivative of the Greek aesthetic and relatively unrelated to Cicero's own, original contribution. The German critic, Adolf Stahr, Nettleship's Victorian contemporary, argued that Cicero's ideas on aesthetics were quite good, and Édouard Bertrand, also Victorian and continental, argued that Cicero was in fact an "artist," although not one who created works of art. But even Cicero's knowledge and understanding of visual art and especially of art history have been challenged. One very interesting letter (*Fam.* 7.23) shows Cicero discussing the purchase of art for home decoration; on this and similar passages such as *Orator* 5 John Edwin Sandys comments, "Cicero's tastes in art resembled those of the most cultivated Romans of his time, but it may be doubted whether his knowledge of the subject was much more than superficial." This view overcame the more favorable views of Stahr and Bertrand, both of whom were art historians rather than philologists.[11]

Indeed, some of Cicero's comments on art and artists are rather commonplace: At one point he states that both painter and orator are subject to the principle of decorum (*Orat.* 74). At another he defends current practice in oratory by defending "modern art" (*Orat.* 169), at still another comparing a disassembled speech to a disassembled statue by Pheidias (*Orat.* 234). He argues that both orator and painter, having learned general techniques, can use them to produce other works in the same

medium (*De Or.* 2.69–70). He notes that a general education is required for both artist and orator (*De Or.* 1.73). Still, Cicero's work makes it clear that he was knowledgeable about paintings and sculptures, and he was an avid collector of art. He was well educated in all aspects of culture, so his comments are worth consideration.

Two passages, the anecdote regarding Zeuxis and his use of models (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.1–10) and the discussion of ideal beauty in Pheidias as a paradigm for the ideal orator (*Orat.* 1.3–10) will be discussed in chapter 6, in the context of the term *phantasia.* Two interesting statements on the relationship between literature and the visual arts appear in the relatively early speech, *Pro Archia,* a defense of the poet Archias on his disputed citizenship. Toward the end of the speech, Cicero notes that men approve of their biographers, who celebrate their deeds. (Archias, in fact, has been writing on Cicero's consulship (39).) Cicero adds that the same is true, or almost as true, of sculpture (30): "Many great men have been studious to leave behind them statues and portraits, likenesses not of the soul, but of the body; and how much more anxious should we be to bequeath an effigy of our minds and characters, wrought and elaborated by supreme talent?" *Pace* Nettleship, this passage suggests that Cicero recognizes problems in the Aristotelian formulation and that in his view, poetry imitates character, sculpture the body, as Lessing is later credited with discovering. We shall see in the following chapters that others in antiquity also had this insight. This passage also sheds a different light on a statement earlier in the same speech (18): "And yet we have it on the highest and most learned authority that while other arts are matters of science and formula and technique, poetry depends solely upon an inborn faculty, is evoked by a purely mental activity, and is infused with a strange supernal inspiration."[12] Visual art, then, depends on art, literature upon talent. In this statement, Cicero finds himself in the company of the later, sophisticated critic Longinus.

In order to understand Cicero's application of the principle of painting to rhetoric it is important to place his theoretical viewpoint in the tradition of comparisons between literature and the visual arts, especially as formulated by Aristotle. As we have seen, Aristotle suggested that both literature and the visual arts are mimetic, that both imitate people in action, and that the difference is in the means of imitation: visual arts employ shapes and colors, literature employs words, rhythm, and harmony. Cicero is at least dimly aware of this distinction; in one passage he refers to poets and visual artists as mimetic (*imitatione*) portrayers of gods in action (*Nat. D.* 1.77). When he, along with other rhetoricians, apply the distinction to their theories of style, the outcome is predictable. Both painting and oratory imitate the same content (*res*), but with different forms or means; the painter's *colores*, or for that matter the sculptor's *formae*, add expression to the content, analogous to the orator's *verba*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus repeats the distinction between words and things (*Comp.* 1.66 Roberts), and more importantly, he states that the colors of a painter are analogous to the words of a writer (*Comp.* 21.210 Roberts). In a study of Plato's references to painting, Keuls has characterized the distinction as it occurs in ancient discussions of painting as one of "contour" against "color," represented by the work of Polygnotus and Zeuxis. This same structure/texture division appeared in ancient comparisons between literature and the visual arts.[13]

If writers apply words to their subject matter in the same way as artists shape their media, then, as it seems to have occurred to Cicero, the creative processes must be similar, and consequently the processes of artistic criticism in both genres must be similar. Hence Cicero's rhetorical analyses sometimes read like analyses of paintings. In one passage of the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero speaks of poets' ability to describe visually (*pictus est*), as even the blind Homer could create a picture (*picturam, non poesin, videmus*, 5.113–115). Although the word does not appear

here, this passage became associated in the Renaissance with *enargeia* and the tradition of *ut pictura poesis*. Cicero even refers to the physical tools of the painter, jars of paint, with reference to oratorical style (*Att.* 1.14), and explains that too many metaphors create the same effect as excessive coloration in painting (*Orat.* 65, where Rouveret sees the technical terminology of skiagraphic color theory). Rhetorical figures, or σχήματα, can illuminate *sententiae*, and hence do for speech what lines do for a painting (*Brut.* 141): "For what the Greeks call postures or figures are the greatest ornaments of oratory. They are not so important in heightening the colour of words (*in verbis pingendis*), as in throwing ideas into a stronger light (*in illuminandis sententiis*)."[14] These last two passages should give us pause. Cicero does not mean that in painting, lines are the content and color the form, nor that in oratory the tropes are the form and sentence structures (as are most σχήματα) are content. Rather all of these elements are, as Aristotle said, media, so all are in the rhetorical category of *verba*. The *res* or subject matter, whether in writing or in painting, must refer to an artistic conception or intention that precedes articulation in a work of art, or one that is at least separable from the application of media. We cannot reduce Cicero's distinction here to a simple dichotomy.

However, from these passages one cannot see how deeply the tendency to analogize literature and the visual arts has permeated Cicero's rhetorical criticism. For this we must examine Cicero's critical terminology, which suggests that rhetorical figures add *colores*, just like pigments to a painting (*Brut.* 298; *QFr.* 2.15a.2). As one commentator on the *Brutus* notes, terms such as *fucus* (red coloring) and *flos* (with reference to visual qualities) are applied to style, and furthermore, Cicero refers to both tropes and figures of syntax as *lumina* and to the elevation of diction as *illuminare* (at *QFr.* 2.11.5 *lumina* seems to be distinguished from *ars*, but the passage is textually corrupt); a heavily figured

passage is called *luminosae* (*Orat.* 125), and the verb *pingo* (to paint) is used as a stylistic description (*De Or.* 3.100, *coloribus, pictas,* and *infucata*; *Brut.* 141; 293). Cicero describes the Stoics in similar terms; they "use far-fetched metaphors and arrange them as painters do colour combinations" (*Orat.* 65). Among the passages cited by Sandys to illustrate *depicta,* "painted," (*Orat.* 39; cf. *Brut.* 233, etc.) is one that combines *clarus, color,* and *picta* (*De Or.* 3.100). We can add to this terminology *pigmenta* (*De Or.* 2.188; *Att.* 2.1) and *liniamenta* (*Orat.* 185). Another term is *polire,* used with obvious reference to pictorial arts at *De Oratore* 3.21 (*picta et politum artis coloribus*); meter in particular can bestow polish (*Orat.* 185). In his critique of Cato, Cicero uses *liniamenta, pigmenta, flos,* and *color* (*Brut.* 298), and notes that Cato's "lines" lack "color" and that he neglects to "polish" his work (*De Or.* 3.21). (Oddly at *Brut.* 66 Cicero says that Cato's speeches exhibit *flos* and *lumen,* although the former is denied him at *Para.,* proem 2).[15]

Cicero uses similar terminology to describe the middle, or moderate, style of speech, "a brilliant and florid (*insigne et florens*), highly coloured and polished style (*pictum et politum*) in which all the charms of language and thought are intertwined" (*Orat.* 96). The middle style is the *genus floridum.* Kroll glosses *florens* as the Greek ανθηρός, *pictus* as ποικίλος, and *politus* as τορεύειν or ρινᾶν. It might seem inappropriate to include "flowers" in this artistic terminology, associated by Cicero with *lumina* (*Brut.* 233), but as Sandys points out, "[i]n English we talk of a 'flowery style' and 'flowers of rhetoric', but neither of these phrases nor the word 'flourishing' will really help us here: *florentes* may be rendered 'bright.'" The word has visual, even olfactory implications.[16]

The terminology of painting can be seen especially in words referring to "illumination." We have already seen the word *lumina* (e.g., *De Or.* 3.25; 3.201; *Orat.* 85). So Cicero says of Marcus Calidius, "He made use too of those high lights of word play and

the manner of putting an idea, which the Greeks call postures or figures (*et verborum et sententiarum illa lumina quae vocant Graeci* σχήματα), with which, like decorative designs distributed here and there, all his style was pointed" (*Brut.* 275). In the final words there is a reference to ποικιλία, a style made attractive by stylistic elevation and variation, recalling the section prior to this, where Calidius' work, along with Scaevola's poetry, was compared to a mosaic (*De Or.* 2.171 and *Orat.* 149). These *lumina* function like *insignia* (*Or.* 134); these were, as Sandys explains, "the more marked and prominent decorations among the banners, trophies and works of painting and sculpture, used to adorn either the forum on festal occasions or the *proscenium* of a theatre." In the *exordium*, or beginning of a speech, *splendor* calls attention to the artistry (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.25). Pollitt has shown that in art criticism *splendor* referred to "highlight," the effect of light on a painting. I might add that *oratio*, like *pictura*, can be *nitida*, "bright" (*De Or.* 1.81) or possess *nitor*, "brightness" (*Leg.* 1.6). Cicero credits Caesar with creating a "brilliant" (*splendida*) style: "Thus by joining to this careful selection of Latin words— a selection incumbent on every good offspring of Roman blood whether orator or not—the characteristic embellishments (*ornamenta*) of oratorical style, he produces an effect as of placing a well-painted picture in a good light" (*Brut.* 261). Similarly, in a comparison with their delivered originals, he critiques the written speeches of Servius Galba: "Their colours have become so much faded (*orationes . . . exaruerunt*) that they are scarcely still visible" (*Brut.* 82). Plato and Democritus are more poetic than comedy because they use *lumina* rather than common speech (*Orat.* 67). Metaphors "illuminate" the style of Demetrius of Phalerum just like stars (*Orat.* 92). Causeret notes that the opposite of *lumina* is *umbra et recessus*, "shade and background," or, to use the modern term, *chiaroscuro* (*De Or.* 3.101; Quint. 2.17.21).[17]

This complex of critical terminology should be distinguished from a different complex of terms based on *lux*, analogous to

the Greek word φῶς and referring to *clarity*. This use of *lux* is attested in Quintilian (2.5.7) and in later Greek writers; Larue van Hook lists numerous parallels in later writers and finds in Aristotle λαμπρός ("bright": *Poet.* 24.1460b.4) and σκοτίζειν (*Rhet.* 3.3.1406A.35) which is defined by Quintilian (8.2.18) as *obscurare*; in Isocrates he finds the term διαλαμπούσων, "shining through" (12.2).[18]

Cicero expands this terminology. An effective argument or style is *dilucidus* (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.12.16; *De Or.* 1.144; etc.) and *illustris* (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.31), and an epistemologically sound idea possesses a *visum insignem et illustrem*, "noteworthy and clear appearance" (*Nat. D.* 3.12). Presumably it is *lux* that takes a matter which is *obscurus* and renders it perspicuous or *clarus* (*De Or.* 3.50). As Johann Ernesti observes, *lux* ("light") is distinguished from *lumen* ("illumination") at *De Finibus* 3.14: ". . . as the light (*lumen*) of a lamp is darkened and overwhelmed by the light (*lux*) of the sun." Cicero clarifies their meaning as rhetorical technical terms at *Partitiones Oratoriae* 19–22: "But the following five ornaments (*lumina*) belong in common both to single words and to combinations of words: lucidity (*dilucidum*), brevity, acceptability, brilliance (*illustre*), charm." The "clear" style avoids metaphor and uses simple sentence patterns. The "obscure" style aims for the opposite, both in words and in syntax. The "brilliant" style is the most interesting:

> The style is brilliant if the words employed are chosen for their dignity and used metaphorically and in exaggeration and adjectivally and in duplication and synonymously and in harmony with the actual action and the representation of the facts. For it is this department of oratory which almost sets the fact before the eyes—for it is the sense of sight that is most appealed to, although it is nevertheless possible for the rest of the senses and also most of all the mind itself to be affected. But the things we said about the

clear (*dilucida*) style all apply to the brilliant (*illustris*) style. For brilliance is worth considerably more than the clearness above mentioned. The one helps us to understand what is said, but the other makes us feel that we actually see it before our eyes.

Even pronunciation can be *dilucida* or *obscura* to Cicero (*De Or.* 3.41) and Quintilian (11.3.33). The word *imago*, "image," makes its way into the vocabulary both as a translation of εἰκών, "simile" (*Ad Her.* 4.50) and as a word for the visual picture used in mnemonic systems.[19]

Not only can we see the effect of art criticism in these terms; we can also see what Cicero means when he says that Caesar's "brilliant" style achieved the effect of placing a painting in bright light (*Brut.* 261). Caesar makes it possible to visualize the action just as if he had painted the scene. Similarly, a subject (*res*) can be brightened (*illustrata*) by words (*splendore verborum*, *De Or.* 2.34), even as a painting is "lighted" (*illustrabimus*) with appropriate figures (*luminibus*) (*Ad Herennium* 4.23), an analogy that will also be used by Longinus, as we shall see. The analogy can be reversed, as in Vergil (*Aen.* 6.34), where Aeneas views works of visual art as if they were written literature (*perlegere*); Eleanor Winsor Leach has used this passage as a paradigm for how the ancients interpreted narrative art.[20]

Cicero can also borrow terms from the plastic arts: "but we pick them [words] up from common life as they live at our disposal, and then shape (*formamus*) them and mould (*fingimus*) them at our discretion, like the softest wax" (*De Or.* 3.177). Even terms from architecture make their appearance, with analogies to the solidity of the foundation or to the balance of the structural design, both in comparison to the balance of a well-designed speech, as for example the *fundamenta . . . firmissima* comparison at *Pro Caelio* 5. Style is to the shape of a building as memory is to the base (*fundamentum*) and the actual speech is

to the illumination (*lumen, Opt. Gen.* 2.5). The Stoics write like "builders of words" (*architecti paene verborum, Brut.* 118). There is a tradition behind this set of terms as well, going back at least to the passages of Pindar and Alcidamas discussed in chapter 2. Cicero's reference to entry halls (*vestibula, aditus*) in speeches (*Orat.* 50) offers a rhetorical application of Pindar's doorways (προθύρων) at *Olympian* 6.1–4. Quintilian likens the first part of rhetoric, *inventio* (invention) to the gathering of building materials, and the second part, *dispositio* (arrangement), to the construction of a building out of those materials (7, proem 1). The same idea can be seen in the use of the word *coagmentare* in reference to the construction of words without hiatus, like a building without mortar or concrete (*Orat.* 77; 69 and Quint. 12.10.60; 12.10.77), and *conglutinatio*, referring to construction as with mortar or concrete (*Orat.* 78); at one point Quintilian differentiates rhetoric from architecture by pointing to the dissimilarity between words and stones: "For we are like those who build a wall of unhewn stone: we cannot hew or polish our words in order to make them fit more compactly (*coagmentare*), and so we must take them as they are and choose suitable positions for them" (8.6.63).[21] So also, the construction of a speech is termed *exaedificare* (*De Or.* 1.164).

Clearly, the complex of architectural terms in Cicero, including *iunctura* and *structura* and their derivatives (e.g., *De Or.* 3.171; *Orat.* 149 and 150), continues in Quintilian; overly finished discourse is *quadrata*, "squared" like building blocks (*De Or.* 3.175; *Orat.* 208; Quint. 2.5.9), and a good sentence has a "basement" (*crepido, Orat.* 67.224). The terminology most often refers to the careful construction of sentences so as to avoid hiatus (e.g., *structura* at *Orat.* 44.149–50); presumably the careful speaker fits words together without hiatus just as the careful builder fits stones together without mortar. Causeret has shown that lack of hiatus is indicated in Cicero and Quintilian both by *coagmentare* and the similarly technical terms *iuncta*,

cohaerens, *apta*, and *conglutinatio* all meaning "joined" in one architectural sense or another, as well as by the more generic word *levis* "light"; this polished style is distinguished from a style with hiatus. In two passages of the *Orator* (65.220 and 70.233) *apta* means metrically well constructed.[22]

In an interesting tribute to Cicero's use of architectural terms, Aper, in Tacitus' *Dialogus*, compares the youthful speeches of Cicero to a building: "Nothing here to excerpt, nothing to take home—it's like a rough building, with a firm wall that will last but with no proper polish or splendour" (*Dial.* 22). One is reminded of Caligula's architectural criticisms of Seneca's style (Suet. *Calig.* 53.2).[23] Indeed, the architectural terminology remains limited in Cicero, Quintilian, Tacitus, and Seneca, who use it only at the level of metaphor. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, as we shall see, uses the analogy to find some basic modes of analyzing styles, and all of this terminology becomes controlling.

At its best, Ciceronian criticism can combine all of this terminology into a unified whole (*De Or.* 3.96):

"Well then, the embellishment of oratory is achieved in the first place by general style and by a sort of inherent colour and flavour (*quasi colore quodam et suco suo*); for that it shall be weighty and pleasing and scholarly and gentle-manly and attractive and polished (*polita*), and shall possess the requisite amount of feeling and pathos, is not a matter of particular divisions of the framework, but these qualities must be visible in the whole of the structure. But further, in order to embellish it with flowers of language and gems of thought (*quasi verborum sententi-arumque floribus*), it is not necessary for this ornamentation to be spread evenly over the entire speech, but it must be so distributed that there may be brilliant jewels placed at various points as a sort of decoration" [*quasi in ornatu disposita quaedam insignia et lumina*].

A superb piece of prose, for Cicero, appeals to all the senses. One can smell the flowers and taste the juice; one can feel the polished surface; one can see the color and the lighting and the sparkle of precious stones. This is truly a synesthetic experience, in which the gifts of nature—flowers, sap, dyes, and gems—are artfully applied to enhance a perfect and balanced structure without causing any obscurity or calling attention to itself. In fact, Cicero follows this passage with a disquisition on the senses: in each case sensual stimulation must not overwhelm and must be tempered by variety, or it will not maintain its effect for long (*De Or.* 3.98–100; cf. 3.195 and 199). The word *varietas*, which has manifold meanings in Cicero, is a metaphor drawn from painting; Cicero especially sees variety as the key to applying each of the three styles appropriately in different situations.[24]

But this and other, adjacent passages (3.96–103) are also significant in terms of the forensic and deliberative theory of styles, which later appears in Horace's *Ars Poetica.* For Cicero, the overly ornate style loses its effect, just as Aristotle's written style and Horace's ornate style do. But neither should a work be overly plain. At *Orator* 36, Cicero overtly distinguishes the two classes, the dark and the bright, admitting, like Horace, that both styles are worth attempting. In terms of the theory of political and forensic styles, an extraordinary thing happens at *Orator* 96: in line with the doctrine of *decorum*, the more figured political style can be blended with the more studied forensic style in the new middle, or mixed style. The doctrine of three styles seems to come from Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.12. But the styles are seen also as part of a developmental history. Contemporary oratory is to archaic oratory as the more advanced sculpture of Polycleitus is to his predecessors Canachus, Calamis, and Myron; or as the painting of Aetion, Nichomachus, Protogenes and Apelles is to the work of their predecessors Zeuxis, Polygnotus, and Timanthes; or as the poetry of Ennius is to that of Naevius (*Brut.* 70–75; 228; *Orat.*

3–6; 169; *De Or.* 3.25–28). Consequently, just as archaic painters had good sketches but used only the four colors, Cato's writing had good "lines" (*liniamenta*), but "it lacked only some brightness and colours (*pigmentorum . . . florem et colorem*) which had not yet been discovered" (*Brut.* 298, although at *Brut.* 66 Cato is said to possess "flower" and "light," *florem . . . lumen*). Thus, the archaic style in oratory was barren—like the early painters, it had good "lines" but no "color". The excessive style becomes like Aristotle's epideictic or written style. The mixed or middle oratorical style is to be preferred because it combines the best of the political and forensic. We shall see in chapter 6 that Pheidias assumes the role as best blender of artistic styles. The theory of styles sits uneasily with the developmental history, and even though the theory of political and forensic styles is involved here, the terms associated with skiagraphia are not prominent. Cicero does not seem to use the word *adumbro*, as a stylistic term, although he knew it as a term of art criticism and philosophy, using it at *Orator* 103; perhaps the pejorative connotations discouraged its use as a positive term in rhetorical theory. Furthermore, as Meerwaldt saw, the passage on multiple sense perception, *De Oratore* 3.96, corresponds to *Ars Poetica* 374–78; Meerwaldt also saw traces of the theory in Quintilian (8.5.26), in Pliny the Younger (*Ep.* 3.13.4), and, as we shall see, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[25]

Cicero's originality is somewhat difficult to assess, but there are few grounds for finding this material derivative. The anonymous author of *Ad Herennium* uses the term *colores*, for example, but clearly marks the usage as metaphorical (*sicuti*, 4.16) and does not think of the analogy between rhetorical styles and the visual arts on a grand scale, as does Cicero. One nineteenth-century historian of art, Bertrand, saw Cicero as deriving from Plato but as new in the rhetorical tradition; Cicero's contribution, then, would be the application of material from the poetic, artistic, and other traditions to rhetoric. More recently,

M.-L. Teyssier has shown that Platonic aesthetic terminology, including *adumbro* and *eminere*, appears in Cicero's philosophical discussions, and thus it seems that we are observing further development here. Oddly, the same transfer of terms from art to literature occurred in the modern period, a transfer censured by Babbitt and Wellek, the latter relating the movement to the biological-sociological theories of Oswald Spengler.[26]

In any case, Cicero is not quite consistent in his use of many of these terms transferred from art criticism to rhetorical criticism. At *Orator* 134–35, *lumina* are distinguished from metaphor and defined: "[O]ther ornaments derived from combinations of words lend great brilliance (*quasi lumina*) to an oration. They are like those objects which in the embellishment of a stage or of a forum are called 'ornaments,' not because they are the only ornament, but because they stand out from others." Examples of the repetition of words and sounds follow. This would seem to contradict the general usage in the *Brutus* and *Orator*, where words like *lumina* and *ornamenta* refer to tropes. Cicero also refers to *sententiarum lumina*, "illuminations of thoughts" which are not technically tropes (*Orat.* 85). Cicero's use of *color* strikes one as loose; in two places (*De Or.* 3.96; 3.199) he even uses *colores* "for the three-styles formula itself," as Grube comments. But the originality of Cicero's use of *lumina* has been noted by Kroll. In Greek rhetorical criticism, color (χρῶμα) was not used to describe tropes, as Cicero used it; in fact, the earliest such use of the word is in *Ad Herennium*, which was probably roughly contemporary with Cicero (*colores* 4.11.16; *lumina* 4.23.32). There are, however, ample parallels to Cicero's usage in Quintilian (8.3.87; 8.5.29; 8.6.7; 9.1.25; 9.1.36; 9.2.2; 9.2.102; 12.10.36; 12.10.46), in Pliny the Younger (*Ep.* 3.13.4), and in Tacitus (*Dial.* 20).[27]

Cicero's parallel history of sculpture to rhetoric at *Brutus* 70 seems most noteworthy in that it leaves out Pheidias. Doreen Innes has shown that this was part of his hostility to Asianism;

leaving out Pheidias allowed him to leave out Isocrates as well, sculpture reaching its apex with Polycleitus, oratory with Demosthenes. Quintilian (12.10.3–9) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus also have developmental theories of art. As Austin notes, "In drawing a direct parallel between orators and artists, Quintilian shows an advance upon Cicero's method of comparison." Still, the earliest coherent uses of the terminology from the visual arts are in Cicero, in the *Ad Herennium*, and in the slightly later Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Isaeo* 4), whose comparison of poets and painters implies that color relates to words as lines relate to content. Dionysius also uses χρῶμα to refer to discourse elevated stylistically and/or emotionally, and in fact, Ernesti's lexicon relegates the Ciceronian sense of the word, as *color*, as "figures of speech," to the fourth definition, attested only in Photius (although Dionysius could have been cited).[28] More will be said of this passage in the discussion of Dionysius below; a similar passage in Longinus (*Subl.* 17) will be discussed in the next chapter. In any case, there is no clear or serious application of this meaning prior to Cicero.

The importance of this Ciceronian terminology should not be underestimated. The terminology influenced aesthetic and poetic doctrine significantly until the eighteenth century, and has been blamed even for the "confusion of the arts" throughout this long period. Additions to the critical terminology, especially of items applied metaphorically from other disciplines, has been identified as one of Cicero's most significant contributions, and indeed, the contribution is great.[29] Cicero applies to oratorical criticism a set of aesthetical concepts that transcend the normal, mimetic aesthetics of antiquity. It is easy to determine, for example, when a painting exhibits decorous *colores*: the viewer can match the painting to the perceived world. The *colores* of a well-written speech appeal to a sense of beauty beyond mere faithfulness of reproduction to reproduced object. We might find this sort of terminological transfer between

genres difficult and even silly, but the terms served many generations of rhetoricians after Cicero.

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

A contemporary of Horace, Dionysius of Halicarnassus was slightly younger than Cicero; he arrived in Rome in 30 B.C.[30] His treatises, written in Greek, are highly technical and written for experts in matters of rhetorical theory and analysis. Dionysius takes for granted the similarity of literature and the visual arts, and this similarity permeates his *De Compositione* (in Greek, Περὶ Συνθέσεως Ὀνομάτων) and his biographical works. In some respects, his attitudes look back to Cicero, who preceded him at Rome, and in others, he looks forward to the approaches of Horace and Longinus.

Dionysius' use of analogies to compare the arts is based on two aesthetic assumptions, which perhaps lurk behind all of the theories explored in this study but are clearly enunciated by Dionysius. First, Dionysius believes that the aesthetic perceptions of the various senses are similar. The ear, like the eye, can perceive "charm and beauty" (ἥ τε ἡδονὴ καὶ τὸ καλόν), the best qualities in both visual art and literature; one can find the two qualities separately in both (*Comp.* 10, pages 118–21 Roberts). Moreover, the principle that different objects strike the perceiver differently holds across the senses of hearing, sight, taste, and so on (*Comp.* 12, pages 130–31 Roberts). Second, Dionysius' conceptions of style are based on a mimetic notion of art. Words imitate things: "The poets and prose-writers themselves, then, with their eye on each object in turn, frame—as I said— words which seem made for, and are pictures of, the things they connote. But they also borrow many words from earlier writers, in the very form in which those writers fashioned them—when such words are imitative of things" (ὅσα μιμητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων

ἐστίν, *Comp.* 16, pages 158–59 Roberts). Thus, one of the quali-
ties that makes Herodotus and Thucydides excellent historians
is their ability to imitate character and emotions ([τῶν] ἠθῶν τε
καὶ παθῶν μίμησις, *Pomp.* 3, page 382 Usher). Dionysius follows
Plato in the *Cratylus*, and most likely a number of other Stoic
and Peripatetic sources, in expounding an onomatopoetic
theory of language (*Comp.* 16, pages 158–61 Roberts).[31]

But Dionysius goes further—the style of a passage can imitate
the content, for instance, conveying the fine appearance of
something by the use of vowels, or the movement of water by
consonants. Dionysius illustrates such effects with passages from
Homer (*Comp.* 16, pages 161–65 Roberts). He illustrates the
notion further when discussing "appropriateness" (*decorum*, τὸ
πρέπον: *Comp.* 20, pages 200–201 Roberts):

> When the same men in the same state of mind report
> occurrences which they have actually witnessed, they do
> not use a similar style in describing all of them, but in
> their very way of putting their words together imitate the
> things they report (μιμητικοὶ γίνονται τῶν ἀπαγγελλομένων),
> not purposely, but carried away by a natural impulse.
> Keeping an eye on this principle, the good poet and
> orator should be ready to imitate the things of which he
> is giving a verbal description, and to imitate them not only
> in the choice of words but also in the composition. This
> is the practice of Homer, that surpassing genius, although
> he has but one metre and few rhythms. Within these
> limits, nevertheless, he is constantly producing new effects
> and artistic refinements, so that actually to see the
> incidents taking place would give no advantage over our
> having them thus described.[32]

What is at stake here is the ability to engender visualization in
the mind of the reader, although Dionysius does not use the

word *enargeia.* He continues to give examples from Homer to support his thesis of onomatopoetic visual effects, which extends beyond words to the syntactic combination of words (*compositio,* σύνθεσις). Again Homer is the main provider of examples (*Comp.* 20, pages 200–201 Roberts).

In his use of terminology Dionysius frequently resembles Cicero. His use of χρῶμα, for example, frequently is like Cicero's *color,* as "ornament" or "figure of speech"; so for example at *De Compositione* 4 (pages 88–89 Roberts), *De Demosthene* 22, *De Isaeo* 4, and *De Thucydide* 42 (although the word χρήμασι probably should be read rather than χρώμασι at *Comp.* 20, pages 198–99 Roberts, in spite of the excellent parallels made by Roberts³³). Also reminiscent of Cicero is *De Compositione* 22 (pages 214–15 Roberts): "and possibly the discourse would have been rendered not unattractive if bedecked with many such flowers of spring" (ὥσπερ ἄνθεσι διαποικιλλόμενος τοῖς ἐαρινοῖς). Certainly this recalls the Latin terms for painting (*pingere*) and flowers (*flores*). Dionysius even reflects the Ciceronian terminology based on light (*lux*) and clarity. Sandys appropriately parallels Cicero's *dilucide planeque,* "clearly and logically," (*Orat.* 79) with Dionysius' φανερὰ καὶ σαφής, "clear and logical," (*Lys.* 4). Even more notable is the extended architectural comparison at *De Compositione* 6 (pages 104–109 Roberts). Here Dionysius discusses the three steps in construction—studying the possible combinations of material, then determining the arrangement of individual material, and finally, aesthetic trimming. These steps are followed whether one is constructing a house, a ship, or a sentence. In his note on the passage, Roberts rightly points to *De Compositione* 22, to be discussed below, to passages in Quintilian (7.1 proem) and Cicero (*De Or.* 3.171), and then delineates a complex of Greek terms that imply analogy to architecture: "A metaphor from building underlies the rhetorical use in all or most of such words as: κανών, γόμφος, πυργοῦν, ἀντερείδειν, στηριγμός, ἀντιστηριγμός, ἕδρα, τέκτων, ὕλη, κατασκευάζειν, ἐγκατάσκευος."

To these passages we could add *De Compositione* 25 (page 164 Roberts) (γλυπτοῖς καὶ τορευτοῖς), referring to the sculptured styles of Isocrates and Plato, and the words related to ξέω discussed by Lockwood.[34] Here indeed is a vocabulary comparable to the metaphors from painting and sculpture used by Cicero.

Dionysius uses the analogy to the visual arts to defend his approach. In one passage he suggests that critics like himself should be allowed to discuss the styles of the masters, whose abilities and accomplishments surpass those of the critics, because such license is commonly granted to critics of sculpture (*Thuc.* 4, pages 1.470–71 Usher). In another passage he suggests that a student of Demosthenes must consider all aspects of Demosthenes' oratory, just as a student of art must study all aspects of the art of great sculptors or painters (*Dem.* 50, pages 1.428–29 Usher). Such study will allow one to determine genuine speeches from spurious ones, just as with sculpture or painting (*De Din.* 7, pages 2.270–71 Usher). In yet another passage (*Comp.* 25, pages 264–65 Roberts), Dionysius defends himself against a charge that the method of composition he recommends is too painstaking by comparing his method to the work of πλάσται—"clay-modellers," according to Roberts. He continues the analogy (*Comp.* 25, pages 266–67 Roberts): "For it appears to me far more reasonable for a man who is composing public speeches, eternal memorials of his own powers, to attend even to the slightest details, than it is for the disciples of painters and workers in relief, who display the dexterity and industry of their hands in a perishable medium, to expend the finished resources of their art on veins and down and bloom and similar minutiae."[35] An almost identical argument is given in *De Demosthene* 51 (pages 1.436–37 Usher), a rhetorical elaboration of the analogy between poems and statues that was found in the Greek lyric poets. Dionysius has developed the themes we saw in the early lyric poets; in the next chapter, we will see Horace develop them further.

The analogy between literature and the arts is central to Dionysius' conception of the three modes of composition. These modes of composition are not the same as the plain, middle (mixed), and high styles of Cicero; rather, Dionysius classifies passages as "austere," "smooth," and middle (mixed). The styles are like painting: "As in that art all painters from life take the same pigments but mix them in the most diverse ways, so in poetry and in prose, though we all use the same words, we do not put them together in the same manner" (*Comp.* 21, pages 208–9 Roberts). A well-constructed sentence in the austere style is like a well-designed and executed Greek temple (*Comp.* 22, pages 211–13 Roberts):

> It requires that the words should be like columns firmly planted and placed in strong positions, so that each word should be seen on every side, and that the parts should be at appreciable distances from one another, being separable by perceptible intervals. It does not in the least shrink from using frequently harsh sound-clashings which jar on the ear; like blocks of building stone that are laid together unworked, blocks that are not square and smooth, but preserve their natural roughness and irregularity. It is prone for the most part to expansion by means of great spacious words. It objects to being confined to short syllables, except under occasional stress of necessity.

Bowra thinks that here Dionysius has Pindar in mind, which seems likely in view of the opening of *Olympian* 6, where Pindar compares a poem to a temple with columns. A scaled-down version of the same analogy is presented at the analogous *De Demosthene* 38 (pages 1.380–81 Usher). But, as Pollitt notes, *austere* was also used in art criticism to describe the use of color, as was *floridus* (Greek ἀνθηρός). Pliny (*HN* 35.30) categorizes colors as either *austerus* or *floridus*. Rouveret associates the *floridi*

colors with the Asian style, the *austeri* with the Attic style. Pollitt believes that Dionysius took these terms and applied them to his styles and hence produced an original and creative comparison of literature and the visual arts.[36]

But more important than Dionysius' model or source, if he even had one, is the fact that in his subsequent stylistic analysis the analogy functions as much more than an analogy. Dionysius discusses the physical relationships between words, and especially the sounds as they are pronounced, as being analogous to the stones used in building. He notes, for example, Thucydides' opening words, Θουκυδίδης 'Αθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε, where "The sound of σ must be sharply arrested by an interval of silence before the ξ is heard"; this shows how Thucydides "does not in the least shrink from using frequently harsh sound clashings . . .; like blocks of building stone that are laid together unworked . . ." (*Comp.* 22, pages 230–31 Roberts).[37] The verbal pause parallels the "perceptible intervals" between the architectural columns. In Demetrius the analogies were facile; here the analogy has become controlling both in critical terminology and in conception.

If writing in the "austere" style resembles a temple, writing in the "smooth" style resembles a river (*Comp.* 23, pages 234–35 Roberts; *Dem.* 40, pages 392–93 Usher). Or, better yet, it resembles a woven fabric or painting: (*Comp.* 23, pages 234–35 Roberts): "It tries to combine and interweave its component parts, and thus give, as far as possible, the effect of one continuous utterance. This result is produced by so nicely adjusting the junctures that they admit no appreciable time-interval between the words. From this point of view the style resembles finely woven stuffs, or pictures in which the lights melt insensibly into the shadows." Dionysius analyzes Sappho and Isocrates to demonstrate how words can be joined in this manner, and he compares the spatial units of architecture to the temporal units in literature: "these words . . . are not separated by long

time-intervals and planted far apart from one another. . . . There are also few dissonances of semi-vowels and mutes" (*Comp.* 23, pages 244–45 Roberts). Dionysius, like Longinus after him, understands the artistic effect now called *chiaroscuro.* This technique, using shadows to offset lighting and to create a three-dimensional illusion, was well known in the early Imperial period and even much earlier, as we have seen. Keuls has shown that to Greek writers of the fifth century, the term *skiagraphia* could mean the impressionistic use of color, through "juxtaposition" rather than "mixing", but to the later Greeks, including Plutarch, and to the Romans (except for Pliny at *Nat. Hist.* 35.29) it referred to a variety of techniques, including various types of *chiaroscuro.*[38] Dionysius returns to the same metaphors when describing the "smooth" style of Isocrates (*Comp.* 23, pages 244–45 Roberts).

In his discussion of the middle or mixed style in *De Compositione,* Dionysius makes no analogy to the visual arts. But in his abbreviated version of the discussion in *De Demosthene,* he compares the composer of the mixed style to a painter who chooses and mixes colors on his palette. Like a painter, a speaker in this style works with traditional materials (colors) but individualizes the composition to fit the speaker's own aptitudes and character (*Dem.* 41, pages 1.398–99 Usher); as Meerwaldt emphasizes, Dionysius, like Cicero, thinks most highly of a "mixed" style.[39]

A doctrine of the parallel development of oratory and the visual arts also permeates Dionysius' essays on individual orators. It has been shown that this doctrine is essentially biological and derived from the Peripatetics, or more specifically from the art historians. Its approach can be seen in Dionysius' comparative method, in passages that have been clarified by Meerwaldt and Trimpi in their analyses of Horace. As Trimpi shows, Aristotle had distinguished the forensic oratorical style from the political (*Rh.* 3.12). Earlier in this chapter we saw that Demetrius and

Cicero hint at the application of this distinction. In Dionysius the application is better developed. At *De Isocrate* 2–3 Dionysius compares the styles of Isocrates and Lysias. Isocrates is less effective because of his structured, ornate periodic style (*Isoc.* 2, pages 1.108–9 Usher): "He tries to express his ideas within the framework of the rounded period, using strong rhythms which are not far removed from those of verse, thus rendering his work more suitable for reading than for practical use. For the same reason his speeches will bear recitation on ceremonial occasions, and private study, but cannot stand up to the stresses of the assembly or the law courts. This is because such occasions demand intensity of feeling, and this is what the period is least capable of expressing." Isocrates provides a good example of Aristotle's epideictic style. But for practical use in court, Lysias should be followed. Isocrates has rhetorical "color" (ἀνθηρός) but lacks Lysias' "charm" (χάρις); one can, however, attain "loftiness" (ὕψος) in the Isocratean style (*De Isoc.* 3, where Polycleitus and Pheidias are introduced). Similar comments regarding Isocrates appear in Cicero (*De Opt. Gen.* 17) and in Quintilian (12.10.8–9).[40]

Dionysius then compares Lysias and Isocrates to sculptors (*Isoc.* 3, pages 1.112–13 Usher):

> I think one would not be wide of the mark in comparing the oratory of Isocrates, in respect of its grandeur, its virtuosity and its dignity, with the art of Polycleitus and Ph[e]idias, and the style of Lysias, for its lightness and charm, with that of Calamis and Callimachus; for just as the latter two sculptors are more successful than their rivals in portraying lesser human subjects, where the former two are cleverer at treating grandeur and superhuman subjects, so with the two orators: Lysias has the greater skill with small subjects, while Isocrates is more impressive with grand subjects.

Two Aristotelian concepts are at work here. First, we see the distinction between political and forensic. Polycleitus and Pheidias are what we might call political sculptors, concerned with larger subjects, whereas Calamis and Callimachus are forensic sculptors, concerned with the smaller. We shall see in the following chapters that Polycleitus becomes the forensic sculptor, Chares the political, and Pheidias the sculptor who transcends the two styles. Lysias here, as elsewhere, does not meet the requirements of Longinus' sublime (*Subl.* 17.1–3); he lacks the "greatness," the "oral" style, the skiagraphic or chiaroscuro effect.[41] But also at work is the Aristotelian distinction of tragedy from comedy, the former imitating serious actions, the latter less serious (*Poetics* 2). Polycleitus and Pheidias might be termed tragic artists, Calamis and Callimachus comic artists. At this point, the best that can be said is that Dionysius applies both of these two critical standards, but not very harmoniously.

In chapters 11 and 12 of *De Isocrate*, Dionysius summarizes his findings and returns to the comparison: Isocrates' style is more fitted to the epideictic situation, Lysias' to the political or forensic. He quotes one "Philonicus the grammarian": "I found the same figures of speech used in all his [Isocartes'] speeches, so that although in many individual cases the treatment was skilful, the overall effect was completely incongruous because the language did not accord with the underlying nature of his characters" (*Isoc.* 13, page 1.135 Usher). Art must follow nature; style must be fitted to the matter. According to "Hieronymous the philosopher," Isocrates is appropriate for reading but not for delivery. As Trimpi observes, Isocrates here does not meet the standards of the oral, political style that corresponds to chiaroscuro in painting and to Longinus' sublime (*Subl.* 17.1–3); Cicero seems to agree, stating that Isocrates avoided the political "light" (*luce forensi, Brut.* 32).[42]

A similar approach is taken in the *De Isaeo*, where the rhetorician Isaeus is compared to Lysias. Isaeus is the more artistic of

the two, both in language, because he employs more and better figures of speech, and in the structuring of his materials (chapters 2–3). This is again best illustrated by a comparison to painting (*De Isaeo* 4, pages 1.179–81 Usher):

> In order to clarify further the difference between the two men, I shall use a simile from the visual arts. There are some old paintings which are worked in simple colours without any subtle blending of tints but clear in their outline, and thereby possessing great charm; whereas the later paintings are less well-drawn but contain greater detail and a subtle interplay of light and shade (σκιᾶι τε καὶ φωτὶ ποικιλλόμεναι), and are effective because of the many nuances of colour which they contain. Now Lysias resembles the older paintings by his simplicity and charm, and Isaeus their more elaborate and more skilfully wrought successors.

Meerwaldt and Stanley Frederick Bonner rightly compare this to Cicero's *Brutus* 70, where the development of sculpture is traced from Canachus to Calamis to Myron to Polycleitus and a similar development is traced in painting: "In Zeuxis, Polygnotus, Timanthes, and others, who used only four colours, we praise their outline and drawing; but in Aetion, Nicomachus, Protogenes, Apelles, everything has been brought to perfection" (*Brut.* 70). Cicero and Dionysius share the same developmental theory of the arts. As A. A. Donahue has pointed out, in spite of apparent differences between them, the accounts of Cicero, Dionysius, and Pliny all associate the process of artistic decline with the political chaos after Alexander and the process of revival with the Romans' adoption of Greek culture.[43]

Also at work here is the doctrine of artistic styles that Meerwaldt and Trimpi trace from Aristotle to Horace and beyond. As seen above in the case of Cicero, the older style corresponds to

the forensic style, the more modern skiagraphic style to the spoken, political style (Arist. *Rh.* 3.12); the latter also corresponds to the "sublime" in Longinus (*Subl.* 17.1–3).[44] Furthermore, Dionysius is clearly developing an analysis of style as color and shade in the Aristotelian and Ciceronian tradition; one cannot help but think of *Poetics* 6.1450a.24–b.4, which, as we have seen, was the first passage to equate shape (drawing) with structure, and color with words or style. (It should be emphasized again that this equation is clear in Aristotle only if Castelvetro's transposition is accepted.) Here again, there is a suggestion that Isaeus is the more forensic of the two speakers. And again Dionysius applies the concept of chiaroscuro and the terms borrowed from art criticism.

A change in the treatise *De Demosthene* probably reflects the maturity of Dionysius' thought in the "second volume" of his essays. Now no longer are there dual comparisons on the political-forensic fulcrum; rather, there is a development of styles on a kind of Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. As Dionysius describes it, first the grand style was developed by Gorgias and Thucydides; then in opposition came the plain style of Lysias; and finally came the middle style, a mixture of the other two, created by Plato and Isocrates, refined and perfected by Demosthenes (*Dem.* 1-8, pages 1.238–67 Usher). Similarly Cicero identifies Lysias as the exemplar of the plain style, Demosthenes as the exemplar of the mixed, Attic style, and Thucydides as an excellent writer of history but not of oratory (*Opt. Gen.* 2.6–6.17). Cicero also gives an evolutionary theory, although in his account the earliest style is exemplified by Thucydides, the next stage by the Sophists, and the third by Isocrates, then Lysias, then Demosthenes; Demetrius of Phalerum was too forensic (*umbraculis, Brut.* 27–8). Although Dionysius does not extend this Hegelian progression to the visual arts, I suspect that he could have done so. In *De Demosthene* 50, Dionysius informs us that all aspects of Demosthenes' speech

must be studied so that the style can be recognized by the student. Such is the case in the visual arts as well (pages 1.428–29 Usher): "Sculptors and painters without long experience in training the eye by studying the works of the old masters would not be able to identify them readily, and would not be able to say with confidence that this piece of sculpture is by Polycl[e]itus, this by Ph[e]idias, this by Alcamenes; and that this painting is by Polygnotus, this by Timanthes and this by Parrhasius." It is probably not a coincidence that both for sculpture and for painting three names are given, and that in each case the three are in chronological order. In each case there is a progression from pioneer to accomplished master. Few today would consider Alcamenes the zenith of Greek sculpture, although Pausanias (5.10) makes him responsible for the west pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia. Little is known of Timanthes. Perhaps more important is the observation that Alcamenes is Pheidias' student.[45]

Once the middle style has been described, Dionysius returns to the familiar comparative method, concluding that Plato tends toward the political, Demosthenes toward the deliberative or forensic; after citing long passages from Plato and Demosthenes, he concludes (*Dem.* 32, pages 1.364–65 Usher):

Every reader, even one with only a moderate appreciation of oratory, unless he be malicious and of a contentious disposition, would admit that the passage which I have just quoted is as different from the preceding one as are the weapons of war from those used in ceremonial processions, real things from images, and bodies developed by hard work in the sunlight from those that pursue a life of ease in the shade. The former aims at nothing beyond formal beauty, and is consequently at its best when describing unreal situations; the latter concerns itself with nothing which does not lead to a useful and practical end.

But Demosthenes did more than refine the political, that is, the "austere," oral, or skiagraphic, style. He saw that one should use the austere style in forensic and political situations, and the "smooth" style in epideictic situations; also, one should use the austere style in arguments, the smooth in narrative (*Dem.* 44, pages 412–19 Usher). Unfortunately, Dionysius is not consistent in this distinction. Perhaps what he is trying to say is that one must, like Demosthenes, master all three styles and adjust one-self to the subject matter, the occasion, and the audience. That would put Dionysius in line with Cicero's recommendation on varied and mixed styles.[46]

Dionysius' comparisons between literature and the visual arts are interesting, if not profound. The Elder Pliny curiously reverses the process, using Dionysius' rhetorical terms to classify sculptors (*HN* 34.66).[47] One cannot but feel that in Dionysius the application of Aristotelian rhetorical and poetic theory and art criticism is reaching its apex. Clearly we are approaching the theory espoused in Horace's *Ars Poetica.*

Plate 1. Statue of a Kouros, sixth century B.C., Greece, marble, height 1.927 m. All rights reserved, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Fletcher Fund, 1932 (no. 32.11.1).

Plate 2. Portrait of "Sulla?" by unknown Roman artist, first century b.c., bronze, height 29.5 cm. The J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu, California (no. 73.AB.8).

Plate 3. *The Doryphoros,* by Polycleitus, fifth century B.C., Greece, marble. The John R. Van Derlip Fund, The Minneapolis Institute of Arts (no. 86.6).

Plate 4. Roman coin, second century A.D., obverse (*above*) with image of Roman emperor Hadrian, reverse (*opposite*) with image of statue of Zeus by Pheidias. Museo Nazionale, Florence (no. 36005). Courtesy SOPRINTENDENZA ARCHEOLOGICA PER LA TOSCANA— FIRENZE.

Plate 5. *Carian Zeus* (adaptation of the Olympian Zeus of Pheidias), fourth century B.C., Greece, marble, height 48 m, length (face) .26 m. Henry Lillie Pierce Fund, courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston (no. 04.12).

Apex and Decline

HORACE, LONGINUS, PETRONIUS, AND PLUTARCH

Cicero was extremely influential in matters of style and grammar, but his aesthetic contributions have not attracted the interest they deserve. Similarly, the ideas of Dionysius of Halicarnassus never reached a large and appreciative audience. We now move to two remarkably influential writers of the early Roman Empire, Horace and Longinus. Their contributions were widely disseminated but unfortunately not well understood. In them many of the trends we have followed here came to fruition. The Roman writer Petronius demonstrates that the ancients were already asking themselves about the consequences of the assumed similarities between literature and the visual arts. Plutarch shows that already in the early Empire the assumed similarities were becoming difficult to maintain.

HORACE

Probably the most famous passages comparing literature and the visual arts appear in Horace. Horace wrote poetry in a wide

variety of genres and meters in the Augustan period, the last part of the first century B.C. Horace was patronized by the first Roman emperor, Augustus, and by the literary patron Maecenas, and is best known for his elegant use and arrangement of words in lyric meters. At the end of his career, he wrote the *Ars Poetica* or *Epistula ad Pisones*. This poetic epistle opens with an unforgettably descriptive passage (*Ars P.* 1–37):

> Imagine a painter who wanted to combine a horse's neck with a human head, and then clothe a miscellaneous collection of limbs with various kinds of feathers, so that what started out at the top as a beautiful woman ended in a hideously ugly fish. If you were invited, as friends, to the private view, could you help laughing? Let me tell you, my Piso friends, a book whose different features are made up at random like a sick man's dreams, with no unified form to have a head or a tail, is exactly like that picture.
>
> "Painters and poets have always enjoyed recognized rights to venture on what they will." Yes, we know; indeed, we ask and grant this permission turn and turn about. But it doesn't mean that fierce and gentle can be unified, snakes paired with birds or lambs with tigers.
>
> Serious and ambitious designs often have a purple patch or two sewn on to them just to make a good show at a distance—a description of a grove and altar of Diana, the meanderings of a stream running through pleasant meads, the River Rhine, the rainbow: but the trouble is, it's not the place for them.
>
> Maybe you know how to do a picture of a cypress tree? What's the good of that, if the man who is paying for the picture is a desperate shipwrecked mariner swimming to safety? The job began as a wine-jar: the wheel runs round— why is that a tub that's coming out? In short, let it be what you will, but let it be simple and unified.

Most of us poets—father and worthy sons—are deceived by appearances of correctness. I try to be concise, but I become obscure; my aim is smoothness, but sinews and spirit fail; professions of grandeur end in bombast; the over-cautious who fear the storm creep along the ground. Similarly, the writer who wants to give fantastic variety to his single theme paints a dolphin in his woods and a wild boar in his sea. If art is wanting, the flight from blame leads to faults. The poorest smith near the School of Aemilius will reproduce nails and mimic soft hair in bronze, though he has no luck with the over-all effect of his work, because he won't know how to organize the whole. If I were anxious to put anything together, I would as soon be that man as I would live with a mis-shapen nose when my black eyes and black hair had made me a beauty.

There is no doubt that Horace had broad acquaintance with the arts and crafts of his day.[1] But from this and other passages one does not get the impression that Horace has been steeped, like Cicero, in the philosophical tradition of art criticism. Still, the passage is strategically placed in the poem, suggesting that the analogy of the arts might be central to his conception of the poetic art.

The general thrust of the argument is clear: hybrid animals, temperaments, or scenes are not acceptable: "let it be what you will, but let it be simple and unified." More specifically, three points are being made. First, the object of imitation should be unified. Second, the artist, poet or painter, should pay attention to the qualitative consistency of the work: there should be no unevenness, no "purple patches." Third, artists should choose tasks for which they are fit. Otherwise the first two principles will be violated; purple patches will appear, or the unity and simplicity will be destroyed. All of this is illustrated by Horace in negative examples, and quite graphic ones. The graphicness

is important here. Horace wants a highly visual sense of the
literary object, a visuality applicable quite clearly and obviously
to the visual artist, less clearly and obviously to the writer. As
Roy Kenneth Hack has observed, "Horace begins the *Ars* with
a sketch of a mad painter and ends with a sketch of a mad
poet. . . . The painter is employed to introduce and the poet to
drive home the central lesson . . .: 'follow propriety as your
guiding star, and submit yourself bitterly to those men who can
teach you what in each and every case is proper.'"[2]

This has seemed to many a confusing way to make an argu-
ment. The pictorial images are striking and the reader is truly
engrossed in the issue, but it takes hard work to get the point.
C. O. Brink's authoritative commentary on the poem offers the
best explanation of Horace's broad movement of thought here:
the opening lines are an example of the principle advocated, as
they themselves illustrate "variety within unity."[3]

As both Plato and Aristotle do, Horace brings in the visual
arts for the sake of analogous comparison, because the points
being made lend themselves to visuality and hence to the visual
arts. And as in Aristotle, the prime object for comparison is an
animal, a biological specimen that preserves and exemplifies
the harmony, balance, and proportion of nature. The observa-
tions on painting are then transferred to literature: "poetry is
like painting" (*ut pictura poesis*), not "painting is like poetry."
Indeed, as commentators have shown, the opening analogy
extends through the first thirty-one lines, and even beyond.
But, as Hagstrum has noted, Horace is advocating a different
type of imitation than that prescribed by Plato or Aristotle—the
"imitation of nature." Hagstrum's comments on the influence of
this view are worth quotation: "This aesthetic ideal—the vivid
representation of reality—could be better achieved in painting
than in poetry. Therefore, whenever in the history of criticism
the phrase 'imitation of nature' has been literally interpreted,
the analogy with painting has been significantly present, and

the notion that poetry must resemble painting has tended to be a critical dogma." Hagstrum sees here the first expression of the doctrine of *enargeia,* "vividness," as later enunciated by Plutarch and Longinus, and the source of pictorialism in poetry.[4]

Numerous critics have argued that the "purple patches" (*purpureus . . . pannus,* lines 15–16) are *ekphrases,* or literary descriptions of scenes, that Horace describes as sitting uneasily in their contexts. In the discussions of Plutarch, Quintilian, and Longinus it will be seen that *ekphrasis* and its cousin-term *enargeia* are to be associated with the ever-growing phantastic or imaginative conception of literature. Given this, the passage here might be seen as an attack by a critic with mimetic orientation on the phantastic view of literature and the arts. But Horace explains why one might add the purple patch—it gives the poem a better look "at a distance." This distinction between poems (or paintings) to be viewed "at a distance" and those to be viewed up close is picked up in a later, more important passage of the *Ars Poetica,* where, in fact, the phrase *ut pictura poesis* appears. This second comparison of literature to the visual arts is located roughly three-fourths of the way through the poem (*Ars Poet.* 361–65): "Poetry is like painting. Some attracts you more if you stand near, some if you're further off. One picture likes a dark place, one will need to be seen in the light, because it's not afraid of the critic's sharp judgement. One gives pleasure once, one will please if you look it over ten times."[5]

This passage has been both highly influential and imperfectly understood, largely because more effort has been devoted to harmonizing the poem with Aristotle's *Poetics* or with the statements of Neoptolemus of Parium than to examining Horace's own words. This passage compares poetry and painting, or rather poems and paintings, on three bases: (1) distance of the viewer from the poem or painting (up close or far away); (2) the mode of display (in dark or in light); and (3) the resultant

pleasure (once or repeatedly). According to Brink, in what we might characterize as the standard interpretation, Horace's point is "The criterion of repeated close scrutiny." Horace is not really interested in painting: "For H. is not discussing modes of viewing pictures but the inherent quality that makes for a repeated viewing of poems. He leads the reader to this quality through illustrating two different ways of viewing pictures, of which only one is approved." Which way of viewing is this? "The view from afar is condemned. The picture which *amat obscurum* is the picture, and later the poem, which does not stand up to repeated inspection; it is seen and discarded."[6] In this view, then, the best poem/painting is the one that is best seen up close and in the light, and that repeatedly pleases.

Trimpi has shown that the first elements in each comparison—up close, in the dark, and pleasurable once—are all correlated with each other, as are the second elements. Trimpi follows the Renaissance scholar Denys Lambin (1596) in suggesting that Horace's point here is derived from, or at least closely related to, Aristotle's distinction at *Rhetoric* 3.12 (1413b.2–1414a.17). There, as we have seen, Aristotle distinguishes written discourse, which he terms *epideictic*, from discourse designed to be presented orally, either political, to be delivered to a crowd, or forensic, to be presented to a judge. This distinction had been raised before, of course, as in the dispute between Alcidamas and Isocrates discussed in chapter 2, above. As Trimpi shows, Aristotle compares political oratory to "shadow painting" (*skiagraphia*), which looks good at a distance but not up close. Epideictic and even forensic discourse, then, invites closer critical investigation than political. This distinction, already observed as basic to Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, is most clearly expressed here in lines 361–65 of Horace's *Ars Poetica*. As Trimpi clarifies all of these passages, there is a more detailed style appropriate to forensic speech, especially with one judge. This detail is best examined up close, inside (i.e., in

the darkness of a study or rhetorical school), but it only gives
pleasure once. The more oral, political style, on the contrary,
is best appreciated from afar, in the open air, and it will give
pleasure repeatedly. But, like Timaeus' style in the *Critias* of
Plato, it should not be held responsible for minute details.
Horace's model here for the political style is Homer, who is
being discussed just prior to this passage, as the comparison of
poetry and painting is introduced, and who, as Horace mentions,
often "nods" (making minor mistakes that are visible when he
is read up close but not when read from a distance). Support
for Trimpi's argument can be found in the passages in *Ars
Poetica* that, as in Cicero, exhibit the critical vocabulary of art
criticism (*Ars Poet.* 86, 143, 150, 236, 351 and 448). In Longinus
(*De Subl.* 17.1–3), the political style will be a mark of the sublime
and, as in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.12), the equivalent in painting will
be chiaroscuro.[7]

This interpretation solves several problems. In spite of objec-
tions, even by Trimpi, the problematic second comparison,
concerning darkness and light, can be considered a reference
to "impressionistic" art or chiaroscuro; Leach, one of the few
classicists to take Trimpi seriously, notes that while Horace was
writing, the older style of painting "which had favored mega-
lography with pronounced illusionism" was being replaced by
"new fashions" that "were bringing in smaller images and more
intricate detail, that cannot be perceived from far away." Although
I believe Leach to err in implying that Horace favors the "new
fashions," this point is well taken.[8] It allows Horace to be placed
solidly in a rhetorical tradition that Trimpi discovers especially
in Longinus and in Seneca. There is no need to track through
the entire tradition here; more will be said in the next chapter,
where Longinus' blending of Platonic, Ciceronian, and Horatian
traditions will be examined.

Although clearly Trimpi believes that Homer represents the
second type of poem, he does not determine what two types of

poems are being compared. As Brink points out, in lines 147–60 preceding this passage, Horace discusses the difference between *poema* and *poesis*, a tradition probably inherited from Neoptolemus of Parium. These Greek terms have numerous meanings, some of which overlap, but generally a *poema* is a line or a few lines of verse, a *poesis* a long poem, such as Homer's *Iliad.* One is tempted to suggest that the *poesis* looks good at a distance, in the light, and will bear repeated examination, while a *poema* is better considered up close, in private, and appeals only once. But if this is true, then Horace is using the terms more loosely than Neoptolemus had done, and his use of the word *poesis* in the phrase *ut pictura poesis* would be somewhat misleading; the natural interpretation would be that two different types of poesis are being compared.[9]

A common view is that Horace prefers the type of poetry that has been more labored over; this would fit the advice in the rest of the *Ars Poetica.* The sort of poem contrasted with a long poem like Homer's *Iliad* would be the shorter, more scholarly poem of the type championed by Callimachus. While Horace seems to prefer the longer poem, much of the advice in the *Ars Poetica* can refer to the shorter poem; the Roman satirist Lucilius, who had used the terms more loosely than Neoptolemus, gives an epistle in verse as an example of a *poema* (frag. 341 Marx). Clearly, to Horace the scholarly poem, including the *Ars Poetica* itself, is a worthy endeavor, at least for the poet whose talents preclude writing the Homeric epic. A third position is that Horace tries to combine the two types—the large work championed by the Aristotelians and the short, carefully written poem championed by the Alexandrians—into an ideal of Roman poetry. (We shall see below that eventually such a combination came to be associated with the sculptor Pheidias.) Perhaps the question of which type Horace prefers cannot be answered, although we shall see in the discussion of Longinus that Horace's *source* definitely prefers the longer poem with blemishes, for example, Homer.[10]

In one more passage Horace alludes to pictorial art (*Ars P.* 86–87): "If I have neither the ability nor the knowledge to keep the duly assigned functions and tones of literature, why am I hailed as a poet?" The words here translated as "duly ascribed functions and tones of literature" (*descriptas . . . vices operumque colores*) refer to literature as a process, first creating a framework (*vices*) of lines (*descriptas*) and then adding color (*colores*) to generate a work of art (*operum*). As Brink has shown in his authoritative English commentary on Horace, here *vices* corresponds to the English word "genre" (i.e., a specific subject matter and a specific meter), and *colores* refers not to the application of rhetorical figures, as generally is the case in Cicero, but to the application of a style appropriate to the genre of the work at hand. Brink finds the same use of *color* in *Ad Herennium* 4.16 and Cicero *De Oratore* 3.96, and suggests that it developed out of the Greek χρῶμα, although no examples prior to Horace are attested.[11] We see here an implicit adoption of the Aristotelian form/content, *res/verba*, lines/color analogies observed by rhetoricians in the last chapter.

This last passage aside, Horace reflects a new tradition, as far as the works studied here are concerned. This tradition is based not on Aristotelian *mimēsis* but on a rhetorical theory of styles, albeit one also descending from Aristotle. This is not to say that Horace is unaware of the Aristotelian notion of mimēsis. His awareness is clear from a passage in Horace's *Letter to Augustus* (*Epist.* 2.1.229–50):

All the same, it's worth finding out what sort of priests should serve virtue well-tried at home and abroad—for it's not something to be handed over to an unworthy poet. The great king Alexander gave his favour to the notorious Choerilus, who repaid the royal gifts of gold pieces in verses ill-born and inelegant. Black ink when handled leaves a disagreeable blot; similarly writers often smear

disgusting poems over fine deeds. All the same, this king who so dearly bought such absurd poetry (improvident man!) made an edict that he was to be painted by none but Apelles, and that only Lysippus should cast statues to represent the martial features of Alexander. He had, then, an acute taste in the visual arts—but summon it to pronounce on books and poetry, and you'd swear he was a Boeotian, born in a gross climate. . . . And for portraying the character and mind of famous men, the work of the poet is as satisfactory as the representation of their features in bronze statues.

In this passage Augustus, the recipient of the poetic epistle, is favorably contrasted with Alexander the Great. Alexander saw the value in letting only the best artists portray him, but he did not apply the same judgment to his biographers. Augustus, we assume, knows better. Horace indicates, as Brink has shown, that Augustus will not repeat the error of Alexander.[12]

Craig La Drière, although his main goal is to criticize the notion that Horace believed all poetry to be imitation in an Aristotelian sense, argues that this passage shows traces of Aristotelian language. On the words *mores animique*, here translated "character and mind," La Drière writes, "Here, indeed, *mores animique* is a fair parallel to the ἦθη καὶ πάθη of Aristotle"; a note refers to *Poetics* 1.1447a28 and Horace's *Epistle* 1.2.62, "where *animum* = πάθη (*ira, furor*, etc." He goes on to gloss *virorum clarorum*, here translated "of famous men," as the ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν of the *Poetics* and the actions in the next part of the poem as πράξεις (also at *Poetics* 1.1447a.28). This is an extremely interesting passage, which does show how theory has progressed since Aristotle. But the connection to Aristotle is not as simple as La Drière would indicate. *Mores animique* may have Aristotelian origins, but the source here is probably not the *Poetics* directly. Aside from the minor detail that Aristotle

uses not ἀγαθῶν but the comparative βελτίων, as for example at *Poetics* 2.1448a.4 and 15.1454b.9—in this passage the aim of sculpture is now to portray facial expressions (*vultus*), that of poetry to portray character and passion (*mores animique*), a distinction also in Cicero (*Arch.* 30, cited by Niall Rudd on this passage). Both sculpture and poetry, however, apparently still imitate the actions of serious men (*res gestae virorum clarorum*). Thus, the formulation derived from Aristotle's *Politics*, as discussed in chapter 3 above, has been adopted over that of the *Poetics*. It is often said that the *Poetics* was lost in antiquity and without influence.[13] This passage is the first of several we shall find in which there is at least indirect influence of the *Poetics*. What makes this passage so important is that Horace, or his source, is familiar both with the terminology of the *Poetics* and with the further clarifications and distinctions made in the *Politics*. One cannot say that the *Poetics* was without influence in the ancient world.

But the greatest significance of the passage is where it *does not* follow the *Poetics*, and indeed looks to an older tradition that may have influenced the discussion in the *Politics*. Race quite rightly lists this passage with others that echo the tradition of Pindar and Isocrates' *Evagoras*, a tradition discussed above in chapter 2. Race makes an important observation: "Here *mores animique* are equivalent to the Isocratean *tropous* and *dianoias* at *Evag.* 75." This reference gains importance from the fact that Horace's Pindaric allusion in *Ode* 1.1.1–5 includes the similar phrase *vires animumque moresque*.[14] We can now see why in Horace's passage sculpture is said to imitate facial expressions (*vultus*), while poetry imitates *mores animique*. Here Horace follows the tradition that distinguished literature from the visual arts based on the aim of the artist/writer, the tradition that had been supplanted by the mimetic tradition of Plato and Aristotle, which sought to make the arts similar because both are mimetic. The theoretical thread lost with Isocrates is here resumed by Horace.

This passage from the *Letter to Augustus* puts in a clearer context another passage from Horace, namely, the famous lines that open the poem at the end of *Odes* Book 3, the final poem in a collection originally published in three books (*Carm.* 3.30.1–5):

> I have sculpted a monument more lasting than bronze
> and higher than the royal edifice of the pyramids
> which not voracious rain, not raging Aquilo
> might be able to ruin or the uncountable
> series of years and flight of the ages.

Horace closes his three-book collection with an echo of the passages in Pindar, Bacchylides, and Simonides discussed at the beginning of this study, in which poems claimed to be able to outlive tombstones and statues. Especially influential was Pindar's *Pythian* 6, with its allusion to a "treasury of hymns" (ὕμνων θησαυρός, lines 7–8). Horace broadens the claim from tombstones and statues to even the pyramids, and his claim asserts greatness of size as well as endurance, but the subsequent lines of the poem, in which he alludes to his own mortality, or more exactly to the mortality of his soul, place the poem firmly within the genre of the funerary epitaph. Matthew S. Santirocco has suggested that Horace here intends to compare to the pyramids not the individual poem, as in Pindar and the rest, but the three-book collection of *Odes* 1–3; the poems are "the individual stones out of which a single monumental edifice is constructed," the collection itself, "an intricate mosaic."[15]

Several other noteworthy parallels to Isocrates' *Evagoras* have been observed. In *Ode* 4.8, Horace tells Censorinus that he cannot honor him with works of art, but he can send poems, which can glorify a man "more clearly" (*clarius*, line 19). Martial compares a painting of himself unfavorably to a collection of poems (*Ep.* 7.84). Not only is the poetry more durable; it is also

a better likeness of the poet (*certior vultus,* line 6). More interesting is an epigram in which Martial denies that a painting can portray character; in fact Martial uses the very same terminology as Horace, deriving from the Pindaric-Isocratean tradition (*mores animumque,* 10.32.5). One can see how pervasive this Pindaric-Isocratean tradition became in late antiquity by examining poem 4.4 in the *Palatine Anthology.* This poem, written by Agathius Scholasticus in Byzantium, puts the doctrine in its most extreme form: visual arts only benefit the living, while the virtues extolled in literature survive beyond death.[16]

The claim for the durability of poetry over statues and buildings appears to endure through the Middle Ages, as evidenced by Leonardo's attempt to rebuff it.[17] Between Pindar and Horace the claim for poetry's greater durability appears only sporadically; here Horace returns to the earlier tradition of Alcidamas and Isocrates' *Evagoras.*

LONGINUS

More mature applications of the comparison of literature to the visual arts appear in the treatise *On the Sublime* (Greek Περὶ Ὕψους, Latin *De Sublimitate*) attributed to "Longinus." As in the case of Horace, the philosophical allegiance of the author (to whom I here refer as Longinus, as in the case of Demetrius without presuming authorship) has been disputed. He has traditionally been considered a Platonist, although recently it has become more fashionable to posit Peripatetic elements in the treatise. Longinus' date has also been disputed. Generally a date in the first century A.D. has been given, and that date will be accepted here, since Longinus' treatment of art and literature appears midway in the development between Horace and Plutarch. *On the Sublime* might have been treated in the previous chapter, since Longinus is aware of the issues disputed in the

philosophical and rhetorical schools (including the doctrine of *ut pictura poesis*). One statement by Longinus, for example, shows that he accepts the words/things dichotomy that permeates Cicero's work (*Subl.* 30.1):

> Thought and expression are of course very much involved with each other. We have therefore next to consider whether any topics still remain in the field of diction. The choice of correct and magnificent words is a source of immense power to entice and charm the hearer. This is something which all orators and other writers cultivate intensely. It makes grandeur, beauty, old-world charm, weight, force, strength, and a kind of lustre bloom upon our words as upon beautiful statues; it gives things life and makes them speak. But I suspect there is no need for me to make this point; you know it well. It is indeed true that beautiful words are the light that illuminates thought.

The equation here, as in Cicero, is that light (= color) is to a perceived object as words are to things (as for example at *Orat.* 139, where the use of figures of thought gives light, *eluceat*, to the style). It will be remembered that this equation was what allowed Cicero to bring the terminology of art criticism into rhetorical criticism.[18]

Longinus is aware of the rhetorical-artistic terminology discussed in the last chapter, although his only use of χρῶμα, "color," occurs at 17.3, in a discussion of art and literature to be discussed below. The by now familiar analogy from architecture appears at 10.7, the word ἄνθος, "flower," at 10.4. At 13.4 there is apparently a comparison to sculpture, but little can be gleaned from it due to textual corruptions. Meerwaldt has shown that Longinus is also familiar with the doctrine of forensic and deliberative styles developing out of Aristotle and materializing in Cicero and in Horace's *Ars Poetica*. In relation to Horace, an

interesting passage is 36.3–4, where Longinus compares a colossus to Polycleitus' *Doryphorus*. Longinus has been comparing genius to art, arguing that geniuses such as Homer and Plato are preferable to lesser if more perfect writers.

> It has been remarked that 'the failed colossus is no better than the Doryphorus of Polycleitus'. There are many ways of answering this. We may say that accuracy is admired in art and grandeur in nature, and it is *by nature* that man is endowed with the power of speech; or again that statues are expected to represent the human form, whereas, as I said, something higher than human is sought in literature.
>
> At this point I have a suggestion to make which takes us back to the beginning of the book. Impeccability is generally a product of art; erratic excellence comes from natural greatness; therefore, art must always come to the aid of nature, and the combination of the two may well be perfection.[19]

There are a number of interesting points here. Once again under a new guise appears the comparison of forensic oratory to political oratory, which we have seen in Aristotle, Cicero, Dionysius, Quintilian, and Horace. The product of genius, like the colossus, looks good at a distance and in public, where minor errors and problems will not be seen. Rouveret points out that skénographia is associated with large objects as early as Plato. By a curious reversal, although consistent with Aristotle, the skiagraphic style is now the one that looks good from a distance (like an impressionistic painting), the skenographic looking better up close. The product of art, like the *Doryphorus*, looks good up close, under scrutiny in the private study.[20]

The *Doryphorus* by Polycleitus is a famous fifth-century statue, now accessible from many copies. Thought in antiquity and by

some moderns to be Achilles, it was designed following mathe-matical laws apparently of Pythagorean origin. Several nearly complete Roman copies of the *Doryphorus* survive, including the statue now in the Minneapolis Institute of Arts (86.6), here reproduced as plate 3. Polycleitus sculpted in the late fifth century, as did Pheidias, but he worked at Argos rather than Athens. He developed the idea of mathematical anatomics and published his ideas as the *Canon*. Varro and Pliny (*HN* 34.56 and 34.65) criticize Polycleitus' work as *quadrata*, "squared," a term which in Greek (τετράγωνος) was associated with the kouros statues, as we have seen in chapter 2; it seems that Polycleitus returned the "four-square" appearance to sculpture to add spatial dimensionality, but that this appearance was subsequently rejected by Lysippus. Pollitt estimates the date of the *Doryphorus* at 450 B.C., before Pheidias' influence. The *Doryphorus* was bronze, although most of our copies are in stone. The *Colossus of Rhodes*, perhaps the "colossus" in this passage, was the famous bronze sun statue by Chares, a sculptor from Lindus, at Rhodes from the late fourth or early third century. The *Colossus*, known only from one copy and perhaps some coins, was the biggest statue in antiquity, more than 100 feet in height, and was one of the "seven wonders" of the ancient world. It was destroyed in the late third century B.C. by an earthquake, but in Longinus' time it was still visible in a ruined state.[21]

In Longinus, the artistic contrast between the forensic style, best exemplified by Polycleitus, and the political style, best exemplified by the *Colossus*, is made much clearer than was the case in Horace, and the preceding discussion by Longinus (32.8–36.2) allows me to conclude that Horace, or perhaps the source of both Horace and Longinus, prefers the political, skiagraphic style: Homer over the more perfect Apollonius, Sophocles over Ion of Chios, and Demosthenes over Hyperides, to choose three of Longinus' examples—and Shakespeare over

Ben Jonson, to choose a modern one. Quintilian's comment (12.10.8–9) that Polycleitus is best in the human sphere, Pheidias in the divine, would seem to place these artists within the similar comparison made by Plato in the *Critias* (106b–108a, discussed in chapter 2). The *Colossus* represents the political, skiagraphic style, the *Doryphorus* the forensic, skenographic style.

Longinus here transcends Aristotelian mimēsis. Literature does not necessarily have to imitate men although apparently sculpture still does. Furthermore, the goal of literature is not accuracy but grandeur (τὸ μέγεθος, the sublime), the former being a product of art, the latter the product of nature. Again, sculpture, other than a colossus, perhaps, seems limited to accuracy. For the first time since Pindar and its Horatian imitation, the analogy of the arts is used to show that literature is greater than visual art; its medium is less limiting and gives more opportunity for true accomplishment. This same argument—that visual art is bound to visuality whereas literature is less limited because it can transcend spatial limits—will appear in more extended form in Dio. (Incidentally, some have thought that the colossus referred to here is Pheidias' Zeus, also the subject of Dio's discourse.) Here, at last, we are on the way toward breaking some of the constrictions imposed by both Aristotelian mimēsis and the doctrines of *ut pictura poesis*.[22]

A more Ciceronian use of the analogy appears in chapter 17 of *On the Sublime*. Longinus is arguing that the use of figures of speech enhances the sublime. While they call attention to themselves as art, they can be masked by sublimity (17.1). The effect is similar to that of the sun on our ability to see the other planets; they disappear owing to the overwhelming sunlight (17.2). Similarly, in painting, lighted parts (sublimity) seem nearer when highlighted by shadow (figures): "Something like this happens in painting: when light and shadow are juxtaposed in colours on the same plane, the light seems more prominent

to the eye, and both stands out and actually appears much nearer. Similarly, in literature, emotional and sublime features seem closer to the mind's eye, both because of a certain natural kinship and because of their brilliance. Consequently, they always show up above the figures, and overshadow and eclipse their artifice." Here, rather than a scheme of *res* and *verba*, as Russell comments, "light corresponds to ὕψος and shade to σχήματα and their artifice." It is more apparent that the rhetoricians are aiming at an application of the term of art criticism, *skiagraphia* (*chiaroscuro*). This type of art criticism is apparently also known to Cicero (*De Or.* 3.101).[23]

Even nearer to Longinus perhaps is Cicero's comment that the Sophists treat metaphors like painters use colors, in a passage also influenced by the doctrine of political and forensic styles (*Orat.* 65), although Cicero, unlike Longinus and Horace, clearly favors the forensic style. *Skiagraphia,* meaning *chiaroscuro,* was known to Dionysius, as we have seen, and to the younger Pliny (*Ep.* 3.13.4, favorably compared to Longinus by Russell), as well as to Quintilian (*luminum umbrarumque . . . rationem,* 12.10.4), who ascribes its invention to Zeuxis; it appeared as early as Plato's *Critias,* as we saw, and perhaps also in the *Republic* (10.602d). As in the case of Horace, the sublime style here represents the political style, again compared to *skiagraphia;* in sections 1 and 2 of chapter 17 Longinus has cautioned against using rhetorical figures when in a forensic situation. But with Longinus we have attained a mature synthesis of the sorts of criticism found in both Cicero and Horace. Longinus' "sublime" in literature mirrors *chiaroscuro* in painting, but as a blending of styles, in which artifice is, as in Horace, studied but hidden even when examined in the light of the sun. But in Longinus the sublime is equivalent to "nature," and especially sunlight, which allows the tropes (colors) given by art to become visible and set off in relief.[24]

PETRONIUS

The *Satyricon*, a novel attributed to Petronius that we know from many fragments, manifests the author's awareness of many of the ideas treated in this study. The date of the treatise is disputed and might be important only in that the action occurs in the early imperial period; the traditional date of authorship is Neronian. While Petronius' comparisons of literature to the visual arts have none of the sophistication of Horace, Longinus, or even Plutarch, he shares with them several motifs. As we have it, the *Satyricon* opens with a discussion by the narrator, Encolpius, of the decline of rhetoric. This same motif ends *On the Sublime*, and in fact is one of the main indications that Longinus' work was composed in the first century A.D., also the traditional date of Petronius' *Satyricon*. Encolpius claims that painting is suffering a similar decline (*Sat.* 2.9). Later in the book, the poet Eumolpus expatiates on the same topic but includes all arts and sciences in the decline (*Sat.* 88), following up with a long description of a painting that he and Encolpius are examining together (*Sat.* 89).

Understanding this description requires a glance at a tradition tangentially related to comparisons between literature and the visual arts, the tradition of *ekphrasis*, or the description of visual art in poetry or prose. This tradition began with Homer's description of the shield of Achilles in *Iliad* 18, where Homer takes the audience around the work spatially in a duplication of the process of examining a picture or statue. Since Lessing (*Laocoön*, chapter 18), it has been recognized that Homer's movement is also temporal, in that Homer describes the temporal action of Hephaestus. This method of ekphrasis became a popular stylistic device with historians; we will examine traces of the genre in Plutarch's discussion of enargeia and one might note another example in Demetrius' selection of Ctesias as

model of enargeia (4.212–216). Graham Zanker's theory of "pictorial realism" must be seen as part of this tradition, related to the rise of the literary enargeia and the "phantastic" in literary and artistic theory.[25]

Among the Hellenistic epigrams, ekphrastic poems become common. Here monuments speak and emphasize their own naturalism in the Horatian sense; for example, a reader is said to mistake the work for the actual object. Moreover, on many occasions poems are shaped like the objects they describe; these might be referred to as "pictographic." Hellenistic ekphrasis has recently been reevaluated by Simon Goldhill. Examining Theocritus and epigrams, Goldhill finds "[i]n Hellenistic literary culture . . . a distinctive way of looking at things." Ekphrasis is more than a static description of a work of art; it is a temporal lesson by an expert (σοφός), often with philosophic and erotic overtones, in how to "read" a work of art. This "viewing" Goldhill associates with the development of phantasia, that is with nonmimetic aesthetic philosophy; this tradition will be examined separately in chapter 6.[26]

The Romans, especially Catullus, Vergil, and Propertius, used the reader's knowledge of Hellenistic painting to heighten the visuality of their works, although in Ovid the pictorial effects are not so sharp. But in the dialogue *Eikones*, the slightly later prose author, Lucian, provides a collage of literary and visually artistic materials, demonstrating the ease with which material can be transferred across genres. This dialogue playfully turns the tables on the anecdote of Zeuxis at Croton. Lyncinus, a speaker in the dialogue, takes details from many existing statues and paintings and even literary portraits to create, through words, an image of a female acquaintance. Another interlocutor, Polystratus, responds with a description of her character and voice. He gives a series of portrayals and, while retaining the terminology of visual art, draws his analogies from literature, mythology, and history. Literature and the visual arts are

thus separated, and the dialogue ends with the expected praise
of literary portraiture over visual art, in the tradition of Pindar,
Isocrates, Plutarch, and Dio Chrysostom. There is special irony
in this conclusion, since Lucian had training as a sculptor and
switched to literature (*Somn.* 9). This trend continues in late
antiquity, as the two Philostrati analyze paintings like works of
literature, looking for plot and character, while in the romances
(prose narrative novels), works of literature are treated as works
of art, or perhaps as galleries. The second Philostratus, a
maternal grandson of the first (*Imag.*, *proem* 2), argues in the
familiar language of Aristotle and Plutarch that painters must
show "signs of men's character" (ἠθῶν ξύμβολα, *proem* 3) and
associates painting with poetry and both with phantasia (*proem*
6); he also knows the term *enargeia* (10.17). Even later, Callis-
tratus treats sculptures and paintings as motionless and voiceless
but on the verge of moving or talking; the mythological figure
Memnon even crosses the genres and speaks.[27]

Hagstrum's interesting explanation for the popularity of
ekphrastic poetry in the Middle Ages is also true in a more
general sense of ekphrastic art in the archaic Greek period:
"The statue or painting has, in spite of official pronouncements
against idolatry and in spite of powerful iconoclastic move-
ments, become a kind of intermediary between the divine and
the human. Spoken to, entreated, implored, it speaks in return.
Therefore, a Christian poet like Philes believed that a mixed
form is more satisfactory than verbal art alone or plastic art
alone. In iconic art the silent form will speak, and in the
combination there will be united the peculiar exellencies of
each medium."

Long before Philes, Pindar understands that the four-
dimensional chorus is more successful than the three-dimensional
statue in singing the victor's praise. Any author of a pictographic
poem, and there are many in the *Greek Anthology*, knows that only
a singing picture truly imitates reality. There is evidence that

painting was used as a "visual aid" to oratory in the Hellenistic and Roman schools and in at least one public oration of which we have record. By the Hellenistic period, in discussions that will come to fruition in Plutarch and, even more fully, in Dio Chrysostom, theorists are pointing out the limitations of both literature and the visual arts in comparisons between them. Thus, whereas the mimetic approaches of Plato and Aristotle had emphasized similarities between the two, by the time of Dio and Plutarch theorists are emphasizing not the similarities, but the differences.[28]

Broad dissemination of the doctrines discussed in this study might also explain the Romans' obsession with narration in their visual arts. The technique of "continuous narration" is preserved in only one Greek work, a Pergamene frieze portraying the deeds of Telephus, but this technique can be seen in many paintings of the Roman period, in the reliefs at St. Rémy, on the *Tabulae Iliacae*, on sarcophagi, and on Trajan's column; Peter H. von Blanckenhagen sees strict continuous narration as a Roman creation, stemming from the Roman convention of showing historical events in plastic form. Here Roman tradition has transformed Greek art by combining natural and unnatural perspectives. The Romans could have found theoretical support for this transformation in the various doctrines of *ut pictura poesis* discussed in this study. The Roman view of art is clarified in Leach's important study of both visual art and literature at the end of the Roman Republic and in the Augustan period. From the murals of Pompeii and elsewhere, Leach derives a notion of Roman space, which she then uses to reconstruct the Roman's mindset when "reading" paintings or visualizing poetic description. For example, she focuses on the narrator of Vergil's *Aeneid* to construct a hypothetical viewer of narrative landscapes (*Aen.* 1.461–87). The study ends with a comparison of Propertius and Ovid: the former furnishes to the reader the experience of walking through a *pinacoteca*, or

artfully arranged series of paintings, while Ovid's pictorial effects shift and complement the effect of his narration on the reader.[29]

Hellenistic and Roman literature is not only visual, it is also spatial. The elaborate ring composition of Homer, analogous to the repeating and interlocked geometric designs on pots in the style of that era, appears in more simple form in Greek poetry, but perhaps the only Greek prose writer to use geometrical ring composition was Thucydides, who opened his *History* with such a structure under the guise of chronological narrative (*Hist.* 1.1). This technique of interlocking structure was well known to the Roman poets, especially Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, Horace, and Vergil, who applied it both in the construction of poems and in the organization of collections of poems. The Romans probably learned these techniques from Hellenistic works. Spatial concern is rarer in Roman prose than in poetry, although elaborate ring composition has been detected in Suetonius' lives of Nero and Galba.[30]

Petronius has been the subject of several recent "viewer response" approaches, in which a hypothetical viewer and indeed a hypothetical cultural context are created and ancient works of art are "read" as texts. Bryson, in an early viewer response study, showed that the same "social code" of guest and host permeates Pompeian murals, Philostratus' verbal ekphrases in his *Imagines*, and Petronius' *Cena Trimalchionis*, the famous dinner scene in the *Satyricon*. Jane Whitehead further studies the art in the *Cena*, especially Trimalchio's elaborately planned tomb, in the context of Pompeian art and shows that standard funerary themes evoke aspects of Trimalchio's life. Whitehead's conclusion is worthy of quotation here: "Read this way, the Cena becomes a satire against the limitations of art. It satirizes as well the limitations of the reader's understanding. Petronius draws on the fact that one best reads ancient narrative, whether literary or artistic, whether relating the exploits of a freedman

or an emperor, through icons or standardized tropes; similarly, one best perceives social differences through stereotypes."[31]

With these traditions in mind, we can better understand the ekphrases in Petronius' *Satyricon*. In one passage Encolpius examines some works by Zeuxis and others and comments that in them he can see the character (*animi*) of the mythological characters they portray (*Sat.* 83). Subsequently, Eumolpus lectures Encolpius, in prose and poetry, on a painting they are viewing (*Sat.* 89). In both ekphrases, Encolpius' and Eumolpus', we see a parody of Goldhill's philosopher/poet/lover (σοφός) of Hellenistic epigrams, a character also found by Elsner in the *Tabula of Cebes*. Eumolpus' ekphrasis has been acutely compared to Catullus 64, where the description of a tapestry of Ariadne on Naxos yields a psychological lament. Most interesting here is that Encolpius has been abandoned by Gito in favor of his former friend Ascyltus, and when he looks at the love scenes in the painting, Encolpius projects his own sad feelings into the characters portrayed. He shows us how he "reads" mythological paintings, creating an interpretation from his own personal experiences. Perhaps the best assessment would be that we have here a sample of the current theoretical culture of Rome, an expression of the comparisons between literature and the visual arts as seen by an educated writer of satire, as opposed to a literary theorist, and, as Leach has shown, an example of how such a narrator would view paintings in a *pinacoteca*-style setting.[32]

PLUTARCH

Plutarch's voluminous writings have proven difficult to date, but it is probably safe to say that most of his works were written between A.D. 96 and 116. Chronologically, then, Plutarch falls shortly after the traditional date for Longinus and Petronius and roughly contemporary with Dio Chrysostom, who will be

discussed in the next chapter. Plutarch is best known for his *Parallel Lives*, a set of paired biographies of Greek and Roman generals and leaders. His *Moralia* consists of an imposing collection of treatises on a wide variety of ethical topics of general interest with an eclectic philosophical basis.[33]

Although a man of extremely broad education and reading, he is probably not a truly original thinker on the issue of the relationship of literature to the visual arts. He applies the terminology of art criticism and carpentry to literature, for example, "sculpting" stories (*De glor. Ath.* 7.350D–351A; *Quomodo adul.* 3.20C). He shows himself thoroughly familiar with Peripatetic doctrine and gives us an indication that since Aristotle, the *Poetics*, in some form, had been important, and that the doctrine of the *Poetics* had been developed and perhaps even criticized. Indeed, the doctrine is central to Plutarch's conception of biography and history. We can infer this from the opening of the *Life of Alexander*, where Plutarch describes biography as different from history in that it focuses not on actions but on character (1.3): "Accordingly, just as painters get the likenesses in their portraits from the face and the expression of the eyes, wherein the character (τὸ ἦθος) shows itself, but make very little account of the other parts of the body, so I must be permitted to devote myself rather to the signs of the soul in men (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα), and by means of these to portray (εἰδοποιεῖν) the life of each, leaving to others the description of their great contests." The thought and language here are clearly Aristotelian, drawn from the tradition not of the *Poetics* but of the *Politics* (18.5.1340a.28–42), where it is stated that writers portray character, while sculptors portray the *signs* of character (σημεῖα τῶ ἠθῶν). Aristotle does not single out the eyes but talks rather of the body in general. Plutarch's emphasis on the face shows that he is not repeating Aristotle but is articulating a later synthesis and improvement of Peripatetic teaching.[34]

The same is true of Plutarch's celebrated passage with which this study opened, quoting Simonides on the similarity of poetry

and painting. The treatise in which the Simonidean passage appears, *De gloria Atheniensium*, has the full title, *Bellone an Pace Clariores Fuerint Athenienses*, translated by Babbitt as "*Were the Athenians More Famous in War or in Wisdom?*" The intention of the work is to extol the deeds of famous Athenians as greater than the literature and art they produced. The treatise opens on an Aristotelian note. Action is greater than literature, which derives greatness only from the action described. Historians, then, are actors of others' deeds (1.345E). The same is true of visual art: surely the painting of the battle of Mantineia by Euphranor is less great than the actual battle. Victory is better than its visual representation, truth better than imitation (τὸν πίνακα τοῦ τροπαίου καὶ τὸ μίμημα τῆς ἀληθείας, 2.346F).

At this point the Simonidean citation appears (*De glor. Ath.* 3.346F–347A):

> Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting (τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν ... τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν): for the actions (πράξεις) which painters portray as taking place at the moment (ὡς γιγνομένας) literature narrates and records after they have taken place (γεγενημένας). Even though artists with colour and design (χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι), and writers with words and phrases (ὀνόμασι καὶ λέξεσι), represent the same subjects, they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation (ὕλῃ καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως); and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation (εἰδωλοποιήσας) of emotions and characters, makes his narration like a painting.

The Simonidean aspects of the passage were discussed in chapter 2, and I have elsewhere made some observations on

the passage that will bear repetition and elaboration here in light of the expanded discussion.[35]

The most important point to be observed is that in his explanation of the Simonidean dictum, Plutarch differentiates literature from the visual arts on the basis of time. Recall that in the *Poetics*, Aristotle derives both plot and character from the object of imitation, namely, the actions of men, and hence was obligated to assert repeatedly that both poetry and visual art depict character. In the *Politics* he recognized some problems with this assertion, problems also seen by Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.10) and by Plutarch in the passage quoted above from the *Life of Alexander*. In the eighteenth century, Lessing based his treatise *Laocoön* on the assertion that the object of imitation for literature differs from the object of imitation for the visual arts (*Laocoön*, chapter 16):

> My conclusion is this. If it is true that painting employs in its imitations quite other means or signs than poetry employs, the former—that is to say, figures and colours in space—but the latter articulate sounds in time; as, unquestionably, the signs used must have a definite relation to the thing signified, it follows that signs arranged together side by side can express only subjects which, or the various parts of which, exist thus side by side, whilst signs which succeed each other can express only subjects which, or the various parts of which, succeed each other.
>
> Subjects which, or the various parts of which, exist side by side, may be called *bodies*. Consequently, bodies with their visible properties form the proper subjects of painting.
>
> Subjects which or the various parts of which succeed each other may in general be called *actions*. Consequently, actions form the proper subjects of poetry.

Literature imitates action, which unfolds through time, and hence has as its goal the portrayal of character. Visual art, on the other hand, imitates objects in space, which do not progress through time. Consequently the goal of visual art is to depict beauty. It is difficult to say when the ideas in Lessing became common currency. Lessing is generally credited with the first clear differentiation between the arts by medium and object, but as we shall see, Dio Chrysostom understands something of the problem, and the differentiation is also relatively clear to Castelvetro in the sixteenth century.[36]

In the first sentence quoted above Plutarch is somewhere between Aristotle and Lessing. Like Aristotle, he maintains that both visual art and literature imitate actions (πράξεις) but believes that the action of art is fixed in the present, signalled by the present participle (γιγνομένας). Literature, on the other hand, depicts actions that are completed, signalled by the perfect participle (γεγενημένας). These points in Plutarch have received some notice. Zanker, for example, in the midst of an important discussion of enargeia, comments that Plutarch "notice[s] the important difference that painting represents 'events as if happening' and literature 'events as if having happened'" (*Mor.* 346F). But Plutarch asserts even more. After this passage, Plutarch praises the narration of Thucydides for its vividness (ἐναργέστατα). The events are so vividly narrated that they seem to be happening (γιγνόμενα) while the reader is reading (347A); Plutarch in fact repeats the participle at 347C. Plutarch's conclusion is that "if it be unworthy to compare painters with generals, let us not compare historians either."[37] When this passage is read with the Simonidean explication, the conclusions are clear and significant, if somewhat paradoxical. At its best, narrative prose is closer to painting than to poetry, since both narrate events as if happening (γιγνόμενα). In other words, time can be used to distinguish not only literature from visual art, but also narrative prose, with its pictorial effect, from

poetry. To use Lessing's terms, Plutarch would see poetry as a temporal art, painting and pictorial narrative prose as spatial arts. Such is the power of enargeia.

The potential here exists, especially when the three Plutarchan passages are considered together, for a serious undermining of Aristotle's position. The importance of Plutarch's sentence on the present and perfect participles has escaped most critics, but Lucas finds even more prefiguration of Lessing: "It is just this extension of the action in time which makes it possible for a poet to give it significance by revealing the logic of events, but it would be unsafe to assert that Simonides himself was aware of this distinction." We might add that the significance of differentiation between the arts based on time probably escaped Plutarch as well, but clearly the Peripatetics traversed some very interesting ground, the loss of which we should regret.[38]

The Simonidean passage can perhaps be understood better if we examine the similar passage in chapter 3 of "How the Young Man Should Study Poetry" (as Babbitt translates Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat), where the same Simonidean statement is anonymously attributed (3.17F–18A):

> We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not merely be acquainted with the oft-repeated saying that "poetry is articulate painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry," but let us teach him in addition that when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become beautiful; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an

ugly body, it fails to give what propriety and probability require.[39]

This comparison is nearly identical to the passage discussed previously, although the syntax is more clipped, different participles are substituted for "articulate" (φθεγγομένην for λαλοῦσαν) and "inarticulate" (σιγῶσαν for σιωπῶσαν), and the adage is not attributed to Simonides or anyone else (ἐκεῖνο τὸ θρυλούμενον, 3.17F). The significance of these details for Simonidean authenticity was discussed in chapter 2. Here I would like to see how this passage provides more information on Plutarch's view of literature and visual art.

The thoroughly Aristotelian nature of this passage has been noted, although there is an added moralistic slant. Poetry is a mimetic art (μιμητικὴ τέχνη, 3.17F) and is similar to painting (ἀντίστροφος τῆι ζωγραφίαι, 3.17F). This latter phrase reminds one of the opening of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where rhetoric is said to be ἀντίστροφος to the art of dialectic (*Rhet.* 1.1.1354a1). For Plutarch the pleasure of appreciating poetry or painting comes not from the subject but from the similarity of imitation to imitated object (οὐκ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ὅμοιον, *Quomodo adul.* 3.18A), an aesthetic problem with which Aristotle had also wrestled with more sophistication but also without finding a solution (e.g., *Poet.* 4.1448b4–17, discussed in chapter 3). The poet/artist can depict an inappropriate action but, again as in Aristotle, the result should be appropriate and probable (τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ εἴκος, *Quomodo adul.* 3.18A).[40]

Plutarch seems implicitly to understand that painting can encompass objects of imitation that poetry cannot, such as lizards. But he does not dwell on this; in fact he seems intent on emphasizing the similarities rather than the differences. The reason for this is clear; Plutarch wishes to extract the moral issue. Both literature and visual arts can imitate disgusting subjects, but the imitation is to be judged on the quality of the

imitation rather than on the quality of the imitated object. Hence, the analogy to painting helps Plutarch's argument. Painting can imitate a lizard, but clearly the student would not personally imitate a lizard. Similarly the poet/painter can imitate a prostitute or an infanticide, but obviously the student should imitate this no more than imitate a lizard. Alan Wardman has interpreted the passage well. Since "artistry" can be distinguished from subject matter (the subject matter of "good art" need not be moral), and since the reader of biography is interested in subject (deeds done by the man being written on), *enargeia*, a technique of art, is appropriate to history but not to biography, and consequently Plutarch will make the claim in the *Cimon* that biography is superior to the visual arts and also to history, since it is more moral.[41]

The distinctions in Aristotle's *Poetics* have here been put to a use that might have surprised Aristotle but that are perfectly in keeping with Plutarch's ethical doctrines elsewhere. Incidentally, this passage is preceded by a comment that also is relevant, wherein Plutarch defends the use of literary fiction (τὸ πλαττόμενον) by observing (*Quomodo adul.* 2.16B–C): "But, just as in pictures, colour is more stimulating than line-drawing because it is life-like, and creates an illusion, so in poetry falsehood combined with plausibility is more striking, and gives more satisfaction, than the work which is elaborate in metre and diction, but devoid of myth and fiction."[42] One is reminded again of the analogies in Aristotle's *Poetics*, although now the "primacy of form" has yielded to the "stimulation" of color.

The passages here are unquestionably derived from the *Poetics*—with its differentiation among object, means, and manner—rather than from the *Politics*. But since the precise terminology is different, it is likely that Plutarch is reading an intermediary source, just as with the passage from the *Alexander*. The means of imitation, called by Aristotle τῶι ἑτέροις, is here called ὕλῃ, for example. It is likely that the Peripatetics continued

to discuss the issues of the *Poetics*, and Plutarch reflects this ongoing debate. Still, he not only holds that both literature and the visual arts are imitative of actions, but he also emphasizes the visual nature of literature. Thus, the passage from *De gloria Atheniensium* quoted above is followed by a praise of Thucydides for his visuality (*enargeia*); the writing of history is the painting of pictures (εἰδωλοποιήσας). But it pales beside action. The writing of mythological material is of even less value, since it is further from reality (or action: *De glor. Ath.* 4.348A–B): "A myth aims at being a false tale, resembling a true one; wherefore it is far removed from actual events, if a tale is but a picture and an image of actuality, and a myth is but a picture and image of a tale (εἰ λόγος μὲν ἔργου, καὶ λόγου δὲ μῦθος εἰκὼν καὶ εἴδωλόν ἐστι)." There is really no coherent literary doctrine here, but rather a good sample of the issues discussed in the schools.[43] Most important is the doctrine of "vividness" (*enargeia*), which is a rhetorical term associated with visuality, which in turn is related to Horace's concept of "appropriateness," which opens the *Ars Poetica* and appears often in connection with comparisons of literature to the visual arts. The term is also important in Demetrius, as we have seen, and will play a role in the doctrine of *phantasia* to be discussed in the next chapter.

It is in Plutarch, in fact, that the concept of enargeia can be best understood in its full significance. The best analysis of this term has appeared in two studies by Zanker, who sees it as a key term in understanding Hellenistic literature. For Zanker, a dominant trait of Hellenistic literature is a realism derived from fourth-century illusionist art. Plutarch admires enargeia because it is typical of Hellenistic art, literature, and literary theory, which attribute representation to individuals (realism) as opposed to Platonic and Aristotelian attribution to types (idealism). But most importantly, as Zanker astutely observes, Plutarch believes in a doctrine of *ut pictura poesis* in which both types of creative production, aural and visual, strive for the same effect: pictorialism,

or *enargeia*. *Enargeia*, then, is a Hellenistic creation, beginning as a term in philosophy and coming then into poetry and history and then into rhetorical theory. In the Roman period it appears under the guise of a number of Latin terms, including *illustris*, which appears in Cicero (*Part. Or.* 6.20) and also in the *Ad Herennium* (4.68; 4.51) and in Quintilian, where it is associated with *phantasia*, as will be seen in the next chapter. Some would deny *enargeia* to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.11.1) and would in fact deny interest in pictorialism among any of the ancient figures discussed here in chapters 1–3, even for Simonides, whose pictorialism was remarked upon in chapter 2. If this is the case, *enargeia* and the more general term *ekphrasis* then explain the "plastic" quality of Hellenistic poetry and represent the core of the difference in attitude between Aristotle, on the one hand, and the Hellenistic painters and writers, including Plutarch, on the other.[44]

A related but much clearer set of distinctions appears in the *Cimon*, where Plutarch explains that he has selected the life of Cimon in contrast with that of Lucullus and that he has a special reason for admiring Lucullus. The Roman leader assisted Plutarch's native Chaeronea in a dispute with a nearby city, Orchomenus: "Accordingly, the people who at that time were saved by him erected a marble statue of Lucullus in the marketplace beside that of Dionysus. And we, though many generations removed from him, think that his favour extends even down to us who are now living; and since we believe that a portrait which reveals character and disposition is far more beautiful than one which merely copies form and feature, we shall incorporate this man's deeds into our parallel lives, and we shall rehearse them truly" (*Cimon* 2.2–3).[45]

Here we may have a more developed version of the theory in Cicero that the face, and especially the eyes, are indicative of character (*imago est animi vultus*, *Orat.* 60). This passage contains Aristotelian terminology that is, however, modified in the

direction we have already seen in Isocrates, and in fact in the direction later taken by Lessing.[46] Both biographer and sculptor represent a visual object; note that Bernadotte Perrin translates εἰκόνα ... λιθίνην as "marble statue," εἰκόνα as "portrait". But after this fundamental similarity between sculpture and biography the differences begin to appear. Sculpture portrays physical characteristics (τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον), and does so by mimesis (ἀπομιμουμένης). Biography can "reveal" (ἐμφανίζουσαν) "character and disposition" (τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὸ τρόπον) and so is "more beautiful" (πολὺ καλλίονα). And Plutarch himself will accomplish this by narrating "deeds" (τὰς πράξεις). The realms of literature and the visual arts have now, within the framework of Aristotelian thought, been meaningfully distinguished.

Plutarch then draws an interesting corollary based on the fundamental similarities and differences between sculpture and biography (*Cimon* 2.4–5):

We demand of those who would paint fair and graceful features that, in case of any slight imperfection therein, they shall neither wholly omit it nor yet emphasise it, because the one course makes the portrait ugly and the other unlike its original. In like manner, since it is difficult, nay rather perhaps impossible, to represent a man's life as stainless and pure, in its fair chapters we must round out the truth into fullest semblance; but those transgressions and follies by which, owing to passion, perhaps, or political compulsion, a man's career is sullied, we must regard rather as shortcomings in some particular excellence than as the vile products of positive baseness, and we must not all too zealously delineate them in our history, and superfluously too, but treat them as though we were tenderly defending human nature for producing no character which is absolutely good and indisputably set towards virtue.[47]

This is a more mature application of Aristotelian doctrine. Faults should be acknowledged, in sculpture and biography, since we must be faithful to "human nature" (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως). The same standard can be applied to both arts because they both represent images (εἰκόνες). But the fault in sculpture is a physical blemish; the fault in biography, a lack of virtue. The arts have similar goals and standards but different realms—one, the physical, the other, the spiritual. Plutarch's thought here is not unique; his contemporary Maximus of Tyre makes virtually the same distinction, likewise comparing the reading of history to the viewing of painting (*Diss.* 12). Tacitus, also writing roughly at this same time, ends his *Agricola* with a recommendation that the man's actions, *facta dictaque*, be commemorated because these are permanent, *aeterna*, (46). Tacitus also states that actions are more imitable for the reader (as Isocrates had pointed out at *Evag.* 75). Again, literature is more ethical than the visual arts, for the simple reason that literature can more easily portray character. The fundamental differences between literature and the visual arts are due to the different media employed and in fact to the different dimensions, space as opposed to time, although none of the authors just discussed openly acknowledges this. Clearly cracks are developing in the Aristotelian formulation, even if Plutarch is little aware of the implications of his own statements. In the work of Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus, these cracks become chasms.

Phantasia

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE, CICERO AND OTHER ROMANS, DIO CHRYSOSTOM, AND PHILOSTRATUS

The theories we have discussed thus far, from Plato to Plutarch, are mimetic. According to Collingwood, they are based on a concept of "art as craft" and are therefore unsatisfactory as theories of beauty. Though it is not explicit, the tension between space and time has been omnipresent throughout the entire tradition, beginning with the initial analogy of Pindar, who suggested that the statue, as compared to the poem, was less valuable because locked in space and time—the continuous present signified by Plutarch's present participle. Throughout the discussions there also lurks a tension between a description of art as imitation, *mimēsis*, and a competing view that the human mind can create nonmimetic images and hence works of art through a process called *phantasia.* There is not need to track the entire tradition here, as there have been several recent studies on *phantasia* or "imagination." Rouveret traces the history of the term and explores some special implications for the visual arts. She traces the distinction from the Stoic opposition of *ars* and *ingenium,* which in turn point to the forensic and political styles, respectively. Watson shows how Cicero, Dio, and Philostratus

exhibit a blend of Stoic and Neoplatonic ideas, a blend that through the church fathers influenced aesthetic theory in the Middle Ages. Watson also shows how Longinus and Quintilian exhibit rhetorical versions of the doctrine of phantasia, how it is tied to the tradition of enargeia as prominent in Plutarch, and how the authors on phantasia tend to champion it over the visual arts. The relevant question here is how the comparisons between literature and the visual arts were linked to these ideas, and how the issues discussed throughout this study were modified and commented upon.[1]

PHANTASIA IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

One passage in Plato exemplifies, not his most mature thought, perhaps, but his opinion that truths regarding the visual arts should be analogously transferable to poetry. At *Sophist* 234b, the "stranger" conversing with Thaeatetus raises again the issue of the painter's ability to create visual illusion: "when he creates with his pencil representations (μιμήματα) bearing the same name as real things, he will be able to deceive the innocent minds of children, if he shows them his drawings (γεγραμμένα) at a distance, into thinking that he is capable of creating, in full reality, anything he chooses to make." We would expect Plato to believe an analogous power to exist for literature. Sure enough: "Then must we not expect to find a corresponding form of skill (τέχνην) in the region of discourse, making it possible to impose upon the young who are still far removed from the reality of things, by means of words that cheat the ear, exhibiting images of all things in a shadow play of discourse (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα), so as to make them believe that they are hearing the truth and that the speaker is in all matters the wisest of men?"[2]

This passage capsulizes Plato's conception of literature and the visual arts as analogous activities, as types of "imitation."

Most interesting here is the ease with which technical terms from literature flow into the discussion of painting, and vice versa. Similarly, at *Republic* 601a the poet "lays on with words and phrases the colors of the several arts" (τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν), and at *Cratylus* 424c–425a it is expressly stated that the poet's imitative use of words is analogous to the painter's use of color. At *Cratylus* 430b–431a, Socrates concludes that both a name and a picture are imitations of an object. Plato's mistrust of the imitator, his ethical and epistemological concern, is evident. Painting and poetry are dangerous and nearly identical weapons that can easily fall into the wrong hands.[3]

Another, more influential group of passages appears in the *Sophist*, immediately following the passages just mentioned. This dialogue is generally considered somewhat of an oddity in the works of Plato and the distinctions about to be discussed are not standard Platonic doctrine. The subject of the dialogue is the nature of the Sophist. After some tentative definitions, the stranger characterizes the Sophist as an imitator and compares him to a visual artist, a dangerous man, as seen in the passages quoted above (234b). The stranger then divides "imitations" into two types (*Soph.* 235d): "One art that I see contained in it is the making of likenesses (εἰκαστική). The perfect example of this consists in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions of the original in all three dimensions and giving moreover the proper color to every part." Visual artists do not imitate in this way, for this type of image would not *appear* to be in scale and would not be attractive. The visual artist creates a second type of image, "which only appears to be a likeness of a well-made figure because it is not seen from a satisfactory point of view. . . . So the best name for the art which creates, not a likeness, but a semblance will be semblance making (φανταστική)" (*Soph.* 236b and c).[4]

An extended ontological discussion follows, in which the stranger proves the existence of falsity (236d–264d). Plato then

returns to the distinction between "image" and "semblance," adding to it another set of distinctions. Production by gods is distinguished from production by humans. Each of these can be divided again: "one section of each part will be the production of originals, and the remaining two sections will be best described as production of images" (*Soph.* 266a). The part of "production by humans" that is "production of images" is now divided into εἰκαστική, "production of originals," and φανταστική, "production of images," the latter divided again into literature and the visual arts, on the one hand, and acting, on the other. After further subdivisions of action, the stranger defines sophistry: "The art of contradiction making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow play of words" (*Soph.* 268a–c).[5]

This definition does not in itself concern our argument, although it provided the motivation for Plato's dialogue. More important is the observation that here phantasia is *not* being distinguished from mimēsis. To Plato, all of the arts differentiated here are imitation in the sense defined in *Republic* 10, as reproductions of some original or Form. Rather the distinction—as Maguire has seen in this passage, at *Laws* 667a–668e, and at *Cratylus* 431c and 434a–b—is between imitation in which the artist tries to replicate the mathematical proportions of the object of imitation, and imitation in which such replication is not attempted. Some have thought that the distinction is between the "archaizers" and "impressionists" of Plato's time, to use Maguire's terms.[6]

In any case, Plato's distinction showed no immediate influence but ultimately contributed to a theory of imitation articulated by later Platonic writers. Grube assembles six passages in the *Republic* where Plato implies that the artist can do more than imitate the shadows of reality in the visible world, since if the

artist is a philosopher, imitation of the Forms themselves is possible; Grube is quick to point out that the implications of the theory were not well understood until Plotinus. Some of the passages show striking similarities to Cicero and Dio Chrysostom. Plato speaks in the *Republic* of the possibility of painting "the ideally beautiful man" (472d), and of an ideal state whose "lineaments were traced by artists who used the heavenly model" (500e). Dio postulates some such ideal beauty in the mind of the sculptor Pheidias. Cicero, too, writes in this tradition in his analysis of Zeuxis, who considers a variety of models in forming an "idea" of a perfect Helen. To Dio and Cicero we shall return below.[7]

Most of the work of the Neoplatonist Plotinus is beyond the bounds of this book, but his *Enneads* 5.8.1 should be examined due to its similarity to these other passages. Here Plotinus compares two blocks of stone, one still a block and one sculpted by an artist: "The stone which has been brought to beauty of form by art will appear beautiful not because it is a stone—for then the other would be just as beautiful—but as a result of the form which art has put into it" (*Enn.* 5.8.1). It follows that the "form" comes not from the material but from the artist, and that the "beauty" came not from the stone but from the art: "And even this does not stay pure and as it wants to be in the stone, but is only there as far as the stone has submitted to the art" (*Enn.* 5.8.1). There is, then, a hierarchy of form and beauty, the more perfect form being in the mind of the creator. This is as true of nature, made by the divine creator, as it is of works of art. Consequently, "he must know that the arts do not simply imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles from which nature derives; then also that they do a great deal by themselves, and, since they possess beauty, they make up what is defective in things. For Pheidias too did not make his Zeus from any model perceived by the senses, but understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible" (*Enn.* 5.8.1).

Two images of Pheidias, both as Cicero's consultor of many models (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.1–10) and as Dio Chrysostom's contemplator of the ideal Zeus, have been collated by Plotinus into the sort of divine artist contemplated but rejected by Plato. Pheidias has become the Platonic master craftsman. Plotinus at times accepts the Platonic theory of mimēsis, that a work of art or literature is three removes from reality, but in this passage and elsewhere he implies that the artist can imitate the Platonic Forms or ideas and so can act like the divine creator who imitated the same ideas in the creation of nature. As Erwin Panofsky has shown, the creator is now a synthesized Platonist-Aristotelian. As in Aristotle, the idea exists in the artist, but as in Plato, the idea has perfection.[8] We shall see a similar being in Philostratus.

Before Aristotle, the word *phantasia* had a broad range of meanings, which in Martha Craven Nussbaum's analysis all share a general notion of "what appears," as derived from the verb φαίνομαι. By the time of Aristotle, the word *phantasia* is used generally, but not exclusively, as a technical, psychological term, usually translated as "imagination." Most of *De Anima* 3.2 is devoted to the term *phantasia*. Here Aristotle divides the soul into "two distinctive peculiarities . . . (1) local movement and (2) thinking, discriminating, and perceiving" (*De An.* 427a.16–18). Nussbaum tries to minimize the visual quality of this Aristotelian *phantasia*, but Rouveret argues a persuasive case that visuality is generally present in Aristotle, even suggesting that the *De Anima* should be read as complementary to the visual *Poetics*.[9] Indeed, Aristotle distinguishes "thinking," both "practical" and "speculative," from "perceiving," the latter being infallible, and then distinguished both, along with "judgement," from "imagination": "imagination . . . is not found without sensation, or judgement without it" (476b.6–27). He then turns to thinking: "Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement" (427b.14–16). "If then imagination is that in virtue of which an image arises for us, excluding

metaphorical uses of the term, is it a single faculty or disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate and are either in error or not? The faculties in virtue of which we do this are sense, opinion, science, intelligence" (428a.1–4). After discussion, Aristotle then concludes that imagination is none of these faculties (428a.5–428b.9), and adds (3.3.428b10–18):

> But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement can be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement must be (1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing apart from sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when we perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may present various phenomena both active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or false.

Phantasia, to Aristotle, is not a faculty but a "movement," an unreliable, lower-level part of "thinking" necessarily related to perception. As he defines it, "then imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense" (429a1–2).

In *De Anima* 3.7, Aristotle adds a corollary to this discussion and definition: "To the thinking soul images (φαντάσματα) serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image" (431a14–17, a thought echoed at *Rh.* 1.11.1370a.28–30). How this happens is further developed later in the same chapter (431b.2–9):

The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images, and as in the former case what is to be pursued or avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation and it is engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or avoidance. E.g. perceiving by sense that the beacon is fire, it recognizes in virtue of the general faculty of sense that it signifies an enemy, because it sees it moving; but sometimes by means of the images or thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it calculates and deliberates what is to come by reference to what is present; and when it makes a pronouncement, as in the case of sensation it pronounces the object to be pleasant or painful, in this case it avoids or pursues; and so generally in cases of action.

At the end of *De Anima* 3.8, Aristotle demonstrates why all thought involves "imagination" (432a.3–14):

Since according to common agreement there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence (1) no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and (2) when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter.

Imagination is different from assertion and denial; for what is true or false involves a synthesis of concepts. In what will the primary concepts differ from images? Must we not say that neither these nor even our other concepts are images, though they necessarily involve them?

In *De Anima* 11 (433a29–31, 434a5–9) Aristotle distinguishes between two types of imagination, "sensitive imagination," which "is found in all animals," and "deliberative imagination only in those which are calculative" (434a5–7). Finally, in the related discussion at *On Memory and Reminiscence* 449b30–450a25, Aristotle notes that animals without intellect possess memory, and hence "it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only incidentally, while directly and essentially it belongs to the primary faculty of sense-perception" (450a13–14).

Atkins criticizes Aristotle for ignoring "imagination in all poetic activity," and notes, following Butcher and referring to *De Anima* 3.3.429a1, that "[e]lsewhere in his works he speaks of 'phantasia' (φαντασία) as an image-forming faculty, . . . capable of reproducing images of sensible objects. But it is reproductive merely, without creative or transforming power." Granted, these passages do not move us far along the path from Platonic to Neoplatonic phantasia (as opposed to mimēsis), they do help to see why Aristotle took for granted the similarity, almost the identity, of literature and the visual arts. Both types of art are imagistic; they present to the viewer either an image, as in visual art, or as in literature, a set of moving images that the soul then uses as raw data (phantasia) to enable thought to occur. Ross comments that phantasia is necessarily low on the psychological chain of importance. This is probably so. We might conclude that, for the same reason, literature and visual art are rather low on the philosophical chain of importance.[10]

PHANTASIA AT ROME

After Aristotle, the tradition of phantasia, or nonmimetic artistic production, fades into obscurity until it reappears, although not labelled as such, in Cicero. At *De Inventione Rhetorica* 2.1.1–2.3.10, the young Cicero narrates the tale of Zeuxis at Croton, a story

also found in Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.10.1) and much earlier in Gorgias, who does not mention Zeuxis by name (*Helen* 18), and perhaps even in Plato (*Resp.* 472d). The painter Zeuxis was commissioned to paint for the city, and suggested a portrait of Helen. As models, "h]e chose five because he did not think all the qualities which he sought to combine in a portrayal of beauty could be found in one person, because in no single case has Nature made anything perfect and finished in every part" (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.1.3). In Cicero, Zeuxis seems to have risen above Aristotle's estimation, but there remains here something of the Aristotelian air of painting men "as they are, but more beautiful." On the other hand, there is a Platonic air to the notion that an ideal beauty can be learned from an examination of particulars sharing in that ideal. In fact Rensselaer W. Lee has discussed the passage as the "transformation of a Platonic idea into an Aristotelian conception of imitation"; Lee is interested, of course, because such a concept became so predominant in Renaissance theories of visual art. But Cicero applies the analogy, not to the production of a poem or an oration, but to the eclectic nature of his own treatise, drawn both from Peripatetic and from Isocratean sources.[11]

Orator 3–10, a comparison of orators to visual artists, is avowedly Platonic. Sandys suggests that Cicero takes this Platonism from Plato's *Timaeus*, but notes that Cicero does not hold to a strictly Platonic reading; "but as eloquence can only be perceived through the sense of hearing, we are not surprised to find that his [Cicero's] endeavour to delineate the ideal eloquence becomes a copy, not of the 'idea' of eloquence itself, but of his own conception of that eloquence as it has been exemplified in actually existing orators, and that in the end he is compelled to confess that his own ideal orator may be different to that of Brutus." Panofsky, in fact, adduces sixteenth-century citations of Cicero as evidence "that classical antiquity itself had transformed the Platonic concept of 'idea' into a

weapon against the Platonic view of art, thereby preparing the ground, as it were, for that of the Renaissance."[12]

In an example of the problem Sandys and Panofsky have isolated, at *Orator* 73–75 Cicero deduces from the theory of *decorum* or "appropriateness" that, in oratory as in painting, there must be several ideals. This in fact is the pseudo-Platonic process described at *De Inventione Rhetorica* 2.1–10. There are intellectually perceived and perfect embodiments of worldly objects: "But I am firmly of the opinion that nothing of any kind is so beautiful as not to be excelled in beauty by that of which it is a copy, as a mask is a copy (*imago*) of a face. This ideal cannot be perceived by the eye or ear, nor by any of the senses, but we can nevertheless grasp it by the mind and the imagination (*cogitatione . . . et mente*). . . . These patterns of things are called ἰδέαι or ideas by Plato" (*Orat.* 8 and 10). The example of this process in *Orator* 8–10 is Pheidias and his statues. Cicero proposes to create the "idea" of an orator for Brutus to consider. The orator described will be like the statue produced by Pheidias. Cicero's account of the orator is flawed, as Stahr has suggested, because Cicero believed himself to be the end of the development of Roman oratory. But as Panofsky has shown, the Platonic idea itself has been transformed and the status of artists has been raised since Plato's time; Plato has been Aristotelianized. Atkins makes an interesting point on this passage: "And here, it is perhaps worth noting, is the first rough statement of what was to be later the doctrine of the literary 'kinds'"—that is, the Platonic notion here applied to oratory as extended to the other genres.[13]

It is apparent that the Platonic notion of an artist who can reproduce an ideal beauty, visualized by the artist from an examination of worldly beings that participate in that ideal beauty, lies behind Cicero's stories of Zeuxis and Pheidias. The connection between this notion and the later Neoplatonic *phantasia* as seen in Plotinus, Dio, and Philostratus is, as Ella

Birmelin has remarked, that Cicero here speaks of ideal beauty rather than actual physical appearance. The theory of phantasia is seen here in embryonic form, and the word *pulchritudo* (beauty) is repeated with reference to idealism in art and also with reference to Pheidias by Pliny (*HN* 34.18 and 34.50) and by Quintilian (12.10.9). As to the origin of the theory before Cicero, we can only guess. Cicero's theory at *Orator* 8 has been described by some as Platonic, by others as Aristotelian. But, as Panofsky has seen, Cicero's position is actually a "compromise" between Plato and Aristotle. The "idea" has perfection, as in Plato, but exists in the mind of the artist, as in Aristotle. Panofsky points out that this compromise is also a contradiction, which can be resolved following Seneca, arguing that it is irrelevant whether the model is in the external world or the artist's consciousness (*Ep.* 65.7), and that *eidos* is form as manifest in the artistic product, and *idea* is form as in the artistic model (*Ep.* 68.16–21), or following Plotinus, where the idea held "existence as a part of human consciousness" and "the rank of metaphysical validity and objectivity."[4]

In the classical Roman period the word *phantasia* becomes a term of literary criticism. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses it once in a sense that Roberts translates as "impression" but glosses as "representation, image": "For thrice in close succession vowels are juxtaposed which cause clashings and obstructed utterance, and make it impossible for the ear to take in the impression of one continuous clause" (*Comp.* 22, page 230 Roberts). This is the meaning in all seventeen occurrences of the word *phantasia* and its cognates φάντασμα and φαντάζομαι in Longinus. Most of them appear in chapter 15, devoted to sublimity created by "visualization," which Longinus associates with enargeia and defines at the beginning of chapter 15 (*Subl.* 15.1):

> Another thing which is extremely productive of grandeur, magnificence and urgency, my young friend, is visualization

(*phantasia*). I use this word for what some people call image-production [εἰδωλοποιίας]. The term *phantasia* is used generally for anything which in any way suggests a thought productive of speech; but the word has also come into fashion for the situation in which enthusiasm and emotion make the speaker *see* what he is saying and bring it *visually* before his audience.

As mentioned in chapter 2, Longinus singles out Simonides for his ability to make the hearer visualize a scene (15.7).[15]

Atkins' suggestion that in *On the Sublime* 10, Longinus shows awareness of the concept of "imagination," if not the use of the term *phantasia* in this sense, seems to be an overinterpretation of the passage, since the concept here is closer to that of *enargeia*, or at most is transitional from *enargeia* to *phantasia*. Quintilian gives a similar definition (6.2.29), equating *phantasia* with the Latin *visiones*, and illustrates the concept by a painting of Theon (12.10.6); also Aelian (*VH* 2.44) and Plutarch (*Amat.* 759C) similarly associate *phantasia* with *enargeia*. Pollitt suggests that the *phantasia* of Theon is probably more like *ekphrasis*. In fact, in his extended study of phantasia, J. M. Cocking argues that in these authors *mimēsis* and *phantasia* should not be greatly distinguished. In other authors of the period, namely Cicero and the *Ad Herrenium*, the word εἰκών conveys the meaning that Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Longinus give to *phantasia*. Both meanings of εἰκών ("image" and "simile") can be found in Plato, the latter meaning carrying over into Aristotle and beyond to Cicero and *Ad Herennium*.[16] Plato's differentiation in the *Sophist* between εἰκαστική and φανταστική has been discussed above.

The discussion of phantasia by Quintilian deserves more detailed discussion, both because it illustrates what is probably in the mind of Longinus and because it shows the uniqueness of the Ciceronian passages. Quintilian was a teacher of rhetoric at Rome at the beginning of the second century A.D. His

Institutio oratoria is a twelve-volume, complete treatise on rhetorical study. In the present passage, Quintilian has been discussing how the speaker can best arouse emotion in the audience, suggesting that "[t]he prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, first to feel those emotions oneself" (*Inst.* 6.2.26). Quintilian elaborates on this and then asks (6.2.29–30):

> But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power? I will try to explain as best I may. There are certain experiences which the Greeks call φαντασίαι, and the Romans *visions* (*visiones*), whereby things absent are presented to our imagination (*per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesantur animo*) with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. . . . Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner (*qui sibi res, voces, actus secundum naturam optime finget*), by the Greek word εὐφαντασίωτος; and it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will.[17]

The question of whether this process is mimetic or imaginative is a good one. H. E. Butler's translation implies the latter, although it is apparent that the process is anchored in the subject matter (*rerum, res*) and in visible reality (*secundum naturam*). On the other hand Quintilian goes on to give examples that are clearly imaginative and then suggests that the standard is not truth but probability (*credibile est*, 6.2.31).

Quintilian then suggests a relationship that should now be familiar. The mechanism for transferring the *visio* from speaker to hearer, as the *visio* becomes manifest in any given passage of a speech, is *enargeia* or vividness, which all along we have seen associated with the parallel between literature and the visual

arts. In two other places, Quintilian associates enargeia with painting (8.3.61–64 and 12.10.6, both discussed below). It is not surprising that he borrows from Cicero familiar terms of art criticism (6.32): "From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls *illumination* and *actuality*, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence." Quintilian admires this quality greatly, and discusses it also, without naming it, at 6.2.34–36 and 8.3.64–65, where he suggests that if the speaker truly feels the emotion in a scene, the hearer will add details of his or her own. These passages prompt J. F. D'Alton to comment that Quintilian "seems to suggest that the quality was derived not merely from an author's power of visualizing a scene, but of reproducing sensuous details to which he had emotionally reacted in a very special way." At 12.10.6, Quintilian discusses the same quality of phantasia in painting. He does not give his description of imagination the Platonic basis that we find in Cicero and in later writers, but it is nonetheless a modified theory of phantasia. Furthermore, enargeia and phantasia are both to be associated with the literary genre of ekphrasis. Elsner has shown that Philostratus' *Imagines* contains a "reflexivity" of viewer and text, that an ekphrasis is a "reading," an "interpretation" of a work, and that this reading is "more real" than mimēsis because phantasia reflects a "real world" transcending the visible, imitable world of mimēsis.[18] Like Aristotle in the more visually oriented passages of his *Poetics*, Quintilian describes imagination as primarily mimetic, anchored in the visual world and in the probable, as in the scene of a crime as visualized by the prosecutor; the essence of the style having enargeia is still the visual image (*imagines rerum absentium*, 6.2.29, quoted above). In the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by another Philostratus, related to the author of the *Imagines*, the concept of enargeia and the genre of ekphrasis will be anchored not in mimēsis but

in *phantasia*. Already in Quintilian oratory is close to painting, and the role of imagination is being liberated.

DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Dio Chrysostom (also known as Dio of Prusa or Cocceianus Dio) wrote in the last half of the first century A.D. and into the second. He spent time at Rome but traveled and wrote orations, in Greek, on a variety of academic topics for the educated Hellenistic and Roman reader. (One must remember that Roman aristocrats were bilingual in Latin and Greek.) Dio's twelfth *Oration* was apparently delivered in A.D. 101 at Olympia, near the statue of Zeus by Pheidias. This would make the oration one of Dio's more mature speeches, written during his more philosophic, less sophistic periods; it would also make the speech roughly contemporary with Plutarch's *De gloria Atheniensium.* In fact, Dio and Plutarch may have been in Rome at the same time; they may have been acquainted with each other and with each other's work. The theme of the speech is divinity in general rather than art and literature, but Dio sets up a contrast between poetry and sculpture by his constant allusions to the statue nearby and by constant quotation from Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar. Then he brings the two arts together with the assertion, apparently commonplace during the period, that Pheidias based his statue on Homer's *Iliad* 1.528–530 (*Or.* 12.25–26).[19]

It is unfortunate that we do not know more about this famous statue. We do know that Pheidias supervised the large statue of Athena in the Parthenon and perhaps also the Parthenon sculpture in general and other projects for his friend Pericles. According to Andrew Stewart, the *Zeus* was "destroyed by fire . . . at Constantinople in A.D. 476," but the general appearance of the huge statue can be reconstructed from imitations of it on

smaller pieces, including coins and a krater. One such coin, here reproduced as plate 4, is in the Museo Archeologico in Florence. The coin, from Elis, is of Hadrianic date (A.D. 137, according to Bernard Ashmole)—that is, approximately thirty-six years after Dio's *Oratio*. What is apparently an image of the sculpture by Pheidias is on the reverse side. Some have also seen Pheidias' influence in the statue of Zeus in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston (04.12), labelled as "Carian Zeus (adaptation of the Olympian Zeus of Pheidias)," here reproduced as plate 5. In fact, this statue has been restored from supposedly Pheidian images of Zeus on coins. We now have materials from Pheidias' workshop at Olympia, which give more insight into the statue, including evidence that the *Zeus* is later than the Parthenon. The statue was chryselephantine (gold and ivory over wood) and huge, perhaps forty feet in height.[20]

The oration turns to the subject of divinity (including its role in the creation of language) and observance and worship by humans, animals, and even plants, everyone, in fact, except the Epicureans (*Or.* 12.27-39). A distinction follows between this natural worship, analogous to the love for one's parents, and a secondary worship originating with the stories of poets and the laws (*Or.* 12.39-43). Images offered by visual artists provide a fourth stimulus to religious activity. Dio distinguishes types of visual artist based on medium and makes an interesting comment on "the craft which makes images of wood, in which the artist little by little removes the excess of material until nothing remains but the shape which the observer sees" (*Or.* 12.44). J. W. Cohoon and Donald Russell both point to the similar discussion by Cicero (*Div.* 2.48); Russell further traces the idea of a statue existing in raw stone forward to Michelangelo and Joseph Addison, while Panofsky traces it backward to Aristotle (*Metaph.* 9.6.1048a). We can add Leonardo and even the Renaissance memory artist, Giordano Bruno, to the list. Dio explains that the visual artists, not wishing to be blasphemous,

imitated the religious work of the poets, and occasionally made their own novel contributions (*Or.* 12.44–46). In turn, the philosopher offers a fifth idea of divinity (*Or.* 12.47).[21]

Up to this point the discussion has been rather conventional. Strabo offers similar discussion (1.2.7–9). But now a unique discussion occurs, well described by Grube: "this elaborate comparison between poetry and sculpture, together with the notion of each art being limited by the nature of its medium, does not seem to occur elsewhere."[22] Here Dio proposes to compare four of these five contributions (by nature, legislator, poet, visual artist, and philosopher), leaving aside the legislator for lack of time, to see which offers the best idea of divinity (*Or.* 12.48). He asks Pheidias about his statue and invites him to justify it as an imitation of the divinity (*Or.* 12.49–54). Most of the rest of the *Oration* is the fictitious reply of Pheidias.

Pheidias begins by deprecating his art in comparison with the contributions of nature and literature (*Or.* 12.56–59). Sculpture came after these two had shaped the idea of divinity. Furthermore, the poets, besides preceding sculptors in time, have more flexibility in their productions: "for they were able through their poetry to lead men to accept any sort of idea, whereas our artistic productions have only this one adequate standard of comparison" (*Or.* 12.57). "This one adequate standard of comparison" is not very clear, but Russell is no doubt right in interpreting it to refer to the statement that follows in 12.59: Pheidias means that sculptors must imitate "the human form" alone. As to artists' renderings of natural divinities, the planets for example, Pheidias comments (*Or.* 12.58–59):

> whereas those heavenly bodies certainly, taken by themselves, reveal in abundance character and purpose (ἤθους καὶ διανοίας), yet in their representations they show nothing to suggest this. . . . For mind and intelligence in and of themselves (νοῦν γὰρ καὶ φρόνησιν αὐτὴν μὲν καθ'

αὐτήν) no statuary or painter will ever be able to represent (εἰκάσαι); for all men are utterly incapable of observing such attributes with their eyes or of learning of them by inquiry. But as for that in which this intelligence manifests itself, men, having no mere inkling thereof but actual knowledge, fly to it for refuge, attributing to God a human body as a vessel to contain intelligence and rationality (ἀγγεῖον φρονήσεως καὶ λόγου), in their lack of a better illustration (παραδείγματος), and in their perplexity seeking to indicate that which is invisible and unportrayable (τὸ ἀνείκαστον καὶ ἀφανές) by means of something portrayable and visible, using the function of a symbol (συμβόλου δυνάμει χρώμενοι) and doing so better than certain barbarians, who are said to represent the divine by animals— using as his starting point symbols which are trivial and absurd. But that man who has stood out most above others in respect of beauty and majesty and splendour, he, we may say, has been by far the greatest creator of the images of the divine beings (δημιουργὸς τῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἀγαλμάτων).

This passage is perhaps intended to separate human imitators of divinity, both poets and sculptors, from the natural divinities such as the planets. But the seeds of separation between poetry and the visual arts have been planted. Interesting is the attribution to the planets of "character and purpose" (ἤθους καὶ διανοίας). As Russell points out, these words are "sources of action according to Aristotle (e.g. *Poet.* 6.1450a2)," adding that Dio had previously indicated Homer's ability to portray these two characteristics of Zeus along with his power (δύναμις, *Or.* 12.53).[23]

Thus Dio allies the natural divinities with the poet against the visual artist, who cannot portray these characteristics. We are in fact close to the language of Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.10), Aristotle's *Politics* (8.5.1340a.28-42) and Plutarch's *Alexander*

(1.3), all discussed above. These parallels to Dio make it fairly clear that Dio is continuing a tradition that descends from the Xenophontic and Aristotelian discussions: Character cannot be visualized (εἰκάσαι). Anthropomorphic representations are "symbols," which make divinity "portrayable and visible." Pheidias seems to suggest that the human body shows "the signs of character," as described by Aristotle and Plutarch. But character in all its forms (ἦθος, φρόνησις, νοῦς, λόγος) is not visible and is thus unavailable to the visual artist. The poet, too, is limited here to anthropomorphic "symbols" of divinity, but as Dio has already hinted, the poet is much less limited. Furthermore, as Trimpi has shown, Dio is equating the less limited realm of the poet with the open, political artistic style, as opposed to the more limited forensic realm of the visual artist, where the works can be scrutinized for greater detail and where they are limited to anthropomorphic shapes. It is curious that a doctrine that, since Plato and Aristotle, had unified literature and the visual arts now becomes a means of distinguishing them. But Trimpi notes that Dio is consistent with Horace in that he allies Pheidias with the poets and the oral, political style through association with Homer, who is champion of that style here as he had been in Horace's *Ars Poetica*.[24]

Somewhat striking here is the criticism of anthropomorphism and the virtual monotheism, but in this, as with Plutarch, Dio is in step with the Platonism of his time. Dio does at least state that the Greeks put their gods in the forms of humans, not as animals or, even worse, plants or rocks (*Or.* 12.59–61). This leads to a praise of Homer, who showed the best techniques of anthropomorphism (*Or.* 12.62–69). Again Dio mentions that Homer provided the model for the statue before them (*Or.* 12.62), a theme also in Strabo (8.354). The sculptor is "a better and more temperate artificer" but the poet has the advantage: "For an extravagant thing is poetry and in every respect resourceful and a law unto itself, and by the assistance

of the tongue and a multitude of words is able all by itself to express all the devisings of the heart (ἱκανὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα δηλῶσαι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς βουλήματα), and whatever conception it may arrive at concerning any shape or action or emotion or magnitude, it can never be at a loss" (*Or.* 12.64). The imitation of "the heart," then, is a matter of degree. Nature can express divinity in the appearance of the planets. Poets can express divinity somewhat better than sculptors because of their "assistance of the tongue and multitude of words." Such things are impossible for the sculptor but are possible for the poet due to the correspondence of nouns to objects of perception. A truly gifted poet can even use multiple names through the multiplicity of dialects, as Homer did with the Greek dialects, "mixing them together much more thoroughly than dyers do their colours" (*Or.* 12.66); Homer also used archaic and foreign words, figurative language, and even coined his own by onomatopoeia (*Or.* 12.65–69).[25]

The medium of sculpture, according to Pheidias, is more limiting. Stone is less pliable than words and more difficult to obtain; the sculptor even depends on assistants (*Or.* 12.69–70). But the different medium also limits the visual artist's conception of his subject (*Or.* 12.70):

> And then, in addition, the sculptor must have worked out for himself a design that shows each subject in one single posture, and that too a posture that admits of no movement and is unalterable, so perfected that it will comprise within itself the whole of the god's nature and power. But for the poets it is perfectly easy to include very many shapes and all sorts of attitudes in their poetry, adding movements and periods of rest to them according to what they consider fitting at any given time, and actions and spoken words, and they have, I imagine, an additional advantage in the matter of difficulty and that of time. For

the poet when moved by one single conception and one single impulse of his soul draws forth an immense volume of verses, as if from a gushing spring of water, before the vision and the conception he had grasped can leave him and flow away. But of our art the execution is laborious and slow, advancing with difficulty a step at a time, the reason being, no doubt, that it must work with a rock-like and hard material.

Here for the first time is expressed clearly what is obvious to us and what we have expected to find since the earliest comparison between literature and the visual arts: the different media make fundamental demands on the conception and execution of artistic production. To state the matter more clearly, the medium of literature is temporal, revealing events as they unfold over time, and the media of visual art are spatial. As we have seen, this fundamental distinction lurks behind Aristotle's assertion in the *Poetics* that visual art can imitate character, an assertion that is problematic because Aristotelian thought holds that character should be revealed through action, that is, over time. This problem is corrected in the *Politics*, where Aristotle states that visual art imitates not character but the "signs" of character—a clarification repeated by Plutarch in the *Alexander*. This distinction most likely lies behind Plutarch's separation, in *De gloria Atheniensium*, of literature from the visual arts based on the tenses of the participle. Plutarch does not seem to see the implications, but with Dio the problem is now clear.[26]

This problem is not really solved until the Renaissance. Leonardo recognizes that spatial imitation is unable to develop its subject over time and agrees that this ability is one of the few respects in which poetry was greater than painting. He argues strenuously that painting can and should convey emotion, but he cannot argue that painting can convey character. He does claim that painting can represent "the working of the mind as

reflected in the movements (of the body)," but he does not explain how painting can show these "movements." In fact, his most powerful argument for the superiority of painting is that the visual arts present balance and harmony at one view, while poetry must develop over time. It was left to Castelvetro and then Lessing to use this fundamental distinction, that character revelation requires development over time, as a means to distinguish among the arts based on medium and hence on method and aim.[27]

Next, still in the voice of Pheidias, Dio adds a series of corollaries to this passage. The sculptor must develop a motionless vision of his subject (εἰκόνα) and maintain this vision throughout the execution of the project (*Or.* 12.71). The similarity of this passage to Cicero *Orator* 8 and Plotinus *Enneads* 5.8.1 encourages us to imagine that Pheidias develops this vision by considering a variety of models (although some specifically reject the suggestion that Dio follows the Neoplatonic theory of Plotinus).[28] According to Dio, visual art is more difficult to execute because vision is more able than hearing to compare imitation to original. Two separate issues are involved here, as Dio recognizes. One is vision's accuracy; the other is the ability of writers to use language to "cover" their inaccuracy. Once again, Dio is presenting new ideas that are clearly correct. Further, poets can distort space, whereas visual artists' space is dictated by material and the area designed to display the work (*Or.* 12.72). Dio concludes with a plea: given these limitations, he has done his best to portray an appropriate divinity (*Or.* 12.72–83). He explains the system of symbols he attempted to use to compensate for his lack of language (*Or.* 12.77), in contrast to those symbols that he felt unable to portray but that were available to Homer in the temporal medium of poetry (*Or.* 12.78–79). Such things only Zeus can create in a spatial medium (*Or.* 12.80–83). Dio follows Pheidias' speech with a summary and an imagined closing address from Zeus (*Or.* 12.84–85).

The constant appearance of Pheidias in these comparisons is important. One scholar notes that Pheidias offers the best of art on two levels: his colossal Zeus has the magnitude so esteemed by Longinus, his more detailed work has the artistic detail admired in Polycleitus. The *Zeus* or the *Athena* then combine the best of the worlds of imagination and imitation, of *ingenium* and *ars*. Pliny verifies this conclusion, praising Pheidias both for his sublimity (*magnificentia*) and for his carefulness (*et in paruis, HN* 36.19).[29] To put it in Trimpi's terms, Pheidias attains the best of the skenographic and skiagraphic styles. He transcends the dualities operative both in artistic and in literary criticism.

PHILOSTRATUS

The traditions of Plato, Cicero and Dio come together in Philostratus, the author of the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* and the last writer whose thoughts on the relationship between literature and the visual arts will be discussed here. Along with his relative of the same name, who wrote the *Imagines*, Philostratus has received a great deal of study by art critics. The *Life* is a biography of a priestly man; the *Imagines*, discussed above, is a series of *ekphrases* or descriptions of paintings in a museum-guide format. Both treatises are written in Greek for a highly educated and sophisticated reader. A modern critic has tried to ground modern "reader reception" theory in the *Life of Apollonius* 2.20–41.[30]

In his *Life of Apollonius of Tyanna*, Philostratus has Apollonius raise the same objection to the non-Greek gods that Dio had raised: the Egyptians deify animals (6.19; Butcher in fact cites Dio and Philostratus as exceptions to "how little notice the Greeks took of symbolical art"). Apollonius' interlocutor, Thespesion, asks about Greek portrayals (ἀγάλματα). Apollonius responds that the Greek gods are the most beautiful and

appropriate (κάλλιστόν τε καὶ θεοφιλέστατον). Thespesion then brings up the theory we have seen, in varying degrees, in Cicero, Dio, and Plotinus: "'Your artists, then, like Ph[e]idias,' said the other, 'and like Praxiteles, went up, I suppose, to heaven and took a copy of the forms of the gods, and then reproduced these by their art, or was there any other influence which presided over and greeted their moulding?'" (*VA* 6.19) At this point, Philostratus at least attempts to free art and literature from the mimetic limits that had been imposed by Plato and Aristotle but that were beginning to show strain in Plutarch and Dio (*VA* 6.19):

> "There was, said Apollonius, "and an influence pregnant with wisdom and genius." "What was that?" said the other, "for I do not think you can adduce any except imitation (μιμήσεως)." "Imagination [*phantasia*]," said Apollonius, "wrought these works, a wiser and subtler artist by far than imitation; for imitation can only create as its handiwork what it has seen, but imagination equally what it has not seen; for it will conceive of its ideal with reference to the reality (τοῦ ὄντος), and imitation is often baffled by terror, but imagination by nothing; for it marches undismayed to the goal which it has itself laid down."[31]

The artist must create an internal and appropriate image, just as Pheidias did. Thespesion suggests, like Dio, that Egyptian animals are "symbols" (ξύμβολα), but Apollonius replies that surely these images are not effective: "for the mind can more or less delineate and figure them to itself better than can any artist; but you have denied to the gods the privilege of beauty both of the outer eye and of inner suggestion (καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι καλῶς καὶ τὸ ὑπονοεῖσθαι)" (*VA* 6.19). As Watson comments, "We have, then, in this passage a movement from the praise of art which

is based on mental vision to the exaltation of the mental vision itself, even if, or especially when, it does not issue in art." We might say that for the first time in antiquity the "inner eye" and "inner ear" have been freed from the tyranny of the "outer eye" and the "outer ear." The creative intelligence is free to contemplate "reality" (τὸ ὄν) without reference to the perception of reality by the senses (τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι καλῶς). Interestingly, here the doctrine of political and forensic styles is alluded to one final time. Imitation is linked to the forensic style, to be examined on the level of accuracy to detail, while the imagination is linked to the more oral, political style, which attains greatness or Longinian sublime and is to be examined at a distance. Thus, the traditions of the sublime and *phantasia* do ultimately intertwine, and one of the doctrines linking literature and the visual arts throughout antiquity is ultimately used to dominate the doctrine of mimēsis.[32]

The centrality of the comparison between literature and the visual arts to Philostratus' *phantasia* can be seen better in chapter 4.7 of the *Life*, where Apollonius argues that people make greater fame for their cities than monuments, because they are more mobile:

> [H]e encouraged them and increased their zeal, and urged them to take pride rather in themselves than in the beauty of their city; for although they had the most beautiful of cities under the sun, and although they had a friendly sea at their doors, which held the springs of the zephyr, nevertheless, it was more pleasing for the city to be crowned with men than with porticos and pictures, or even with gold in excess of what they needed. For, he said, public edifices remain where they are, and are nowhere seen except in that particular part of the earth where they exist, but good men are conspicuous everywhere, and everywhere talked about.[33]

Philostratus continues with the familiar analogy to Pheidias' Zeus, bound in space to Olympia.

Cocking comments that Philostratus has not completely separated phantasia from mimēsis in an Aristotelian sense; but we cannot ignore the fact that an important step has been taken. Watson correctly states that here literature is greater than visual art because it is "less earthbound," and also rightly places the passage in the tradition of Cicero, Longinus, Quintilian, and Dio discussed here. Watson finds the source of this tradition in a blend of Stoicism and Neoplatonism, and indeed these schools may have been the proximate source. But the ultimate source of the ideas is to be traced back to Pindar, the lyric poets, and the Sophists, who understood the mobility and temporality of the word to be superior to the spatiality of the visual image before the issue was confused by the mimeticism of Plato and Aristotle. That the tradition extends back to the lyric poets is clear from the reference, noted by Watson in both Dio (*Or.* 12.79) and Quintilian (6.1.35), to the visual arts as "speechless."[34]

With Philostratus, literature is at least potentially freed from the spatial limitations of visual art, and visual art is at least potentially freed from the temporal limitations of literature. That these issues continue to dominate literary and artistic theory in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and in fact are at the core of many issues in the Modernist movement, continues to be the subject of other studies.

7

Conclusions

The most salient conclusion reached here is that there is no one, single doctrine of *ut pictura poesis* in the ancient world. The Renaissance theorists created one for themselves, and modern discussions have perpetuated this belief, but no one system unifies all of the doctrines discussed in this study. There are instead a multitude of trends in theory and criticism. This study has followed these trends diachronically, as they developed and intertwined.

The predominance of Aristotelian mimetic ideas has also been overly stressed by critics, modern as well as Renaissance, while Platonic mimeticism has been shoved back into the pre-Socratic period. There is virtually no evidence of mimetic theory in the passages prior to Plato. One exception would be the passage of Simonides discussed and cited by Plutarch (*De glor. Ath.* 3.346F–47A), but that passage is so encumbered by later Peripatetic doctrine that its value as evidence for Simonides is questionable. In fact, whereas Plato introduced the comparison between literature and the visual arts in order to disparage literature, and Aristotle, because of the usefulness of the analogy

for making his point, in the period before Plato the visual arts usually are introduced to show their inferiority to literature, a trend that we have followed in Horace, Plutarch, and Dio. However, as Hurwit notes, artists themselves in the pre-Socratic period were aware of the mimetic aspects of their work. Plutarch, along with Dio, provides unwitting evidence that problems in Aristotle's formulation were seen even by writers in the Aristotelian tradition, and even in the *Politics*. In other words, the mimetic aspects of ancient comparisons between literature and the visual arts have been overemphasized. The blending of Aristotle and Horace in the Renaissance not withstanding, most of the texts discussed here are attempting to come to grips with a growing awareness of the problems involved in Aristotle's formulation, and their solutions recovered approaches taken by the lyric poets and Sophists.[1]

Two areas where Aristotle was influential should be pointed out. First, Aristotle's insistence on a distinction between form and content, or better, between structure and external style, became central to Ciceronian rhetoric and enabled the Roman critics to equate color with words, both to be distinguished from content. This allowed a general enrichment of Ciceronian critical vocabulary with terms from art criticism, a movement which, with only a few exceptions, did not flow in the reverse direction. Second, the Aristotelian distinction of styles in *Rhetoric* 3.12 dominated analogies between literature and visual art, ultimately becoming the distinction between the forensic style of mimetic creation and the opposing political style of imaginative creation. By the second century A.D., this distinction from the *Rhetoric* had generally replaced Aristotle's formulation in the *Poetics*.

Also more influential than the mimetic doctrines of Plato and Aristotle were the architectural analogies stemming from Pindar and Alcidamas. The earliest such analogies after Pindar were hostile to monuments and favorable to literature, but in

Dionysius, Cicero, and others, the architectural analogy became a useful way of thinking about structure—again, borrowing the ultimately Aristotelian view of a literary work as separable into a content or structure and a more decorative exterior. In Horace, true to the Pindaric model, the hostility to monuments in favor of literature still predominates.

These various analogies and critical terms and concepts encompass a variety of ways of looking at literature and the visual arts. How a particular author uses the analogies between literature and visual arts is determined by the goals of the critic at that moment. There is no single doctrine, but a variety of doctrines, each implying a set of assumptions about art and about the world. These ways of thinking grew more descriptive in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., as writers and critics thought about art and literature. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods these ways of thinking tended to become prescriptive.

Ekphrasic and "pictorial realist" art and literature in the Hellenistic and Roman periods must be seen as attempts to transcend the limitations on their arts, as responses to the challenges posed by theorists, rather than as misguided experiments. The same thing can be said of modern art, although in that case artists are responding favorably to theorists who are emphasizing similarities between literature and the visual arts. Not content with the illusion of three-dimensionality provided by perspective in painting, Cubists tried to reduce their subjects to geometrical shapes, as if they were viewed from more than one perspective. It has been shown that Lysippus' *Apoxyomenus* similarly exhibits two poses, as the figure has already moved in space when the pose is locked in time.[2] Duchamp, in *Nude Descending a Staircase*, tried to add a fourth dimension. The same may be said of the visuality of the literary Imagists, especially in the pictographs by Ezra Pound. The result of such attempts in the twentieth century is geometric fragmentation—surprisingly, the same trend seen in the earliest stages of literate western

culture, in Homer and geometric pottery, also a period that emphasized the similarities rather than the differences between literature and the visual arts. In both the archaic Greek and the modern era, the artist returns to the "building blocks" of reality. This surprising similarity is a subject for further inquiry, outside my area of expertise. But I would suggest that the artists and writers of the Homeric period (if we can call them "writers") and those of the twentieth century are all trying to rebuild a model of humanity in the wake of perceived social disintegration and reformation. The difference is that archaic art *produced* theoretical comparisons between literature and the visual arts, while Modernism *is produced* by such discussions.

Literary and artistic theory since Philostratus can be seen as a pendulum with now one side in vogue, now the other. The mark of phantasia is that literature and the visual arts are distinguished based on medium and artistic conception, with literature generally being viewed as superior; during mimetic periods the similarities between literature and the arts are emphasized. Phantasia was predominant in the Middle Ages, under the influence of the church fathers. One feature of the Renaissance was the recovery of mimetic doctrines, which was naturally followed by a tendency to equate literature and the visual arts in the creation of what we call the "doctrine of *ut pictura poesis*." This trend was objected to by only a few, such as Leonardo and Castelvetro, who thought about these matters much more than most. The equation was also challenged by Lessing, who prepared the way for the phantastic period that followed. The pendulum swung back in the Romantic period, with its emphasis on Imagination, accompanied by what Irving Babbitt called the "confusion of the arts."[3] Viewed from this angle, Homeric culture would have to be viewed as mimetic in orientation, Greek lyric culture as phantastic.

Paradoxical as it might seem, when viewed from this same angle, twentieth-century art and literature are mimetic. Move-

ments such as Imagism and Cubism move across literature and the arts and emphasize similarity rather than difference. One cannot help but see many works of Modernism as attempts to incorporate all four dimensions into aural or visual media. It is consequently not surprising to see geometry surface in visual art; the fragmented Homeric man reappears in Picasso, in Duchamp, and so on. These movements are, of course, anchored in Imagist theories of psychology, which look back to the mimetic theories of Plato and Aristotle. One cannot help feeling that in spite of constant laments, especially by nonartists, that modern art "doesn't look like the world we see around us," future cultural historians might view the twentieth century as a conservative culture, as a period characterized by mimetic views of art and literature, perhaps even as Neoclassical in its orientation.[4]

Notes

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Henry Nettleship, "Literary Criticism," 54; D. Thomas Benediktson, "Lessing."

2. Bruno Gentili, *Poetry*, especially 3–25, 48, 248, 249.

3. Lewis Richard Farnell, *Works* 1.186; Leslie Kurke, *Traffic*, 251; Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 19, 53–54.

4. Gentili, *Poetry*, 50–56, 249–51. There is no need to address here the issue of the origin of the term *mimēsis*, although it will be discussed as it becomes relevant to specific passages; for the history of the term see especially Hermann Koller, *Mimesis* and the review by Gerald Else, "'Imitation,'" 73–90. On the seventeenth century see Jean Hagstrum's comments on Dryden in *Sister Arts*, 176.

5. Gentili, *Poetry* 41; J. D. Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 155–63; Wesley Trimpi, "Meaning"; Trimpi, "Horace's 'ut pictura poesis'"; and Trimpi, "Early Metaphorical Uses," 403–13. On Martial, see J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2:301.

6. On Agatharchus and skēnographia, see Trimpi, "Early Metaphorical Uses" 403–13; Jerome J. Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 145–46; Jerome J. Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 54–56; Jerome J. Pollitt, *Ancient View*, 236–47; Agnès Rouveret, *Historie*, 65–127; Eva Keuls, *Plato*, 63–66; Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 84, 172; Norman Bryson, *Looking*, 30–59, 180–82; Froma I. Zeitlin, "Artful Eye," 139–40, 295.

On Apollodorus and skiagraphia, see Martin Robertson, *History*, 414, 693; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 147–48; Rouveret, *Histoire*, 13–63. On chiaroscuro in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. and after, see T. B. L. Webster, *Hellenistic Poetry*, 160; Pollitt, *Ancient View*, 24, 44–45, 76, 95, 99, 247–54, 270–71, 395–96, 399–400, 439–41 (including discussions of Greek terms τόνος and ἁρμογή and Latin *lumen et umbras* and *splendor*); Eva Keuls, "Skiagraphia" (cf. Keuls, *Plato*, 72–87; and Rouveret, *Histoire*, 229–31); Robertson, *History*, 411–12, 692–93; Jeffrey M. Hurwit, *Art*, 289 (Hurwit sees chiaroscuro in the sixth century B.C.!); Johannes Vahlen, "Aristoteles' Lehre," 167 n. 31 (Pliny, *HN*, 35.36.4); Frank Cole Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 4.495 (*De glor. Ath.* 2.346A).

On both skiagraphia and skēnographia, see Barbara Hughes Fowler, *Hellenistic Aesthetic*, 168–86; Rouveret, *Histoire*, 165–299. On both terms in the fourth century, see Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 162–64.

7. I can offer only a representative bibliography for the global issues raised here: On Homer, see John T. Sheppard, *Pattern*; Friedrich Stählin, "Geometrische Stil"; four works by John Linton Myres: *Who Were the Greeks?* 488–530; "Last Book"; "Pattern"; and "Structure"; Stephen Bertman, "Structural Symmetry"; Stephen Bertman, "The *Telemachy*"; three works by James A. Notopoulos: "Parataxis"; "Continuity"; and "Homer and Geometric Art"; Cedric H. Whitman, *Homer*, especially 87–101, 249–84, 331–33, 350–53, and pull-out diagram. On the "organic" approach see Lane Cooper, *Aristotle*, xx–xxxiv; and Goran Sörbom, *Mimesis*, 47–49. For a "parallel history of Greek literature and art from Homer to the Roman period" see Thomas B. L. Webster, *Greek Art and Literature 530–44 B.C.*; *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*; *Greek Art and Literature 700–530 B.C.*; and *Hellenistic Poetry*. On the Hellenistic period, see Barbara H. Fowler, *Hellenistic Aesthetic*; and Simon Goldhill, "Wise and Knowing Eye," 197–223, 304–9. On the Middle Ages and Renaissance see Karl Borinsky, *Antike*, 1:97–98, 183–88; Rensselaer Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis"; Erwin Panofsky, *Idea*, 3–126 and notes; John R. Spenser, "Ut Rhetorica Pictura," 26–44; William Guild Howard, "ut pictura poesis." On Leonardo, see Irma A. Richter, *Paragone*, especially 4–17, 27–28, 45–47, 49–51 (*Par.* 17–18), and 52–71 (*Par.* 20–31); Lee, 250–55; Anthony Blunt, *Artistic Theory*, 26–27, 52. On Varchi and Castelvetro, see Richter, 48 and 43, respectively; Lee, 254–55; J. M. Cocking, *Imagination*, 224–26. On Richardson, see Lee, 241–42. On comparison in general see Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, especially vii, xiv–xv, 3–36. On Galileo, see

Erwin Panofsky, *Galileo.* This doctrine also affected Ingres, the painter, and the writer on memory, Giordano Bruno. On Ingres, see King, "Ingres," especially 86–102, 109-13; on Bruno, see Frances A. Yates, *Art,* especially 252–54, 257, 263–64.

8. René Wellek, "Parallelism," 29–63; Mario Praz, *Mnemosyne,* especially 22–27; Irving Babbitt, *New Laocoon*; Franklin R. Rogers, *Painting and Poetry*; Murray Krieger, *Ekphrasis.* On Ingarden, *The Cognition,* see Victor M. Udwin, "Reading." On Plato, see J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine,* 150–52 and the discussion in chapter 3, below.

9. For poststructuralist theory, see Richard Brilliant, *Visual Narratives,* 15–20, 169–70; Bryson, *Looking,* 17–59, 179–82; Andrew Stewart, "Narration," 130–74; Valérie Huet, "Stories," 9–24, 30–31, and 278-82 (cf. Brilliant, 90–123 and 182–89); Jaś Elsner, *Art and the Roman Viewer.* See also Peter J. Holliday, *Narrative,* 3–13; Jaś Elsner, *Art and Text,* 1–6; and the works cited in the discussion of Petronius in chapter 5, below. For an example of the "cultural milieu" view expressed by a classicist, see Notopoulos, "Homer and Geometric Art," 76–78, 85–86.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Translation in Frank Cole Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia,* 4.405, note omitted. Benediktson, "Lessing," 101–5; Leonardo, *Par.* 23, trans. in Richter, *Paragone,* 35; Blunt, *Artistic Theory,* 53. On Simonides' dates, see John H. Molyneux, *Simonides,* especially 23.

2. On visuality, see Gilbert Norwood, *Pindar,* 220, n. 27, quoting Wilamowitz; Albin Lesky, *History,* 190 (citing Longinus); Yates, *Art,* 27; H. S. Thayer, "Plato's Quarrel," 3–26, especially 11–13 (cf. Rouveret, *Histoire,* 146–49); Anne Carson, "Simonides Painter," 51–64, quotation from 54; Hurwit, *Art,* 265–66, 314, n. 38 (on frag 550 Page). On mimetic theory, see Rosemary Harriott, *Poetry,* 143–44; Bell, "Κίμβιξ," 81; cf. Mario Untersteiner, *Sophists,* 286 and 299.

3. Translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia,* 1.91–93 (titles of Plutarch's works also translated by Babbitt). On the story of Simonides' invention of the "art of memory," see Charles Causeret, *Étude,* 205–6; George Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion,* 317–18; Yates, *Art,* especially 1–2, 27–30; and Kurke, *Traffic,* 59–60. On the Scopidae anecdote, see Molyneux, *Simonides,* 124–26. On λαλεῖν, see Donald W. Lucas, *Aristotle,* 269 n. 2. Froma Zeitlin ("Artful Eye," 162–63, 299–300) sees mnemonic systems, visual arts, and drama as interrelated.

4. On Simonides and the *Cratylus*, see Bell, "Κιμβιξ," 81; and Thayer, "Plato's Quarrel" 13. For criticism, see Gerald F. Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 15. On mimēsis in the *Cratylus*, see Lucas, *Aristotle*, 263.

5. Jesper Svenbro, *Parole*, 141–61 (see especially 152–57 and 186–87 on terminology of the visual arts), supported by Rouveret, *Histoire*, 146–49 and following Hermann Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry*, 305–13, especially 306–8, and François Lasserre, *Plutarque*, 48; cf. Pollitt, *Ancient View*, 263–69. For criticism of Lasserre see Gennaro Perrotta and Bruno Gentili, *Polinnia*, 308, where both the artistic and Simonides' uses are seen as Pythagorean (cf. 312). On the date of the Scopas poem, see Perrotta and Gentili, *Polinnia*, 306. Translation by W. K. C. Guthrie, in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 333.

6. Hurwit, *Art*, 198–99, 344–45; Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 12, 34–35, 108–10, and figures 38–39 and 42–43 (but cf. pages 35 and 80; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 76, 99; Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 41, 46; and Robertson, *History*, 331, 664, 675, and 703 on τετράγωνος); Robertson, 40–47, 620–21, plate 10. Gisela Richter and Irma Richter, *Kouroi*, 11–12, quotation from 12—on the "Sounion Group" and the "squarish" look, see especially pages 30–58 and plates 25–131 (pages 41–42 and plates 25–32 and 60–62 for the kouros in New York, their statue 1).

7. Translation in J. M. Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, 2.297 (581 Page). Svenbro, *Parole*, 141–61, 186–87; Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry*, 305–13. On Simonides as visual, mnemonic, and mimetic, see Gentili, *Poetry*, 5, 52, 237; Molyneux, *Simonides*, 132–38, 144–45.

8. Gentili, *Poetry*, 50, 163–65, 249; Bacchylides, *Ep.* 5, in Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, 3.145; Harriott, *Poetry*, especially 92–104 (poetry as craft) and 55–56 (*Ep.* 5.1–6), with a list of further passages in Bacchylides; Svenbro, *Parole* (also on craft); and C. M. Bowra, *Pindar*, 13–22, 33–34.

Svenbro (157) finds the same theme as in *Ep.* 5.1–6 at Bacch. 10.11 Snell. On ἄγαλμα in Pindar (including *Nem.* 5.1, discussed below), with the same ambiguities as in Bacchylides, see Thomas K. Hubbard, *Pindaric Mind*, 37. Kurke (*Traffic*, 190–91) argues against J. B. Bury's contention (*ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΙΣΘΜΙΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ* 152–53) that the word means "statue" at *Nem.* 8.16.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, Sir Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick MacKenzie, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 5, italics removed; Thomas B. L. Webster, "Greek Theories," 166; Kerenyi, "ΑΓΑΛΜΑ," especially 168–71 (trans. mine); Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 22, 44–45, 48.

Kerenyi distinguishes ἄγαλμα from εἴδωλον ("shade," "ombra") and εἰκών ("copy," *simulacro*), both properly used of mortals rather than gods.

9.   Harriott, *Poetry*, 95; Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry*, 306–7, 430 n. 9; Svenbro, *Parole*, 156–57, 180–81, 189–91 (the best discussion of the Pindaric passages). Pindaric passages here cited from Bruno Snell and Herwig Maehler, *Pindari Carmina.*

10.   Translation in Richmond Lattimore, *Odes of Pindar*, 108–10. Gildersleeve quoted by Herbert P. Houghton, "Gildersleeve," 216; cf. Farnell, *Works* 1.186.

11.   Harriott, *Poetry*, 144; Gentili, *Poetry*, 163–65.

On the irony of Pindar's statement, see William Race, *Pindar*, 32; cf. Norwood, *Pindar*, 230 n. 90. On Pindar's imagery and visuality, see Bowra, *Pindar*, 239–77, 366–70, 373–84. On rivalry, see Farnell, *Works* 1.186; cf. Kurke, *Traffic*, 251. On rivalry and the "competitive system," see Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 19, 53–54, quote from 54.

12.   Mary Lefkowitz, "ΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΩ," 199–201, 243, quotation from 243 n. 51; Charles P. Segal, "Arrest," 397–411, quotation from 405. This type of "polar" analysis is also applied to Pindar by Hubbard in *Pindaric Mind*, see especially 104–6 on *Nem.* 5.

13.   Bury, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΙΣΘΜΙΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ*, 83–89, 91–92, 95–97; cf. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry*, 161, 215 n. 1a, 429–31; Svenbro, *Parole*, 180–81. Translation by Lattimore, *Odes* 108, 110. On verbal and thematic repetition and ring composition in *Nem.* 5, see especially Jacob Stern, "Structure" and Segal, "Arrest." On motion in *Nem.* 5 and 3, see Kevin Crotty, *Song*, 7, 30. On Pindar's awareness of mimēsis as applied to music, see *Pyth.* 12.21 and Webster, "Greek Theories," 168. For the motifs of telling/not telling and athletic training here I am indebted to Lars Engle.

14.   Crotty, *Song*, 76, 100; William Race, "Pindaric Encomium," 154–55; Gentili, *Poetry*, 287 n. 57. See also John B. Bury, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΝΕΜΕΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ*, 89; Farnell, *Works* 2:346; Svenbro, *Parole*, 180–81, 190. On prostitution, see Willem J. Verdenius, *Commentaries*, 123 and 146 (cf. Bowra, *Pindar*, 355–56), on πρόσωπα, see page 124. On *Isth.* 2, see Bury, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΙΣΘΜΙΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ*, 34, 37, 49; Race, *Pindar*, 87, 91; Kurke, *Traffic*, 250–51. On the controversial date, see Farnell, 1.247–48; Norwood, *Pindar*, 152, 260 n. 31; Bowra, 124, 410, 413 (470?); Svenbro, 470; Race, *Pindar* 88; Verdenius, *Commentaries*, 19; Kurke, 222; Molyneux, *Simonides*, 234–45, 244, 258–89, 274, 279.

15. On the date of *Nemean* 5 (480 or so) and Bacchylides *Ep.* 5 (476), see Farnell, *Works*, 1.185–86, 2.274; Svenbro (*Parole*, 180) thinks 485; Lefkowitz, "ΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΩ," 199; cf. Bowra, *Pindar*, 109, 407, 413. Pindar and Bacchylides were contemporaries; the latter also wrote an ode (13) for Pythias' victory; see Bowra, 109, 407; Race, *Pindar*, 25, 94; Molyneux, *Simonides*, 273, 284 n. 124. Hubbard, *Pindaric Mind*, 83 n. 36, with references; discussion and references also in Jacqueline Duchemin, *Pindare*, 258–62 (her argument that κρηπίς refers to statues in *Pyth.* 7 and fr. 194 need not be accepted), 280–84 (also noting *Isth.* 8.61, *Ol.* 3.3), and 296; Svenbro, *Parole*, 189–90 (with further references including *Isth.* 1.14–16 and *Nem.* 4.79–85) and 193–200 (distinguishing these terms from the superficially similar terms in Homer); Bowra, 20–22, 270; Bury, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΝΕΜΕΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ*, xxxiii–l and 45–46; Lefkowitz, 203; Paolo Angeli Bernardini, "Linguaggio," 81–82; Verdenius, *Commentaries*, 124; and Farnell, *Works* 1.123, 1.125, 2.45, 2.157, 2.184–86, 2.190–91, 2.309, and 2.449. On *Pyth.* 7 see Basil Gildersleeve, *Pindar*, 293, 321–23 (comparing *Pyth.* 4.138); Crotty, *Song*, 10–11; Kurke, *Traffic*, 191–92.

16. On *Ol.* 6.1–4 see Gildersleeve, *Pindar*, 173; Farnell, *Works* 1.250, 1.351 (also on fr. 194), and 2.40; Charles J. Billson, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΙΑ*, xxiv; Norwood, *Pindar*, 89, 92, 144, 239; Duchemin, *Pindare*, 201–2; Bernardini, "Linguaggio," 81; Elroy Bundy, *Studia*, 55; Race, *Pindar*, 114; Bowra, *Pindar*, 322–23 and 353. Analogies to the arts, especially architecture, pervade the criticisms of Gildersleeve, especially *Pindar*, xxxvi–lxiv, cix–x, cxiii; and Bury, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΙΣΘΜΙΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ*, vii–xi. On *Pyth.* 3 see Bundy, 27–28. On *Nem.* 8.47 see Bury, *ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΙ ΝΕΜΕΟΝΙΚΑΙΣ*, 148–49, 157–58; and Kurke, *Traffic*, 45–46. On Democr. B21, see Bowra, 13; Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla*, 322; Svenbro, *Parole*, 190 n. 116 (with further references, including Paus. 10.5.8, apparently for κίονας), and 193 n. 134; Gentili, *Poetry*, 50, 53, 163–65, 249, linking the architectural metaphors to the developments of poetry and the visual arts as "crafts" and as mimēsis.

17. Translation in Lattimore, *Odes of Pindar*, 74–75, italics Lattimore's. The quotation on the date is from Farnell, *Works* 1.123 (see also Bowra, *Pindar*, 107, 124, 406, 413; Svenbro, *Parole*, 181). For discussion of 513 Page, see Molyneux, *Simonides*, 234, 268–69. Race, *Pindar*, 86–87, quotation from 87. On πρόσωπον, see Verdenius, *Commentaries*, 124. Farnell takes πρόσωπον as a human visage, both here and in *Ol.* 6.4 (*Works*, 2.185–86, 2.343). Kurke, *Traffic*, 156–59,

translation from 158. Kurke (188–90) discusses the treasury as cult object and compares *Isth.* 1, where the terminology of architecture is applied to the efforts of Theban Herodotus, to *Pyth.* 6. See also Billson, ΠΙΝΔΑΡΟΥ ΕΠΙΝΙΚΙΑ, 231; Gildersleeve, *Pindar,* 315–17; Fraenkel, *Early Greek Poetry,* 430 n. 9; Svenbro, 180–81; Bundy, *Studia,* 64. On ἐν μυχοῖσι Πιερίδων as a physical place see Duchemin, *Pindare,* 39–40.

18. Wilhelm Schubart, "Über den Dithyrambus," 24-29; trans. mine. Lasserre, *Plutarque,* 48–49; cf. Svenbro, *Parole,* 155.

19. The anecdote is found in Porph. *Abst.* 2.18; see Webster, "Greek Theories," 173–74.

20. Mario Untersteiner, *Sofisti,* 3.148–49; Untersteiner, *Sophists,* 304, 308–9 n. 2; Freeman, *Ancilla,* 162; Freeman, "Pre-Socratic Philosophers," 417; T. M. Robinson, *Contrasting Arguments,* 34–54.

21. Translation in Robinson, *Contrasting Arguments,* 115 and 119, italics his.

22. See for example Untersteiner, *Sofisti,* 3.166–69; Untersteiner, *Sophists,* 112, 127 n. 46, 179, 183, and 310 n. 31; Robinson, *Contrasting Arguments,* 68, 92, 184; Levi, "On 'Twofold Statements,'" 301–302.

23. Translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia,* 4.509, note omitted.

24. Wilhelm Nestle, *Vom Mythos,* 319–24, translation mine from 324; cf. Untersteiner, *Sofisti,* 3.167; Robinson, *Contrasting Arguments,* 92, 184.

Thomas Sheerer Duncan ("Gorgias' Theories," 404) thinks that Gorgias is not serious in his comments on ὄψις.

25. Nestle, *Vom Mythos,* 319–24; translation of *Hel.* 11 is mine. Few accept Max Pohlenz' ("Die Anfänge," 142–78) argument that Gorgias is the source of Aristoph. *Ran.* 905–118; see Otto Immisch, *Gorgiae Helena,* 28–30; Ludwig Radermacher, Review of Immisch, 6–9; Untersteiner, *Sophists,* 189–90. On the relationship between knowledge, art, and the tragic in Gorgias, see Nestle, 306–32; Freeman, *Pre-Socratic Philosophers,* 153–67; Untersteiner, 92–205, esp. 185–93; and Charles Segal, "Gorgias," especially 106–8. Segal is sympathetic to Pohlenz but creates his own version of Gorgias' aesthetic based on the psychological effect of literature on the audience. Eric Dodds (*Plato: Gorgias,* 6–10) finds Gorgias, not "Sophist" or "original philosophical thinker," but "rhetor." Lucas (*Aristotle,* 270) tries to reduce Gorgias' thought to a mimetic theory. On πλάσσαντας, see also Xen. B1.21–22 Diels and Kranz, discussed in Freeman, *Pre-Socratic Philosophers,* 99; Harriott, *Poetry,* 114 n. 4 (minimizing the comparison), and 142–43; Svenbro, *Parole,* 103–4, especially note 137, and 200 (distinguishing from Pindar).

26. Translation from Larue van Hook, "Alcidamas," 93. For a general introduction to Alcidamas and a translation of *On the Sophists*, see van Hook. Greek text in Ludwig Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores*, 135–41. On his life and thought cf. Untersteiner, *Sophists*, 341–42, 350; Kennedy, *Art*, 5, 70, 79, 86, 172–73.

27. Translation in van Hook, "Alcidamas," 93, note omitted. On this passage and the *Phaedrus*, see van Hook, 93, citing *Phdr.* 275D–276A; Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 5, 79; Keuls, *Plato*, 37.

28. van Hook, *Isocrates*, 3.2–3.

29. Translation from van Hook, *Isocrates*, 45–47, note omitted. Race, "Pindaric Encomium," 134, 149–50, 153–55; Gentili, *Poetry*, 163, 165, and 287, quotation from 287. On ring composition, see Race, 149.

30. On authorship, date and similarities to Isocrates see Blass, *attische Beredsamkeit* 3.1.406-8; cf. DeWitt and DeWitt, *Demosthenes* 40–41 and, on the date, 72. Translation of *Eroticus* from Norman W. DeWitt and Norman J. DeWitt, *Demosthenes*, 53. On spuriousness, see Anton Westermann, quoted in Wilhelm Dindorf, *Demosthenes*, 7.1413–18, 7.1422–23 (1415–16 on this passage). On Isocrates, see Race, "Pindaric Encomium," 139–40. On "motionlessness" here see Heinrich Schaefer, quoted in Dindorf, 7.1421.

31. According to Freeman (*Ancilla*, 70), "Ion of Chios was active between 452 and 421 B.C."; cf. Freeman, *Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 206. Translation by Donald A. Russell, in Russell and M. Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 4–5, notes omitted.

32. Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 6 n. 7. On frag. 162, see August Nauck, *Tragicorum* (= 159 Snell, Kannicht, and Radt) and on Aristophanes, see Svenbro, *Parole*, 190 n. 116 (terminology in *Pax* 749–50, *Ran.* 1004 and *Thesm.* 49–69, all cited by Svenbro, is somewhat different); Bowra, *Pindar*, 20–21.

33. Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 54.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. For an introduction to Plato's views, see J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, I.33–70, to which the following discussion is indebted; J. G. Warry, *Greek Aesthetic Theory*, 1–82; Crombie, *Examination*, 143–50, 183–95; Neville Richard Murphy, *Interpretation*, 224–46; or Sörbom, *Mimesis*, 99–175. For a summary of some issues see Maguire, "Differ-

entiation," 389–410 and "Beauty," 171–93. Julias Elias (*Plato's Defense*) finds Plato favorable to poetry, but broadens "poetry" to mean Plato's myths. There is little relevant in Rupert C. Lodge's *Plato's Theory*, which explicates a Platonic theory of art descended from the Ionians, the Pythagoreans, and the Sophists. Keuls (*Plato*) presents Plato as using painting metaphorically.

2. Translation by Lane Cooper, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 218.

3. Translation by W. D. Woodhead, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 283–84, 284, 285, 283–84.

4. Translation by R. Hackforth, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 1132, 1134, 1137, 1139. Elias, *Plato's Defense*, 34–36; cf. Panofsky, *Idea*, 5; and Keuls, *Plato*, 43–44, 147–50.

5. Translation by A. E. Taylor, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 1264 and 1266. On Leonardo, see Richter, *Paragone*, 14–17, 27–28 (*Par.* 7), 45–47, 49–51 (*Par.* 17–18), 52–71 (*Par.* 20–31), and 78–79 (*Par.* 35); Blunt, *Artistic Theory*, 49–53, especially 52.

6. Notopoulos, "Parataxis," 4–5, also citing *Ti.* 32D–33A, *Prt.* 329D–E and Arist., *Poet.* 1459a; Maguire, "Differentiation," especially 400–403 and notes; "Beauty," 171–73 and notes (184–86 on the *Phaedrus*); John Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine*, 133–54, 162–97, especially 182–85; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 27 and *Plato and Aristotle*, 15–16; Krieger, *Ekphrasis*, especially 32–33, 67–78, 202–4; see also Cooper, *Aristotle*, xx–xxi and xxiii–xxiv.

7. R. G. Collingwood, "Plato's Philosophy," 154–72; *Principles*, 146–50, 97–99. For criticism of Collingwood, see Stanley Rosen, "Collingwood," 135–48.

8. J. Tate, "Imitation," 16–23; "Plato and Imitation," 161–69. For examples of similar approaches, see John Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine*, 60; William C. Greene, "Plato's Views," 28–56; Whitney J. Oates, *Plato's View*, especially 36, 59, 73, and 77; Willem J. Verdenius, *Mimesis*; Battin, "Plato," 163–74; Edith Watson Schipper, "Mimesis," 199–203; Charles Karelis, "Plato," 315–21. For criticism of Tate's approach, see Warry, *Greek Aesthetic Theory*, 65–66; Thomas Gould, "Plato's Hostility," especially 70–75; and Lucas, *Aristotle*, 260–61. For argument that Plato in the *Ion* presents two types of imitation, of nature (by representation) and of the divine (by inspiration), see Kenneth Dorter, "Ion," 65–78. George Grube (*Greek and Roman Critics*, 46–65) rehabilitates Plato by emphasizing the *Phaedrus* and *Laws*, an approach criticized by Gould. Leon Golden ("Plato's Concept," 118–31) tries to justify artistic

imitation in Plato as a means to knowledge of the ideals. In "Art in the Republic," D. R. Grey argues that Plato was highly "aesthetic," but torn between a mimetic and a utilitarian view of art. In "Plato and the *Poetics*," Leonard Moss argues that the contradictory views in *Resp.* 2–3 and 10 are reconciled by Aristotle, who models his view of imitation on the best aspects of Plato's self-contradictory views. There is a summary of modern views on Plato, painting, and mimēsis in Keuls, *Plato*, 48–50.

9. Translation by Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 624.

10. Koller, *Mimesis*, 15–21; for criticism of Koller, see Else, "Imitation," 73–90 (83–86 on the present passage); Lucas, *Aristotle*, 271–72. Sörbom (*Mimesis*, 11–21) criticizes both Koller and Else. Translation by Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 637, 637, 638, 640, 642.

11. Translation by Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 820, 822, 824, 826, 827. Greene, "Plato's Views," 51. Most believe that Plato's criticism here also reflects his views on illusionistic art; see R. G. Steven, "Plato," 149–55; cf. George K. Plochmann, "Plato," 189–200; Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 81; and in opposition Keuls, *Plato*. For an argument that Plato attacks contemporary drama, painting, and music see Catherine Rau, *Art*, 34–35, 44–50.

12. Translation from Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 828. Gentili, *Poetry*, 4–5; cf. Lucas, *Aristotle*, 261; Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 45–46. Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 4–5, quotations from 4. See also Crombie, *Examination*, 149; Murphy, *Interpretation*, 240–41.

13. Translation by Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 830.

14. Armando Plebe, "La formulazione," 2.759–88. On *Pol.* 306c, see Greene, "Plato's Views," 68.

15. Keuls, *Plato*, 33–35; Richard McKeon, "Literary Criticism," 155. On the *Sophist*, see J. A. Philip, "Mimesis," 453–68. On *Timaeus*, see Philip, 464 and 466. On Plato's use of *mimēsis*, see McKeon, especially 149–59; on visuality, see especially 154–58; cf. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics*, 25–27; *Plato and Aristotle*, 38–44, 60–61; and Lucas, *Aristotle*, 260–61. Plato's distinction between "copies" and "phantasms" will be treated further in chapter 6, in the discussion of *phantasia*.

16. On *Phaedrus* 249b, see Greene, "Plato's Views," 59. Plato translation by Hackforth, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 521; Simonides translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 4.501.

17.   Translation by M. E. Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism,* 90–91, subdivisions and notes omitted. Hagstrum, *Sister Arts,* 6. On aesthetic versus functional approaches, see Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 65–66; cf. Alfred Gudeman, *Aristoteles,* 421; S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory,* 115–20, 198–239; for an example of criticism, see Pollitt, *Ancient View,* 97–98. On ease in classifying media, see Augusto Rostagni, *Arte Poetica,* 3–11, 103; Lucas, *Aristotle,* 56, 259–60, 269; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica,* 10; and Sörbom, *Mimesis,* 207.

18.   Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 69; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 18. On shapes and colors in painting and sculpture, see also Gudeman, *Aristoteles,* 81; and Lucas, *Aristotle,* 56. On σχήματα and dancing, see Else, *Aristotle's Poetics,* 22 and Keuls, *Plato,* 37. On Galileo, see Panofsky, *Galileo,* 6–11 and his Appendix I. On the possibility that pantomimes, etc., are also among those who imitate by means of shapes and colors, see Else, *Aristotle's Poetics,* 22–23.

19.   Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 25–26; *Plato and Aristotle,* 205–18. Some would take the word to refer to the human reproduction of animal sounds; Rostagni holds that it includes this as well as visual images, and the word is minimized by Lucas, but his citation of Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.1 (on sculpture) hardly helps him; Plato's *Laws* 668a is more ambiguous.

For other interpretations of the word translated by Hubbard as "the voice," see Lucas, *Aristotle,* 56–57; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica,* 5. On ἀπεικάζοντες and the related word ἐικών (image), see Lucas, 56; Kerenyi, "ΑΓΑΛΜΑ," 169–70.

20.   Gudeman, *Aristoteles,* 82. For diagrammatic breakdowns of this passage see, e.g., Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 67; Gudeman, 108; Friedrich Solmsen, "Origin," 196 (196–97 emphasize Platonic influence here), cited by Else; or Golden and Hardison (*Aristotle's* Poetics, 72), who do not recognize the imagistic/nonimagistic distinction; cf. Ingram Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 102. Quote from Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 37 (italics Else's), see also page 22.

21.   For a mathematical interpretation of mimēsis, see W. F. Trench, "Mimesis," especially 8–21.

22.   Translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism,* 92, notes omitted. Hardie, *Poetics* 351; cf. Rouveret, *Histoire,* 129–33. Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 77–78. Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica,* 10; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 82.

23.   On Polygnotus, see Robertson, *History,* 241–70, 658–64; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece,* 126–41, 143–45; *Art and Experience,* 43–45,

54, quotation from 54; Rouveret, *Histoire*, 135–61. On Pauson, see Robertson, 417, 694; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 146–47. On Dionysius, see Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 125, 145.

24.   Else's argument (*Aristotle's* Poetics, 77–82 and 88–89) is favorably appraised by Golden and Hardison (*Aristotle's* Poetics, 80–81); Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 81–81 and 212–13; Lucas, *Aristotle*, 64–65; cf. Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 113; Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 98–99; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 9–10; and Sörbom, *Mimesis*, 190–92. Butcher ascribes to each of the three painters an artistic style: "idealistic" (Polygnotous), "realistic" (Dionysius), and "caricature" (Pauson). Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 231–32, quotation from 232; cf. Winter, "Parallelerscheinungen," 709–10; and Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*, 18–23, 33, 88. See also Graham Zanker, *Realism*, 133–54.

25.   Translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 127. On εἰκονοποιός, see Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 420. On εἴκαζεν, see Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 25–27.

26.   Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 81–88, 216.

27.   R. P. Hardie, "*Poetics*," 351; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 40.

28.   Translation in W. David Ross, *Works*, volume 9. On the ethical doctrine here in relation to the *Poetics*, see Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 70.

29.   Winter, "Parallelerscheinungen," 710–12.

30.   Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 102. Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 1.103. On the *Metaphysics*, see W. David Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2.416, 2.418; Warry, *Greek Aesthetic Theory*, 87–88. Translations of *Poetics* here are mine.

31.   Translation of *Poetics* by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 99, subdivision omitted. Rouveret, *Histoire*, 136–61; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 39, 168; Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 181, trans. mine; cf. Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 168. On Rembrandt, etc., see Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art*, 24–25. On Aristotle's assertion here, see Lucas, *Aristotle*, 105. On Zeuxis, see Robertson, *History*, 411–13, 415, 692–93; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 149–53.

32.   Translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 111. Edgar Lobel, "Crux," 78; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 468–69, 475–82; *Plato and Aristotle*, 122, 180, 207, 209–10, 212–16, quotation from 216; cf. Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 227–28, who also removes the two words, and Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 56.

Lucas (*Aristotle*, 166) praises Lobel's transposition ("Crux," 78) and suggests a lacuna after the passage but obelizes it, calling it "possibly an explanatory note which has got into the text from the margin."

Most modern editors follow Ms. A in changing the word "good" (ἀγαθόν) to the name of the poet Agathon (Ἀγάθων). Gudeman (*Aristoteles*, 284–85) finds the two words displaced from elsewhere and objects to *Agathon* on stylistic grounds, also adding a lacuna. Golden and Hardison (*Aristotle's* Poetics, 210 n. 1) acknowledge corruption and comment, perhaps overoptimistically: "The point is the same in either case." Against ἀγαθόν, see Marvin Herrick, "Aristotle's *Poetics*," 248–49; Else, 478–79; Lucas, 166. Rostagni (*Aristotele, Poetica*, 83–84, 87–88), who finds *Poet.* 1454b.8–15 helpful in interpretation of 1454a.23, also recognizes some textual difficulty in both passages and is suspicious of *Agathon*, but finds παραδείγματα σκληρότητος sound where it is.

33. Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 231; Stephen Halliwell, *The Poetics*, 140; Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 369. On Polygnotus' *Nekyia*, see Robertson, *History*, 266–70, 662–64; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 133–40.

On καλλίους see, e.g., Halliwell, *Poetics* 48; Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 1.93; Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 81; other interpretations are found in Cooper, *Aristotle on the Arts*, 51 ("ennoble him in the picture") and L. J. Potts, *Aristotle*, 37–38 ("who follow the model closely, but refine on it"). On influence, see Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 7.

34. Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 477, 480–82.

35. Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 27, 203–4, 210, quotation from 233; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 477, 480–82. Lucas (*Aristotle*, 165, 264–65) inclines toward Else's view of "idealization" here. Butcher wavers (*Aristotle's Theory*, 150, 153). Gudeman (*Aristoteles*, 272–73) adopts the view that in both passages Aristotle begins with individuals and "idealizes." Webster (*Art and Literature in Fourth-Century Athens*, 87) sees here growing tension between a developing realism and an older idealism.

36. Translation of *Politics* by Benjamin Jowett in Ross, *Works*, volume 10, note omitted; translation of *Rhetoric* by W. Rhys Roberts, in Ross, *Works*, volume 11. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 128–36. Plebe, ("La formulazione," 2.786) sees Pythagorean influence here through Plato. On *Poet.* 17.1455a29–34, see Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 217–18. On *Int.* 1.1.16a3, see Butcher 125. On the *Pol.* passage, see also Sörbom, *Mimesis*, 182–86.

37. Translation mine. Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 83, 135–36, 147, 198–99, 223–24, and plates 287–88, 610–11, 613, and 803, quotation from 223; cf. Zeitlin, "Artful Eye," 192–93. On *Mem.* 3.10, see Sörbom, *Mimesis*, 82–98 and Rouveret, *Histoire*, 14–15.

38. On the *Poetics* as early (360–55) see Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 67–73.

39. Keuls, *Plato*, 9–32 (*mimēsis*) and 95–109 (*ēthos*), quotation from 100; Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art*, 24, 30–31, 96, 184–89, and 304–6, quotation from 24.

40. Translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 94, subdivision and note omitted.

41. For arguments that this passage refers to visual arts see, for example, Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 126–27; Ella Birmelin, "Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 173; Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 81 and 117–19; Potts, *Aristotle*, 20; Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art*, 10; Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 92.

Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 128, italics Else's; *Plato and Aristotle*, 90, 198; Lucas, *Aristotle*, 72–73; Lane Cooper, *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 65; cf. Edward Cope (*Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 217–19), who thinks the passage a later gloss on the *Poetics*. Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 131 n. 129.

42. H. L. Tracy, "Aristotle," 498–508, quotation from 508; Tracy, "Intellectual Factor," 43–46; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 132; Birmelin, "Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 174–75. See also Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 92–95, also comparing *Poet*. 9. Lucas (*Aristotle*, 72) likes this explanation but finds no evidence. For a discussion of the "learning" involved in this passage and an extension to the theory of catharsis, see Golden, "Catharsis," especially 54. On this aspect of Aristotle as response to Plato see, e.g., Murphy, *Interpretation*, 227–29. On *Poet*. 9.1451a36–b11, see Elias, *Plato's Defense*, 10–12.

43. *Poet*. 6.1450a.24–b.4, as translated by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 99, subdivisions and note omitted, modified as described in text.

44. On λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνας see, e.g., Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 185; or Robertson, *History*, 422–23, 695. Vahlen, "Aristoteles' Lehre," 166–67; cf. Vahlen *Aristoteles de Arte*. On line versus color, see Rouveret, *Histoire*, 433 and Keuls, *Plato*, 91–95.

45. Lucas, *Aristotle*, 104–5 (with paleographic and stylistic arguments against the transposition); Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 259–61; see also A. W. Gomme, *Greek Attitude*, 65 n. 1. For a defense of the original ms. position, see Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 170–71; and for a defense of the color/character analogy, see Keuls, *Plato*, 93. On influence, see Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 7. Gudeman (*Aristoteles*, 181–82, 185) virtually reaches this position without accepting the transposition. "Primacy of shape" would still remain, to a lesser extent, if the transposition is

rejected; see, e.g., Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 40 and Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 345–46.

46. Translation by Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 825.

47. *Poetics* translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 101. Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 284–85, 361–62, quotations from 284 n. 9, and 361–62; Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 57–58, 70–71, 126–29; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 44; Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 178–79; Lucas, *Aristotle: Poetics*, 112–13 (see 113–14 on time in perception), 265–66 on *Phdr.*, and 266–67 on "superiority"); Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 186–90, 275–78; Hardie, "The *Poetics*," 361–62; cf. Bywater, 180; Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 81; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 285.

48. On the Platonism in *Poetics*, chapters 7–9, see Solmsen, "Origin," 198; cf. Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art*, xx–xxi, xxiii–xxiv, 28; Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*, 53–62, 75, 152; Maguire, "Differentiation," especially 400–3 and notes; Maguire, "Beauty," 171–73 and notes. Golden and Hardison (*Aristotle's* Poetics, 143) also see live animals here; Gudeman (*Aristoteles*, 194) oddly praises Aristotle's originality. On *Poet.* 8.1451a.28–29, see Birmelin, "Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 173.

49. Andrew Stewart, "Narration and Allusion," 173 n. 11. *Poetics* translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 127, subdivision omitted. For the two interpretations of "other visual artist," see Lucas, *Aristotle*, 234; and Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 324; cf. Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 273.

50. Halliwell, *Poetics*, 177–79; Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 182, cf. 217–18.

51. Translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 130. Halliwell, *Poetics* 68 (cf. Lucas, *Aristotle*, 46 and 248); Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 123. On Zeuxis here, see Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 277–78 and the discussion below in chapter 6.

52. Translation by Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 113. Lucas, *Aristotle*, 174. For modern parallels to Aristotle's advice, see Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 303–4.

53. Hubbard, trans., Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 127 (note omitted), 128. Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 330–31; Lucas, *Aristotle*, 235; Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 424; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 158, 174. Bywater cites modern pictorial representations of the horse moving as described by Aristotle; also Hubbard, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 127 n. 3.

54. Halliwell, *Poetics*, 97. On drama and *enargeia*, see Rostagni, *Aristotele*, *Poetica*, 97–98; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 644; Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 135–38; cf. Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 449–50; Golden and Hardison, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 215, 261–62; Keuls, "Rhetoric and Visual Aids," 123–25, 131–32 (= 204–206 in reprint edition). On *enargeia*, see Zanker, "Enargeia," 297–311, especially 305–10; and discussion below in chapters 5 and 6.

55. Potts, *Aristotle*, 10, 68, quotation from 68; Zeitlin, "Artful Eye," 138–96, 295–304; Allison Sharrock, "Representing Metamorphosis," 103–4, quotation from 104.

56. On visual sense impressions, see Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 125–28; Rostagni, *Aristotele, Poetica*, 17, 88–89. On the Renaissance and Enlightenment, see Cocking, *Imagination*, 225; on Robortello, see Weinberg, "Robortello," especially 324 and 328–30, quotation from 329–30. On dramatic gestures and masks see Bywater, Ἀριστοτέλους, 241; and Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 285–86.

57. Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 157–58; Trimpi, "Meaning," especially 3–6.

58. Translation by Roberts in Ross, *Works*, vol. 11, notes omitted. Roberts's note (n. 5) reads: "ἀγωνιστική: more strictly, the oratory of debate—of the actual 'struggles' of the law-courts and the assembly; the 'combative', 'controversial' style."

59. Translation by Roberts in Ross, *Works*, volume 11. Trimpi, "Meaning," 3–6, 30–31; Keuls, "Skiagraphia" (cf. Keuls, *Plato*, 72–87, 81 on this passage); Rouveret, *Histoire*, 58; cf. Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*, 27–28. George Kennedy ("Theophrastus," 96) sees here an early manifestation of the three styles (or characters); as will be seen in the next chapter, many trace this distinction to Theophrastus; cf. Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 112–13. On *skiagraphia* and *skēnographia*, see the discussion and bibliography in chapter 1, above.

60. Trimpi, "Meaning," 19–22.

61. Dodds, *Plato*, 322. On *Thesm.* 148–55, see Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 30.

62. Cf. Grube, *Greek Critic*, 12–14.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Phillip de Lacy, "Stoic Views," especially 249–51, quotation from 241 (cf. Grube, *Greek Critic*, 15); Christian Jensen, *Philodemus* x.32–xi.2; Nathan Greenberg, *Poetic Theory*.

On Cicero and the philosophic schools, see J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory*, 157–66. See Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, on rhetoric between Aristotle and Cicero, 264–336, and on Stoicism, 290–99. See also W. Rhys Roberts (*Demetrius*, 19–20) on Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism. On the Peripatetics, see de Lacy, "Stoic Views," 251. For attribution to the Peripatetics, see C. O. Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 94–99; cf. D'Alton, 114–29. For attribution to Academics see, e.g., Mary Grant and George Fiske, "Cicero's 'Orator,'" especially 15–21, 57–60; for criticism, see Brink, 94–99. On the Epicureans' attitude toward language and poetry, see de Lacy, "Epicurean Analysis"; on Academic and Epicurean rhetoric, see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 300–301. For an outline of a possible Epicurean imagist poetics, see Benediktson, *Propertius*, 103–16.

2. On the traits of the Peripatetics, see Brink (*Prolegomenon*, 90–150), who tries to trace ideas from Aristotle to Horace; see especially 94–99 (*decorum*), 103 (unity), and 103–8 (universals), following Rostagni, *Arte Poetica*). On τὸ πρέπον (*decorum*), see also Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art*, 68–70, 105–6, 341–47. On the Peripatetic criticism, see Anthony Podlecki, "Peripatetics"; on rhetoric, see Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition." On "naturalistic" decorum in Plato's *Hippias Major*, see Murphy, *Interpretation*, 246.

3. Translation by Doreen Innes, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 204. On Theophrastus, cf. Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 1.157; Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 277; and E. E. Sikes, *Greek View*, 162. Theophrastus follows Arist. *Rhet.* 3.2.13: Grube ("Theophrastus," especially p. 73) thinks Theophrastus probably a follower of Aristotle; cf. Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*, 122; and Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 104. On the doctrine of styles, see Roberts, *Demetrius*, 16; Kennedy, "Theophrastus"; and Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 279–82. Kennedy argues that Theophrastus developed the theory of styles by combining the generic distinctions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with his comments on diction in the *Poetics*. For criticism of the attribution to Theophrastus, see George L. Hendrickson, "Peripatetic Mean," 125–46, clarifying Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 3 and Demetr. *Eloc.* 41; Innes, "Theophrastus," 260–63 and notes; Grube, "Thrasymachus," 251–67, especially 251–52 and 261–67. Grube (*Greek and Roman Critics*, 107–8) finds a notion of three types of language in Theophrastus, but not the technical theory of the three styles. On the "virtues," see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 273–78; and Dirk Marie Schenkeveld, *Studies*, 73, following Kennedy against Grube.

4. Grube, *Greek Critic*, 32–38, 56, and references in notes 39–56 (Aristotle), 133–63 (date), 50–51, and 54–55 (oldness of views). For an

overview, see Schenkeveld (*Studies*, 135–48), who argues, primarily on linguistic grounds, for late composition using earlier writings; cf. Innes, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 172. Kennedy (*Art of Persuasion*, 285–86) follows Grube's suggestion of a very early date. For internal evidence dating the work to after 100 B.C. see J. F. Lockwood, "Direction-Posts," 59. The attribution to Demetrius of Tarsus (late first century A.D.) by Roberts (in Fyfe and Roberts, *Aristotle*, 272–79) is tentatively followed by Atkins (*Literary Criticism*, 2.197–200); earlier Roberts (*Demetrius*, 49–64, 213, 241–42, 244–47, 249, 251–54, 256–59) had dated Demetrius to 100 B.C. to A.D. 100 but favored the first century A.D. On Demetrius and the Peripatetics, see also Roberts, *Demetrius*, 50–51, 250.

5.   Translation by Innes, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 176.

6.   Grube, *Greek Critic*, 64; cf. Roberts, *Demetrius*, 215. On the date, see Kim Paffenroth, "Note," 280–81.

7.   Roberts, *Demetrius*, 273, s.v. γραφή.

8.   Schenkeveld, *Studies*, 28–39; Lockwood, "Notes," 41–42, quotations from 41; cf. Roberts, *Demetrius*, 298, s.v. περιεξεσμένος. Schenkeveld (35) considers the comparisons "commonplace," comparing to the architectural analogy in Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22, to the sculptural analogy Quint. 12.10.7–9 and Cic. *Brut.* 257. George Kennedy ("Theophrastus," 100) suggests that the similarity of this passage to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Isocrate* 3, and the similar allusion to art in both passages points to Theophrastus as the source of both Demetrius and Dionysius. There might also be an allusion to sculpture in *De Elocutione* 55 (παραξύσματα). Also on Theophrastus, see Innes, "Theophrastus"; cf. Innes, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 176 n. 4, comparing *Brut.* 70 and Quint. 12.10.1–9. On παράξυσμα, see Roberts, *Demetrius*, 296 s.v. παράξυσμα.

9.   Innes, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 193, note omitted. On the "purple," see Adolf Kiessling and Richard Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus*, 291; Roberts, *Demetrius*, 53–54, 232, without much enthusiasm; and against the interpretation Grube, *Greek Critic*, 45–46.

10.   Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 116. On Aristotle and Isocrates cf. Cope, *Rhetoric*, 110–11; Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 1.147; and Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition," 184–86. Aristotle's distinction of *enargeia* from *energeia* is preserved by Demetrius; see Roberts, *Demetrius*, 279. On vividness in Demetrius' other styles, see Schenkeveld, *Studies*, 18 (on

Eloc. 4.214), and 55 (on *Eloc.* 4.220). On the middle style, see Hendrickson, "Peripatetic Mean," 142–46; cf. Grube, *Greek Critic,* 70–71 (note on p. 37). For good comparisons of Demetrius' four-fold classification with the standard three-fold one, see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion* 281–2 and 286–89 and Schenkeveld, 66–72; Grube, *Greek Critic,* 109 (note on p. 210).

11.   Nettleship, "Literary Criticism," 54, see also pages 34, 48, and 55–56; Adolf Stahr, *Torso,* 2.220–24. Édouard Bertrand, *Études,* 259–300; John Edwin Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis,* lxi–lxiv (quotation from lxxii), 5, 42, and 242–43. Stahr (2.209–30) treats Cicero as a typical Roman of his time, Bertrand as a tasteful and knowledgeable critic. See also Webster, *Hellenistic Poetry* 302–3.

12.   N. H. Watts, trans., *Cicero,* 39 and 27.

13.   This general distinction, although primarily rhetorical, is traced from Aristotle (*Poet.* 6.1450a.23–29) through Cicero (*Orat.* 65) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 16C), to the Renaissance and Enlightenment by Lee, in "Ut Pictura Poesis" (202–3); see also Rostagni, *Arte poetica,* 10–11; Eleanor Winsor Leach, *Rhetoric,* 12; Roberts, *Demetrius,* 35–35; Krieger, *Ekphrasis,* 81 (Dryden); and Trimpi, "Meaning," 25–29. On "contour"/"color," see Keuls, *Plato,* 91–95.

14.   On *skiagraphia* at *Orat.* 65, see Rouveret, *Histoire,* 37–38. Translation of *Brut.* 141 by George L. Hendrickson, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero,* 125. On the tools of painting, see Johann August Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum,* s.v. *pingere.* On the Renaissance, see Hagstrum, *Sister Arts,* 57.

15.   Stahr, *Torso,* 2.215. Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis,* 24, 94, 129; Wilhelm Kroll, *Orator,* 84. Translation by Harry Mortimer Hubbell, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero,* 353. On *fucus,* see A. E. Douglas, *M. Tulli Ciceronis,* 27, 57, 113, 204, 211, 215. For *inventi expolitio,* see *Inv. Rhet.* 1.40.74–75; 1.41.76; etc. Larue van Hook (*Metaphorical Terminology,* 38–39) classifies *polire* as a metaphor from carpentry and metalworking, equivalent to λεαίνειν, συγξεῖν, γλαφυρός, or τορεύειν, tracing the second of these back to Alcidamas (*Soph.* 20). On *liniamenta,* see Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art,* 392–97.

References for the authors discussed in this and the next chapter also can be found in Abbott, Oldfather, et al, *Index Verborum,* s.v. *color, coloro, coloratus, illumino, illuminate, illustris, inlustrior, illustro, pictor, pictura, pigmentum, pingo,* and *pictus;* Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 151–63; Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis," 197–269; Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum,* s.v. *color, flos, illustrare, lineamenta, lumen, pigmentum, pingere,*

and *politus;* Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum,* s.v. χρῶς; *Clavus* s.vv. *adumbratus, color, coloratus, exaedificare, expingere, fingo, flos, illuminare, illuminate, illustrare, lineamentum, linere, lucere, lumen, nitidus, pellucens, perpolitus, pictus, pingere,* and *polite;* Sandys, xxii, lxxi–iv, 3, 8, 23, 24, 25, 42, 65, 73–74, 94, 100, 103, 105, 140, 148, 158–59, 201, 203–5, and 237; Nettleship, "Literary Criticism," 48, 54–56; van Hook, *Metaphorical Terminology,* 40–43.

16. Translation by Hubbell, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero,* 375. Kroll, *Orator* 93. Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis,* 24; cf. R. G. Austin, *Quintiliani,* 199. The floral metaphor appears as early as Plato (*Phd.* 100d, χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἦ σχῆμα, on which see Murphy, *Interpretation,* 114–15 n. 2, and 231–32). On the middle style, see D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory,* 73–74, citing *Orat.* 96 and Quint. 12.10.58 (ἀνθηρός), for Greek equivalents see also Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 40 and Demetr. *Eloc.* 36 (γλαφυρός), although it seems difficult to equate Demetrius there with the middle style; cf. Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22 (Roberts, 212–13), where the austere type of composition is said not to be ἀνθηρός, and Roberts' valuable gloss, *Demetrius,* 288 on ἀνθηρός. Interestingly Dionysius' two characterizations of γλαφθρός (his second type of composition) are rejected by ms. *P* and by Roberts. On *polio* and compounds, see Causeret, *Étude,* 173–75, especially 174 on *nitidus* and *nitens.*

17. Translations (*Brut.* 275; 261; 82) by Hendrickson, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero,* 239, 225, and 77. Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis,* 136; Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art,* 440–41; Causeret, *Étude,* 180–81, also with references to *flos, color,* and *pigmentum.* On *chiaroscuro* in Cicero, see also Bertrand, *Études,* 312–13, describing *Orat.* 73; Rouveret (*Histoire,* 262–64) does not believe these Latin terms to describe chiaroscuro.

18. For further examples, see van Hook, *Metaphorical Terminology,* 14–15; Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum,* s.v. *lumen* and *apertus;* Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum,* s.v. φῶς.

19. Ernesti, *Clavus,* ccxxxvi, s.v. *lumen,* who adds earlier references and comments, "But this distinction is not observed" (translations mine). At *Orat.* 25.85, *illustris* is associated with *lumina.* Ernesti's definition of *illustrare* as *ornare* at *Div.* 2.1 goes beyond the evidence, as can be seen from *Acad.* 2.1.2 and *Tusc.* 1.5 (where even *lumen* borders on *lux*), cited by Arthur Stanley Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis,* 348. See also Causeret, *Étude,* 169–70 and 208–9 n. 5, on *dilucidus, lucidus,* and *illustris,* with parallels from *Ad Her.* and Quintilian.

Translation of *Part. Or.* 19–22 by Rackham, *Cicero*, 325 and 327; on the value of visuality see also *De Or.* 2.357 and 3.201–202. See also Causeret, 204 (*dilucida/obscura*), 197 (simile), and 206 (memory system). Cicero apparently confuses *lux* and *lumen* at *Part. Or.* 6: Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum* s.v. *illustrare*.

20. Leach, *Rhetoric*, 309–18.

21. Cicero translation in Rackham, *Cicero*, 141; so also *exprimo* at *Orat.* 3. See also *Brut.* 274; *Orat.* 181 (*quaedam forma et lumen orationis*); *De Or.* 2.90 (*imitando effingat atque exprimat*), etc.; Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, 3 and 8; for Greek equivalents, all later than Cicero, see van Hook, *Metaphorical Terminology*, 43–44. Quint. translation in Butler, *Institutio*, 3.337. See Sandys (87–89) for these and more references. See also Austin, *Quintiliani*, 201; and Douglas, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, 58.

22. See Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, 158, citing *Orat.* 149, *Brut.* 33, *De Or.* 3.171, and Quint. 9.4.27; on Cic. *Orat.* 50 and *Ol.* 6.1–4 see Thomas D. Seymour, *Selected Odes* 98; on *quadrata*, see Causeret, *Étude*, 141–43; Sandys, 213 and 219, citing *Orat.* 197, 208, *De Or.* 3.175, Quint. 2.5.9, 9.4.62, and Columella 8.3.7 and 9.2.13 (on the process in building); on the "basement" see Sandys, 232. On *componere* and *struere* see Causeret, 118–19; and Douglas, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, 202; on *coagmentandis* (Quint. 12.10.77), see R. G. Austin, "Quintilian," 214. There does not seem to be enough evidence to connect *rotunda* with domes; see Causeret 125–27, 132, 141–43, 145, and 163, with further references; cf. Austin, 201.

23. Translation by Winterbottom, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 446. Interpretation of Caligula's comment is difficult: see Donna Hurley, *Historical and Historiographical Commentary*, 191.

24. Translation in Rackham, *Cicero*, 77. On *varietas*, see Ernesti, *Clavus* s.v.

D'Alton (*Roman Literary Theory*, 267–68) sees *De Or.* 3.98 as part of "the quarrel of the Ancients versus the Moderns."

25. Translation of *Brut.* 298 by Hendrickson, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero*, 261. Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 160–61; cf. Trimpi, "Meaning," 15–16 n. 22. See also *Orat.* 206–9, where the epideictic style is the one designed for unjudging audiences. On *Orat.* 96, see Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, 190. On *adumbro* see Ernesti, *Clavus*, clxxvii; and M.-L. Teyssier, "Le langage," 187–203.

26.   Bertrand, *Études*, 261, 279–80, 299–315; Teyssier, "Le langage," 197–203; Babbitt, *New Laocoon*; Wellek, "Parallelism," 29–63.

27.   Translation of *Orat.* by Hubbell, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero*, 407. Kroll, *Orator* 84; Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 177–79, quotation from 179. Causeret (*Étude*, 160 n. 11) also notes the Greek πλάσματα, perhaps suggestive of sculpture, in [Plut.] *Vit. Hom.* 72 and Proclus. Austin, *Quintiliani*, 67, 133, 135–55, 182–83, 190,192, 210, and 214 (*nitor* at 12.10.73 and 12.10.78); Austin, "Quintilian," 17–26; cf. Morales, "Torturer's Apprentice," 189 on Sen. *Contr.* There are at least two other rhetorical meanings of *color* in Quintilian, which Austin characterizes as "the special 'colour' put on a case by the orator's treatment of the facts" (12.1.33) and "'tone,' 'complexion.'" For more complete references in Quintilian, see Eduard Bonnell, *Lexicon*, s.vv. *color, illumino, illustratio, illustro, lumen,* and *lux.*

28.   Doreen Innes, "Phidias," 470–71; cf. A. A. Donahue, "Winkelmann's History," 342 and 352). Austin, *Quintiliani*, 153; see also Austin, "Quintilian," 17–26; Douglas, *M. Tulli Ciceronis* on 70.19 and 20, following A. Oltramare, "L'Idées," 94; Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art*, 60–63, 104–5. For examples of early uses of this terminology, see *Ad Her.* 4.6.9; Demetr. *Eloc.* 13–14; Dion. Hal. *De Isaeo* 4; Fronto *Ad Verum* 1.1. Atkins (*Literary Criticism*, 2.281 and 296–97) compares Cicero to Quintilian, whose originality was to see that the arts can develop beyond their contemporary states. Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum* s.v χρῶμα. On these developmental theories, their origin and the doctrine of styles, see Rouveret, *Histoire*, 428–60.

29.   See, e.g., Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum*, 65; van Hook, *Metaphorical Terminology*; D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory*, 203–7; Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.43. On Cicero's influence, see Dorothy Reich, *G. E. Lessing*, 26–28.

30.   On the chronology of Dionysius' life and works and the development of his thought, see Stanley Frederick Bonner, *Literary Treatises*.

31.   Translation by Roberts, *Dionysius* 159. See Schenkeveld, *Studies*, 107–11, for a discussion of the origin of the similar Demetr. *Eloc.* 2.94. On the Stoic doctrine, see D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory*, 35.

32.   Translation in Roberts, *Dionysius*, 201.

33.   χρώμασι *F*, Roberts, *Dionysius*; σχήμασι *PMV*; In his *Dionysius*, Stephen Usher follows Usener-Radermacher's χρήμασι. For parallels, see Roberts, 333, s.v. χρῶμα; and Lockwood, "Metaphorical Vocabulary," 203, s.v. χρῶμα; see also Lockwood, 202, s.v. συγχωρίζειν.

According to Usher (2.411 n. 1), at 2 *ad Am.* 2, "ὄργανα and χρώματα
. . . are derived from the technical vocabulary of music." Much more
specialized is the use of *colores* in the title of Seneca's *Oratorum et
Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores Suasoriarum et Controversiarum*;
Grube (*Greek and Roman Critics*, 258–59) defines it as "the particular
slant or colouring given to the attack or defense." Perhaps this use is
also that of Horace (*Ars P.* 86), which Atkins (*Literary Criticism*, 2.88)
translates as "tone."

34.   Translation in Roberts, *Dionysius* 215. Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*
90; Roberts, 106; of these words only the fifth and sixth appear in
Lockwood, "Metaphorical Vocabulary," 194, s.v. ἀντιστηριγμός, but see
also 198, s.v. ἐρείδεσθαι. On *Comp.* 22, see also Roberts, *Dionysius*, 295;
ἀνθίζω appears at *Lys.* 13. Grube (*Greek and Roman Critics*, 217–18)
finds the analogy effective and persuasive. Lockwood, "Notes," 41–42;
see also Sandys 88–89 on Cicero's *conglutinatio* and Dionysius' *Dem.* 43
and 40.

35.   Translation in Roberts, *Dionysius* 267.

36.   Translation in Roberts, *Dionysius* 209, 211, and 213; "austere"
and "smooth" are also Roberts' translation. Bowra, *Pindar*, 219. On
Dem. 38 see Usher, *Dionysius*, 1.381 n. Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art*,
24, 138–39, 321–25, 373–75; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 229 (on
colors); Rouveret, *Histoire*, 255–66.

37.   Translation in Roberts, *Dionysius* 231.

38.   Translation in Roberts, *Dionysius* 235 and 245. Keuls,
"Skiagraphia."

39.   Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 158–59. Dionysius in *De Demosthene*
follows a slightly different theory of style than in *De Compositione*,
proposing "three styles of diction" instead of "composition"; see
Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 282, following Grube, *Greek Critic*, 24. On
the similarity between Dionysius' styles of composition and Demetrius'
treatment of periodic styles, see Kennedy, 288–89.

40.   Rouveret, *Histoire*, 428–60; Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 237–39;
Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 158–60, 162; Trimpi, "Horace's 'ut pictura
poesis,'" especially 62–65 and 67–68. Translation in Usher, *Dionysius*
109. On *De Isoc.* 3 and Quintilian, see John Pollini, "The Augustus,"
267–68, 278; and Donahue, "Winkelmann's History," 341–42, 352. *De
Isoc.* 3 begins with citation of Theophrastus, causing some to see him
at the bottom of this development; see note 6 above.

41.   Translation in Usher, *Dionysius* 1.113, notes omitted. Trimpi,
"Meaning," 15 n. 20.

42. Translation in Usher, *Dionysius* 1.135. Trimpi, "Meaning," 15 n. 20.

43. Translation in Usher, *Dionysius* 1.179–81. Cicero translation by Hendrickson, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero*, 67. Donahue, "Winkelmann's History," 341–44, 352–53.

44. Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 158–61; Bonner, *Literary Treatises*, 54; see also Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, lxxiii.

45. On the "second volume," see Bonner, *Literary Treatises*, passim, but especially 26 on Dion. Hal. *Praef.* 4. D'Alton (*Roman Literary Theory*, 513) sees Arist. *Rh.* 3.12 at the bottom of *Dem.* 18 and *Thuc.* 23. On the development of styles, see Bonner ("Dionysius," especially 265), who finds the mixed style an Aristotelian mean. Sandys (*M. Tulli Ciceronis*, lxx) attributes this developmental theory to Theophrastus. Translation of *Dem.* 50 in Usher, *Dionysius* 1.429, notes omitted. See Usher ad loc. and Russell, *Dio*, 192–93, comparing Quint. 12.10.8. At Cic. *De Or.* 3.26, Polycleitus represents the middle style according to Kennedy ("Theophrastus" 100). On Alcamenes, see Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 164–65, 267–69, and plate 460; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 65–66; Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 27–36 (pessimistic on the temple); Robertson, *History*, 271–91, 665–66, and plates 92–97a (optimistic). On the west pediment, see Bernard Ashmole and Nicholas Yalouris, *Olympia*, 8–9 (Ashmole is pessimistic on Alcamenes), 17–22, 178–81, 185–87 (Yalouris not mentioning Alcamenes, emphasizing *ethos* and the dramatic), and plates 62–142. Some see two Alcamenes. See Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, on Timanthes, 156–57, on Parrhasius, 153–56.

46. Translation in Usher, *Dionysius* 1.365. On *Dem.* 36, 44–45, and the "austere" style, see Trimpi, "Meaning," 54 n. 31.

47. Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 108.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Translated by Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 279–80, notes and subdivisions omitted. On Horace and art, see especially Elizabeth H. Haight, "Horace," 157–62 and 201–2.

2. Roy Kenneth Hack, "Doctrine," 16–17; see also Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 246.

3. Brink, "*Ars Poetica*," 473, 476.

4. Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 9–17, quotation from 10. On the analogy's dominance in the poem, see Kiessling and Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus*, 289–95; on organic unity, see also Rostagni, *Arte Poetica*, 3–11.

5. Translation by Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 289. On *ekphrasis*, see Kiessling and Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus*, 291; Rostagni, *Arte Poetica*, 6–8; Zanker, *Realism*, 40; Andrew Laird, "ut figura poesis," 93, 298.

6. Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 368–72, quotations from 369, 371, and 372. For a Platonic view see, e.g., Grant and Fiske, "Cicero's 'Orator,'" especially 15–21 and 57–60. For a view of the poem as Platonic filtered through Aristotle, see Hack, "Doctrine," 37–61; as Aristotelian filtered through Neoptolemus, see Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 43–149; cf. Niall Rudd, *Horace*, 23–28. Nettleship, ("Literary Criticism," 48, 54–56), writing before publication of Philodemus, argued that comparisons of literature and oratory with the visual arts was common in the rhetorical schools, apparently did not reach a sophisticated level, and was important in the theory of Neoptolemus.

7. Trimpi, "Meaning," 1–34; "Horace's 'ut pictura poesis,'" 29–73; and "Early Metaphorical Uses," 403–13. See also Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 162–63, also referring to *Epist.* 2.1.

8. Leach, *Rhetoric*, 5–6, 242–43, quotations from 5. For objections, see Trimpi, "Meaning," 6–7; and Grant and Fiske, "Cicero's 'Orator,'" 20.

9. Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 60–74, especially 63 n. 2. Brink (247 n. 1, and "*Ars Poetica*," 371) suggests that *poema* and *poesis*, here as elsewhere in Horace, do not always have their technical sense, even though Horace ascribes to the doctrine.

10. For the various views described here, see Rostagni, *Arte Poetica*, 103; Rudd, *Horace*, 209; Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 63, 219–20, etc.

11. Translation by Russell in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 281. Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 171–73; cf. Rudd, *Horace*, 165.

12. Translation by Winterbottom, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 278, notes omitted. Brink, *Epistles*, 483–84, 253.

13. La Drière, 298–99, quotation from 298; Rudd, *Horace*, 117, also citing *Arch.* 14, where literature is said to produce *imagines*, and *Odes* 4.8.13–20, where however the reference may be to inscriptions rather than commemorative statues. Horace calls the poet an *imitator* at *Ars. P.* 318. Craig La Drière ("Horace," 288–300) makes the concession

for epic and drama. For a subsequent defense of Horace's Aristotelianism see, Brink, *Prolegomenon*, 90–150. On the disappearance of the *Poetics* see, e.g., Gudeman, *Aristoteles*, 183; Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 337; and Else, *Plato and Aristotle*, 87–88; Lucas, *Aristotle*, xxiii. Roy C. Flickinger ("When Could Horace") shows that Horace might have had access to Pellicon's (poor) edition of Aristotle in 45–44 B.C., and Andronicus of Rhodes' (better) edition by the time he wrote this passage (ca. 12 B.C.): see Brink, *Epistles*, 552–54. Philodemus knew the *Poetics*; see Greenberg, *Poetic Theory*, 124–29 and notes.

14.   Race, "Pindaric Encomium," 149–50, quotation from 150. On Pindar and *Odes* 1.1 and 3.30, see Duchemin, *Pindare*, 334, including an Egyptian parallel.

15.   Translation mine. On *Pyth.* 6 cf. Farnell, *Works*, 1.123 and 2.184–5; Bowra, *Pindar*, 22, also comparing Timoth. *Pers.* 15.232–233 Page. Race, *Pindar* 87. Matthew S. Santirocco, *Unity*, 174 and 176. On allusion to architecture throughout the *Odes*, see Lee T. Pearcy, "Horace's Architectural Imagery," 772–81.

16.   On the passages cited here, see Race, "Pindaric Encomium," 139–40.

17.   Leonardo *Par.* 23, in Richter, *Paragone*, 57.

18.   On Peripatetic elements in *On the Sublime*, see James A. Coulter, "Περὶ Ὕψους," 197–213. For the traditional date see, e.g., Walter Allen, Jr., "Terentianus," 51–64; Roberts, *Demetrius*, 26; Russell, "*Longinus*," xxii–xxx; Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 461. For criticism of the traditional date, see Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 341–42, supporting no alternative date; against Hermagoras as author, see Grube, "Theodorus," 356–65. Translation by Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, 489. On this passage see also, Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.230; Russell, "*Longinus*," 150, comparing Philo, *Quid Det.* 12 and *De Or.* 3.24. On "beautiful words," see the discussion of Theophrastus in chapter 4 above.

19.   Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 161, citing 3.1, 7.2, 17.3, 32.8, 33.2, 35.2, and 36.3. Translation by Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 495, n. omitted. For a list of occurrences of χρῶμα, see the "Index Verborum Potiorum" in Russell, *Libellus*, 93. On *Subl.* 10.7, see Grube, "Notes," 367–68; cf. Russell, "*Longinus*," 105–7 on the textual difficulties at 10.7. On ἐγκοπάς at 41.3, in the context of carpentry, see Roberts, *Dionysius*, 297; Russell, "*Longinus*," 180. At 39.3 Longinus uses εἴδωλα and μιμήματα in a contemptuous (Platonic?) manner. On 13.4, see Russell, "*Longinus*," 117.

20.   Rouveret, *Histoire*, 65–127; Trimpi, "Meaning," 18–20. On *Subl.* 36.3–4, see also Russell, *"Longinus,"* 169–70.

21.   On Polycleitus and the *Doryphorus*, see Robertson, *History*, 328–39, 465–66, 674–72, and plates 109a and 110a; Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 160–62, 263–66, and plates 378–82; Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 105–10 and plate 4a; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 8, 75–79, 99. On Achilles as subject, see Pollini, "The Augustus," 273, 275, 281. On Pythagoreanism and the *Doryphorus/Canon* see Andrew Stewart, "Lysippan Studies," 166; Pollitt, "The *Canon*," 22–24; Hurwit, "The Doryphoros," 17, 24. On Varro, Pliny, and Lysippus, see Hurwit, 12 and 17; Andrew Stewart, "Notes," 258–59, 261; Stewart, "Lysippan Studies," 167–68; Pollini, 275 and 282. On the *Colossus*, see Robertson, 495, 464, 476–77, 664, 705; Stewart, 298–99; Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 190; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 110; and Rouveret, *Histoire*, 414.

22.   On μέγεθος as synonymous with τὸ ὕψος, see Grube, "Notes," 358. On Wilamowitz's suggestion that the colossus is Pheidias' see Russell, *"Longinus,"* 169.

23.   Longinus *Subl.* 17.3, translation by Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 481–82, note omitted. Russell, *"Longinus,"* 132.

24.   On Pliny and the art criticism here, see Meerwaldt, "Adnotationes," 161; Trimpi, "Meaning," 11–13; and Trimpi, "Horace's 'ut pictura poesis,'" 37–38, comparing *Subl.* 3.1, 47–48, comparing Plato's Cave, and 65–66, comparing Cic. *De Or.* 3.101–103, Quint. 8.5.25–30, and 12.10.73–78. On *lumen et umbrae* as skiagraphia, see Keuls, *Plato*, 49. On *Resp.* 10.602d, see Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 140; Gentili, *Poetry*, 38; and Bryson, *Looking*, 32. On Pliny and Martial (1.16, 7.81, and 7.90, where in my opinion the doctrine of forensic and deliberative styles is involved but *chiaroscuro* is not), see Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.302–3, 2.306–7.

25.   On Homer, see Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 17–22. On Lessing and Homer, see Hurwit, *Art*, 46–47; cf. Leach, *Rhetoric*, 12; and Laird, "ut figura poesis," 79, 99–100. On *ekphrasis* in the Greek poets and historians, see D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory*, 507–8. On the relationship of *enargeia* and literary pictorialism see Zanker, *Realism*, 55–112.

26.   Goldhill, "Wise and Knowing Eye," 197–223 and 304–9, quotation from 198; cf. Rouveret, *Histoire*, 351, citing *Sat.* 83, and Keuls, "Rhetoric and Visual Aids," 127–28, 133 (= 211–13), citing *Sat.* 81–88. See Webster, *Hellenistic Poetry*, 182 (on pictographic poems), 207–8, 219–20, 234, 256 and 292 (on the *Anth. Pal.* and visual arts). On Hellenistic literature see Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 22–27.

27. See Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 27-29 (Latin literature), 29-34 (Philostrati and romances), and 34-36. On Catullus see, e.g., Richard Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets*, 85-150; on Propertius, see Benediktson, *Propertius*, especially 78-102 and 150; on Ovid, see Benediktson, "Pictorial Art," 111-20. On "audience reception" in the Roman poets, especially Vergil and Propertius, see Laird, "ut figura poesis," 75-102, 293-300, especially 99-100. On Lucian as sculptor, see Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 227-28; Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 20, 69-70. Translation in Arthur Fairbanks, *Philostratus*, 283.

28. Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 50. Keuls, "Rhetoric and Visual Aids," 121-34 (= 201-16).

29. Peter H. von Blanckenhagen, "Narration," 78-83; Leach, *Rhetoric*, especially 309-466; Hurwit, *Art*, 170-79, 347, 349.

30. For Catullus see, e.g., Poem 68. On Tibullus, see Barry P. Powell, "Ordering," 107-12. On Propertius see, e.g., Otto Skutsch, "Structure," 238-39; Thomas A. Suits, "Mythology," 427-37; and Benediktson, *Propertius*, 1-17. On Horace and his Hellenistic antecedents, see Santirocco, *Unity*, 5-11, 179-85. On Vergil see, e.g., Rudd, *Lines*, 119-44. On Suetonius, see Richard C. Lounsbury, "Inter quos et Sporus," 3751-60; and Benediktson, "Structure," 167-73.

31. Bryson, *Looking*, 17-59, 179-82; Jane Whitehead, "'Cena Trimalchionis,'" 299-325, quotation from 320.

32. Elsner, *Art and the Roman Viewer*, 41-6, 318-19. Leach, *Rhetoric*, 405-7, 411. On the passage and Catullus 64, see Jenkyns, *Three Classical Poets*, 125.

33. On Plutarch's dates, see C. P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology," 61-74.

34. Translation in Bernadette Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives*, 7.225.

35. Translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 4.501, note omitted. Benediktson, "Lessing," especially 102-5.

36. Translation by William A. Steel, in Steel, *Lessing*, 55; Benediktson, "Lessing," 101-5. See Reich, *G. E. Lessing*, 7-44 (for background on Lessing), 20 (on Lessing, Plutarch, and Dio). On Castelvetro, see Bernard Weinberg, "Castelvetro's Theory," 369.

37. Zanker, *Realism*, 51 n. 26. Translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 4.503. On Plutarch, see Benediktson, "Lessing." On Plutarch, Thucydides, and Xenophon, see R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch*, 157-58.

38. Lucas, *Aristotle*, 270; Benediktson, "Lessing."

39. Translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 1.91-93.

40. See Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.312–13.

41. Alan Wardman, *Plutarch's LIVES*, 23–26, 248.

42. Translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 1.83.

43. Benediktson, "Lessing," 101–5; translation in Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, 4.507–509. It is somewhat difficult to see how artistic genres could be distinguished by "manner of imitation" as, in literature, drama is distinguished from narrative. But Pollitt (*Ancient View of Greek Art*, 99) gives an ingenious example, namely, "when a certain subject is represented in relief sculpture or in freestanding sculpture."

44. Zanker, "Enargeia," 297–311 (298–99 on the Romans, 311 on Plutarch); Zanker, *Realism*, 39–112 (51 n. 22 on Aristotle, 42 on Plutarch); see also Hagstrum, *Sister Arts*, 10–12, with further references; and Leach, *Rhetoric*, 7–8.

45. Translation by Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives*, 2.409.

46. Gentili, *Poetry*, 287.

47. Translation by Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives*, 2.409–411.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Collingwood, *Principles*, 15–56; Rouveret, *Histoire*, 382–423; Gerard Watson, "Concept," 4765–810; see also Cocking, *Imagination*; and on art criticism, Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art*, 52–55, 101–3, 293–97. Birmelin ("Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 149–80, 392–414) argued for the origin of *phantasia* in the Peripatetics and Antiochus, criticized by Schweitzer ("Mimesis," 286–300) and Watson as too early.

2. Translation by F. M. Cornford, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 977.

3. Translation by Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 825.

4. For the *Sophist* as oddity, see Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics, 26; a contrary view is in Philip ("Mimesis," 453–68), who argues compellingly that in fact the analysis of mimēsis in the *Sophist* accounts for the discrepancy between the description of theatric mimēsis in *Republic* 3 and the claim in *Republic* 10 that art and literature are three removes from reality. Translation by Cornford, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 978, 979. On the visual effects given by visual artists here, see Panofsky, *Idea*, 5; Elias, *Plato's Defense*, 12; and Keuls, *Plato*, 111–15, who sees here a natural development of the ideas in Book 10 of the *Republic*.

5. Translation by Cornford, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 1014, and 1016–17. For clarification of the distinctions in the *Sophist*, see the diagram in Philip, "Mimesis," 461.

6. Maguire, "Differentiation," 393–94; and "Beauty," 173–74; on imitation in these passages, see Philip, especially 462. Rouveret (*Histoire*, 27–31) compares *phantastikē* here to *Resp.* 10 and *Phlb.*

7. Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 54–55, 354–55, citing *Resp.* 472d, 484c and e, 488a, 500e, 592b, and Plotinus 5.8.1. Translations by Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, *Collected Dialogues*, 712, 736. See also Panofsky, *Idea*, 3–6 (qualifying *Resp.* 501 and 417), and 15 (comparing Arist. *Pol.* 3.6.5.1281b and *Poet.* 25.1461b.12–13).

8. Translation from A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, 5.237, note omitted, 5.239–41, note omitted. Panofsky, *Idea*, 25–32; Audrey N. M. Rich, "Plotinus," especially 235–39; John M. Rist, *Plotinus*, 183–84. On Pheidias and phantasia, see also Rouveret, *Histoire*, 405–23. On Plotinus, see also Pollitt, *Ancient View of Greek Art*, 55–58, 103; and Cocking, *Imagination*, 52–61.

9. Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu*, especially 241–44 and 254; Rouveret, *Histoire*, 385–92. All translations in the discussion below are by J. A. Smith (*De Anima*) and J. I. Beare (*De Mem. et Rem.*) in Ross, *Works*, volume 3, notes omitted. For discussion and a list of passages with the technical psychological meaning, see Hermann Bonitz, *Index*, 811–12 s.vv. φαντάζεσθαι 2, φαντασία 2, φάντασμα 2, φανταστικός; Ross, *Aristotle's De Anima*, 38–40, 50–52, 168, 223–24, 235, 281–88, 291, 308, 310–15, 317–19; Terrell Ward Bynum ("New Look," 94, 100–107, following Nussbaum, 221–69), argues that there are three types of *phantasia* in Aristotle of which only the higher two necessarily involve images.

10. Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 1.117; the ellipsis contains the citation of Aristotle (*De An.* 3.3.429a1) and of Butcher (*Aristotle's Theory*, 125–26, same pages in the first edition of 1895 used by Atkins). Ross, *Aristotle's De Anima* 39; see also, Arist. *Rh.* 1.11.1370a27 and Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 94 n. 1. On *phantasia* as basic to Aristotelian psychology, see Butcher 125–28.

11. Translation by Hubbell, *Cicero*, 169. Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis," 205–10, also citing Arist. *Pol.* 3.6.1281b, Xen. *Mem.* 3.10, and Pliny *HN* 35. On Zeuxis, see Panofsky, *Idea*, 15. On Gorgias, see Untersteiner, *Sophists*, 131, n. 103, 187, and 192 n. 5; Nestle, *Vom Mythos*, 325. On Plato, see Birmelin, "Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 169. For a Platonic reading of the Ciceronian passages, see Bertrand,

Études, 292–99; and Kroll, *Orator*, 24–29. Helen Morales ("Torturer's Apprentice," 190–91, 313–14) sees Parrhasius in the development of phantasia.

12. Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, lxvii, note omitted; see also Sandys, 11–12 and, on "the end," 245 on *Orat.* 237. Panofsky, *Idea*, 13–16, 107, and 181–82, quotation from 7.

For an Aristotelian reading of *Orat.* 7–10, see Oltramare, "L'Idées," 99. *Orat.* 19 and 36 also appear to me Platonic.

13. Translated by H. M. Hubbell, in Hendrickson and Hubbell, *Cicero*, 311, 313, note omitted. Stahr, *Torso*, 220; Panofsky, *Idea*, 7, 11–18, and notes; Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.29–30 (Atkins underestimates the role of Aristotle in this development). On the doctrine in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Horace as descended from Plato, see Hack, "Doctrine," especially 37–61.

14. Birmelin, "Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 407–8; Panofsky, *Idea*, 16–18 (Cicero), 19–25 (Seneca), and 25–32 (Plotinus), quotation from 26.

On Cicero, Dio, and Plotinus, see Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis*, 9, comparing to Raphael's letter to Baldassare Castiglione; cf. Lucas, *Aristotle*, 258. On Pliny and Quintilian, see Jacob Isager, *Pliny*, 152. On Seneca, see also Rist, *Plotinus*, 235.

15. Dionysius translation in Roberts, *Dionysius*, 231; cf. his glossary, s.v. Occurrences of φαντασία are listed by Russell (*Libellus*, 92). Longinus translation by Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism*, 477, note omitted, italics Russell's.

16. Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.240–41; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 222 (cf. Rouveret, *Histoire*, 448); Cocking, *Imagination*, 28–32. See Austin, *Quintiliani*, 145 for the references in the text, including Longinus *Subl.* 15.1 and Sen. *Suas.* 2.14. On Plato and Aristotle, see Else, *Aristotle's Poetics*, 26–27; and McKeon, "Literary Criticism," 149–68. On the Roman period, see Schenkeveld (*Studies*, 100), who cites Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.30.49, *Ad Her.* 4.45.59, and *Ad Her.* 4.48.62, and notes that εἴκων usually means "simile."

17. Translation in H. E. Butler, *Institutio*, 2.441–43, 2.433–35, italics Butler's. For a link between this passage, Pompeian painting, and Epicureanism see Brilliant, *Visual Narratives*, 76–78, 180.

18. Quintilian translation in Butler, *Institutio*, 2.435–37, note omitted and italics Butler's. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory*, quotation from p. 114; Elsner, *Art and the Roman Viewer*, 21–39, 46–48, 313–17, 319 (26–28 and 314–15 on phantasia and ekphrasis).

On enargeia and phantasia see Watson, "Concept," 4775; on enargeia in Quint. and Longinus, see also Zanker, *Realism*, 41 and Atkins, *Literary Criticism*, 2.264–65. On Quint. 12.10.6 see also Austin, *Quintiliani* 145–46.

19.   On the date of Dio, see C. P. Jones, *Roman World*, 53; for alternatives (A.D. 97 and 105), see Kennedy, *Art of Rhetoric*, 575; Rouveret, *Histoire*, 408–10; and Russell, *Dio*, 16, 171. On the name, see Jones, 7; on delivery of *Or.* 12 before the statue, see Kennedy, 575, and Russell 15, 186, 211. On Dio's development, see Jones, especially 54 on this speech. On Plutarch and Dio, see Barrow, *Plutarch*, 45, 136–37, 141, 188 n. ii.7. J. N. Cohoon (*Dio*, 2.29) gives more references; cf. Russell, 19, 175, and on "foreshadowing" of Pheidias' later speech, 174.

20.   On Pheidias and the *Zeus*, see Ashmole and Yalouris, *Olympia* 5, 30, and Plates 12–13. Robertson, *History*, 285, 292–97, 311–22, 666, 667, 670–73; Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 20, 24, 26, 33, 40, 43, 45, 53, 60–61, 69, 159, 220–21, 237–38, 257–63, and Plates 372–74, quotation from 24; Pollitt, *Art and Experience*, 71–72, 79–80, 83, 97–105; Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 53–56, 58–62, 117, 223–24; and B. F. Harris, "Olympian Oration," 86–88 (85–97 for Dio as "theistic" with interesting similarities to and differences from early Christian thinkers). On the Boston statue, see George H. Chase, *Greek and Roman Sculpture*, 57–60 and Figure 61.

21.   Translation in Cohoon, *Dio*, 2.49. Cohoon, 2.48–49, note omitted. Russell, *Dio*, 19, 192; Panofsky, *Idea*, 116–18, 245–47 (notes, with further references). On Michelangelo and Leonardo, see Richter, *Paragone*, 81–84 (*Par.* 37); Blunt, *Artistic Theory*, 73–74. On Bruno, see Panofsky, 188 n. 43; Yates, *Art*, 253–54. On the structural problems at this point of the *Oratio*, see Russell, 17–18, 188–89; on the conversion of a "tripartite theology" into five types, see Russell, 189 with references; Rouveret (*Histoire*, 408–10) sees the distinction as Stoic.

22.   On the conventionality of Strabo, see the notes of Cohoon, *Dio*, 2.48–50. Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 329; cf. Russell, *Dio*, 19. Atkins (*Literary Criticism* 2.328–29) well summarizes the entire passage and compares Dio's conception of artistic symbolism to Philostratus and Dio's differentiation of literature from the visual arts to Lessing's *Laocoön*. Cf. Benediktson, "Lessing."

23.   Translation in Cohoon, *Dio*, 2.63 and 63–65, notes omitted. Russell, *Dio*, 198, 199.

24.   Trimpi, "Meaning," 22–24. On the relationship of Dio, Xenophon, and Aristotle see Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics*, 329; Cohoon, *Dio*, 2.2; Russell, *Dio*, 199.

25. On Plutarch's religious ideas see Russell, *Plutarch*, 63–83. Translation in Cohoon, *Dio*, 2.67, 2.69.

26. Translation in Cohoon, *Dio*, 2.73–75, note omitted. Benediktson, "Lessing," 101–5.

27. Richter, *Paragone*, especially 37–43, 52–53 (*Par.* 21), 57 (*Par.* 23), and 59–60 (*Par.* 25), translation from 23, quotation from 57. Blunt, *Artistic Theory*, 35–36.

28. Russell, *Dio*, 15–16 and especially 205; cf. Cohoon, Dio, 2.74.

29. Rouveret, *Histoire*, 405–23. On Pliny, see Isager, *Pliny*, 151.

30. Don Fowler, "Even Better," 58–62, 287–88.

31. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory*, 393, n. 1; cf. Atkins (*Literary Criticism*, 2.344–45), who sees Philostratus in a line from Longinus and Dio to Plotinus and ultimately to Coleridge ("the truth"). For a comparison of Philostratus here and Dio 12.59, see Birmelin, "Die kunsthistorischen Gedanken," 394. Translation in F. B. Conybeare, *Philostratus*, 2.77, 2.77–79.

32. Translation in Conybeare, *Philostratus*, 2.81. Watson, "Concept," 4767. On the political style, see Trimpi, "Meaning," 23, n. 31; on the sublime and phantasia see Rouveret, *Histoire*, 412–23.

33. Translation in Conybeare, *Philostratus*, 1.357–59.

34. Cocking, *Imagination*, 43–47. Watson, "Concept," especially 4769, 4775, and 4779. On phantasia in relation to sculpture, see Stewart, *Greek Sculpture*, 20, 45, 83, 220, 258, 262; and Pollitt, *Art of Ancient Greece*, 5–8, 223–24.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. Hurwit, *Art*, 259, 261; Benediktson, "Lessing," 101–5.

2. Rogers, *Painting and Poetry*, 102–3. On Cubism and time, see Gardiner, *Art*, 728–30. On Lysippus, see Andrew Stewart, "Lysippan Studies," 170–71.

3. On the Middle Ages, see Elsner, *Art and the Roman Viewer*. Babbitt, *New Laocoon*.

4. Krieger (*Ekphrasis*, 24–27) sees this "seesaw" of mimesis and phantasia as a pull not between time and space but between "natural sign" and "conventional sign." Curiously he sees the twentieth century as a period dominated by the "conventional sign"—perhaps wishful thinking by the deconstructionist establishment.

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Index