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PLATO

MENEXENUS

EDITED BY DAVID SANSONE

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PREFACE

Students of philosophy have, with good reason, been embarrassed by Plato's *Menexenus*. The former Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Cambridge University referred in print to the dialogue as "this astonishing little piece (which is, let us admit, of no great importance save as an illustration of Plato's versatility)." The very versatility that Plato displays, by composing an *epitaphios logos* that is, let us admit, a virtuoso tour de force of epideictic oratory that belies the philosopher's expressed disdain for rhetoric and his lack of formal training in the subject, disturbs those who patrol the boundaries of literary genres; already in antiquity Dionysius of Halicarnassus felt the need to demonstrate at some length that *Menexenus* was not quite as successful an oration as Demosthenes' *On the crown*. Also, historians have derided Plato for his historical inaccuracies and for misrepresenting contemporary military and political developments. On top of it all, Plato wishes us to accept a Socrates who can speak eloquently of events that occurred a dozen years after he drained the kylix of hemlock that ended his life.

Serious engagement with the problems posed by this astonishing little piece was inspired by the publication in 1981 of *L'invention d'Athènes* by Nicole Loraux, a brilliant study of the funeral oration as an instrument of Athenian ideology, later translated into English. The significance of this work was recently acknowledged by the organization of a conference held in 2018 at the University of Strasbourg, "The Athenian funeral oration: 40 years after Nicole Loraux." Loraux wrote the work originally as her PhD dissertation for the University of Paris. Another dissertation, this one for the University of Cologne, served as the basis for the splendid commentary on *Menexenus* by Stavros Tsitsiridis, published in 1998. This was the most substantial work ever devoted to the dialogue and was the first commentary of any sort to appear in almost a century. The most recent commentary in English, that of J. A. Shawyer, appeared over a hundred years ago. English-language students of Plato's Greek text deserve to have a more up-to-date introduction to this curious work than is provided by Shawyer's twenty-four pages of notes or the still older commentary by C. E. Graves. The idea of correcting this deficiency arose in the happy environment of Kirk Sanders' Greek Reading Group at the University of Illinois, where faculty and students read Plato and other prose authors in a relaxed and congenial atmosphere. It is a pleasure to dedicate this modest work to Kirk, in the fond recollection of many pleasant meetings.

It is also a pleasure to thank Neil Hopkinson and Richard Hunter, whose vigilance and guidance have been most beneficial. Finally, the readers of this volume, along with its author, owe a great debt of gratitude to Jane Burkowski for her exemplary copyediting.

ABBREVIATIONS

The names of ancient Greek authors and titles of their works are abbreviated according to the conventions of LSJ, sometimes expanded for clarity. In the commentary, the names of Menexenus, Plato and Socrates are abbreviated M., P. and S.

BA	R. J. A. Talbert (ed.), <i>Barrington atlas of the Greek and Roman world</i> , Princeton, 2000
CGCG	E. van Emde Boas et al., <i>Cambridge grammar of Classical Greek</i> , Cambridge, 2019
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> ⁶ , Berlin, 1952
FGrHist	F. Jacoby et al. (eds.), <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , Berlin and Leiden, 1923–
Gildersleeve	B. L. Gildersleeve, <i>Syntax of Classical Greek, from Homer to Demosthenes</i> , New York, 1900–11
GP	J. D. Denniston, <i>The Greek particles</i> ² , Oxford, 1954
Hornblower	S. Hornblower, <i>A commentary on Thucydides</i> , Oxford, 1991–2008
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Berlin, 1877–
KG	R. Kühner and B. Gerth, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache: Satzlehre</i> ⁴ , Hannover, 1955
LIMC	<i>Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae</i> , Zurich, 1981–99
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott and H. Stuart Jones, <i>A Greek–English lexicon</i> ⁹ , Oxford, 1996 (with <i>Revised supplement</i> , Oxford, 1996)
Nails	D. Nails, <i>The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics</i> , Indianapolis, 2002
PCG	R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), <i>Poetae comici Graeci</i> , Berlin, 1983–2001
Riddell	J. Riddell, “A digest of Platonic idioms,” in <i>The Apology of Plato</i> , 118–252, London, 1877
SEG	<i>Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum</i> , Amsterdam, 1923–
SMT	W. W. Goodwin, <i>Syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek verb</i> , rev. ed., London, 1889
Threatte	L. Threatte, <i>The grammar of Attic inscriptions</i> , Berlin, 1980–96
Tsitsiridis	S. Tsitsiridis, <i>Platons Menexenos: Einleitung, Text und Kommentar</i> , Stuttgart, 1998

INTRODUCTION

1 THE ATHENIAN STATE FUNERAL

The earliest, and most valuable, evidence we have regarding the Athenian practice of communal burial and public eulogy for those who died in war is the description given by Thucydides when he introduces Pericles' funeral oration, delivered in 431 BC, for those who were killed in action in the first year of the Peloponnesian War.¹ That Thucydides supplies as much detail as he does is an indication that the custom he describes is specific to Athens and that the Panhellenic audience to whom his history is addressed cannot be expected to be familiar with the specifics:²

In the same winter the Athenians, in accordance with their ancestral custom (τῶι πατρίῳ νόμῳ χρώμενοι), conducted burial rites at public expense for those who were the first to be killed in this war. They do this in the following manner: they lay out the remains (τὰ ὄσῳ) of the departed, having erected a temporary pavilion two days previously, and each person brings offerings for their loved ones should they wish to do so. When the funeral procession takes place, wagons carry coffins made of cypress wood, one for each tribe, holding the remains from that tribe to which each person belonged. A single empty bier, covered with a shroud, is carried along for the missing, that is, for those who could not be found for burial. Whoever wishes, whether a resident of Athens or a visitor, joins the procession; women related to the deceased also are present at the burial, performing lamentations. The dead are laid to rest in the communal burial grounds (τὸ δημόσιον σῆμα), located in the most attractive area just outside the city. This is where they always bury those who died in war, with the exception of those killed at Marathon. (Since they judged the valor of those men to be exceptional they buried them on the spot.) Once they have interred the remains, a man chosen by the city who is considered to possess outstanding intelligence and who enjoys the esteem of his fellows delivers a fitting speech in tribute to the deceased, after which they take their leave. (Thuc. 2.34.1–6)

¹ The penetrating analysis of Rees 2018, however, suggests that Thuc.'s account of the disposition of the cremated remains may be unrealistically simplified and sanitized.

² That the practice of conducting communal public burial for those who died in war was an exclusively Athenian custom is stated explicitly by Demosthenes in *Against Leptines* (20.141).

Thucydides' reference to "ancestral custom" and his singling out of the Marathonomachoi as an exception give the impression that he believes the practice of public burial of the war dead to date from time immemorial.³ That impression is supported by the opening sentence of Pericles' speech, in which he criticizes the man who added the funeral oration – unnecessarily in the opinion of Pericles – to a venerable custom. But the historian is mistaken about the hoary antiquity of the practice, which was an innovation of the democratic city.⁴ There is no archaeological evidence to support the existence of burial of the war dead in the communal burial grounds before the time of the Persian Wars. The available evidence consists of a small number of mass burial sites from the fifth and fourth centuries and fragments of inscriptions from the same period containing the names of casualties, listed by tribe.⁵ That the dead from the same tribe were listed together points unmistakably to the period after the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes, who introduced the ten new tribes in 508/7 BC.⁶ The communal burial and public ceremony are likely to have originated some decades after that date. For, contrary to Thucydides' implication that the Marathonomachoi were exceptional, Herodotus records that the Athenians who died at Plataea also were buried on the battlefield (9.85.2), indicating that this was still the standard practice in 479.

Practical considerations always dictated that the bodies of those killed in battle be disposed of promptly, whether by cremation or inhumation or both. The *Iliad* concludes with two funerals, those of Patroclus and Hector, both of whom are cremated and then buried. Hector's funeral is arranged by his family members and the lamentation is performed by

³ Note, however, that "ancestral custom" can be used to refer to practices less than 100 years old: Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 29.3 quotes a resolution from 411 BC that refers to "the ancestral customs (τοὺς πατρίους νόμους) that Cleisthenes established when he founded the democracy."

⁴ For detailed discussion, see Jacoby 1944; Stupperich 1977: 200–24; Ziolkowski 1981: 13–21; Pritchett 1985: 112–24; Loraux 1986: 56–76; Hornblower 1 292–6; Arrington 2010. The proposed dates range from the last decade of the sixth century to 464. Whether the oration was a still more recent addition to the ritual cannot be determined; nevertheless, Pericles' claim that most of those who delivered the funeral oration in previous years praised the man who added it suggests that such was widely believed to be the case.

⁵ Arrington 2010: 510–21. Arrington (506) sees the origin of the practice of communal burial in Athens as belonging to a time close to 500, relying, it seems, on a notice in Pausanias, who mentions "a tomb of the Athenians who fought against the Aeginetans before the Persian invasion" (1.29.7).

⁶ On the battlefield at Marathon the Athenian army was arranged according to tribe (Hdt. 6.111.1) and, as Thucydides attests, the remains of the dead from each tribe were contained in separate coffins.

his wife, mother and sister-in-law. The remains of Patroclus, however, who died far from home, are interred by his fellow warriors, and this must have been the case generally in Archaic Greece, whether the remains were given special treatment, like those of Patroclus, or were buried in a mass grave. In Book Seven such a communal burial on the battlefield is described, when the bodies of the Achaeans are cremated and buried under a single mound (430–5). This was done at the prompting of Nestor, whose speech earlier in the book also mentioned the possibility that the bones of the deceased could be sent back to their children “when we return to our homeland.”⁷ The chorus of Argive elders in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* also envisions the return home of the remains of casualties of the Trojan War; the god of war is imaginatively depicted as a gold-changer who converts men into ashes, which he packs like gold dust into urns that can be conveniently transported in a ship’s cargo (437–44). The date of *Agamemnon*, produced in 458, places it in the period after which the Athenians had started bringing home the remains of those killed in battle, but the chorus’ mention of urns, here and at line 435, points to individual, rather than mass, burial. That is, Aeschylus and his audience were familiar with the practice of sending home the remains of the dead, but they were aware that communal burial was a recent Athenian innovation and that it would be inappropriate to ascribe it to the Argives of the heroic age.

By the end of the Archaic period, wealthy Athenian families that had become accustomed to erecting conspicuous funerary monuments will have wanted to memorialize at home those who died abroad, whether their remains could be brought home or not. One such monument was placed on a marble base found in Attica some 30 km south-east of Athens, bearing an inscription identifying the monument as a memorial to “Croesus, cut down by furious Ares in the front line of battle.”⁸ This inscription is dated to the third quarter of the sixth century and the base is thought to have been that of the contemporary “Anavyssos kouros” now in the National Archaeological Museum of Athens, inv. 3851. This was a period of rapidly increasing prosperity in Athens, and

⁷ *Il.* 7.334–5. These lines, however, do not cohere with their context and are certainly an interpolation, as was recognized already by Aristarchus. Still, they acknowledge that, at the (unknown) time of the interpolator, some remains might be buried elsewhere than on the battlefield.

⁸ The base is associated with a tomb that may have contained a cinerary urn (Neer 2010: 24), but it is not certain whether Croesus’ monument marked his grave or a cenotaph, nor do we know where his death occurred. The inscription, *IG* 1³ 1240, refers only to a σῆμα, which can signify either a tomb or a marker for a cenotaph (e.g. *Od.* 1.291).

aristocratic families used funerary monuments as symbolic statements in competing with each other for public attention, placing them along the principal thoroughfares that led to the city. The affluence of the family of Croesus is proclaimed by the fact that their son was named after the fabulously wealthy Lydian king, by his position in the line of battle and by the family's ability to erect a costly memorial in his honor along the road to Sounion, where other opulent grave markers have been found.

Another prominent location for elite display was the Ceramicus cemetery, outside the Dipylon Gate to the northwest of the city, particularly along the road that led to the deme of Colonus Hippius, the very name of which proclaims its equestrian, and therefore aristocratic, associations. Just to the west of that road was the road that led to the Academy, where Plato would establish his philosophical association, and it was along this thoroughfare that the Athenians located the communal burial grounds for those killed in battle.⁹ One of the aims of Cleisthenes' reforms was to limit, and perhaps eliminate, the potentially destructive aristocratic rivalries of which these conspicuous displays were a symptom. Mass burial of the war dead, with no distinctions drawn among individuals apart from their tribal affiliation, was consistent with those aims. For the remains of a cavalry officer, or a hoplite who died in the front rank, were commingled with those of an oarsman in the fleet, and their names might be listed consecutively on the inscribed casualty list, which gives only names, in no discernible order, without patronymics or an indication of deme affiliation.¹⁰ The purpose, then, of the ancestral custom was to encourage a belief in the equality of all male Athenian citizens of fighting age, each of whom was equally responsible for the defense of the city and the promotion of its interests abroad. The state was thus appropriating to itself the commemoration of the war dead, which had previously been in the hands of the families of the deceased. The resources of the state allowed it to mount a more magnificent funeral than most Athenians could afford on their own, as Socrates points out in our dialogue (234c), and it could even outdo the wealthiest families by staging athletic and equestrian competitions (249b) reminiscent of those provided by Achilles for the funeral of Patroclus.

⁹ See the map at Arrington 2010: 513. Arrington's argument is persuasive, namely that the road to the Academy was deliberately chosen to make a democratic statement in opposition to the aristocratic values displayed on the nearby road to Colonus.

¹⁰ For the casualty lists, see Arrington 2010: 510, with references and earlier bibliography.

2 THE EPITAPHIOS LOGOS

The oration that accompanied the state funeral articulated for the assembled mourners the democratic message of the equality of all Athenian citizens, generally abstaining from singling out by name any individual.¹¹ At the same time, the very nature of the funeral oration raised questions about the assumption that underlay that message. For not every Athenian citizen was equally adept at public speaking. Thucydides notes that the man chosen on each occasion to deliver the oration “possessed outstanding intelligence and enjoyed the esteem of his fellows.” It goes without saying that such a person could only come from the upper strata of Athenian society; as it happens, of the many who were chosen to deliver the funeral oration before 338, the only person whose name we know is Pericles, the leading citizen of Athens (Thuc. 2.65.9), and he gave the funeral oration on at least two occasions. That is not to say that only members of the elite possessed the intelligence to fashion an oration appropriate to the occasion, but only they had the experience of public speaking that would have brought them to the attention of the panel that selected the speaker (234b) and, more importantly, only they could afford training in rhetoric, which was becoming increasingly professionalized by the end of the fifth century. Such training was provided by men such as Protagoras and Gorgias, who were attracted by the opulence and openness of Athens in the late fifth century. Like the Athenian poets who composed opposing speeches for the characters in their tragic *agônes*, these men were able to argue with equal effectiveness on both sides of a dispute and they offered to teach their pupils, for a substantial fee, the ability to persuade others to believe even what they themselves did not think was the case. The extremity to which this could be carried is parodied by Plato in his *Euthydemus*, where Dionysodorus and his brother “prove” that Socrates did not have a father and that the father of Ctesippus is the dog that he routinely beats (297e–298e; see 3(c)ii below).

The solemn occasion of a state funeral was no place for bravura displays of rhetorical inventiveness that confront the audience with propositions that they are unwilling to accept. Rather, it was incumbent upon the speaker to console the survivors, by expressing conventional sentiments in attractive language, and to persuade them, regardless of the

¹¹ For the exceptional character of Lysias’ references to Themistocles and Myronides, see Todd on Lysias 2.42 and 52; for Hyperides’ reference to the Athenian general Leosthenes, see Herrman on Hyperides 6.3. By contrast, there was no hesitancy over naming foreigners like Darius and Xerxes or legendary figures from the Athenian past.

speaker's own convictions, that the sacrifice made by their loved ones elevated them to the status enjoyed by the nameless heroes who defended Athens against the Persians at Marathon. The unspoken implication was that the Athenians of the speaker's day had in no way degenerated in comparison with their antecedents. The speaker might even go so far as to claim that the heroes of today had equaled or surpassed those of legendary times, as when Hyperides compares Leosthenes favorably with the victors of the Trojan War, who "with the help of all Greece conquered a single city, while he, assisted only by his homeland, brought to its knees the entire ruling power of Europe and Asia" (6.35). Hyperides seems not to have been alone among the speakers of funeral orations to engage in such hyperbole. Pericles, according to his contemporary Ion of Chios, was so proud of his conquest of Samos that he compared that campaign, which took a mere nine months, with Agamemnon's ten-year war to capture "a barbarian city"; given that Pericles delivered the funeral oration over those who died in the Samian War, it is a not unreasonable supposition that Ion is recording a version of what Pericles said in that very speech.¹²

(a) *Pericles*

Pericles and Hyperides mark, for us, the beginning and the end point, being the earliest and latest orators whom we know to have delivered the Athenian state funeral oration, in 439 and 322, and whose speeches have been preserved.¹³ The oration that Pericles spoke over the dead in the Samian War has not survived, but we are told that in it he referred to the dead as having become "immortal like the gods."¹⁴ Also likely to come from this speech is the metaphor that Aristotle praises as having been spoken by Pericles "when he delivered the funeral oration," namely that the loss of the young men in the war is comparable to a year being robbed of its springtime (*Rhet.* 1.1365a30–2, 3.1411a2–4). The speech that Pericles gave at the start of the Peloponnesian War, on the other hand, is recorded by Thucydides and is among the most famous and controversial passages

¹² So Węcowski 2013: 160–2. Ion's comment (fr. 110 Leurini = *FGrHist* 392 F 16) is preserved by Plutarch at *Per.* 28.7 and *mor.* 350e.

¹³ The fundamental study of the funeral oration is Loraux 1986. All the surviving speeches and fragments are conveniently translated by Herrman (2004). Ziolkowski 1981 analyzes the standardized format that the speeches followed.

¹⁴ *Plut. Per.* 8.9 = Stesimbrotus of Thasos, *FGrHist* 107 F 9. That the dead will attain immortal renown is a commonplace found in all the funeral orations but Plato's (Ziolkowski 1981: 126–8, 142–5).

in fifth-century literature.¹⁵ The controversy, as with all the speeches in Thucydides, involves the question of the degree of faithfulness with which the historian reports what was said. For our purposes, it is perhaps safest to say that Thucydides gives his readers a version of what Pericles said, a version that cannot have deviated radically from the original, given that Thucydides' history was written at a time, close to 400, when some of his readers had been in Pericles' audience thirty years previously. Those readers, and that audience, may have included Socrates and several members of Plato's family. If Pericles' speech contained an abundance of florid metaphors and hyperbolic statements about the deceased, those would have been pruned by Thucydides, just as, in all likelihood, he removed an extended section on the glories of Athens' past of the sort that appears in other funeral orations and seems to have been a standard element of such speeches already in the fifth century (see 235d3–4n.). Instead, the speech as reported by Thucydides concentrates on the present success of the Athenian "empire" (ἀρχή, 2.36.2) and gives a remarkable assessment of the character of the Athenians and their democratic way of life. Whatever the relationship between Thucydides' text and the words spoken by Pericles, it is generally agreed that the historian has edited and adapted the content of the funeral oration to suit its place near the start of his account of the war between Athens and Sparta.¹⁶

Also controversial is the question of whether Plato's *Menexenus* is somehow directed specifically at Pericles' speech. Dionysius of Halicarnassus expresses his personal opinion that Plato wrote his funeral oration in imitation of Thucydides,¹⁷ but he goes on to observe that this goes against Plato's own claim that Archinus and Dion are his exemplars, a manifestly perverse reading of 234b. In more recent times scholars have pointed to the explicit references in the opening dialogue to Pericles, Aspasia and Antiphon, who is praised by Thucydides for his character and his oratorical excellence (8.68.1–2), as indicating that Plato's funeral oration is a direct response to the speech of Pericles as transmitted by Thucydides.¹⁸ But given the formulaic character of the Athenian funeral

¹⁵ Thuc. 2.35–46. See the commentaries by Rusten (1989: 135–78) and Hornblower (1 292–316), with earlier bibliography.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Ziolkowski 1981: 202–7; Connor 1984: 63–75 with 252; Rusten 1989: 16.

¹⁷ D.H. *Dem.* 23 ὡς μὲν ἔμοι δοκεῖ, Θουκυδίδη παραμιμούμενος. The force of the preverb παρα- here is unclear.

¹⁸ Von Loewenclau 1961: 33–6; Kahn 1963: 220–2 = 2018: 10–13; Coventry 1989: 3; Salkever 1993; Yunis 1996: 136–9; Collins and Stauffer 1999; Monoson 2000: 185–9; Long 2003; Eucken 2008; Trivigno 2009: 32–8; Heitsch 2009; Richter 2011: 94–100; Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 4–9; Zelcer 2018.

oration, many examples of which Plato must have heard in person, and given that Thucydides' Periclean speech deviates from that character to a much greater degree than the speech that Plato attributes to Aspasia, it seems more sensible to assume that, while Plato was undoubtedly familiar with Thucydides' history, his target in *Menexenus* is not one speech in particular but the rhetorical tradition as a whole.¹⁹

(b) *Gorgias*

Gorgias, from Leontini in Sicily, is said to have composed an *epitaphios logos* "in praise of those Athenians who distinguished themselves in wars" (DK 82 B6). There is no way of knowing when during Gorgias' long life – he was born before Socrates and outlived him – the work was composed; it is likely to postdate 427, the year in which he came to Athens as an ambassador and made a profound impression with his rhetorical style. In any event, he cannot have delivered a speech at a public funeral in Athens, since he was not an Athenian citizen. It must have been written as a display piece, like the preserved *Encomium of Helen* and *Defense of Palamedes*, both designed to advertise to potential clients the kind of verbal skills he was capable of imparting to his pupils. Only a few fragments of his funeral oration survive, but one of them is long enough, at over two hundred words, to give a sense of Gorgias' manner and his verbal style.²⁰ As is the case with the two surviving works just mentioned, it is written not in Gorgias' native Ionic dialect but in Attic, and it displays the distinctive style for which Gorgias was famous, characterized by facile verbal paradox, obsessive antithesis, isosyllabic clauses that often involve rhyme or repetition and, in general, a play on the sound of words for its own sake. While it has been suggested, most acerbically by Denniston (1952: 10–12), that Gorgias' style calls attention to itself for the purpose of distracting from the content's lack of substance, such a style is well suited to the cliché-suffused funeral oration, with its standardized format and predictable message.²¹

¹⁹ Berndt 1881: 3–6; Trendelenburg 1905: 9; Méridier 1931: 78–82; Henderson 1975; Clavaud 1980: 74–6, 90–2, 201–2. In the commentary below an effort will be made, wherever possible, to cite in the first instance parallels of language and thought drawn from the other funeral orations.

²⁰ Russell 1991: 22–4. For biographical details of Gorgias, who appears prominently in P.'s dialogue named for him, see Nails 156–8. The fragments of his funeral oration are collected at DK 82 B5a–6 and translated by Herrman (2004: 24–5).

²¹ Berndt (1881: 26–45) and Clavaud (1980: 230–44) document the many places where *Menexenus* displays features associated with the style of Gorgias. For what appears to be a deliberate echo of Gorgias' funeral oration, see 234c6–235a1n.

(c) *Lysias*

The orator Lysias is familiar to readers of Plato from his presence at the conversation recounted in *Republic*, which is set in the house of Lysias' brother Polemarchus (1.328b), and from Lysias' speech on *erôs* that is central to the dialogue *Phaedrus*. The second speech in the collection of Lysias' surviving works is entitled in the manuscripts *Funeral oration for those who came to the aid of the Corinthians*.²² The title is drawn from section 67 of the speech, where it is said to have been composed for those who were killed during the Corinthian War (395–387 BC). As was the case with Gorgias' speech, however, it cannot have been delivered at the public funeral since Lysias, a metic, was not an Athenian citizen. It is likely to have been written, like Gorgias' speech, as a display piece, probably in the 380s (Todd 2007: 163–4). That makes it roughly contemporary with *Menexenus* (see 3(b) below), and it has been argued that Plato was inspired to compose his dialogue by the recent publication of Lysias' speech.²³ Given the timing, that is indeed a possibility. But, while Lysias' funeral oration may have prompted Plato to compose his own version, the speech in *Menexenus* should not be seen as directed specifically at Lysias. When he parodies Lysias, as he does in *Phaedrus* (230e–234c), Plato makes his intention clear, both by naming the target of his criticism and by repeatedly using recognizably Lysianic transition formulas, such as *καὶ μὲν δὴ* (for which, see Shorey 1933) and *ἔτι δέ*, neither of which is to be found in our dialogue. Rather, since Lysias' funeral oration seems, on the basis of the evidence available to us, to be a typical representative of the genre,²⁴ it may be that it is the very generic, stereotypical quality of Lysias' oration that is the object of Plato's critical reaction. At the end of the discussion in *Phaedrus*, Socrates indicates that he regards Lysias as representative of the class of writers who spend their time “cobbling together and trimming down” (*κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν*, 278e1) their compositions, and he instructs his young companion to deliver a message to “Lysias and anyone else who puts words together” (*Λυσίαι τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος συντίθησι λόγους*, 278c1). Another member of that class, according to what we see in *Menexenus*, is Aspasia, who “put together”

²² See Todd 2007: 149–274 for introduction, text (Carey's OCT, reprinted), translation and full commentary; prosopographical details for Lysias can be found at Nails 190–4.

²³ Stallbaum 1833: 10–14; Kahn 1963: 230–1 = 2018: 25–6; according to Loraux (1986: 94), *Menexenus* “is no more than a pastiche of Lysias' epitaphios.”

²⁴ Herrman 2004: 27–8; Todd 2007: 153, 164. In any event, as Tsitsiridis (48–9, 92) points out, the Corinthian War provided frequent opportunities for the spoken delivery of funeral orations in Athens, some of which are likely to have been heard by Plato.

the funeral oration that Pericles delivered, from whose leftovers she “cobbled together” the speech that Socrates recites (συνετίθει . . . συγκολλῶσα, 236b5–6). By using the same banausic metaphor (for which see 236b6n.), Plato seems to be suggesting that such written works as Lysias’ speech on *erôs* and Aspasia’s funeral oration are mass-produced by a process of manufacture not unlike that which yielded the hundreds of shields taken from the armory owned by Lysias’ family (Lysias 12.19).

(d) *Demosthenes*

In his speech *On the crown*, delivered before an Athenian jury in the summer of 330, Demosthenes describes, with characteristic self-serving grandiloquence, the process by which he had earlier been chosen to give the funeral oration over those who died at the battle of Chaeronea in 338. He boasts that he was publicly selected – the verb χειροτονεῖν is repeated four times (18.285–7) – by the *dêmos* in preference to Aeschines, Demades and others.²⁵ The speech survives as *Oration* 60 among the works of Demosthenes.²⁶ An unusual feature of this speech is that the legendary eponym of each of the ten Cleisthenic tribes is named and the “descendants” of each are lauded for having proved themselves worthy of their ancestor by sacrificing their lives for Athens (27–31). In this way the speaker propagates one of the prominent themes found throughout the funeral orations, that bravery is instilled through imitation of admirable exemplars, and at the same time alludes to one of the defining democratic reforms of the Athenian government just at the time when that government was about to become subservient to the Macedonian king. The authenticity of this oration has been questioned at least since the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who condemns it as uncharacteristic of Demosthenes and as “coarse, superficial and immature” (φορτικός καὶ κενὸς καὶ παιδαριώδης, *Dem.* 44). It was often regarded as spurious by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars, but it is generally considered

²⁵ In the funeral oration itself, addressed not to a jury but to a general audience, Demosthenes says that the choice was that of “the polis” (60.2; cf. Thuc. 2.34.6 ἀνὴρ ἡρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως). There is no necessary inconsistency between Demosthenes’ statements and what we learn from *Mnx.* 234b5, that it was the Boule that chose the speaker. The Assembly acted on a προβούλευμα of the Boule (Rhodes 1981: 543), rendering the decision an act of the *dêmos*. Presumably the recommendation of the Boule was normally adopted, but Demosthenes seems to indicate that his nomination as speaker was controversial and the vote was contested, although in the end the choice of Demosthenes was triumphantly vindicated by vote of “the people” of Athens.

²⁶ There is a translation, with a brief introduction, in Herrman 2004: 63–75.

genuine today, its deviations from Demosthenic style and temperament plausibly ascribed to the conventions of the epitaphic genre, in which vituperation and self-justification are out of place (Worthington 2003).

(e) *Hyperides*

In 1858 a papyrus dating to the late second century AD was published, containing what appears to be the greater part of Hyperides' funeral oration.²⁷ This was the speech, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus (18.13.5), that was delivered in 322 during the Lamian War, commemorating those who were killed in action along with their general Leosthenes in an engagement in central Greece. Prior to the publication of the papyrus, only a paragraph preserved by Stobaeus and a couple of brief quotations from the speech survived on the basis of which we could assess the praise of "Longinus," who considered it the outstanding specimen of epideictic style.²⁸ We can now see that the epideictic style of Hyperides displays a number of similarities to the style exhibited in the other surviving funeral orations and that it is readily distinguishable from the style of the few forensic speeches of Hyperides that are available to us.²⁹ The differences in style are comparable to those between the funeral orations of Lysias, Demosthenes and Plato and the other works of those writers. In the past, the authorship of all three of those funeral orations has been questioned, largely on the basis of style. But the example of Hyperides, the genuineness of whose *epitaphios* is not in doubt, shows that ancient authors were capable of adapting their styles to the exigencies of the genre in ways that can confound the judgment of even the most accomplished of philologists.

3 THE *MENEXENUS* OF PLATO

(a) *Authorship*

As with the funeral orations of Lysias and Demosthenes, questions have been raised concerning the authorship of Plato's *Menexenus*. In the case of Lysias and Demosthenes, the comparison is with other public speeches composed by those orators, the style of which seemed incompatible with

²⁷ Text, translation and commentary (= Hyperides, *Oration 6*) in Herrman 2009; translation with brief introduction in Herrman 2004: 77–86.

²⁸ *De sublim.* 34.2 τὸν δὲ Ἐπιτάφιον ἐπιδεικτικῶς, ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἄλλος, διέθετο [sc. Ὑπερείδης].

²⁹ Herrman 2009: 24–6. Newly published sections of the Archimedes palimpsest containing parts of two previously lost speeches have recently increased the size of Hyperides' corpus by about 20 percent (Herrman xii).

that of their funeral orations. In the case of Plato, however, the *Menexenus* stands out from the rest of the corpus (with the exception of the *Apology*) in that more than 80 percent of the text comprises a single, continuous speech very different in character from the conversational give-and-take that prevails throughout most of Plato's works. In addition, scholars have found it difficult to accommodate *Menexenus* to the philosophical outlook of Plato and have considered the egregious anachronisms, which seem to go beyond what can be paralleled elsewhere in Plato, to be intolerable.³⁰ Further, the serious tone of the funeral oration is felt to be inconsistent with the playful character of the conversation that opens and closes the work.

Those who doubt that *Menexenus* is the work of Plato must deal with the seemingly unanimous verdict of antiquity, since it is regarded as genuine by all ancient authors who cite it or refer to it, beginning with Plato's pupil Aristotle.³¹ In his *Rhetoric*, discussing how one should compose an encomium, Aristotle says that it is necessary to take into account the audience before whom the praise is spoken, ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν (1.1367b8–9). This appears to be a reference to what Socrates says at *Menexenus* 235d, that it is difficult to praise Athenians in Sparta, but easy to praise those before whom one is speaking. The imperfect ἔλεγεν, however, has been taken as an indication that this was a sentiment that the historical Socrates was in the habit of expressing. That may indeed be the case, but if so, Aristotle later confirms that this Socratic observation was incorporated into *Menexenus*, when he speaks approvingly of “what Socrates says in the *Epitaphios*, that it is not difficult to praise Athenians among the Athenians, but it is among the Spartans.”³² Aristotle does not, it is true, name Plato as the author of this dialogue, but it is difficult to believe that he would have omitted the name of the author if the work was the product of some other writer of Socratic dialogues.³³ Nevertheless, ever since the early nineteenth century there have been scholars who questioned the authenticity of all or part of *Menexenus*.³⁴ For

³⁰ For the anachronisms, see 3(b) below.

³¹ For details, see Tsitsiridis 36, citing Cicero, “Longinus,” Plutarch, Quintilian and others. We can now add Apuleius, if he is indeed the author of the newly published summary of Plato's works attributed to him; see Stover 2016: 106.

³² *Rhet.* 3.1415b30–1. For *Epitaphios* as the alternative title by which our dialogue is often identified in antiquity, see Tsitsiridis 127, to which add Ἐπιτάφιος *vel Menexenus* from Apuleius (see previous n.). The fact that Aristotle refers to a statement in the opening dialogue as coming from “the *Epitaphios*” confirms, what some have doubted, that the funeral oration and the surrounding dialogue belong together.

³³ Aristotle feels no need to name Plato when he paraphrases *Apol.* 27d at *Rhet.* 3.1419a8–12, although Xenophon and others had written *Apologies of Socrates*.

³⁴ For a survey, see Tsitsiridis 21–41, concluding that there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the work.

the most part, the dialogue is now considered to be an authentic work of Plato's, although its curious nature still on occasion engenders some uneasiness. Debra Nails, for instance, in order to remove the awkwardness of having Socrates speak of events that occurred after his death, suggests that the section from 244b to 246a was added to a genuine Platonic dialogue by some later member of the Academy.³⁵ David Engels (2012) even goes so far as to consider the preserved *Menexenus* an amalgam of two texts of different origins, a Platonic frame dialogue combined with a funeral oration composed by someone else. Most recently, and more seriously, Thomas Koentges has marshaled the resources of big data to conduct topic modeling and stylometric analysis on the Platonic corpus. Only a preliminary report of the results is currently available, on the website of the Center for Hellenic Studies (Koentges 2018). Intriguingly, Koentges' initial findings purport to show that "there is little stylistic evidence that the *Menexenus* was written by the authorial entity we identify as Plato." It is, however, difficult to assess this conclusion until the full results have been made available; publication has been announced as forthcoming in 2020. The view adopted here is that, unless conclusive evidence to the contrary is produced, *Menexenus* is to be regarded as a genuine work of Plato's that, for reasons to be addressed below (3(c)), deliberately presents un-Platonic ideas in an un-Platonic style.

There are several reasons critics have sought to remove *Menexenus* from the Platonic corpus, and those reasons are directly related to matters that are essential to any attempt at understanding the aims of the dialogue. We have already mentioned the anachronisms, the disparity in tone between the conversational portions and the oration itself and the seemingly uncharacteristic style. Not only is the style unlike what we are used to finding in a Platonic dialogue, but scholars have found it difficult to accommodate the content of the work to what is usually understood to be the thinking of Plato, both because of what is found in *Menexenus* and what it omits. For the funeral oration that Socrates recites is an unabashed laudation of contemporary Athens, the democratic citizenry of which was responsible for the unjust and unjustified execution of Socrates himself.³⁶ Further, the dialogue makes clear that the successful education

³⁵ Nails 319–20. In addition to eliminating the anachronism, it is claimed that the proposed deletion "would mark a rhetorical improvement."

³⁶ Plato's disillusionment with the Athens of his day is most powerfully expressed in the *Seventh Letter* (324d–326b), justifying his departure from his city and his first trip to Sicily; similar is Socrates' assessment of the degeneration in the character of the Athenians after the time of Pericles, *Gorg.* 515b–516b.

of the young that is envisioned has the form of simply imitating approved models (234a5n.), a procedure that is plainly at odds with the practice of Socrates, as it is portrayed not only by Plato but also by Xenophon. On the other hand, there is nothing in the dialogue that resembles the characteristically Socratic questioning of basic ethical concepts, nor do we find any reference to the concern for and care of the soul (235a2n.), which the Platonic Socrates regards as his divinely mandated mission, to be pursued even at the cost of his life (*Apol.* 30a–b). If we are to make sense, then, of *Menexenus* as a genuine work of Plato's, we will need to locate it, both intellectually and chronologically, within the Platonic corpus.

(b) *Date, Anachronisms*

The question of the order in which Plato wrote and published his various works has exercised the ingenuity, and exposed the prejudices, of scholars over the past two centuries.³⁷ Two general classes of evidence have been adduced, one relating to the presumed development of Plato's thinking (the presence or perceived absence in a given work of, say, the Theory of Forms or the practice of collection and division) and the other relating to the stylistic variations to be found throughout the corpus. Unfortunately, neither type of evidence is useful for determining the place of *Menexenus* within that corpus. The philosophical content of the work, such as it is, does not allow for meaningful comparison with other Platonic works, while its verbal style is so distinctive that, as we have seen (3(a)), even its authenticity has been seriously questioned on stylistic grounds. There is, however, one piece of evidence that provides a secure *terminus post quem*, regardless of whether the work is genuine or not. For the funeral oration refers (245e) to the conclusion of the Corinthian War, which ended with the Peace of Antalcidas in 386. We can be confident, therefore, that *Menexenus* was composed after that date and, if it was written by Plato, before the philosopher's death in 348/7. It is usually assumed that the work can be dated to the period shortly after 386, on the reasonable grounds that, had it been written long after that date, more recent events would have been mentioned.³⁸ Several of the scholars who accept this

³⁷ The various attempts at producing a chronology of Plato's dialogues are summarized by Thesleff (1982: 7–17 = 2009: 153–63) and, at greater length and with critical assessments of and amendments to earlier studies, by Brandwood (1990).

³⁸ This is the conclusion reached by Tsitsiridis, following a thorough examination of the matter (41–52); similarly Méridier 1931: 82; Dodds 1959: 24; HENDERSON 1975: 25; Clavaud 1980: 255–6, 288; Thesleff 1982: 116–17, 127–8 = 2009: 265–6, 276; Ledger 1989: 210–12.

date also point to certain affinities of theme with *Gorgias*, which is often dated to just this time. It is true, the dating of *Gorgias* is itself sometimes based in part on its affinities with *Menexenus*, so that the reasoning can be seen to be circular. Still, we have little else to go on, and it seems best to accept the view that *Menexenus* and *Gorgias* were conceived and written around the same time, the mid to late 380s.

The reference to the end of the Corinthian War means that the speech purports to be the funeral oration delivered for those who died in the last year of that war. All of Plato's contemporaries knew, and most subsequent readers of *Menexenus* have recognized, that the Corinthian War ended more than a decade after the death of Socrates and, most likely, after the death of Aspasia as well.³⁹ It is true that anachronisms can be found elsewhere in Plato's works, but this one stands out as by far the most blatant, prompting scholars to resort to extreme measures either to explain it or to explain it away.⁴⁰ As it happens, there is an anachronism in *Symposium*, although it is of a much less obtrusive nature, that likewise points to precisely the period immediately following the Corinthian War. Or, rather, there are two such anachronisms (Dover 1965). In his encomium of Eros, Pausanias makes reference to the Ionian cities that are under the rule of the barbarians (ἄσοι ὑπὸ βάρβαροις οἰκοῦσιν, 182b7), a state of affairs that did not obtain at the dramatic date of the dialogue, 416, when the Greek cities in Ionia were still allied with Athens; it was in fact one of the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, to which the Athenians were reluctant signatories, that ceded control of the cities in Asia to the Persian king (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31). Later in *Symposium*, Aristophanes recounts in his fanciful myth how the Ur-humans were punished by Zeus for insubordination by being sliced in half, and now we humans are forced by the god to live separated, just as the Arcadians were partitioned by the Spartans (διωκίσθημεν . . . καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, 193a2–3). This is a clear reference to the actions taken in 385 by the Spartans to punish the Mantineans, requiring their disobedient allies to demolish their fortifications and assigning the population to live in four separate villages. Xenophon describes these actions, twice using the same uncommon verb (*Hell.* 5.2.5

³⁹ The anachronism was criticized already in antiquity, by Aelius Aristides (*To Plato in defense of the four*, pp. 286–7 Jebb). Since Aelius refers to specific archon-years, it is likely that he is relying on earlier, Hellenistic scholarship.

⁴⁰ Rosenstock (1994) and Dean-Jones (1995) propose that Plato is representing Socrates as returning from the dead to address one of his sons, supposedly also named Menexenus; while not fully endorsing this view, Pappas and Zelcer (2015: 25–7) express some sympathy with it. Others argue that different portions of *Menexenus* are later additions, either by Plato himself or by someone else (Thesleff 1982: 182 = 2009: 327–8; for Nails and Engels, see 3(a) above).

διοικιοῦντο, 5.2.7 διοικισθη), immediately after his account of the Peace of Antalcidas, making clear his view that the Spartans were emboldened by the provisions of the peace treaty to act as they did.

All of this suggests that the Corinthian War and its aftermath made a powerful impression on Plato, who does not ordinarily allow allusions to contemporary events to intrude into his dialogues, as it must have done on his fellow Athenians. The terms of the treaty, worked out between the Spartan Antalcidas and Artaxerxes, sent a clear message to the Athenians that future attempts at reestablishing their earlier hegemony would be met with the combined military force of the Persians and those of the Greeks who chose to abide by the treaty (Hyland 2018: 165–6). The situation could not be more different from the image that the Athenians had created for themselves of their glorious past, when they faced the Persians at Marathon and when they caused Spartan hoplites to surrender at Pylos. That image was nowhere more extravagantly promulgated than in the traditional funeral oration, where those triumphs from the past were remembered, along with the accomplishments of the Athenians who lived in legendary times. Over the years the content of the funeral oration remained essentially unchanged, although it might be clothed in ever more elaborate verbiage as Athenian orators became more skilled at “bewitching the souls of their hearers,” as Socrates puts it at 235a2. The contrast between the present reality in 386 and the illusion constructed by the orators and welcomed by their audiences certainly struck Plato, who was both troubled by the disparity and the equal of any orator in using language to bewitch souls, and it was perhaps this contrast that prompted him to compose a funeral oration of his own. The deliberate anachronism – representing the oration as having been composed by Aspasia, who was associated with the period of Athens’ greatest power – served to highlight the disparity. It also served to accentuate the purely “fictive character” (Tsitsiridis 24; cf. Pownall 2004: 58–9) of the funeral oration. Graham (2007) argues persuasively that this is the explanation for anachronisms generally in Plato, who was happy to ignore inconvenient truths in order to fabricate a conversation between Socrates and Parmenides and to bring together a flock of sophists in the home of Callias. But, unlike *Parmenides* and *Protagoras*, *Menexenus* masquerades as a work wholly devoted to political and historical matters. And yet, as has long been recognized, the funeral oration is itself permeated with historical inaccuracies.⁴¹ The outrageous anachronism, therefore, which the reader does not encounter

⁴¹ The various historical distortions (for which see Shawyer 1906: xi–xv; Méridier 1931: 59–64; Vlastos 1973: 190–2; Henderson 1975; Clavaud 1980: 115–67; Trivigno 2009: 38–41) will be pointed out in the commentary below.

until the very end of the funeral oration, seems designed to ensure that the reader will understand that the historical distortions have not been momentary lapses but are, like the anachronism itself, an indication that this speech does not pretend to historical accuracy, being in this regard no different from Athenian funeral orations generally. Thus the oration is a sample of rhetoric as that term is usually understood, that is, rhetoric of the specious sort that distorts and falsifies, not the ideal, truth-telling rhetoric that Socrates engages in when he delivers his *Apology* and about which he will theorize in *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*.

(c) *Plato and Rhetoric*

In the *Apology*, Socrates concludes his exordium by saying that, just as it is the mark of the exemplary juror to be mindful of justice, so it is the mark of the ῥήτωρ to speak the truth (18a5–6); indeed, jurors (δικασταί, a word derived from δίκη) swore a solemn oath to cast their vote in accordance with the laws, and litigants swore that their depositions were true.⁴² Socrates' assertion is an instance of what the American philosopher Charles Stevenson identified as a "persuasive definition," that is, it serves the rhetorical purpose of redirecting people's interests.⁴³ But not in this case the interests of the jurors. For the words are those, not of Socrates, but of Plato, who was convinced that the so-called jurors on this occasion failed to deliver justice and who believed that the charges brought by Socrates' accusers, one of whom, Lycon, is represented as having joined the prosecution ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων (24a1), were meretricious. The effect of Plato's expressing himself in this way is to brand the jury as illegitimate, on the grounds that it is not entirely composed of "real" jurors (a point that Socrates will make explicitly when he addresses those who voted for his acquittal as the δικασταί correctly so called at 40a3), and to represent Socrates as a more authentic ῥήτωρ than his accusers, notwithstanding his failure to persuade a majority of his listeners.⁴⁴ Plato recognized that, just as language is an indispensable instrument in the discovery and dissemination of the truth, so the techniques of the orators can be used just as well by those whose arguments are not in accordance with justice and who use rhetorical means to mask their falsehoods. He himself, in fact,

⁴² For a convenient survey of Plato's complicated relationship with rhetoric, with further bibliography, see Yunis 2007.

⁴³ Stevenson 1938, giving Socrates' definition of justice in *Republic* as a prime example.

⁴⁴ The ability to persuade successfully is the mark of the exemplary ῥήτωρ, according to *Gorgias* (*Gorg.* 457a–b), expressing a more usual view of the matter.

shows that he is as skilled at fashioning eloquent speeches for Callicles and Thrasymachus as he is for Socrates. When Plato presents his philosophical inquiries in the form of dialogues, he is following in the literary tradition of dramatists like Euripides, who devotes the same verbal artistry to writing scripts for Helen and Hecuba, for Jason and Medea. But where, and how, did Plato learn the prodigious rhetorical dexterity that he exhibits in *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, among other acknowledged masterpieces? If he had a formal teacher, he must have been careful to conceal the fact, since later tradition preserves no record of his training in rhetoric.⁴⁵

In fact, it is the contention of Plato's Socrates that rhetoric, as it is commonly understood and practiced, is not a τέχνη that can be taught in the same way the art of the physician is taught and learned. Rather, it is "an aptitude that may be acquired through practice."⁴⁶ The contrast with medicine, which requires an actual knowledge of what is truly in the best interests of the patient, is especially well conveyed through Gorgias' claim that he, as a man skilled in rhetoric but with no expertise in medicine, is able to persuade patients to subject themselves to a treatment that they resist when Gorgias' brother Herodicus, a physician, advises them to undergo it (*Gorg.* 456a–b). Thus, Plato was conscious of the power that could be wielded by those, himself included, who had mastered the art of language. At the same time, he recognized that there was no necessary connection between the desire, or the ability, to master the art of language and an interest in pursuing wisdom (φιλοσοφία) and, ultimately, the truth. An exploration of this troubling disjunction is the focus of a series of dialogues that occupied Plato in the middle years of his career. *Menexenus* appears to belong in that series, demonstrating that it is possible for someone who rejects the training of the "experts" to create a specimen of oratory which, judged by the standards of rhetoric as that term is normally understood, can equal or even surpass the recognized classics of the genre.

(i) *Gorgias*

The first part of the dialogue is devoted to a conversation between Socrates and Gorgias, who identifies himself as a ῥήτωρ and who professes

⁴⁵ This is in contrast to the anecdotes, perhaps originating as early as the fourth century, giving the names of his instructors in grammar, wrestling and music (Swift Riginos 1976: 39–51).

⁴⁶ ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή, *Gorg.* 463b4; cf. *Phdr.* 260e4–5 οὐκ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἀλλὰ ἄτεχνος τριβή. The difference between τέχνη and ἐμπειρία is that the former is concerned with the true nature of things and can give an account of its methods, whereas the latter operates unscientifically, merely performing actions that the practitioner remembers as having worked in the past (*Gorg.* 501a–b).

to be able to teach others to be ῥήτορες (449a–b). When Gorgias' definition of the ῥητορική τέχνη is shown to be inadequate, Socrates is forced by Polus to propose his own definition of rhetoric. It is, he says, not a τέχνη at all (462b). Rather, it is “a practice born of experience that produces some kind of gratification and pleasure” (ἐμπειρία χάριτος τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, 462c6–7). In this regard it resembles the culinary art, for which exactly the same description is offered (462d10–e1), and the art of the tragic poet, which also aims at the pleasure and the gratification of the spectators (502b9–c1), all of these being examples of ingratiating, κολακεία (e.g. 463b1, 501c3, 502c3). As it happens, the only other place in Plato where the pair χάρις + ἡδονή occurs is in the later *Sophist* (222e5–6). The context there is the distinction between the art of the sophist and the ingratiating (κολακική, 222e7–223e1) connected with erotic seduction, which uses pleasure and gratification as inducements. Plato's sense of delicacy prevented him from proposing too direct an analogy between sexual gratification and the so-called arts of rhetoric and sophistry (both of which are forms of κολακεία; *Gorg.* 463b). But he comes close to suggesting such a connection in the passage from *Sophist* and elsewhere, most notably in *Phaedrus*, where Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech explicitly attempt to seduce the hypothetical hearer (see 3(c)iii below). In *Gorgias*, Socrates jokes that Callicles' behavior when he gives a public address to the *dēmos* parallels his behavior toward his *erōmenos*, Demos son of Pylilampes; in either case Callicles obsequiously tailors his words and his sentiments to the desires of his addressee (481d–e). Similarly, in *Menexenus*, the speaker of the funeral oration tells the Athenian audience only what it is happy to hear. It is surely no accident that Plato has chosen to ascribe authorship of the oration to a woman whose reputation, whether justified or not, associates her with prostitution and pandering.⁴⁷

The relationship between *Gorgias* and *Menexenus* is generally acknowledged, but the nature of that relationship has been a matter of considerable disagreement. According to Guthrie (1975: 320), what Plato does by means of argument in *Gorgias* he does by example in *Menexenus*, which dialogue is, for Clavaud (1980: 255), “a sort of illustration” of *Gorgias*. But is the funeral oration intended as a serious example of the type of rhetoric approved by Plato?⁴⁸ Or is it rather a parody or pastiche of contemporary rhetorical

⁴⁷ So Stern 1974: 506 (“to praise the Athens of his [*sc.* Plato's] day is an act of prostitution”); Richter 2011: 94, n. 30 (“Aspasia the orator, like Aspasia the courtesan, is primarily concerned with the giving of pleasure”). For Aspasia, see 3(d)iii below and 239c5n.

⁴⁸ Von Loewenclau 1961; Pappas and Zelcer 2015.

practice?⁴⁹ E. R. Dodds has even called *Menexenus* “a kind of playful appendix” to *Gorgias*, serving as a “satyr-play” to its more ambitious, more theoretically explicit companion piece.⁵⁰ Comparison with a satyr-play seems to trivialize the funeral oration, especially the solemn concluding address by the deceased to their living relatives (246d–248d). Still, there is one way in which *Menexenus*, like all Platonic dialogues in which the satyr-like Socrates participates, resembles tragedy’s sibling. In satyr-play, unlike in comedy, there is no parabasis in which the playwright expresses his own views *in propria persona*. It will be necessary then, throughout the commentary below, to examine carefully the words that Plato puts into the mouths of his characters, using the same linguistic and interpretative strategies that we would apply to the text of dramatists like Aeschylus or Euripides. Doing so will expose a number of peculiarities of the funeral oration that seem designed to discourage readers from taking it as an expression of Plato’s sincerely held views. Those peculiarities include sentiments and stylistic features that are uncharacteristic of Plato, numerous apparently deliberate historical inaccuracies and, perhaps most telling, Socrates’ insistence that he is not himself responsible for the speech, attributing it instead to a woman from an Ionian city proverbial for its luxury and effeminacy (Athenaeus 12.523e–f). At the same time, the speech is, and has often been regarded as, a moving and brilliantly written model of epitaphic oratory (see 3(e)ii below). It is reasonable to conclude, then, that Plato set out to compose a masterwork using the recognized techniques of a genre that he considered to be fundamentally flawed (Kerch 2008). The flaws are left to the reader to identify, perhaps with help from a familiarity with *Gorgias*, even as the reader is impressed with the skill of the author, a skill acquired with no formal training in the misnamed ῥητορικὴ τέχνη, but merely picked up by observing the techniques used by earlier practitioners and the effects those practitioners were able to produce in their hearers (235a–c).

(ii) *Euthydemus*

We include *Euthydemus* in our discussion even though it is not concerned with rhetoric. The two brothers whose demonstrations are the focus of the dialogue are experts in eristic, that is, a verbal technique whereby they are able to refute any proposition, regardless of its truth value, an ability

⁴⁹ Parody: e.g. Berndt 1881; Trendelenburg 1905; Vlastos 1973: 190–2; Clavaud 1980: 201–2; Pownall 2004: 38–64; Trivigno 2009. Pastiche: e.g. Guthrie 1975: 315; Henderson 1975; Thesleff 1982: 117 = 2009: 266.

⁵⁰ Dodds 1959: 24. Characterization of *Mnx.* as *Gorg.*’s satyr-play is found also in Dümmler (1889: 26) and Méridier (1931: 77).

(σοφία) that Socrates wishes to learn from them (272a–b). Unlike the ῥήτωρ, who specializes in captivating his hearers with lengthy speeches, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus employ a method of question and answer that, on its surface, ought to be congenial to Socrates. In the course of the dialogue the brothers' skill is demonstrated through a series of "proofs," for example, refuting Ctesippus' assertion that it is possible to tell an untruth (283e–284a). These proofs are, and are meant to strike the reader as, absurd, but in many cases the fallacies that enable them are left unexamined and unchallenged. In this regard *Euthydemus* bears a resemblance to *Menexenus*, in which the reader is required to identify the blatant flaws and fabrications and to make sense of Plato's purpose in fashioning them. There is another way in which *Euthydemus* may shed some light on issues raised in *Menexenus*. In both dialogues there is an implicit contrast between the questionable practices of individuals who may be characterized as charlatans and the genuine search for truth embodied in Socrates' philosophizing. *Euthydemus* presents us with displays of eristic, the "vulgar counterfeit" (Dodds 1959: 213) of Socratic dialectic, in the same way *Menexenus* shows off Plato's ability to master rhetoric without having taken a course of study in the subject. As we have seen, Plato considers rhetoric to be a talent one can acquire through observation and imitation, without necessarily requiring an understanding of how rhetoric achieves its effects or how and when one ought to employ it. In *Euthydemus* Socrates congratulates the two brothers on their marvelous skill, noting ironically that the best thing about it is how easily anyone at all could learn it in a very short time merely by imitating them (303e; repeated at 304c), and he advises Euthydemus and Dionysodorus not to show off their skill in public, otherwise large numbers of people will learn for free what the brothers offer to teach for a fee (304a). Thus Plato makes clear his view that neither eristic nor rhetoric is a legitimate τέχνη, since they are learned without understanding, by rote observation and imitation. As proof, Plato offers the ingenious series of demonstrations in *Euthydemus* and the impressive funeral oration in *Menexenus*. For Plato, genuine education cannot take place in a short time, and it involves instruction in serious matters, like the distinction between the just and the unjust (*Gorg.* 455a).

(iii) *Phaedrus*

Both *Phaedrus* and *Menexenus* are, like *Gorgias*, concerned generally with the art of rhetoric, but there are further similarities between the two that are of interest.⁵¹ The two works are among the "dramatic dialogues" that

⁵¹ For some of the similarities, see Friedländer 1964: 218–19; Tsitsiridis 88.

involve Socrates in discussion with only a single interlocutor.⁵² In each, the interlocutor is a young adult with a particular interest in public speaking and, in each, Socrates engages in banter redolent of that between *erastês* and *erômenos* (*Mnx.* 236c–d, *Phdr.* 243e), although Menexenus and Phaedrus are past the age at which the role of *erômenos* would be appropriate. Both of Socrates' interlocutors urge him to recite an oration in response to an earlier speech or speeches, which Socrates undertakes to do, claiming that it would be easy for him to fulfill his interlocutor's request. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates tells his companion that he is confident that he “would be capable of producing a speech different from and better than” (ἀν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω, 235c6) the speech of Lysias that Phaedrus has just recited; in *Menexenus*, he affirms that “even someone with training [in rhetoric] inferior to my own” (καὶ ὅστις ἐμοῦ κάκιον ἐπαιδεύθη, 236a3) could distinguish himself by praising the Athenians in Athens. Accordingly, Socrates demonstrates his superior rhetorical skill by reciting a speech that earns the enthusiastic praise of each of his interlocutors. But there the similarities end. For there is no palinode in *Menexenus*. After expressing his admiration for the funeral oration and receiving Socrates' assurance that he will recite further speeches for him in future, Menexenus departs and the dialogue comes to an end. By contrast, Phaedrus objects that Socrates' speech, though admirable, is not yet complete, and an intervention by Socrates' familiar supernatural sign compels him, not to complete his speech, but to produce a second speech that counteracts and corrects the first, which is now shown to be not only rhetorically deficient but lacking any moral basis. Socrates' palinode, supplemented by the lengthy discussion that follows, lays the foundation for a truly philosophical rhetoric, explicitly deploying the fully developed Theory of Forms and the doctrine of *anamnêsis*, which presupposes the survival, if not necessarily the immortality, of the human soul. Indeed, an understanding of the nature of the soul is essential to the rhetorical art as Socrates conceives it, which entails the shepherding of the listener's soul.⁵³ It is therefore worth noting that, in *Menexenus*, the word *ψυχή* is almost completely absent, occurring only once, at 235a2. Perhaps the most telling difference, however, between *Menexenus* and *Phaedrus*, which

⁵² For the “dramatic,” as opposed to the “narrated” and “mixed,” dialogues, see Finkelberg 2019, esp. 47–58. The restriction to a cast of only two characters is otherwise a mark of early, “Socratic” dialogues like *Crito*, *Euthyphro* and *Ion*.

⁵³ *ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων*, *Phdr.* 261a, 269c–272b. Socrates singles out Pericles for his pre-eminence as an orator; in contrast, however, to what Socrates says about Pericles at *Mnx.* 235e–236b, he attributes Pericles' rhetorical skill not to the tutelage of Aspasia but to his study of natural history with Anaxagoras (*Phdr.* 269e–270a).

was likely composed some twenty years later, is the nature of the speech elicited from Socrates. For the funeral oration is not intended to persuade its audience to adopt an attitude that it would not otherwise approve; indeed, it serves to magnify and justify the Athenians' own already elevated opinion of themselves.⁵⁴ On the other hand, Socrates' first speech in *Phaedrus* aims to convince a presumably reluctant *erômenos* to grant sexual access to the speaker by virtue of the speaker's status as a non-*erastês*, a perversion of Socrates' own perverse practice of causing attractive young men to treat him as their *erômenos* by deceiving them into believing that he is their *erastês* (*Symp.* 222b). In this regard it bears a resemblance to the speech that, according to the Socrates of *Menexenus*, requires the skills of a first-rate orator, namely a eulogy of Athenians in Sparta or of Spartans in Athens (235d3–5). The difference between the speeches in the two dialogues is reflected in the response invited by, and accorded to, each of them. The funeral oration, as is traditional, concludes by dismissing its audience,⁵⁵ and, indeed, Menexenus departs shortly afterwards, unchanged in his views regarding Aspasia (249d9) and in his eagerness to hear the sort of speech that has just been delivered (249e6n.). The reaction of Phaedrus, however, to Socrates' similarly disingenuous speech prompts the lengthy, serious philosophical discourse that transforms Phaedrus from a passionate devotee of Lysianic rhetoric into a worthy partner in Socrates' pursuit of wisdom (*Yunis* 2011: 3–6). All of this suggests that Friedländer was justified in seeing *Menexenus* as, in a sense, "an anticipation of the *Phaedrus*" (1964: 219).

(d) *Personages of the Dialogue*

Only two characters, Socrates and Menexenus, speak in the course of this "dramatic" (above, n. 52) dialogue. But as is the case with some other two-character dialogues by Plato, other figures hover in the background. In *Ion*, for example, the rhapsode who gives his name to the dialogue is presented as little more than an intermediary through whom the poetry of Homer, several of whose verses are quoted, is channeled. And in *Phaedrus* a speech purporting to be by Lysias is recited and provokes two further speeches and a lengthy discussion of the nature of rhetoric, a discussion which features judgments of other orators, most prominently Isocrates.

⁵⁴ The funeral oration thus seems to embody the view, which Phaedrus describes and Socrates will contest, that the aspiring orator does not need to know the truth about the just, the good or the beautiful, but only needs a familiarity with what the audience regards as just, good and beautiful (*Phdr.* 259e–260a).

⁵⁵ The last word of the speech is ἀπιτε (249c8n.).

In *Menexenus*, four fifths of the words spoken are attributed to Aspasia, who is also credited with having composed the funeral oration delivered by Pericles. Clearly these two individuals need to be taken into account in any attempt to interpret Plato's dialogue. In addition, a number of other people are named in the course of the opening dialogue (234b, 235e–236a), and their brief appearances are surely intended to color the reader's reaction to the oration that follows.

(i) Socrates

"Socrates" is a fictional character who appears in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and in many of Plato's works, as well as in a number of works by other writers of so-called Socratic dialogues, only those of Xenophon having survived.⁵⁶ The relationship between this fictional character and the man who was executed by the state of Athens in 399 is uncertain.⁵⁷ His portrayal in *Menexenus* obviously relies on the reader's prior familiarity with the character, who is represented as an elderly man accustomed to running into younger acquaintances on the streets of Athens and engaging them in conversation. Because the dialogue at the beginning and end of the work is so brief, there is little opportunity for characterization, and little that distinguishes this Socrates from the man depicted elsewhere in Plato's (and Xenophon's) Socratic dialogues. There is, however, one surprise, and it comes as quite a revelation to those familiar with Socrates from elsewhere: Socrates discloses (235e) that he is currently a devoted and compliant pupil of Aspasia, who is his instructor in the art of rhetoric. Everything in the dialogue proceeds from this "fact," which readers are given every reason to suspect. There is a parallel, of sorts, in *Euthydemus*, where, as we have seen (3(c)ii), Socrates hopes to learn eristic from Euthydemus and his brother.⁵⁸ But in that dialogue the inadequacy of eristic is fully explored, and Socrates' conversation with

⁵⁶ For a convenient survey of the Socratic literature of the fourth century, see Kahn 1996: 1–35.

⁵⁷ The evidence for the life of Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, of the deme Alopece, is summarized by Nails (263–9). His date of birth is generally given as 469/8, but that is likely only an inference based on an approximation: Diogenes Laertius (2.44) quotes Apollodorus (*FCrHist* 244 F 34) as saying that Socrates was born in the archonship of Apsephion. Apollodorus, however, can have had no documents on which to base the claim and he was likely just counting back from the year of Socrates' death, at which time, according to Plato (*Apol.* 17d, *Cri.* 52e), Socrates was seventy. When Socrates refers to his age, he may only be giving a round number, a number that happens to correspond to the standard lifespan (Solon fr. 27 West).

⁵⁸ For another significant parallel with *Euthd.*, see 249d6n.

Crito ends with the former, true to his nature, urging his companion to have his sons pursue training in philosophy instead. Further, Socrates' intention to become a pupil of the professors of eristic is not fulfilled. By contrast, in *Menexenus*, Socrates makes no effort to persuade Menexenus to abandon his ambition to engage in political affairs, a pursuit that demands expertise in public speaking. In fact, he promises at the end of the dialogue to relay many more of Aspasia's πολιτικοὶ λόγοι in the future.

(ii) Menexenus

We know nothing about Menexenus son of Demophon beyond what is said and implied in Plato's dialogues.⁵⁹ He is mentioned in *Phaedo* as being present, along with his older cousin Ctesippus of Paeania (59b9), in the prison at the time of Socrates' execution. The two cousins also appear, and speak, in *Lysis*. There, Ctesippus teases his friend and age-mate Hippothales over his obsession with the younger Lysis, whose wealth and aristocratic ancestry (205c–d) are commensurate with his outstanding personal qualities.⁶⁰ In the palaestra in which the dialogue takes place, Socrates lures Lysis into a discussion of friendship by beginning a conversation with Menexenus, Lysis' closest friend and age-mate, with whom Socrates is familiar; the conversation, which occupies the bulk of the dialogue, is carried out mostly between Socrates and Lysis. From *Lysis* we can infer that Menexenus was at the time a teenager from a distinguished family of the sort that Socrates was in the habit of associating with. He is characterized by Socrates as “disputatious” (ἐριστικός, 211b8), so that his presence in the palaestra frequented by the otherwise unknown sophist Miccus, said to be a companion and admirer of Socrates (204a4–7), is not surprising. In our dialogue, Menexenus is older than he was in *Lysis*, being at an age at which he could reasonably consider his education to be complete and he might contemplate entering politics (234a). That he comes from a family that has a history of participation in public affairs (234b1–2) confirms what can be inferred from *Lysis* about his social standing. As long as we ignore the anachronism contained in the funeral oration (3(b) above), the dramatic date of our dialogue thus lies somewhere between that of *Lysis* and that of *Phaedo*.

⁵⁹ Nails 202–3; Robinson 2018: 176–81. According to a confused notice in Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle claimed that one of Socrates' sons was named Menexenus (D.L. 2.26 = Arist. fr. 93 Rose); for recent attempts to make a connection with our Menexenus, see above, n. 40.

⁶⁰ See Nails 119–20 (Ctesippus) and 195–7 (*Lysis*).

It is not unusual to find Socrates in conversation with a young Athenian from a prominent family who is on the verge of entering public life. Such young men are typically subjected to the attractions offered by various sophists and teachers of rhetoric, whose instruction is likely to aid them in advancing their careers. Counteracting these attractions is the challenge facing Socrates, who would prefer that those who exercise political power have some understanding of what that power entails and how it ought to be employed. One of those young men, as we learn from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, was Plato's brother Glaucon, who at an early age sought to make speeches in the Assembly, since he strove to attain a leading position in the state.⁶¹ By subjecting Glaucon to a series of questions, Socrates shows the young man that he is sadly ignorant of such fundamental matters as domestic revenues, military strategy and estate management, thus forestalling Glaucon's premature entry into public life. Plato's Socrates is less interested in the sorts of practical matters involving finance and logistics that are of concern to Xenophon; his focus is rather on the ethical underpinnings that he considers necessary to political leadership. As he has demonstrated to Calicles (*Gorg.* 515b–c), the only legitimate motive for entering politics, as Glaucon and Menexenus are intending to do, is to make one's fellow citizens as good as possible. For this reason, Socrates devotes a great part of the discussion in *Euthydemus*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* to showing that rhetoric and eristics, as they are practiced, are morally neutral and can be used equally well for good or evil. The only way of ensuring the proper use of these techniques, as Socrates tries to demonstrate to Crito, Calicles and Phaedrus, is by engaging in the serious pursuit of philosophy. In striking contrast to the lengthy protreptics found in these dialogues, *Menexenus* offers neither a critique of Aspasia's rhetoric nor an inducement to Menexenus to abandon his ambition and to pursue a life of philosophy instead.

(iii) Aspasia

Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a contemporary of Socrates.⁶² Apparently a woman of some intellectual accomplishment, she came from her native Miletus to live in Athens with Pericles after he divorced his first wife, around 450. Her Ionian origin, her high visibility, unusual for

⁶¹ *Mem.* 3.6.1. ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως; cf. *Mnx.* 234a–b, of Menexenus.

⁶² For Aspasia, see Nails 58–62; Henry 1995; Podlecki 1998: 109–17; Kennedy 2014: 68–96; Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 31–7.

a woman in fifth-century Athens, and her suggestive name (ἀσπάζομαι = “embrace”) all contributed to suspicions concerning her character. Consequently, references to her in Attic comedy, which constitute the whole of the surviving evidence for her from her lifetime, represent her exclusively in unflattering sexual terms. In Cratinus’ *Cheirons* she is Pericles’ “bitch-faced concubine” (παλλακὴν κυνώπιδα, fr. 259 *PCG*). Eupolis in his *Prospaltians* (fr. 267 *PCG*) calls her “Helen,” the promiscuous wife who had famously described herself in Homer as κυνώπις (*Il.* 3.180, *Od.* 4.145). In his *Demes* Eupolis goes even farther, using the term πόρνη to refer to her (fr. 110 *PCG*). In Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* she is not herself a prostitute, but it is claimed that two of “her” πόρναι (527) were abducted by Megarians, setting off the Peloponnesian War; she seems to be envisioned by Aristophanes as maintaining and training a stable of high-class prostitutes. In the fourth century the figure of Aspasia was appropriated by writers in the Socratic circle, who clothed her in less indecorous, and undoubtedly more historically accurate, apparel. Still, a feature of her portrayal is her concern with relations, albeit more respectable ones, between men and women. Antisthenes and Aeschines each published a dialogue entitled *Aspasia*, the latter surviving in fragments substantial enough to be reconstructed in some detail.⁶³ In Aeschines’ dialogue Socrates advises Callias to send his son to Aspasia to be educated, and Socrates himself, old as he is, is her pupil (fr. 17–19 Dittmar). Pericles too, despite being some twenty or twenty-five years her senior, had been her pupil, having learned Gorgianic rhetoric – which was introduced into Athens two years after Pericles’ death – from her (fr. 24 = Philostr. *Epist.* 73). In another section of the work (fr. 31 = Cic. *De inv.* 1.31.51–2), Socrates reports Aspasia as providing marriage counseling to Xenophon and his wife (whose wedding almost certainly occurred after Socrates’ death). Xenophon himself records Socrates as approving what he heard Aspasia say about matchmakers (προμνηστρίδες), namely that they make successful matches when their praise of the man and the woman is truthful, because deception only leads to resentment when it is discovered.⁶⁴ Aspasia’s commitment to the truth, it would seem, is of a different sort from that of Socrates, being of a purely pragmatic nature.

⁶³ For Antisthenes, see Prince 2015: 146–7 and 417–21. For Aeschines, see Ehlers 1966; Kahn 1994 and 1996: 23–9.

⁶⁴ *Mem.* 2.6.36. The implication is that the reputation of matchmakers was such that they were considered generally unreliable, dispensing praise whether praise was warranted or not; cf. 239c5n.

What has all this to do with Plato's prominent introduction of Aspasia into our dialogue? The works just referred to, with the exception of Xenophon's, predated the composition of *Menexenus*. While Plato makes no explicit mention of the erotic aspect familiar from earlier portrayals, he cannot have expected his readers to ignore the most salient feature of Aspasia's curriculum vitae.⁶⁵ Consequently, when he focuses exclusively on her rhetorical expertise, he invites us to think in terms of rhetoric's seductive powers of deception, powers most memorably explored by Gorgias in his *Encomium of Helen*. Socrates is too polite, in his own conversation with the Sicilian sophist (3(c)i above), to compare rhetoric with prostitution or pandering, calling it instead a form of flattery that bears the same relationship to justice that the art of the master chef bears to medicine (*Gorg.* 465b–e); that is, rhetoric serves up to the soul what satisfies the soul's cravings, not necessarily what is in the best interests of the soul. In our dialogue Socrates describes the satisfying effects of rhetoric (235a–c) and, shortly afterwards (235e), associates mastery of rhetoric with instruction by a woman popularly spoken of as a prostitute and a procuress. By doing so Plato seems to be hinting that sexual gratification may be as good an analogy for rhetoric as gourmandise. Aspasia is, thus, the mirror image of Diotima, the other foreign-born woman whose pupil Socrates claims to be.⁶⁶ On the reasonable assumption that Diotima is not a historical individual, Plato's audience can have had no prior expectations about her sexuality, yet it is explicitly expertise in τὰ ἔρωτικά that Socrates learned from her. By contrast, there is no hint of τὰ ἔρωτικά in Aspasia's speech or in her instruction of Socrates. More significantly, the two women's teaching methods are diametrically opposed. Unlike Aspasia, who demands that her elderly pupil repeat verbatim what she has taught him (236b7–c1), Diotima engages Socrates in dialectic. Not only does Diotima teach the young Socrates about Eros, she teaches him how to learn, namely by a process of question and answer. And, in contrast to Socrates' complete silence regarding the validity of Aspasia's instruction in the art of persuasion, he says that he found Diotima's lessons utterly persuasive.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ For a conversation between Socrates and a woman whose income is explicitly identified as deriving from the gifts of "friends," see Xen. *Mem.* 3.11, where Socrates discusses with Theodote (who is called a ἑταίρα by Athenaeus at 5.220e–f, referring specifically to this passage of Xen.) how to attract friends, and Theodote suggests that Socrates ought to become her business partner.

⁶⁶ *Symp.* 201d. Attempts to see a parallel between the women (von Loewenclau 1961: 31–3) or even to identify the two (D'Angour 2019: 42, 185) are perverse; see the penetrating criticism of von Loewenclau by Newiger (1964).

⁶⁷ *Symp.* 212b2–3 πέπεισμαι δὲ ἐγὼ· πεπεισμένος δὲ πειρῶμαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πείθειν.

(iv) Others

Only three voices are heard in the course of *Menexenus*, but a number of individuals are named in quick succession in the opening dialogue, and the way they are introduced indicates that their identity is somehow important to an understanding of the dialogue as a whole. Menexenus mentions, as the men most likely to be chosen to deliver this year's funeral oration, Archinus and Dion (234b10), presumably the leading orators of the time at which his conversation with Socrates is imagined to have taken place. In response to Socrates' claim that it is not difficult to compose the funeral oration, Menexenus asks if Socrates would be capable of doing so. Socrates replies that he would of course be capable, having learned the art of rhetoric from Aspasia, who has trained many fine orators, one of whom is the leading orator in Greece, Pericles (235e6–7). He adds the irrelevant claim that he has been trained in music by Connus (235e9) and continues by saying that even someone who had been taught by inferior teachers, like the musician Lamprus and the rhetorician Antiphon (236a4), could distinguish himself by delivering an encomium of Athens among the Athenians. When asked what he would have to say if he were chosen to give the funeral oration, Socrates immediately backtracks, saying that he would not be capable on his own, casting serious doubt on the value of Aspasia's tutelage. Instead, he offers to recite the speech that Aspasia concocted, using leftovers from the speech that she prepared for Pericles. What are we to make of this farrago? Regardless of the real or perceived differences between the instructional abilities of Aspasia and Connus, on the one hand, and Antiphon and Lamprus, on the other, we are left utterly confused. Is it in fact easy to compose the funeral oration or can it be done only by the most highly qualified expert? Are we to regard the speech that Socrates recites as a masterpiece of the genre or merely a derivative of an earlier specimen? The confusion and the uncertainty are undoubtedly intended by Plato, whose point seems to be that the funeral oration (and perhaps public oratory in general) is merely a *mélange* of clichés, so that there is little if any distinction between the finest example and the most pedestrian.

PERICLES

Plato cannot have known Pericles,⁶⁸ whose death in 429 preceded his own birth by a few years, but Plato's stepfather Pylilampes was an associate of Pericles (Plut. *Per.* 13.15) and his name must have been frequently

⁶⁸ Nails 223–7; Podlecki 1998; Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 45–50.

mentioned in the household in which Plato grew up. Pericles is introduced in *Menexenus* for his pre-eminence as an orator, a reputation confirmed by other authors. Thucydides praises him as the leading Athenian of his time, most capable in both speech and action (πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, 1.139.4), and a character in Eupolis' *Demes*, produced in the 410s, similarly describes him as κράτιστος . . . ἀνθρώπων λέγειν (fr. 102.1 *PCG*). The same character goes on to say (5–7) that a certain persuasive power settled upon Pericles' lips, that he would enchant (ἐκθήλει; cf. 235a7n.) audiences and that he alone among orators would leave his stinger behind in his hearers. This positive assessment is reflected elsewhere in Plato, but is always undercut, as it is in *Menexenus*, in one way or another. In *Symposium* (221c8) Alcibiades, who can be expected to be sympathetic to Pericles since he was one of Alcibiades' guardians, compares Pericles with Nestor and Antenor, the Homeric figures most noted for their eloquence, and singles him out as an outstanding orator (215e4–5), although, notably, he does this only to contrast Pericles with Socrates, the effects of whose speech are even more profound and more lasting. In *Phaedrus* (269a5–6) Socrates himself pairs Pericles, whom he elsewhere (*Gorg.* 455e5) claims to have heard in person, with the legendary orator Adrastus and describes him as πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν (269e1–2). Plato's *Gorgias* also praises Pericles, along with Themistocles, as being more effective in advising the Athenian people on matters of public works than the expert builders themselves (*Gorg.* 455d–e). Later, however, Socrates argues that Pericles, for all his rhetorical skill, in fact made the Athenian people worse (515d–516d). Elsewhere, Socrates questions whether Pericles ever made anyone else, including his own sons, wise (*Alc.* 118d–119a, *Prot.* 319e–320a) or good (*Meno* 94a–b). The explanation for this apparent inconsistency, between Pericles' proficiency in the art of persuasion and his inability to improve others (in implicit contrast to Socrates' focus on doing just that), is suggested at *Protagoras* 329a, where Socrates claims that Pericles, like others of those skilled in speaking, is incapable of answering, or even asking, vital questions about the subject of his discourse, comparing those orators to inert books. The same objection to written works is made at *Phaedrus* 275d. For Socrates, genuine rhetoric is dialectical, whereas those who have distinguished themselves for public speaking learned their craft from written manuals (*Phdr.* 266d). In our dialogue (236b) we are told that Pericles' funeral oration, perhaps his most famous speech, was not even composed by him, but was prepared for him to memorize, presumably in written form. Only if Pericles' speech was prepared with the help of writing would it be possible for

Aspasia to reuse discarded elements from that speech, as Socrates claims she did in the composition of the oration that Socrates recites for Menexenus. Already in the works of Antiphon (for whom, see below), who died in 411, there are passages that appear in almost identical form in more than one speech.⁶⁹ In this way the orator resembles the rhapsode or the poet – neither of whom, according to Plato, is a practitioner of a τέχνη, being infused rather with a θεία δύναμις (*Ion* 533d3, 534c6) – whose inventory of ready-made formulas enables him to perform before a mass audience, ignoring the crucial differences that distinguish one listener from another and reciting only what is likely to appeal to the audience's common interests.

ARCHINUS

About Archinus of Coile (Nails 43–4) we are reasonably well informed. He was sufficiently prominent to have been subjected to ridicule on the comic stage at some time before 405, the date of Aristophanes' *Frogs*. The chorus of that play banishes from its presence, among others, any politician (ῥήτωρ, 367) who, after being ridiculed in comedy, reduces the compensation of the poets. The scholiast (= Plato comicus fr. 141 *PCG*, Sannyrion fr. 9 *PCG*) informs us that the reference is to Archinus. During the archonship of Euclides (403/2), Archinus was recorded as the author of a decree that required the official adoption of the Ionic alphabet. For the significance of this reform, see D'Angour 1999, who provides a detailed account of Archinus' career. It was his political activities at just this time that earned him enthusiastic praise from the author of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (40.1–2): he facilitated the reconciliation following the overthrow of the Thirty (cf. 243e–244a), he took vigorous action to uphold the amnesty and he thwarted a measure, uncongenial to the sensibilities of Aristotle, that would have had the effect of enfranchising slaves. Elsewhere (34.3), the author names Archinus, Anytus, Clitophon and Phormisius as being among the prominent moderate oligarchs who were associated with Theramenes and who sought to restore the ancestral constitution in 404 (cf. 244a).⁷⁰ Given that Archinus appears not to have been an extremist in his political views, and given that

⁶⁹ Antiphon 5.14 ≈ 6.2, 5.87–9 ≈ 6.3–6.

⁷⁰ Anytus was one of the prosecutors of Socrates in 399; for Clitophon, who appears in *Rep.* and *Clit.*, see Slings 1999: 56–8 and Nails 102–3; at Ar. *Frogs* 965–7 “Euripides” names Phormisius as a pupil of Aeschylus' while claiming Clitophon and Theramenes as his own pupils.

we know nothing about the political views of Dion (for whom, see below), it is fruitless to speculate about a political motive for Plato's introduction of these two men here.⁷¹

DION

The identity of this Dion (Nails 129) is uncertain, but Plato surely does not intend us to think of his Syracusan friend, as Monoson (2000: 184–5) proposes, assuming that Menexenus is not being serious when he names Archinus and Dion. The Syracusan Dion, son-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I, in addition to being disqualified from delivering the oration by his lack of Athenian citizenship, was even younger than Menexenus. Up to this point in the dialogue Plato has been careful to establish the dramatic date in the period shortly before Socrates' death (3(d)ii above); only later will he abruptly undermine the reader's certainty by introducing a blatant anachronism (3(b) above). The name Dion was not uncommon in Athens, with over 150 men of that name being recorded, two of whom have been suggested as possible candidates for our Dion: in 392 a man named Dion was sent with Conon and three other Athenians as ambassadors to the Persian general Tiribazus in order to counteract the Spartan embassy of Antalcidas (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13), a mission that would have required the services of experienced and persuasive speakers; and a Dion was the adversary against whom a speech of Lysias was directed, a speech from which only a single uninformative word is preserved. Either or neither of these men might be the Dion to whom Menexenus refers. Krüger (1836: 241) identified our Dion with the ambassador of 392; Trendelenburg (1905: 11) suggested that the man attacked by Lysias would be a suitable alternative to Archinus. They may, of course, have been the same man.

ANTIPHON

Antiphon of Rhamnous,⁷² son of Sophilus, is the author of six surviving speeches, two of which were written to be delivered by defendants in Athenian courts; the remaining four, the "Tetralogies," are model speeches that argue both sides of the same (hypothetical) case, apparently intended to illustrate methods of argumentation and to advertise Antiphon's skills to potential students or clients. Whether he is the same man as "Antiphon the sophist," fragments of whose *On truth* and other works survive, is a

⁷¹ See the sensible comments by Pappas and Zelcer (2015: 40–2).

⁷² Nails 32–4; Hornblower III 953–9; Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 38–40.

subject of controversy.⁷³ The Rhamnousian was canonized by the Hellenistic critics as the earliest of the ten “choice” Attic orators and he is commended in extravagant terms by Thucydides (8.68.1–2), whom the later biographical tradition represents as Antiphon’s pupil. He may have been the first to write out speeches for delivery. According to Thucydides, he was generally reluctant to speak in public, but he was required to do so when he was put on trial in 411 for treason in connection with his prominent role in the oligarchic coup that established the short-lived Council of Four Hundred. His speech is praised by Thucydides as “the finest defense against a capital charge” (8.68.2) that he knows of. For all the supposed brilliance of the speech, a few papyrus fragments of which are all that survives, Antiphon was convicted and executed. Whether Plato knew the speech and shared Thucydides’ assessment of it cannot be known, but he must have heard about its failure, like Socrates’ defense speech, to sway a jury of politically minded Athenian democrats. That he has Socrates single out Antiphon in our dialogue as an example of a second-rate teacher of rhetoric, in contrast to the expert tutelage provided by Aspasia, seems almost certainly to be ironic.

CONNUS

Irony is likely to be at issue also in the contrast drawn between Socrates’ excellent music teacher Connus and the less competent Lamprus.⁷⁴ Socrates claims to be the pupil of Connus son of Metrobius also in *Euthydemus*. The more fully developed account of the relationship there sheds light on the brief reference here (and perhaps indicates that *Euthydemus* was composed before *Menexenus*). When Crito expresses surprise at Socrates’ interest in seeking instruction in a new subject at his advanced age, namely learning eristics from Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Socrates says that he is even now still trying to learn to play the kithara from Connus and is suffering the derision of his younger fellow pupils (272c). We learn later (295d) that Connus keeps losing patience with his elderly pupil because of his incessant questioning, a habit that is threatening to interfere, ironically, with his progress in learning eristics as well. That is, the seemingly gratuitous reference in *Menexenus* to Socrates’ music teacher serves further to undercut his claim to expertise in rhetoric. Just as Aspasia’s instruction in rhetoric seems to consist merely in requiring her pupil to memorize a

⁷³ See Hornblower III 954–5, who notes that two well-argued books were published in 2002, one presenting a separatist case and one a unitarian.

⁷⁴ For Connus, see Nails 103–4; Trendelenburg 1905: 12–13; Tsitsiridis 165–9; Biles and Olson 2015: 296–7.

speech composed by her, Connus' excellence as an instructor turns out to be irrelevant, since Socrates is such a poor learner.⁷⁵ Connus was prominent enough to have been the title character of a comedy by Ameipsias, which finished second behind Cratinus' *Pytine* and ahead of Aristophanes' *Clouds* in 423; the play featured a chorus of intellectuals (φροντισταί) and, if fr. 9 *PCG* (= D.L. 2.28) is correctly assigned to this play, Socrates was mentioned by name either as a member of the chorus or as a character.

LAMPURUS

Little is recorded, and less is known, about the Lamprus named by Socrates. The evidence is assembled and ably discussed by Power (2012: 288–90). The ancient *Life of Sophocles* (3) tells us that Lamprus was the tragic poet's music teacher and Athenaeus (1.20f) adds that, in his youth, Sophocles learned dancing and music from Lamprus. "Plutarch" (*On music* 1142b, quoting Aristoxenus = fr. 76 Wehrli) refers to Lamprus, along with Pindar and Pratinas, as an excellent lyric poet. This would seem to put Lamprus quite early in the fifth century. It is therefore unclear whether he is the same man who is ridiculed by the comic poet Phrynichus, whose works belong to the very end of the century. Phrynichus calls him a "twittering hypersophist" (μινυρός ὑπερσοφιστής, fr. 74 *PCG* = Athenaeus 2.44d), indicating that he is likely a contemporary, rather than an old-time musician who taught Sophocles. Like Ameipsias (see "Connus," above), Phrynichus wrote a comedy entitled *Connus*, and Power (289–90) suggests that this fragment may belong to that play, which would bring Socrates together on the comic stage with the two musicians he mentions in *Menexenus*. But even if that is the case, we are no better informed about how Plato expects us to understand the distinction he draws between Connus and Lamprus (see 236a4n.).

(e) *Survival and Influence*

The preservation and interpretation of Plato's text begins with the Academy, the research institute established by him in the 380s. His dialogues were studied and discussed by the members of the Academy, which

⁷⁵ Socrates confesses his lack of expertise in musical matters at *Phd.* 60e–61b and *Rep.* 3.400b–c, likely the source of Polyhistor's erroneous claim (D.L. 2.19 = *FGrHist* 273 F 86) that Socrates was a pupil of Damon, for whom see 236a3–4n. Our passage is presumably the source of the confused claim by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 6.13) that "Socrates, even though he was well advanced in years, was not embarrassed to take lessons from Lampon [*sic*] the kithara-player."

continued in existence at least until the reign of Justinian in the sixth century. But there is, surprisingly, no evidence of an “edition” of the Platonic corpus prepared by or for the Academy. Diogenes Laertius reports (3.56) that Thrasyllus, who advised the emperor Tiberius on matters having to do with astrology, said that Plato published his dialogues in groups of four, modeled on the tetralogies in which Attic tragedies were performed. Diogenes even gives the contents of the nine tetralogies (3.58–61), the seventh of which contains *Menexenus*, along with *Ion* and the two dialogues entitled *Hippias*. It is absurd to imagine that this arrangement originated with Plato, for other reasons and because the list includes such spurious works as *Rivals* and the genuine, but unfinished, *Critias*. Still, this organization of the dialogues achieved such authority that it was generally adopted in those of the mediaeval manuscripts that preserve the complete works of Plato;⁷⁶ it is still largely adhered to in the text printed in the series of Oxford Classical Texts.

(i) The Manuscripts

Approximately 250 manuscripts are known that contain some or all of the works of Plato, and of these about fifty preserve the text of *Menexenus*. Only around half of them have been fully or partially collated. No manuscripts have been newly collated for the purposes of this edition, which relies on the reporting by Tsitsiridis (93–5) of the three primary manuscripts. The text has, however, been newly constituted, and has been provided with a severely curtailed apparatus. The reader is encouraged to consult the full apparatus in Tsitsiridis’ text.⁷⁷ The three manuscripts on the basis of which the text has been constituted are:

T = Venetus append. class. 4,1. Date: ca. 950. Contents: Tetralogies I–VII, *Clitophon*, *Republic* (to 3.389d; the remainder of *Republic* and *Timaeus* were added in the fifteenth century). See Dodds 1959: 37–9; Boter 1989: 55–6, 111–18; Tsitsiridis 95–6; Jonkers 2016: 79–80.

W = Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 7. Date: eleventh century. Contents: Tetralogies I–VII (although the dialogues of Tetralogies IV–VII appear in a confused order; *Clitophon*, *Republic* and *Timaeus* were

⁷⁶ See the lists of manuscripts and their contents in Boter (1989: 25–64) and Jonkers (2016: 45–90).

⁷⁷ There are, however, a couple of omissions in Tsitsiridis’ reporting of readings from the indirect tradition: at 246e1, lambl. *Protr.* 118.9 des Places reads μετ’ ἀρετῆς ἀσκεῖν and at 247e6, D.H. *Dem.* 30 reads τῶι ὄντι γάρ. Note also that at 247b5, D.H. *Dem.* 30 reads καταχρήσασθαι δὲ χρημάτων and Stobaeus 4.10.31 reads χρήσθαι δὲ καὶ χρημάτων.

added in the fourteenth century). See Dodds 1959: 39–41; Boter 1989: 61–2; Tsitsiridis 96; Jonkers 2016: 88–9.

F = Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 39. Date: thirteenth or fourteenth century; supplements and corrections to the main text were subsequently made by one or more hands, collectively designated by **f**. Contents: from the middle of Tetralogy VI (*Gorgias* and *Meno*) to the beginning of IX (*Minos*). See Dodds 1959: 41–7; Boter 1989: 62–4; Tsitsiridis 96–100; Jonkers 2016: 89, 97–100, 165–75.

Other manuscripts that contain the text of *Menexenus* are deemed unlikely to preserve ancient readings that are not also found in one or more of the three primary manuscripts. Despite the difference between **T** and **W** in the order of the dialogues, as well as other differences,⁷⁸ the two manuscripts appear to belong to a family different from that to which **F** belongs. (Because of the high degree of contamination in the manuscripts of Plato, “family” should be understood in a very broad sense.) This emerges not only from the frequency with which the readings of **F** diverge from those of the other manuscripts (see 235a7n.), but from the tendency of **F** to agree, against the other manuscripts, with readings found in the indirect tradition (e.g. 246c3) and in the papyri.⁷⁹ As it happens, no papyri have yet been published that provide evidence for the text of *Menexenus*.⁸⁰ Thus the most we can hope for is a reconstruction of the text as it appeared at some time after it became standard to arrange the works of Plato in tetralogies.

(ii) The Indirect Tradition and Afterlife

The indirect tradition, that is, the texts of those later authors who quote, refer to or comment on the text of Plato, can be a valuable resource for determining the affiliation of Platonic manuscripts and can occasionally preserve correct readings not found in the direct tradition.⁸¹ While the indirect tradition happens to be of only limited importance for consti-

⁷⁸ Tsitsiridis (96) reveals that **T** regularly includes *nu-ephelkystikon* whereas **W** regularly omits it. Editors, including Tsitsiridis, generally omit to report this trivial detail in their apparatus, despite its potential significance (see 236e1n.).

⁷⁹ See Dodds 1959: 58, 65–6; Tsitsiridis 101–2; Jonkers 2016: 98–100.

⁸⁰ The MP³ Database (cip193.philo.ulg.ac.be/Cedopal/MP3/dbsearch_en.aspx), consulted February 2020, gives details of the publication of 103 papyri representing almost all the genuine (and some of the spurious) works of Plato, but not *Mnx.* or *Ion.*

⁸¹ See the “Index testimoniorum” compiled by Tsitsiridis (421–2), to which may be added Libanius, whose *Oration* 59.10 quotes 237a6 ἀγαθοὶ . . . ἀγαθῶν, and Manuel Chrysoloras, for whom see 246d2–7n.

tuting the text of *Menexenus*, it is, perhaps surprisingly, of potential interest for an understanding of the dialogue. Interpretation of *Menexenus* is bedeviled by the question how seriously to take the funeral oration, a question whose answer is dependent to some extent on an appreciation of tone and style, and it may be thought that Plutarch, say, or the author of *On the sublime* has an advantage over the author of this commentary and its readers by virtue of being a native speaker of Ancient Greek and being culturally and chronologically closer to the author of *Menexenus*. It is, therefore, important to pay attention to the way *Menexenus* is discussed and quoted by its earliest readers, particularly since it is mostly quoted and discussed for stylistic and literary reasons, unlike some of Plato's dialogues, the indirect tradition for which is dominated by authors like Proclus and Olympiodorus, whose primary interest is in Plato's thought.

It has been noted that there is no hint in the ancient discussions of *Menexenus* of the irony that has been detected by some of those who have studied the dialogue in more recent years. Clavaud, who surveys reactions to *Menexenus* in antiquity (1980: 15–35), shows that ancient authors are interested in the funeral oration itself as a specimen of rhetoric and tend to ignore its context: the framing dialogue, the role of Aspasia and the disquisition of Socrates on the intoxicating effects of public orators. This is especially noticeable in the case of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who quotes about one quarter of Plato's funeral oration – but none of the surrounding dialogue⁸² – in the course of his essay *On the style of Demosthenes*. What, it is reasonable to ask, is the relevance of *Menexenus* to the style of Demosthenes? The purpose of Dionysius' essay is to show that Demosthenes is the best representative of the best style, the middle or mixed style (8), the leading practitioners of which, apart from Demosthenes, were Isocrates and Plato (3). Therefore Dionysius needs to demonstrate Demosthenes' superiority to these two stylistic paragons. After dealing with Isocrates in sections 17–22, Dionysius turns to Plato. He dismisses *Apology* and *Symposium* as inappropriate *comparanda* (23) and concentrates instead on an extended criticism of *Menexenus*, “the most impressive of all his political speeches,”⁸³ after which he quotes (31), by way of comparison, not anything from Demosthenes' own funeral oration, which he regards as inauthentic (see 2(d) above), but *On the crown*

⁸² That he is aware of the introductory dialogue is clear from his odd assertion (*Dem.* 23) that Plato claims to be modeling his speech on those of Archinus and Dion (234b10).

⁸³ D.H. *Dem.* 23 κρᾶτιστος πάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων. It is as if one were to compare Mozart and Beethoven on the basis of the latter's *Fidelio*, the most impressive of all his operas.

199–208. The criticism is tempered with frequent expressions of praise for Plato’s style (e.g. 5, 7, 16, 23) to give the impression that Dionysius is presenting an unprejudiced analysis, but the tendentiousness is apparent from the very start. He begins (24) by quoting the opening words of the speech,⁸⁴ praising them for the appropriateness of the sentiment and the beauty and dignity of the language, but immediately devotes a paragraph to excoriating Plato for fatally damaging the effect by tacking on the words προπεμφθέντες . . . οἰκείων, which are superfluous to the sense and ruinous to the sound. This is merely the first of many critical judgments leveled at the oration by Dionysius, motivated, it would seem, by a desire to reproach the philosopher for encroaching on the territory that rightfully belongs to the orators.⁸⁵ There seems to have been a controversy among ancient critics over which author deserved first prize for prose style, with Dionysius’ contribution being the most detailed to have survived.⁸⁶ What is at stake in the controversy is illustrated by Dionysius’ condescending dismissal (*Dem.* 23) of those who assert that, if the gods use human language, Zeus must speak as Plato does.

The fact that Dionysius not only considers Plato’s funeral oration to be worthy of comparison with *On the crown* but engages in such contortions to demonstrate that it falls short of Demosthenic grandeur shows that Plato was taken to be sincerely attempting to produce a respectable specimen of the epitaphic genre. Cicero too appears to have held a high opinion of Plato’s ability to compose serious oratory, quoting from *Menexenus* with approval (see 247e6–248a7n.) and seeming to say that Plato’s funeral

⁸⁴ Ἐργωι . . . πορείαν, 236d4–5. D.H. quotes these words again at *Comp.* 18, where he gives a metrical analysis in the same way he analyzes the spondaic opening of Pericles’ funeral oration (Thuc. 2.35.1). He praises the rhythmical beauty of both passages, although his analysis strikes the modern critic as eccentric. For example, he does not consider the possibility that ἐνθάδε ἦδη in Thuc. or οἶδε ἔχουσιν in *Mnx.* would have been subject to elision in pronunciation (see pp. 40–1 below), and some of the quantities he assigns to syllables can most charitably be described as questionable. He scans ἔχουσιν τὰ as υ --- (*sic*), although at *Dem.* 24 his text omits the nu-*ephelestikon*, and he describes ἔργωι μὲν as a “bacchius,” i.e. -- υ, explicitly rejecting an iambic analysis on the grounds that the solemnity of the occasion is not suited to the rapid movement of iambic rhythm. In fact, the iambic character of the opening, which is even more pronounced with D.H.’s scansion of τὰ as a long syllable (ἔργωι μὲν ἡμῖν οἶδ’ ἔχουσιν τὰ προσή, -- υ - | -- υ - | -- υ -), is an expanded version of the iambic openings of Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen* and Agathon’s “Gorgianic” encomium of Eros; see 236d4n.

⁸⁵ See the detailed treatment by Wiater (2011: 310–51) of D.H.’s criticism as an “out-group reading” of *Mnx.*; the frequent references to D.H. in the commentary below are listed in the General Index. For D.H.’s complicated relationship with *Phdr.*, see Hunter 2012: 151–84.

⁸⁶ See the discussion, curtailed by a lacuna, at “Longinus” *De sublim.* 12.3–13.2.

oration was recited annually in Athens in his own time.⁸⁷ The patriotic appeal of Plato's text continued even into modern times. Loraux (1986: 5, with 342 n. 25) notes the proliferation of scholarly editions and school texts of *Menexenus* in Germany and France following the Franco-Prussian War. The text's nationalistic pride, based as it is on supposed purity of descent, contributed to its popularity in certain circles in the twentieth century (see 245d6n.). It was not until the late nineteenth century that the possibility was raised that Plato might have intended the funeral oration in *Menexenus* as something other than a purely straightforward example of the genre.⁸⁸ It is now not uncommon to see the words "irony," "parody" and "pastiche" used in connection with *Menexenus*. However we describe it, we must acknowledge that Plato has written a successful, even inspiring, *epitaphios logos*, fully worthy of being delivered before the same Athenian audience that was emotionally affected by the words of Pericles and Demosthenes. The question – which, it is hoped, the present commentary will go some way toward addressing – is whether the funeral oration in *Menexenus* reflects the sincerely held convictions of its author or, rather, demonstrates its author's ability, regardless of his own beliefs, to articulate the sincerely held convictions of the community at large using attractive and persuasive language.

⁸⁷ Cic. *Orator* 151. The words *quae [sc. oratio] sic probata est, ut eam quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit*, however, have often been suspected as an interpolation into Cicero's text, most recently by Vössing (2007). But *ut scis* is a curious expression for an interpolator to use. (*Orator* is addressed to Brutus, whom Cicero knows to be a devotee of the Old Academy.)

⁸⁸ See especially Berndt (1881), and the survey by Clavaud (1980: 42–77) of studies that have appeared in the wake of Berndt.

NOTE ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE TEXT

In the printing of Greek poetic texts editors have adopted the traditional, and rational, procedure of marking elision, crasis, etc. in those places where the meter guarantees its occurrence and not elsewhere.⁸⁹ Readers of Homer are accustomed to seeing the fourth verse of the *Odyssey*, for example, printed as follows:

πολλὰ δ' ὃ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὄν κατὰ θυμόν

This practice is justified by the scansion, which shows that δέ and γε are elided whereas ἄλγεα is not. On the other hand, no rational principle – indeed, no discernible principle of any kind – lies behind the practice of printing Greek prose when it comes to such matters. So, for example, in the Oxford text of *Gorgias* 507e6–508a4 Burnet prints φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί . . . οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν, with elision marked in one place but not in another, and in this he is followed by Dodds. The explanation for this inconsistency lies in the inherent conservatism that imposes itself on the editing of Classical texts: an earlier reading is automatically taken over in a subsequent edition unless the editor makes a conscious decision to alter it. Features of the text that do not significantly affect the meaning, such as accentuation, crasis, elision and the presence or absence of nu-*ephelestikon*, are often adopted unthinkingly. And so the same inconsistency we see in *Gorgias* 507e6–508a4 is found already in the text of Plato printed in 1578 by Henri Estienne and, before that, in the Aldine edition of 1513.⁹⁰ The Aldine edition, printed in Venice, was based on manuscripts that happened to be available to the editor, Aldus Manutius, in that city.⁹¹ But there is no reason to believe that the manuscripts on which Aldus relied had any special authority. On the contrary, a papyrus from the second century AD that preserves fragments of *Gorgias* 507–8 reads, with no word division, punctuation or diacritical marks, φασιδεισοφοι . . . ουδακολασιαν.⁹² That is, the

⁸⁹ By contrast, in the case of Latin texts, both prose and verse, it is conventional to employ *scriptio plena*.

⁹⁰ Estienne is also known by his Latinized name, Henricus Stephanus. The “Stephanus numbers” according to which we still refer to the text of Plato designate the pages and sections of pages in his three-volume edition (*Gorg.* appears in vol. 1, *Mnx.* in vol. 2).

⁹¹ For details, see Boter 1989: 242–4; Jonkers 2016: 361–5.

⁹² *POxy* 454 col. ii, 28–38. See Turner 1971: 106–7 for a photograph and transcription; Turner’s index, under “scriptio plena: elision and scriptio plena in same

papyrus exhibits a practice exactly the opposite of what is found in modern printed texts. Since we have no reliable evidence for what the author intended, this edition employs *scriptio plena* throughout. That is not to say that it is assumed that Plato in speaking avoided a pronunciation that would be more accurately represented using the written conventions of crasis and elision. We simply cannot rely on any of the manuscripts available to us, whether ancient or mediaeval, for reliable evidence regarding Plato's spoken practice.

text," refers to nine papyri, all of which are verse texts. The same, seemingly random, treatment of elision is revealed by Boter's collation of papyri of *Rep.* against the readings of mediaeval manuscripts and the indirect tradition (1989: 254-7); the same is apparently the case with Demosthenes (McCabe 1981: 48-67).

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΜΕΝΕΞΕΝΟΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΜΕΝΕΞΕΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἢ πόθεν Μενέξενος;

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MEN. Ἐξ ἀγορᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, [καί] ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου.

ΣΩ. Τί μάλιστα σοὶ πρὸς βουλευτήριον; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι παιδεύσεως καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τέλει ἡγήει εἶναι, καὶ ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχων ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἐπινοεῖς τρέπεσθαι, καὶ ἄρχειν ἡμῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐπιχειρεῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τηλικούτος ὢν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκλίπῃ ὑμῶν ἡ οἰκία ἀεὶ τινα ἡμῶν ἐπιμελητὴν παρεχομένη;

5

b

MEN. Ἐὰν σύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔαις καὶ συμβουλεύῃς ἄρχειν, προθυμήσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. νῦν μέντοι ἀφικόμην πρὸς τὸ βουλευτήριον πυθόμενος ὅτι ἡ βουλή μέλλει αἰρεῖσθαι ὅστις ἔρεῖ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποθανούσιν· ταφᾶς γὰρ οἶσθα ὅτι μέλλουσι ποιεῖν.

5

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε· ἀλλὰ τίνα εἶλοντο;

MEN. Οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ ἀνεβάλοντο εἰς τὴν αὔριον. οἶμαι μέντοι Ἀρχῖνον ἢ Δίωνα αἰρεθήσεσθαι.

10

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Μενέξενε, πολλαχῆι κινδυνεύει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθνήσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ταφῆς καλῆς τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς τυγχάνει, καὶ ἐὰν πένης τις ὢν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ ἐπαίνου αὐτῷ ἔτυχεν, καὶ ἐὰν φαῦλος ᾖ, ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰκῆι ἐπαινοῦντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου λόγους παρεσκευασμένων, οἱ οὕτως καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἐκάστου λέγοντες, κάλλιστα πῶς τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες, γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐγκωμιάζοντες κατὰ πάντας τρόπους, καὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἔτι ζῶντας ἐπαινοῦντες, ὥστε ἔγωγε, ὦ Μενέξενε, γενναίως πάνυ διατίθεμαι ἐπαινούμενος ὑπὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκάστοτε ἔστηκα ἀκροώμενος καὶ κηλούμενος, ἡγούμενος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα

5

235

5

b

234a2 καὶ del. Richards c2 ταφῆς καλῆς τε TF: καλῆς ταφῆς τε W: ταφῆς τε καλῆς Stob. 4.9.15 235a7 ἔστηκα TWf: ἐξέστηκα F

μείζων καὶ γενναιότερος καὶ καλλίων γεγονέναι. καὶ οἷα
 δὴ τὰ πολλὰ αἰεὶ μετὰ ἐμοῦ ξένοι τινὲς ἔπονται καὶ συν-
 ακροῶνται, πρὸς οὓς ἐγὼ σεμνότερος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα
 5 γίγνομαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δοκοῦσί μοι πάσχειν
 καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, θαυμασιωτέραν
 αὐτὴν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ πρότερον, ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος ἀναπει-
 θόμενοι. καὶ μοι αὕτη ἡ σεμνότης παραμένει ἡμέρας πλέον
 c ἢ τρεῖς, οὕτως ἔναυλος ὁ λόγος τε καὶ ὁ φθόγγος παρὰ τοῦ
 λέγοντος ἐνδύεται εἰς τὰ ὦτα· ὥστε μόγις τετάρτη ἢ πέμπτη
 ἡμέραι ἀναμιμνήσκομαι ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι οὐ γῆς εἰμι,
 τέως δὲ οἶμαι μόνον οὐκ ἐν μακάρων νήσοις οἰκεῖν, οὕτως ἡμῖν
 5 οἱ ῥήτορες δεξιοὶ εἰσιν.

MEN. Ἄει σὺ προσπαίξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ῥήτορας.
 νῦν μέντοι οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸν αἰρεθέντα οὐ πάνυ εὐπορήσειν· ἐξ
 ὑπογύου γὰρ παντάπασιν ἢ αἴρεσις γέγονεν, ὥστε ἴσως
 ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁ λέγων ὥσπερ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.

d ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ; εἰσὶν ἐκάστοις τούτων λόγοι παρε-
 σκευασμένοι, καὶ ἅμα οὐδὲ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ γε τοιαῦτα
 χαλεπὸν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δέοι Ἀθηναίους ἐν Πελοποννησίοις εὖ
 λέγειν ἢ Πελοποννησίου ἐν Ἀθηναίοις, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος
 5 δέοι τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκιμήσοντος· ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν τούτοις
 ἀγωνίζεται οὕσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ, οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν.

MEN. Οὐκ οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

e MEN. Ἥ οἶει οἶός τε ἂν εἶναι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, εἰ δέοι καὶ
 ἔλοιτο σὲ ἢ βουλή;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν γε, ὦ Μενέξενε, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οἶω
 τε εἶναι εἰπεῖν, ὧι τυγχάνει διδάσκαλος οὔσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη
 5 περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλὰ ἥπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς [καὶ] ἀγαθοὺς
 πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, ἓνα δὲ καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
 Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου.

MEN. Τίς αὕτη; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι Ἀσπασίαν λέγεις;

236 ΣΩ. Λέγω γάρ, καὶ Κόννον γε τὸν Μητροβίου· οὗτοι γάρ
 μοι δύο εἰσὶν διδάσκαλοι, ὁ μὲν μουσικῆς, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικῆς.
 οὕτω μὲν οὖν τρεφόμενον ἄνδρα οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν δεινὸν εἶναι
 λέγειν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅστις ἐμοῦ κάκιον ἐπαιδεύθη, μουσικὴν μὲν

ὑπὸ Λάμπρου παιδευθεὶς, ῥητορικὴν δὲ ὑπὸ Ἀντιφῶντος τοῦ Ῥαμνουσίου, ὅμως καὶ ἂν οὗτος οἶός τε εἶη Ἀθηναίους γε ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινῶν εὐδοκιμεῖν.

5

MEN. Καὶ τί ἂν ἔχοις εἰπεῖν, εἰ δέοι σὲ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Αὐτὸς μὲν παρὰ ἑμαυτοῦ ἴσως οὐδέν, Ἀσπασίας δὲ καὶ χθὲς ἠκροώμην περαινούσης ἐπιτάφιον λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ἤκουσε γὰρ ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὅτι μέλλοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν ἐροῦντα· ἔπειτα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμά μοι διήκει οἷα δέοι λέγειν, τὰ δὲ πρότερον ἐσκεμμένη, ὅτε, μοι δοκεῖ, συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον ὃν Περικλῆς εἶπεν, περιλείμματα ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα.

b

5

MEN. Ἥ καὶ μνημονεύσαις ἂν ἃ ἔλεγεν ἡ Ἀσπασία;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε· ἐμάνθανόν γέ τοι παρὰ αὐτῆς, καὶ ὀλίγου πληγὰς ἔλαβον ὅτε ἐπελανθανόμην.

c

MEN. Τί οὖν οὐ διῆλθες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ ὅπως μὴ μοι χαλεπανεῖ ἡ διδάσκαλος, ἂν ἐξενέγκω αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον.

MEN. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ εἰπέ, καὶ πάνυ μοι χαριῆι, εἴτε Ἀσπασίας βούλει λέγειν εἴτε ὄτουοῦν. ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰπέ.

5

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ ἴσως μου καταγελάσῃ, ἂν σοι δόξω πρεσβύτης ὢν ἔτι παίζειν.

MEN. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ εἰπέ παντὶ τρόπῳ.

10

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι σοί γε δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἂν ὀλίγου, εἴ με κελεύοις ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι, χαρισαίμην ἂν, ἐπειδὴ γε μόνω ἐσμέν. ἀλλὰ ἄκουε· ἔλεγε γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἀρξαμένη λέγειν ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν τεθνεώτων οὕτωςί.

d

Ἔργῳ μὲν ἡμῖν οἶδε ἔχουσιν τὰ προσήκοντα σφίσι αὐτοῖς, ὢν τυχόντες πορεύονται τὴν εἰμαρμένην πορείαν, προπεμφθέντες κοινῇ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἰδία δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων· λόγῳ δὲ δὴ τὸν λειπόμενον κόσμον ὃ τε νόμος προστάττει ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν καὶ χρή. ἔργων γὰρ εὖ πραχθέντων λόγῳ καλῶς ῥηθέντι μνήμη καὶ κόσμος τοῖς πράξασι γίγνεται παρὰ τῶν ἀκουσάντων· δεῖ δὴ τοιοῦτου τινὸς λόγου ὅστις τοὺς μὲν τετελευτηκότας ἱκανῶς ἐπαινέσεται, τοῖς δὲ ζῶσιν

5

e

5 εὐμενῶς παραινέσεται, ἐγγόνους μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοῖς μιμεῖσθαι
 τὴν τῶνδε ἀρετὴν παρακελευόμενος, πατέρας δὲ καὶ μητέρας
 καὶ εἴ τινες τῶν ἄνωθεν ἔτι προγόνων λείπονται, τούτους δὲ
237 παραμυθούμενος. τίς οὖν ἂν ἡμῖν τοιοῦτος λόγος φανείη; ἢ
 πόθεν ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀρξάμεθα ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐπαινοῦντες, οἱ
 ζῶντές τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἡὔφραινον διὰ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν
 ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν ζώντων σωτηρίας ἠλλάξαντο; δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι
 5 κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὕτω καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐ-
 τοὺς. ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ φῦναι ἐξ ἀγαθῶν. τὴν
 εὐγένειαν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐγκωμιάζωμεν, δεύτερον δὲ τροφήν
b τε καὶ παιδείαν· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τὴν τῶν ἔργων πρᾶξιν ἐπιδεί-
 ξωμεν ὡς καλὴν καὶ ἀξίαν τούτων ἀπεφάνησαντο.

τῆς δὲ εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξε τοῖσδε ἢ τῶν προγόνων γέ-
 νεσις οὐκ ἔπηλυς οὔσα, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐγγόνους τούτους ἀποφνηαμένη
 5 μετοικοῦντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἠκόντων, ἀλλὰ
 αὐτόχθονας καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν πατρίδι οἰκοῦντας καὶ ζῶντας,
 καὶ τρεφομένους οὐχ ὑπὸ μητριᾶς ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ
c μητρὸς τῆς χώρας ἐν ἣ ὄικουν, καὶ νῦν κεῖσθαι τελευτήσαντας
 ἐν οἰκείοις τόποις τῆς τεκούσης καὶ θρεψάσης καὶ ὑποδεξα-
 μένης. δικαιοτάτον δὴ κοσμησαὶ πρῶτον τὴν μητέρα αὐτὴν·
 οὕτω γὰρ συμβαίνει ἅμα καὶ ἡ τῶνδε εὐγένεια κοσμουμένη.

5 ἔστι δὲ ἀξία ἡ χώρα καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐπαι-
 νεῖσθαι, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν, πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, πρῶτον
 δὲ καὶ μέγιστον ὅτι τυγχάνει οὔσα θεοφιλῆς. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ
 ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων περὶ αὐτῆς θεῶν
d ἔρις τε καὶ κρίσις· ἦν δὴ θεοὶ ἐπήνεσαν, πῶς οὐχ ὑπὸ
 ἀνθρώπων γε συμπάντων δικαία ἐπαινεῖσθαι; δεύτερος δὲ
 ἔπαινος δικαίως ἂν αὐτῆς εἴη, ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἐν ᾧ [ἡ]
 πᾶσα γῆ ἀνεδίδου καὶ ἔφυε ζῶια παντοδαπά, θηρία τε καὶ βοτά,
 5 ἐν τούτῳ ἢ ἡμετέρα θηρίων μὲν ἀγρίων ἄγονος καὶ καθαρὰ
 ἐφάνη, ἐξελέξατο δὲ τῶν ζώων καὶ ἐγέννησεν ἄνθρωπον, ὃ
 συνέσει τε ὑπερέχει τῶν ἄλλων καὶ δίκην καὶ θεοὺς μόνον
e νομίζει. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ἦδε ἔτεκεν
 ἢ γῆ τοὺς τῶνδὲ τε καὶ ἡμετέρους προγόνους· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ
 τεκὸν τροφήν ἔχει ἐπιτηδείαν ᾧ ἂν τέκη, ᾧ καὶ γυνὴ δῆλη
 τεκοῦσά τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ ὑποβαλλομένη, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχη
 5 πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γεννωμένῳ. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα γῆ τε καὶ

μήτηρ ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον παρέχεται ὡς ἀνθρώπους γεννησα-
 μένη· μόνη γὰρ ἐν τῷ τότε καὶ πρώτη τροφήν ἀνθρωπείαν
 ἤνεγκεν τὸν τῶν πυρῶν καὶ κριθῶν καρπὸν, ὧι κάλλιστα καὶ
 ἄριστα τρέφεται τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ὡς τῷ ὄντι τοῦτο τὸ
 ζῶιον αὐτὴ γεννησαμένη. μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὲρ γῆς ἢ γυναικὸς
 προσήκει δέχεσθαι τοιαῦτα τεκμήρια· οὐ γὰρ γῆ γυναικὰ
 μεμίμηται κυήσει καὶ γεννήσει, ἀλλὰ γυνὴ γῆν. τούτου δὲ
 τοῦ καρποῦ οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν, ἀλλὰ ἔνειμεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.
 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐλαίου γένεσιν, πόνων ἀρωγὴν, ἀνῆκεν τοῖς
 ἐκγόνοις. θρεψαμένη δὲ καὶ αὐξήσασα πρὸς ἡβην ἄρχοντας
 καὶ διδασκάλους αὐτῶν θεοὺς ἐπηγάγετο (ὧν τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα
 πρέπει ἐν τῷ τοιῶνδε ἔαν [ἴσμεν γάρ]), οἳ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν
 κατεσκεύασαν πρὸς τε τὴν κατὰ ἡμέραν δίαιταν τέχνας πρῶ-
 τους παιδευσάμενοι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας φυλακὴν
 ὀπλων κτῆσιν τε καὶ χρήσιν διδασκόμενοι.

238

5

b

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γεννηθέντες δὲ καὶ παιδευθέντες οὕτως οἱ τῶνδε πρόγονοι
 ὠικουν πολιτείαν κατασκευασάμενοι ἧς ὀρθῶς ἔχει διὰ βρα-
 χέων ἐπιμνησθῆναι. πολιτεία γὰρ τροφή ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν,
 καλὴ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν. ὡς οὖν ἐν καλῇ
 πολιτείᾳ ἐτρέφθησαν οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν, ἀναγκαῖον δηλῶσαι,
 διὰ ἣν δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ νῦν εἰσιν, ὧν οἶδε τυγχάνουσιν
 ὄντες οἱ τετελευτηκότες· ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολιτεία καὶ τότε ἦν
 καὶ νῦν [ἀριστοκρατία], ἐν ἣι νῦν τε πολιτευόμεθα καὶ τὸν αἰὲ
 χρόνον ἐξ ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλά. καλεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν
 δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ὧι ἂν χαίρηι, ἔστι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μετὰ
 εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία. βασιλῆς μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἡμῖν
 εἰσιν (οὗτοι δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους, τοτὲ δὲ αἰρετοί), ἐγκρατῆς
 δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλά τὸ πλῆθος, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς δίδωσι
 καὶ κράτος τοῖς αἰεὶ δόξασιν ἀρίστοις εἶναι, καὶ οὔτε ἀσθενεῖαι
 οὔτε πενίαι οὔτε ἀγνωσίαι πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ
 τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ
 εἷς ὅρος, ὁ δόξας σοφὸς ἢ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει.
 αἰτία δὲ ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης ἢ ἐξ ἴσου γένεσις. αἱ μὲν
 γὰρ ἄλλαι πόλεις ἐκ παντοδαπῶν κατασκευασμέναι ἀνθρώπων
 εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνωμάτων, ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνώμαλοι καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι,
 τυραννίδες τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι· οἰκοῦσιν οὖν ἔνιοι μὲν δούλους,
 οἱ δὲ δεσπότης ἀλλήλους νομίζοντες· ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι,

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d

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e

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- 239** μιᾶς μητρὸς πάντες ἀδελφοὶ φύντες, οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν δοῦλοι οὐδὲ δεσπόται ἀλλήλων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν ἀναγκάζει ζητεῖν κατὰ νόμον, καὶ μηδενὶ ἄλλω ὑπεῖκειν ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀρετῆς δόξῃ καὶ φρονήσεως.
- 5 ὅθεν δὴ ἐν πάσῃ ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθραμμένοι οἱ τῶνδὲ τε πατέρες καὶ ἡμέτεροι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι καὶ καλῶς φύντες, πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφάναντο εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους
- b** καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίαι, οἴομενοι δεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ Ἑλλησιν ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων μάχεσθαι καὶ βαρβάροις ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Εὐμόλπου μὲν οὖν καὶ Ἀμαζόνων ἐπιστρατευσάντων ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τῶν ἔτι προτέρων ὡς
- 5 ἡμύναντο, καὶ ὡς ἤμυναν Ἀργείοις πρὸς Καδμείους καὶ Ἡρακλείδαις πρὸς Ἀργεῖους, ὃ τε χρόνος βραχὺς ἀξίως διηγήσασθαι, ποιηταὶ τε αὐτῶν ἤδη καλῶς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐν μουσικῇ ὑμνήσαντες εἰς πάντας μεμνηύκασιν· ἐὰν οὖν ἡμεῖς
- c** ἐπιχειρῶμεν τὰ αὐτὰ λόγῳ φιλῶι κοσμεῖν, τάχα ἂν δεῦτεροι φαινοίμεθα. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα δοκεῖ μοι ἔαν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἔχει τὴν ἀξίαν· ὧν δὲ οὔτε ποιητῆς πω δόξαν ἀξίαν ἐπὶ ἀξίοις λαβῶν ἔχει ἔτι τέ ἐστὶν ἐν μνηστείαι, τούτων πέρι μοι
- 5 δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐπιμνησθῆναι ἐπαινοῦντά τε καὶ προμνῶμενον ἄλλοις εἰς ὠιδὰς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν αὐτὰ θεῖναι πρεπόντως τῶν πραξάντων. ἔστιν δὲ τούτων ὧν λέγω
- d** πρῶτα· Πέρσας ἡγουμένους τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ δουλουμένους τὴν Εὐρώπην ἔσχον οἱ τῆσδε τῆς χώρας ἔκγονοι, γονῆς δὲ ἡμέτεροι, ὧν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ χρὴ πρῶτον μεμνημένους ἐπαινεῖσαι αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν. δεῖ δὴ αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν, εἰ μέλλει τις καλῶς
- 5 ἐπαινεῖν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγόμενον λόγῳ, ὅτε πᾶσα μὲν ἡ Ἀσία ἐδούλευε τρίτῳ ἤδη βασιλεῖ, ὧν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Κῦρος ἐλευθέρωσας Πέρσας τοὺς αὐτοῦ πολίτας τῷ αὐτοῦ φρονήματι
- e** ἅμα καὶ τοὺς δεσπότας Μήδους ἐδουλώσατο καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἀσίας μέχρι Αἰγύπτου ἤρξεν, ὁ δὲ ὑὸς Αἰγύπτου τε καὶ Λιβύης ὅσον οἶόν τε ἦν ἐπιβαίνειν, τρίτος δὲ Δαρεῖος πεζῇ μὲν μέχρι Σκυθῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρίσατο, ναυσὶ δὲ τῆς τε
- 240** θαλάττης ἐκράτει καὶ τῶν νήσων, ὥστε μηδὲ ἀξιοῦν ἀντίπαλον αὐτῷ μηδένα εἶναι· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι δεδουλωμένοι ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἦσαν, οὕτω πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μάχιμα γένη

καταδεδουλωμένη ἦν ἡ Περσῶν ἀρχή. αἰτιασάμενος δὲ
Δαρεῖος ἡμᾶς τε καὶ Ἑρετριᾶς Σάρδεσιν ἐπιβουλευσαι 5
προφασιζόμενος πέμψας μυριάδας μὲν πεντήκοντα ἔν τε
πλοίοις καὶ ναυσίν, ναῦς δὲ τριακοσίας, Δᾶτιν δὲ ἄρχοντα,
εἶπεν ἦκειν ἄγοντα Ἑρετριᾶς καὶ Ἀθηναίους, εἰ βούλοιτο τὴν
ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλὴν ἔχειν· ὁ δὲ πλεύσας εἰς Ἑρέτριαν ἐπὶ ἄνδρας 10
οἱ τῶν τότε Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς εὐδοκιμώτατοι ἦσαν τὰ πρὸς
τὸν πόλεμον καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγοι, τούτους ἐχειρώσατο μὲν ἐν
τρισὶν ἡμέραις, διηρευνήσατο δὲ αὐτῶν πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν,
ἵνα μηδεὶς ἀποφύγοι, τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ· ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρια ἔλθόντες 15
τῆς Ἑρετρικῆς οἱ στρατιῶται αὐτοῦ, ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν
διαστάντες, συνάψαντες τὰς χεῖρας διῆλθον ἅπασαν τὴν
χώραν, ἵνα ἔχοιεν τῷ βασιλεῖ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς σφᾶς ἀποπε-
φευγῶς εἶη. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ διανοίᾳ κατηγάγοντο ἐξ Ἑρετρίας 20
εἰς Μαραθῶνα, ὡς ἔτοιμόν σφισιν ὄν καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ
αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀνάγκῃ ζεύξαντας Ἑρετρίευσιν ἄγειν. τούτων
δὲ τῶν μὲν πραχθέντων, τῶν δὲ ἐπιχειρουμένων οὔτε 25
Ἑρετρίευσιν ἐβοήθησεν Ἑλλήνων οὐδεὶς οὔτε Ἀθηναίοις
πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων (οὔτοι δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ τῆς μάχης ἀφί-
κοντο), οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκπεπληγμένοι, ἀγαπῶντες τὴν
ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωτηρίαν, ἡσυχίαν ἦγον. ἐν τούτῳ δὴ ἄν 30
τις γενόμενος γνοίη οἷοι ἄρα ἐτύγχανον ὄντες τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ
Μαραθῶνι δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν καὶ κολασά-
μενοι τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν [ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας] καὶ πρῶτοι στήσαντες
τρόπαια τῶν βαρβάρων, ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις 35
γενόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἶη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν
πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ ὑπέικει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνους
τούς ἄνδρας φημὶ οὐ μόνον τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἡμετέρων
πατέρας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ
συμπάντων τῶν ἐν τῇιδε τῇ ἡπείρῳ· εἰς ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τὸ ἔργον
ἀποβλέψαντες καὶ τὰς ὑστέρας μάχας ἐτόλμησαν διακινδυ-
νεύειν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας, μαθηταὶ τῶν Μαραθῶνι 40
γενόμενοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀριστεῖα τῷ λόγῳ ἐκείνοις ἀναθε-
τέον, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τοῖς περὶ Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀρτεμισίῳ 45
ναυμαχήσασι καὶ νικήσασι. καὶ γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν
πολλὰ μὲν ἄν τις ἔχοι διελθεῖν, καὶ οἷα ἐπιόντα ὑπέμειναν

κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ὡς ἡμύναντο ταῦτα, ὃ
 5 δέ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκείνων κάλλιστον εἶναι, τούτου μνησθή-
 σομαι, ὅτι τὸ ἐξῆς ἔργον τοῖς Μαραθῶνι διεπράξαντο. οἱ μὲν
 γὰρ Μαραθῶνι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐπέδειξαν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, ὅτι
 b κατὰ γῆν οἷόν τε ἀμύνασθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους ὀλίγοις πολλούς,
 ναυσὶ δὲ ἔτι ἦν ἄδηλον, καὶ δόξαν εἶχον Πέρσαι ἄμαχοι εἶναι
 κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ πλήθει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ῥώμῃ·
 τοῦτο δὴ ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν τότε ναυμαχησάντων,
 5 ὅτι τὸν ἐχόμενον φόβον διέλυσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἔπαυσαν
 φοβουμένους πλήθος νεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν. ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων
 δὴ συμβαίνει, τῶν τε Μαραθῶνι μαχεσαμένων καὶ τῶν ἐν
 c Σαλαμίῃ ναυμαχησάντων, παιδευθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλ-
 ληνας, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν κατὰ γῆν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν,
 μαθόντας καὶ ἐθισθέντας μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους.
 τρίτον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον καὶ ἀριθμῶι καὶ ἀρετῇ
 5 γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας, κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο Λακε-
 δαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον καὶ
 χαλεπώτατον οὗτοι πάντες ἦνυσαν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
 ἀρετὴν νῦν τε ὑπὸ ἡμῶν ἐγκωμιάζονται καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα
 d χρόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ὕστερον· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις
 τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔτι ἦσαν μετὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου, αὐτὸς δὲ
 ἠγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ
 τοὺς Ἑλληνας. δίκαιον δὴ καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς ἐπιμνησθῆναι,
 5 οἱ τοῖς τῶν προτέρων ἔργοις τέλος τῆς σωτηρίας ἐπέθεσαν
 ἀνακαθηράμενοι καὶ ἐξελάσαντες πᾶν τὸ βάρβαρον ἐκ τῆς
 θαλάττης. ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι οἳ τε ἐπὶ Εὐρυμέδοντι ναυμαχή-
 e σαντες καὶ οἱ εἰς Κύπρον στρατεύσαντες καὶ οἱ εἰς Αἴγυπτον
 πλεύσαντες καὶ ἄλλοσε πολλαχόσε, ὧν χρὴ μεμνησθαι καὶ
 χάριν αὐτοῖς εἶδέναι, ὅτι βασιλέα ἐποίησαν δείσαντα τῇ
 ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίᾳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν Ἑλ-
 5 λήνων ἐπιβουλεύειν φθορᾷ.

καὶ οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἴπασῃ τῇ πόλει† διηνητλήθη ὁ πόλεμος
 242 ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοφώνων πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους·
 εἰρήνης δὲ γενομένης καὶ τῆς πόλεως τιμωμένης ἦλθεν ἐπὶ
 αὐτήν, ὃ δὴ φιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι
 προσπίπτειν, πρῶτον μὲν ζῆλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ φθόνος· ὃ καὶ

τήνδε τήν πόλιν ἄκουσαν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέ- 5
 στησεν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο γενομένου πολέμου, συνέβαλλον μὲν
 ἐν Τανάγραι ὑπὲρ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ἐλευθερίας Λακεδαιμονίοις
 μαχόμενοι, ἀμφισβητησίμου δὲ τῆς μάχης γενομένης, διέκρινε **b**
 τὸ ὕστερον ἔργον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὦιχοντο ἀπιόντες, καταλιπόντες
 [Βοιωτοὺς] οἷς ἐβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι τρίτη ἡμέρῃ ἐν Οἰνο-
 φύτοις νικήσαντες τοὺς ἀδίκως φεύγοντας δικαίως κατήγαγον.
 οὔτοι δὴ πρῶτοι μετὰ τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον, Ἕλλησιν ἤδη 5
 ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας βοηθοῦντες πρὸς Ἕλληνας, ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ
 γενόμενοι καὶ ἐλευθερώσαντες οἷς ἐβοήθουν, ἐν τῷιδε τῷ **c**
 μνήματι τιμηθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως πρῶτοι ἐτέθησαν. μετὰ
 δὲ ταῦτα πολλοῦ πολέμου γενομένου, καὶ πάντων τῶν
 Ἑλλήνων ἐπιστρατευσάντων καὶ τεμόντων τὴν χώραν καὶ
 ἀναξίαν χάριν ἐκτινόντων τῇ πόλει, νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς 5
 ναυμαχίαι οἱ ἡμέτεροι καὶ λαβόντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας
 Λακεδαιμονίους ἐν τῇ Σφαγίαι, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς διαφθεῖραι ἐφεί-
 σαντο καὶ ἀπέδωσαν καὶ εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο, ἡγούμενοι πρὸς **d**
 μὲν τὸ ὀμόφυλον μέχρι νίκης δεῖν πολεμεῖν, καὶ μὴ διὰ
 ὄργην ἰδίαν πόλεως τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων διολλύναι,
 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους μέχρι διαφθορᾶς. τούτους δὲ ἄξιον
 ἐπαινέσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἱ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον πολεμήσαντες 5
 ἐνθάδε κεῖνται, ὅτι ἐπέδειξαν, εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμφεσβήτει ὡς ἐν
 τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ἄλλοι τινὲς
 εἶεν ἀμείνους Ἀθηναίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἀμφισβητοῖεν· οὔτοι
 γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἔδειξαν, στασιασάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος περιγενο- **e**
 μένοι τῷ πολέμῳ, τοὺς προεστῶτας τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων
 χειρωσάμενοι, μετὰ ὧν τότε τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνίκων κοινήι,
 τούτους νικῶντες ἴδιαι. τρίτος δὲ πόλεμος μετὰ ταύτην τὴν
 εἰρήνην ἀνέλπιστός τε καὶ δεινὸς ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ καὶ 5
 ἀγαθοὶ τελευτήσαντες ἐνθάδε κεῖνται, πολλοὶ μὲν ἀμφὶ Σι-
 κελίαν πλεῖστα τρόπαια στήσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς Λεοντίων **243**
 ἐλευθερίας, οἷς βοηθοῦντες διὰ τοὺς ὄρκους ἔπλευσαν εἰς
 ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους, διὰ δὲ μῆκος τοῦ πλοῦ εἰς ἀπορίαν
 τῆς πόλεως καταστάσης καὶ οὐ δυναμένης αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν,
 τούτῳ ἀπειπόντες ἐδυστύχησαν (ὧν οἱ ἐχθροί, καὶ προσπολε- 5
 μήσαντες, πλείω ἔπαινον ἔχουσι σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς ἢ

τῶν ἄλλων οἱ φίλοι), πολλοὶ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ναυμαχίαις ταῖς κατὰ
 Ἑλλησποντον, μιᾷ μὲν ἡμέραι πάσας τὰς τῶν πολεμίων
b ἐλόντες ναῦς, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἄλλας νικήσαντες. ὁ δὲ εἶπον
 δεινὸν καὶ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ πολέμου γενέσθαι, τόδε λέγω τὸ
 εἰς τοσοῦτον φιλονικίας ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τοὺς ἄλλους
 Ἑλληνας, ὥστε τολμῆσαι τῷ ἐχθίστῳ ἐπικηρυκεύσασθαι
5 βασιλεῖ, ὃν κοινῇ ἐξέβαλον μετὰ ἡμῶν, ἰδία τοῦτον πάλιν
 ἐπάγεσθαι, βάρβαρον ἐπὶ Ἑλληνας, καὶ συναθροῖσαι ἐπὶ
 τὴν πόλιν πάντας Ἑλληνας τε καὶ βαρβάρους. οὗ δὴ καὶ
c ἐκφανῆς ἐγένετο ἡ τῆς πόλεως ῥώμη τε καὶ ἀρετὴ· οἰομένων
 γὰρ ἤδη αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμηθῆσαι καὶ ἀπειλημμένων ἐν
 Μυτιλήνῃ τῶν νεῶν, βοηθήσαντες ἐξήκοντα ναυσίν, αὐτοὶ
 ἐμβάντες εἰς τὰς ναῦς, καὶ ἄνδρες γενόμενοι ὁμολογουμένως
5 ἄριστοι, νικήσαντες μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους, λυσάμενοι δὲ τοὺς
 φίλους, ἀναξίου τύχης τυχόντες [οὐκ ἀναιρεθέντες ἐκ τῆς
 θαλάττης] κεῖνται ἐνθάδε. ὣν χρὴ αἰεὶ μεμνησθαί τε καὶ
d ἐπαινεῖν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων ἀρετῇ ἐνικήσαμεν, οὐ μόνον
 τὴν τότε ναυμαχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόλεμον· δόξαν
 γὰρ διὰ αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις ἔσχεν μὴ ποτε ἂν καταπολεμηθῆναι
 μηδὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔδοξεν· τῇ δὲ ἡμετέροι
5 αὐτῶν διαφορᾷ ἐκρατήθημεν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων· ἀήττητοι
 γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνων ἐσμέν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
 καὶ ἐνικήσαμεν καὶ ἠττήθημεν.
e μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἡσυχίας γενομένης καὶ εἰρήνης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλ-
 λους, ὁ οἰκεῖος ἡμῖν πόλεμος οὕτως ἐπολεμήθη, ὥστε εἶπερ εἰμαρμέ-
 νον εἶη ἀνθρώποις στασιάσαι, μὴ ἂν ἄλλως εὐξασθαι μηδένα πόλιν
 ἑαυτοῦ νοσῆσαι· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ τοῦ ἄστεως
5 ὡς ἀσμένως καὶ οἰκείως ἀλλήλοις συνέμειξαν οἱ πολῖται καὶ
 παρὰ ἐλπίδα τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλησι, τὸν τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλευσῖνι
244 πόλεμον ὡς μετρίως ἔθεντο. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο
 αἴτιον ἢ ἡ τῷ ὄντι συγγένεια, φιλίαν βέβαιον καὶ ὁμόφυλον
 οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ ἔργῳ παρεχομένη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτῳ
 τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτησάντων ὑπὸ ἀλλήλων μνείαν ἔχειν καὶ
5 διαλλάττειν αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνάμεθα, εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις ἐν τοῖς
 τοιοῖσδε, τοῖς κρατοῦσιν αὐτῶν εὐχομένους, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς
 διηλλάγμεθα· οὐ γὰρ κακία ἀλλήλων ἦσαντο οὐδὲ ἔχθραι

ἀλλὰ δυστυχίαι. μάρτυρες δὲ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν τούτων οἱ ζῶντες· οἱ αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὄντες ἐκείνοις γένει συγγνώμην ἀλλήλοις ἔχομεν ὧν τε ἐποιήσαμεν ὧν τε ἐπάθομεν.

μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παντελῶς εἰρήνης ἡμῖν γενομένης, ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν ἡ πόλις, τοῖς μὲν βαρβάροις συγγινώσκουσα, ὅτι παθόντες ὑπὸ αὐτῆς κακῶς [ἰκανῶς] οὐκ ἐνδεῶς ἡμύναντο, τοῖς δὲ Ἑλλησιν ἀγανακτοῦσα, μεμνημένη ὡς εὖ παθόντες ὑπὸ αὐτῆς οἶαν χάριν ἀπέδοσαν, κοινωσάμενοι τοῖς βαρβάροις, τὰς τε ναῦς περιελόμενοι αἶ ποτε ἐκείνους ἔσωσαν, καὶ τείχη καθελόντες ἀντὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὰ ἐκείνων ἐκωλύσαμεν πεσεῖν. διανοουμένη δὲ ἡ πόλις μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀμῦναι μήτε Ἑλλησι πρὸς ἀλλήλων δουλουμένοις μήτε ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, οὕτως ὤικει. ἡμῶν οὖν ἐν τοιαύτῃ διανοίᾳ ὄντων ἡγησάμενοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς μὲν τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐπικούρους πεπτωκέναι ἡμᾶς, σφέτερον δὲ ἤδη ἔργον εἶναι καταδουλοῦσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους, ταῦτα ἔπραττον. καὶ μὴκύνειν μὲν τί δεῖ; οὐ γὰρ παλαιὰ οὐδὲ παλαιῶν ἀνθρώπων γεγονότα λέγοιμι ἂν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἴσμεν ὡς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἀφίκοντο εἰς χρεῖαν τῆς πόλεως τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων οἱ πρῶτοι, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι, καὶ τό γε θειότατον πάντων, τὸ καὶ βασιλέα εἰς τοῦτο ἀπορίας ἀφικέσθαι, ὥστε περιστῆναι αὐτῶι μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν τὴν σωτηρίαν γενέσθαι ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, ἣν προθύμως ἀπώλλυ. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἴ τις βούλοιτο τῆς πόλεως κατηγορῆσαι δικαίως, τοῦτο ἂν μόνον λέγων ὀρθῶς ἂν κατηγοροῖ, ὡς ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοικτίρμων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπείς. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῶι τότε χρόνῳ οὐχ οἶα τε ἐγένετο καρτερῆσαι οὐδὲ διαφυλάξαι ἃ ἐδέδοκτο αὐτῆι, τὸ μηδενὶ δουλουμένῳ βοηθεῖν τῶν σφᾶς ἀδικησάντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκάμφθη καὶ ἐβοήθησεν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἑλληνας αὐτῆ βοηθήσασα ἀπελύσατο δουλείας, ὥστε ἐλευθέρους εἶναι μέχρι οὗ πάλιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς κατεδουλώσαντο, βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτῆ μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν βοηθῆσαι, αἰσχυνομένη τὰ τρόπαια τὰ τε Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιαῖς, φυγάδας δὲ καὶ ἐθελοντὰς ἔασασα μόνον βοηθῆσαι ὁμολογουμένως ἔσωσεν. τειχισαμένη δὲ καὶ ναυπηγησαμένη, ἐκδεξαμένη τὸν πόλεμον, ἐπειδὴ ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν ἵππερ

244b6 ἰκανῶς del. Bekker d2 παλαιὰ Tsitsiridis: πάλαι TWF παλαιῶν F: πολλῶν TWf

b

5

c

5

d

5

e

5

245

5

b

παρίων† ἐπολέμει Λακεδαιμονίοις. φοβηθεῖς δὲ βασιλεὺς
 τὴν πόλιν, ἐπειδὴ ἑώρα Λακεδαιμονίους τῶι κατὰ θάλατταν
 πολέμωι ἀπαγορεύοντας, ἀποστῆναι βουλόμενος ἐξήιτει τοὺς
 5 Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ, οὕσπερ πρότερον Λακεδαιμόνιοι
 αὐτῶι ἐξέδοσαν, εἰ μέλλοι συμμαχήσειν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 συμμάχοις, ἡγούμενος οὐκ ἐθελήσειν, ἵνα αὐτῶι πρόφασις εἴη
 c τῆς ἀποστάσεως. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἐψεύσθη·
 ἠθέλησαν γὰρ αὐτῶι ἐκδιδόναι καὶ συνέθεντο καὶ ὤμοσαν
 Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι,
 εἰ μέλλοι χρήματα παρέξειν, ἐκδώσειν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ
 5 Ἕλληνας. μόνοι δὲ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐτολμήσαμεν οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι
 οὔτε ὁμόσαι· οὕτω δὴ τοι τό γε τῆς πόλεως γενναῖον καὶ
 ἐλεύθερον βέβαιόν τε καὶ ὑγιές ἐστιν καὶ φύσει μισοβάρ-
 d βαρον, διὰ τὸ εἰλικρινῶς εἶναι Ἕλληνας καὶ ἀμιγεῖς βαρ-
 βάρων· οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κάδμοι οὐδὲ Αἴγυπτοὶ τε καὶ
 Δαναοὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φύσει μὲν βάρβαροι ὄντες, νόμῳ
 δὲ Ἕλληνας, συνοικοῦσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ Ἕλληνας, οὐ
 5 μειξοβάρβαροι οἰκοῦμεν, ὅθεν καθαρὸν τὸ μῖσος ἐντέτηκε τῇ
 πόλει τῆς ἀλλοτρίας φύσεως. ὅμως δὲ οὖν ἐμονώθημεν πάλιν
 e διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐθέλειν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον ἐργάσασθαι
 Ἕλληνας βαρβάροις ἐκδόντες. ἐλθόντες οὖν εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ ἐξ
 ὧν καὶ τὸ πρότερον κατεπολεμήθημεν, σὺν θεῶι ἄμεινον ἢ τότε
 ἐθέμεθα τὸν πόλεμον· καὶ γὰρ ναῦς καὶ τείχη ἔχοντες καὶ
 5 τὰς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν ἀποικίας ἀπηλλάγημεν τοῦ πολέμου
 οὕτως ἀγαπητῶς <ὡς> ἀπηλλάττοντο καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι.
 ἀνδρῶν μέντοι ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῶι πολέμῳ ἐστερήθημεν,
 τῶν τε ἐν Κορίνθῳ χρησαμένων δυσχωρία καὶ ἐν Λεχαιῳ
 246 προδοσίαι· ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ βασιλέα ἐλευθερώσαντες καὶ
 ἐκβαλόντες ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης Λακεδαιμονίους· ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν
 ὑμᾶς ἀναμιμνήσκω, ὑμᾶς δὲ πρέπει συνεπαινεῖν τε καὶ κοσμεῖν
 τοιούτους ἄνδρας.
 5 καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἔργα ταῦτα τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμέ-
 νων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως τετελευτήκασι, πολλὰ
 μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ καλὰ, πολὺ δὲ ἔτι πλείω καὶ καλλίω τὰ
 b ὑπολειπόμενα· πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες οὐχ ἱκαναὶ
 γένοιοντο τῶι τὰ πάντα μέλλοντι περαίνειν. τούτων οὖν χρή

μεμνημένους τοῖς τούτων ἐγγόνοις πάντα ἄνδρα παρα-
 κελεύεσθαι, ὡσπερ ἐν πολέμῳ, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν τὴν τῶν
 προγόνων μηδὲ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσω ἀναχωρεῖν εἴκοντας κάκῃ. ἐγὼ 5
 μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὧ παῖδες ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, νῦν τε παρα-
 κελεύομαι καὶ ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ, ὅπου ἂν τῷ ἐντυγχάνω
 ὑμῶν, καὶ ἀναμνήσω καὶ διακελεύσομαι προθυμεῖσθαι εἶναι c
 ὡς ἀρίστους· ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν ἃ οἱ
 πατέρες ἡμῖν ἐπέσκηπτον ἀπαγγέλλειν τοῖς ἀεὶ λειπομένοις,
 εἴ τι πάσχοιεν, ἥνίκα κινδυνεύσειν ἔμελλον. φράσω δὲ ὑμῖν
 ἃ τε αὐτῶν ἤκουσα ἐκείνων καὶ οἷα νῦν ἡδέως ἂν εἴποιεν ὑμῖν 5
 λαβόντες δύναμιν, τεκμαιρόμενος ἐξ ὧν τότε ἔλεγον. ἀλλὰ
 νομίζειν χρὴ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν ἐκείνων ἃ ἂν ἀπαγγέλλω. ἔλεγον
 δὲ τάδε·

Ἵω παῖδες, ὅτι μὲν ἐστε πατέρων ἀγαθῶν, αὐτὸ μηνύει τὸ d
 νῦν παρόν· ἡμῖν δὲ ἐξόν ζῆν μὴ καλῶς, καλῶς αἰρούμεθα
 μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν, πρὶν ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τοὺς ἔπειτα εἰς ὀνειδῆ
 καταστῆσαι καὶ πρὶν τοὺς ἡμετέρους πατέρας καὶ πᾶν τὸ
 πρόσθεν γένος αἰσχῦναι, ἡγούμενοι τῷ τοὺς αὐτοῦ αἰσχύναντι 5
 ἀβίωτον εἶναι, καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ οὔτε τινὰ ἀνθρώπων οὔτε
 θεῶν φίλον εἶναι οὔτε ἐπὶ γῆς οὔτε ὑπὸ γῆς τελευτήσαντι.
 χρὴ οὖν μεμνημένους τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων, ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο
 ἀσκῆτε, ἀσκεῖν μετὰ ἀρετῆς, εἰδόμενος ὅτι τούτου λειπόμενα e
 πάντα καὶ κτήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα αἰσχροῦ καὶ κακά. οὔτε
 γὰρ πλοῦτος κλέος φέρει τῷ κεκτημένῳ μετὰ ἀνανδρίας
 (ἄλλῳ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλουτεῖ καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ) οὔτε σώματος
 κάλλος καὶ ἰσχὺς δειλῷ καὶ κακῷ συνοικοῦντα πρέποντα 5
 φαίνεται ἀλλὰ ἀπρεπῆ, καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα
 καὶ ἐκφαίνει τὴν δειλίαν· πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη
 δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς πανουργία, οὐ σοφία 247
 φαίνεται. ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστατον καὶ διὰ παντὸς
 πᾶσαν πάντως προθυμίαν πειρᾶσθε ἔχειν ὅπως μάλιστα μὲν
 ὑπερβαλεῖσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς πρόσθεν εὐκλείαι· εἰ δὲ μή,
 ἴστε ὡς ἡμῖν, ἂν μὲν νικῶμεν ὑμᾶς ἀρετῇ, ἢ νίκη αἰσχύνην 5
 φέρει, ἢ δὲ ἦττα, ἐάν ἦττώμεθα, εὐδαιμονίαν. μάλιστα δὲ
 ἂν νικῶμεθα καὶ ὑμεῖς νικῶιητε, εἰ παρασκευάσαισθε τῇ τῶν

- b** προγόνων δόξει μὴ καταχρησόμενοι μηδὲ ἀναλώσοντες αὐτήν, γνόντες ὅτι ἀνδρὶ οἰομένω τι εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσχιον οὐδὲν ἢ παρέχειν ἑαυτὸν τιμώμενον μὴ διὰ ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ δόξαν προγόνων. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τιμὰς γονέων ἐγγόνις καλὸς
5 θησαυρὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπήσ· χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν θησαυρῶι, καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐγγόνις παραδιδόναι, αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄνανδρον, ἀπορίαὶ ἰδίων αὐτοῦ κτημάτων τε καὶ εὐδοξιῶν.
- c** καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύσητε, φίλοι παρὰ φίλους ἡμᾶς ἀφίξεσθε, ὅταν ὑμᾶς ἢ προσήκουσα μοῖρα κομίσηι· ἀμελήσαντας δὲ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακισθέντας οὐδεὶς εὐμενῶς ὑποδέξεται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν παισὶ ταῦτα εἰρήσθω.
- 5 πατέρας δὲ ἡμῶν, οἷς εἰσὶ, καὶ μητέρας ἀεὶ χρὴ παραμυθεῖσθαι ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὴν συμφορὰν, ἐὰν ἄρα συμβῆι γενέσθαι, καὶ μὴ συνοδύρεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τοῦ λυπήσοντος
- d** προσδεήσονται· ἰκανὴ γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἡ γενομένη τύχη τοῦτο πορίζειν) ἀλλὰ ἰωμένους καὶ πραῦνοντας ἀναμιμνήσκειν αὐτούς ὅτι ὧν ἠὔχοντο τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοὶ ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀθανάτους σφίσι παῖδας ἠὔχοντο γενέσθαι
5 ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ εὐκλεεῖς, ὧν ἔτυχον, μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ὄντων. πάντα δὲ οὐ ῥαίδιον θνητῶι ἀνδρὶ κατὰ νοῦν ἐν τῶι ἑαυτοῦ βίωι ἐκβαίνειν, καὶ φέροντες μὲν ἀνδρείως τὰς συμφορὰς δόξουσι τῶι ὄντι ἀνδρείων παιδῶν πατέρες εἶναι
- e** καὶ αὐτοὶ τοιοῦτοι, ὑπεῖκοντες δὲ ὑποψίαν παρέξουσιν ἢ μὴ ἡμέτεροι εἶναι ἢ ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας καταψεύδεσθαι. χρὴ δὲ οὐδέτερα τούτων, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνους μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἐπαινέτας εἶναι ἔργωι, παρέχοντας αὐτοὺς φαινομένους τῶι ὄντι πατέρας
5 ὄντας ἄνδρας ἀνδρῶν. πάλαι γὰρ δὴ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν λεγόμενον καλῶς δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι· τῶι γὰρ ὄντι εὖ λέγεται. ὅτωι γὰρ ἀνδρὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνήρηται πάντα τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν
- 248** φέροντα ἢ ἐγγύς τούτου, καὶ μὴ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἰωρεῖται ἔξ ὧν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πραξάντων πλανᾶσθαι ἠνάγκασται καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου, τούτωι ἄριστα παρεσκεύασται ζῆν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σώφρων καὶ οὗτος ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ φρόνιμος,
5 οὗτος γιγνομένων χρημάτων καὶ παιδῶν καὶ διαφθειρομένων μάλιστα πείσεται τῆι παροιμίαι· οὔτε γὰρ χαίρων οὔτε λυπούμενος ἄγαν φανήσεται διὰ τὸ αὐτῶι πεποιθέναι. τοιοῦτους
- b** δὲ ἡμεῖς γε ἀξιούμεν καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους εἶναι καὶ βουλόμεθα καὶ φαμεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς νῦν παρέχομεν τοιοῦτους, οὐκ

ἀγανακτοῦντας οὐδὲ φοβουμένους ἄγαν εἰ δεῖ τελευτᾶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι. δεόμεθα δὴ καὶ πατέρων καὶ μητέρων τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ διανοίᾳ χρωμένους τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διάγειν, καὶ εἰδέναι 5 ὅτι οὐ θρηνοῦντες οὐδὲ ὀλοφυρόμενοι ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν μάλιστα χαριοῦνται, ἀλλὰ εἴ τις ἔστι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν αἴσθησις τῶν ζώντων, οὕτως ἀχάριστοι εἶεν ἂν μάλιστα, ἑαυτοὺς τε c κακοῦντες καὶ βαρέως φέροντες τὰς συμφοράς, κούφως δὲ καὶ μετρίως μάλιστα ἂν χαρίζοιντο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέτερα τελευτῆν ἤδη ἔξει ἢ περὶ καλλίστη γίνεται ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε πρέπει αὐτὰ μᾶλλον κοσμεῖν ἢ θρηνεῖν, γυναικῶν δὲ τῶν ἡμετέρων 5 καὶ παίδων ἐπιμελούμενοι καὶ τρέφοντες καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸν νοῦν τρέποντες τῆς τε τύχης μάλιστα ἂν εἶεν ἐν λήθῃ καὶ ζῶιεν κάλλιον καὶ ὀρθότερον καὶ ἡμῖν προσφιλέστερον. ταῦτα d δὴ ἱκανὰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις παρὰ ἡμῶν ἀγγέλλειν, τῇ δὲ πόλει παρακελευοίμεθα ἂν ὅπως ἡμῖν καὶ πατέρων καὶ υἱῶν ἐπιμελήσονται, τοὺς μὲν παιδεύοντες κοσμίως, τοὺς δὲ γηροτροφοῦντες ἀξίως· νῦν δὲ ἴσμεν ὅτι καὶ ἔαν μὴ ἡμεῖς 5 παρακελευώμεθα, ἱκανῶς ἐπιμελήσεται.

Ταῦτα οὖν, ὧ παῖδες καὶ γονῆς τῶν τελευτησάντων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐπέσκηπτον ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς δύναμαι προθυμότερα ἀπαγγέλλω· καὶ αὐτὸς δέομαι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων, τῶν μὲν μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ θαρρεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἡμῶν καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσῖαι γηροτροφησόντων ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπιμελησομένων, ὅπου ἂν ἕκαστος ἐκάστω ἐντυγχάνῃ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐκείνων. τῆς δὲ πόλεως ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὅτι νόμους θεμένη περὶ τοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτησάντων παῖδας τε καὶ γεννήτορας ἐπιμελεῖται, καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν προστέτακται φυλάττειν ἀρχῇ 249 ἢ περὶ μεγίστη ἐστίν, ὅπως ἂν οἱ τούτων μὴ ἀδικῶνται πατέρες τε καὶ μητέρες· τοὺς δὲ παῖδας συνεκτρέφει αὐτῇ, προθυμωμένη ὅτι μάλιστα ἀδηλον αὐτοῖς τὴν ὀρφανίαν γενέσθαι, ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι καταστᾶσα αὐτοῖς αὐτῇ ἔτι τε παισὶν οὔσιν, 5 καὶ ἐπειδὴν εἰς ἀνδρὸς τέλος ἴωσιν ἀποπέμπει ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν πανοπλῖαι κοσμήσασα, ἐνδεικνυμένη καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκουσα τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιτηδεύματα <τὰ> ὄργανα τῆς πατρῶι-

b ας ἀρετῆς διδοῦσα, καὶ ἅμα οἰωνοῦ χάριν ἄρχεσθαι ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὴν πατρώϊαν ἐστίαν ἄρξοντα μετὰ ἰσχύος ὄπλοις κεκοσμημένον· αὐτούς δὲ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας τιμῶσα οὐδέποτε ἐκλείπει, κατὰ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν αὐτῇ τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιοῦσα κοινῇ
 5 πᾶσιν ἅπερ ἐκάστωι ἰδίαι γίγνεται, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀγῶνας γυμνικούς καὶ ἵππικούς τιθεῖσα καὶ μουσικῆς πάσης, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τῶν μὲν τελευτησάντων ἐν κληρονόμου καὶ υἱός
 c μοίραι καθεστηκυῖα, τῶν δὲ υἱῶν ἐν πατρός, γονέων δὲ τῶν τούτων ἐν ἐπιτρόπου, πᾶσαν πάντων παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐπιμέλειαν ποιουμένη. ὧν χρή ἐνθυμουμένους πραιότερον φέρειν τὴν συμφορὰν· τοῖς τε γὰρ τελευτήσασι καὶ τοῖς
 5 ζῶσιν οὕτως ἂν προσφιλέστατοι εἶτε καὶ ῥᾶιστοι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἤδη ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες κοινῇ κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἀπολοφυράμενοι ἄπιτε.

d Οὗτός σοι ὁ λόγος, ὦ Μενέξενε, Ἀσπασίας τῆς Μιλησίας ἐστίν.

MEN. Νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μακαρίαν γε λέγεις τὴν Ἀσπασίαν, εἰ γυνὴ οὕσα τοιούτους λόγους οἷα τέ ἐστὶ
 5 συντιθέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ εἰ μὴ πιστεύεις, ἀκολούθει μετὰ ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἀκούσῃ αὐτῆς λεγούσης.

MEN. Πολλάκις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα Ἀσπασίαι, καὶ οἶδα οἷα ἐστίν.

10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄγασαι αὐτὴν καὶ νῦν χάριν ἔχεις τοῦ λόγου αὐτῆς;

MEN. Καὶ πολλὴν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ χάριν ἔχω τούτου
 e τοῦ λόγου ἐκείνηι ἢ ἐκείνωι ὅστις σοι ὁ εἰπὼν ἐστὶν αὐτόν· καὶ πρὸς γε ἄλλων πολλῶν χάριν ἔχω τῶι εἰπόντι.

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι· ἀλλὰ ὅπως μου μὴ κατερεῖς, ἵνα καὶ αὐθὶς σοι πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους παρὰ αὐτῆς πολιτικούς
 5 ἀπαγγέλλω.

MEN. Θάρρει· οὐ κατερῶ. μόνον ἀπάγγελλε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔσται.

COMMENTARY

234a1–236d3: INTRODUCTORY DIALOGUE

S. meets the adolescent M., who has just come from the Bouleuterion hoping to learn who has been chosen by the Boule to deliver the funeral oration over those who were killed in war during the past year. He reports to S. that the decision has been postponed, which will make it all the more difficult for the orator chosen to prepare adequately. S. assures M. that there is no challenge involved in delivering so standardized an oration, especially before a sympathetic audience. When asked by M. what S. would have to say should he be chosen to speak, S. offers instead to repeat from memory the oration that has just been thrown together for this purpose by Aspasia, whom S. represents as his instructor in rhetoric. Plutarch aptly refers to this opening dialogue in his *Life of Pericles* as having been written in a playful manner (μετὰ παιδιᾶς, 24.7); still, Plutarch regards it as providing historical evidence that Aspasia was sought out as a teacher of rhetoric.

234a1 Ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἢ πόθεν Μενέξενος; cf. *Lys.* 203a6–b1 ὦ Σώκρατες, ποῖ δὴ πορεύησι καὶ πόθεν; Here, however, as the nominative shows, we are expected to supply a third-person verb (“Is Menexenus coming from the agora, or from where?”), as at the start of Horace’s *Satire* 2.4, *Vnde et quo Catus?* Similarly, S. opens *Clit.* by referring to Clitophon in the third person, expecting him to respond, and he opens *Ion* with τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν [*sc.* κελεύω]. The nominative rather than the vocative can be used, even in association with the second person, in apposition to οὗτος or the definite article, because those pronouns have no vocative forms; see *Symp.* 172a5 οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος· οὐ περιμενεῖς; and the opening of *Hp.Ma.* (281a1–2) Ἰππίας ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ σοφός· ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας. In such cases the nominative is exclamatory, or simply declarative, as if calling the attention of an imaginary bystander to the presence or the status of the effective addressee (“Well, what do you know, it’s So-and-so,” where “you” ≠ “So-and-so”); see Slings 1999: 40. So, at *Prot.* 310b4–5, S. recounts that, when he was awakened by Hippocrates asking in a loud voice whether he was asleep or awake, ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοῦς αὐτοῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος· μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; A similar effect is produced in drama by the use of rhetorical questions, as in Lorenzo’s entry-line in Act III, scene ii of Kyd’s *Spanish Tragedy*, “How now, who’s this? Hieronimo?” P.’s “dramatic” (see the Introduction 3(c)iii) dialogues often open with an economical

indication of the setting and the identity of the interlocutors. The brief question here allows the reader to understand that M. and the speaker, who is revealed in the next sentence to be S., encounter each other somewhere on the streets of Athens, where M. appears to be coming from the direction of the agora, for which see Camp 1986. That our dialogue opens with a question is not unusual (so *Cra.*, *Cri.*, *Euthd.*, *Euthphr.*, *Hp.Mi.*, *Meno*, *Phd.*, *Tht.*, *Tim.*, *Phdr.*, *Prot.*, the last two with *πόθεν*). Often the questions serve, as here, to set the scene and to initiate conversation, a technique found also in comedy (e.g. *Frogs*), Theocritus (4, 10, 15) and mime (Herodas 5). What is surprising is that it is only questions of a factual nature that are asked in the course of this dialogue, many of them directed at, rather than asked by, S. (Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 21). S. is noted, if anything, for raising difficult questions about important issues, about the nature of the soul, say, or about whose advice should be followed for the education of the young. In our dialogue, however, S. does not raise any “philosophical” issues, leaving it to the reader to ask (and to try to answer) all the important questions, including why P. has abandoned his usual practice of portraying S. as engaged in relentless interrogation of his companions and why he has portrayed him as taking lessons in rhetoric.

a2 Ἐξ ἀγορᾶς: the article is often omitted in prepositional phrases (Gildersleeve §569), but there are exceptions, e.g. *ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς*, *Rep.* 2.360b8, where the reference is to someone having a ring like that of Gyges and being able to take with impunity whatever he wants from the (i.e. his own, local) marketplace. **[καί] ἀπό τοῦ βουλευτηρίου:** the Bouleuterion was a large (ca. 16 m × 22 m) building constructed on the west side of the agora at the end of the fifth century, replacing an older building nearby, to accommodate the meetings of the 500-member Boule (Paus. 1.3.5; Camp 1986: 90–1, with figs. 67, 68, 71 and 91; Rhodes 1972: 30–9, 299–304). Instances like *Chrm.* 153a1–2 *ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπό τοῦ στρατοπέδου*, *Euthd.* 271c2–3 *ἐντεῦθεν ποθέν εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου* and *Tht.* 142a7 *ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπό τοῦ στρατοπέδου* show that Richards’ deletion of *καί* (1911: 29) is justified. There are times when *καί* has “a sense of climax,” but in those cases “the particle is usually reinforced” (*GP* 291–2), and there seems to be nothing comparable to what the MSS present here. This particularizing force of *καί* is frequent in Hdt. in passages like 3.136.1 *ἐς Φοινίκην καί Φοινίκης ἐς Σιδῶνα πόλιν*; it is always reinforced, as in this instance from Hdt., by anaphora or a form of *οὗτος*; see Powell 1938: *καί* A.I.2.b, c. **a4 Τί μάλιστα σοί πρὸς βουλευτήριον;** the construction requires that *ἔστί* be supplied, “What exactly do you have to do with . . . ?” More common than *πρὸς* + accusative is a second dative, as at Ar. *Knights* 1022 *τί γάρ ἐστ’ Ἐρεχθεῖ καὶ κολιοῖς καὶ κυνί;* (“What does Erechtheus have to do with jackdaws and a dog?”; cf. *KG* I 417), but we find *πρὸς* + acc. in

what is in effect the negative answer to such questions (“nothing to do with . . .”), as at Ar. *Clouds* 1188 τουτί μὲν οὐδὲν πω πρὸς ἔνην τε καὶ νέαν and the proverbial οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. πρὸς βουλευτήριον: M. had used the article, and will do so again in 234b5 πρὸς τὸ βουλευτήριον, where the preposition, however, has a different meaning from its meaning here. M. uses ἀπό and πρὸς in their local senses, referring to coming from (234a2) and going to the building, familiar to both M. and S., where the business of the Boule (in which S. had served: *Apol.* 32b1) is conducted. Here, S. is speaking in more general terms, expressing some surprise that M., given his youth (234b1), might be concerned with political deliberative matters. Compare *Gorg.* 452e2, *Hp.Ma.* 304a8, *Tht.* 173d1, where βουλευτήριον similarly lacks the article. ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι “or is it (superfluous to ask because it is) obvious that . . .” In P. ἢ δῆλα is always followed by δὴ (*Euthphr.* 4b5, *Prot.* 309a1, 330b1, *Rep.* 5.452a10); ἢ δῆλον is occasionally followed by δὴ but more commonly not, as at 235e8 below. The colloquial δηλαδή is not found in P. a4–5 ὅτι . . . καὶ ὥς: for the variation, see *Rep.* 3.392b1–2; for the reverse (ὥς . . . καὶ ὅτι), *Laws* 10.885d2–3, *Phdr.* 249e1–3, *Prot.* 324c5–7, 328c4–5, *Rep.* 7.517a3–4, b9–c3. a5 παιδεύσεως καὶ φιλοσοφίας: cf. *Rep.* 6.498b2–3 μειρακιώδη (n.b.) παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν. Elsewhere in P. παιδευσις is paired with τροφή (*Criti.* 110c6, *Laws* 5.740a2, 11.926e2, *Rep.* 4.424a5, *Tim.* 44b8) and διδαχή (*Pol.* 274c6). Closest to our passage are *Prot.* 349a3, where S. praises Protagoras for openly proclaiming himself a professor of education and virtue (παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον) and charging a fee for his services, and *Symp.* 184e1–2, where Pausanias speaks of the *erastês* “an education and the rest of wisdom” (παίδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν, accepting Schütz’s deletion of εἰς before παίδευσιν). Neither παιδευσις nor φιλοσοφία recurs in our dialogue. While this is the last we are to hear of philosophy (Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 91), education will be of great concern, both in the introductory dialogue and in the funeral oration. S.’s rhetorical training, however, turns out to be a matter of rote learning sustained by threats of physical violence (236b–c), and the education provided by the *laudandi* and their predecessors is merely instruction by example (e.g. 240d5, e5, 241c1, 248e3, 249a7–8). None of this could be mistaken for philosophy, and none of it would have met with the approval of either P. or S. It is unlikely that the S. portrayed elsewhere by P. could imagine that there is a τέλος to philosophy or that one can “be adequately practiced” (ικανῶς ἔχειν) in it. Indeed, P. depicts S. as philosophizing on the last day of his life, addressing his closest friends from the perspective of a man who has truly spent his life engaging in philosophy (ἄνθρωπος τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον, *Phd.* 63e9–10). The implication of M.’s subsequent behavior, on the other hand, is that he does, in

fact, consider that he has reached the *telos* of training and philosophy. **a6** *ικανῶς ἤδη ἔχων*: for ἤδη (found in a similar context at *Euthd.* 291b7–8 οἰόμενοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι), see Burnet on *Euthphr.* 3e2: “ἤδη marks that a certain stage has been reached, οὐπω that it has not yet been reached, οὐκέτι that it has been passed.” **ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω**: compare the discussion in *Gorgias*, where Callicles, whom S. ironically characterizes as having been educated *ικανῶς* (487b7), urges S. to abandon philosophy, which he considers a suitable pastime only for the young, and to move on ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω (484c4–5). For M. and Callicles, “the more substantial matters” comprise public engagement in civic and political activities, glossed here by S. in terms of authority (ἄρχειν) and oversight (ἐπιμελητήν), activities generally thought of as requiring training in rhetoric. At the end of *Phaedrus*, S. will express the hope that some divine impulse might lead Isocrates, who is currently pursuing oratory rather than philosophy, ἐπὶ μείζω (279a8). **a7–b1** *ἄρχειν ἡμῶν . . . τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τηλικούτος ὦν*: this is intended to sound like a paradox, since it is “obvious” that those who rule should be older and those who are ruled should be younger (ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον, *Rep.* 3.412c3–4; cf. *Laws* 3.690a7–8). The thematic issue of youth versus age will recur at the end of the introductory dialogue, when S. expresses concern that M. will mock him, an old man, for seeming still to be acting like an adolescent (δόξω πρεσβύτης ὦν ἔτι παίζειν, 236c8–9) should he recite Aspasia’s oration. While Callicles thinks it absurd for a man of S.’s age to engage in philosophy (see previous n.), S. thinks it laughable for mature men to indulge in such juvenile activity as practicing rhetorical displays; in *Apol.* he says that it would be unseemly (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν . . . πρέποι) for him at his advanced age to come before the jurors like an adolescent (τῆιδε τῆι ἡλικίαι ὥσπερ μαιρακίωι, 17c4–5), fabricating tales of the sort that, by implication, his (younger) accusers have been telling (see 17b6–c1). **a7** *ὦ θαυμάσιε*: this seems to be one of the passages where this “primarily Platonic” form of address is used by the speaker to express surprise (i.e. θαῦμα) at the addressee (Dickey 1996: 141, with a listing of occurrences at 280). If so, the surprise is feigned, given that S. is expressing what he has just characterized as “obvious” (δῆλα).

234b1–2 *ἵνα μὴ ἐκλίπῃ . . . ἐπιμελητήν παρεχομένη*; the clear implications are that (1) there is an expectation that families that had previously supplied leadership among the Athenians would continue to do so and (2) the family of M. had a record of supplying such leadership. We do not know enough about M. to be able to confirm the latter independently, nor do we know anything beyond the title, and subtitle, of Antisthenes’ *Μενέξενος ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν* (D.L. 6.18; Prince 2015: 161–2), but there is no

reason to believe that P. would misrepresent the prominence of M.'s family in Athenian politics, a prominence that characterizes the families of most of the young men who populate P.'s dialogues, Alcibiades, Charmides and Clinias being typical examples. M. is the cousin of Ctesippus (*Lys.* 206d3–4), whose *erōmenos* is Alcibiades' relative Clinias (*Euthd.* 274c2–3, with Nails 100–1, 119–20). In *Lysis* M. appears as a close companion of the title character, whose family is quite distinguished (*Lys.* 205b–c, with Nails 195–7; see the Introduction 3(d)ii). **b1 ὑμῶν ἡ οἰκία:** as at *Chrm.* 154e2–3 (τῆς γε ὑμετέρας . . . οἰκίας), where S. is talking to Charmides, the plural is used although only one person is addressed. Wackernagel (2009: 137) explains this phenomenon, rare in Classical Greek, as, in effect, the “royal we” transposed to the second person; compare Thuc. 1.137.4 τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον, from Themistocles' letter to the Persian king, with 1.129.3 τῶι ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ, from Xerxes' letter to Pausanias. There may, then, be a hint of irony involved in S.'s references to the families of M. and Charmides, a hint missing from his references to, e.g., the families of Meno (ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ, *Meno* 85e4) and Plato's brother Glaucon (σου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, *Rep.* 5.459a2). **b1–2 ἡμῶν ἐπιμελητήν:** there is a seemingly irresolvable ambiguity. Does S. mean “us Athenians” or “us elders” (cf. ἡμῶν . . . τῶν πρεσβυτέρων just above)? At the end of the funeral oration the noun ἐπιμέλεια and the verb ἐπιμελοῦμαι will be used repeatedly (248c6, d4, d6, e4–5, e6, e8, 249c3), referring to the tendance of young children and elderly parents left desolate by the death of the *laudandi*. By repeating ἄρχειν (b4) and ignoring S.'s implication that ruling entails ἐπιμέλεια (Coventry 1989: 1; Salkever 1993: 136; Long 2003: 52), M. reveals something about his character which suggests that he really is in need of the kind of education that S. is prepared to offer. At *Gorg.* 516a–b S. gets Callicles to admit (reluctantly) that even the great Pericles was not a successful ἐπιμελητής, since he did not make his fellow citizens more just. **b3–4 Ἐὰν σύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔῤαις . . . εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ:** somewhat disingenuous. M. is clearly eager to enter politics at present, but by expressing himself as he does, using the future tense, he pretends that his eagerness will be contingent upon S.'s approval. This is the first of several issues that are raised in this dialogue and are later either left unresolved, seemingly on purpose, or are conspicuously undercut. M. says that he will pursue a political career if and only if S. gives his blessing, but that blessing is neither given nor explicitly withheld. The closing words of the dialogue leave open the possibility that S. will continue to regale M. with πολιτικοὶ λόγοι from Aspasia. But, of course, the existence of such *logoi* is as problematic as is Aspasia's authorship of the funeral oration itself. We may compare the account in the *Seventh Letter* of P.'s early withdrawal from political life, which on two occasions is connected explicitly, not with the advice, but

with the fate of S. When he was young, P., apparently like M., thought that he would enter politics as soon as he attained his majority (ὠιήθην, εἰ θάπτον ἑμαυτοῦ γενοίμην κύριος, ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐθύς ἰέναι, 324b–c; similarly *Alc.* 1 105a7–b4, of Alcibiades). But after the Thirty attempted to involve S. in their illegal activities P. turned his back on the corrupt world of politics (324d–325a); later he was again seduced by the appeal of politics, only to recoil after the trial and execution of his friend (325b–c).

b3 συμβουλεύεις: this lone occurrence in *Mnx.* stands in sharp contrast to the frequent use (over twenty times) of words from this root in *Laches*, in which Lysimachus and Melesias have invited Laches and Nicias to join them for the purpose of giving advice regarding the training of their sons; S. directs the discussion to the more general question of the kind of expertise needed by the adviser, concluding with the advice that he and his interlocutors should find teachers from whom they might learn the expertise that, it emerges, they all lack (201a1–7). Here, M.’s expression of his unquestioning willingness to rely on S.’s advice is intended to portray him as someone who has a long way to go on the path to philosophy and not, as some critics have suggested, as a polite young man who, recognizing the ironic tone of S.’s question, is displaying deference to his elder.

b4 νῦν μέντοι: as below (235c7), this expression shows M.’s reluctance to be sidetracked and his eagerness to direct the discussion to the matter that is of immediate concern to him; similarly *Phlb.* 24e4, *Prot.* 314b6.

b5 πρὸς τὸ βουλευτήριον: for the article, see a4n. Rhodes (1972: 40, 80) cites evidence that some, at least, of the deliberations of the Boule were open to attendance by non-members, despite the difficulty posed by the size of the building (for which, see a2n.). He includes this passage in that evidence, but it is not explicitly stated that M. was present for the deliberations; the general public may only have been informed of the decision after the fact by public proclamation or word of mouth.

πυθόμενος ὅτι ἡ βουλή μέλλει αἰρεῖσθαι: M. knows in advance (as does Aspasia: 236b2–3) that the choice of a speaker is on the agenda of the Boule and he assumes (b6–7) that S. is aware that the funeral is to be held, from which we can infer that word of the agenda spread, likely among fellow demesmen. The decision of the Boule would then go to the Assembly for final action (see the Introduction 2(d)). According to Thucydides, the remains of the dead were laid out for public viewing in a tent for two days before the ceremony (πρότριπα, 2.34.2). We do not know how far in advance the speaker of the funeral oration was chosen, but given that M. thinks a mere one-day postponement of the decision (b9) will cause hardship for the speaker (235c7–9), the decision is likely to have been made only a few days before the event. It would appear, then, that the speaker of Lysias’ *Epitaphios*, referring to “those who asked me to

speak on a few days' notice" and "on short notice" (τοῖς ἐπαγγελίαισιν . . . ἐξ ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν λέγειν and ἐξ ὀλίγου, 2.1), was expressing himself accurately rather than exaggerating for rhetorical effect. Of course, Lysias' speech was not written for delivery at the public funeral (see the Introduction 2(c)), and S. will point out at 235d1–2 that such speeches could be prepared in advance. In this way, and by writing a funeral oration of his own, P. undercuts the illusion created by Lysias and other orators that they are overcoming difficulties by speaking with little opportunity for preparation (Henderson 1975: 33). **b5–7 μέλλει . . . μέλλουσι:** for the change from singular, normal with βουλή, to plural ("construction according to the sense"), see Gildersleeve §121, citing Thuc. 3.72.3 ὁ μὲν δῆμος . . . καταφύγει . . . καὶ τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα εἶχον. (That the subject of μέλλουσι is ἡ βουλή is confirmed by εἶλοντο and ἀνεβάλοντο in what follows.) **b6 ὅστις ἐρεῖ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν:** the construction with αἰρεῖσθαι is normally with the future tense, either, as here, in a relative clause or, as at 236b3, in a substantive participle; cf. KG I 175. For ἐπὶ + dat. "over, in honor of" (cf. ἐπιτάφιος λόγος), KG I 499 cites, in addition to this passage, Thuc. 2.34.6 λέγει ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον, ISOCR. 4.74 εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς δημοσίοις θάπτομένοις, Dem. 18.285 and 287 τὸν ἐροῦντα ἐπὶ τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν. Demosthenes, referring to an event eight years in the past, uses the perfect tense (= "the dead"); here the aorist suggests the immediacy of the event (= "those who have (recently) died"). For the contrast between the perfect and the (constative) aorist, see Rijksbaron 1994: §10.1, Note 2. **b6–7 ταφὰς . . . ποιεῖν:** Thucydides uses the middle voice (ταφὰς ἐποίησαντο, 2.34.1), with "the Athenians" as subject. Allan 2003: 112 describes this "indirect reflexive" use of the middle as follows: "The subject is affected in that s/he derives benefit from the action performed, i.e. the subject has the semantic role of *beneficiary*." In the case of the performance of funerary rites it is legitimate to ask, and difficult to answer, Who is the beneficiary, the deceased, the bereaved or, indeed, the imagined community of the living and the dead? It would seem that the difference between ταφὰς ποιεῖν and ταφὰς ποιεῖσθαι may depend upon the speaker's answer to this question. **b8 Πάνυ γε:** confirmatory. Thesleff 1954 divides the usage of confirmatory πάνυ into two classes, one in which the word "has a collateral notion of intensity with reference to a word in its context" (§§76–7) and one in which there is no such apparent reference (§§79–80). It is difficult to tell into which category our instance falls, that is, whether the meaning is "I am well aware" or simply "I know." For πάνυ is not often used as an intensifier with εἰδέναι. Xen. An. 6.1.31 ὡς πάνυ εἰδῆτε, cited at Thesleff §67, is a rare occurrence (at Mem. 4.2.24 πάνυ τοῦτό γε ὤμην εἰδέναι, also cited there, it seems that it is ὤμην that is intensified). Percy Bysshe Shelley, who translated the opening dialogue of *Mnx*. while staying at the

Casa Bertini in 1818, well renders “Assuredly.” **b9** ἀνεβάλλοντο εἰς τὴν αὔριον *sc.* ἡμέραν; cf. *Symp.* 174e6–7 εἰς αὐθις ἀναβαλοῦ, *Dem.* 21.84, 57.12 and 15 ἀναβαλέσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν. For the attributive use of the adverb, cf. *Eur. Alc.* 784 τὴν αὔριον μέλλουσαν. According to Rhodes (1972: 30), the Boule met on an almost daily basis. **b9–10** οἶμαι μέντοι: as at b4 and 235c7 (μέντοι οἶμαι) the force of the particle is almost “be that as it may,” expressing M.’s desire to move on to what he considers of greatest interest, namely the choice of speaker and the challenges facing him. Thus the particle here combines the adversative force (*GP* 404–6) and the progressive (406–9), specifically “proceeding to a new item in a series, a new point, a new argument” (407). **b10** Ἀρχῖνον ἢ Δίωνα: for the identity of these men, see the Introduction 3(d)iv. At the time when P. wrote the dialogue, he and his readers knew whether Archinus or Dion had ever delivered the public funeral oration. There would seem to be no point to his naming them if either of them had been passed over by the Boule, and S.’s rapturous praise of the skills of public speakers, which appears to have been prompted by M.’s mention of their names, would have fallen flat if these men were not generally regarded as outstanding in that regard. Of course, S.’s praise is ironic, but his irony is effective only if employed at the expense of deserving targets. We may then feel confident that both Archinus and Dion had at some point delivered the funeral oration in Athens (so Köppen 1790: 69), perhaps with P. in the audience, and that P.’s own composition is a response to theirs, among many others’.

234c1 Καὶ μὴν: often accompanied by an enthusiasm, even excitement, about what the speaker has to say, as at *Phd.* 58e1 (θαυμάσια ἔπαθον), 88e4 (θαυμάσας), *Tht.* 143e4–5 (πάνυ ἄξιον). The enthusiasm that accompanies καὶ μὴν in its various uses may be genuine or feigned, as we see from *Ion* 530b5, which bears some resemblance to our passage. There, after S. has wished Ion success in the competition at the Panathenaia and Ion has said that he will win the crown, provided the god is favorable, S. exclaims καὶ μὴν πολλάκις γε ἐζήλωσα ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥαψωιδούς. In our passage S.’s exclamation is prompted by the prospect that a speaker of the caliber of Archinus or Dion is likely to deliver the funeral oration. Ion is impervious to S.’s mordant irony – he responds to S.’s speech with ἀληθῆ λέγεις (530c7) – and the same may be the case with M. as well (see 235c6n.). **κινδυνεύει** “it is likely that.” P. often uses κινδυνεύει with the infinitive to convey the speaker’s assertion that what is expressed by the infinitive can be reasonably inferred, often from what is said in the immediate context, to be the case. So, e.g., at *Euthphr.* 2c5–6 S. says that Meletus is likely to be an intelligent person (κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι), to judge from his understanding of how the young are corrupted and who corrupts them. And at *Rep.*

1.334a11 S. tells Polemarchus that he is likely to have picked up from Homer (κινδυνεύεις παρά Όμήρου μεμαθηκέναι) the notion that the just man is also a kind of thief, for (καί γάρ) Homer esteems Autolycus. So here, according to S., it is reasonable to imagine that it is καλόν to be killed in battle, for (καί γάρ) the dead are buried in lavish fashion and are gloriously praised by the most skilled public speakers. **c1-2 καλόν . . . τὸ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθνήσκειν**: one expects the aorist infinitive (as at e.g. *Apol.* 39a2-3 τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι), since it is not the process of dying that is admirable but the fact. Death in battle is traditionally seen to be an especially fine thing and is often described as καλόν or even κάλλιστον (248c4); e.g. Tyrtaeus fr. 10.1-2 West, Alcaeus fr. 400 Voigt, Aesch. *Sept.* [1011], Eur. *Trö.* 386-7, Thuc. 2.42.4, Lysias 2.79, Xen. *An.* 3.1.43, *Hell.* 4.8.38. By the very fact of dying in battle one becomes an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός (Aeschin. 3.154, Hdt. 6.114, 9.75, Thuc. 2.35.1; Loraux 1986: 99-101; Rusten 1986: 71-4). **c2-235b2 καί γάρ ταφῆς . . . καλλίων γεγονέναι**: in order to convey the illusion that his characters are engaging in spontaneous conversation, P. often goes out of his way to construct lengthy sentences that exhibit anacoluthon; see Reinhard 1920. But this sentence, for all its length – it contains no fewer than thirteen participles – and being complicated to the fourth level of subordination, is carefully and elaborately composed. Its structure, which is clearly articulated (except for the string of participles under (4), for which see below) may be seen from the following outline and paraphrase:

- (1a) καί γάρ ταφῆς . . . τυγχάνει,
- (2a) καί ἐὰν πένης τις ὦν τελευτήσῃ,
- (1b) καί ἐπαίνου αὖ ἔτυχεν,
- (2b) καί ἐὰν φαῦλος ᾖ,
- (2c) ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν . . . οὐκ εἰκῆι ἐπαινούντων,
- (2d) ἀλλὰ . . . παρεσκευασμένων,
- (3) οἱ οὕτως καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν,
- (4) ὥστε . . . λέγοντες . . . ποικίλλοντες, γοητεύουσιν . . . ,
 - (καί τὴν πόλιν ἐγκωμιάζοντες . . . ,
 - καί τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
 - καί τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἅπαντας . . .
 - καί αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἔτι ζῶντας ἐπαινοῦντες,)
- (5a) ὥστε . . . διατίθεμαι ἐπαινούμενος . . . ,
- (5b) καί ἐκάστοτε ἔστηκα . . . κηλούμενος,
 - (ἡγούμενος . . . γεγονέναι.)

“He receives magnificent burial (1a), even if he is poor (2a), and he is lauded (1b), even if he is undistinguished (2b), (lauded) by men not

praising indiscriminately (2c) but crafting carefully prepared speeches (2d), (men) who eulogize so impressively (3) that they enchant our souls (4) by praising the city, the dead, our ancestors and the living, so that I am invested with a sense of grandeur (5a) and am entranced (5b), thinking that I have become thoroughly estimable.” The sentence purports to explain why (καὶ γάρ) it is a fine thing to die in battle, and so it begins with the deceased as subject (as does the funeral oration: 236d2–3), but it quickly turns its attention to the virtuosity of the public speakers and ends with the disorienting effect that their virtuosity has on the audience. In this respect it serves as a one-sentence critique of rhetoric, which is represented as beguiling its audience, regardless of both the nominal topic of the speech and the truth, and focusing its attention on the skill and effectiveness of the speaker. And it does this while employing some of the very techniques – chiasmus, parallelism, rhyme, parisosis – that make rhetoric so distasteful in the eyes of P. **c2–3 ταφῆς καλῆς τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς:**

cf. *Hp.Ma.* 291e1–2 καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι. The variation in our sources (see the apparatus) is most easily explained on the assumption that, in some earlier manuscript, καλῆς was omitted, coming as it does immediately after ταφῆς, and then was added in the margin; subsequently, different copies of that manuscript inserted the word in different places. For lavish burial rites and conspicuous funerary monuments as a reward and consolation for death in battle, see *H. Od.* 1.239 = 14.369 = 24.32, Tyrtaeus fr. 12.29 West, Aesch. *Choe.* 351–2, Lysias 2.80. **c3 καὶ ἔαν**

πένης τις ὦν: in his exhortation to his troops before the battle of Munichia Thrasybulus assures them that if they should die in battle they will receive a finer memorial than even the wealthiest could afford as an individual (*Xen. Hell.* 2.4.17). **c4 ἔτυχεν:** Rijksbaron 1994: §8.4 refers to this usage as “the generic aorist” (“found in descriptions of habits, procedures . . . , in general truths, etc.”) and cites *Hdt.* 1.194.1 and 3.82.3 where, as here, it is coordinated with a present indicative (τυγχάνει); cf. *Gorg.* 511d7 and e3, 524e4, *Laws* 7.791a8, 798a5, *Prot.* 342e2, *Rep.* 10.606c7, *Symp.* 181a3, 187d3, *H. Il.* 4.161, 16.689 = 17.177, *Dem.* 2.10, with *SMT* §§155 and 157. Here, the shift to the aorist not only produces *variatio*, it creates a chiasmic balance with the (aspectually appropriate) tenses of the subordinate clauses: τυγχάνει, καὶ ἔαν . . . τελευτήσῃ, καὶ . . . ἔτυχεν, καὶ ἔαν . . . ἦι. **καὶ ἔαν φαῦλος ἦ:** the seductive parallelism with

καὶ ἔαν πένης τις ὦν τελευτήσῃ in the preceding line conceals an imbalance that ought to arouse suspicion. While a common burial for rich and poor alike can be seen as a welcome symptom of democratic ideology and a continuation of the Solonian curbs of aristocratic ostentation, the same can surely not be said of praising a man who is φαῦλος. In his funeral oration Pericles had justified bestowing praise on the martial valor of those

who are deficient in other respects (τοῖς τὰ ἄλλα χείροσι, Thuc. 2.42.3), since their value to the community outweighs their individual shortcomings. P., however, has chosen to express himself by using a word that he elsewhere applies to the morally depraved (e.g. *Phd.* 81d6–7, *Symp.* 181b1–2). Further, ἔπαινος τοῦ φαύλου ought not to be something to be taken seriously. Isocrates (12.135) disparages people who take delight in hearing orators who ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ἢ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν ὄντων ἢ τοὺς παρανομωτάτους τῶν γεγενημένων. Alcidas' *Encomium of poverty*, a fragment of which is preserved in *POxy* 5130, was presumably intended as a *jeu d'esprit*, as was Lucian's *Encomium of the fly* (Hopkinson 2008: 142–3). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 5.17.5) clearly has our passage in mind (so Loraux 1986: 384 n. 95) when he compares the Athenian funeral oration unfavorably with the Roman *oratio funebris*, saying that the former accords praise to those who died in battle καὶ ἐὰν τὰ ἄλλα φαῦλος γένηται τις. **c4–6 ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν . . . παρεσκευασμένων:** balancing, antithetical 15-syllable clauses closing with parallel participles in -ων. Further along in this sentence are parallel clauses ending in rhyming participles (λέγοντες . . . ποικίλλοντες). For these and other “Gorgianic figures,” see Berndt 1881: 26–45; Kennedy 1963: 64–6; Clavaud 1980: 92–5. **c4 ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν:** for S., the appellation σοφός is appropriate only to the divine (*Phdr.* 278d3–4). S.'s own denial in *Apology* that he possesses any σοφία, except perhaps in the limited sense of recognizing his worthlessness with regard to σοφία (23b2–4), is his way of refuting what he represents as a charge brought against him by his earlier and more dangerous accusers, that he is a σοφὸς ἀνὴρ (18b7). As Burnet ad loc. notes, “This was not a compliment in the mouth of an Athenian of the fifth century B.C.” Euripides' *Medea* also fears that her reputation for σοφία has put her in danger (*Med.* 292–3) and, like S., she denies being unusually σοφή (305). In P. the word is usually ironic, as it is here, unless it is applied to a god (*Apol.* 23a5–6) or a figure from legend, like Odysseus (*Rep.* 3.390a8), or a distinguished poet of the past, like Homer (*Ion* 542a1) or Simonides (*Rep.* 1.331e6). Even in these cases the possibility of irony cannot always be ruled out (at *Tht.* 194e2 Homer is described as πάσσοφος, a word that is heavily ironic elsewhere in P.). **c5 οὐκ εἰκῆι ἐπαινούντων** “not praising artlessly.” At his trial S. tells his judges that they will hear him speaking εἰκῆι (*Apol.* 17c2), in contrast to his accusers, whose speeches are ingeniously embellished ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασι (compare τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες below). Similarly, the inebriated Alcibiades says that he will deliver his encomium of S. in whatever order his recollections happen to occur to him (ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν, *Symp.* 215a1). “Not A but B,” where A and B are contradictories, as εἰκῆι and παρεσκευασμένων are here, is a frequent form of emphasis in Greek poetry, especially Euripides, and

oratory, as well as in Thuc. (Rusten 1989: 24–5). For οὐκ εἰκῆι . . . ἀλλά, cf. *Gorg.* 503d7, e2–3, Xen. *Oec.* 20.28. We are given the impression that S. is here saying that the orators spend a great deal of time carefully constructing their speeches according to rational principles. But εἰκῆι also allows us to understand that S. is saying (ironically) that the orators “do not dispense praise indiscriminately,” which is precisely what S. suggests that they do, when he says immediately below that they laud the deceased by recounting τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ, which would appear to be the very definition of indiscriminate praise. **c5–6 ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου λόγους παρεσκευασμένων:** with a verb in the perfect tense ἐκ πολλοῦ (χρόνου), like πάλαι, specifies that the action of the verb took place some time ago and that, consequently, the state resulting from that action is of long standing. (By contrast, ἐξ ὀλίγου appears not to occur with a verb in the perfect tense.) So at Thuc. 1.68.3 the Corinthians warn the Spartans that their enemies have long been prepared for war (ἐκ πολλοῦ προπαρασκευασμένους) and the defendant in Antiphon’s *On the murder of Herodes*, employing a familiar topos, protests that it is difficult on the spur of the moment (παραχρῆμα; cf. 236b3 below) to counteract the lies and the plots to which he has long been subjected (τὰ ἐκ πολλοῦ κατεψευσμένα καὶ ἐπιβεβουλευμένα, 5.19). S.’s contention that the funeral oration was prepared well in advance is challenged by M. (235c7–9), but P. substantiates the claim by having S. explain at 236b that such generic speeches can be constructed partially from existing material and partially from content created on the spur of the moment and, most effectively, by composing one such generic speech himself (236d–249c). **c6–235a1 καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ:** we are now told how the orator can praise the deceased “even if he is φαῦλος,” namely by attributing qualities to him whether he possessed them or not. Of course, in the case of a mass funeral the orator can speak in generalities, ignoring the possibility, even likelihood, that one or more of the *laudandi* was deficient in some regard. But in P.’s eyes it is the standard procedure of contemporary orators simply to say what sounds appealing, whether it happens to be true or not. At *Symp.* 198d–e, after S. has listened to Agathon’s dazzling Gorgianic encomium, he says that he now realizes that the proper way to deliver an encomium was not, as he had thought, to tell the truth about each object of praise (περὶ ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐγκωμιαζομένου) but to attribute the grandest and finest qualities to it ἐάν τε ἦι οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐάν τε μὴ, and it is of no great consequence if the statements are false. Here the words περὶ ἐκάστου underline the fact that, in the funeral oration, the qualities of “each” *laudandus* are buried amid the praises of the collectivity. P.’s phrasing seems to be deliberately recalling that of Gorgias’ funeral oration (τί γὰρ ἀπῆν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ὧν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσεῖναι; τί δὲ καὶ προσῆν ὧν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι; DK 82 B6), but without the equivalents

of Gorgias' defining relative clauses. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (370–3) Dicaeopolis says that unsophisticated rural Athenians are delighted when some charlatan delivers an encomium of them and their polis, whether what he says is justified or not (καὶ δίκαια κᾶδικα). Of particular interest is the context in which Aristophanes' hero says this: Dicaeopolis has placed himself in great danger by doing what S. will shortly say (235d) requires the skills of a truly accomplished orator, namely speaking well of the Spartans to an audience of Athenians.

235a1 κάλλιστά πως: with the exception of μάλιστα, it is rare to find πως with a superlative. The tentativeness conveyed by the particle – it is frequently found following εἰ or ἔάν – probably accounts for this. In P., apart from our passage, the only occurrences of πως with a superlative appear to be *Phdr.* 261b3–4 (μάλιστα) and *Laws* 7.818a4 (ὀρθότατα λέγεται), a puzzling passage. Here, in the context of the attractive falsehoods that the previous clause seemed to attribute to the speakers, the implication of the particle is that S. finds it difficult to account for the extraordinary appeal of the speakers' words unless, perhaps, as a result of enchantment (γοητεύουσιν). **a2 τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες** “using flamboyant language.” Unless it is somehow qualified, ὀνόματα simply refers to verbal expression in general. Here, in association with ποικίλλοντες, it is clear that the verbal expression in question is of the artful variety generally disapproved by S. and espoused by, *inter alios*, Isocrates, whose ideal, in Jebb's translation, is “to stud [καταποικίλαι] the whole discourse with points happily made, and to clothe it in phrase [τοῖς ὀνόμασιν] of gracious movement and melody” (13.16). The basic reference of words from the root ποικιλ- (cognate with Latin *pingo*) is to an object whose surface presents an intricate appearance to the eye. Often words from this root are used to refer to woven fabric, such as the tapestries with which Agamemnon is lured to his death (*Aesch. Ag.* 923, 926, 936) and the garment in which he is ensnared (*Choe.* 1013, *Eum.* 460). Alluring visual patterns created by women (who were normally responsible for weaving in Greece) using a tortuous technique that involves inserting strands of the weft alternately in front of and behind the warps inevitably aroused an association between weaving, including words from the root ποικιλ-, and notions of deviousness and verbal dexterity. It is, therefore, not surprising that these words often have negative connotations for P. and are used by him to refer to a superficially attractive multiplicity (*Rep.* 3.404d1, e3, 8.557c5–9, 558c3, 559d8, 561e4) that distracts from or disguises an underlying uniformity or truth (*Cra.* 393d7, 394a5, 8, *Meno* 75e5, *Phlb.* 12c4, *Soph.* 234b4, *Tht.* 146d5). **γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς:** P. is virtually quoting from Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* (DK 82 B11.14; see Loraux 1986: 264–5); in

describing the power of the *logos* Gorgias says that it resembles drugs, some of which are beneficial but some “poison and bewitch the soul with a sort of evil persuasion” (πειθοῖ τινη κακῆι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν), the only other time ψυχή is found as the object of (ἐκ-)γοητεύειν. A γόης (see Burkert 1962, esp. 50–5) is a wizard or sorcerer, and the word can be used as a term of abuse, as it is by Theseus condemning Hippolytus (Eur. *Hipp.* 1038), Pentheus condemning the Lydian stranger (*Bacch.* 234) and Aeschines condemning Demosthenes (Dem. 18.276, with Yunis ad loc.). P. uses the word to criticize those who think that the gods change their divine shape and deceive mortals, like some sorcerer (*Rep.* 2.380d1, 381e10, 383a3), since, if the gods were to disguise themselves as someone or something else they would necessarily debase themselves by engaging in a form of imitation. For P. γοητεία is associated with mimesis (*Pol.* 303c4, *Rep.* 10.598d4, *Soph.* 234c5, 235a1, a8) and deception (*Rep.* 3.413c4). At *Euthd.* 288b8 S. tells Ctesippus that the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are imitating the archetypal shape-shifter, “the Egyptian sophist Proteus,” with their sorcery (γοητεύοντε), and it is specifically with sophists and their slippery language that P. associates γοητεία (*Soph.* 234c5, 235a1, a8, 241b7). S. is himself accused of sorcery and *pharmakeia* by Meno, who says that if he behaved in another polis as he behaves in Athens he would be subject to summary arrest as a γόης (*Meno* 80a2, b6), and Diotima describes Eros, who bears a striking resemblance to S. in her account, as δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής (*Symp.* 203d8). We are, then, well advised to be extra vigilant when S. undertakes to deliver a sophistic display, as he will do when he recites Aspasia’s funeral oration. **ψυχάς:** the only occurrence in *Menexenus* of this word, which appears over 1,000 times in P. By contrast, in *Phaedrus* (where the art of rhetoric is defined as ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, 261a8) and *Gorgias*, the word is used well over 100 times. **α3–6 καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐγκωμιάζοντες . . . ἐπαινοῦντες:** a string of four cola of approximately equal length (16, 13, 14 and 14 syllables), each starting with καί, in which there are two more-or-less synonymous participles. It seems best to take ἐγκωμιάζοντες as governing τὴν πόλιν alone, with ἐπαινοῦντες (which Cobet 1874: 241 proposed deleting) governing the remaining objects, since “the city” can be seen as including “the dead,” “our ancestors” and “we the living.” The speakers eulogize so impressively that, by attributing to the dead both appropriate and irrelevant qualities that they have marvelously embellished with their verbiage and by bestowing on the city all manner of praise, they enchant our souls, paying tribute alike to the dead, to our ancestors and to the living. The seeming synonymy of ἐγκωμιάζοντες and ἐπαινοῦντες (for which see also *Euthd.* 303c3, *Prot.* 326a2) finds a parallel in Hyperides’ funeral oration (ἐγκω[μιάζ]ειν . . . ἔπαινον . . . ἐγκώμιον . . . ἐπαι[ῶ] . . . ἐγκωμ[ιάζ]ω,

6.15). **α3-5** τούς τετελευτηκότας . . . τούς προγόνους . . . αὐτούς ἡμᾶς: in his *Rhetoric*, just before he quotes what S. says at 235d, Aristotle advises that the speaker of an epideictic oration should make the audience feel that it too is being praised (3.1415b27-8). For P., however, this is one of the reasons for his distaste for such oratorical performances. While it is understandable that we lavish praise on those who died in war and who can therefore be seen as deserving the honor accorded to war heroes, and while deceased ancestors are subject to the universal precept *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*, indiscriminate praise of the audience can be motivated only by the speaker's own base desire for adulation. As is clear from S.'s next remarks, that adulation is short-lived, at least among those capable of seeing through what S. elsewhere (*Gorg.* 463b1) defines as *κολακεία*. This sentence, then, seems intended to instruct the reader to scrutinize with great care all rhetorical displays, including – or rather, especially – the one that S. will shortly perform for M. **α6** ὦ Μενέξενε: P. uses a vocative in the middle of an utterance (here repeating the vocative from 234c1) to focus the addressee's attention on the most important element of the utterance, in this case the effect the inspiring words of the orator have on his audience; compare the use of the vocative at *Cri.* 48c4, *Euthd.* 294d7 (also following ὥστε ἔγωγε), *Gorg.* 514e2 (following an oath), 526c3 (following ἔγωγε), *Rep.* 5.473d5. **γενναίως πάνυ**: more commonly πάνυ precedes the adjective or adverb that it intensifies (Thesleff 1954: §71). Other occurrences in P. of πάνυ following an adverb include *Cra.* 421c3 (ἀνδρείως), *Euthd.* 300d3 (μέγα), 302b3 (εἰρωνικῶς), *Phdr.* 275d6 (σεμνῶς), all occurring after punctuation, as here. In these examples the intensifier, being of lesser importance than the word it modifies, cedes position to the adverb, which appears at the head of its clause. So here it is the unexpected feeling of ennoblement on the part of a member of the audience rather than the intensity of that feeling that takes precedence. Despite its obvious derivation from the root γεν-, the word γενναῖος rarely refers to lineage (Dover 1974: 95). Still, on the one occasion the word is used in the funeral oration (245c6) it will be predicated of the city of Athens specifically because of the alleged purity of its inhabitants' ancestry, untainted as it is by any admixture of "barbarian" stock. **α7** ἐκάστοτε ἔστηκα: the impression given by the adverb is that this is a routine occurrence and that the speakers on each occasion are more or less interchangeable. The meaning of ἔστηκα here is colored by its association with κηλούμενος, so that the combination in effect = "I stand spellbound, immobilized, as I listen" (see Loraux 1986: 266 with 441 n. 9). Words related to κηλῶ are used to refer to a mesmerizing effect, similar to the pacifying of wild beasts (*Euthd.* 290a2-4, *Lys.* 206b2, *Rep.* 2.358b2), for which reason they are used in connection with Orpheus (*Prot.* 315a8-b1, *Eur. Alc.* 359, *IA* 1213,

A.R. 1.515), the Sirens (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.31, Aeschin. 3.228, Arist. *EE* 1230b35) and S. himself (*Symp.* 215c), compared to a Siren at 216a. The victims of κληθμός are reduced to silence (H. *Od.* 11.333–4 = 13.1–2), are “melted” (*Rep.* 3.411b1–3) or are lulled into a soporific state (*Phdr.* 259a3). Such is the (temporary) effect Protagoras’ display piece has on S., who is for a long time entranced (πολὺν χρόνον κεκλημένος, *Prot.* 328d4–5), continuing to gaze upon the master in the fond hope that he will have more to say. So here, S. is frozen in a contemplation of his own status; compare S.’s reaction to Agathon’s Gorgianic encomium, which caused him to fear that he would be turned to stone and rendered speechless (*Symp.* 198c3–5), and his habit of standing still when he is lost in thought (*Symp.* 175b1–2, 220c7). The reading of F (ἐξέστηκα) has been preferred by many editors, but the absolute use of this verb in the required meaning, “take leave of one’s senses,” is unexampled in P., as is the related noun ἐκστασις. The idiosyncratic manuscript F is notable for its frequent insertion and omission of function words, such as particles and prepositions (Tsitsiridis 96–100; Boter 1989: 104–10; Jonkers 2016: 165–75), and prepositional prefixes.

235b1 ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα: there are two expressions involving παραχρῆμα that P. uses, with some overlap: ἐν τῷ π. (here and b4) and ἐκ τοῦ π. (236b3). The latter is used to refer to something “arising out of” the present moment and = “extempore, on the spot, on the spur of the moment” (*Cra.* 399d10, *Criti.* 107d8, *Euthd.* 303e8, *Laws* 6.768b5, 9.867a3, a5, *Symp.* 185c3). This meaning is occasionally conveyed by ἐν τῷ π. (*Laws* 7.799d7, 11.915d8, *Rep.* 5.455a6), which, however, is used primarily to refer to what is the case “in” the present moment, as opposed to what is the case permanently or in the long term (*Phlb.* 21c3, *Pol.* 310c5, *Prot.* 353d1, 354b1, *Rep.* 3.408b1). As is the case here, these passages are for the most part concerned with pleasurable (or rarely painful) sensations that are only temporary, and the same is often the case when παραχρῆμα is used without the preposition (*Prot.* 353d8, 355b3, 356a6, *Thuc.* 2.51.6, *Critias* fr. 6.22 West, *Antiph.* *Soph.* DK 87 B58) or with εἰς (*Thuc.* 1.22.4). The outlier is Xenophon, who speaks of αἰ . . . ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναί (*Mem.* 2.1.20). Such imprecision in the use of temporal adverbs is not unexampled. In English, the word “momentarily,” properly (given the meaning of “momentary”) used to mean “fleetingly,” is sometimes encountered in the meaning “anon, soon.” **b2 μείζων καὶ γενναιότερος καὶ καλλίων:** it is easy to see why S. might feel γενναιότερος (“more distinguished”; cf. γενναίως a6) as a result of what the orators say, but why bigger and more good-looking? P. and his contemporaries imagined that there was a correlation between physical appearance, on the one hand,

and social class and moral worth, on the other; hence the existence of the word *καλοκάγαθία*. S., of course, is being ironic, so that we are not to imagine that S. is representing himself as actually thinking that he has become taller and more attractive. The irony here is especially acute, since S.'s physical appearance was notoriously at odds with his admirable inner qualities. He was acknowledged to be physically unattractive; Zanker 1995: 32–9. Whether he was also short is not recorded; in any event, he assures the young Theaetetus, who is now shorter than S., that he will grow up to be taller than him (*Tht.* 155b). **b2–3** *καὶ οἷα δὴ τὰ πολλὰ αἰεὶ* “and as is for the most part the case I am constantly accompanied . . .” For *δὴ* with adverbial accusatives like *οἷα*, *οἷον* or *ἄτε*, see *GP* 221, citing *Symp.* 219e9 *οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας* [*sc.* *φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι*]. Here, *δὴ* calls attention to the orator's effect not only on Athenians like S. but on visitors from elsewhere as well. Later in his career P. prefers *οἷον δὴ* to *οἷα δὴ*, using the former six times in *Laws* but not at all in *Rep.*, while using the latter six times in *Rep.* but not at all in *Laws*. For the pleonasm, cf. 238c6–7 *τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον . . . ὡς τὰ πολλὰ*. **b3** *μετὰ ἐμοῦ ξένοι τινὲς ἔπονται*: in place of the more usual dative, verbs meaning “follow” or “accompany” are sometimes found with prepositional phrases (KG I 431, quoting our passage and 249d6 *ἀκολουθεῖ μετὰ ἐμοῦ*); for *ἔπεσθαι* + *μετὰ*, cf. *Euthd.* 276c1, *Phdr.* 250b7, in both of which the metaphor of members of a chorus following their leader is explicit. In the Socratic literature S. is often represented as conversing with non-Athenian Greeks (e.g. Ion of Ephesus, Polus of Acragas, Phaedo and Hippias of Elis). We know from Thuc. 2.34.4 and 36.4 that *ξένοι* could, if they wished, attend the funeral service, and Lysias (2.66) tells us that non-Athenian allies could even be buried with and receive praise alongside the citizens. But since these rites took place during wartime it was presumably only metics like Lysias or visitors from allied cities who heard the oration. Thus, while the funeral oration does not quite rise to the level of eulogizing the Athenians before an audience of Spartans (235d3–5), P. wants to make sure that we understand that it is not only those who are praised directly who are affected by the accomplished orator's intoxicating rhetoric (Loroux 1986: 79–80). **b4** *σεμνότερος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα*: as in b1, P. emphasizes the temporary nature of this apparent ennoblement, which is further debased in what follows, when S. makes explicit that he is exalted only by virtue of his Athenian citizenship, so that his *σεμνότης* is no more enhanced by the orator's praise than is that of every other Athenian. *σεμνός*, cognate with *σέβομαι*, describes that which is deserving of reverence and respect, like the gods, their shrines and their rites. In Athens, the goddesses whose name was felt to be too dangerous to utter were called the *Semnai Theai* (*Eur. Or.* 409–10). Gorgias in his funeral oration describes the dead as *σεμνοί* in

their justice with regard to the gods (DK 82 B6). When applied to living humans, however, the word can be derogatory = “stuck up, pretentious” (e.g. Eur. *Alc.* 773, *Med.* 216, Ar. *Frogs* 178; Loraux 1986: 319–21). In the genuine works of P. σεμνός and related words are almost always derogatory or are used ironically; so De Vries 1944 and 1984. Apart from S. here, whose language is plainly ironic, only two individuals are recorded as having previously described themselves as σεμνός: Euripides’ Hippolytus (*Hipp.* 1364) and the unnamed character in Callias’ comedy *Pedetai* (of the 420s?) who blames Socrates for her σεμνότης (fr. 15 *PCG*). **b5 μοι:** to be taken both with δοκοῦσι, “they seem to me,” and τὰ αὐτὰ . . . πάσχειν, “to have the same experience I have.” **b6–7 θαυμασιωτέραν αὐτὴν ἡγεῖσθαι:** the infinitive is exegetical “(they seem to have the same experience I have, namely) to come to believe . . .,” as at *Euthphr.* 11a9 πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὄσιον, φιλεῖσθαι; cf. *Phd.* 72c2–3, 73b6–7, 74a6, 78c2, KG II 4. In his funeral oration Pericles affirms that Athens is worthy of admiration (τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι, Thuc. 2.39.4) and that “we” shall be an object of admiration (θαυμασθησόμεθα, 41.4) to future generations even in the absence of a Homer to sing our praise. **b7–8 ἀναπειθόμενοι:** this compound tends to have sinister overtones in P. It is used by S. at his trial to refer to those accusers who prejudiced the citizens against him (*Apol.* 18d2–3). The poets claim falsely that the gods are capable of being diverted and won over (*Rep.* 2.365e4) by sacrifices, prayers and dedicatory offerings, and the poets themselves use their seductive falsehoods to persuade (381e2) mothers to believe frightful stories about the gods, with which they in turn terrify their children. Cf. also *Gorg.* 493a4, *Laws* 10.886d7, 12.941b6. **b8 πλεόν:** although Méridier keeps πλείω in his text, he says in a note to his translation that the MS reading “is unusual in such cases for πλεόν,” the form found at *Ion* 535d4, *Laws* 6.774d3, *Meno* 91e5, *Symp.* 175e6 and 214a1.

235c1 οὕτως ἔναυλος: the orator’s speech is “so resonant” that its effects last more than three days. The adjective is emphasized both by its location in the sentence and by being placed in “predicate” position, for which see 237b1–2, *Laws* 9.880a2–3 φιλαῖς ταῖς χερσίν, *Prot.* 357a6 ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἰρέσει, *Rep.* 3.397b6 μικρὰς τὰς μεταβολάς, *Thi.* 168b3–4 ἴλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ; CGCG §28.12, Gildersleeve §629. Both here and at *Laws* 3.678c3, P.’s only other use of ἔναυλος, the word conveys the reverberations from an event, here the lasting resonance of the orator’s words and voice, there the abiding apprehensiveness caused by memory of the primeval flood. This connotation derives from the sound of the aulos, which the Greeks considered to be particularly resonant. So S. tells Crito that the sound of the Laws’ speech continues to ring in his ears in the same way the Corybantes

imagine that they hear auloi playing (*Cri.* 54d3–5); and when Alcibiades wishes to impress upon his fellow symposiasts the overwhelming effect that he felt *and still feels* (*Symp.* 215d8–9) as a result of hearing S.’s words, he compares the effect to hearing the playing of a master aulos-player and compares himself to a participant in the Corybantic rites (215b–e). For the aulos, see West 1992: 81–107; Wilson 1999; Lynch 2018. Editors have generally put heavy punctuation before οὕτως, taking it to be preparatory to the following ὥστε. But that results in an asyndeton that is difficult to justify. Clause-initial οὕτω is normally backward-looking, as at c4, 240a3, 245c6 and *Thi.* 169c1–2 οὕτω τις ἔρωσ δεινός ἐνδέδουκε [n.b.] τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. **ὁ λόγος τε καὶ ὁ φθόγγος:** at *Soph.* 263e the visitor from Elea, repeating the distinction drawn by S. at *Thi.* 189e and 206d, defines λόγος and διάνοια, the latter being a silent conversation that takes place inside the ψυχή, while the former is the stream that flows from the ψυχή through the mouth μετὰ φθόγγου. That is, for P. the addition of φθόγγος here is strictly speaking superfluous; it has been introduced to continue the image implicit in ἔναυλος and to emphasize the incantatory effect of the speaker’s performance, which relies as much on the sounds of the words as on their meaning. Juxtaposed τε καὶ is very frequent in P., in striking contrast to, e.g., Isocrates and Demosthenes, in whose works it is rare except in the idiom ἄλλως τε καὶ. Here the close connection between the nouns is shown, not only by the particles, but by the preceding adjective (ἔναυλος) and the following verb (ἐνδύεται), both singular in form; cf. *Apol.* 20c7–8 τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν. **c3 ἀναμιμνήσκομαι ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι οὐ γῆς εἶμι:** for the latter, compare *Rep.* 3.403e5–6 μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπου γῆς ἐστίν, of the need to prevent the Guardians from getting drunk and losing their senses, and *Men. Sik.* 369 ποῦ γῆς εἶμι; asked by Cichesias, who is recovering after having fainted. The former expression does not seem to have an exact parallel (at *Apol.* 34c1 ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ means “recalling his own circumstances”), but cf. the converse expression (ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν) at *Apol.* 17a3, ironically describing S.’s reaction to the brilliant oratory of his accusers. In any event, both expressions are designed to convey the extreme disorientation created by the orator’s rhetoric, from which S. eventually recovers. Depictions of such returns from extreme psychological states are a specialty of the dramatists, usually in connection with a derangement brought about under divine influence; so Cassandra regains her senses after an Apolline trance (*Aesch. Ag.* 1178 ff.), Heracles awakens to a realization of the carnage he has wrought under the influence of Hera’s agent Lyssa (*Eur. HF* 1089 ff.), Orestes recovers his senses after being maddened by the Furies (*Or.* 211 ff.) and Cadmus gradually brings Agave to a recognition of how she has dismembered her son in a frenzy induced by Dionysus (*Bacch.* 1259 ff.);

Papadopoulou 2005: 68–70. **c4** **μόνον οὐκ**: a colloquial expression (= “all but, practically”), not found in serious verse but occurring in comedy and the orators where, as here, it introduces a fanciful exaggeration, e.g., Ar. *Wasps* 516 σὺ μόνον οὐ προσκυνεῖς, Aeschin. 2.79 μόνον οὐκ ἔστιγμένος αὐτόμολος, Dem. 19.47 μόνον οὐκ ὀπίσω τῷ χεῖρε δήσαντες. In P. only here and *Rep.* 10.600d4, where S. says that the sophists have attained such an exalted status that their followers all but carry them around on their shoulders. **ἐν μακάρων νήσοις**: the similarities between our passage and Ar. *Wasps* 637–41 are so great that it is difficult to imagine that P. does not have the Aristophanic passage in mind (see Biles and Olson ad loc.; Loraux 1986: 311): ὥστ’ ἔγωγ’ 637 = a6; ηὔξανόμην ἀκούων 638 ≈ ἀκροώμενος . . . ἡγούμενος . . . μείζων . . . γεγονέναι b1–2; κὰν μακάρων δικάζειν (“a humorous substitute for a vb. such as οἰκεῖν,” Biles and Olson) αὐτὸς ἔδοξα νήσοις 639–40 ≈ οἶμαι . . . ἐν μακάρων νήσοις οἰκεῖν c4. For the Isles of the Blessed, the final abode of heroes like Menelaus (Eur. *Hel.* 1677), of those who have kept their souls pure and free from wrongdoing (Pind. *Ol.* 2.68–73) and of the Athenians who died at Chaeronea (Dem. 60.34), see Hes. *Op.* 171 with West ad loc.; Manfredi 1993. Reference here to the Isles of the Blessed is particularly ironic, since P. would seem to regard S. as an especially suitable candidate for permanent admission, but certainly not on the basis of his hearing a half-hour oration filled with platitudes and untruths. P. puts into S.’s mouth the assertion that the philosophers who have returned to the cave and have proved themselves worthy after a lifetime of study and selfless public service are to dwell in the Isles of the Blessed (*Rep.* 7.540b6–7) and, in the myth that concludes *Gorgias*, the veracity of which is repeatedly stressed (523a2, 524b1, 527a8), S. relates that the judges who were appointed by Zeus himself assign to the Isles of the Blessed the souls of those who have lived a life piously pursuing the truth, in particular those philosophers who have spent their lives in contemplation and have avoided sullyng themselves with participation in public life (526c5; other references to the Isles of the Blessed at 523b1, b8, 524a3). **c5** **δειοί**: the meaning “clever, skillful” is frequent in Aristophanes, where it is generally complimentary; see Dover on *Clouds* 148 and his introduction to *Frogs*, pp. 13–14. Elsewhere in P., however, the word is used only in the literal sense, referring to the right-hand side (although *Laws* 1.634a3–4 πρὸς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κομψὰ καὶ θωπευτικά hints at the more, so to speak, sinister connotation). S. had begun by referring to the orators as σοφοί (234c4). Given the common pairing σοφός/δεινός (*Cra.* 398d6, *Hp.Mi.* 373b7, *Prot.* 341a9, *Tht.* 154d8, 173b2, 176c5–6), one might have expected δεινός here; cf. *Euthd.* 272a7–b1 οὕτω δεινῶ γεγονάτον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξελέγγειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὁμοίως ἕαντε ψεῦδος ἕαντε ἀληθές ἦι, of the sophists Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus. **c6 προσπαίξεις . . . τοὺς ῥήτορας** (apparently) “you play up to, are deferential toward, the orators.” When the verb is not used absolutely (= “engage in playful activity,” *Euthd.* 283b10, *Laws* 2.653e2, 7.804b1, 10.885c3, *Phdr.* 262d2) it is found governing either the dative (= “engage in playful activity at someone’s expense,” *Euthd.* 278b3, b6, *Laws* 6.778a1, *Xen. Mem.* 3.1.4, *Men. Epit.* 399) or the accusative. Apart from our passage, P. uses the construction with the accusative only at *Euthd.* 285a3 and *Phdr.* 265c1. In neither case is any mockery or denigration intended; indeed, in the latter case the object is the god Eros and the meaning is “exalt,” while in the former S. is concerned to “conciliate” Ctesippus. Thus there is little reason to believe that P. intends to represent M. as charging S. with mocking the orators, as is generally assumed.

c7 νῦν μέντοι: M. dismisses S.’s remarks and, as above (234b4), directs the discussion to the challenge that will face the speaker to be chosen tomorrow. **οὐ πάνυ εὐπορήσειν:** cf. *Euthd.* 292a5 ἴσως οὐ πάνυ γε εὐπορεῖς, *Lys.* 213c9 οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ ἔγωγε. The verb is frequent in P. in connection with fluency in speech. M. is here “correcting” S.’s representation of the almost superhuman powers of the orators. In the end M. will have to admit that S.’s portrayal was accurate, when he characterizes the author of the funeral oration that S. delivers as μακαρία (249d3). **c7–8 ἐξ ὑπογούου** “on the spur of the moment,” an idiom confined to prose and first attested in the fourth century: *Xen. Cyr.* 6.1.43, *Arist. Rhet.* 1.1354b3, 2.1396b5. Isocrates, in what may be the earliest attested use of the expression (4.13), speaks of orators who use, as a form of *captatio benevolentiae*, the excuse that they have been compelled to speak at short notice, as Lysias does at the start of his funeral oration (234b5n.). S., however, will show that this is a hollow excuse. In fact, a splendid oration has already been prepared, with enough time left over for the text of the oration to be memorized and rehearsed by S. **c8 παντάπασιν:** like πάνυ, παντάπασιν (for which see Thesleff 1954: §221) more commonly precedes the expression it intensifies. Here, as was the case with πάνυ at a6, the adverbial ἐξ ὑπογούου is more prominent than the intensifier, which is in any event a youthful exaggeration on M.’s part, “absolutely on the spur of the moment.” Other examples of postposition in P.: *Chrm.* 168e4, *Cra.* 394b6, *Gorg.* 501a6, *Meno* 92b9, *Parm.* 138d8, *Phlb.* 21d4, *Rep.* 7.523a3, *Tht.* 158e8, 202c7. **ἡ αἴρεισις γέγονεν:** the perfect tense is surprising, since the selection has not yet been made. M. must be projecting and imagining what the speaker will say in extenuation (γάρ) of his efforts, as though the words were in quotation marks; cf. *Isocr.* 4.13 λέγοντας . . . ὡς ἐξ ὑπογούου γέγονεν αὐτοῖς ἡ παρασκευή. **c9 ὥσπερ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν:** the usage of ὥσπερ here (= “virtually, practically, as it were”) is unusual. For the range of meanings of the word when it is not used in connection with metaphor or comparison, see

Silk 1974: 230–1. The sense of “improvisation” for words from the root αὐτοσχεδ- is first found in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, when the infant god sings impromptu (ἐξ αὐτοσχεδίας, 55) to the accompaniment of the newly invented lyre. (“In Homer αὐτοσχεδῖος and αὐτοσχεδόν are only used of close or hand-to-hand fighting,” Richardson ad loc.) The verb is first attested in Thuc., used in praising Themistocles for his ability αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα, 1.138.3. Here M. uses the verb expecting S. to share his admiration for orators capable of producing polished orations with little or no preparation. But the verb in P. can have the connotation of “fabricating,” and elsewhere S. tells Euthyphro that he, S., has been brought up on criminal charges for contriving novel theological doctrines (αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι [*sc.* Meletus] καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων, *Euthphr.* 5a7–8), and he had hoped to become Euthyphro’s pupil so he could refrain from engaging in such behavior “out of ignorance” in future (16a2–3). Similarly, at his trial S. imagines a member of the jury asking him to explain what exactly he does, to ensure that the jury not reach its verdict based on judgments made up on the spur of the moment (ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν, *Apol.* 20d1).

235d1–6: S. responds to M. by claiming that the orators’ impressive performance is only an apparent improvisation and that orators have ready-made speeches that they can produce at short notice. He goes on to add the irrelevant statement that such improvisation would, in any event, be no great challenge. This is the first of a series of irrelevant and increasingly outrageous statements that S. makes in reply to questions from M. **d1 Πόθεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ;** also at *Cra.* 398e6, *Gorg.* 471d8. πόθεν; (“How so?”) is a colloquial expression (Collard 2018: 87) that implies incredulity. In P. ἀγαθέ is always preceded by ὦ (at *Prot.* 311a3 μήπω, ὦ ἀγαθέ should be read with the MS Coislin. 155), often appearing in printed texts as ὠγαθέ. Dickey (1996: 136 and 277–8) gives details for its usage in P., characterizing it as a “mild F[riendship]T[erm]” that “can be used at any time by the character dominating the argument” (113). **εἰσὶν ἑκάστοις τούτων λόγοι:** enclitic words like εἰσὶν by definition depend upon the word that precedes them, so they should not be able to begin a clause. Forms of εἰμί and φημί that are normally enclitic do, however, appear in initial position, necessarily when they constitute the whole of an utterance (e.g. *Phlb.* 40c7, *Rep.* 1.350b4 and 6) but also on other occasions. In P., apart from familiar locutions like εἰσὶν οἱ, we find normally enclitic forms of εἰμί in initial position at, e.g., *Prot.* 342d2, where S. makes the startling claim that there are in certain Dorian cities not only men but even women who pride themselves on their learning; at *Gorg.* 449b9, where Gorgias responds to S.’s request that they converse using brief questions and answers by saying

that there are actually some answers that require lengthy exposition; and at *Laws* 12.951b4, where the visitor from Athens asserts that, among the many people who exist, there are in fact a small number whose near-divine status renders their company worth cultivating. In each case the speaker is asserting the existence of something that may come as a surprise or is unwelcome to the addressee (see also *Euthd.* 284c9, coming after the exclamation πῶς λέγεις . . . ;). So here, S. is asserting the existence, contrary to M.'s expectation, of previously prepared speeches. In such cases the word cannot actually be enclitic; the anomalous accent – finite verb forms normally have recessive accent – must have arisen as a result of generalization from the innumerable places where the enclitic was accented on the second syllable (Probert 2003: §283). The force of the plural (ἐκόστοις, rather than ἐκόστῳι) and of the demonstrative (τούτων, rather than αὐτῶν) is difficult to gauge. It may be intended to distance S. further from “those people.” **d1–2 παρεσκευασμένοι**: S. had earlier (234c5–6) said that the orators prepare their speeches well in advance, but M. seems to have ignored that comment, suggesting that he has fallen so far under the spell of the public speakers that he takes seriously their claims regarding the pressure of time. Word order shows that παρεσκευασμένοι is to be taken as a predicate adjective, rather than as an element of a periphrastic verb-form, as at *Gorg.* 454e1, 479a5–6, 523c5, *Laws* 7.801d4–5, *Lys.* 206d1–2, *Rep.* 3.416b7, 7.527e5, where there is little if any separation between the elements; ἐκόστοις, then, is dative of possession, not agent. **d2 και ἄμα** “and besides” (*Lach.* 182a1, 186c8, *Parm.* 137b8, *Phd.* 63d2, 108d6–7, 116e2, *Phdr.* 258e6, *Prot.* 352c8), adding a further, somewhat superfluous, reason for approving what has just been said. Here, either of S.'s claims on its own, that the orators prepare in advance or that improvisation in such cases is easy, suffices to deflate M.'s exalted opinion of the skills of the public speakers. **τά γε τοιαῦτα**: the limitation will be explained in the next sentence, for (γάρ) it is easy to find words of praise for Athenians when speaking in Athens, but not in Sparta. S. thus distracts M. from consideration of one of the favorite boasts of the sophists and their pupils, about their ability to improvise on any subject whatsoever. Hippias appears to have traveled around Greece professing to be able to answer questions on all topics (*Hp.Mi.* 363c–d, *Prot.* 315c, *Xen. Mem.* 4.4.6), as did Gorgias (*Gorg.* 447c, *Meno* 70c), and the sophistic brothers in *Euthydemus* display their ability to dispute and refute anything that is said, whether true or false (272a–b). In his *On sophists*, P.'s contemporary Alcidas condemns those who write out their speeches in advance and extols the virtues of improvisation (see Muir 2001 for text, translation and commentary). According to the *Suda* (αἰ 347), the orator Aeschines “was the first to be showered with the compliment ‘Your speech

is divine!' on account of his improvisatory skill (διὰ τὸ σχεδιάζειν).” **d3-6** εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . εὖ λέγειν: the implication, spelled out at 236a3-6, that it does not require expert training in rhetoric to be able to praise Athenians in Athens, explains why it is easy to improvise in these circumstances, not why speeches are prepared in advance. Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* twice refers to this statement, the only times he makes mention of *Mnx.* anywhere in his extant works; see the Introduction 3(a). **d3-4** Ἀθηναίους ἐν Πελοποννησίοις εὖ λέγειν: this was precisely the challenge that the Athenians faced and, if Herodotus (9.26-8) is to be believed, successfully overcame in 479. Before the battle of Plataea a disagreement arose between the Athenians and the Tegeans as to which of them should occupy the left wing. Each disputant delivers a speech before the Spartans (which is how Aristotle understands “Peloponnesians” here, surely correctly), who are in command of the united Greek forces and who are therefore entitled to hold the right wing. In response to the Tegeans’ oration the Athenians assert their priority by recounting their heroic defense against the mythical Amazon invasion, their protection of the children of Heracles, their military victory over the Thebans in support of the Argives’ right to the burial of their war dead and, in more recent times, their single-handed (*sic*) defeat of the Persians at Marathon. These are the very events that will be mentioned below (239-40) and are the common currency of Athenian funeral orations; see Loraux 1986: 74-5 on the likelihood that Herodotus, or his source, was drawing on the tradition of the funeral oration. **Πελοποννησίοις**: this is the only occurrence in the Platonic corpus of “the Peloponnesians.” Elsewhere, including regularly in the funeral oration, P. speaks of “the Lacedaemonians.” **d5 τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκμήσοντος**: cf. 247c7-d1 οὐ γὰρ τοῦ λυπήσοντος προσδεήσονται. The definite article is used with the future participle in referring to indefinite persons or entities whose role is to fulfill a requirement or obligation, esp. after verbs of sending or appointing (Thuc. 7.85.2, Xen. *Symp.* 4.26, Plut. *Fab.* 3.7, 18.1, *Flam.* 7.1, *Philop.* 12.2, *Them.* 19.2), sometimes even accompanied by a form of the indefinite τις: *Rep.* 1.342a4-5 δεῖ τινος τέχνης τῆς . . . σκεφομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριούσης, 348b2 δικαστῶν τινων τῶν διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα, *Dem.* 18.71 φανῆναί τινα τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸν ταῦτα κωλύσοντα ποιεῖν αὐτὸν ἐχρῆν. With εὐδοκμήσοντος, compare δοκεῖν d6 and εὐδοκιμεῖν 236ab. P. thus emphasises that the public speaker operates in the realm of mere appearance. **d6 ἀγωνίζεται**: the verb refers to engaging in activity involving rivalry, conflict or antagonism, as in warfare (*Tim.* 19c4), gymnastic, equestrian and musical competitions (*Laws* 12.955a6-7; cf. 249b5-6 below) or courtroom litigation (*Apol.* 34c2). To the Greeks, putting oneself in the public eye was an inherently competitive enterprise, an *agôn*,

especially when one undertook to express oneself verbally, either in writing or before an audience. Thucydides distinguishes his own history from an ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα (1.22.4; for the latter expression, see b1n.). In his funeral oration Lysias acknowledges that he is engaged in an *agôn* (2.2); his competition is not with the *erga* of those who died in battle but with the *logoi* of his predecessors. For the agonistic character of the *epitaphios logos* as a genre, see Derderian 2001: 161–88. It would appear from the wording of d3, e1 and 236a7 (δέοι) that the speaker chosen was obliged to speak, making the delivery of the funeral oration somewhat akin to a liturgy, another intensely competitive institution (for which, see Christ 2006: 156–7). οὔσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ: cf. ε5 ἥπερ καὶ ἄλλους. After ὅσπερ we often find a superfluous καί, just as also in Latin, e.g., *sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris*. d8 μὰ Δία: the use of oaths as intensifiers is colloquial and is found frequently in Aristophanes and P.; see Dover 1997: 62–3. Accordingly, the only two occurrences in *Mnx.*, here and 249d3, are in the dialogue between M. and S., with none in the funeral oration. This oath by Zeus is found as an intensifier with οὐ μέντοι also at *Apol.* 17b9, 26e5, *Euthd.* 290e4 (also answering the question οὐκ οἶει;), *Lach.* 195a6, *Lys.* 208a4, *Phd.* 82d1, *Rep.* 3.403b3, 4.426b7, 444a7. There is a complete database of Greek oaths down to 322 BC, The Oath in Archaic and Classical Greece, housed at the University of Nottingham and available at: nottingham.ac.uk/greatdatabase/brzoaths/public_html.

235e3 Καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν γε: by way of responding to M.'s question S. says that it is not surprising that he too, or even he (καὶ ἐμοί), is capable of speaking, never mind the many others who are implicitly imagined to be capable, given how easy the task is according to S. That is, this is “μὲν *solitarium*” (*GP* 380–2), with a contrasting δέ-clause to be supplied mentally; for the combination μὲν γε, see *GP* 159: “the effect of γε being to concentrate attention momentarily on the μὲν clause.” What is surprising here is the dative case; elsewhere in P., when οὐ(δέν) θαυμαστόν is construed with the infinitive, the subject of the infinitive is in the accusative case, including just below (236a2), where the sentiment is repeated, and at *Hp.Mi.* 376c3 καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν οὐδέν θαυμαστόν πλανᾶσθαι. Attraction of the antecedent into the case of the relative pronoun (here ᾧ) is attested (*CGCG* §50.14), but seemingly only when antecedent and relative are immediately adjacent. e4 οὔσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη: the gender of S.'s instructor in rhetoric comes as a complete surprise, given that the role of women in Classical Athens was neither to speak nor even to be spoken of in public (Thuc. 2.45.2; Schaps 1977). For οὐ πάνυ, see c7. Here, however, it is used in litanes (“no mean teacher” = “an outstanding teacher”), as Thesleff 1954: §83 notes, citing this passage. P. uses οὐ φαῦλον το = ἀξιόλογον more than any

other Classical author; e.g. *Cra.* 401b8, *Rep.* 1.337e7, *Symp.* 213c7, 218d8, *Th.* 151e8, 152d2. **ε5** **περί ῥητορικῆς**: cf. *Lach.* 186c1 διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου [*sc.* τοῦ ἀγαθῶι γενέσθαι] πέρι, *Meno* 90b3–4 ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, 96b4 περὶ ὅτουσιν . . . διδασκάλους. “The genitive after *περί* connotes a general area of inquiry, a ‘sphere,’ the accusative connotes a specific object of inquiry,” Renehan 1997: 167. The “sphere” of rhetoric had only recently developed in P.’s day, and it has even been argued that the name for it (ἡ ῥητορικὴ being short for ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη) was created by P. around 385 as he was composing *Gorg.*; see Schiappa 1990. If so, and if *Mnx.* is close in date to *Gorg.* (see the Introduction 3(b)), then our passage is among the earliest occurrences of the word. **καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς** [**καὶ**] **ἀγαθούς**: the first *καὶ* does double duty, both as the *καὶ* that often follows *-περ* (d6n.; in addition to being proficient she *also* teaches others) and as the expected connective with forms of *ἄλλος* (in addition to teaching me she has *also* taught many others); the second is intrusive and has been inserted by a copyist who, seeing *πολλούς* and *ἀγαθούς* juxtaposed, attempted to “correct” the seemingly unidiomatic expression by adding the *καὶ* that normally joins forms of *πολύς* with other adjectives (KG II 252), as at 242e5–6 (*πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί*), 237c6, 239a7, 240a3, 243b1. The transmitted text would mean either “created many other fine orators” or, with two accusatives (CGCG §30.10), “turned many other fine men into orators.” The latter is clearly not what S. intends, and yet P.’s usage shows that the construction with two accusatives is what is expected (“turned many other men into fine orators”), as at *Gorg.* 449c9–d1, where S. says that Gorgias claims to be knowledgeable in the rhetorical art and that he could also make someone else an orator (*ποιῆσαι ἄν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα*; cf. 455c3–4 *καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς*, 458e5 *ῥητορικὸν φῆις ποιεῖν* [*sc.* *τινα*] οἷός τε εἶναι, 460a5–6 *ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σὺ *τινα* ποιήσης*). **ε7** **Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου**: for Pericles (ca. 495–429 BC), see the Introduction 3(d) iv. **ε8** **ἡ δῆλον ὅτι**: 234a4n. The unexpected gender of S.’s teacher and Aspasia’s well-known connection with Pericles are what make her identity “obvious” to M. **Ἀσπασίαν**: for Aspasia, see the Introduction 3(d)iii. But in what sense did either S. or Pericles learn the art of rhetoric from Aspasia, given that, as we are soon told, each of them merely memorized a speech prepared for them by their teacher? **ε9** **Λέγω γάρ**: cf. *Alc.* 1 108d3–4 *ΑΛ. Μουσικήν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. ΣΩ. Λέγω γάρ*. Denniston (*GP* lxvii and 88) notes that this type of formula of assent is frequent in P. and the Socratic works of Xenophon, and he suggests that *Ar. Ecclesiazusae* 773–6, where it appears four times in four lines, is parodying an idiom that “was coming into prominence in certain circles early in the fourth century.” **Κόννον**: for Connus, see the Introduction 3(d)iv. S. claims to be his pupil also at *Euthd.* 272c and 295d. **τὸν Μητροβίου**: Connus is named as “son of Metrobius” also at *Euthd.* 272c2. Following the reforms

of Cleisthenes in 508/7 and the reorganization of the Athenian population into demes, it became increasingly common to refer to Athenian men by name plus deme, like Ἀντιφῶντος τοῦ Ῥαμνουσίου below; earlier, it was usual to use the father's name as an identifier, like Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου above; see Whitehead 1986: 69–72. As we can see, P.'s practice in naming Athenians – when he refers to non-Athenians he usually gives the name of their polis, like “Hippias of Elis” and “Prodicus of Ceos” at *Prot.* 314c – is “variable and inconsistent” (Jones 2004: 243). Occasionally the choice is determined by the context, as when S. introduces Clinias as the son of Axiochus (and the grandson of Alcibiades) to convey both the young man's promise and the potential risks he faces (*Euthd.* 275a10), or when Apollodorus is addressed by his demotic by way of making a pun on the name of his deme Phalerum (*Symp.* 172a4). But in most instances it is impossible to determine why P. has used the patronymic or the demotic, and there are places where the two appear in alternation: *Gorg.* 487c3–4 Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα, *Prot.* 315c2–4 Ἐρυξίμαχος τε ὁ Ἄκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος.

236a2 μὲν οὖν: the particles are to be taken separately; οὖν has “resumptive” force (*GP* 428–9; note the repetition of οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν from 235e3) and μὲν prepares for ἀλλά in the following line. For ἀλλά following μὲν, which gives greater weight to the second clause and may even call into question the validity of the first, see *GP* 5–6. **a2–3 δεινὸν . . . λέγειν:** by contrast, in *Apology* S. insists that the prosecution's claim that he is δεινὸς λέγειν is unfounded, unless, that is, by δεινὸς λέγειν the prosecution is referring to someone who speaks the truth (17b1–5). In *Symposium* (198c4) S. uses this expression to describe Gorgias and, by implication, his follower Agathon, whose speech has left S. in a state similar to what was depicted above (235a7n.). According to S.'s friend Hippocrates, rendering someone else δεινὸς λέγειν is the particular expertise of sophists (*Prot.* 312d–e; cf. *Euthd.* 272a–b). **a3–4 μουσικὴν . . . ῥητορικὴν:** “retained” accusatives with a passive verb (παιδευθεῖς) that in the active takes a double accusative; see *CGCG* §35.15 and *Laws* 3.695a2 παιδευομένους τέχνην. Norden (1898: 56) cites our passage as evidence that it was taken for granted that training in music went hand in hand with training in rhetoric. But there is no other evidence he can point to, nor does there seem to be any evidence that musical training was felt necessary for a skilled orator. Pericles' pre-eminence in the art of rhetoric is elsewhere attributed by P. to his studies with the philosopher Anaxagoras (*Phdr.* 269e–270a) and not to his well-known association with Damon, the leading instructor in music in his day (*Alc.* 1 118c), or to Aspasia. **a4 Λάμπρου . . . Ἀντιφῶντος:**

for these men, see the Introduction 3(d)iv. In Nepos' *Life of Epaminondas* (2.1) Lamprus (G. Longolius: *lampus* LPA) is mentioned in the same breath as Damon. According to Thucydides (8.68), Antiphon was inferior to none of his contemporaries when it came to ἀρετή, was supremely competent in assisting those who needed advice (συμβουλευσαίτο; cf. 234b3n.) on public speaking and, when on trial, delivered the most skillful defense speech known to Thucydides. With the introduction of these two names S.'s argument rises to the pinnacle of irrelevance. Having made the claim that it is easy to praise the Athenians to their face, it was unnecessary for S. to refer to his own expert training in rhetoric. Now, in making the further (unnecessary) claim that even someone with second-rate training in rhetoric could make a name for himself by praising the Athenians to their face, there was no need to supply, by way of example, the names of those who might provide such second-rate training. Clearly none of this is to be taken seriously, quite apart from the matter of the relative merits of Lamprus and Connus as instructors of music and those of Antiphon and Aspasia as teachers of rhetoric. It is likely that the very irrelevance and absurdity is the point. Musical training is not relevant and training in rhetoric is unnecessary to the delivery of a formulaic encomium that merely repackages the same commonplaces with minor variations in language and organization. **α5 καὶ ἄν οὗτος:** the καὶ here emphasizes by repetition the καὶ in α3, "even he who . . . , nevertheless even he . . ."; see Denniston (*GP* 293), who cites Lysias 7.18 καὶ περὶ ὧν . . . , καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων. For the tendency of postpositive ἄν, which here belongs syntactically with εἴη, to usurp second position in its clause, even at the expense of separating καὶ from the word it emphasizes, compare the frequent οὐδὲ ἄν εἰς, dividing the elements of οὐδεῖς. **α6 εὐδοκίμειν:** see 235d5n. **α8 παρὰ ἑμαυτοῦ ἴσως οὐδέν:** S. is thus absolved of any responsibility for what is said in the funeral oration. The situation here is thus to be distinguished from the similar one in *Phaedrus*, where S. is encouraged by his younger companion to deliver an oration answering that of Lysias; while S. claims that the inspiration will come from outside himself, since on his own he lacks expertise (παρὰ γε ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδέν αὐτῶν ἐννεόηκα, 235c7), he agrees that he will, though a mere amateur, improvise (ιδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων, 236d5) a speech which he will acknowledge, somewhat reluctantly, as his own. See the Introduction 3(c)iii.

236b1 ἠκροώμην: the verb, regularly construed with a genitive of the person heard (e.g. *Gorg.* 499b4, *Rep.* 10.605c9–10), is commonly used to refer to a pupil listening to an instructor or to an audience member listening to a sophistic or musical performance (235b1, *Apol.* 37d7, *Euthd.* 304d7, *Laws* 7.800d3). **b1–2 περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων:** masculine, referring

to the dead in whose honor the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος is to be spoken. **b3 τὸν ἐροῦντα:** for the future, see 234b6, 235d5nn. **b3-4 τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ:** corresponding to the improvisation that M., unlike S., considers to be especially difficult (235c8-d3) and to the material prepared well in advance (234c5-6, 235d1-2). **b3 ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα** “on the spot” (235b1n.). **b4 διήκει** “she went through” (cf. c2 διήλθες), a common expression in P. for relating a narrative account or imparting the steps of an argument; e.g. *Tht.* 157e5 ὄν ἄρτι διήμιεν λόγον. **ἰσκεμμένη:** for the rather uncommon use of σκέπτομαι to = “prepare, devise” (LSJ II.3), see *Prot.* 317b7, where the title character acknowledges that he is a sophist and he notes that this acknowledgment is one of the safeguards he has devised (ἔσκεμμαι) to deflect resentment, and *Dem.* 24.158, referring to Androtion designing arguments (λόγους . . . ἐσκέφθαι) to secure an acquittal. **b4-5 μοι δοκεῖ:** for this expression inserted parenthetically, with the enclitic following a pause, see *Euthd.* 278c6, 297c5, *Ar. Peace* 1267, “Longin.” 2.3; for other enclitics following a pause, see Riddell §311. **b5 συνετίθει:** cf. 249d5; here almost = “concocted,” as at *Apol.* 27a1, *Euthd.* 305c4, *Phdr.* 260b6 (of a speech in praise of an ass), *Rep.* 2.377d5. **τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον ὄν Περικλῆς εἶπεν:** in fact, Pericles delivered at least two funeral orations. In addition to the speech of 431 reported by Thucydides, Stesimbrotus of Thasos, a contemporary of S., quotes from an oration spoken over those Athenians who were killed during the military action against the Samians, who revolted in 440 (*Plut. Per.* 8.9). Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.1365a31-2) gives a quotation from Pericles τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, which could come from either of these orations, or conceivably from a third. The definite article, then, in both P. and Aristotle, denotes not “his (one and only)” funeral oration but “the” funeral oration that was delivered annually during wartime. **b6 περιλείμματα ἄττα:** ἄττα < -ά τινα, that is, it originated as a redivision of the neuter plural of enclitic τις following the noun with which it agrees, eventually becoming a lexical item on its own that no longer needs to follow a neuter plural noun (e.g. *Apol.* 30c6, *Soph.* 254c4, *Tht.* 145c8). The noun περίλειμμα occurs only here and (several times) in Archimedes before the Roman period. In Archimedes it = “remainder,” but not in the sense of what is left over after performing an arithmetic computation (which is normally τὸ λοιπὸν or τὰ λοιπά); rather it is used in the context of solid geometry, referring to that which has been cut away from a given solid to create another, smaller solid. This suggests that the image here is of scraps lying on the floor of a craftsman (see next n.). **συγκολλῶσα:** literary composition is often spoken of in terms of the crafts (e.g. *Phdr.* 234e7-8 στρογγύλα . . . ἀποτετόρνευται, *Ar. Thesm.* 52-7 and Aeschylus’ ῥήματα γομποπαγῆ at *Frogs* 824; cf. Dover 1993: 28). κολλῶ and κόλλησις can refer to the metalworker’s practice of welding or

soldering (Hdt. 1.25.2), or to the fitting together of wooden elements by carpenters (Ar. *Knights* 463, 470) or shipwrights (Theophr. *HP* 5.7.4); see Austin and Olson 2004: 71; Biles and Olson 2015: 391–2. When these words are applied to the verbal arts they tend to connote artifice as opposed to substance or truth; e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 446 ψευδῶν συγκολλητής. In the concluding discussion of *Phaedrus* S. withholds the name “philosopher” from those whose written compositions do not adhere to the dialectical requirements previously laid out, compositions that, he says, the author has constructed (συνέθηκεν; cf. b5) over a period of time, bending them this way and that, cobbling them together and trimming them down (πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, 278d9–e1). **b7 Ἡ καὶ μνημονεύσας** “could you actually (καί) recall . . . ?”; cf. *Pol.* 306d7 Ἡ καὶ μνήμην ἔχεις . . . ; and *GP* 285. In fifth-century Attic the ending of the second-person singular aorist active optative varied between -(σ)αῖς and -(σ)είας; by the following century the former had taken over (Willi 2003: 246) and is the only form used by P., with the exception of *Pol.* 272b4 ἐθελήσειας, spoken by the visitor from Elea. **ἡ Ἀσπασία**: the article here is perhaps intended as an honorific. In *Menexenus* Aspasia’s name is accompanied by the article only here and at 249d3–4, where the article is required to render μακαρίαν predicative. The most one can say about P.’s use of the definite article with proper names is that it “is used with the utmost freedom” (Gildersleeve §537). **b8 Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε**: the same expression at *Chrm.* 156a6, *Rep.* 10.608d6 and (without γε) 4.430d9; cf. the similarly colloquial εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε, *Euthd.* 283e8, *Prot.* 349e6, also (without γε) Ar. *Clouds* 660, *Thesm.* 470. For these “attitudinal” conditionals, see Wakker 1994: 231, who notes that the conditional clause “serves to emphasize, in an ironical way, the truth of the proposition presented in the main clause.” **ἐμάνθανόν γέ τοι παρὰ αὐτῆς** “Let me tell you (γέ τοι) I worked on committing it to memory under the direction of the Master herself.” The imperfect underlines the process involved in learning. For αὐτός, like Latin *ipse*, meaning “master of the household,” see *Prot.* 314d7 and *Rep.* 1.327b6; at *Prot.* 315b5 it is used of Protagoras, where Denyer comments that it “almost means ‘the Boss’,” comparing Ar. *Clouds* 219 (of “Socrates”) and the Pythagorean recourse to αὐτός ἔφα = *ipse dixit*.

236c1 ὀλίγου sc. δεῖν, “almost, nearly” (LSJ A. IV.1), regularly found with a verb in the aorist (KG I 204). **πληγᾶς ἔλαβον**: this periphrasis serves in Attic as the aorist of τύπτομαι in the sense of Lat. *uarpulo* (as opposed to *ferior*). For an account of the intricacies of the conjugation of verbs meaning “beat, strike,” see Rutherford 1881: 257–65. Much of the evidence comes from comedy where, as in Roman comedy, frequent reference is made to the beating of slaves (e.g. Ar. *Wasps* 3 with Biles and Olson ad

loc.); corporal punishment was also the standard inducement to learning in Greek and Roman schools (Bloomer 2015). The image of the elderly Socrates being threatened with lashings by a woman who is a courtesan and a non-citizen is, so to speak, striking. One wonders if it has had an influence on the late story, frequently illustrated by Renaissance artists, of Aristotle being ridden like a horse by Alexander's concubine Phyllis, who is often depicted wielding a riding crop (Sarton 1930). Frustratingly, fragment 7 of *Hermesianax*, which catalogues the indignities prominent men have undergone in thrall to their passion for women, breaks off before reaching Aristotle, having recounted in lines 85–98 the infatuation of the philosophers Pythagoras, Socrates (for Aspasia) and Aristippus. **δτε:** the MSS read **δτι**, but “because I kept forgetting” only serves to weaken S.’s claim that of course he can remember Aspasia’s speech, whereas **δτε** leaves open the possibility that such lapses were infrequent and were firmly corrected. This oration, then, is fixed in S.’s memory, unlike the speech that he extemporized in *Phaedrus*, which he can only vaguely remember only minutes after having delivered it (263d2). The indicative with **δτε** is justified by **δλιγου**, which is equivalent to a negative (*SMT* §536). **c2 Τι οὖν οὐ διήλθεις;** “Then why not recite it?” Compare *Prot.* 310a2 Τι οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν; where Denyer notes, “Such questions with **τι οὐ** are equivalent to imperatives, and the aorist of the indicative . . . has the same import as the aorist of an imperative.” That is, the aorist is aspectual rather than temporal. For conversational expressions of this type, see *Meno* 92d5, with Bluck ad loc.; Collard 2018: 148–9; *CGCG* §33.33. **c3 ὅπως μή μοι χαλεπανεῖ:** verbs of fearing can be construed with **ὅπως μή** and the future indicative (*SMT* §370). Analogously, we find **ὅπως μή** and the future indicative “in independent sentences implying a desire to avert something that is not desired” (§278); cf. *CGCG* §38.34. The construction, and S.’s (feigned) apprehensiveness, recur at 249e3. **c4 ἐξενέγκω** “publish,” LSJ A. II.3. **αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον:** the possessive genitive of the unemphatic third-person pronoun can appear either before or after the article + noun. When it appears before, it assumes a degree of emphasis. So, here, the force is either “*her* speech,” stressing the authorship of Aspasia, or “the Master’s speech” (b8n.). For the former, see 238e3n. and *Cri.* 47c1–2, where αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν marks the contrast between the judgment of the one person who is an expert and the approbation of the many; for the latter, see *Phd.* 117e8, where the man who administers the hemlock to S. pinches the foot of Phaedo’s mentor (αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα) and asks if he can feel it. **c5 Μηδαμῶς . . . ἀλλὰ εἶπέ:** cf. *Euthd.* 294c7–8 Μηδαμῶς . . . ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔτι ἡμῖν μόνον εἶπατον καὶ ἐπιδείξατον, *Phdr.* 234e1 Μηδαμῶς . . . ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς εἶπέ, a conversational expression found in comedy (e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 296–7, *Men. Dysc.* 502) and P. (*Gorg.*

497b4, *Laws* 10.890d1, *Symp.* 175b1, *Th.* 173b7); Riddell §136; Collard 2018: 70–1. The speaker vigorously protests against the interlocutor’s intended action (or reluctance to act) and suggests an alternative. No specific verb need be supplied. If a verb were to be expressed, it would be a present imperative or aorist subjunctive (*CGCG* §38.26), accounting for the form of the negative; contrast Οὐδαμῶς . . . ἀλλὰ εἰπέ c10, where the verb, if expressed, would be an indicative (future). **c6 χαριῆι**: there is something perverse about the younger M. begging the older S. to “grant him a favor,” as the verb χαρίζεσθαι is the *mot juste* for referring to the compliance of the *erômenos* with the request of the *erastês* for sexual gratification (LSJ A. 1.3). The verb is repeatedly thus used by Pausanias and Eryximachus in their encomia of Eros (*Symp.* 180c–185c, 185e–188e), and Alcibiades makes the shocking admission that he was willing “to grant favors” (χαρίζεσθαι, *Symp.* 217a4) to S. **εἶτε Ἀσπασίας . . . εἶτε ὄτουοῦν**: this is the converse of what Alcibiades says at *Symp.* 215d, that those who hear S.’s *logoi*, even if they are spoken by someone else, are captivated to a greater degree than when they listen to an accomplished orator. Here, M. is eager to listen to S. in the unaccustomed role of an orator delivering a speech, whether one composed by Aspasia or by anyone else. There is nothing in the Greek to suggest that M. doubts Aspasia’s authorship of the speech to be recited. **c8–9 ἄν σοι δόξω πρεσβύτης ὦν ἔτι παίζειν** “if I allow you to think that I am still (ἔτι), at my advanced age, acting like an adolescent.” For S., a fascination with rhetoric and oratorical display is appropriate to young men like M. (234a7–b1n.). **c10 παντί τρόπῳ**: a characteristically Platonic expression; over half the occurrences from the Classical period are in his works. For its use with an imperative, see *Cri.* 46a7–8, *Euthd.* 274d5, *Euthphr.* 15d1, *Rep.* 2.368c5, *Th.* 148d1. **c11 Ἀλλὰ μέντοι σοί γε δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι** “Well, you at any rate are someone who must be satisfied” (c6n.). “Ἀλλὰ μέντοι is practically confined to Plato and Xenophon” (*GP* 410). In P. the combination is frequent and is almost always followed by a vocative or, as here, a word emphasized by γε. The implication is that there is (almost) no favor S. can refuse M. and that a very special relationship exists between the two, an implication confirmed by the presence of M. in the prison at the time of S.’s execution (*Phd.* 59b). **ὥστε καὶ ἄν ὀλίγου** “so that I would really (καὶ) almost.” For the position of ἄν, see a5n. For ὀλίγου, see c1n.; in this case the aorist is a potential optative (χαρισσαίμην ἄν), with ἄν repeated here in anticipation, as often happens when a subordinate clause intervenes (e.g. *Phd.* 72c3–5 καὶ ἄν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο . . . , ταχύ ἄν . . . εἶη; *KG* I 246–7; *SMT* §223).

236d1 ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι “to strip naked and dance.” This is an extraordinary statement, particularly after S. and M. have just been using

vocabulary appropriate to the exchange of sexual favors (c6 and 11). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that P. intends us to think in terms of the kind of seductive dancing with which *hetairai* enlivened symposia. Lucian seems to have understood the passage in this way, since in his *De saltatione* (25) he commends S. for his devotion to the dance, saying that S. “used to frequent the training-places for αὐλητρίδες, nor did he think himself above taking lessons on serious matters from the *hetaira* Aspasia.” The reference to Aspasia and to “serious matters” is completely irrelevant to the question of S.’s interest in the dance, so Lucian can only have inserted it to show that he is thinking of our passage. That is, he associates S.’s dancing with the activity of αὐλητρίδες and ἑταῖραι at a symposium, for which see *Symp.* 176e, 212c–d, *Xen. Symp.* 2. Coming as it does immediately before S. “gratifies” M. by reciting an oration allegedly composed by a woman otherwise known as a *hetaira* and a pander, this comment is surely designed to let us know how P. regards the kind of encomiastic oratory exemplified by the funeral oration; see also 239c5n. **d1–2 ἐπειδὴ γε μόνω ἔσμεν:** cf. *Parm.* 137a6–7 δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ . . . αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν, *Alc.* 1 118b5 ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἔσμεν, *Clit.* 40ba9–10 ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντε, *Phdr.* 236c8 ἔσμεν δὲ μόνω ἐν ἔρημῳ. This is a literary trope that P. has borrowed from the theater, where an actor, speaking before an audience of thousands, portrays a character adopting a confidential tone to ensure that the conversation not be overheard, e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 504 = *Thesm.* 472 αὐτοὶ (-αι) γὰρ ἔσμεν, parodying a line from Euripides’ *Telephus*. **d2 ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι:** this should not be taken as indicating that S. lacks confidence in his ability to repeat Aspasia’s oration faithfully. It is one of those polite formulas used by speakers in P. (and Xen.) to apologize, as it were, for displaying the kind of precision expected of a secretary, say, or a professional rhapsode, but not of a gentleman. So, for example, S. tells Euthyphro that the indictment against him has been brought, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, by someone named Meletus from the deme Pitthos (*Euthyphr.* 2b9), and he uses the same expression when he quotes a familiar dactylic hexameter from Homer (*Od.* 17.218) at *Lys.* 214a5. **d2–3 ἀρξαμένη λέγειν ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν τεθνηώτων:** as S. had earlier suggested (234c2–235b2n.), it is standard for the funeral oration to start out by giving the impression that the subject is the deceased. It will not take long for this speech to shift its focus elsewhere.

236d4–237b2: EXORDIUM

The speech begins with a conspicuous display of some standard rhetorical commonplaces: the *logos/ergon*, living/dead and public/private antitheses; a rhetorical question suggesting that the speaker is at the moment

wrestling with the difficulty of the task facing him and that, consequently, he is extemporizing; a clear articulation of the topics to be covered (πρῶτον . . . δεύτερον . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις, 237a7–b1). This is all expressed in a manner reminiscent of Gorgias, using figures such as balanced clauses and epanalepsis (237a6). “Longinus” (*De sublim.* 28.2) quotes the opening sentence, through to the end of d6, as a model of “periphrasis,” praising the author’s lyrical elevation of mere prose. Dionysius of Halicarnassus twice quotes the opening of the oration, on one occasion saying that it is among the most renowned and often repeated passages (*Comp.* 18), and discussing its style, with reservations, at some length; see Wiater 2011: 340–3, also the Introduction 3(e)ii and 236e1n.

236d4 Ἔργωι μὲν ἡμῖν οἶδε ἔχουσιν: the iambic character of the opening (assuming elision of οἶδε; see above, pp. 40–1) is reminiscent of the openings of Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen* (κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὖ-, DK 82 B11.1) and Agathon’s encomium of Eros (ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βού-, *Symp.* 194e4). **Ἔργωι μὲν:** answered by λόγωι δέ, d7. The *logos/ergon* antithesis is found at the start of the funeral orations of Pericles (and frequently elsewhere in Thuc.: Parry 1957) and Lysias. Pericles uses it to question the adequacy of words in honoring the acts of the deceased, saying that he would have thought it sufficient to honor those acts with acts, namely the public *prothesis* and burial (2.35.1). Lysias acknowledges the lack of congruity between words and acts, and therefore represents his words as competing, not with the deeds of the dead, but with the words of those who have spoken in the past (2.2). Similarly, the funeral oration of Demosthenes claims that the *aretē* of the deceased surpasses every *logos* that could be spoken (60.1) and that of Hyperides expresses anxiety that his speech will seem to be no match for the acts that are commemorated (6.2). Remarkably, although he signals with his first word that he will employ this topos, P. here ignores the acts that his words will commemorate. Instead, the *ergon* referred to is the act of carrying out the funeral rites which, unlike in Thuc., is put on a par with the words about to be spoken. The topos will be used below (244a3) more conventionally, to express “not (merely) in word but in deed.” **ἡμῖν:** an “ethical dative,” which can “loosely express the involvement of the speaker or hearer in the action” (CGCG §30.53). The funeral rites accorded the deceased are, “in our eyes,” those that are appropriate to them. **d5 πορεύονται τὴν εἰμαρμένην πορείαν:** S. uses the same *figura etymologica* shortly before his own death (περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἄιδου πορείαν ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῆι, *Phd.* 115a2–3) and when he recounts the myth of Er (τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν πορεύεσθαι, *Rep.* 10.619e4–5). At his trial he says that death is either a complete cessation of sensation or, according to the commonly

expressed view, a sort of migration from this place to another (κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, μεταβολή τις . . . καὶ μετοίκησις . . . τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, *Apol.* 40c8–10). The image of death as a journey is indeed commonly expressed, e.g. Aesch. fr. 239 Radt (*Telephus*), Soph. *Trach.* 874–5, Eur. *Med.* 1067–8, Catullus 3.11–12. **εἰμαρμένην**: perfect passive participle of μείρομαι (cognate with μοῖρα), “receive as one’s portion,” thus “fated, destined.” **d6 κοινῆι μὲν . . . ἰδίαι δέ**: the antithesis, expressed in nearly isosyllabic clauses, is not merely decorative. It is an obligatory element of the funeral oration, appearing at Thuc. 2.42.3, Lysias 2.44, Dem. 60.10 and Hyperides 6.24. In all these places it sets the bravery and sacrifice of the individual against the common advantage for which that sacrifice was made. Here, and again at the end of the oration (249b4–5), P. affectingly uses the antithesis, as Pericles does at Thuc. 2.43.2, to express the reciprocal acknowledgment, on the part of both the individual and the commonwealth, of the common benefit bestowed by the individuals who sacrificed their lives. Elsewhere (242d3, e3–4, 243b5) P. will employ the figure in an original manner, using “common” to refer to the concerted efforts of Greek poleis united against a barbarian foe and “individual” to stand for a single polis asserting its interests in a conflict with other poleis. **d7 δὲ δὴ**: the second particle indicates that, in contrast to the balanced parallelism of μὲν . . . δέ in the previous line, here the emphasis is on the content of the δέ-clause, as at, e.g., *Apol.* 24d6, *Lach.* 179d6, *Th.* 170d6. That is, the speaker is implicitly challenging the statement made at the start of Pericles’ funeral oration (d4n.), that words are superfluous after the deceased have been honored by the actions of the mourners, and suggesting that the words to be spoken are at least as important as the ritual actions that have been performed. Further, by using κόσμος (237c3–4n.) to refer to the honor paid to the dead by the words of the funeral oration, the speaker underlines the distinction between his attitude and that of Pericles, who says at the end of his oration that the dead have been honored (κεκόσμηται) by the acts of the funeral ritual, using the *logos/ergon* antithesis to contrast those acts with the words that have just been spoken (Thuc. 2.46.1). **νόμος προστάττει**: cf. 249c7 κατὰ τὸν νόμον. For the πατριος νόμος (Thuc. 2.34.1) prescribing the ritual and the oration, see the Introduction 1. Reference to the νόμος at the start of the funeral oration is common: Ziolkowski 1981: 66–8.

236e1 καὶ χρή: Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 24; see Wiater 2011: 344–6) condemns in the strongest terms the addition of these words to a sentence that is already complete and perfectly clear. See, however, 239d3 καὶ δίκαιον καὶ χρή, *Symp.* 186c2–3 καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ, *Phd.* 117c1–2 ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή (imitated by the author of *Theages* at 122a9–b1). For

Dionysius, not only are the words superfluous but it is self-evident that their addition does violence to the sonorousness of the period's end. The text of Dionysius, however, quotes ἀνδράσιν without the final nu. This may seem like a trivial detail, but in fact it alters radically the character of the period. For the text of Plato presents the highly favored cretic + spondee clausula, whereas that of D.H. gives us a clausula which orators tend to avoid. Whether our printed texts, and the manuscripts on which they rely, accurately reflect what Plato and Dionysius wrote or intended is uncertain (see the Introduction, n. 78), but given that the speaker of the funeral oration elsewhere (see 243c7n.) goes out of his way to avoid the clausula that the text of D.H. attributes to him, we are justified in giving P. the benefit of the doubt here and following the reading of his modern editors. For just as poets employ nu-*ephelestikon* before a consonant for metrical convenience (e.g. Eur. *HF* 544 ἦλθεν φόβος) so do orators for the sake of prose rhythm (e.g. Dem. 3.32 γέγονεν θαυμάζω, avoiding a succession of three short syllables, which would violate Blass' Law; see McCabe 1981: 1, 67–73). As it happens, the later rhetorician Hermogenes of Tarsus (*On types of style*, p. 250 Rabe) quotes our passage with καὶ χρῆ (but omitting τοῖς ἀνδράσιν), along with a phrase from Demosthenes' *On the crown* (18.97), both of which he praises for embodying the very quality, σεμνότης, that Dionysius claims is impaired by the addition of the offending words. ε1–3 ἔργων . . . ἀκουσάντων “For, by means of a speech admirably delivered, those who have acted (dat. of possessor) obtain from the audience an ornate commemoration (μνήμη καὶ κόσμος is a hendiadys) of their admirably performed deeds.” After conspicuously beginning the previous sentence with *ergon*, but not in the expected reference to performance of heroic deeds on the battlefield, the speaker begins this sentence with that word in just that meaning. As in the previous sentence, however, the prominence accorded *erga* by its appearance in first position is undermined as the sentence proceeds. The two parallel isosyllabic participial expressions, ἔργων γὰρ εὖ πραχθέντων and λόγῳ καλῶς ῥηθέντι, seem to give the same weight to words and deeds, but it emerges that it is the words that adorn the deeds and make them memorable. This is in stark contrast to the practice of the other funeral orations (d4n.), which present the speaker in the unenviable position of having to compensate the sublime accomplishments of the deceased in the common currency of mere words. Indeed, P.'s is the only funeral oration that does not explicitly refer to the difficulty of finding words adequate to the deeds being celebrated (Ziolkowski 1981: 63–70); after all, S. had assured M. that the task of composing such an oration was not at all demanding (235d). The position of the speaker here seems more in line with that of Gorgias (Wickkiser 1999: 66–9); in his *Encomium of Helen* he calls *logos* a powerful

lord which, despite its small and inconspicuous substance, accomplishes the most godlike *erga* (DK 82 B11.8). In the following sentences P. presents the challenge facing the speaker in purely linguistic terms, namely how to organize the material, rather than in terms of how to find words to match the extraordinary deeds that are the nominal subject of the speech. **e3–237a1 δεῖ δὴ . . . παραμυθούμενος:** the organization of the speech is clearly laid out in a sentence articulated around the antitheses living/dead and younger/older, expressed in parallel clauses that end in rhyming words:

- (1a) τοὺς μὲν τετελευτηκότας ἱκανῶς ἐπαινέσεται,
 (1b) τοῖς δὲ ζῶσιν εὐμενῶς παραινέσεται,
 (2a) ἐγόνους μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοῖς . . . παρακελευόμενος,
 (2b) πατέρας δὲ καὶ μητέρας . . . παραμυθούμενος.

What is needed is a speech that will praise the dead (1a) and encourage the living (1b), by exhorting the sons and brothers of the deceased to follow their example (2a) and by consoling their parents and grandparents (2b). The key terms will later be repeated at the start of each section of the oration: ἐπαινοῦντες 237a2, παρακελεύομαι 246b6–7, παραμυθεῖσθαι 247c5–6. **e3 δεῖ δὴ:** connective δὴ, “accordingly,” is often found in the company of δεῖ, introducing an expression of what is required given what has been stated in the previous sentence; e.g. *Cra.* 428d6, 436d4, *Symp.* 184c7, 201d8, *Rep.* 1.347b10; *GP* 239. **e5 ἐγόνους μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοῖς:** the brothers of the deceased, referred to briefly by Pericles (*Thuc.* 2.45.1), will not be mentioned again; they are included here for the purpose of creating an expression that exactly balances πατέρας δὲ καὶ μητέρας. By mentioning the brothers P. includes in this clause the present generation along with the next, paralleling the following clause, which embraces the previous generation along with the one before it. **e7 ἄνωθεν:** for the meaning, “from earlier ages,” see *Tim.* 18d3 τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἄνωθεν γονέας, *Theocr.* 22.163–4 ὑμεῖς . . . | καὶ πατέρες καὶ ἄνωθεν ἅπαν πατρῷον αἶμα. **τούτους δέ:** for apodotic δέ following a conditional protasis, see *GP* 180–1. Here the protasis is equivalent to a relative clause (“if any” = “any who”), in which case “the apodosis normally opens with a demonstrative (ὁ, οὗτος), or personal pronoun” (*GP* 178).

237a1–2 τίς οὖν . . . ἀρξάμεθα: cf. *Parm.* 137a7–b1 πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; *Phlb.* 15d1–2 πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἀρξεται . . . μάχης; *Soph.* 242b6–7 τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἂν ἀρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; One or more such “rhetorical” questions are commonly found at the beginning of an oration; e.g. Gorgias DK 82 B11a.4, Andoc. 1.8, Hyperides 6.6–10. In this respect the orators seem to be repeating a poetic commonplace: H.

Od. 9.14, *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 19, *Aesch. Choe.* 855–8, *Eur. El.* 907–8, *IA* 442; Hunter 2018: 125–35. **a2 ἀρξάιμεθα . . . ἐπαινοῦντες:** for the participle, cf. *Symp.* 186b2–3 ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, as the physician Eryximachus begins his speech, after praising the beginning but criticizing the end of Pausanias’ speech. **a3 ζῶντές τε . . . καὶ τὴν τελευτήν:** the living/dead antithesis is used in two ways in the funeral orations, to distinguish the survivors from the deceased (236e4, 248b7–c1, *Lysias* 2.3, 74) and to oppose the lives of the *laudandi* to their death (*Lysias* 2.69, *Dem.* 60.1–2). Here the speaker creatively combines the two, noting that they benefited the living both while alive and by their death. Throughout the funeral oration P. uses τελευτή and τελευτῶ to refer to death and dying; unlike the other writers of funeral orations he avoids the words θάνατος and ἀποθνήσκω (although those words are used in the opening dialogue: 234b6, c2, 236d3). **a3–4 τὴν τελευτήν ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν ζώντων σωτηρίας ἠλλάξαντο:** imitated by Lycurgus in *Against Leocrates* 88 τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν ἀντὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι, contrasting the cowardice of Leocrates with the self-sacrifice of such legendary Athenians as Codrus (from whom P. was supposed to have descended: *D.L.* 3.1). **a4 δοκεῖ μοι:** the asyndeton contributes to the illusion that this is a real answer to a real, as opposed to a rhetorical, question. **a5 ὥσπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγένοντο:** in the context of a speech honoring those who have been killed in war, this expression is inevitably taken as the standard euphemism used to refer to death on the battlefield; see 242b6–7, 243c4–5, 245e7, 246a1, *Thuc.* 2.35.1, *Lysias* 2.25, 51, *Dem.* 60.1, *Hyperides* 6.28; Herrman 2009: 75. But this understanding of the words is undermined by what has just been said, that the *laudandi* gave pleasure διὰ ἀρετὴν to their loved ones *during their lifetimes*, and by what will follow, that they were ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ *by birth*. It was not their death in battle that rendered them, or revealed them to be, ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ; they derived their *aretê* merely from their having been born in Athens. Thus, so far from the words ὥσπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγένοντο meaning “in that they faced death with fortitude,” they appear to be used as a gloss on κατὰ φύσιν, meaning “in that they were born ἀγαθοὶ.” P. takes advantage of the gaping ambiguity in the words ἀγαθός and γενέσθαι to leave unresolved the questions that S. and Protagoras, with help from Prodicus, explore (unsatisfactorily) in their discussion of Simonides’ poem at *Prot.* 339a ff. **a6 ἀγαθοὶ . . . ἐξ ἀγαθῶν:** quoted by Libanius (*Or.* 59.10), this is an example of epanalepsis, a figure that calls attention to a statement’s conclusiveness by enclosing it within a repetition of the same word or words at beginning and end, as in Shakespeare’s “Kings it makes gods and meaner creatures kings” (*Richard III*, Act v, scene ii, a future king speaking of Hope). **a7 εὐγένειαν οὖν πρῶτον:** just as the

first element, after the exordium, of the encomium of an individual is praise of the subject's good breeding (Burgess 1902: 119–22), so here the speech will begin with εὐγένεια. This had been prepared for by the wording of the previous lines, with its emphasis on the vocabulary of birth and generation (γεν-, φύσιν, φῦναι). But rather than sing the praises of the aristocratic ancestors of an individual, the oration will include in its laudation the common ancestry of the deceased, the audience and, as it happens, the speaker himself.

237b1–2 ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις . . . ἀπιφάναντο “After that let us demonstrate how splendid were the accomplishments that they exhibited, and how worthy they were of them” (i.e. of their ancestry, upbringing and education, τούτων having the same reference as τούτοις). This is an example of prolepsis (CGCG §60.37), with τὴν τῶν ἔργων πράξιν promoted from the subordinate to the main clause and with the adjectives καλὴν καὶ ἀξίαν in “predicate” position (235c1n.). In the *Symposium* Diotima uses the same language when speaking of lawgivers like Lycurgus and Solon: πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα, 209e2. **b1 τὴν τῶν ἔργων πράξιν** “the performance of their accomplishments”; cf. the second *Tetralogy* of Antiphon, where the defendant draws a distinction between the verbal narrative and the way the events in fact occurred (ἡ πράξις τῶν ἔργων, 3.4.9), and Thucydides’ programmatic statement, distinguishing between his reporting of speeches and of the course of events (τὰ δὲ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων, 1.22.2). Despite the speaker’s clear outline of the topics to be covered in the funeral oration, and despite the use here of the verb ἐπιδείξωμεν, which is redolent of the specificity affected by the genre of “epideictic” oratory (241a7n.), there is to be no demonstration of the accomplishments of the deceased. Instead, after a lengthy account of earlier Athenian exploits the speaker will pass over the deeds of the deceased in a *praeteritio* (246a5–b2).

237b3–238b6: THE BIRTH, REARING AND EDUCATION OF THE ANCESTORS

The speaker begins not with mortal ancestors but with the Attic soil as the mother of the Athenians. Reference to the myth of Athenian autochthony is found in all the complete surviving funeral orations (Thuc. 2.36.1, Lysias 2.17, Dem. 60.4, Hyperides 6.7). “Autochthony,” however, can be used in one of two ways, a more general signification referring merely to having lived always in the same location, like the Libyans (Hdt. 4.197.2) or the Arcadians, and in the stronger sense of literally having the Earth as one’s mother, like the Theban Spartoi or the Earth-born Erichthonius, shown

in fifth-century art being delivered to Athena by his mother, who is rising out of the ground (e.g. Loraux 1993: Plates 3 and 4). The latter is appropriate only for legendary kings or other elite males to whom aristocratic families might trace their ancestry; the former applies to whole peoples. The Athenians, unlike other Greeks, had no tradition of having migrated from elsewhere, and so they considered themselves to be autochthonous in the more general sense. Athenian democratic ideology, encouraged perhaps by the practice of referring to the citizens as Erechtheidae (e.g. Eur. *Med.* 824), began to speak in metaphorical terms of the whole populace as having sprung from the soil, as though all Athenians belonged to the same aristocratic *genos*. (In similar fashion, each of the ten newly created tribes into which the population was distributed under the reforms of Cleisthenes was named for a hero from whom all the members supposedly traced their descent.) P. takes this to the extreme and literalizes the metaphor, as he does in the explicitly fabricated grandiose falsehood foisted upon the citizens of Callipolis in the *Republic* (414b–e). In the *Republic*, however, the myth is used explicitly to account for the inequality in the citizen body, whereas here it underpins the democratic fiction that all Athenians are of equal status (Coventry 1989: 12). There is irony here, undoubtedly deliberate, in that the “author” of the speech, who uses first-person pronouns (237d5, e2, e5) to include herself along with the deceased and the audience in claiming descent from the Attic soil, was born in Asia. For Athenian autochthony, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1993: 37–71; Loraux 2000.

237b3 τῆς δὲ εὐγενείας πρῶτον “To take their noble ancestry first . . .” For the genitive of respect or reference announcing the topic about to be addressed, see 241a2n. **b4 οὐκ ἔπηλυς οὔσα**: defining autochthony in the general sense, as Praxithea does in Euripides’ *Erechtheus* fr. 360.7–10, explaining her willingness to allow her daughter to be sacrificed in order to ensure victory against Eumolpus (239b3n.): there is no city more deserving of salvation than Athens, whose citizens have not immigrated from elsewhere but are indigenous (οὐκ ἑπακτός ἄλλοθεν, | αὐτόχθονες δ’ ἔφουμεν), in contrast to other cities, whose populations are εἰσαγώγιμοι. For the opposition ἔπηλυς/αὐτόχθων, see Hdt. 4.197, Isocr. 4.63, 12.124. **τούς ἐγγόνους τούτους**: the pronoun has the same reference as τοῖσδε (239a6n.), but we cannot be sure of that until we reach ὠίκουν (c1). That is, initially we may be encouraged to think that the speaker includes the audience among those referred to. Indeed, everything said here about the deceased applies equally well to all Athenian citizens, living or dead. **ἀποφηνάμενη**: there is a surprising anacoluthon in this sentence. It would not be in the least surprising in another dialogue, where

P. attempts to reproduce the effect of characters speaking impromptu (234c2–235b2n.). But this purports to be a carefully prepared speech and this sentence is otherwise artfully constructed with balancing clauses structured around participles – there are no fewer than eleven of them, not counting τῶι ὄντι – and the repeated pattern “not A but B” (234c5n.). Everything from here on depends on the participle ἀποφνηαμένη, which is initially construed with participles but then, apparently, governs the infinitive κείσθαι. Construction with the infinitive is much less common, but is attested (*Soph.* 268b7, *Th.* 168b5). The motive for the change of construction seems to have been a desire to avoid two consecutive participles, with one dependent on the other, itself dependent on a third. **b5 μετοικοῦντας**: by using this verb the speaker hints at the distinction between genuine Athenians and metics, non-citizen resident aliens like Lysias, whose father, an immigrant to Athens, we meet at the beginning of *Republic*. Metics had financial and military obligations to the city in which they resided but had only limited legal rights; for the status of metics, see Kamen 2013: 43–61. **b6 οἰκοῦντας καὶ ζῶντας**: cf. *Rep.* 3.416d4–5 ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, the one referring to the location and particulars of one’s habitation, the other to the manner and quality of one’s existence, as illustrated by Isocr. 4.39 ἀνόμως ζῶντας καὶ σποράδην οἰκοῦντας. **b7 οὐχ ὑπὸ μητριᾶς ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι** (sc. τρέφονται): the “others” are the rest of the Greeks, none of whom, according to Dem. 60.4, are autochthonous, and thus, by implication, are virtually metics in their own land. The opposition between one’s native land and a foreign country in terms of the opposition between mother and stepmother underlies Artemidorus’ claim (*Onir.* 3.26) that a dream of one’s stepmother (or stepfather) portends foreign travel. For the negative stereotype of the stepmother, see Hdt. 4.154.2, Eur. *Alc.* 305–10, *Ion* 1025, 1329–30, fr. 4 Kannicht (*Aegeus*); Watson 1995.

237c1 κείσθαι: for the change of construction from participle to infinitive, see b4n. **c2 ἐν οἰκείοις τόποις τῆς τεκούσης**: cf. *Laws* 9.865e8–9 τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους συμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος. **c2–3 τεκούσης καὶ θρεψάσης καὶ ὑποδεξαμένης**: cf. Lysias 2.73 τεκεῖν μὲν καὶ θρέψαι καὶ θάψαι. The three participles recapitulate the three stages through which the sentence has progressed: γένεσις, τρεφομένους, κείσθαι τελευτήσαντας. It is especially appropriate that the earth-born Athenians should find their final resting place in the bosom of their mother. For the common notion that Mother Earth gives birth to and nurtures all and takes all back in death, see Aesch. *Choe.* 127–8 γαῖαν . . . , ἥ τὰ πάντα τίκτεται | θρέψασά τ’ αὐθις τῶνδε κῦμα λαμβάνει, Eur. *Suppl.* 536 τὴν θρέψασαν αὐτὸ δεῖ λαβεῖν, fr. 839.7–9 Kannicht (*Chrysiippus*) μήτηρ πάντων νενόμισται (sc. Γαῖα). | χωρεῖ δ’ ὀπίσω

| τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας φύντ' εἰς γαῖαν, fr. 195 (*Antiope*) ἅπαντα τίκτει χθῶν πάλιν τε λαμβάνει. **c3 δικαιοτάτων δῆ:** emphatically using the superlative to correct Pericles who, after his exordium, says, "I shall begin first with their ancestors, for it is right . . ." (ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον· δίκαιον γὰρ . . . , Thuc. 2.36.1). Pericles goes on to praise the ancestors for their continuous habitation of the land, although he does not use the word αὐτόχθων. The speaker here, representing the Athenians as sprung from the land, insists that praise of the land is equivalent to praise of the ancestors, "for in this way the nobility of these men is, at the same time, necessarily celebrated" (c4; for συμβαίνω + participle, see *Euthd.* 281e2–3, *Phlb.* 42d3). **c3–4 κοσμηῆσαι . . . κοσμουμένη:** the repetition rounds off this section of the speech, which began with the repetition κόσμον . . . κόσμος, 236d7–e2. These words recur repeatedly in the oration, always expressing the honor conferred by the speaker or the city, either on the deceased (239c1, 246a3, 248c5) or on their children (249a7, b2). P.'s use of these words reinforces the earlier suggestion (236e1–3n.) that what the speaker says is at least as important as the acts of the *laudandi*. By contrast, Pericles asserts that it was the *aretai* of the deceased that conferred the honor (ἐκόσμησαν, Thuc. 2.42.2) on the city. **c5 ἔστι δὲ ἄξια ἢ χώρα:** the speaker begins a series of "proofs" of why the Attic land is deserving of universal praise: it was fought over by the gods, it gave birth only to tame creatures, most notably human beings, and it produced nourishment suitable for consumption by humans, for whose benefit it also provided deities to serve as leaders and educators. The passage is laden with language characteristic of the lecture halls of the sophists; for μαρτυρία and τεκμήριον, see Thomas 2000: 190–200. **c6–7 πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, πρῶτον δὲ καὶ μέγιστον ὅτι** "for many other reasons, but first and foremost because"; cf. *Symp.* 178a8–9 πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὐχ ἥκιστα δέ, from the opening of Phaedrus' encomium. A frequent means of highlighting a particular item or topic is to call the audience's attention to the many other items or topics from which this one stands out, using various forms of πολλ- and ἄλλ- in the μὲν-clause: *Cri.* 45c1–2, *Euthd.* 303c5–7, *Gorg.* 463b2, *Parm.* 133b4, *Rep.* 9.584b4, 10.595a1–3, *Symp.* 221c2–3 (μὲν . . . ἄλλά). **πρῶτον δὲ καὶ μέγιστον:** cf. Hdt. 2.22.2 πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον μαρτύριον, from his lecture on the Nile, and Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* (DK 82 B1 1a.29) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ δεύτερον καὶ μέγιστον. **c7 θεοφιλῆς:** Athens is described as θεοφιλεστάτη by Athena at Aesch. *Eum.* 869, as is an unnamed city, perhaps Athens, by a character in Eupolis fr. 330 PCG. Aegina (Pind. *Isthm.* 6.66) and Argos (Bacchyl. 11.60) are also θεοφιλεῖς. The meaning of the word is the focus of much discussion in *Euthyphro*, a dialogue that almost certainly predates *Menexenus*; Euthyphro had defined τὸ ὄσιον as that which is loved by all the gods (9e1–2), but S.

reduces his interlocutor to *aporia* (11b6) by showing that by calling something θεοφιλέσ one has merely named an accidental property of that thing, not defined its essence. Here the speaker gives as “the first and most important” reason the territory of Athens deserves praise the fact that it happens to be (τυγχάνει οὔσα) the object of the gods’ affection. Further, the “evidence” given for that affection is the supposed fact that the gods quarreled over possession of Athens, but in *Euthyphro* S. is not willing to commit himself to a belief that the gods quarrel among themselves (6b2–c9, 8e7 εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί), and in *Republic* he insists that the young people of Callipolis should not be exposed to such stories, since they are not even true (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, 2.378c1). Critias is of the same opinion, explaining that, in ancient times, the regions of the Earth were apportioned to the various gods not through strife (οὐ κατὰ ἔριν, *Criti.* 109b2) but by lot. **c8 ἡμῖν τῶι λόγῳι:** cf. Hdt. 2.18.1 and 4.29 μαρτυρέει δέ μοι τῆι γνώμηι, where, however, some MSS read μου; here the MSS’ ἡμῶν is unnecessarily emphatic (= “my statement”; cf. 236c4n.), whereas ἡμῖν, like μοι, is appropriately postpositive. For unemphatic, virtually enclitic ἡμῖν, cf. 238e1; Probert 2003: §292.

237d1 ἔρις τε καὶ κρίσις: at *Rep.* 2.380a1 S., discussing the false stories that are to be banned from the ideal state, says, “we shall not approve the θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν brought about by Themis and Zeus,” referring to the Judgment of Paris. Here the reference is to the rivalry of Athena and Poseidon, who were vying for the land of Athens (ἐρίσαντας περὶ τῆς χώρης, Hdt. 8.55; *LIMC* “Poseidon” nos. 236–48). According to the version of Apollodorus, Poseidon claimed the city for himself by striking the acropolis with his trident, while Athena put down roots by causing an olive tree to grow on its rocky summit; Zeus appointed a panel of arbitrators and the land was judged to belong to Athena (ἡ χώρα τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἐκρίθη, *Bibl.* 3.14.1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 28) condemns P.’s reference to this rivalry as trite, claiming that it is found in nearly all speeches praising the city. But none of the other funeral orations mentions it; presumably P. has gone out of his way to include it precisely because of his disapproval of such unseemly stories (c7n.). **d2 συμπάντων:** more emphatic than πάντων in c5, lending force to the rhetorical question that concludes the specious a fortiori argument. **d2–3 δεύτερος δὲ ἔπαινος:** the second ground for praise is that, in the earliest times, the Attic land was free of wild beasts, and gave birth instead to the human race. Evidence for this claim follows. **d3 ἐκείνῳι τῶι χρόνῳι** “that remote time,” equivalent to ἐν τῶι τότε (e7); cf. 239d5, *Criti.* 111a8, *Pol.* 271a7, *Tim.* 91a1. ἐκεῖνος does not serve merely as the correlate to the relative pronoun, which in Greek is normally οὗτος (KG I 647). **d3–4 [ἡ] πᾶσα γῆ** “every land.”

The article has been deleted because the expected contrast with ἡ ἡμετέρα (*sc.* γῆ) d5 is not “the whole earth” (for which P. uses the order πᾶσα ἡ γῆ) but “every land”; cf. *Criti.* 110e3-4 πᾶσαν γῆν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνθάδε ὑπερβάλλεσθαι (“every land was surpassed by this land”). **d4** θηρία τε καὶ βοτᾶ “wild and domesticated animals”; the latter is a poetic word, glossed by the scholiast with τὰ βοσκήματα, not found in prose before the Roman period except here and in a late fourth-century *lex sacra* from Cyrene (*SEG* ix 72.31). **d6** ὄ: with neuter ζῴιον (understood from ζῴιων) as antecedent and μόνον d7 in agreement. **d7** συνέσει: for σύνεσις, “reason, understanding,” as distinguishing (along with language) humans from beasts, see Eur. *Suppl.* 203-4, *Tro.* 671-2. **d7-e1** δίκην καὶ θεοῦ μόνον νομίζει: according to the myth told by P.’s Protagoras, the human race alone among creatures embraced worship of the gods (ζῴιων μόνον θεοῦ ἐνόμισεν, *Prot.* 322a4) and received αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην (322c2) from Zeus. For δίκην νομίζειν, compare Hdt. 4.106, describing the Man-eaters as οὔτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμῳ οὐδενὶ χρεώμενοι, well translated by Robin Waterfield as “they have no sense of right and wrong.”

237e1 μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ: cf. *Symp.* 195a8-b1 μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ, spoken by Agathon. P. puts the expression μέγα τεκμήριον in the mouth of speakers who are conversant with the latest fashions in argumentation, like Agathon (again at *Symp.* 196a5), Gorgias (*Gorg.* 456b1), Critias (*Criti.* 110e6) and Euthyphro (*Euthphr.* 5e2-3); also Aristophanes in his parodic encomium (*Symp.* 192a5-6) and S. himself when lecturing Protagoras (*Prot.* 341e1). Here, the “strong evidence,” such as it is, is given in the following sentence, introduced, as often following τεκμήριον, σημείον and the like, by γάρ (*GP* 58-9); the ὅτι-clause clarifies τῷ λόγῳ (“namely that . . .”). **e2-3** πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τεκόν: cf. Dem. 60.5 πάντα γὰρ τὰ τίκοντα ἅμα καὶ τροφήν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἀπὸ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως φέρει, offering this as an indication (σημείον) that the land is “the mother of our ancestors.” P.’s argument here seems to be that (1) whatever gives birth provides suitable sustenance for its offspring; (2) the Attic land was the first and only provider of sustenance suitable for humans; therefore, (3) Attica gave birth to “these men’s ancestors and ours.” Support is enlisted in the form of an analogy with lactating mothers. But the analogy cuts two ways. The statement that the Attic land altruistically shared its bounty with “the others” (238a6) portrays Attica as a generous wet nurse, thus raising the awkward question as to who those others could be. In point of logic, the argument proves that all humans, not only Athenians, were born from the Attic soil (cf. e6-7 ὡς ἀνθρώπους γεννησαμένη), which rather dilutes the special status that the speaker wishes to confer on his fellow citizens. In making Athens the home of all humankind P. goes well

beyond even the outrageous innovation of Euripides, who, at the height of the Peloponnesian War, puts into the mouth of Athena the claim that the Athenian Creusa is the ancestor of all Greeks (*Ion* 1587–94). **e3** ὧι καὶ γυνή δήλη “by which it is clear, also in the case of a woman, . . .” The antecedent is the content of the earlier part of the sentence; that is, whether a woman has truly given birth or not is revealed by whether she can provide sustenance for her young. According to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.1357b15–16), if a woman is producing milk, that is a necessary indication (τεκμήριον) that she has given birth. **e4** ἀλλὰ ὑποβαλλομένη “but is trying to pass off someone else’s child as her own,” elaborating on καὶ μή. **e5** πηγὰς τροφῆς: Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 28), ignoring the fact that P. is here making a comparison with the earth, ridicules P.’s use of this expression in place of the plain word for “milk”; the expression is repeated by Plutarch (*mor.* 3d, where it = “breasts”) and Clement of Alexandria (*Paed.* 1.6.49), both of whom either quote or paraphrase the Platonic context. **e7** μόνη . . . καὶ πρώτη: for this order of words, as opposed to the more usual πρώτος καὶ μόνος (e.g. Lysias 2.18), see *Laws* 1.628d7, as well as *Dem.* 19.302 and *Aeschin.* 3.76 and 77, in which each orator refers to the other. The odd notion that Attica is the origin of human alimentation can be attributed to the Eleusinian myth found in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. When Demeter went in search of her abducted daughter Persephone she neglected her responsibility to the flourishing of plant life. After she was reunited with her daughter, Zeus sent Rhea to Eleusis, in Attic territory, to ask Demeter to rejoin the gods and restore fertility to the earth. The first place where Rhea alights (457) is the Rarian Plain, near Eleusis. The myth commemorates the founding of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which are intimately connected with the agricultural cycle, but there is nothing in the myth about the origins of humankind. On the contrary, before she restores fertility to the land, Demeter visits the leading human inhabitants of the territory, among whom is Triptolemus (153, 474–7). Later sources, including an early play by Sophocles (now lost) entitled *Triptolemus*, related how this Eleusinian ruler traveled around the world teaching the art of agriculture that he learned from Demeter. This last is perhaps what the speaker is referring to with the claim (238a6) that the Attic land shared its fruits with “the others.” The funeral oration avoids mention of individual gods (238b3n.), and so all this is spoken of in terms of the physical earth rather than in terms of Gaea or Demeter. In sharp contrast to this glorificatory picture of Athens as the place where agriculture originated, Thucydides (1.2.5) attributes to the exiguity of its soil the fact that Attica was never invaded nor was its population displaced, essentially explaining Athenian autochthony (in the general sense) as due to the fact that no one else coveted its contemptible land.

P. was of course aware of the discrepancy between his glowing picture of Attic fecundity in mythic times and the contemporary reality; in the myth of the *Critias* (111a–b) the explanation is given that, over the millennia, massive cataclysms washed away the rich Attic soil.

238a1–2 κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα: Dionysius also heaps scorn on P.’s use of this phrase (*Dem.* 29; Wiater 2011: 347), not recognizing that P. is deliberately adopting an exaggeratedly formal manner. (The expression is rare in P. outside of *Tim.* and *Laws*, where it is fairly common; it occurs in a prose invocation at *Ar. Thesm.* 302–3, for which see Austin and Olson ad loc.) In *Symposium*, Agathon repeatedly praises Eros as κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος (195a7, 197c2, e3), and S. quotes the phrase ironically when he says that the earlier encomiasts had gone out of their way to make Eros appear – to the ignorant but not to the knowledgeable – ὡς κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος (199a1). In *Phaedrus*, S. describes the palinode that he has just offered to Eros as “the fairest and finest of which I am capable” (εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστη καὶ ἀρίστη, 257a3–4), and he goes on to apologize that some of its language was inspired by a desire to appeal to Phaedrus’ tastes. **a2 τῶι ὄντι:** looking back to ἀληθῶς 237e4, with which it is synonymous. **a3 γεννησαμένη:** use of the middle voice for this verb, here and at 237e6–7, apparently with no distinction in meaning from the active (ἐγέννησεν, 237d6), seems to be a mannerism of late P.: *Criti.* 113d2, e7, *Laws* 784e2–3, *Tim.* 34b9. **μᾶλλον δέ:** having proved, with the help of the analogy with maternal lactation, that the Attic soil is truly the mother of the human race, the speaker asserts that the evidence supporting the proof is even stronger than the analogy might suggest. For the analogy does not supply independent evidence; rather, since woman is merely an imitation of the earth, logic would require one to argue from the earth to woman rather than the other way around. In this way the speaker summarily withdraws from human mothers the very distinction that the analogy with the life-giving earth had seemed to confer (Loraux 2000: 83–94). In similar fashion, in *Timaeus*, the Receptacle, which had been compared to a nurse and a mother (49a6, 50d3), is deprived of all distinguishing characteristics at 50d–e. **a4–5 οὐ γὰρ γῆ γυναῖκα μιμήται . . . ἀλλὰ γυνή γῆν:** cf. *Symp.* 196d1–2 οὐ γὰρ ἔχει Ἔρωτα Ἄρης, ἀλλὰ Ἔρως Ἄρη, from Agathon’s Gorgianic encomium of Eros. Here, however, the chiasmic disposition of the nouns renders this an example of the figure *antimetabole*, like Shakespeare’s “I wasted time, and now doth Time waste me” (*Richard II*, Act v, scene v). The force of the perfect tense seems to convey the sense “woman is a simulacrum of the earth.” The association between women and the earth is widespread and is encoded, for

example, in the familiar use of the same word for male ejaculate and for that which farmers plant in the earth (seed, σπέρμα, *semen*). **a6** ἔνιμιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις: this serves to provide an ancestral basis for the Athenians' supposed inveterate altruism, which can be traced back to their origin in the Attic soil. **a7** ἑλαίου γένισιν: traditionally, it was Athena who introduced the olive to Athens (Eur. *Tr.* 801-2; 237d1n.); an olive branch, along with an owl, is shown on the reverse of Athenian coins, the obverse of which bears the image of the goddess. **πόνων ἀρωγήν**: this phrase is criticized as "dithyrambic" by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 29), yet it is used in prose, also in reference to olive oil, by Plutarch (*Alex.* 57.9), Clement of Alexandria (*Paed.* 2.8.69) and Porphyry (*On the cave of the nymphs* 33). Greek athletes considered olive oil to have an almost magical power to restore their strength and enhance their performance (Ulf 1979), for which reason Protagoras calls it "beneficial" to mankind (ἀρωγόν, *Prot.* 334b5).

238b1 θραγαμένη δὲ καὶ αὐξήσασα: marking the end of the section on τροφή, promised at 237a7, and introducing the section on παιδεία, which is surprisingly perfunctory given that it comes from the pen of the founder of the Academy. In both cases, rearing and education, the responsible agents are not the Athenians themselves, but the earth and the gods. **b2** τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα: with "μέν *solitarium*" (235e3n.), as if e.g. τὰ δὲ ἔργα (*Criti.* 109d3), which it would be impious to exclude, were to follow. **b3** [ἴσμεν γάρ]: the speakers of funeral orations refrain from naming the gods not because their names are unknown but, as the speaker has just said, because naming the gods οὐ πρόπει ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε; cf. the reference in Demosthenes' funeral oration to the divine son of Semele, ὃν οὐ πρόπον ἐστὶν ὀνομάζειν ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ τάφου (60.30). The speeches are part of a funeral rite and the gods, being immortal, want nothing to do with the taint of death; Parker 1983: 32-48. For this reason Artemis and Apollo leave the stage before the imminent deaths of Hippolytus and Alcestis (Eur. *Hipp.* 1437 οὐ θέμις, *Alc.* 22 μίασμα). **b3-4** οἱ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν κατισκιάσαν: cf. *Laus* 11.920d7-e1 οἱ τὸν βίον ἡμῖν συγκατεσκευάκασιν τέχνας, where Hephaestus, Athena and Ares are named as the divinities who assisted the craftsmen in furnishing our lives with the everyday τέχνας and with the art of war. **b4** πρὸς τε . . . δῖαιταν: an 11-syllable phrase matched by the parallel 11-syllable phrase καὶ πρὸς τὴν . . . φυλακὴν, with both phrases introducing expressions that end in rhyming, isosyllabic participles, the second of which is enhanced by the parechesis κτήσιν/χρήσιν, bringing the section to an impressive close with one of the oration's favorite clausulae, ∪ - ∪ ∪ × (see 246a3-4n.). **b4-5** τέχνας πρώτους

παιδευσάμενοι: apparently all the arts and crafts, not just agriculture (237e7n.), are here given an Athenian origin. It makes sense, after all, for the gods to teach the crafts first to the first humans.

238b7-239a4: THE ATHENIAN ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ

Having dealt with the origin and, in a sentence, the education of the ancestors, the speaker turns to a consideration of the type of social and political system under which the Athenians live. Pericles had devoted a large portion of his funeral oration to praise of the democratic constitution of his day; Lysias (2.18-19) and Demosthenes (60.25-6) include brief sections of their orations to similar effect. Our speaker claims that the constitution has remained unchanged since the earliest times and that it is an aristocratic one, thus tacitly erasing, or at least disguising, the democratic reforms of Solon, Cleisthenes, Ephialtes and Pericles himself. On this section and its relationship to Pericles' oration, see especially Vlastos 1973: 188-201; Loraux 1986: 172-220.

238b7 γεννηθέντες δὲ καὶ παιδευθέντες οὕτως: summing up and moving on from the previous section, on noble ancestry and education. **b8 πολιτείαν κατασκευασάμενοι:** in contrast to the active *κατεσκεύασαν* b4, which represented the gods as seeing to the organization of the lives of the Athenians for them, the middle here gives the impression that the Athenians themselves were responsible for fashioning their own *πολιτεία*. That impression, however, is shown to be an illusion, since (e1) the Athenian constitution derives automatically from the circumstances of the citizens' birth from the Attic soil. "Constitution" is only an approximate translation of *πολιτεία*, which is the title of P.'s *Republic* and of works by Xenophon, pseudo-Xenophon and Aristotle. The word refers to the way in which the polis arranges its affairs and the degree to which the various residents of the polis are eligible to share in the benefits and responsibilities connected with membership in the polis. **b8-c1 ὀρθῶς ἔχει . . . ἐπιμνησθῆναι:** this is one of about twenty times the speaker justifies the inclusion of a topic or an element as proper, using words like *δίκαιον* and *ἄξιον*, or obligatory, using *ἀναγκαῖον*, *δεῖ* or *χρή*.

238c1 πολιτεία γὰρ τροφή ἀνθρώπων: as Clavaud (1980: 122-3) points out, this stands in contradiction to the very premise of P.'s *Republic*, which examines the state in order to discover justice in the individual precisely because the state reflects the character of the individual, not vice versa. **c3 πολιτεῖαι ἐτρέφησαν:** echoing *πολιτεία γὰρ τροφή* (c1). The argument here is that (1) fine constitutions produce good citizens; (2)

the Athenian constitution is and has always been fine; therefore, (3) the current Athenians, like their ancestors, are good citizens. The flaws in the argument, both logical and historical, need no comment. **ἀναγκαῖον δηλώσαι:** an uncommon expression, used previously by the Athenians at the beginning of their speech before the battle of Plataea, when they say that they feel compelled to justify their claim to occupy the left wing (Hdt. 9.27.1), and again by the fictional Plataeans addressing the Athenians after 373 (Isocr. 14.3). **c6 [ἀριστοκρατία]:** deleted as an explanatory gloss. It inappropriately anticipates the climax of the following sentence and its removal absolves P. from saying that some people call aristocracy “democracy”; the proper referent of αὐτήν c7 is not ἀριστοκρατία but πολιτεία. This sentence explains (γάρ) why the speaker is justified in treating together the present Athenians and their ancestors, because their constitution is the same now as then, which claim is emphasized by the chiasmic arrangement surrounding the repeated νῦν (τότε . . . καὶ νῦν / νῦν τε . . . καὶ τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον). **c7 ὡς τὰ πολλά** “for the most part” (LSJ ὡς Ab.IIIe), brushing aside the decades-long Peisistratid tyranny, the oligarchic coup of 411 and the tyranny of the Thirty in 404. **c7-d2 καλεῖ δὲ . . . ἀριστοκρατία:** with this sentence the speaker mischievously echoes what Pericles had said about the Athenian form of government and what Thucydides himself says about Athens under Pericles’ leadership. In his “obituary” of Pericles (2.65.9), Thucydides claims that, at the time of his death, Athens was in name (λόγῳ μὲν) a democracy but in reality (ἔργῳ δέ) was ruled by its leading citizen. Pericles for his part, in his funeral oration for the war dead, offers an account of their constitution more palatable to a mass Athenian audience. It is, he says, called a democracy (ὄνομα μὲν . . . κέκληται, 2.37.1), because the government aims at the interests of the majority rather than of a few (i.e. contrasting it with an oligarchy); further, everyone is eligible to contribute to the running of the state, regardless of social or economic class, the only criterion being ἀρετή. While Pericles declines to assign a more appropriate label, our speaker, in agreement with Pericles’ emphasis on excellence, offers the term “aristocracy,” explaining (d4–5) that the mass of the population grants authority to those it deems to be the best. At the time P. composed *Menexenus*, “aristocracy” was not yet the recognized term for a specific type of government that it would soon become. Compare *Republic* 1.338d6–7, where the three types of government are aristocracy, tyranny and democracy, with the debate on constitutions in Herodotus (3.80–3; see Pelling 2002), where they are oligarchy, monarchy and rule by the *dēmos*, or *isonomia*. The word “aristocracy” is found only twice before its occurrence here in P., both times in Thucydides and both times as if between quotation marks (3.82.8, 8.64.3). That is, it seems to have been used by oligarchs as

an approbatory term for their preferred form of government, as appears to be borne out by the earliest attestation of the verb ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι, at Ar. *Birds* 125. Oligarchs flatter themselves by referring to themselves as “the best” on the basis of their illustrious ancestry. According to P.’s account here, all Athenians share the same outstanding pedigree; therefore, he can flatter his audience by appropriating and democratizing an oligarchic term, suggesting that rule by the Athenian *dēmos* is rule by the best, since the city’s uniformly excellent population selects the best of the best to rule itself.

238d1–2 μετὰ εὐδοξίας πλήθους “with recognition accorded to large numbers of citizens” (for the genitive with εὐδοξία see [Eur.] *Rhes.* 760), a striking formulation that glosses what Pericles says at Thuc. 2.37.1, when he explains that the government, called a democracy, ensures that each citizen is recognized (ἕκαστος . . . εὐδοκιμεῖ) according to his merits, nor is anyone prevented by poverty from making a contribution (cf. d6). The following sentence explains (γάρ) how widespread are the honors enjoyed by the citizens. **d2** πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία: the juxtaposition, surely deliberate, teases us with the absurd notion that the one word might depend on the other. An “aristocracy of the masses” would seem to be a contradiction in terms, but it is, in effect, how the speaker wishes to portray Athenian democracy. **βασιλῆς**: Athens was thought to have been ruled in the remote past by kings, who are occasionally portrayed on the stage in fifth-century tragedy (239b3, 5 and 6nn.), one of whom claims to have liberated the people and made the city into a monarchy in which everyone has an equal voice (Eur. *Suppl.* 352–3). *Basileus* was also the name of one of the nine Athenian archons in the Classical period. In P.’s day he was chosen by lot (*Pol.* 290e6) for a one-year term, and his duties included supervision of the Eleusinian Mysteries and other ritual procedures, such as trials for impiety and homicide (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 57). In the opening sentence of *Euthyphro* we learn that S. has met Euthyphro at the Stoa of the Basileus (for which, see Camp 1986: 100–5) because both of them have business with the *basileus*, the former having been accused of impiety and the latter bringing charges against his father for murder. It is not clear what connection, if any, there was between the legendary kings of Athens and the annual magistrate. At any rate, it suits the speaker’s purpose to pretend, and his audience’s to believe, that the kingship had been democratized and that now there were so many citizens competent to exercise the office once held by Theseus that a new *basileus* could be selected randomly each year. **d3** τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους, τοτὲ δὲ αἰρετοί: cf. Arist. *Pol.* 3.1285a15–16 αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ αἰρεταί, referring to types of kingship. Ordinarily, αἰρετός is used to distinguish

election from selection by lot (LSJ A. II.2), but αἰροῦμαι can refer in general to assignment to office, with no implication as to the method used (Rhodes 1981: 182, on *Ath. Pol.* 13.2, referring also to αἵρεσις 26.2), and so Andromache calls her wretched fate, over which she has had no control, κλήρωσιν αἵρεσίν τε (*Eur. Andr.* 384). The funeral orations suppress any mention of the lot, a characteristically democratic institution vigorously attacked by opponents of democracy (Loraux 1986: 175). In this context, where Athens has just been described as an aristocracy, the speaker has gone out of his way to avoid acknowledging the fact that the *basileus* owed his position to the lot. With this mention of the *basileus*, the speaker contrives, in the span of a single sentence, to display the inclusiveness of the Athenian constitution, allegedly embracing elements of monarchy, oligarchy (ἀρίστοις) and democracy (πλήθος). **d3-4 ἐγκρατές δὲ τῆς πόλεως . . . τὸ πλήθος:** P.'s true feelings are revealed by the fact that elsewhere he uses the expression ἐγκρατές πόλεως only in the idealistic reference to the philosopher-king (*Rep.* 6.499d4, 501e1-2). **d5 τοῖς ἀεὶ δόξασιν ἀρίστοις εἶναι:** neither this nor δόξας in d8 necessarily implies δόξα in the sense "opinion" as opposed to knowledge or truth (Vlastos 1973: 199-200). They may simply refer to the formulaic means of describing decisions reached by vote of the Boule or Assembly, frequently expressed in inscriptions and quoted by S. at *Phdr.* 258a4: ἔδοξε . . . τῆι βουλῆι ἢ τῶι δήμῳ. **d6 ἀγνωσίαι πατέρων:** cf. Appian *B.C.* 2.1.2 ἀγνωσίαν γένους, applied derisively by Catiline to Cicero's status as a "New Man." Use of the expression here ignores the fact, of which we are reminded at e1, that all Athenians share the same distinguished ancestors. **d8 δόξας σοφός ἢ ἀγαθός:** given the Platonic doctrine of the unity of the virtues, ἢ is surprising, especially after εἷς ὄρος and with ἀρετῆς δόξῃ καὶ φρονήσεως below (239a4). ἢ and καὶ are common manuscript variants, so it is possible that we are dealing with corruption here. **κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει:** repeating in chiasmic order ἀρχάς . . . καὶ κράτος (4-5).

238e2 παντοδαπῶν . . . ἀνθρώπων: it is notable that, at *Rep.* 8.557c1-2, S. says that it is especially in a democracy that the most diverse (παντοδαποί) population is to be found. **e3 ἀνωμάτων:** before they become relatively frequent in *Laws* and *Timaeus*, words from this root occur in P. only here and at *Rep.* 8.547a4, where the Muse explains the origin of stasis in an aristocratic state as due to miscegenation, resulting in an adulteration of the "metals" that characterize the various classes of citizen. **αὐτῶν** "their constitutions (in contrast to ours)"; its position at the head of its clause shows that this normally unemphatic possessive is here emphatic (238c4n.). **e4-5 ἔνιοι μὲν δούλους, οἱ δὲ δεσπότες ἀλλήλους νομίζοντες** "one group regarding the rest as slaves, the other group regarding the

rest as masters." For the compendious use of ἀλλήλους, cf. *Euthphr.* 8d10 οἱ μὲν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν; Riddell §233. Of course, the Athenians, like all Greeks, owned slaves, but they did not enslave fellow Athenians. The speaker's point is that, in tyrannies and oligarchies, with their motley populations, those in power treat their fellow citizens as slaves, whereas in the Athenian "aristocracy," where all citizens are brothers born from a single mother (239a1), all are free (239a5).

239a2 ἰσογονία: P. appears to have coined the word to match the isosyllabic ἰσονομία a3, an instance of parechesis. It occurs only once again before the Byzantine period, in Agrippa's speech favoring *isonomia* (Dio Cassius 52.4.1-3), a passage bearing unmistakable verbal similarities to ours. **ἡμῶς:** object of ἀναγκάζει and subject of ζητεῖν, its placement between ἰσογονία and ἡ κατὰ φύσιν corresponding to the placement of ἀναγκάζει ζητεῖν between ἰσονομίαν and κατὰ νόμον. For the position of the unemphatic pronoun, see 237c8n. **a2-3 ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν:** a deliberately paradoxical formulation, worthy of the cleverest of the sophists. In the time of S. and P. *nomos* and *physis* were generally regarded as antithetical (see 245d3-4 and e.g. *Prot.* 337d1 φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ, with Denyer ad loc.); conservatives celebrated *physis* as justifying inequality in political power according to supposedly "naturally" occurring differences among people depending upon circumstances of their birth, while for progressives *nomos* represented the civilizing force that ensured a fair distribution of rights and responsibilities (Guthrie 1969: 55-134). In particular, *isonomia* "was so closely associated with democracy that it even served as a name for that constitution before *demokratia* came into use" (Vlastos 1973: 164). Thus the speaker's phrase here attempts to satisfy all members of his audience by reconciling democratic *isonomia* with aristocratic *physis* on the pretense that the Athenians' equality of rights is based on their natural equality of birth (cf. κατὰ φύσιν 237a5). **a3-4 μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ (neuter)** "on no other grounds." **a4 δόξει:** cf. 238d5 and d8nn.

239a5-c7: LEGENDARY ATHENIAN TRIUMPHS

In a *praeteritio* the orator mentions four Athenian military successes from the mythical past, but he declines to describe them in detail, on the grounds that the poets have adequately extolled the virtues of those legendary ancestors. Two of those victories, against the Amazons and the Thracians, involved defending Athenian freedom against foreigners invading Attic territory; the other two were instances of Athens coming to the aid of other Greeks. This section, then, parallels and prefigures the following account of the Persian Wars, in which the Athenians (with

no mention of their Plataean allies) first withstood the Persian invasion at Marathon and then helped defend the freedom of the rest of Greece.

239a5 ἐν πάσῃ ἐλευθερίαι: cf. *Laws* 3.699e4 ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, with ἐπὶ πᾶσαν δουλείαν in the previous line. When modifying an abstract noun πᾶς can = “complete, total, absolute” (Gildersleeve §651). **a5–6 τεθραμμένοι . . . καὶ καλῶς φύντες:** this section begins with an expression summarizing what has gone before, as had the previous section (γεννηθέντες δὲ καὶ παιδευθέντες, 238b7). **a5 τε:** both the value and the idiosyncrasy (235a7n.) of F are illustrated here by the fact that it alone correctly preserves τε, while in the following line it alone wrongly adds οἱ before ἡμέτεροι. **a6 οὔτοι:** i.e. the deceased, referred to in the previous line by τῶνδε. For οὔτος and ὅδε having the same reference, see 237b3–4, *Apol.* 24e3–4; *KG* I 644–5. **καὶ καλῶς φύντες:** cf. *Lys.* 2.20 καὶ φύντες καλῶς. The intransitive root aorist (*CGCG* §13.64) refers to an event, their birth, while the parallel perfect participle τεθραμμένοι denotes the completion of the process of their upbringing. The deceased and, by extension, the speaker and his audience share the same εὐγένεια and τροφή (237a7) that are the object of the speaker’s encomium. **a7–b1 πολλά δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφάναντο . . . καὶ ἴδιαί καὶ δημοσῖαι:** cf. *Phdr.* 244b1–2 πολλά δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἴδιαί τε καὶ δημοσῖαι . . . ἠργάσαντο, from S.’s rhetorically and poetically charged “palinode,” and *Symp.* 209e2 πολλά καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα, from Diotima’s account of the poets and lawgivers who have “sired excellence of various sorts.” In *Lysias’ Epitaphios* (2.20, quoted also in the previous note) we read πολλά μὲν καλὰ καὶ θαυμαστά οἱ πρόγονοι τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμένων ἠργάσαντο. **a7 εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους:** as at b8, the preposition conveys the public nature of the display (*KG* I 470, “*coram*”); cf. *Symp.* 179b6–7 μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται . . . εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, and, with ἀποφαίνω, *Dem.* 19.156, 57.50.

239b1 καὶ ἴδιαί καὶ δημοσῖαι: cf. κοινῆι . . . ἴδιαί, 249b4–5. Herrman 2009: 93, commenting on Hyperides’ *Funeral oration* 24 ἴδιαν . . . κοινήν, notes, “This antithesis is common throughout the epitaphioi (e.g. *Thuc.* 2.42.3, *Pl. Mx.* 236d, *Lys.* 2.44, *Dem.* 60.10).” Its use is inspired by the Greek fascination, almost obsession, with polar expressions, such as “land and sea” and “gods and mortals” (Lloyd 1966: 90–4). **ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας:** the Athenians’ commitment to serve as champions of freedom is attributed to the fact that they were raised in complete freedom (a5), which is itself merely a product of their common birth from a single mother (238e5–239a2). **b3 Εὐμόλπου . . . καὶ Ἀμαζόνων:** Demosthenes in his funeral oration pairs the victory over the Amazons with that over Eumolpus (60.8), as does Isocrates on a number of occasions (4.68–70,

6.42, 7.75, 12.193). Like P. here, Demosthenes passes over these mythical accounts, since they are familiar from numerous earlier treatments (60.9). **Εὐμόλπου:** the son of Poseidon, Eumolpus invaded Attica at the head of a Thracian army and was defeated in a battle in which both he and the earth-born Athenian king Erechtheus were killed. The events were the subject of Euripides' lost tragedy *Erechtheus*, for a reconstruction of which see Cropp's text, translation and commentary in Collard et al. 1995: 148–94. The play, which was produced shortly before 420, dramatized the voluntary self-sacrifice of Erechtheus' virgin daughter to ensure victory and the prediction by Athena *ex machina* that Eumolpus' descendants, the Eumolpidae, would become the priestly family at Eleusis. Euripides' drama, then, included a number of themes that appear in the funeral oration: the conflict of Athena and Poseidon for possession of Athens (237d1n.), the importance of individual sacrifice for ensuring the security of the state and the use of victory over a foreign foe to justify Athenian hegemony (if, as seems to have been the case, the incorporation of Eleusis was among Athena's predictions). The play was famous enough that almost a century after its production Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates*, delivered in 331, included a lengthy quotation from it, accompanied by the claim that the patriotic verses served as the education (ἐπαίδευε, 101) of the jury's parents. **Ἀμαζόνων:** the defeat of the Amazons was referred to in the Athenians' speech before the battle of Plataea as one of their glorious achievements (Hdt. 9.27.4; see 235d3–4n.), and it appears in the funeral orations of Lysias (2.4–6) and Demosthenes (60.8). The Amazons are mentioned in Homer (*Il.* 3.189, 6.186), and artists of the Archaic period frequently depict Amazonomachies (*LIMC* "Amazones") as well as scenes of Achilles defeating the Amazon queen Penthesilea. But the earliest surviving reference to their invasion of Athens occurs in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* of 458, when Athena speaks of their encampment on the Areopagus at the time of their campaign against Theseus and the Athenians (685–9). This aspect of the Amazon myth appears to date from the second quarter of the fifth century, created as a legendary precursor to the successful repulse of the historical invasion by the Persians, another army from Asia: Boardman 1982; Tyrrell 1984, with 13–19 on the use of the myth in funeral orations. During the fifth century a number of public buildings in Athens were adorned with Amazonomachies: both the Theseion and the Stoa Poikile housed painted representations, and Amazonomachies could be seen at the Parthenon, both on the metopes and on the shield of Athena Parthenos. **b4 ἐπιστρατευσάντων:** the genitive absolute goes proleptically (*CGCG* §60.37) with only the first of the two coordinated ὡς-clauses, "how they repelled the threat when Eumolpus and the Amazons invaded." **b4–5 ὡς ἡμύναντο, καὶ ὡς**

ἡμυαν: the clauses depend on διηγῆσασθαι b7, their verbs illustrating the distinction between the middle voice (“defend oneself”) and the active (“come to someone’s defense”). **b5 Ἀργείοις πρὸς Καδμείους:** “Cadmeans” is a poetic term, found only here in P. (also at Hdt. 9.27.3 and Lysias 2.7–10), used to refer to the Thebans of legendary times, whose city was founded by Cadmus (245d2–3n.). Oedipus’ son Polyneices recruited an Argive army to help him wrest power in Thebes from his brother Eteocles, as dramatized in Aeschylus’ *Seven against Thebes*. When Polyneices and his allies were defeated, the Thebans refused burial to their enemies, whereupon the mothers of the Seven appealed to Athens for aid. Euripides’ *Suppliant Women*, of the late 420s, portrays that appeal and its success in persuading Theseus to undertake the forcible recovery and burial of the bodies, over which Adrastus delivers a funeral oration (857–917). Although Theseus is the king of Athens, he goes out of his way to contrast the equality and freedom (432–41) that characterize his city with the despotic rule of his Theban counterpart. **b6 Ἡρακλείδαις πρὸς Ἀργείους:** another Euripidean tragedy took its plot from the myth referred to here (mentioned also at Hdt. 9.27.2, Lysias 2.11–16 and Dem. 60.8). *The Children of Heracles* of about 430 (Aeschylus had previously produced a play of the same name, now lost) portrays the plight of Heracles’ orphaned children; they have come to Athens as suppliants in flight from the despotic king of Argos, who has forbidden other cities to receive them. Only Athens, governed now by Theseus’ son Demophon, is willing to admit the suppliants and stand up to the threat of military pressure from Argos; to do otherwise would be for Athens to surrender its freedom (197–8, 243–5, 286–7). **b6–7 βραχὺς ἀξίως διηγῆσασθαι** “insufficient to recount in a manner that does justice to the subject.” For the infinitive, cf. *Prot.* 314b5–6 νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πράγμα διελέσθαι (“young for deciding so great a matter”), *Rep.* 8.556c1 μαλακοὺς καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας (“lacking firmness in their resistance to pleasures and pains”); Stevens 1961. The excuse that the time available to the orator is inadequate for the magnitude of the topic is a rhetorical commonplace: 246a7–b2, *Apol.* 19a1–2, 24a2–4, 37a8, *Tht.* 201b2–4, Lysias 2.1, 54, Hyperides 6.4. Pericles alludes to this topos in his funeral oration, saying that he will pass over (Thuc. 2.36.4 ἐάσω; cf. c2 ἐάν) earlier defenses of Attica against Greek and barbarian invasions because he does not wish to speak at great length among those already familiar with the material. The speaker here adds a further, superfluous, justification; he declines to elaborate on the legendary military successes because they have already been widely and admirably celebrated by poets (for a similar sentiment, see Dem. 60.9), against whom he feels unable to compete in prose. **b7–8 ἐν μουσικῇ sc. τέχνῃ,** “by means of their musical skill,” and not, as it is often rendered,

“in verse” or “in song,” as if P. had written ἐν ὕμνοις or ἐν ποιήμασιν. For the “instrumental” meaning of the preposition, see KG I 464–6. Elsewhere, the phrase either means “in the case (or realm) of music” or it refers to training “in the craft of music.”

239c1 λόγῳ ψιλῶι κοσμεῖν: the juxtaposition of ψιλῶι and κοσμεῖν suggests, despite 237c3–4, that κοσμεῖν is normally the province of poetry rather than of prose (cf. Thuc. 1.21.1 ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι . . . ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον κοσμοῦντες, contrasting the reliability of the historian’s own account with the embellishments of the poets). And yet Alcibiades, in his encomium of S., says that S. alone is capable of producing in prose (ψιλοῖς λόγοις, *Symp.* 215c7) and without instruments the same enchanting effects created by the legendary musicians Olympus and Marsyas. Alcibiades goes on to say (215d) that S.’s unadorned prose affects him to a much greater extent than when he listens even to a very accomplished orator. The funeral oration is not, however, a typical example of S.’s unadorned prose, which aims at uncovering the truth and has the effect of making people like Alcibiades uncomfortable; rather, it is P.’s attempt to reveal the shallowness of a rhetoric that seeks to make its audience feel that it has been transported to the Isles of the Blessed (235c4) by obscuring the truth behind a veil of pretty words and clever phrases in the manner of a poet. **c1–2 τάχα ἂν δεύτεροι φανοίμεθα:** the speaker seeks to mitigate the shame of inevitable defeat by using the attitudinal adverb τάχα, “perhaps,” with the potential optative, and by describing his status as “second.” But coming second in a field of two (prose vs. verse) is tantamount to coming in last. **c3–4 ὧν δὲ . . . ἐν μνηστείαι** “but things for which a poet has not yet secured a reputation worthy of worthy deeds (or, of worthy rewards) and which are still seeking a match (lit. still engaged in wooing)”; that is, the relative pronoun initially depends on δόξαν (for the genitive, cf. a4, *Laws* 5.729d7, *Phdr.* 251a6, *Rep.* 2.361c6, 10.606c6–7) but then must be supplied in the nominative. It is normal for the pronoun in a different case to be omitted in the second of two relative clauses: *Alc.* 1 134e8–9, *Phd.* 65a4–5, 82d2–3, *Rep.* 7.533d4–5; KG II 432. The reading of F (ἐν ἀμνηστίαι) has been adopted by a number of editors, but it is unimaginable that P., or anyone in the fourth century, would say that the events of the Persian Wars were in danger of slipping into oblivion, much less that they were still (ἔτι) unrecalled. It is possible that P. wrote, perhaps coining the word for use here, ἀμνηστείαι, a form attested only by Byzantine lexicographers, who gloss it with ἀγαμία and τὸ μὴ μνηστεύεσθαι (cf. Eur. fr. 818 Kannicht ἀμνήστευτος γυνή, apparently referring to a concubine). For οὔτε . . . τε, common in P., see *Prot.* 309b8–9, with Adam ad loc. **c3 οὔτε ποιητῆς πῶ δόξαν ἀξίαν:** P. was certainly familiar with

the work of poets who had celebrated the battles of the Persian Wars, such as Aeschylus' *Persae*, for which Pericles had served as *chorêgos*, and Phrynichus' *Phoenician Women* and *Conquest of Miletus* (Hdt. 6.21.2), the latter a tragedy with which Aspasia as a Milesian would be especially familiar, as well as the epigrams and elegies of Simonides. Rather, he is indulging in a rhetorical topos, to judge from Phaedrus' assertion that no one had yet brought himself to celebrate Eros in a worthy fashion (ἀξίως ὑμνησαι, *Symp.* 177c3) and S.'s own claim in his "palinode" that no earthly poet had yet adequately praised the region beyond the heavens (οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῆϊδε ποιητῆς . . . κατὰ ἀξίαν, *Phdr.* 247c3-4). **c3-4 ἀξίαν ἐπι ἀξίοις:** with ἀξίως in b6 and τὴν ἀξίαν in c3 it is clear that P. is deliberately repeating the word (he is criticized for inappropriate use of the figure by D.H. at *Dem.* 26; see the Introduction 3(e)ii), presumably in imitation of the way poets and sophists like to play with words from this root (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 1527, *Gorg.* *Palamedes* DK 82 B1 1a.22, 37); cf. Hippias at *Prot.* 337d7-e1 τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον, and the man skilled in creating speeches for the courtroom quoted at *Euthd.* 304e4-5 περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδῆν. **c4 τούτων πέρι:** contrary to the impression given by LSJ (ἐπιμνησκόμαι A.2, where the reference to Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.12 is in error), the verb is rarely found with περὶ + genitive in place of the simple genitive, unless the prepositional phrase serves as a "theme" (*CGCG* §60.33), as it does here, *Tim.* 18c1 περὶ γυναικῶν ἐπεμνήσθημεν, ὡς . . . and Hyperides 6.8 [πε]ρὶ τῆς παιδείας αὐτῶν ἐπι[μνη]σθῶ καὶ ὡς . . . **c5 ἐπιμνησθῆναι . . . προμνώμενον:** the metaphor and the wordplay on -μνησθῆναι had been prepared for by μνηστεία. The verb μνώμαι has two distinct meanings, "call to mind" and "woo as one's bride"; προμνώμαι = "serve as a go-between for someone else" (cf. c6 ἄλλοις) and a προμνήστρια is a matchmaker, the word Hippolytus uses to disparage Phaedra's nurse (Eur. *Hipp.* 589). Here the speaker employs the compound verb in a bold and seemingly unparalleled metaphor for bringing poet and subject matter together, by using his encomiastic skill to call attention (ἐπιμνησθῆναι) to deeds deserving of poetic treatment. Aspasia, the alleged author of the oration, is reputed to have been a matchmaker or even a pander (see the Introduction 3(d)iii), an occupation that S. himself claims he pursues (*Tht.* 149d-151b, Xen. *Symp.* 3.10, 4.56-60). The parallelism in ἐπαινοῦντά τε καὶ προμνώμενον thus expresses forcefully P.'s view of the relationship between encomiastic rhetoric and pandering. **c6 εἰς ὠιδάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν:** cf. *Phdr.* 245a3-4 κατὰ τε ὠιδάς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, from S.'s "palinode," describing the frenzy inspired by the Muses, which results in the composition of both lyric and other types of poetic creation. **c7 πρεπόντως τῶν πραξάντων:** the genitive is found with πρέπον (also at *Rep.* 3.400b2-3 and *Soph. Aj.* 534) as with forms of ἄξιος; cf. *KG* I 379. When Aelius

Aristides (second century AD) paraphrases this passage, he writes εἰς ὠιδάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν θεῖναι, κοσμήσαντας (c1n.) ἀξίως τῶν πραξάντων (*To Plato* 341 Lenz–Behr).

239c7–240e6: THE PERSIAN INCURSION

The speaker begins a summary account of the events of the Persian Wars, which are presented in terms of the Athenian rescue of Greece from enslavement by an invading power. The events, familiar to us from the *Histories* of Herodotus, took place in the generation of S.'s parents and were vividly recalled, and subjected to patriotic embellishment, in subsequent generations. In keeping with standard Athenian ideology, the speaker represents the battle of Marathon as a model for other Greeks to emulate in their fight to retain their freedom. For a detailed account of the battle, see Krentz 2010; for the battle and its enduring afterlife, see the papers in Carey and Edwards 2013.

239d1 Πέρσας ἡγουμένους: asyndeton is common when, as here, “a writer or speaker directly or indirectly announces his theme in advance,” *GP* xliii; cf. Denniston 1952: 109–11. **d1–2 ἡγουμένους . . . Εὐρώπην:** the exact parallelism and equal number of syllables in the two phrases suggest the seeming inevitability of the enslavement that “our ancestors” forestalled when they halted the Persians (ἔσχον; for this meaning of the verb in a military context, see *H. Il.* 11.820, 13.51, 20.27, *Hdt.* 7.171.2, 8.110.3 and lines 5 and 7 of the oracle at *Hdt.* 7.220.4). The opposition freedom/slavery in connection with the Persian Wars is familiar from Aeschylus’ *Persians*, but it is expressed there in terms of the opposition Greeks/Persians (50, 242, 402–3). The Europe/Asia opposition – many Greeks, after all, lived in Asiatic cities – seems to have been a later development, and is pervasive in Herodotus; compare Atossa’s dream, where Xerxes’ intention is to place the yoke of slavery on two women distinguished by their Persian and Dorian, i.e. Greek, dress (*Pers.* 182–3), with the dream of Cyrus, in which Darius overshadows Europe and Asia with the wings that sprout from his shoulders (*Hdt.* 1.209.1). So Lysias in his funeral oration speaks of Darius as ἐλπίζων καὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην δουλώσεσθαι (2.21), where καὶ denotes “in addition to Asia.” Framing the opposition in this way would enable the Athenians to justify their hegemony over Greek cities in Asia (and elsewhere). One of those cities, Miletus, was the home of the alleged author of this speech. **d2 ἔργοι, γονῆς:** the juxtaposition of words from the same root emphasizes the supposed continuity; just as those from whom we have descended are descendants of the earth so are we ourselves children of the earth. **d3 καὶ δίκαιον καὶ χρῆ:** cf. *Thuc.*

2.36.1 δίκαιον . . . καὶ πρέπον . . . τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης δίδοσθαι and 238b8–c1n. For the pleonasm, see 236e1n. **μεινημένους ἐπαινέσαι:** recalling c5 ἐπιμνησθῆναι ἐπαινοῦντα, with χρῆναι preceding. **d4–5 δεῖ δὴ . . . λόγῳ:** no entirely satisfactory explanation of these words has been proposed. As the text stands, it can be rendered literally, “it is necessary to see it (their valor), if one is to deliver a fine speech of praise, being in that time in word.” It appears that the speaker is inviting his hearers to visualize the bravery of the ancestors by relocating them in time by means of speech, aiming at what later writers on rhetoric would call ἐνάργεια, the ability to make the audience think it is witnessing first-hand what the speaker is describing (e.g. D.H. *Lys.* 7, with O’Connell 2017: 124–7). There are, however, several problems: γενόμενον λόγῳ (in word as opposed to in deed?) is difficult to parallel (neither τῶι λόγῳ in 240e6 nor *Laws* 3.683c8 γενώμεθα δὴ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐν τῶι τότε χρόνῳ is comparable); “visualize” is not an attested meaning of ἰδεῖν, nor is it clear what it means to say that “seeing” the valor of the ancestors is indispensable to a fine encomium; further, it is not easy to tell whether γενόμενον refers to the speaker or a member of his audience. Near the end of this section, the speaker seems to be referring back here when he says, “If someone had been in that (time?) he would recognize what sort of men they were with respect to valor” (240d1–2). In addition to the problems posed by the wording, the summary account that follows entirely avoids any description of the battle of Marathon, concentrating instead on the build-up of Persian power and the fall of Eretria. **d5–6 πᾶσα μὲν ἡ Ἀσία:** cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 57 ἐκ πάσης Ἀσίας, 61 πᾶσα χθὼν Ἀσιήτις, 249 γῆς ἀπάσης Ἀσιάδος, 548–9 πρόπασα . . . γαῖ’ Ἀσίς, 763 ἀπάσης Ἀσίδος. The point of the emphasis, both here and in Aeschylus, on the whole of Asia is to magnify the accomplishment of the small numbers responsible for the Persian defeat. The exaggeration is somewhat less in the case of Aeschylus, whose theme is the much larger invasion led by Xerxes; at this point the speaker is referring only to the mission of Datis under Darius. Corresponding to μὲν here is δέ at 240a4, contrasting all Asia with Athens and Eretria. Intervening is the inventory of Persian kings (μὲν . . . δέ . . . δέ), culminating in Darius, whose conquests included campaigns by both land and sea (μὲν . . . δέ), and (δέ) who brought about universal enslavement. **d6 τρίτῳ ἤδη βασιλεῖ:** for ἤδη, often found with ordinal numbers, see 234a6n. “Third” entails a group of at least three, justifying the plural relative pronoun ὧν. Darius (e3) is the third Persian king if one ignores the usurper Gaumata, the “false Smerdis,” whom Darius overthrew (Hdt. 3.61–88); Darius’ son Xerxes ignores him when he enumerates his predecessors in his address to his advisers (Hdt. 7.8α.1), although the ghost of Darius includes him, as “Mardus,” in a similar enumeration at Aesch. *Pers.* 774–5. In any event,

threes are especially common in *Menexenus*, sometimes in clear opposition to other sources: a three-day trance (235c1), a three-day siege (240b4), three major battles against the Persians (241c4), three further actions following Plataea (241d7–e2), a three-day interval (242b3), three wars against Greeks (242e4). **πρῶτος Κῦρος**: Cyrus the Great (d. 530) is “first” in the sense that he founded the Persian empire and, after subjugating the Medes and Croesus’ Lydians, was thought by the Greeks to rule over all Asia. In Aeschylus, however, he is third after Medus and Medus’ unnamed son (*Pers.* 765–8), while Darius is sixth. In the fourth century, particularly among the writers of the Socratic circle, Cyrus was idealized as a thoroughly admirable monarch. He is the subject of Xenophon’s adulatory fictionalized biography, *Cyropaedia*, and Antisthenes wrote at least one dialogue in which he featured as title character (Prince 2015: 144–6). In P., apart from our passage, he is mentioned only at *Alc.*1 105c5, where S. accuses Alcibiades of regarding Cyrus and Xerxes as the only persons who have ever amounted to anything, and at *Laws* 3.694a–695e, where the visitor from Athens faults Cyrus for the same reason S. elsewhere faults Pericles (*Alc.*1 118d–e, *Meno* 94a–b, *Prot.* 319e–320a), namely for failing to provide his offspring with a proper education. **d7–e1 ἐλευθέρωσας Πέρσας . . . Μήδους ἐδουλώσατο**: cf. Hdt. 1.129.4, referring to the result of Cyrus’ overthrow of Astyages, Μήδους μὲν . . . δούλους ἀντὶ δεσποτέων γεγονέναι, Πέρσας δὲ δούλους ἔοντας τὸ πρὶν Μήδων νῦν γεγονέναι δεσπότης. P.’s text seems to mean, “having liberated the Persians, his own fellow citizens, by means of his own φρόνημα (see below), he also simultaneously enslaved their overlords, the Medes.” But the Greek can equally well be construed, “having liberated the Persians, he enslaved his own fellow citizens to his own φρόνημα and simultaneously their overlords, the Medes.” In some ways this is a more natural way of taking the words, since ἅμα καὶ normally joins items that are grammatically and syntactically parallel (although a participle is joined to a finite verb using ἅμα καὶ at *Laws* 8.847a3, 9.871e3 and 11.925e10); further, “his own fellow citizens” is rhetorically more effective as an object of “enslaved” than as a gratuitous apposition to “the Persians.” No matter how we construe the Greek, P.’s wording speaks of an intimate connection between securing freedom for oneself and imposing slavery on others, either one’s fellow citizens or others, by means of conquest. **d7 τῷ αὐτοῦ φρονήματι**: in P., φρόνημα is that aspect of one’s disposition that does not tolerate domination by someone else; it can express itself as a freedom-loving spirit that incurs the suspicion of tyrants (*Rep.* 8.567a5, *Symp.* 182c2) or, when not disciplined by good sense, can itself become an arrogant and even tyrannical temper (*Alc.*1 103b5, *Lys.* 206a4, *Rep.* 6.494d3, 9.573c1, *Symp.* 190b6). φρονήματι can thus be taken equally well as a dative of means with

ἐλευθέρωσας or with ἐδουλώσατο, and translators have varied between the two. But the parallelism with τοὺς αὐτοῦ πολίτας calls for the two phrases to be taken together, and the dative with expressions of enslavement can denote that to which one is enslaved (see d6, *Rep.* 9.589e1), so that both the vocabulary and the syntax are perfectly ambiguous.

239e2 ὁ δὲ ὕψ: Cambyses (d. 522) is nameless also in the list of his predecessors given by Darius' ghost (*Aesch. Pers.* 773), but he is named at *Laws* 3.694c–695e as the ruler who threatened the integrity of the Persian monarchy as a result of his father's failure to bring him up properly (d6n.). **e2–3 Αἰγύπτου τε καὶ Λιβύης:** the genitives depend on ἤρξεν, to be supplied from the previous clause. **e3 ὅσον οἶόν τε ἦν ἐπιβαίνειν** “as far as it was possible to advance,” parallel to μέχρι Αἰγύπτου in the previous clause. ἐπιβαίνειν can be construed with a genitive, but here it is used absolutely (LSJ A. IV.2), as at *Lach.* 183b4–5. **τρίτος δὲ Δαρεῖος:** Darius (d. 486) was one of the seven conspirators who overthrew the usurper Gaumata (d6n.). Hdt. recounts a fabulous story of how he assumed power (3.84–7) and describes his administrative accomplishments (3.89–96), his conquest of Samos (139–49), the suppression of the Babylonian revolt (150–60) and the invasion of Scythia (4.83–144). His ruthless, unprovoked acts of aggression earned the admiration of Callicles, who singles out Darius and Xerxes as illustrating the self-evident fact, supposedly acknowledged by men and beasts alike, that it is natural for the strong to dominate the weak (*Gorg.* 483d). **e3–4 πιεζῆι μὲν . . . ναυσὶ δέ:** parallel clauses of nearly equal length (14 and 15 syllables). **e4 ναυσί:** the Persian navy consisted almost entirely of ships and crews supplied by their subjects, especially the Phoenicians; cf. Hdt. 3.19, recounting Cambyses' inability to attack the Carthaginians by sea, because the Phoenicians refused to attack their kin and because Cambyses' navy was ineffective without the Phoenicians.

240a1 ἀξιοῦν: for the meaning (almost = τολμῆσαι), compare the Persian queen's question whether the Greeks at Salamis had so large a fleet ὥστ' ἀξιῶσαι Περσικῶι στρατεύματι | μάχην συνάψαι (*Aesch. Pers.* 335–6) and Nicias' encouragement to his troops before the naval disaster at Syracuse, telling them that previously οὐδὲ ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς . . . ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν (*Thuc.* 7.63.4). The statement here deviously hints at the fact that the Scythians for their part frustrated Darius' efforts to enslave them precisely by refusing to stand up to him (Hdt. 4.121–42). **ἀντίπαλον:** in P. the word occurs only here and twice in *Alc.* 1 (119e6, 124b1), where it refers to those with whom Alcibiades is, or ought to be, competing. The word appears once each in the funeral orations of Pericles (*Thuc.* 2.45.1), Lysias

(2.38) and Hyperides (6.38). **a2 γνῶμαι δεδουλωμένοι:** the meaning of the metaphor, “their will was reduced to that of a slave, i.e. was rendered non-existent,” is illuminated by its occurrence in the Hippocratic treatise *On fractures*, which dates to the lifetime of P., when the author says (15), of patients who have suffered a broken leg, that a constraint has eliminated their will, because they are unable to stand up (ἀνάγκη καταδουλοῦται τὴν γνώμην, ὅτι ἀδύνατοι μετεωρίζεσθαι γίνονται). The image is found also in Thuc. 7.71.3 (τὴν γνώμην . . . ἐδουλοῦντο) and 4.34.1 (τῆι γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι, with dative, rather than accusative, of respect); cf. Huart 1968: 120. **a2–4 δεδουλωμένοι . . . ἦσαν . . . καταδεδουλωμένη ἦν:** the seeming parallelism is tempered by the chiasmic arrangement of the verbs and their subjects, by the change from passive to middle voice, by the fact that one verb is metaphorical while the other is literal and by the intensifying use of the compound verb following the simplex, for which see Renehan 1976: 22–7; cf. *Rep.* 1.351b2–3 (δουλοῦσθαι . . . καταδεδουλώσθαι . . . δουλωσαμένην) and 9.589d7–e2 (καταδουλοῦται . . . ἐδουλοῦτο), where, however, the verbs are all in the middle voice. **a2–3 ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων:** the exaggerated reference to the totality of humankind, combined with the assertion that no one was willing to stand up to the might of the Persian king, is part of the rhetorical build-up to the claim that only the Athenians stood up to, and defeated, the forces of Darius. **a5 Ἐρετριᾶς:** accusative plural of Ἐρετριεύς. The MSS here and at a8 preserve the uncontracted form Ἐρετριέας, but inscriptional evidence from the fifth century (evidence from the fourth is lacking) indicates that the form in -ᾶς, with the contraction resulting in alpha rather than eta due to the preceding iota, was normal in Attica; see Threatte II 256–7. **Σάρδεσιν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι:** Athens and Eretria were the only mainland Greek cities to send military support to the Ionian cities in Asia when they revolted from Persian rule in 498. The revolt was unsuccessful, but in the course of it the Greek forces managed briefly to capture Sardis, the capital of the Persian satrapy, which was seriously damaged by fire (Hdt. 5.99–102). According to Herodotus, Darius vowed to punish the Athenians for the burning of Sardis (5.105) and used this as an excuse (πρόσχημα 6.44.1, πρόφασις 6.94.1) for invading mainland Greece; further, the burning of the sanctuary of Cybebe at Sardis was the pretext later used by the Persians to justify their burning of Greek sanctuaries (5.102.1). **a6 προφασίζόμενος:** Cobet (1874: 242) proposed deleting the word as superfluous. If it is retained, there are two possibilities: either it is used absolutely, as at Ar. *Lys.* 756, Thuc. 6.25.1 and Dem. 21.82, and the meaning is “after accusing us and the Eretrians of having conspired to attack Sardis, using this as a pretext he sent . . .,” or, since the verb can

govern an infinitive (e.g. Dem. 19.124), we can take the meaning to be “accusing us and the Eretrians, using as a pretext that we had conspired to attack Sardis, he sent . . .” A profusion of participles characterizes the style that P. has affected in this work: 234c5–235b1 with 235a3–6n., 237b4–c3, 242c3–d1, 243c1–6, 244b4–c2, 249a3–b2. A similar accumulation of participles is found in Lysias’ funeral oration (2.14, 37–8, 61–2; Trendelenburg 1905: 22). **μυριάδας μὲν πεντήκοντα:** given that the men arrived by ship, the figure of half a million is absurdly inflated; the same number is given also by Lysias in his funeral oration (2.21). Herodotus (6.95.1) merely refers to a “large and well-equipped army.” Of course, P. and his contemporaries had sources other than Herodotus for the events of the Persian Wars, as we for the most part do not. Reference to the Persian Wars was a common feature of the many funeral orations that were delivered orally and never transmitted as part of the written historical record, nor were the inevitable exaggerations that they contained subjected to challenges and corrections by contemporary historians. These dubious figures may then have been repeated year after year, taking on a specious aura of authority. **α6–7 ἐν τε πλοίοις καὶ ναυσίν** “in transport vessels and warships.” For this position of τε, not uncommon when a preposition governs two nouns, see 243e4 ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ τοῦ ἄστεως; *GP* 518. Herodotus (6.95) speaks of a fleet of 600 triremes and an unspecified number of horse-transport vessels setting out for Greece in 490. He had described an abortive Persian invasion in 492 under Mardonius in which approximately 300 ships were destroyed in a storm as the fleet attempted to round the headland at Athos (6.44.3), perhaps giving rise to P.’s figure here. **α7 Δᾶτιν δὲ ἄρχοντα:** Darius relieved Mardonius of his command after the failure of his mission and replaced him with Datis and Artaphernes, dispatching them with instructions to “thoroughly andrapodize Athens and Eretria and to bring the serviceable captives into his presence” (ἐξανδραποδίσαντας Ἀθήνας καὶ Ἐρέτριαν ἀνάγειν ἐωυτῶι ἐς ὄψιν τὰ ἀνδράποδα, Hdt. 6.94.2; the verb occurs again without the prefix ἐξ- at 101.3, 106.2); cf. *Laws* 3.698c5–6, where, as here, Datis alone is mentioned, πέμψαντος Δαρείου . . . ἐπὶ τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἐρετριᾶς, ἐξανδραποδισάμενον ἀγαγεῖν. For the meaning and horrific implications of andrapodizing, see Gaca 2010. The aim of the practice, by no means confined to barbarian nations or to the ancient world, is to exterminate the conquered population. This was done by killing off all adult males and raping the women of childbearing age, ensuring that the next generation were descendants of the conquerors, on the theory, rather crudely propounded by Aeschylus’ Apollo (*Eum.* 660), that “he who mounts” is the true parent.

240b1 κεφαλὴν ἔχειν: i.e. to avoid being beheaded. Beheading was considered by the Greeks a “barbaric” form of execution and was associated especially with Xerxes (Hdt. 7.35.3, 8.65.5, 8.90.3, 8.118.4; cf. 9.78.3). At *Laws* 3.698c6–7 Darius’ threat is expressed in more conventional language: θάνατον αὐτῷ προειπὼν μὴ πράξαντι ταῦτα. **b2 ἐν τοῖς εὐδοκίμωτατοι:** for ἐν τοῖς serving to intensify a superlative, regardless of the case, gender or number of the superlative, see *Cri.* 43c7–8 ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα, *Symp.* 178c1–2 ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατος; KG I 28–9, Thesleff 1955: §131. It is not true that the Eretrians were the most renowned of all Greeks for warcraft (the MS reading says only that they were “among the most renowned”), but καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγοι implies a preceding nominative and, regardless of the truth of the matter, the expression is rhetorically effective. **b4 τρισὶν ἡμέραις:** elsewhere P. says more vaguely that Eretria was taken by the Persians ἐν τινὶ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ (*Laws* 3.698c7–d1). According to Herodotus (6.101.2), the siege lasted for six days. Whether P. is aware of a different tradition or is substituting the rhetorically attractive number three (239d6n.) or is shortening the duration to magnify the potency of Athens’ adversary cannot be determined. **b4–5 διηρευνήσατο . . . τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ:** at *Laws* 3.698d the visitor from Athens similarly describes the Persian practice of “trawling” in connection with the fall of Eretria, using the verb σαγηνεύειν, from σαγήνη, a net used in fishing. The verb is used by Herodotus to describe the Persian army’s depopulation of the islands of Samos (3.149), Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos (6.31), explaining that the Persian troops would link arms and traverse the islands ἐκ θαλάσσης τῆς βορρῆς ἐπὶ τὴν νοτῆν. He further says that the practice was not employed in the case of the mainland Ionian cities captured by the Persians, “because it was not possible.” Nor could it have been employed in Eretria, despite what P. says here and despite Strabo’s false claim (10.1.10) that Herodotus says that it was. For, as any Athenian would know, Eretria posed the same difficulty posed by a mainland city by virtue of its location on the coast of Euboea, a hilly island with an area of more than 4,000 km², making nonsense of P.’s ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν. P. seems himself to be aware of the falsity of the claim he makes here, as we can infer from *Laws* 3.698d, where the Athenian says, not that Eretria had been trawled, but that Datis dispatched to Athens a terrifying report, “whether true or not,” to the effect that the city had been trawled and that no one had escaped. **b5 ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρια:** for the asyndeton, see 239d1n. **b6 τῆς Ἐρετρικῆς sc. χώρας;** cf. *Laws* 3.698d4–5 πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν. The χώρα is the hinterland, the rural land that comprises the polis along with the urban center (also referred to as the polis); see Hansen 2006: 57–8. **b7 συνάψαντες τὰς χεῖρας:** cf. *Laws* 3.698d4 συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας. **b7–c1 ἅπασαν τὴν χώραν:** cf. b4 πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν. The repetition, and the fullness of expression in general, in the

build-up to the battle of Marathon contrasts noticeably with the complete omission of any account of the battle itself. (Pericles makes no mention of Marathon or the Persian Wars in his funeral oration, most likely because mention of a successful repulse of a massive foreign invasion might be an unwelcome reminder in the winter of 431, in view of the Athenians' unwillingness to oppose the actions of the Spartan king Archidamus in Attica earlier that year; Ziolkowski 1981: 190 n. 17.) We may contrast the treatment given in Lysias' funeral oration, where Marathon is dwelt on at length (2.21-6) and mention of Eretria is conspicuously suppressed, the speaker even going out of his way to explain why the Persians did not attack any city before attacking Athens (22). P.'s reluctance to paint a verbal picture of the battle of Marathon is all the more surprising given that we were earlier told that it was necessary to "see" the bravery of the Athenian heroes (239d4-5n.). P. seems to be using rhetorical means to make the point that the rhetoric of the public funeral oration is merely verbiage with no substance, the object of which is to make the audience think it has heard what it wanted to be told even if nothing has been said.

240c1-2 ὅτι οὐδείς σφᾶς ἀποπεφευγῶς εἶη: cf. b5 ἵνα μηδείς ἀποφύγοι, *Laws* 3.698d3 ὡς οὐδείς Ἐρετριῶν αὐτὸν [*sc.* Δᾶτιν] ἀποπεφευγῶς εἶη. **c3** ὡς ἔτοιμόν σφισιν ὄν "as if there was nothing preventing them"; accusative absolute with an impersonal expression (*CGCG* §52.33), introduced by ὡς (*KG* II 95, *SMT* §864) to express an assumption made by the subject of the sentence but not necessarily shared by the speaker, as at *Euthphr.* 4d1, *Gorg.* 491a2. **c4** ἀνάγκη ζεύξαντας: the "yoke of compulsion" is a poetic metaphor first found in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 216-17; see Aesch. *Ag.* 218, with Fraenkel's note, giving further examples. The metaphor of the yoke is particularly common in connection with enslavement, and both the chorus of Persian elders in Aeschylus (*Pers.* 50) and Xerxes himself in Herodotus (7.8 γ3) speak of the intention of imposing the δούλιον ζυγόν on the Greeks. **ἀγειν**: cf. ἄγοντα, a8. The frequent expression to describe the plundering of a conquered people is ἀγειν καὶ φέρειν (*LSJ* ἄγω A. 1.3), the latter word referring to inanimate property, the former to animate property such as livestock and humans. The equivalence of human slaves and livestock is further evoked by the metaphor of the yoke. **c6** ἰβοήθησεν Ἑλλήνων οὐδείς: that no Greeks came to the aid of either Eretria or Athens is untrue and would have been known to be untrue by both P. and his readers (Walters 1981). According to Herodotus, when the Eretrians learned that the Persians were on their way to attack them they asked the Athenians for aid (Ἀθηναίων ἐδεήθησαν σφίσι βοηθοὺς γενέσθαι, 6.100.1), who responded by providing a force of 4,000 Athenian cleruchs from neighboring Chalcis; these men later

abandoned the Eretrians and crossed over into Attica before the enemy arrived, allegedly on the advice of one of the Eretrians (6.100.3). It is understandable that P. would want to avoid having to refer to this last detail. The Plataeans did not abandon their Athenian allies, coming to their aid in full force (πανδημεί, Hdt. 6.108.1) and occupying the left wing of the army that faced the Persians at Marathon. For their service the Plataeans were included in the public prayer offered up every four years at the Great Panathenaia (Hdt. 6.111.2) and they were depicted in the painting commemorating the battle that everyone could see in the Stoa Poikile (Paus. 1.15.3). Still, their contribution was regularly suppressed by Athenian speakers claiming that the Athenians alone had fought the Persians at Marathon: *Laws* 3.692d5, 698e1 (βοηθεῖν οὐδεις ἤθελεν πλὴν γε Λακεδαιμονίων), Hdt. 9.27.5 (a speech delivered at Plataea; 235d3-4n.), Thuc. 1.73.4, Lysias 2.20, Dem. 60.10-11. We must, therefore, acknowledge the Athenians' willingness to delude themselves and, if they could get away with it, others. Walters (1981: 211), writing before "alternative facts" became a breezy euphemism for lies, complacently notes that this situation illustrates the difference between us and the ancient Greeks regarding what constitutes historical truth. **c7 τῆι ὑστεραίαι:** similarly *Laws* 3.698e4-5; Herodotus (6.120) merely says that the Spartans arrived too late. **c8 ἐκπεπληγμένοι:** cf. *Laws* 3.698d7 ἐξέπληττεν, of the report sent by Datis following the capture of Eretria (b4-5n.), and γνῶμαι δεδουλωμένοι a2n. All the Greeks except the Athenians (and the Spartans) were paralyzed by the approach of the Persians. **ἀγαπῶντες** "being content, or satisfied, with"; in this meaning very rarely governing a direct object, the object normally being neuter: *Rep.* 3.399c1 (τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα), Dem. 6.19 (τὰ παρόντα), Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.38 (τοῦτο). In P. the verb in this meaning is usually found with a participle (e.g. *Rep.* 5.475b1) or more commonly an if-clause (*Gorg.* 483c5, *Meno* 75c1, *Prot.* 327d6, *Rep.* 1.330b6, 5.450a9).

240d1-2 ἐν τούτῳι δὴ . . . γινόμενος: it is not at all clear what noun is to be supplied with τούτῳι; in any event, this is a reference back to the speaker's earlier promise to transport the audience with his words to the time of the Persian Wars (239d4-5n.) in order to "see" the valor of the Athenian soldiers. There the noun χρόνῳι had been expressed, but it is impossible to supply it here after so long a lapse. The aorist tense suggests that the expression means "if one had been present in that (time? situation?)," but for this meaning one would have expected παραγενόμενος. The particle δὴ can have a climactic force, marking, as here, a recapitulation or, as often in P., the culminating item in a series of questions or examples (e.g. *Euthphr.* 10d9, 13b4, *Rep.* 1.333a11, 350a6). **d2 ἄρα:** see *GP*

36–7 for ἄρα marking the sudden recognition of what has, as it turns out, been the case all along (with τυγχάνω, *Th.* 161c9). **d3–4 κολασάμενοι τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν**: middle forms of this verb (apart from the future, e.g., *Rep.* 9.575d4) are very rare. The middle appears in the “poetic” form κολαζόμεσθα at Ar. *Wasps* 406; in P. we find it only here and in Protagoras’ *epideixis*, where it occurs once in the midst of a number of active and passive forms in the expression τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται (*Prot.* 324c1–2). KG I 107 suggests that the middle is used on the analogy of τιμωρεῖσθαι, but in both Platonic passages it seems that auditory considerations are uppermost, namely rhyme (here δεξάμενοι) and syllable count (see next n.). The Athenians are regularly represented in the funeral orations as punishers of wrongdoing: Gorgias DK 82 B6 κολασταὶ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχοῦντων, *Thuc.* 2.42.4, Lysias 2.8, 16, 19, Dem. 60.11, Hyperides 6.5. Elsewhere the role of scourge of arrogance is assigned to Zeus: Aesch. *Pers.* 827–8 Ζεὺς τοὶ κολαστῆς τῶν ὑπερκόμπων ἄγαν | φρονημάτων ἔπεστιν (the ghost of Darius speaking in the aftermath of Salamis), Eur. *Hclid.* 387–8 φρονημάτων | ὁ Ζεὺς κολαστῆς τῶν ἄγαν ὑπερφρόνων (Heracles’ nephew trying to assure Demophon that his Athenians will be successful against the Argives; 239b6n.). The earliest associations of words related to ὑπερηφανία (cf. Hyperides 6.20 τὴν Μακεδόνων ὑπερηφανίαν) are with the monstrous hundred-armed offspring of Gaea and Uranus (Hes. *Th.* 149) and with the hybris of the Epeians who attack Nestor (H. *Il.* 11.694–5). **d4 [ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας]**: without these intrusive words, added to supply an unneeded genitive corresponding to those in the phrases that precede and follow, we have three parallel participial phrases of 12 syllables each (see 235a3–6, 239d1–2nn.). **πρῶτοι**: according to Isocrates’ *Helen*, it was following the Trojan War that there was the first instance of “Europe erecting a trophy over Asia” (10.67). The funeral orations, however, rarely make mention of the Trojan War (Loraux 1986: 69–72), and Demosthenes even goes so far as to compare it unfavorably with more recent achievements on the grounds that it involved the whole of Greece in a ten-year war against only a single city (60.10). **d4–5 στήσαντες τρόπαια τῶν βαρβάρων**: for the expression, cf. Gorgias’ *Epitaphios*, DK 82 B6 τρόπαια ἔστησαντο τῶν πολεμίων, Lysias 2.25 ἔστησαν μὲν τρόπαιον . . . τῶν βαρβάρων. Elsewhere (*Criti.* 108c1, *Tim.* 25c3–4) P., like Lysias, uses the more prosaic singular τρόπαιον, which is regular in Thucydides and Xenophon (the plurals at 243a1 and 245a5 are used in reference to more than one trophy). In verse the plural is more common than the singular, even in reference to a single trophy. For the accent of τρόπαιον (τροπαῖον before about 400 in Attic), see Probert 2004: 285–6. A *tropaion* (for which see Pritchett 1974: 246–75; Kinnee 2018), usually consisting of an upright to which spoils from the defeated enemy were attached, would be set up at

the place where the rout (τροπή) of the enemy occurred, that is, where the enemy literally turned and fled. In the case of Marathon, a permanent monument was erected some thirty years later to replace the trophy that the Athenians constructed after the battle; see Vanderpool 1966. **d5** ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι: the Marathonomachoi are now given the status that the speaker had earlier assigned to the gods (ἀρχοντας καὶ διδασκάλους, 238b1-2) and that S. will assign in the *Republic* to Homer vis-à-vis the tragic poets (διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμών, 10.595c2-3). **d6-7** πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος: parallel phrases marked by exact syllabic equivalence and corresponding assonance, leading up to a poetic clausula (◡ ◡ - ◡ - -) identical to the one that ends the first strophic pair of the Erechtheidae ode in Eur. *Med.* (834 = 845 ἀρετᾶς ξυνεργούς) and is frequent elsewhere in the lyrics of tragedy. **d7** ὑπείκει: for variation between indicative and optative (εἴη) in the same indirect statement, see KG II 365-6; often, as here, that which is spoken of in the optative is contingent upon that which is expressed by the indicative. **εγὼ μὲν οὖν**: unlike the “transitional” μὲν οὖν (*GP* 470-3) at ε6, here the two particles are to be taken separately, with inferential οὖν and “μὲν solitarium” (*GP* 380-2; 235e3n.), “For which reason I, for my part, . . .”

240e2 πατῖρας: the move from the literal (the men who fought at Marathon are the listeners’ biological ancestors) to the figurative (they are the progenitors of European freedom) is rhetorically effective but, on reflection, undercuts, or at least calls into question, the biological basis for Athenian excellence with which the speech began, since ἀρετή can apparently be learned by imitation. **ε3** τῆιδε τῆι ἡπείρω: i.e. Europe (239d1-2n.). At the time when *Menexenus* was written, the Greeks of mainland Asia (τοὺς ἐν τῆι ἡπείρω Ἕλληνας, 245c4-5), including Aspasia’s Milesians, were once again under the control of the Persian king, according to the terms of the King’s Peace of 387 (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.31). **ε4** ἀποβλέψαντες: the basic meaning of the verb is to focus one’s attention on a specific object, usually expressed by εἰς or πρὸς + accusative, by looking away (ἀπο-) from something, or everything, else. (It is not clear whether what was said earlier about “seeing” the valor of the Marathonomachoi is relevant here; see 239d4-5, 240d1-2nn.) In P. the verb is used by S. to describe the inquirer who, after examining a number of particulars, turns to a contemplation of what those particulars have in common (*Cra.* 390e2-3, *Euthphr.* 6e5, *Meno* 72c8, *Phdr.* 237d1, *Rep.* 5.477c8). S. relates this procedure to that of craftsmen, who look away from the object being created to the model or the original being copied (*Gorg.* 503e1, *Rep.* 6.484c7). Given these associations, P.’s use of the verb here suggests that he considers that there is something derivative about the ἀρετή practiced by the Greek pupils (ε5)

of the Athenians who fought at Marathon; the derivative nature of this ἀρετή will be assigned in the next section even to those Athenians who fought at Salamis and Plataea. For craftsmen are engaged in an imitative practice that is not held in high regard by P., and particulars have a contingent status for him, whether in the context of “the full-blown theory of Forms” (Dodds on *Gorg.* 503e1) or otherwise. Part of the purpose of the funeral oration, announced at the beginning and repeated near the end (236e5, 248e3), is to encourage the living to imitate the deceased and their ἀρετή, but nowhere in P. is it seriously proposed that ἀρετή can be acquired merely through imitation.

240e6–241e5: SALAMIS, PLATAEA AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE PERSIAN WARS

The speaker ranks the battles of the Persian Wars in order of merit, the order coinciding, not coincidentally (καὶ ἀριθμῶι καὶ ἀρετῆι, 241c4), with their chronological order. First prize goes to the hoplite victory at Marathon (although the word “hoplite” is never uttered in this or any of the funeral orations), which served as a model for others to follow. Second prize is awarded to the defeat of the Persian forces at Salamis and Artemisium, explicitly labeled as naval victories. Finally, the battle at Plataea is accorded third prize, after which the speaker mentions the engagements at Eurymedon, Cyprus and Egypt, which allegedly caused the Persian king to fear for his safety. By using temporal priority as the criterion, P. accomplishes two objectives: he promotes the notion that the ἀρετή praised in funeral orations is imitative (and therefore derivative), and he circumvents a direct comparison of hoplite service, highly valued by men of P.’s social class, and naval superiority, cultivated by those of a more democratic sensibility (compare Lysias 2.40–3, seemingly elevating the victory at Salamis above all others).

240e6 ἀριστεία: the “prize for valor” awarded to an individual or military unit after a victorious engagement (Pritchett 1974: 276–89); e.g. *Symp.* 220e6 Alcibiades following Potidaea, Hdt. 8.11.2 Lycomedes of Athens following Artemisium, Lysias 2.43 the Athenians following Salamis. P. takes this literal meaning and creates a particularly fitting metaphor, applying the word to the winner in an imaginary competition among military victories. **240e6–241a1 τῶι λόγῳ κείνοις ἀναθεῖτον:** although the context makes the meaning clear, P. has expressed himself in such a way as to present the listener with a formal ambiguity (239d7–e1n.). Strictly speaking, the words could mean “the prize deserves to be awarded by them to my speech,” as though the speaker is claiming that his oration

should be acknowledged by the Marathon victors as the finest praise their bravery has received. (For the competitive nature of the funeral oration, see 235d6n.) Verbal adjectives in -τέον are often accompanied by a dative of agent (*CGCG* §37.3), and the adjacent ἐκείνοις is the only word that can fulfill that function, τῶι λόγῳι being inanimate. As it happens, however, τῶι λόγῳι is instrumental (as at *Phdr.* 238d7 ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῶι λόγῳι ἰτέον, with ἡμῖν as agent) and ἐκείνοις is indirect object with the verbal notion contained in ἀναθετέον (as at *Rep.* 3.414a2 τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι).

241a1 δευτερεῖα: the relative importance of the battles of Marathon and Salamis was already in the fifth century a matter of contentious debate between the supporters of Cimon and those of Pericles, the former the son of the hero of Marathon and the other the *chorêgos* for Aeschylus' *Persians* and the architect of the Athenian naval empire (Loraux 1986: 161; Sfyroeras 2013). Democratic ideology would favor the collective nature of the naval victory at Salamis, and the present oration purports to have been constructed by Pericles' companion from bits left over from the speech she composed for him to deliver. It is, therefore, notable that P., who is alone among the authors of funeral orations to explicitly rank the battles, places Salamis second after the hoplite victory at Marathon, justifying it on chronological grounds, as if later successes were merely imitations. **περὶ Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀρτεμισίῳι:** the naval action off Artemisium occurred simultaneously with the Spartan army's heroic but futile defense of the pass at Thermopylae in 480. Lysias (2.30–1) speaks of the battle of Thermopylae to contrast the Spartan defeat there, which he seems to attribute to faulty intelligence, with the Athenian naval victory, but P. refrains from mentioning it altogether, both here and at *Laws* 4.707b–c. In that passage the visitor from Athens responds to the claim by the Cretan Clinias that the naval success at Salamis was the salvation of Greece. He acknowledges that such is the view of οἱ πολλοί (never a mark of approbation in P.), but he and the Spartan Megillus contend that the battle at Marathon initiated the Greeks' struggle for their salvation and the battle at Plataea completed it; further, those two battles “made the Greeks better,” as Salamis (and, he adds, Artemisium) did not. The reason for this is supplied by what the Athenian had said at 707a–b, that cities that rely on their naval forces for salvation cannot properly recognize and celebrate the valor of individuals, since victory at sea is determined by “helmsmanship, lieutenancy and oarsmanship, and by a motley assortment of not very consequential individuals.” It is clear that this represents something resembling P.'s sincere assessment of the merits of naval service relative to hoplite warfare, but it would be impolitic to voice such an assessment

in a funeral oration, which is aimed at a democratic audience and which avoids singling out different elements of the fighting forces (Loraux 1986: 278 with 447 n. 75). **a2** **τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν**: a genitive of respect or reference, often occurring at the start of a sentence and equivalent to the genitive found with *περί* in passages such as Isocr. 11.28 ἔχοι δὲ ἄν τις . . . πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ περὶ τῆς ὀσιότητος αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. For this genitive, see 237b3, *Laws* 7.794a8, *Prot.* 336b9, *Rep.* 9.576d7, *Symp.* 221c3; KG I 363; Riddell §27; Renehan 1997: 157–61. **a3** **πολλὰ μὲν ἄν τις ἔχοι διελθεῖν**: cf. *Symp.* 221c2 πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις καὶ ἄλλα ἔχοι Σωκράτη ἐπαιέσαι, spoken by Alcibiades; also Dem. 22.13 πολλὰ μὲν ἄν τις ἔχοι λέγειν, followed by mention of the battle of Salamis, which “saved the city.” Like that passage, ours begins a *praeteritio*, designed to highlight the most admirable (κάλλιστον, a5) feature of the naval victories at Salamis and Artemisium. **a3–4** **καὶ οἷα ἐπιόντα ὑπέμειναν . . . καὶ ὡς ἡμύναντο ταῦτα**: the reciprocal actions of attack and defense (for ὡς ἡμύναντο and the middle voice, see 239b4–5n.) are artfully expressed in clauses with verbs and objects chiasmatically disposed and with *variatio* in the choice of introductory conjunctions, carefully balanced around the polar expression κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν (Lloyd 1966: 90–4), giving the impression that both elements figured equally in the Athenians’ defense of the homeland. Mastery of land and sea is celebrated in the funeral orations of Pericles (Thuc. 2.41.4) and Lysias (2.2), but both speakers are expressing themselves in general terms. Here, mention of the land is out of place in connection with the menace (for this force of the verb, see LSJ ἔπειμι (B) 1.1b, *Phdr.* 238d6, *Rep.* 2.374a2) faced by the sailors at Artemisium and Salamis. P. appears to be alluding to the engagement on the small island of Psyttaleia (Aesch. *Pers.* 435–64, Hdt. 8.95, Plut. *Arist.* 9.1–4), where Aristides and a band of Athenian hoplites massacred Persians who had been stationed there during the battle at Salamis; the magnitude of this encounter seems to have been a cause of debate between the supporters of Themistocles and those of Aristides and Cimon, who may have sought to diminish the exclusively naval character of the victory (Harrison 2000: 97–100). **a5** **τούτου** looks back to ὁ in the previous line and forward to ὅτι (“namely, the fact that”) in the line following. **a6** **τὸ ἐξῆς ἔργον τοῖς Μαραθῶνι διεπράξαντο**: the speaker singles this out as the most admirable feature of the Athenians’ most glorious naval victory, after having declined to describe the actual engagement. As it stands, it need mean no more than “they accomplished the deed that came next after Marathon” (τοῖς Μαραθῶνι is a brachylogy for τῶι ἔργωι τῶι τῶν Μαραθῶνι; for the dative with ἐξῆς, see *Cra.* 399d1, 420d4, *Phd.* 100c3, *Tim.* 61d4). Strabo uses the same locution when speaking of the work done on the canal from the Delta to the Gulf of Suez, which was left incomplete until Darius took up τὸ ἐξῆς ἔργον (17.1.25); he goes on to say

that Darius abandoned work on the canal, which was only completed later by Ptolemy. In the present passage, the verb διεπράξαντο certainly denotes completion, but we have to wait until the next sentence, introduced by γάρ, for an explanation of the nature of the accomplishment. **a7 επίδειξαν:** it emerges that the achievement of those who fought at Salamis, like that of the Marathonomachoi, is essentially educational; cf. c1 παιδευθῆναι. The verb ἐπιδείκνυμι and the related noun ἐπίδειξις are regularly associated with displays of sophistic learning (e.g. *Cra.* 384b4, *Euthd.* 274d7, *Gorg.* 447c3, *Prot.* 347b1; Thomas 2000: 249–69), and the speaker had earlier announced that the present speech belongs in that tradition (237b1–2). Denyer (on *Alc.* 1 114d6) notes that an ἐπίδειξις differs both from persuasive speech and from an ἀπόδειξις (“a rigorous argument whereby something is shown to be true”), pointing out that, when S. himself consents to deliver an ἐπίδειξις at *Phaedo* 99d2, “it is with the explicit acknowledgement that his discourse is, by ideal standards, second best.” Here, S.’s ἐπίδειξις is a display piece that he has learned verbatim by imitation, under threat of corporal punishment (236b8–c1), just as the men who fought at Salamis learned from those who fought at Marathon and will in turn serve as a model to be followed by later generations. Readers familiar with P.’s portrayal of S. will know that this is not the type of education favored by S.; listeners who have not been paralyzed by the speaker’s spellbinding words will recognize that the remainder of this sentence contradicts what was said just moments before. For the claim here that the victors at Marathon displayed only this much (τοσοῦτον μόνον), namely that a large number of barbarians could be resisted by a small number on land, but that the Persians retained a reputation for invincibility (ἀμαχοὶ εἶναι) at sea because of their numbers and wealth (καὶ πλήθει καὶ πλούτῳ), is contradicted by the unqualified assertion at 240d5–7 that the Marathonomachoi showed that the might of the Persians is not invincible (οὐκ ἀμαχος εἶη) and that every multitude and every amount of wealth (πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος) succumbs to valor.

241b1 ὀλίγοις πολλούς: cf. Lysias 2.24 ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλούς, also referring to the battle of Marathon, as well as 2.37 and 56. This pairing of contrasting words is very common in poetry (Fehling 1969: 271–85, esp. 283) and is taken up by Thuc. (e.g. 4.36.3 πολλοῖς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι) and the orators. Here the words are juxtaposed for maximum effect, as in the epigram dedicated to the soldiers from the tribe Erechtheis who died at Marathon, *SEG* LVI 430.5 [π]αυρότεροι πολλῶν. **b4 ἄξιον ἔπαινεῖν:** cf. ἄξιον ἔπαινεῖσαι 242d4–5, Lysias 2.66, Hyperides 6.3 and 238b8–c1n. **b5 τὸν ἐχόμενον φόβον διέλυσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων** “put an end to the Greeks’ next cause for concern”; for the middle of ἐχω referring to that

which follows, either temporally or logically (*Rep.* 6.511b7, 7.526c8), or is adjacent spatially, see LSJ c. 1.3 and compare ἐξῆς α6. This, or seeing the genitive as separative with διέλυσαν (cf. *Laws* 10.904d3-4 διαλυθέντες τῶν σωμάτων), is preferable to taking the participle as governing τῶν Ἑλλ. (so Gottleber); while φόβος ἔχειν τινά is common (e.g. *Eur. Or.* 1255), there seems to be no parallel for φόβος ἔχεσθαι τινος. **b6-7 ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων δῆ:** the particle is here used as a connective and virtually has the force, “So, as we can see” (Sicking and Van Ophuijsen 1993: 82-7), as at *Republic* 4.421e4, where S., after first securing agreement that wealth can make a craftsman worse and then that poverty can have the same effect, sums up the argument by saying, “So, as we can see (δῆ), the craftsman and his products are made worse by both poverty and wealth.” **b7-c1 τῶν τε Μαραθῶνι . . . ναυμαχησάντων:** balanced, rhyming 11-syllable phrases with *variatio* (middle vs. active; no preposition vs. ἐν), clarified by the parallel μέν- and δέ-clauses in c2.

241c3 μαθόντας καὶ ἐθισθέντας: here, as throughout the speech, education is represented exclusively as a matter of imitation and habit. In a vital passage of *Republic*, by contrast, S. insists that genuine ἀρετή cannot be implanted merely by habituation and practice (ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν, 7.518d11); rather, the soul must be turned, by means of a prolonged process of rigorous intellectual exertion described in Book Seven, to a true understanding of the Good. **c4 τρίτον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον:** for the more positive evaluation of the infantry battle at Plataea in *Laws*, see a1n. **καὶ ἀριθμῶι καὶ ἀρετῆι:** cf. *Laws* 1.630c8 τετάρτη . . . ἀριθμῶι τε καὶ δυνάμει, of the place of courage among the virtues, which confirms that the “number” in question is the ranking of Plataea in third place, rather than the number of combatants (so Jowett) or the disparity in the size of the forces (so Méridier). **c5 κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο:** for the force of the adverb (“now,” connoting that up until this point the Athenians had acted alone), see 234a6n. **c6-7 τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον sc. ἔργον.** The particle combination is “transitional” (*GP* 470-3; cf. 240e6), summing up the account of the three major battles of the Persian Wars and preparing for the brief discussion of the aftermath, introduced by μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο d1. **c7 οὗτοι πάντες:** referring to the Athenians who fought in the three battles that together ensured the salvation of Greece (c5).

241d1-e5 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο . . . φθορᾶι: the period of the 470s to the 450s, in which the so-called Delian League was founded and then transformed into an Athenian empire, is here treated as an extension of the Persian Wars (cf. οὗτος . . . ὁ πόλεμος, e6). This allows the speaker and his audience to imagine that the actions taken by the Athenians (with

no mention of the allies) were nothing more than a continuation of the struggle to ensure the freedom of the Greeks from barbarian influence. “Delian League” is a modern designation; its members simply referred to themselves as “the Greeks.” For the circumstances of its organization in 478/7, see Thuc. 1.89–97, with Hornblower 1 143–7, giving further bibliography. Collins and Stauffer (1999: 99–101; similarly Trivigno 2009: 47; Richter 2011: 99) see the omission of any reference to the Delian League or to Athenian imperialism in general as disparagement of the praise of Athens’ empire found in Thucydides’ Periclean oration, but silence is a curiously ineffective means of criticism. The fundamental difference in outlook between P. and Thucydides with regard to “progress” (Dodds 1973: 11–16) is sufficient to account for the discrepancy without requiring us to see a specific reference to Pericles’ speech. In any event, the Delian League is ignored also in the funeral orations of Lysias, Demosthenes and Hyperides.

d3 ἠγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς διανοεῖσθαι “the king was reported to be considering.” For the passive of ἀγγέλλω + infinitive, see *Chrm.* 153b9–c1. The article is regularly omitted when the king referred to is the king of Persia (Gildersleeve §572), as if βασιλεὺς were a proper name, like “Pharaoh” in the English Bible.

ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων: for ὡς + future participle following διανοεῖσθαι, see *Laws* 6.783d8–9, 12.964a3, *Rep.* 1.327c14, 5.470e1–2. Whether or not Xerxes contemplated a renewal of the war against Greece, the fear of such a possibility seems to have gripped the Greeks. Herodotus reports that, at a meeting on Samos following the battles of Plataea and Mycale, there was a discussion about resettling the Ionian Greeks to a safer location (9.106.2), and the Spartans attempted to persuade the Athenians to refrain from rebuilding their walls, so that the Persians would not have a fortified city to occupy should they invade Greece again (Thuc. 1.90.2). It was this anxiety that served as justification, or pretext, for the creation of the Delian League as a defensive alliance.

d3–4 ἐπιχειρήσων . . . ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας: the normal construction for this verb is either with a dative or with an infinitive (which some scholars have wished to supply here). The text may, however, find a parallel in Hermocrates’ encouragement to his troops to attack the Athenians (ἐπιχειρήσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, Thuc. 7.21.3).

d5 οἱ τοῖς τῶν προτέρων ἔργοις τέλος τῆς σωτηρίας ἐπέθεσαν “who consummated their predecessors’ efforts to secure their freedom.” The second genitive is objective (KG I 335–6), specifying that the ἔργα were productive of the salvation of the Greeks, as at c4–5. In speaking of the battles of Marathon and Plataea in *Laws* (4.707c3–4), the Athenian says that the former was the beginning of freedom for the Greeks while the latter added the finishing touches: τὴν μὲν ἄρξαι τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τὴν δὲ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. Similarly, the speaker of Lysias’ funeral oration says that the victors at

Plataea crowned the earlier ventures (τελευτήν τοῖς προτέροις ἐπιθέντες κινδύνοις, 2.47) and accomplished the salvation of Europe. Here, however, it is the actions of the Athenians in the 460s and 450s that, according to the speaker, finally brought about freedom for the Greeks. This involves P. in chronological difficulties of which he was unaware or to which he was indifferent, for the speaker refers in 242a to a period of peace between Athens and Persia before hostilities began between the Athenians and other Greeks. **d7-e1 ἐπὶ Εὐρυμέδοντι ναυμαχήσαντες:** the Eurymedon River (BA 65 F3) empties into the Mediterranean at Pamphylia, on the south coast of Anatolia. There, according to Thucydides, at some time early in the 460s the Athenians and their allies under the command of Cimon won victories over the Persians on both land and sea (πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία, 1.100.1). P. here ignores the infantry battle either to vary the string of participles or to highlight the naval action, which resulted in the destruction of the Phoenician fleet of 200 ships.

241e1-2 καὶ οἱ εἰς Κύπρον στρατεύσαντες καὶ οἱ εἰς Αἴγυπτον πλεύσαντες: two parallel 9-syllable phrases ending in rhyming participles, following a longer phrase that also ends in -σαντες. Cyprus, opposite the mouth of the Eurymedon River, was of strategic importance in the struggles for naval domination in the eastern Mediterranean. In 478 the Greeks wrested control of most of the island from the Persians (Thuc. 1.94.2), but fighting continued for many years, and Cimon died there in 451 (Thuc. 1.112.4). This makes it impossible for us to tell what specific action, if any, the speaker has in mind. In 460, while the Athenians were engaged in Cyprus, they responded to a request to intervene in the Egyptian revolt from the Persians (Thuc. 1.104). *IG I³ 1147* (460-459 BC) preserves the names of 177 members of Erechtheis, one of the ten Athenian tribes, who died in a single year fighting in Cyprus, in Egypt and elsewhere. Casualties are likely to have been even higher in subsequent years; after some initial success in Egypt, the Athenian and allied forces met with disastrous defeat in 454 (Thuc. 1.109-10). **e2 ὧν χρή μνησθῆναι:** cf. 243c7-d1 ὧν χρή ἀεὶ μνησθῆναι τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. P. is also capable of varying the wording to show off his rhetorical sophistication: 238b8-c1 ὀρθῶς ἔχει . . . ἐπιμνησθῆναι, 239c5 δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐπιμνησθῆναι, 239d3 χρή πρῶτον μνημῆνους ἐπαινεῖσαι, 241d4 δίκαιον . . . ἡμᾶς ἐπιμνησθῆναι. For the frequency of such expressions in the funeral oration, see 238b8-c1n. **e3 χάριν αὐτοῖς εἶδέναι** “to whom a debt of gratitude is owed.” Rather than repeat the relative pronoun in a different case, Greek prefers to use a personal or demonstrative pronoun (KG II 432-3). For the idiom, see LSJ χάρις A. II.2. **e3-4 τῆι ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαὶ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν:** the fantasy of the Great King attending to his personal safety out of fear goes back to Aeschylus (*Pers.* 465-70) and

Herodotus (8.97.1, 118.2–3; cf. 7.212.1). These, however, are connected with Xerxes' alleged panic as he witnessed at first hand the defeat of his forces at Salamis in 480. In reference to the period the speaker is concerned with, the middle of the fifth century, Lysias speaks less hyperbolically in his funeral oration, saying only that the Persian king feared to lose what territory he had (2.56).

241e6–242e4: TWO VICTORIES OVER GREEKS

Just as the war against the barbarians was divided into three phases, so here the Athenians' conflicts with other Greek poleis are spoken of as three wars. The first is the Athenian activity in Boeotia in 457, here represented as a successful war of liberation. The second is the ten-year war (431–421), sometimes called the Archidamian War, that culminated in the Peace of Nicias. Both of these are counted as victories for the Athenians (242b4, c5, e4). By arranging his material in this way the speaker avoids expressing the view that Athens was engaged in a single, ongoing conflict with Sparta and its allies that ended, after a number of vicissitudes, in humiliating defeat for the Athenians in 404.

241e6 και . . . μὲν δὴ: the particles are transitional (*GP* 258), as at 246a5, *Phd.* 111c4 and *Symp.* 216c4. †πάσῃ τῇ πόλει†: it is difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of these words, which are brought to prominence by their position in the sentence. It has been noted that they imply a contrast between the whole city's involvement in the Persian Wars and some lesser involvement in the conflicts that are introduced in the following sentence, a contrast that is unwelcome in the context. There is in addition a more serious syntactical problem. The dative can only be taken as expressing the agent with the passive verb that follows; typical is Bury's Loeb translation: "Now this war was endured to the end by all our citizens." But P. very rarely uses the dative of agent with a passive verb unless the verb is in the perfect or pluperfect tense; even then only a limited class of verbs is found, and the word in the dative is normally a pronoun rather than, as here, a noun (Bluck on *Meno* 95b6; George 2005: 91–2). The conclusion that the text is corrupt seems inevitable, but it is difficult to be more specific. Some reference to the city or its inhabitants here is needed to account for ἐαυτῶν in the following line (for the change from singular to plural, cf. 244e5–245a1 αὐτῇ . . . σφᾶς). διηντλήθη ὁ πόλεμος "(the hardships of) the war were thoroughly tolerated." The verb ἄντλω, along with its compounds, refers literally to reducing the volume of a liquid by channeling it or drawing it off (*Laus* 5.736b3, *Tim.* 79a3), often in reference to bailing bilge water from the hold of a ship

(Theogn. 673). Words from this root are primarily used metaphorically and, since Greek authors are fond of the metaphor of the “ship of state,” whose seaworthiness is threatened by the tempests of violent conflict, we find these words in connection with the heroic efforts needed to save the city from war or factional strife (Alcaeus fr. 208.6 Voigt, Aesch. *Sept.* 796). The present passage is the source of Libanius’ πολέμου διαντλουμένου (*Or.* 59.94; see 237a6n. for another quotation from *Menexenus* in the same oration), used in reference to external warfare in contrast to a revolt directed against the Roman emperor.

242a2 εἰρήνης δὲ γενομένης: if there was a peace treaty agreed to in 450 between Athens and Persia, that is presumably what the speaker is referring to. P.’s stepfather Pyrilampes (Nails 257–9) may have been involved in the negotiations. For the controversy over the “Peace of Callias,” which is not mentioned by Thucydides, see Hornblower 1 179–81; Hyland 2018: 15–36. Such a treaty would indeed enhance the prestige (τιμωμένης) of the city. **a3 ὁ δὲ φιλεῖ** “a thing which, as we know (δὴ), tends . . .” For the “self-evidential” force of the particle, see Sicking and Van Ophuijsen 1993: 145–6 and compare *Symp.* 182c3–4 (from Pausanias’ speech) ὁ δὲ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἕρως ἐμποιεῖν. **ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων:** expressing the agent with the virtually passive verb προσπίπτειν = “occur, happen,” but using “the less agentive preposition ἐκ” (George 2005: 170), which conveys a somewhat impersonal sense of “source” rather than of individual “agent”; cf. H. *Od.* 2.136–7 νέμεσις δέ μοι ἐξ ἀνθρώπων | ἔσσεται. **a4 πρῶτον μὲν ζῆλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ φθόνος:** in his funeral oration Lysias similarly attributes the origin of what he calls “the Hellenic War” to envy of the Athenians, saying that the war arose διὰ ζῆλον τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ φθόνον τῶν πεπραγμένων (2.48), sacrificing any meaningful distinction between ζῆλος and φθόνος to the opportunity to create impressively resonant rhetoric. That P. speaks of a progression from one to the other suggests that he draws the distinction familiar from other authors, that ζῆλος is a positive emotion leading to a potentially productive rivalry while φθόνος is a mean-spirited spitefulness that seeks to curtail others’ success or deprive others of what they have acquired (e.g. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.1388a35–7; Sanders 2014). In Pericles’ last speech as recorded by Thucydides (2.64.4), delivered when the war was already under way, after praising the Athenians’ glorious achievements he warns that anyone who is ambitious of success will emulate (ζηλώσει) those achievements, while those who fail to equal them will harbor resentment (φθονήσει). **a5 ἄκουσαν:** Athens is represented as the reluctant victim of impersonal forces over which it has no control (ἦλθεν a2, προσπίπτειν 4, κατέστησεν 5–6), rather than as a hegemonic power expanding its

empire at the expense of others. **a6** **μετά δὲ τοῦτο**: merely a formula of transition, as there is nothing to which τοῦτο can reasonably be said to refer. The next event referred to, the battle at Tanagra, took place while the Athenians were still engaged in action against the Persians in Egypt (241e1-2n.). **συνέβαλλον** “they were engaged in combat.” For this absolute, intransitive use of the verb, common in Herodotus, see Powell 1938: *συμβάλλω* 1. The imperfect (some MSS have the aorist) in the μέν-clause sets the stage, as it were, for the decisive aorist (διέκρινε) in the δέ-clause (Rijksbaron 1994: §6.1). **a7** **ἐν Τανάγραι ὑπὲρ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ἐλευθερίας**: in 457 the Spartans came to the defense of some cities in Doris, the territory in central Greece supposed to be the homeland of the Dorians, then being attacked by the neighboring Phocians. The Athenians suspected that the Spartans, encouraged by Spartan sympathizers in Athens, might on their return to the Peloponnese attempt to overthrow the Athenian democracy, and so they engaged the Spartans at Tanagra in Boeotia. According to Thucydides (1.108), the Spartans were victorious in a battle that involved heavy losses on both sides; Diodorus, in a more detailed account (from Ephorus?), agrees with P. that the engagement was indecisive (11.80). In any event, the Spartans returned home following the battle, and shortly afterwards the Athenians attacked the Thebans, winning a victory at Oenophyta (see b3-4) and “liberating” Tanagra. Athenian propaganda, and P. here, sought to justify Athens’ expanding hegemony in this period as motivated by an altruistic desire to ensure the freedom of other Greeks (Raaflaub 2004: 166-81). Only with difficulty can this be reconciled with what has just been said, that the Athenians were drawn into conflicts unwillingly, as a result of the enviousness of others.

242b2 **τὸ ὕστερον ἔργον**: cf. 241a6 **τὸ ἐξῆς ἔργον**. **b2-3** **καταλιπόντες [Βοιωτούς] οἷς ἐβοήθουν**: the antecedent is unnecessary (cf. ἐλευθερώσαντες οἷς ἐβοήθουν c1) and, in any event, the Spartans were not assisting “the Boeotians”; they were helping the Thebans assert control over the rest of the Boeotians (D.S. 11.81.2-3). The Spartans’ abandonment of their allies stands in stark contrast to (the speaker’s portrayal of) the Athenians’ selfless and unwavering support of their allies (e.g. b6, 243a1-2, c5-6, 245a2). **b3** **τρίτη ἡμέραι** “on the second day (after the Spartan departure).” Inclusive reckoning is standard among Greek authors, so that e.g. a fever that recurs every other day is called “tertian” (τριταῖος, *Tim.* 86a). P.’s chronology is at odds with that of Thucydides, according to whom the Athenians waited for two months after the battle at Tanagra before sending troops, commanded by Myronides, into Boeotia (1.108.2-3). **b3-4** **ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις νικήσαντες**: the location of the Boeotian town of

Oenophyta is not certainly known, but it is likely to have been in the neighborhood of Tanagra, for which see *BA* 58 F1. The Athenians' victory led to a period of about ten years in which Athens exercised control over Boeotia; see Hornblower on Thuc. 1.108.3. **b4** τοὺς ἀδίκως φεύγοντας δικαίως κατήγαγον: that is, the Athenians set up governments in the cities of Boeotia sympathetic to their interests by restoring those who had been driven into exile "unjustly" by the oligarchic faction in Thebes. For the "resultative" use of the present tense of verbs like φεύγω (= "be in exile"), see *CGCG* §33.18. **b5-6** Ἕλλησιν ἤδη . . . πρὸς Ἕλληνας: tactfully separating the two occurrences of "Greeks" by a phrase assuring the audience that fighting against Greeks was only undertaken for the sake of freedom. For the force of ἤδη ("now"), marking the contrast between the Greeks and the Persians, against whom combat had up until this point been waged, see 234a6, 241c5nn. **b6-c1** ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι: i.e. died fighting for their homeland. For the idiom, see 237a5n.

242c2 πρῶτοι: echoing πρῶτοι at the start of the sentence. It is, however, unlikely that those who were killed in action in 457 were the first to receive public burial in the δημόσιον σῆμα (see the Introduction 1). **c2-d4** μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . διαφθορᾶς: this is P.'s one-sentence account of the ten-year Archidamian War, of which he singles out only two events, the repeated devastation of the Attic landscape by "all the Greeks" (cf. Thuc. 2.39.2 Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . μετὰ ἀπάντων) and the Athenians' honorable treatment of the Spartans captured at Sphacteria. The speaker understandably neglects the Athenian defeat in the fighting at Delium in 424, in which S. participated as a hoplite (*Symp.* 221a). **c4** τεμόντων τὴν χώραν: more commonly τὴν γῆν (*Rep.* 5.470a5, 471c1-2; LSJ τέμνω A. IV.3); the weightier expression is used perhaps in order to equal the syllable count of ἐπιστρατευσάντων. The reference here is to the annual invasion of Attica by the Spartans and their allies, during which the Athenians, following the advice of Pericles (Thuc. 1.143.4-5, 2.13.2), sheltered within the walls of Athens while the enemy ravaged the countryside. The invasions began in 431 and continued every summer until 425. **c5** ἀναξίαν χάριν ἐκτινόντων: i.e. compensating Athens in full (ἐκ-) for its previous benefactions with a return unworthy of those benefactions, an unparalleled expression sarcastically conveying the unprecedented ingratitude on the part of the Greeks in return for the Athenians' unselfish acts of salvation. It is unclear why P. sometimes treats the compound adjective as having three terminations, as here, and sometimes two, as at 243c6. **c5-6** αὐτούς . . . αὐτῶν: referring to "all the Greeks," although they appeared earlier in the sentence as part of a genitive absolute; *CGCG* §52.32, Note 1. **c7** Σφαγία: the name, found

also at Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.31, for the island called by Thucydides Σφακτηρία (4.8.6; BA 58 B4). In the summer of 425 the Athenians won a naval victory and surrounded a force of Spartan and allied troops on the island, off Pylos on the west coast of the Peloponnese. Eventually the Spartan hoplites, contrary to their normal practice, agreed to surrender, and the Athenians took prisoner about 120 full Spartan citizens (Thuc. 4.38.5). P. represents the treatment of these prisoners of war as motivated by humanitarian concerns; in fact, the Athenians were able to secure relief from the annual invasions of their territory (c4n.) by threatening to execute them if the Spartans invaded again (Thuc. 4.41.1; Henderson 1975: 40–1; Pownall 2004: 53). In 421 the Athenians agreed to return the prisoners in accordance with one of the provisions of the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.7) that ended the Archidamian War.

242d1–2 πρὸς μὲν τὸ ὁμόφυλον: i.e. against Greeks; cf. ὁμόφυλον 244a2, ὁμοφώνων 242a1. Euripides' Iphigenia says that, whenever she was required to sacrifice Greeks, the intensity of her lamentation would correspond to the degree of her kinship (ἐς θούμόφυλον, *IT* 346). S. distinguishes between war with other Greeks and war with barbarians at *Rep.* 5.471a–c, saying that the citizens of Callipolis should not devastate the land or burn the dwellings of other Greeks, nor should they pursue warfare with them ἐπὶ δουλείαι . . . οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ὀλέθρῳ (a6–7). In his funeral oration Gorgias says that victory over barbarians calls for hymns, while victory over Greeks calls for lamentations (DK 82 B5b). **d3** τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων: an arresting and seemingly unprecedented expression, as though the various Greeks belonged to a common political entity (cf. e.g. τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Σαμίων, *Hdt.* 6.14.3), a notion further suggested by the use of στασιασάσης at e1. For the contrast with ἰδίαν and P.'s novel application of the antithesis, setting an individual polis against the common interests of the Greeks (also e3–4, 243b5), see 236d6n. **d6** εἴ τις ἄρα: the particle marks the protasis as ironic (cf. *Laws* 2.668b1, 3.686c9, d10), as though it were unthinkable that anyone should dispute the Athenians' superiority. **d8** ἀμφισβητοῖεν: for the plural verb, although the singular τις preceded, a common "construction according to the sense," see KG I 54.

242e1–4 ἔδειξαν . . . νικῶντες "they demonstrated their superiority" by prevailing (περιγεγόμενοι) when they defeated (χειρωσάμενοι). ἔδειξαν = ἐπέδειξαν (d6); for this common phenomenon, where a verb takes on the meaning of a compound of that verb used earlier in the context, see Renehan 1976: 11–22. **e1** στασιασάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος: cf. Lysias 2.21 στασιαζούσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος. There, however, the reference is to the disagreement among the Greeks as to how to defend themselves against

the Persian invasion. Here P. distinguishes, as he does at *Rep.* 5.470b-d, between warfare against barbarians and stasis, which normally refers to strife involving factions within a polis but which P. wishes to apply also to conflicts among Greek poleis.

242e4-243d7: THE "THIRD WAR" AGAINST THE GREEKS

The events of 415-404, from the Sicilian Expedition to the end of the war, are presented as a series of triumphs for Athens, tarnished only by bad luck, the treachery of other Greeks in allying themselves with the Persian king and infighting among the Athenians, leading to the conclusion that no one but the Athenians themselves had the power to defeat the Athenians. The speaker thus conveniently ignores the almost complete destruction of the Athenian fleet by Lysander at the battle of Aegospotami in 405 (*Xen. Hell.* 2.1.20-9).

242e6 πολλοὶ μὲν: answered by πολλοὶ δέ 243a7, reducing the second half of the Peloponnesian War to the Sicilian Expedition and the naval action in Ionia, while ignoring the painful memory of the Spartan occupation of Decelea, which prevented the Athenians from having access to their farmland and silver mines. **e6-243a1 ἀμφὶ Σικελίαν:** the preposition, frequently used by the tragedians but rare in Attic comedy (Olson on *Ar. Ach.* 1072), is found elsewhere in P. only in the expression οἱ ἀμφὶ τινα. It is here perhaps intended to evoke the aura of high poetry; cf. e.g. *Soph. Aj.* 415 ἀμφὶ Τροίαν.

243a1 πλεῖστα τρόπαια στήσαντες: for the expression, see 240d4-5n. Initially, the Sicilian Expedition was indeed successful. In his *Life of Nicias* (17.4) Plutarch quotes an epigram, which he attributes to Euripides, purporting to be an epitaph for the men who "defeated the Syracusans eight times, when divine influence favored neither side." That is, like P. here, the poet suggests that the Athenians' ultimate defeat in Sicily was the result of circumstances beyond their control. **a1-2 ὑπὲρ τῆς Λεοντίνων ἐλευθερίας:** Leontini (*BA* 47 G4) was an Ionian polis often at odds with its Dorian neighbor Syracuse. In 427 the Leontines sent an embassy to Athens, one member of which was Gorgias (*Hp.Ma.* 282b), appealing for military assistance, which the Athenians provided. The large-scale Athenian expedition of 415 was, according to Thucydides (6.6.1), in reality motivated by a desire to dominate the entire island but purportedly for the purpose of assisting allies and kinsmen, including punishing the Syracusans for their earlier expulsion of democratic supporters from

Leontini (6.6.2; cf. 5.4.2). **a2** *διὰ τοὺς ὄρκους*: cf. Thuc. 6.19.1, where ambassadors from Eggesta and exiles from Leontini urge the Athenian Assembly to be mindful of the oaths sworn at the time of the creation of their alliance. **a3** *διὰ δὲ μῆκος τοῦ πλοῦ*: the length of the voyage was one of the reasons for the concern expressed by Nicias before the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc. 6.21.2). Still the Athenians were not dissuaded from dispatching “the most costly and most magnificent force that had ever been sent out by one polis up to that time” (Thuc. 6.31.1), nor were they prevented from later sending reinforcements at Nicias’ request (7.16.1, 42.1). But even with these reinforcements the Athenian army and navy were utterly destroyed within two years. The speaker’s comment here seems intended, tendentiously, to validate Nicias’ hesitation. **a5** *τούτῳ ἀπειπόντες*: i.e. (apparently) τῷ τοῖς Λεοντίνοις ὑπηρετεῖν. For the dative, compare 245b3–4 τῷ . . . πολέμῳ ἀπαγορεύοντας (ἀπείπον serves as the aorist of ἀπαγορεύω; see LSJ). Use of this verb hints at a moral deficiency on the part of the Athenians, for ἀπείπον normally implies a weakness of will or failure of spirit that would bring discredit upon the Athenians, but the speaker counteracts the suggestion of moral failure with the very next word, which attributes the Athenians’ lack of success to bad luck (244a7–b1n.). **a5–7** *ὧν οἱ ἐχθροὶ . . . τῶν ἄλλων οἱ φίλοι* “Their enemies, even having encountered them as foes on the battlefield, praise them for their restraint and valor to a greater extent than others praise their friends (lit. than friends praise others).” The juxtapositions show that τῶν ἄλλων and ὧν are parallel and that both are objective genitives with ἐπαινον ἔχουσι (= ἐπαινεῖν). The only difficulty is that ἐπαινον ἔχειν elsewhere = ἐπαινεῖσθαι, as at e.g. *Symp.* 177b5–6 ἅλεις ἐπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν. Similar locutions, however, like μέμψιν ἔχειν, can be either active ([Aesch.] *Prom.* 445) or passive (Eur. *Hclid.* 974). **a6** *σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς*: for the genitives, compare e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 1683 αἰνῶ μὲν σε τῆς προθυμίας and see KG I 390–1. **a7** *πολλοὶ δέ*: sc. τρόπαια στήσαντες ἐτελεύτησαν. **a7–8** *ταῖς κατὰ Ἑλλάσποντον*: in 411 the Athenian navy encountered a fleet of Peloponnesian and Syracusan ships off Cynossema in the Hellespont (*BA* 51 G₄), where they erected a trophy (Thuc. 8.106.4). Later that same year the Athenians were moderately successful in an engagement off Abydos, on the Asiatic coast of the Hellespont, thanks to reinforcements under the command of Alcibiades that arrived while the battle was under way (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2–7). The following spring Athenian naval forces were again victorious at Cyzicus in the Propontis (*BA* 52 B₄), where they captured all the Peloponnesian ships stationed there and where the Spartan admiral was killed in battle (1.1.14–18). The Hellespont is also the body of water into which the river Aegospotami (*BA* 51 H₄) empties, at the mouth of

which the Athenians suffered their final defeat of the war in 405, but that battle is here passed over in silence (Henderson 1975: 42–3). **αδ μιᾶ μὲν ἡμέραι πάσας**: presumably referring to the action at Cyzicus, enhanced by the gratuitous juxtaposition of “one” and “all,” which strives to be even more impressive than the more common one/many juxtaposition (e.g. Thuc. 2.35.1).

243b1 **πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἄλλας νικήσαντες**: *sc.* νίκας οἰ ναυμαχίας (CGCG §30.12, Note 1); cf. ἐνίκησαμεν . . . τὴν τότε ναυμαχίαν d1–2, νίκην . . . νικῶσι *Rep.* 5.465d8. For the successes of the Athenians, both military and diplomatic, mostly under Alcibiades, in the years 410–408, see Xen. *Hell.* 1.2 with Munn 2000: 160–9. **b2** **δεινὸν καὶ ἀνέλπιστον**: referring chiasmatically to ἀνέλπιστός τε καὶ δεινός 242e5. **τόδε λέγω** “this is what I mean,” referring forward to τὸ . . . ἐλθεῖν and back to ὁ δὲ . . . γενέσθαι (“what I said was the appalling and unforeseen aspect of the war”). **b3–4** **εἰς τοσοῦτον φιλονικίας ἐλθεῖν . . . ὥστε**: a locution frequent in the orators, but relatively rare in P.; see 244d6–7, *Apol.* 25e1–2, *Gorg.* 487b2–3, 514e3–4; Bers 2009: 53–4. For P., φιλονικία seems to represent the stage beyond ζῆλος and φθόνος (242a4n.), since at *Rep.* 9.586c8–9 S. suggests that φθόνος can arise from φιλοτιμία while φιλονικία can result in violence; cf. *Lys.* 215d3–4, where φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας is perhaps intended as a progression. **b4–5** **ἐπικηρυκεύσασθαι βασιλεῖ**: the verb governs ἐπάγεσθαι; for the infinitive with ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι specifying the proposed terms to be negotiated, a construction not recognized by LSJ, see Thuc. 7.83.2, 8.80.2. Thucydides (8.18, 36–7, 58) records a series of three treaties formalized in 412/11 between the Persians and “the Lacedaemonians and their allies.” To enter into negotiations with the Great King was (publicly) regarded in Athens as treasonous behavior; see the parody of the solemn curse uttered in 411 against anyone who ἐπικηρυκεύεται | Εὐριπίδῃ Μήδοις τε (*Ar. Thesm.* 336–7). In fact, Athens repeatedly, including in 411, sought to come to terms with the Persians in hopes of securing their support in the war or, failing that, their neutrality; Munn 2000: 127–31, 141–4. **b5** **κοινῇ . . . ἰδίαι**: for the antithesis, which here emphasizes the treachery involved in inviting in a common enemy for individual advantage, see 236d6n. **b6** **βάρβαρον ἐπὶ Ἑλληνας**: repeated chiasmatically in the following clause, where the outrage is further enhanced by the addition of πάντας, which is hyperbolic even if it modifies only Ἑλληνας. **συναθροῖσαι**: the tense shows that it is parallel to ἐπικηρυκεύσασθαι and is dependent on τολμησαι. **b7** **οὐ δὲ**: the particle, which is common with a relative adverb (“often followed by καί,” *GP* 219), here illustrates especially well, with ἐκφανής, its “visualizing” force (Sicking and Van Ophuijsen 1993: 140–1).

243c1–7 οἰομένων γὰρ . . . κείνται ἐνθάδε: this sentence describes the vicissitudes of Athens' fortunes in the year 406, beginning in seeming hopelessness, continuing with the uplifting victory at Arginusae, followed by an undeserved stroke of misfortune, and concluding with the somber κείνται ἐνθάδε. The sentence is constructed in two sections, with each consisting of a sequence of four participial phrases diminishing in length from an initial 16-syllable phrase to phrases of 8 or 9 syllables. (For the deletion in c6–7, see below; for the proliferation of participles, see 240a6n.) **c1 οἰομένων:** *sc.* Ἀθηναίων. A genitive absolute may dispense with a noun if it can be easily inferred from the context: *CGCG* §52.32, Note 1. **c2 ἀπειλημένων:** from ἀπολαμβάνω. After losing thirty ships to a Spartan fleet financed in part by Persian gold, the Athenian general Conon found himself and his remaining ships under blockade (this is the force of the perfect tense) in the harbor of Mytilene, on the east coast of Lesbos (*Xen. Hell.* 1.6.16–22). When word reached Athens, an emergency levy in remarkably short order fitted out a fleet consisting, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.6.24), of 110 ships. The discrepancy between P.'s number and that of Xenophon (who may in fact have been among those called up; Munn 2000: 180) is difficult to explain. **c3 αὐτοί:** *sc.* Ἀθηναῖοι, which seems intended to obscure the fact that even slaves were mobilized to serve on board the ships alongside citizens, who included “even many of the knights” (*Hell.* 1.6.24; Xen. was himself a knight). **c4–5 ἄνδρες γενόμενοι ὁμολογουμένως ἄριστοι:** the adverb is a favorite of the orators, found only once in Thuc. (6.90.3, a speech by Alcibiades) and in P. only a few times, including 245a7 and in the speeches of Eryximachus and Agathon (*Symp.* 186b5, 196a6). Here the word serves as a polysyllabic invitation to the audience to acquiesce in the speaker's modification of the standard formula ἄνδρες γενόμενοι ἀγαθοί (237a5n.). **c5–6 νικήσαντες μὲν . . . φίλιους:** parallel 9- and 10-syllable participial phrases encapsulating the standard Greek approval of helping one's friends and harming one's enemies, e.g. *Rep.* 1.332a9–10; Dover 1974: 180–4. The relief force sent out to rescue Conon met and routed the enemy fleet near the Arginusae Islands, between Lesbos and the mainland (*BA* 56 D3), freeing the blockaded Athenian ships and erecting a trophy (*Xen. Hell.* 1.6.25–35). **c6 ἀναξίου τύχης τυχόντες:** the same *figura etymologica* is found at *Eur. Hel.* 698–9 εἰ . . . τῆς τύχης εὐδαίμονος | τύχοιτε. The reference here is to the fact that, immediately after the victory, heavy winds and a powerful storm prevented the recovery of the bodies of the dead (or served as an excuse for the failure to recover the bodies: *D.S.* 13.100.1–4). This failure was to have consequences that personally involved both S. and, if she was still alive, Aspasia; it also accounts for the fact that the victory at Arginusae is ignored by the other

speakers of funeral orations (Pownall 2004: 54). Those of the generals who returned to Athens following the victory, among whom was Aspasia's son by Pericles, also named Pericles, were put on trial in the Assembly for dereliction of their responsibility to, as one citizen put it, τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένου (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.11). As it happened, the person who was assigned by lot to serve as the chairman (ἐπιστάτης) of the steering committee for the day on which the vote was to take place was S.; he refused to put the matter to a vote on the grounds that condemning the generals en masse rather than individually had no precedent in law (*Apol.* 32b, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.18, 4.4.2). The following day, with a new chairman presiding, the generals were convicted en masse and the six who were in the city, including Aspasia's son, were put to death; for the trial, see Munn 2000: 181–7; Nails 79–82. **c6–7** [οὐκ ἀναιρεθέντες ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης]: it is patently nonsensical to say that those who were not recovered from the sea are lying here. These words were added as an erroneous explanatory gloss on the previous participial phrase by someone who was familiar with other references to the battle of Arginusae in which similar wording is used, e.g. *Apol.* 32b3, Lysias 12.36, Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.9. The speaker's reference to an ἀνάξιος τύχη (unworthy, that is, of the splendid victory) is surely to the unfortunate occurrence of adverse weather, not to anything that would dishonor the victors. **c7** κείνται ἐνθάδε: in the order ἐνθάδε κεί(ν)ται (cf. 242d6 and e6) this is an almost formulaic ending to dactylic hexameters in funerary epigrams (e.g. Philodemus, *Epigr.* 33.1 Sider = *AP* 7.222.1). P.'s deliberate inversion of the order in this carefully constructed period shows his familiarity with rhetorical convention, which prefers to avoid the "heroic" clausula – ∪ ∪ – × (see also 236e1n.).

243d1 τῆι μὲν . . . ἐνικήσαμεν: the μὲν-clause is answered by the parallel δέ-clause τῆι δὲ . . . ἐκρατήθημεν, with each followed by a clause introduced by a negative, itself followed by an explanatory sentence introduced by γάρ. The second explanatory sentence, expressed in seemingly paradoxical fashion (ἀήττητοι γάρ . . . ἡττήθημεν), repeats the sense of the whole structure, namely that the Athenians are capable of overcoming all adversaries, including themselves. **d2** καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόλεμον: the Athenians were victorious not only at Arginusae but "also in the rest of the war" only in the very distorted sense that their defeat was self-inflicted. This takes to the extreme, and thereby subverts, "the kind of chauvinist fiction" (Henderson 1975: 43) seen in Lysias' funeral oration, which attributes Athens' defeat not to the enemy's superiority but to the "misfortune" of factional strife (2.65; cf. 244a7–b1n.). In the looking-glass world of rhetoric as envisioned by P., this is how defeat can be transmuted

into victory, and how the orator can assault reason. **d3 μή ποτε ἄν καταπολεμηθῆναι:** for μή rather than οὐ as the negative with the infinitive “in strong asseverations” (Burnet on *Apol.* 37a5), see *Apol.* 37b2, *Rep.* 1.346e8, *Tht.* 155a3, 201a5. At c2 we were told that Athens was thought to have been overcome in war (καταπεπολεμησθαι); the bravery of those who died at Arginusae has now made it appear (δόξαν . . . ἔσχεν = ἔδοξεν) unimaginable that the city could ever be overcome, a supposition that, the speaker assures us, corresponds to reality. Later, however, the speaker will admit that the Athenians had in fact been overcome (κατεπολεμήθημεν 245e3). **d4–5 τῆι δὲ ἡμετέροι αὐτῶν διαφορᾷ ἐκρατήθημεν:** Thucydides similarly attributes the final defeat of Athens to internal dissent (2.65.12 οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν), as does Lysias (2.65). **d7 ἠττήθημεν:** sc. ὑπὸ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

243e1–244b3: THE ATHENIAN CIVIL WAR

After the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami, Lysander’s fleet set up a blockade of Athens, which eventually surrendered to Sparta, agreeing to demolish its walls and decommission its navy. In 404 the Athenians voted to establish a panel of thirty men, one of whom was P.’s relative and S.’s associate Critias (Nails 108–11), “to compile the ancestral laws” (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2). These men, often referred to as the Thirty Tyrants, embarked on a reign of terror involving large-scale confiscations of property and executions of political enemies. Opposition to the Thirty resulted in armed conflict, in the course of which Critias was killed, as was Charmides (Nails 90–4), another of P.’s relatives and S.’s associates who was allied with the Thirty. The end of the civil war was marked by an amnesty (which did not extend to the persons of the Thirty themselves) and a restoration of the democracy in 403. The speaker highlights this reconciliation, but ignores the series of acrimonious trials that took place in the years immediately following, including, understandably, that of S. himself in 399. For the Thirty, the civil war and the amnesty, see Xen. *Hell.* 2.3–5, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.2–39.6 with Rhodes ad loc.; Munn 2000: 218–72, Nails 111–13, 219–22.

243e2–4 ὥστε εἴπερ . . . νοσήσαι “that, if it is (or “should be”) fated that humans fight civil wars, no one would pray for his own city to be afflicted with this sickness in any other fashion”; i.e. everyone would pray that the (allegedly) inevitable civil war turn out for his city in the way that it did for Athens. A remarkable statement that begs the question whether stasis is indeed inevitable. (The optative εἴη is ambiguous; it might stand for an original indicative and owe its mood to the governing secondary sequence or it might represent an original optative in a future less vivid condition.)

The *eunomia* on which Sparta prided itself was generally held, even by those who were not apologists for the Spartan system, to have kept it free from stasis for centuries (e.g. Hdt. 1.65.2, Thuc. 1.18.1). For the common metaphor of stasis as a kind of sickness (νοσῆσαι), see Brock 2013: 69–82. **e3–4 πόλιν ἑαυτοῦ**: the normal construction in prose requires that the genitive of the reflexive pronoun appear in attributive position: τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν. The unusual omission of the definite article here is perhaps to be explained by the indefiniteness imparted by the foregoing negative, as at Dem. 9.41 οὐ λόγους ἑμαυτοῦ λέγων. **e4 τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ τοῦ ἄστεως**: the opponents of the Thirty occupied the port of Piraeus, while the Thirty and their supporters controlled the acropolis and the older parts of Athens. **e5 ὡς ἀσμένως καὶ οἰκείως**: cf. 244a1 ὡς μετρίως. The force of ὡς with an adverb (LSJ Ab. III.a, KG II 415–16) has not been adequately explained. Sometimes, as here, an exclamatory/explanatory sense (cf. demonstrative ὡς = οὕτως) can be envisioned, but that is not always the case. **e6 παρὰ ἐλπίδα τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι** “contrary to expectation, as far as the other Greeks were concerned”; the dative “marks the person from whose perspective or vantage point the action is perceived” (CGCG §30.52). Mention of the other Greeks is relevant, since a civil war in any polis regularly attracted the attention and involvement of other poleis. In this instance Sparta and some of its allies provided support to the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28–34), while Thebes and Megara harbored Thrasybulus and other opponents of the Thirty in their exile (2.4.1–2). **τούς Ἐλευσίνοι**: after their defeat in the battle of Munichia in the spring of 403, the Thirty and their supporters retired to Eleusis (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.24). Two years later their leaders were killed when they made themselves available for a conference; the remainder agreed to come to terms (2.4.43, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 40.4).

244a1 πόλεμον ὡς μετρίως ἔθεντο: for the expression, see 245e4 and Thuc. 1.83.6 πόλεμον . . . οὐ ῥάδιον εὐπρεπῶς θέσθαι. **a1–2 οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . . συγγένεια**: compare 238e1, where it was said that the cause (αἰτία) of Athens’ harmonious form of government is ἡ ἐξ ἴσου γέनेσις. **a3 οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ ἔργῳ**: for the antithesis, here elaborating τῶι ὄντι, see 236d4n. **a4 τελευτησάντων ὑπὸ ἀλλήλων**: the verb can serve as the passive of a verb meaning “kill,” and so is construed with the usual expression of agent (CGCG §35.16). **a5 διαλλάττειν αὐτούς**: encounters between personal enemies in the afterlife are occasionally envisioned (H. *Od.* 11.543–64, Aesch. *Ag.* 1555–9) and lie behind some explanations of the practice of the *maschalismos* of murder victims (Muller 2011: 284–6), but the idea of opposing armies continuing their hostilities after death never seems to have appealed to the imagination of the Greeks. In the case of civil war

it would be particularly important to hope for a post-mortem reconciliation, since combatants with different allegiances might come from the same family. **a6 τοῖς κρατοῦσιν αὐτῶν**: apparently a reference to the deities of the underworld, who are the objects of the prayers and sacrifices just mentioned, although no exact parallel has been cited for this expression. Euphemisms, commonly used in referring to the gods of the underworld, are especially appropriate here, where even the Olympian deities are not named; see 238b2-3, with ἐν τῷ τοιῶνδε ≈ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε here. **a7 διηλλάγμεθα**: according to Demosthenes (24.135), speaking in 353, responsibility for this reconciliation was shared between the gods and Archinus, for whom see 234b10 and the Introduction 3(d)iv. **a7-b1 οὐ γὰρ κακία . . . ἀλλὰ δυστυχία**: cf. Lysias 2.65 οὐ κακία τῇ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἀρετῇ τῶν πολεμίων πρότερον ἐδυστύχησεν ἢ πόλις, which P. is plainly adapting. Lysias is referring specifically to the democratic faction in the civil war, while P. wishes to apply the sentiment to both sides. In doing so P. uses κακία to mean “moral turpitude” rather than, as in Lysias, “military inferiority,” and he replaces ἀρετῇ τῶν πολεμίων with ἔχθραι (“animosity”). The nature of the “misfortune” (cf. 243a5, c6) is left vague; P. almost seems to be using the word to parody Lysias, in whose funeral oration words from the root δυστυχ- appear a dozen times. The point is that reconciliation is possible because (γὰρ) no enmity was involved; rather the cause of the war was some unspecified unfortunate circumstance that affected both sides equally. **a7 ἀλλήλων ἤψαντο** “laid hands on one another.” When P. uses this verb in the context of violent or aggressive action, the object is regularly someone on whom it would be shameful to lay one’s hands, like a fellow citizen or one’s parents (*Laws* 9.880e6-7, *Rep.* 5.465b2); at *Symp.* 221b5-8 Alcibiades uses the word to convey the supposed inviolability of S. on the battlefield, whom he thus invests with an almost sacrosanct status.

244b1 μάρτυρες . . . τούτων: we are “witnesses to this,” not in the sense that we can supply corroborating verbal testimony but by our behavior. For this meaning of μάρτυς, almost = “paradigm,” see *Laws* 8.836c3-4, where the Athenian says that it would be possible to use the natural disposition of wild creatures (τὴν τῶν θηρίων φύσιν) as a witness to the proposition that sexual relations between men is unnatural. **b2 ἐκείνοις**: i.e. the dead, the dative depending on οἱ αὐτοί = “the same (as).” The logic seems to be that, since those who died in the civil war are our kin, there is all the more reason for them to follow our example and be reconciled. It is not at all clear how this should be related to the point with which we began (a1-2), namely that the reason we the living reached such a firm and congenial rapprochement with our enemies is our kinship with them.

In any event, this statement is immediately undercut by the reference in b5 to the forgiveness extended to the barbarians (Pownall 2004: 55). **b3 ὦν τε ἐποίησαμεν ὦν τε ἐπάθομεν:** cf. Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, DK 82 B1 1.7 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε. Strictly speaking, what the speaker says is illogical, since forgiveness is not normally expected for what one has suffered. The form of expression, however, illustrating once more the Greek fondness for polar expression (239b1, 241a3–4nn.), well conveys the reciprocal nature of mutual forgiveness and brings the section to a close with a resounding rhetorical flourish.

244b4–246a4: THE CORINTHIAN WAR

This section speaks of events that took place after the death of S. and, most likely, after that of Aspasia (see the Introduction 3(b)). In the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War the absence of fortifications and a navy inhibited Athens' imperial designs. At the same time, the Spartans took advantage of Athens' incapacity in order to extend their own influence, including advances in Asia, which they justified as an effort to liberate Greek cities from Persian domination. This in turn encouraged Persia, beginning in 395, to provide financial support to those Greek cities, including Athens, that could be counted on to oppose Spartan expansionism. The ensuing conflict, known as the Corinthian War because of crucial engagements in the area of the Isthmus, came to an end in 387. The peace treaty ending the war is sometimes called "the King's Peace," referring to the Persian king Artaxerxes (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31; Hyland 2018: 164–8). The speaker calls particular attention to this section of his speech with a *praeteritio* in which he recounts, not once but twice, the events that are so recent that they need no recounting, first in summary (244d3–e1) and then in greater detail (244e1–246a4).

244b4 εἰρήνης . . . ἡσυχίαν: cf. ἡσυχίας γενομένης καὶ εἰρήνης 243e1. **b6 ἱκανῶς** is commonly used in the Platonic scholia as a gloss on ἐπιεικῶς and ἄδην; here it seems to have intruded as a gloss on οὐκ ἐνδεῶς, with which it is synonymous; cf. *Phd.* 88e3 ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς. **b7–c1 ὡς εὖ παθόντες . . . οἶαν χάριν ἀπέδοσαν:** cf. Soph. *El.* 751 οἷ' ἔργα δράσας οἶα λαγχάνει κακά. This type of locution, where two exclamatory expressions are paratactically juxtaposed to emphasize the disparity between what is deserved and what accrues, is characteristic of tragedy (e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 503, 923, *Trach.* 994, 1045) and the more "poetic" sections of Thucydides (e.g. 5.7.2, 7.75.6). Here it highlights the alleged ingratitude of the other Greeks toward Athens, the city that "saved" them at the time of the Persian Wars (ποτε) and then was

rewarded by being robbed of its power by those very Greeks in collusion with the barbarians. **b7 εὖ παθόντες**: in contrast to the harm suffered by the Persians at the hands of the Athenians (παθόντες ὑπὸ αὐτῆς κακῶς).

244c1-2 τάς τε ναῦς περιελόμενοι: by using the verb that regularly refers to taking down a city's walls (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.22, Thuc. 1.108.4), the speaker subtly suggests that the Athenian navy served as the real defensive fortification for the Greeks against the Persians; by using the middle voice the speaker underlines the advantage attained by the Greeks at the Athenians' expense. **ναῦς . . . καὶ τείχη**: among the conditions of the Athenians' capitulation to Sparta in 404 were the surrender of all but twelve of their ships and the demolition of their walls (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20). A dozen years later the walls were rebuilt and the navy began to be restored thanks to contributions from the Persians (245a7n.). **c3 ἀντι ὧν**: before the battle of Salamis the Athenians abandoned their city and its walls "in exchange for" the preservation of the walls of the other Greek cities; cf. Lysias 2.33 ἡγησάμενοι κρεῖττον εἶναι . . . ἐλευθερίαν ἢ . . . δουλείαν τῆς πατρίδος, ἐξέλιπον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν πόλιν. **c3-4 διανοουμένη . . . μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀμῦναι** "being resolved that under no circumstances would it any longer defend." The particle ἂν marks the infinitive as potential; for the negative μὴ rather than οὐ, which carries with it almost the force of an oath, see *SMT* §685. The speaker represents the incapacity to act imposed upon the Athenians by their surrender as a principled posture (cf. e5 ἃ ἐδέδοκτο αὐτῆι), thereby converting a dire necessity into a moral virtue. **c4-5 πρὸς ἀλλήλων . . . ὑπὸ βαρβάρων**: George (2005: 176-7) detects a subtle distinction here between the two expressions of agency, based on the fact that in the former the agent "is to some extent a patient as well." But P. is not averse to using the expression ὑπὸ ἀλλήλων (244a4 and elsewhere), and this may be merely an instance of *variatio* for its own sake. **c7 ἐλευθερίας ἐπικούρους**: a unique formulation. **ἡμᾶς**: Cobet (1874: 244) proposed deleting this, but it seems more likely that a glossator would have used Ἀθηναίους than ἡμᾶς. P. uses the seemingly unnecessary pronoun to conclude this portion of the sentence as it had begun, with ἡμῶν, and to create a juxtaposition with σφέτερον, with which the next portion of the sentence begins. **ἤδη**: for the force of the adverb, see 234a6n. The sentence can be read, and P. may have deviously intended it, as suggesting that the stage was reached when it was no longer up to Athens to enslave the rest of the Greeks, a function now gladly taken over by the Spartans.

244d1 ταῦτα ἔπραττον "they set about doing this," the imperfect creating an expectation that details will follow (Rijksbaron 1994: §6.1). **d1-2 καὶ μηκύνειν μὲν τί δεῖ**; cf. Isocr. 16.8 καὶ τί δεῖ μακρολογεῖν; (also 12.181,

14.29). This and similar expressions became an Isocratean mannerism, which P. is perhaps parodying both here and in the speeches of S. (*Phdr.* 241e6–7 καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου;) and Alcibiades (*Symp.* 217c3 καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν;). Unlike Isocrates, P. here postpones the interrogative, as at Aesch. *Ag.* 598 καὶ νῦν τὰ μάσσω μὲν τί δεῖ σ' ἐμοὶ λέγειν; cf. Soph. *Phil.* 11, Eur. *Hec.* 960, *Or.* 28. **d2 οὐ γὰρ παλαιά:** the speaker spells out the reason for the *praeteritio*, elsewhere left implicit; see Isocr. 5.43 καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους; Dem. 22.15 καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ παλαιὰ λέγειν; 26.7 καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν; **d3 λέγοιμι ἄν:** a locution frequent in tragedy (imitated by Ar. at *Knights* 40, *Lys.* 97, 119); see Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 336 and Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 838, whose speculation that it “evidently reflects a forensic usage at Athens” is not borne out by the texts of the orators. **αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἴσμεν:** cf. Isocr. 20.10 αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς . . . ἐπειδομεν, immediately following καὶ τί δεῖ . . . διατρίβειν; **d4 ἀφίκοντο εἰς χρεῖαν τῆς πόλεως:** cf. Eur. *Alc.* 719 εἶθ' ἀνδρὸς ἔλθοις τοῦδε γ' ἐς χρεῖαν, *Laws* 3.697d6–7, 702b6, *Rep.* 3.410a8. **d5 Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι:** in 395, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.1), the agent of the Persian king distributed fifty talents of silver among the leading citizens of Thebes, Corinth and Argos to induce those cities to form an alliance against the Spartans, whose increasing influence in Asia was causing annoyance to the king. The Thebans asked the Athenians for their support, which the Athenians agreed to supply by a unanimous vote (3.5.16). **d6 θεϊότατον:** for θεῖος referring to that which is explicable only in terms of divine influence, “extraordinary, miraculous,” see S.’s discussion at *Meno* 99c–d, where he denigrates the way “women and Spartans” apply the word to people as a term of praise. **καὶ βασιλέα:** the speaker encourages the audience to believe that “even the Great King” was so fearful for his safety (cf. 241e3–4n.) that he had to rely on Athenian assistance. The truth is that the Persians were happy to give financial support for the rebuilding of Athens’ walls in 393, apparently at the request of Conon (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9), in order to maintain the balance of power among the various Greek poleis; earlier, during the Peloponnesian War, the Persians had agreed to help finance the Spartan navy (Thuc. 8.58.5–6) for similar reasons. Hyland (2018) may be justified in challenging the current view that Persian strategy aimed at a “balance of power” among the Greek poleis, but passages like Thuc. 8.46.4–5 and 87.4 suggest that the Greeks, at least, perceived the Persian strategy as aiming at just that. **d6–7 εἰς τοῦτο ἀπορίας ἀφικέσθαι, ὥστε:** cf. 243b3–4n. **d7–8 περιστῆναι αὐτῶι . . . τὴν σωτηρίαν γενέσθαι** “it turned out for him that his salvation came about.” For the construction of the verb with dative and infinitive, see Dem. 18.218 περιεστῆκει τοῖς βοηθείας δεήσεσθαι δοκοῦσιν . . . αὐτοὺς βοηθεῖν, with the translation of Yunis ad loc.: “it turned out for us who seemed

to need help . . . that we were the very ones to help.” **d8** ἀλλὰ ἦ: cf. *Phd.* 68b3–4 μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλὰ ἦ ἐκεῖ. For the lack of agreement among scholars as to whether this or ἄλλο ἦ is the appropriate way of analyzing what regularly appears in printed texts as ἀλλ’ ἦ, see KG II 284–5, *GP* 24–7. In sentences like this, “except” can be expressed by ἀλλὰ alone (e.g. *H. Od.* 8.311–12 οὐ τί μοι αἴτιος ἄλλος, | ἀλλὰ τοκῆε δύω) or by ἦ alone (e.g. *Cri.* 46b5 μηδενὶ ἄλλωι πείθεσθαι ἦ τῶι λόγωι). Our expression involves a redundancy like that seen in πλήν versus πλήν ἦ (Riddell §148); compare *Euthphr.* 3e3–4 ἄδηλον πλήν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν with *Apol.* 42a4–5 ἄδηλον παντὶ πλήν ἦ τῶι θεῶι.

244e1 ἀπώλλυ: for the conative force of the imperfect (*CGCG* §33.25), see e.g. *Eur. IT* 359–60 οὐ μ’ ὥστε μόσχον Δαναΐδαι χειρούμενοι | ἔσφαζον, spoken by the still living Iphigenia. **καὶ δὴ καί** “and in fact,” a frequent formula of transition in P. (*GP* 255–6). But it is rare to see it used twice in close proximity, as it is here and e3–4, where it focuses on a specific instance, “and in particular.” **e2** ἄν . . . ἄν: the preferred positions for the particle are either second in its clause or adjacent to the verb; here, as often, it is repeated so that both tendencies can be satisfied. **e3** ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοικτίρμων: the adjective is attested in the Classical period only here and at *Eur. IT* 345, where also it is accompanied by ἀεὶ, referring to Iphigenia’s (former) consistently compassionate attitude toward foreigners. For another possible echo of that passage, see 242d1–2n. **τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπείς**: similarly Gorgias, in his funeral oration, describes the *laudandi* as θεράποντες τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων (DK 82 B6). The language of θεραπεία will return at the very end of the oration (249c5–6). **e4–245a1** οὐχ οἷα τε ἐγένετο καρτερῆσαι . . . ἀλλὰ ἐκάμφθη: there is considerable irony in the speaker’s praise of the Athenians’ failure to maintain their resolve, given that inconstancy was among the most common grounds for criticism of Athenian democracy. Here the Athenians’ steadfastness (normally a praiseworthy quality) is broken by the city’s admirable consideration for the plight of the oppressed, a trait seen earlier in its defense of the Argives and the children of Heracles (239b5 and 6nn.). As Henderson (1975: 44) notes, however, in this instance Athens “clearly was not aiding the weaker side.”

245a1 τῶν . . . ἀδικησάντων: the genitive must depend on βοηθεῖν, “(to rescue) from those who had wronged them,” although the only parallel with this verb seems to be pseudo-Democritus DK 68 B302.170 τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τοῖς φίλοις ἀπορίας. **σφᾶς**: plural, referring to the singular μηδενί, as if τινι had preceded, since the meaning is “not to rescue anyone.” The change from singular to plural is similar to what is seen at

Xen. *An.* 1.4.8 οὐδὲ ἐρεῖ οὐδεὶς ὡς ἐγὼ ἕως μὲν ἂν παρῆι τις χρώμαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀπιέναι βούληται, . . . αὐτοὺς κακῶς ποιῶ. **a1–7 καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἑλληνας . . . ἔσωσεν:** a carefully constructed and well-balanced period. In the case of the Greeks (μὲν), Athens in its official capacity came to their aid so as to free them from servitude; when it was a matter of the Persian king, on the other hand (δέ), officially (μὲν) the city could not bring itself to come to his aid, for fear of tarnishing its earlier triumphs, but (δέ) it was willing to countenance the participation of Athenian fugitives and volunteers who came to his aid and brought about salvation. In P., sentences like this are generally designed to illustrate the capacity of rhetoric to conceal defects in the content with the illusory precision of the wording. Here, it is not at all clear what specific events are referred to and, in any event, the city had no authority to either forbid or allow fugitives and volunteers from entering into the services of a foreign king. **a2 ἀπελύσατο δουλείας:** generally taken as referring to the battle of Cnidus (*BA* 61 E4) in 394, in which Spartan naval power was crushed and the Spartan commander Pisander was killed (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10–12). Similarly hyperbolic statements about this naval victory are made by Isocrates (9.68 οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ἀντὶ δουλείας αὐτονομίας ἔτυχον; cf. 5.64, 9.56) and Demosthenes (20.69, quoting a decree honoring Conon as the man who ἤλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους). But this makes nonsense of the emphatic distinction drawn here between action taken by Athens itself (αὐτή) and action taken by Athenians acting in an unofficial capacity. The opposition to Sparta at Cnidus consisted of the Phoenician navy under the command of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus and a fleet of Greek ships, the majority of which, according to Isocrates (9.56), were supplied by Euagoras of Cyprus, under the command of the Athenian Conon. After the naval defeat at Aegospotami Conon had absented himself from Athens, taking the remaining eight ships and putting them at the service of Euagoras (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.29). Later, Conon served as an adviser to Pharnabazus, who put him in command of forty triremes (*Hell.* 4.8.1–3), and it is surely to Conon that the speaker refers in a6 (φυγάδας δὲ καὶ ἐθελοντάς). **a7 ὁμολογουμένως ἔσωσεν:** the adverb (243c4–5n.) encourages the audience's acquiescence by assuming that its acquiescence has already been granted. Although the claim is repeated at 246a1, it is not clear when exactly the Athenians, "by common consent," proved to be the salvation of the king of Persia. The sentence ends with ithyphallic rhythm (– ∪ – ∪ – ×), frequently found as a concluding element in tragic lyrics and in Agathon's speech in the *Symposium*, including in his first sentence (194e4–5; also 195a7, b5, 196c3). **τειχισαμένη δὲ καὶ ναυπηγησαμένη:** the speaker ignores the contribution of the Persians to the restoration of Athenian power, giving the impression that the

Athenians were themselves responsible for the reconstruction of their navy and their fortifications. According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.9), Conon asked Pharnabazus that he be allowed to retain the ships that had been put under his command; the satrap agreed to this and in addition gave him funds for the rebuilding of Athens' walls. The Athenians had surrendered their fleet and torn down their walls after their defeat by Sparta in 404 (244c1-2n.). In *Gorgias* (517c, 518e-519a) S. condemns those earlier politicians who persuaded the Athenians to build walls and ships, thereby contributing to the unhealthy bloating of the city; they should instead have fostered justice and austerity among the citizens.

245b1 *ἐκδεξαμένη* “took on” or “took over” the war, as though Athens was now in charge of prosecuting the resistance to Sparta, with *ἠναγκάσθη* giving the impression that Athens was reluctantly pressed into the role, and had no interest in settling scores with Sparta or in restoring its empire. **b1-2** *ὑπὲρ παρίων*: there is no evidence that the Athenians undertook to fight the Spartans “on behalf of the Parians.” The words are clearly corrupt, nor can we be sure whether what P. wrote, perhaps a prepositional phrase or an adverb, goes with the previous or the following words. Possibly the text originally read *ὑπὲρ ἐτέρων* (cf. Isocr. 18.56, Isaeus 10.1), but it is difficult to see why that should have been corrupted in this way. Given the inelegant repetition of *πολεμ-* three times within seven words, the corruption may in fact extend beyond the obelized words. **b2** *φοβηθεῖς δὲ βασιλεύς*: cf. 241e3-4. Here, it is alleged, the Persian king was fearful of Athenian power since (*ἐπειδὴ*) he became aware of the Spartans' withdrawal from naval operations. This ought to be a reference to the destruction of the Spartan fleet at Cnidus (a2n.), but the Persians were so far from being alarmed at the prospect of renewed Athenian naval power that they in fact helped to restore Athens' fleet not long after that battle (a7n.). At the same time, the Persians secretly gave money to the Spartans to help rebuild their fleet, in hopes that the Athenians and their allies would be more likely to welcome a peace treaty (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16). **b4-c1** *ἀποστῆναι . . . ἀποστάσεως*: a highly distorted version of the aborted peace negotiations that took place in 392/1, here presented as motivated by the frightened king's desire to extricate himself from danger. For a discussion of the evidence for those negotiations, which includes Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12-15, Andoc. *On the peace* and Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 149, see Harding 2006: 165-73; Hyland 2018: 156-61. There appear to have been two conferences, one in Sardis and one in Sparta. Given the competing interests of the various participants it is not surprising that the negotiations were unsuccessful. Uppermost in the minds of the Athenians was the fate of the Greek cities in Asia and on

the Aegean islands that had earlier been controlled by Athens; Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros are mentioned by both Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.15) and Andocides (3.12). **b5** τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ: that is, the Greek cities in Asia that the Spartans had surrendered (ἐξέδοσαν) to the Persian king as part of the treaty signed in 411 (Thuc. 8.58.2), cities that the Athenians felt had subsequently been liberated by them.

245c2 συνέθεντο καὶ ὤμοσαν “agreed under oath” or “swore to an agreement,” a hendiadys. This is standard treaty language (e.g. *IG* 1³ 127.16 [405/4 BC], *II*² 111.17–18 and 57 [362 BC]), but no treaty was signed on this occasion. The speaker means that the cities were prepared to sign such a treaty. **c3** Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοί: repeated from 244d5, the point being to emphasize the contrast between the other Greeks, who are scarcely distinguishable from barbarians, and the Athenians, who alone (μόνοι c5) are unwilling to betray their fellow Greeks. The pervasiveness of that spirit of betrayal is itself emphasized by the fourfold occurrence of ἐκδιδόναι (b6, c2, c4 and c5). **c5** μόνοι δὲ ἡμεῖς: as noted by Loraux (1986: 1), the singularity of Athens is a common feature of the funeral orations; cf. Thuc. 2.40.2, 5, 41.3, Lysias 2.18, 20, 50, 57, Dem. 60.4, 10–11, Hyperides 6.35. **οὐκ ἐτολμήσαμεν**: cf. a4 οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν (*sc.* ἡ πόλις). This passage is characterized by an unusually high frequency of repetition; see c3n., b1–2n. and the five occurrences of βοηθεῖν at 244e5–245a6. **c6** δὴ τοι: an uncommon particle combination (*GP* 552), occurring only five times in P. and not at all in the orators (τοι itself appears only here in the funeral oration). Interestingly, the only occurrence in Thuc. is in Pericles’ funeral oration (2.41.4, also, as here, followed by γε). **γενναῖον**: referring not merely to the virtuous character of the Athenian spirit but, as becomes immediately apparent, locating that character in the very blood of the “race” (γεν-, φύσει) of the Athenians, the only true and pure Greeks. **c7** βέβαιόν τε καὶ ὑγιές: the collocation appears only twice in the Classical period, here and at *Phaedo* 90c3, where S. characterizes the “antilogicians” who feel justified in arguing both sides of any issue on the grounds that everything is in a state of flux and nothing is secure or stable (οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδὲ βέβαιον). **c7–d1** μισοβάρβαρον: the word occurs only here before the Roman period; it was perhaps invented by P. to prepare for (οὐ) μειζοβάρβαροι below.

245d1 διὰ τὸ εἰλικρινῶς εἶναι Ἕλληνες: the meaning of the adverb, “unadulterated,” is illuminated by what Diotima says when she imagines what it would be like εἴ τῳ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρὸν, ἄμεικτον (*Symp.* 211d8–e1), describing the essence of the Beautiful, untainted by contact with the physical world. Most editors have followed Berndt

(1881: 48) in emending to accusative Ἕλληνας, but the conceptual subject of the sentence, and the grammatical subject of most of c5 to d5, is ἡμεῖς. **d2–3 Πέλοπες οὐδέ Κάδμοι οὐδέ Αἴγυπτοί τε καὶ Δαναοί** “men like Pelops or Cadmus or Aegyptus and Danaus”; for this use of the plural of proper names “to express contempt and indignation,” see Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 1439 Χρυσίδων μείλιγμα τῶν ὑπ’ Ἰλῖωι, and compare *Rep.* 3.387c1 Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας. Pelops, the legendary eponym of the Peloponnese, came from Lydia (Pind. *Ol.* 1.24); Cadmus, a Phoenician from Tyre, was the founder of Thebes (Hdt. 2.49.3); the trilogy of which Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* is a part is set in Argos and dramatizes the immigration of Danaus and his daughters in flight from their native Egypt, pursued by Aegyptus and his sons. By contrast, the Athenians were born of the Attic soil and did not migrate from elsewhere (237b3–c3). **d3–4 φύσει μὲν . . . νόμῳ δέ:** for the antithesis, see 239a2–3n. The antithesis is put to novel, and potentially dangerous, use here in intersection with the Greeks/barbarians antithesis. It is commonplace to speak of the “natural” animosity between Greeks and barbarians (e.g. *Rep.* 5.470c6, Isocr. 4.158, 12.163); we are now reminded that it is only the Athenians who are “naturally” Greek, all others being Greek only “by convention.” **d4 συνοικοῦσιν:** the verb is commonly used of cohabitation in marriage and, metaphorically, of the coexistence of traits or features within an individual (246e5), implying a more intimate connection than would have been conveyed by μετοικοῦσιν (237b5n.), which expresses a change from one habitation to another. **αὐτοὶ Ἕλληνες** “Greeks without qualification,” glossed by the immediately following words. This use of αὐτός (LSJ A. 1.4) features prominently in P.’s attempts as he works toward an understanding of, and a formulation of the language for, the Forms (see *Parm.* 133d–134d, *Rep.* 4.437e–438e and *Symp.* 211d8–e1, quoted in d1n.). Thus, Cobet’s ingenious proposal (1874: 244–5) that we read the unattested αὐτοέλληνες is unnecessary. **d5 μειξοβάρβαροι:** only twice elsewhere in the Classical period, at Eur. *Phoen.* 138, referring to the Aetolian (and therefore somewhat backward: Thuc. 1.5.3–6.2) Tydeus, and at Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.15, of a city with a mixed population of Greeks and Carians. **d5–6 καθαρὸν τὸ μῖσος ἐντέτηκε τῇ πόλει:** an iambic trimeter; for the expression, cf. Soph. *El.* 1311 μῖσός τε γὰρ παλαιὸν ἐντέτηκέ μοι, where Electra is speaking of her inveterate hatred of her mother. The metaphor is from the casting of, e.g., bronze by pouring the molten metal into a mold, where it will cool and solidify. P. adds to the image that the hatred in this instance is pure, that is, it is unadulterated as though with a baser metal. καθαρὸν is made emphatic by being in predicate position (Gildersleeve §627) and by appearing first in its clause. **d6 τῆς ἀλλοτρίας φύσεως:** all the talk in this section about racial purity and inborn antipathy to alien natures

contributed to the appeal of this text in National Socialist circles in the 1930s; see Harder 1934, esp. 499–500; Bambach 2003: 204–7. **ὁμῶς δὲ οὖν** “be that as it may,” like simple **δὲ οὖν** (for which, see *GP* 463–4), but with a bit more urgency; cf. *Pol.* 272d1–2, *Symp.* 217d1, *Antiph.* 5.75, *Eur. El.* 508, *Ar. Eccl.* 326. **ἐμονώθημεν πάλιν**: cf. **μόνοι δὲ ἡμεῖς** c5, in both instances referring to the Athenian isolation resulting from the alleged refusal in 392/1 to abandon the Asiatic Greeks, an isolation that is here presented as a repetition (**πάλιν**) of that following the Peloponnesian War.

245e1 ἔργον ἐργάσασθαι: this *figura etymologica* goes back to Hesiod (*Op.* 382) and is frequent in Herodotus. For its application to shameful deeds, see *Eur. Med.* 791, *Ar. Ach.* 128, *Wealth* 445–6. **e2 Ἕλληνας βαρβάροις ἐκδόντες**: distinguishing the Athenians from the other Greeks (c2, 4, 5). The participle is aorist because it describes the same action as the aorist **ἐργάσασθαι**; for this “coincident” use of the aorist participle, see Barrett on *Eur. Hipp.* 289–92. **e2–3 ἐξ ὧν**: causal. The Athenians found themselves at the end of the Corinthian War in the same circumstances that resulted in their defeat in the Peloponnesian War. As Xenophon notes, the Athenians in 387, seeing that the Persian king had allied himself with the Spartans, were “afraid that they would be overcome as they had been earlier,” **φοβούμενοι δὲ μὴ ὡς πρότερον καταπολεμηθεῖσαν** (*Hell.* 5.1.29). **e3 ἄμεινον ἢ τότε**: the Corinthian War ended with a treaty signed in 386. The peace that resulted was called sometimes the Peace of Antalcidas, after the Spartan admiral who helped negotiate the treaty, and sometimes the King’s Peace, after Artaxerxes, to whose terms the parties agreed (see the Introduction 3(b)). Those terms included acknowledgment that the cities of Asia belonged to the king, while other Greek cities were self-governing, with the exception of the islands Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which continued to be controlled by Athens (*Hell.* 5.1.31). **e4 ἐθέμεθα τὸν πόλεμον**: see 244a1n. **e5–6 ἀπηλλάγημεν . . . καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι** “we welcomed the end of the war with the same sense of relief as our enemies used to do”; cf. the opening sentence of *Critias*, in which Timaeus expresses his relief at coming to the end of his discourse (**ἀγαπητῶς ἀπήλλαγμαί**), comparing it to the satisfied feeling at the end of a long journey. The speaker here is not comparing the feelings of the Athenians with those of their opponents in the Corinthian War. If he had wanted to do so he would have omitted the verb; cf. e.g. *Apol.* 28e3–4 **ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις** (*sc.* **ἔμενον**), which also illustrates the “superfluous” **καὶ** (235d6n.). Rather, the verb is conspicuous for being repeated, but now in the imperfect tense. The point seems to be that the Athenians are receiving the same humane treatment that their (Greek) adversaries regularly received at their hands (242c7–d4), with

perhaps the further implication that it was the Athenians' example that set the precedent. **e7 ἀνδρῶν . . . ἀγαθῶν:** see 237a5n. **μέντοι:** it is difficult to gauge the force of this particle, which appears only here in the funeral oration. It is a generally conversational particle (e.g. 234b4, 10) occurring frequently in P. but absent from *Timaeus* and *Critias* and rare in *Laws* (Brandwood 1990: 28–31). Here it may have an adversative sense (*GP* 404–6), in which case the implication is that men were lost even though the war was concluded successfully, or it may be progressive (*GP* 406–9), moving on to a new point about the war. There may even be a hint of the preparatory sense inherent in μέν (although Denniston finds this force of μέντοι only occasionally and only in epic: *GP* 398), since ἀγαθοὶ δέ follows. **e8–246a2 τῶν τε ἐν Κορίνθῳ . . . Λακεδαιμονίους:** concluding the section on the Corinthian War by mentioning Athenian actions that took place near Corinth, then those that took place in Asia. By adopting this order, which reverses the chronology of events, the speaker ends with what brings greatest credit upon the Athenians; by attributing the loss of Athenian life at Corinth to rugged terrain and the treachery of the Corinthians, the speaker allows no credit to the skill or bravery of the enemy. **e8 δυσχωρίαί:** it is not at all clear to what the speaker is referring. The sources for the fighting in Corinthian territory offer no evidence of an instance in which the topography contributed to Athenian losses. In fact, the Corinthian War is especially noted for the emergence of lightly armed Athenian peltasts, troops that depended for success upon their mobility and were particularly effective in rough terrain. In 390 Iphicrates and his peltasts inflicted so humiliating a defeat on a Spartan detachment near Corinth that Agesilaus led his troops home in such a way as to avoid being seen during daylight (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.13–18).

246a1 προδοσίαι: in 392, with Corinth occupied by the Athenians and their allies, two Corinthians agreed to betray the city to the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7) by allowing access through a point in the walls connecting Corinth with the port of Lechaeum (*BA* 58 D2). **βασίλεια ἐλευθέρωσαντες:** referring back to 245a4–7. The expression is paradoxical, given that the Greeks generally regarded the Great King as the only free person; cf. Eur. *Hel.* 276 τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἑνός. The following comment about expelling the Spartans from the sea refers to the battle of Cnidus (245a2n.). **a3 ἀναμνησκῶ . . . κοσμεῖν:** cf. 236e2 μνήμη καὶ κόσμος. The function of the speaker is to commemorate, that of the audience to remember and honor. **a3–4 καὶ κοσμεῖν τοιούτους ἀνδρας:** the entire section concerning ἡ τῶν ἔργων πρᾶξις (237b1) is brought to a somber, spondaic close. (The two clausulae most favored in the funeral oration are this one, — — — — ×, and ∪ — ∪ ∪ ×, eleven times each.)

It is perhaps relevant that one of the brave Athenians who lost his life in the Corinthian War was the brilliant mathematician Theaetetus (Nails 274–8), whose early death, which serves as the occasion for the dialogue named after him, made a profound impression on P.

246a5–c8: INTRODUCTION TO THE ΠΑΡΑΙΝΗΣΙΣ

Having concluded the praise of the dead by recounting their glorious accomplishments, the speaker now turns to address the family members of the deceased. As had been promised in the exordium (236e3–237a1n.), the address falls into two parts, exhortation of the younger generation (246d1–247c4) and consolation of the parents (247c5–248d6). Such an address is a conventional feature of the funeral oration (Ziolkowski 1981: 138–63), but P.'s treatment is original, and characteristically Platonic. For he places the address in the mouth of the dead. Thus the words are those of the deceased, transmitted by the (male) speaker of the oration, an oration composed by Aspasia and repeated by S. for the benefit of M. This is a technique familiar from other Platonic dialogues. In *Symposium* the words of Diotima are reported by S., whose speech is recounted to his friends by Apollodorus, who heard it from Aristodemus. This has the effect of distancing P., who is of course the author of everything that is spoken, from the words, the purpose being to require the reader to concentrate on the words themselves and their coherence (or lack thereof) rather than on the multiple stages of transmission or the person of the speaker.

246a5 καὶ . . . μὲν δὴ: transitional, as at 241e6. **a6** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: raising potentially awkward questions. This may be taken as a reference to the heroes of Marathon, who were buried in a mass grave at the site of the battle (Thuc. 2.34.5). But it could equally well refer to the corpses of those who died at Arginusae; the failure to recover those corpses resulted in the trial and execution of Aspasia's son (243c6n.). **a6–b1** πολλὰ μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ καλὰ, πολὺ δὲ ἔτι πλείω . . . τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα: cf. Lysias 2.2 ὥστε καλὰ μὲν πολλὰ . . . εἰρῆσθαι, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ . . . παραλελείφθαι. The words of the speaker thus match the deeds of the deceased (πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα 239a7), but only up to a point, since much more could be said. It is a rhetorical commonplace to say that the speaker has given the audience only a sample of what he could say; so Agathon, after lauding the beauty (κάλλος) of the god Eros, says ταῦτα ἱκανὰ καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ λείπεται (*Symp.* 196b4–5). By doing so the speaker modestly suggests that he has not adequately praised his subject and, at the same time, hints that he is fully aware of the store of material with which he could do so.

246b1 πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες: cf. Soph. *El.* 1365 πολλὰ κυκλοῦνται νύκτες ἡμέραι τ' ἴσαι, where the Paidagogos cuts off Electra's request for further details by saying that the full story will unfold at length after the task at hand has been accomplished. Here, the "many days and many nights" are applied to the rhetorical commonplace that the speaker has too little time in which to do justice to the present topic, e.g. *Apol.* 19a1–2, 37a8, Lysias 2.54, Arist. *Rhet.* 1.1374a33. **b3** μεμνημένους: plural, agreeing in sense with πάντα ἄνδρα; cf. *Laws* 6.763c1–2 πᾶς ἀνὴρ εἰς δύναμιν ἐπιτηδεύετω, ὅσοι . . . **b4–5** μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν . . . μηδὲ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσω ἀναχωρεῖν: cf. *Cri.* 51b8–9 οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν. The metaphor, which appears also at *Apol.* 29a1–2 and is adopted by Demosthenes in a speech delivered in 353 (15.33 τοὺς τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων τάξιν . . . παραδεδομένην λιπόντας), refers to the admirable demeanor of the hoplite who bravely maintains his position in the phalanx (*Symp.* 179a3–5); it is especially appropriate in this context. **b5** κάκη: a poetic noun, found in tragedy and a tragic-style passage in Aristophanes that also contains that author's only use of πρόγονος (*Birds* 540–1); P. is the only prose author in the Classical period to use it, once in *Republic* (5.468a6–7 τὸν λιπόντα τάξιν . . . διὰ κάκην), twice in *Phaedrus* (247b3, 273c2) and several times in *Laws*. **b5–6** ἐγὼ . . . αὐτός: although the "author" of the speech is Aspasia, the masculine pronoun, along with the adjectives just below, reminds us forcefully that the speaker is a hypothetical male citizen, the only category of person eligible to address the assembled mourners. The very words of the reminder (αὐτός, δίκαιος, τεκμαιρόμενος) thus serve paradoxically to undermine the fictional speaker's authority and to falsify the speaker's claim to have heard what the deceased said as they prepared to risk their lives. **b6** ὦ παῖδες ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν: this type of vocative, accompanied by "a genitive which does not simply replace the name of a parent" (Dickey 1996: 54), is characteristic of military exhortations as found in the poets; e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 402, Eur. *Hec.* 930, *Hel.* 1593, *IT* 1386. **b6–c2** νῦν τε παρακελεύομαι . . . εἶναι ὡς ἀρίστους: in similar fashion, in the *Apology* (29d–e) S. promises, or threatens, that if the jury acquits him he will not leave off philosophizing and exhorting anyone he encounters (παρακελευόμενος . . . ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν) to concern himself with the truth and to look after his soul, ensuring that it be as good as possible (ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται). S. there articulates his essential mission, which he obstinately insists on pursuing even at the cost of his life. By echoing these words and the sentiment they convey P. here brings into the clearest possible focus the distinction between the S. of the *Apology* and the speaker of the funeral oration. The former refuses to

abandon his commitment (b4–5n.) to his mission, which involves engaging and questioning Athenian citizens one by one until their discomfort leads them to improve their lives; the latter takes as his point of departure what his assembled audience already believes and ratifies those beliefs by embellishing his speech with beautiful words and phrases. Analogously to what he says here, in the closing words of the dialogue S. promises that in future he will continue to recite for M. additional “political” speeches of Aspasia, presumably of the same anodyne character. Significantly, he does not promise to engage M. in the kind of stimulating discussion envisioned at the end of some other dialogues (see 249e4n.).

246c2 δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν: cf. *Apol.* 18a7 δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι and *Prot.* 319b3 δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν, both spoken by S. **c3 ἐπέσκηπτον:** for this verb used of transmitting one’s testamentary instructions, see Hdt. 3.65.6, *Soph. Aj.* 566, *Trach.* 1221, Eur. *Alc.* 365, *IT* 701, *Phoen.* 774. **ἀεὶ** “in each instance”; cf. *Apol.* 29d–e, quoted above (b6–c2n.). For this force of the adverb with a participle, in attributive position, see *Phdr.* 238b4–5 ὀνόματα τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης [*sc.* ἐπιθυμίας], Thuc. 1.22.1 περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων. **c4 εἶ τι πάσχοιεν:** a common euphemism for death; Chadwick 1996: 231–2. The speaker consistently avoids using words for death and dying (237a3n.). **c5 καὶ οἷα νῦν ἠδέως ἂν εἴποιεν:** the distinction between what the speaker allegedly heard from the deceased and what the speaker imagines they would say, based on the evidence of what they actually said, is immediately ignored when the speaker introduces the speech with ἔλεγον δὲ τάδε (cf. ταῦτα οὖν . . . ἐπέσκηπτον, 248d7–e1). **c6 λαβόντες δύναμιν:** for the more usual expression, see *Prot.* 361a5 εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι and Aesch. *Ag.* 37 εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι, with Fraenkel ad loc. The suppression of a word meaning “voice” seems intended to suggest that the speaker really is the voice of the dead. **c7 νομίζιν χρὴ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν:** the speaker had earlier (239d4) said that it was necessary to see the bravery of the dead; here the audience is encouraged to think that it is hearing them speak. In rhetorical terms this is an instance of prosopopoeia; see Demetr. *Eloc.* 265–6, quoting our passage as an example and saying that the words are thereby rendered ἐνεργέστερα καὶ δεινότερα. P. uses the figure elsewhere, when S. in *Theaetetus* pronounces the defense that he thinks Protagoras would give and when he puts words into the mouth of the Laws in *Crito*. S. and Theaetetus subject Protagoras’ defense to extended criticism, but when S. gives Crito an opportunity to refute the divine Laws he declines to do so, making it clear that what has been said is beyond dispute. Here we are left to our own devices, either to accept or to question what S. has put into the mouths of the dead. **αὐτῶν ἀκούειν ἐκείνων** “to hear from them themselves” (masculine), repeated for emphasis from c5.

246d1–247c4: ΠΑΡΑΚΕΛΕΥΣΙΣ OF THE YOUNG

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 30) quotes the whole of this section and the next, to 248e2, saying that it is the most beautifully expressed part of the speech, although he unfairly faults it for being precisely what it professes to be, political in presentation rather than forensic (πολιτικόν γε . . . οὐκ ἐναγωνίον); he then quotes Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 199–200 for comparison. In fact, our passage is among the most accomplished specimens of rhetoric in the whole of Greek literature; it is cited on more than one occasion by Cicero (see 246e7–247a2, 247e6–248a7nn.), and Iamblichus closely adapts the whole of 246d2–248b4 in his *Exhortation to Philosophy* (*Protr.* 118–19 des Places). Many scholars would agree with Kahn's assertion that it is in this address to the living by the dead that "the real meaning of the speech must be found" (Kahn 1963: 226 = 2018: 19; cf. Turner 2018: 63, with earlier bibliography); unfortunately, there is little agreement as to what that meaning is. The view adopted here is that P. seems to be going out of his way to signal the superficiality of the sentiments by freighting the passage with a conspicuous profusion of vocabulary having to do with appearance, reputation and attractiveness: καλ(λ)-, πρεπ-, φαν-, κλε-, δοξ-. The ἀρετή that the deceased encourage their sons to pursue is the traditional ἀρετή that the audience is predisposed to approve and that the deceased embody, as displayed by their willingness to follow orders and, if necessary, to die, in contrast to the ἀρετή that requires an understanding of what constitutes right and wrong; see Petrucci 2017.

246d1 μίν: the particle is "inceptive," a usage characteristic of the opening of speeches in drama and earlier Attic oratory (*GP* 382–4); it does not correspond to δέ in the following line, which is explanatory (= γάρ; *GP* 169–70). **d1–2 αὐτὸ μνηύει τὸ νῦν παρόν:** cf. *Cra.* 413e5 αὐτὸ μνηύει . . . τὸ ὄνομα. It is the very fact of their fathers having died in battle that proves that they are sons of ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί (237a5n.). Of course, their fathers had not yet died at the time they gave their instructions to the speaker (note the present tense αἰρούμεθα), but the expectation was that those instructions would be conveyed only εἴ τι πάσχοιεν. **d2–7 ἔξόν . . . τελευτήσαντι:** this passage, along with 247b2–c3, is quoted by the fifteenth-century scholar Manuel Chrysoloras in his recently published epistle to the emperor Manuel; see Patrinelis and Sofianos 2001: 109–10. **d2–3 ἔξόν ζῆν μὴ καλῶς, καλῶς αἰρούμεθα μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν:** cf. Ajax's words at *Soph. Aj.* 479–80 ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι | τὸν εὐγενῆ χρῆ, a sentiment shockingly repudiated by the well-born Iphigenia at *Eur. IA* 1252 κακῶς ζῆν κρείσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν, before she changes her mind. The speaker vies with the poets in expressing a cliché in memorable fashion, juxtaposing

μή καλῶς and καλῶς, and prefixing the negative notion with life and following the positive with death (the latter, however, is expressed less directly than is done by the tragedians: 237a3n.). The governing verb emphasizes the deliberate choice that validates the bravery of the dead, a common feature of the funeral orations (Ziolkowski 1981: 112–13): Gorgias DK 82 B6 (προκρίνοντες), Lysias 2.62 (αἰρούμενοι), Dem. 60.26 (εἴλοντο), Hyperides 6.40 (προείλοντο). **d3–4 πρὶν ὑμᾶς . . . καταστήσαι:** it is traditional to speak of avoiding shaming one’s ancestors by one’s actions (e.g. H. *Il.* 6.209 ≈ *Od.* 24.508, Hyperides 6.3), as the speaker does in the next clause. With this clause the speaker balances parents and earlier generations with children and later generations (236e5n.). **d6 ἀβίωτον:** the S. of the *Apology* justifies his willingness to risk death rather than forgo philosophizing by saying that, for a human being, the unexamined life is not worth living (οὐ βιωτός 38a6). What he had spent his life examining are the very values and assumptions celebrated by the speaker throughout the oration. **d7 τελευτήσαντι:** not strictly necessary after ὑπὸ γῆς, but it is more impressive to end a sentence with a polysyllabic word, especially one that echoes τελευτᾶν d3, thus underlining the contrast between the glorious death that the *laudandi* have chosen and the friendless afterlife awaiting those who have brought disgrace upon their family. **d8 χρὴ οὖν μνησθέντων τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων:** echoing τούτων (neuter) οὖν χρὴ μνησθέντων b2–3, which introduces the exhortation to conform to the steadfastness of one’s ancestors as if maintaining one’s position in the line of battle.

246e1 ἀσκήτε, ἀσκέιν: the repetition at the start of a clause of the word that had ended the previous clause (epanastrophe), as at d2, is a common rhetorical figure; see Berndt 1881: 29, Denniston 1952: 92–5. **μετὰ ἀρετῆς:** it is clear from what follows (μετὰ ἀνανδρίας, δειλίαν) that the speaker is using the word in the restricted sense “courage,” of the sort that elicits acclamation (εὐκλεία). **e1–2 εἰδότας ὅτι . . . κακά:** while it would be reasonable to say that possessions improperly employed carry a taint – and, indeed, that appears to be the purport of the next sentence – the speaker improperly uses contradictories to make the more decisive, and decidedly questionable, claim that all possessions and all practices, in the absence of ἀρετή, are shameful and depraved. **e2 πάντα καὶ κτήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα:** amplified in what follows by, on the one hand, wealth and bodily endowments (for the latter, as well as the former, as κτήματα, see *Symp.* 216d7–e3) and, on the other, πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη. **αἰσχροὶ καὶ κακά:** the opposite of καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ (*Gorg.* 474d1–2, *Laws* 5.728a6–7), the constituents of καλοκάγαθία, the ideal of human excellence; Dover 1974: 41–5. That the deceased embody that ideal was suggested at the

very start of their speech, when they asserted that they are ἀγαθοί and have chosen to die καλῶς. **e3 κλέος:** although it is adopted by all editors, the reading of the MSS and the indirect tradition is impossible. For in the absence of further specification κάλλος can only refer to physical attractiveness. (The proximity of σώματος κάλλος is presumably responsible for the corruption.) The issue here is whether the sons will be able to live up to the reputation for valor that constitutes their patrimony. P. occasionally uses the largely poetic word κλέος (twice in Diotima's "sophistic" speech, *Symp.* 208c5, 209d3, and four times in *Laws*), which appears also in the funeral orations of Pericles (Thuc. 2.45.2) and Lysias (2.5); cf. 247a4n. on εὐκλεία. **e4 ἄλλωι . . . καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῶι:** cf. *Gorg.* 452e6–7 οὗτος ἄλλωι ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῶι. There, however, the discussion is about the acquisition of wealth; here, as the perfect participle makes clear, the speaker is concerned with the possession of inherited wealth. Understanding of these words emerges from what is said below, that it is αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνανδρον (247b6–7) to fail to preserve one's ancestral wealth, a failure that incurs shame by allowing one's wealth to pass into the hands of another. **e5 συνοικοῦντα:** neuter nominative plural, in agreement with neuter κάλλος and feminine ἰσχὺς (KG I 78), hence the singular verbs. **e5–7 πρόποντα . . . τὴν δειλίαν:** it is traditional to denounce the man whose strength or good looks contrast with his lack of courage; e.g. H. *Il.* 3.44–5, Tyrtaeus fr. 12 West, Archilochus fr. 114 West, Eur. fr. 282 (*Autolycus*) Kannicht. Here the speaker puts that topos to use in an original fashion, playing with the language of appearance to make the point that superficial qualities may, paradoxically, serve to expose the underlying truth by calling attention to the disjunction. Using similar language, Laches denigrates those who practice ὄπλομαχία on the grounds that, if the practitioner is a coward (εἰ μὲν δειλὸς τις ὢν), his tendency to overconfidence will reveal all the more clearly his true character (ἐπιφανέστερος γένοιτο οἷος ἦν, *Lach.* 184b–6). **e7–247a2 πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη . . . φαίνεται:** Cicero translates this at *De officiis* 1.63 (*scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda*), introducing it as *praeclarum illud Platonis* and continuing with material from *Laches* 197b as though it is part of the same sentence. Although ἐπιστήμη and σοφία are sometimes used as synonyms, P. does occasionally distinguish them (see Denyer on *Prot.* 330b5); indeed, S.'s questioning of Theaetetus' identification of the two at *Tht.* 145e6–7 serves as the point of departure for P.'s most extensive epistemological inquiry. **e7 πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη** "every form of expertise" (cf. *Euthd.* 282e2, 292c7–8, *Phlb.* 62d9–10, *Pol.* 308c3–4), virtually glossed by the predicate πανουργία; that is, ἐπιστήμη here essentially = τέχνη (cf. Cicero's *scientia*, although he fails to translate πᾶσα despite its prominence). In the singular πᾶς can mean "the whole

of” or, with an abstract noun, “total” (see 239a5n.), but neither meaning is appropriate here.

247a1 δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς: this is a formulaic way of referring to “the whole of ἀρετή” or to “all the ἀρεταί”; cf. *Cri.* 54a1, *Gorg.* 527e4, *Isocr.* 3.2 (earlier than *Mnx.*), 8.63 and 12.228 (later than *Mnx.*), *Xen. Mem.* 3.9.5. **πανουργία:** this quality, immortalized by Rabelais in his character Panurge, is applied by P. to sophists in general (*Phdr.* 271c2, *Prot.* 317b3, *Soph.* 239c6) and to such formidable individuals as Callicles (*Gorg.* 499b9) and Meno (*Meno* 80b8, 81e6). It implies a certain degree of craftiness or skill, which may attract a grudging admiration, being put to use for self-aggrandizement regardless of higher moral considerations. Use of the word confirms the understanding of ἐπιστήμη as more or less equivalent to τέχνη. While it may be legitimate to say that it is not admirable to pursue a craft while failing to observe traditional moral standards, the speaker goes too far in asserting that all crafts so pursued involve depravity; the knowledge of, say, how to play the αὐλός is, in itself, morally neutral. **οὐ σοφία:** it is tempting to read this as a reference to the Socratic and Platonic doctrine of the unity of the virtues, with knowledge pre-eminent among them. In particular, in this context in which the virtue of courage has been in the forefront, one is put in mind of Nicias’ observation that he has often heard S. speaking of courage in terms of σοφία (*Lach.* 194d). But Nicias’ attempt to define courage as a form of wisdom is subjected to scrutiny and the dialogue ends in ἀπορία with regard to the definition of courage. In any event, even if it were true that any pursuit lacking virtue is revealed to be “not wisdom,” it would not therefore be the case that it is πανουργία. **α2–3 παντός . . . πειρᾶσθε:** “Alliteration in π is frequent in Plato” (Denniston 1952: 129). But this instance is extreme and is surely intended to call particular attention to what the speaker regards as of special importance. No fewer than five consecutive words begin with π; the string begins with a threefold polyptoton of πᾶς (cf. 249c2; Gygli-Wyss 1966: 43–8); there is hyperbaton of πᾶσαν, πάντως and πειρᾶσθε; and the words are introduced by the poetic and highly rhetorical καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστατον, reminiscent of the Homeric introduction to a list of successful exploits with the question τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ’ ὕστατον ἔξενάριξεν; (e.g. *Il.* 11.299; cf. 237a1–2n.) or the hymnic formula πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν αἰεῖν (e.g. *Hes. Th.* 34). Comparable instances of alliteration are the highly wrought description of the rivers of the underworld in the myth of *Phaedo* (πολύ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρός μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλούς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ, 111d7–8) and the mythical account in *Phaedrus* of the turmoil among the souls effortfully striving to apprehend true being (πολλὰ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται· πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον, 248b3–4).

a3 μάλιστα μὲν: despite μάλιστα δέ below, the correlate to this is εἰ δὲ μή. For μάλιστα μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ (μή), “ideally . . . , but failing that,” see *Rep.* 9.590d4–5, *Hdt.* 8.22.2; *KG* II 485–6. **a4 ὑπερβαλεῖσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς πρόσθεν εὐκλείαι:** the wording leaves no doubt that what is at issue here is the traditional glorification (cf. δόξηι and δόξαν below) of valor on the battlefield. εὐκλεία (cf. d5 εὐκλειῆς, 246e3 κλέος) is a poetic word that appears only here in P. (unless the *Eighth Letter* is genuine: 354b8). In Thucydides (2.44.4) and Demosthenes (60.32, twice) it occurs only in their funeral orations. The wish that the son might surpass the father is first uttered by Hector (*H. Il.* 6.476–81; his wish is not fulfilled) when he is about to enter the battle, as is the case with the fathers whose words are transmitted here, and this sentiment is regularly associated with courage as displayed in combat; see Schouler 1980, esp. 3. The hero of Sophocles’ *Ajax*, who is also the eponym of one of the ten Athenian tribes, prays rather that his son be his father’s equal for courage but surpass him in good fortune (550–1). Such a prayer would be appropriate here, since the standard set by the ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί (or ἄριστοι, as the speaker would have it: 243c5) who are being celebrated can hardly be surpassed. Pericles makes this explicit when he says that, given the extraordinary valor of the dead (ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς), their sons and brothers could scarcely be judged their equals, but only somewhat inferior (οὐχ ὅμοιοι, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγωι χείρους, *Thuc.* 2.45.1; cf. the Spartan Archidamus, urging his soldiers μήτε τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, 2.11.2). But quite apart from the question whether a paragon of martial valor like Ajax or the recent war dead can be surpassed, or even equaled, there is a more fundamental issue that is raised by the dialogue’s insistence on a form of education based on imitation (see 234a5, 241a7nn.). For it is standard Platonic doctrine, as well as a matter of common sense, that an imitation is necessarily inferior to its model. The aim of a genuine educator, as S. and P. were surely aware, is to be surpassed by one’s pupils. **a5–6 ἂν μὲν νικῶμεν . . . εὐδαιμονίαν:** the notion that victory in this contest brings disgrace, while defeat confers bliss, is worthy of Gorgias, who delights in such paradoxical expression (e.g. *DK* 82 A26, B23). Here there is a further paradox in that, while the context is that of a funeral for those who died fighting the enemy, this contest is among friends. The repetition involved in the *figura etymologica* (νικῶμεν . . . νίκη, ἦττα . . . ἠττώμεθα; cf. *Gorgias DK* 82 B6 νομίζοντες . . . νόμον) is artistically varied by the chiasmic arrangement; Berndt 1881: 30, 41.

247b1 μὴ καταχρησόμενοι μηδὲ ἀναλώσοντες: cf. *Gorg.* 490c3 ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρησθαι, referring to an inequitable distribution of food. The wording thus anticipates the likening of δόξα to a material good that is transmitted as part of the sons’ patrimony. **b2 οἰομένωι τι εἶναι** “who

imagines that he amounts to something,” a colloquial expression that recurs at *Apol.* 41e7 and *Lach.* 200a8 and, with a form of δοκῶ, at *Apol.* 41e5 and elsewhere (Collard 2018: 63-4). **b4-5 εἶναι . . . χρῆσθαι:** normally when an infinitive is the subject of a sentence it has the article; for exceptions (more common in verse, where the article is in general less frequent), see *Gorg.* 454e7, *Rep.* 3.397b8; KG II 3-4. **καλὸς θησαυρὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆς:** recalling the grand expression used to refer to the burial accorded even to the paupers among the dead, ταφῆς καλῆς τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς (234c2-3). For the metaphorical use of the noun, see *Phlb.* 15e1 σοφίας . . . θησαυρόν. Here the metaphorical meaning is immediately merged with the literal, as the sons are expected to preserve and maintain their fathers’ store of both wealth and reputation. **b5 χρῆσθαι** “to misuse, dissipate,” taking on the sense of καταχρῆσθαι from the use of the compound in b1; for this phenomenon, see 242e1-4n. **b7 ἰδίων αὐτοῦ:** elsewhere in P. forms of ἴδιος are accompanied by the genitive of the reflexive (or other) pronoun: *Cra.* 387d2, *Pol.* 305b7, d8, *Prot.* 359a6, *Soph.* 257d1. **κτημάτων τε καὶ εὐδοξιών:** rephrasing χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν. To squander the first of each pair is αἰσχρόν; to fail to live up to the second is ἄνανδρον.

247c1 φίλοι παρά φίλους: cf. *Soph. Ant.* 73 φίλη μετ’ αὐτοῦ κείσομαι, φίλου μέτα, where Antigone speaks of being buried beside her brother. Polyptoton (a2-3n.) with φίλος (and ἐχθρός) is frequent in expressing a reciprocal relationship, e.g. *Laws* 4.708b3, 5.740e7, 11.915e6-7, 12.953d7; Gygli-Wyss 1966: 67. That the dead are expected to welcome newcomers to the underworld is implicit in passages like *H. Od.* 24.105-19, *Aesch. Ag.* 1555-9, *Soph. OT* 1371-4. Hyperides takes advantage of this expectation in his funeral oration, naming several legendary heroes who are likely to greet the arrival of Leosthenes with appreciation (6.35-40). **c2 ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα κομίση:** cf. *Soph. Phil.* 1466 ἡ μεγάλη Μοῖρα κομίζει, where Philoctetes bids farewell to the island of Lemnos, from which Fate is now removing him. There the personification, and consequently the capital letter printed by most editors, seems justified. Here the case is less clear, but the taboo against naming divinities in the funeral oration (238b3n.) suggests that the meaning is something like, “the fate relevant to each,” i.e. the time at which each person happens to die. P. uses the same expression in the myth in *Phaedo*, when S. speaks of those who have committed great crimes and face the fitting consequence, namely being cast into Tartarus (ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, 113e5-6), and in *Laws*, when the Athenian proposes that each individual should believe that his or her place in society depends upon a plan for the welfare of the whole, so that each individual is assigned the appropriate lot

(ἵνα τῆς προσηκούσης μοίρας λαγχάνη, 10.903d8–e1). **c3** **κακισθέντας** “proving to be spineless,” a strong term of abuse; cf. Electra urging her brother on to face the task of matricide, οὐ μὴ κακισθῆις εἰς ἀνανδρίαν πεσῆι (Eur. *El.* 982). **οὐδεὶς εὐμενῶς ὑποδέξεται:** in *Crito* the Laws, who represent themselves as S.’s parents (50e), similarly end their speech by telling S. that, if he runs away from the punishment that Athens has decreed, the Laws in the underworld “are not going to give you a cordial welcome” (οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, 54c7–8). **c4** **τοῖς μὲν οὖν παισὶ ταῦτα εἰρήσθω:** Herodotus often ends an ἐπίδειξις, or a section of an ἐπίδειξις, in this fashion; e.g. 2.34.2 Νείλου μὲν νυν πέρι τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω (transitional μὲν νυν is regularly used by Hdt., almost to the exclusion of μὲν ὧν).

247c5–248d6: ΠΑΡΑΜΥΘΙΑ OF THE PARENTS OF THE DEAD

It is difficult to be original in offering consolation, and what follows exhibits many of the standard items seen in the funeral orations (for a table of commonplaces, see Ziolkowski 1981: 163) and in consolations generally (Kassel 1958; Schauer: 2002: 304–5). P.’s originality is to be found in his putting the consoling words into the mouths of the deceased themselves. This has the effect, as P. was undoubtedly aware, of the immediacy of the drama, where the words spoken are not those of the tragic playwright or of the Athenian actor behind a mask, but of Antigone or Agamemnon. This effect is most urgently felt toward the end of the speech, where the future tenses and potential optatives convey the impression that the disposition of the deceased is in a dynamic state of flux and can still be affected by the actions of the addressees. The parents, however, are not directly addressed; rather, the deceased continue to speak to their sons, who are asked to console the parents of the deceased (ἐκείνους, 247e3) on their behalf.

247c5–6 **ἀεὶ χρὴ παραμυθεῖσθαι ὡς:** there appears to have been some disturbance in the transmission. The text printed here, with no great confidence, is that of F, D.H. *Dem.* 30 and all recent editions. **TW** have εἰ in place of ἀεὶ and they repeat χρὴ after ὡς. The difficulty is that the position of ἀεὶ makes it look intrusive; it ought to go either with παραμυθεῖσθαι or with φέρειν; cf. Eur. fr. 823 (*Phrixus*) Kannicht χρὴ γὰρ . . . τὰς τύχας φέρειν ἀεὶ. **c5** **χρῆ:** sc. ὑμᾶς, the sons of the deceased, with which ἰωμένους and πρᾶυνοντας agree. It is not clear why the dead do not address their parents directly; Pericles assumes the presence of at least some of the parents in the audience (τοὺς τῶνδε νῦν τοκέας, ὅσοι πάρεστε, Thuc. 2.44.1). The continuation of the address to the younger generation may be an indication that P.’s

funeral oration is really meant for an audience of young men like M. (so Robinson 2018), who hope to learn by example how to construct rhetorically effective speech. **c5-7 παραμυθεῖσθαι . . . και μή συνοδύρεσθαι:** so Pericles says οὐκ ὀλοφύρομαι μᾶλλον ἢ παραμυθήσομαι, Thuc. 2.44.1. **c6 εἰν ἄρα συμβῆι:** cf. 246c4 εἴ τι πάσχοιεν. For the force of ἄρα in a subjunctive protasis, signaling that the state of affairs posited by the speaker, which the form of the condition presents as a real possibility, is unwanted, see Wakker 1994: 346-8, citing Hdt. 8.109.5 ἦν ἄρα τί μιν [*sc.* Θεμιστοκλέα] καταλαμβάνηι πρὸς Ἀθηναίων πάθος. **c7 τοῦ λυπήσοντος:** for the future participle with the definite article, see 235d5n. and *SMT* §826.

247d3-4 ὅτι ὧν ἠὔχοντο . . . γεγόνασιν “that the gods have granted them what they prayed for as of the greatest importance.” The genitive depends on ἐπήκοοι; the dative denotes the interested party. Similar is *Laws* 11.931c1-2 ὧν γέγονε σαφές ἐπηκόους εἶναι γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα θεούς, “which (*sc.* curses), as is common knowledge, the gods fulfilled for parents against their children.” **d4 οὐ γὰρ ἀθανάτους:** that we all know that death is inevitable is among the most common, and least comforting, of consolatory motifs; cf. Lysias 2.77-8; Kassel 1958: 66-9. **d5 ἀγαθούς και εὐκλειῆς, ὧν ἔτυχον:** the meaning of ἀγαθούς (“courageous”) is clarified by the following adjective and the relative clause (and by ἀνδρείων παίδων below), for it is by virtue of their death in battle and the resulting acclaim that their parents’ wishes have been fulfilled. These may be, as the speaker goes on to say, “the greatest goods” in the eyes of the many, but surely not in the eyes of S. or P. For the S. of the *Apology* the greatest good (μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, 38a2) for a human being is to engage every day in examining ἀρετή and other vital matters. **d6-7 πάντα δὲ . . . ἐκβαίνειν:** that all lives contain a mixture of good and bad fortune is another cliché; e.g. Eur. fr. 661.1 (*Stheneboea*) Kannicht, Hdt. 1.32.1-4. **d7-e2 και φέροντες μὲν . . . ὑπείκοντες δὲ . . . καταψεύδεσθαι:** two parallel clauses of 34 syllables each, expressing the same idea, first positively then negatively. **d8 δόξουσι τῷ ὄντι** “will seem in reality,” a deliberately oxymoronic formulation. The opposition between seeming and reality is most famously expressed at Aesch. *Sept.* 592, of Amphiaraus, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλει.

247e1-2 ἢ μή . . . καταψεύδεσθαι: if the parents do not bear the loss of their sons bravely either they are not really their parents or the sons did not die bravely. The entire weight, therefore, of Athenian ideology is now seen to rest on the shoulders of the bereaved, for their fortitude will validate both the bravery of the deceased and the speaker’s veracity. **e2 ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας καταψεύδεσθαι** “the eulogists (that is,

orators like the present speaker) are misrepresenting us"; for the genitive with καταψεύδεσθαι, see LSJ A. 1.1. The prominent position of ἡμῶν at the head of its clause corresponds to that of ἡμέτεροι. **e3-4 ἐπαινέτας εἶναι ἔργωι:** the speaker turns the *logos/ergon* antithesis (236d4n.) in a novel direction, proposing that the very actions of their parents constitute the praise of the deceased. **e5 ἄνδρας ἀνδρῶν:** polyptoton (a2-3n.) to end the sentence. The mothers (c5) have conveniently been lost sight of while the talk is of ἀνδρεία; they do not reappear until 248b4. **δή:** another instance of the "self-evidential" force of the particle (242a3n.); Aristotle refers to the saying quoted by the speaker as a commonplace (*Rhet.* 2.1395a20-1). **μηδὲν ἄγαν:** referred to below as a proverb. In an epigram (fr. 7 West), P.'s uncle Critias attributes it to Chilon, the only Spartan among the so-called Seven Sages. In *Protagoras* (343a-b), S. ascribes it, along with γνῶθι σαυτόν, more generally to the Seven Sages, all of whom, he says, were devotees of Spartan wisdom and laconic sayings. **e6 τῶι γὰρ ὄντι εὖ λέγεται:** cf. *Alc.* 2 146e3 τῶι ὄντι ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων, *Euthd.* 296d6 τῶι ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Although editors do not record it in their apparatus, D.H. *Dem.* 30 reads τῶι ὄντι γάρ. P. elsewhere uses now one, now the other order; it is reasonable to adhere here to the reading of P.'s manuscripts (and *Iambl. Protr.* 91). **e6-248a7 ὅτῳ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ . . . πεποιθέναι:** Cicero (*Tusc. Disp.* 5.36) quotes this passage out of context in his own elegant translation, praising it as a revered fount of virtually divine wisdom. The connection, however, between self-reliance and observance of the maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν is not immediately obvious, despite the appearance of γὰρ three times in three lines. S. seems to supply that connection in Book Three of the *Republic*: in arguing that Homeric accounts of heroes engaging in excessive lamentation ought to be suppressed, he says (387d11-e5) that an exceptional individual, who is αὐτὸς αὐτῶι αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν and who has least need of others, will be least affected by the loss of "a son or a brother or material goods (χρημάτων)." This ideal of personal autarky, while it may be appropriate in the context of the Homeric warrior, seems ill suited to the world of the hoplites and oarsmen whose death the funeral oration is designed to commemorate. It is, however, worth noting that Pericles had praised the autarky of both the city of Athens (*Thuc.* 2.36.3) and its citizens individually (41.1). **e7 εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνήρηται** "are within his own control"; for ἀναρτᾶσθαι εἰς, cf. *Laws* 5.729e4-5 εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρημένα, *Meno* 88e6 εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρητῆσθαι. The literal sense of the verb is acknowledged in the following clause (καὶ μὴ ἐν ἄλλοις . . . αἰωρεῖται), which underlines the statement here by using a form of antithetic parallelism, adding denial of the opposite; cf. a1 πανουργία, οὐ σοφία; KG II 586. **εὐδαιμονίαν:** contradicting what the deceased

had said earlier, that their happiness (εὐδαιμονία, a6) depended upon the behavior of their sons.

248a2-3 ἐξ ὧν . . . καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου “depending on the vicissitudes of whose fortunes his own happiness also inevitably fluctuates”; τὰ ἐκείνου = τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου εὐδαιμονίαν φέροντα. **a3-6** τούτῳ . . . ζῆν, οὗτός ἐστιν . . . φρόνιμος, οὗτος . . . παροιμιαί: threefold asyndetic anaphora, with each successive element increasing in length, and with the second element itself containing three items; Denniston 1952: 108-9. It is easy to see why Cicero was impressed with this passage. **a4** σώφρων . . . ἀνδρείος . . . φρόνιμος: three of the four cardinal virtues, according to P. (*Rep.* 4.427e9-10, *Symp.* 196d4-5). The absence of “justice” (247a1n.) is likely due to nothing more than the speaker’s fondness for threes (239d6n.). The substitution of φρόνιμος for σοφός, however, may be significant. In this work P. is unusually sparing in his use of the term σοφός, applying it, ironically, only to the ingenious speakers who contrive to praise even common men (234c4) and to the man who is entrusted with public office in the democracy because he is thought to be wise (ὁ δόξας σοφός, 238d8); the noun σοφία appears only at 247a1, where it is negated. **a7** διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ πεποιθῆναι: this form of the perfect tense of πείθομαι, occurring only here and *Epinom.* 974b7 in P., is almost exclusively poetic, appearing in prose before P. only once in Herodotus (9.88) and once in Thucydides, in the funeral oration, again in the context of self-reliance (σοφίσι αὐτοῖς ἀξιοῦντες πεποιθῆναι, 2.42.4). **a7-b1** τοιούτους . . . τοὺς ἡμετέρους εἶναι: it now emerges that the dead are not relying on the foregoing “philosophical” argument, such as it is, to persuade their parents to forgo excessive lamentation; rather, as has been the case throughout, the form of instruction advocated consists in imitation of a model. For emulation of the dead as a commonplace, see Ziolkowski 1981: 156-7, quoting Thuc. 2.43.4 and Dem. 60.35. In this instance, the dead urge their parents to follow their example of stoic fortitude in the face of the approach of death.

248b1-2 καὶ βουλόμεθα καὶ φάμεν: having said that we expect (ἀξιοῦμεν) and wish our relatives to be such, it seems nonsensical to say that we declare them to be such, but it is hard to see what else the Greek can mean. As Trendelenburg (1905: 28) notes here, the more expansive the flow of words becomes, the more it lacks depth. **b2** τοιούτους: with τοιούτους a7 presenting another instance of epanalepsis (237a6n.), emphasizing the uniformity from one generation to the next. **b4** πατέρων καὶ μητέρων: the definite article is sometimes omitted with words expressing personal relationships, e.g. d3, *Lach.* 179a2 πάππου. The effect of the omission of

the article seems to convey a particular intimacy, almost rendering the word a proper noun, “as we usually omit it with ‘father’ and ‘mother’” (Adam on *Prot.* 310c6 ἀδελφός). **b6–7 οὐ . . . χαριοῦνται:** that lamentation for the dead is discouraged and should be subordinated to praise of their accomplishments is a commonplace (Kassel 1958: 41; Ziolkowski 1981: 152–3; Schauer 2002: 306–7, 332). To have the dead themselves say that excessive lamentation will actually displease them, and to emphasize their parents’ obligation to them by using words related to χάρις, is an especially powerful means of conveying that message. **b7 εἴ τις ἔστι τοῖς τελευτηκόσιν αἴσθησις:** cf. Hyperides 6.43 εἰ δὲ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἄιδου, with Herrman ad loc. and Tsitsiridis 393–4 for further parallels and bibliography. In Euripides’ *Helen* the priestess Theonoe, who knows all there is to know concerning divine matters (13–14), mysteriously explains that the νοῦς of the dead does not live on, but it somehow retains an undying γνώμη (1014–16).

248c1–3 οὕτως ἀχάριστοι . . . χαρίζονται: having said that excessive lamentation will displease them, the dead repeat the sentiment in an elaborate “negative–positive statement” (Rusten 1989: 24) carefully and chiasmatically expressed: (a) ἀχάριστοι εἶεν, (b) ἄν, (c) μάλιστα . . ., (d) βαρέως φέροντες . . ., (d) κούφως δὲ καὶ μετρίως, (c) μάλιστα, (b) ἄν, (a) χαρίζονται. This statement is itself part of a larger “negative–positive statement” that began at b6 (οὐ θρηνοῦντες . . . ἀλλά). **c1–2 ἑαυτοῦς τε κακοῦντες:** i.e. engaging in such self-destructive behavior as tearing the hair and beating the head and breast, as Priam is described doing at the prospect of Hector’s imminent death (*H. Il.* 22.33, 77–8). S. condemns Homer for depicting such acts, on the grounds that good men, and even good women, are self-sufficient and are therefore not overly affected by loss (*Rep.* 3.387d–388b; cf. 247e6–248a7n.). **c3–5 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέτερα . . . γυναικῶν δέ:** the thought is, “(Our parents will please us by not grieving but bearing their loss lightly), for our lot is to be envied rather than lamented, while their caring for our wives and children will take their minds off their sorrow.” **c4 ἤδη ἔξει** “will presently have.” This is spoken by the fathers as they are about to enter the battle (246c4) in which they will lose their lives. The force of the adverb on the rare occasions when it is found with the future (mostly in the first person, where the intention is already present in the mind of the speaker, as at Lysias 31.16) seems to be to underline the immediacy of the action described by the verb; cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 494, Eur. *Med.* 985, *Tro.* 161, Ar. *Thesm.* 673. **ἥπερ καλλίστη γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις:** for the “beautiful death” in battle, see 234c1–2n. Reference to it in the consolation section of the funeral oration is commonplace (Ziolkowski

1981: 140–2). **c4–5 πρέπει . . . κοσμεῖν**: echoing 246a3, where the speaker in his own voice had told the audience that it was fitting for them to join him in praising and honoring (πρέπει . . . κοσμεῖν) all those who had died in service to their homeland. **c5 γυναικῶν δὲ τῶν ἡμετέρων**: the widows are mentioned only here, almost as an afterthought. They are ignored entirely in the funeral orations of Demosthenes and Hyperides and are mentioned only briefly by Lysias (2.75) and Pericles (“only with reluctance,” Rusten on Thuc. 2.45.2), who says no more than that their great mark of distinction is not to fall short of their inherent nature and to be least spoken of among men for either good or ill. **c7 τῆς τε τύχης . . . εἶεν ἐν λήθῃ**: this expression for being oblivious of something is attested only here before the Roman period. For comparable periphrases, see *Prot.* 318a3 ἐν ἐπιθυμίαι ὧν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας, *Symp.* 221a7 ἐν φόβῳ . . . εἶναι.

248d1 κάλλιον . . . ὀρθότερον . . . προσφιλέστερον: ending with a sequence of three adverbs of increasing length, the last bringing the thought back to the beginning (χαριοῦνται b7). **d1–2 ταῦτα δὴ ἱκανά**: cf. *Phdr.* 271d7–8 δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα . . . , where S. is lecturing Phaedrus on the stages of rhetorical training. The particle frequently accompanies a form of οὔτος, marking a transition to a new topic. **d2 τῆι δὲ πόλει**: having charged their parents with the ἐπιμέλεια and τροφή of their wives and children, the dead address the role of the city, but only very briefly, on the grounds that the city needs no further encouragement from them to take adequate care of their parents and children. (In the *Apology*, S. ridicules as a sign of Meletus’ ἀμέλεια his ill-considered assertion that it is the entire population of Athens, with one notable exception, that educates and improves the young: 24e–25c.) This humanitarian role of the city (or “we,” e3–5) is emphasized by the speaker in what follows, where words related to “care” and “upbringing” appear repeatedly. The collective responsibility of the community for the care of its citizens thus contrasts with what served as the point of departure of the dialogue, which began with S. asking M. if he thinks he is now ready to become ἡμῶν ἐπιμελητήν (234b1–2). **d3 καὶ πατέρων καὶ υἱῶν**: that “fathers and sons” here stands for “parents and offspring” is clear from e8 παῖδας τε καὶ γεννήτορας ἐπιμελεῖται (sc. ἡ πόλις). **d4–5 τοὺς μὲν . . . ἀξίως**: parallel 9- and 10-syllable phrases, with rhyming participles and adverbs, arranged so as to form a chiasmus with their referents, πατέρων and υἱῶν.

248d7-249c8: CLOSING REMARKS BY THE SPEAKER

The speaker concludes the oration by continuing to address the relatives of the dead, but now in the speaker's own voice, assuring them that the city will look after the parents, the children and the memory of the dead. The three groups are named first in an order that reverses the order in which they had been treated in the oration (249a2-b6), then, in summary, returning to the original order (b6-c2). In the final sentence the speaker dismisses the relatives and the other members of the audience, using a formula that closes the other funeral orations as well.

248e1 ἐπίσκηπτον ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλειν: repeating the wording with which the speaker introduced the words of the dead at 246c3. e1-2 ὡς δύναμαι προθυμότεα: cf. *Rep.* 2.367b2-3 ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα. For this locution to express the highest degree possible, see Thesleff 1955: §§121-9; many examples of this type of "Doppelsteigerung" in P. are collected by Ritter (1935: 12-13). e2-3 τῶν μὲν . . . ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν: parallel isosyllabic clauses ending with the same word but in varying constructions (possessive genitive, object of a preposition). e3 μιμῆσθαι τοὺς αὐτῶν: recalling what the speaker had said at the start of the oration (236e5-6), that it was necessary to exhort the children of the deceased to emulate their fathers' valor. e4 καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίαι: for the antithesis, see 236d6, 239b1nn. e4-5 γηροτροφησόντων ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπιμησομένων: referring to the parents and children in chiasmic order. Similarly, Demosthenes says in his funeral oration (60.32) παῖδες οἱ τούτων ὀνομαστοὶ τροφήσονται καὶ γονεῖς περιβλεπτοὶ γηροτροφήσονται, without specifying by whom the children are to be reared and the parents supported. The speaker states below that the city has legal responsibilities to both, and he seems to imply as much here by having both participles agree with ἡμῶν and by the central placement of "privately and publicly," which appears to apply to both parents and children. There is, however, no independent evidence for the city's obligation to support the parents of those who died in war. The speaker seems intent upon blurring the line between family and community, as has been the case since the start of the oration. According to the speaker, all Athenians belong to the same family, being descended from the Attic soil, and all are nourished by their excellent πολιτεία (238c1). For the state funeral as a means by which the state attempted to usurp the role of the family, see especially Loraux 1986: 22-8. e5 ὅπου ἂν ἕκαστος ἑκάστω ἐντυγχάνῃ: extending to the entire citizenry of Athens the commitment that the speaker had undertaken, in connection with the children of the deceased, as an individual at 246b7. e6 ἴστί που: the

particle is used, as often, ironically; it does not convey the speaker's hesitation to ascribe to his audience familiarity with the city's benevolence. In the *Apology* (20e8–21a3) S. immediately follows *Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που* with *ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν*, where *δὴ* has “self-evidential” force (242a3n.); the frequent references to Chaerephon in Old Comedy (for which, see Nails 86–7) show that his person and his character were indeed well known. **e7–8** *ὅτι . . . ἐπιμελεῖται* “namely that the city takes care.” The clause is in explanatory apposition to *τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν*. **e7** *νόμους θεμένη:* a law was attributed to Solon requiring that the sons of those who died in war *δημοσῖαι τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι* (D.L. 1.55). “Traditional practices” (an acceptable meaning for *νόμους*) whose origins were not known were often attributed to Solon, so that it is not necessary to accept the attribution. The evidence for the practice, which includes Thuc. 2.46.1, is collected by Stroud (1971: 288–90), who accepts the Solonic origin. The provisions appear to have amounted to a grant of one obol per day and perhaps also the privilege of *ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι*, that is a daily meal in the Tholos, adjacent to the Bouleuterion (234a2n.; Camp 1986: 94–7). The latter is the “penalty” that S. proposes that he be assessed for his service to the city (*Apol.* 36d7–8). For an orphan from a poor family the obol and the free meal, if indeed these are to be distinguished, would represent a subsistence; for someone whose father was of hoplite status, like S., it would be purely honorific. As S. points out in making his proposal to the jury, meals at public expense were granted to citizens who were victorious in the equestrian events at the Olympic games, that is, to those least in need of public assistance. **e8** *καὶ γεννήτορας:* no such law, or practice, is known; see e4–5n. P. uses the otherwise poetic noun *γεννήτωρ* also in Diotima's speech (*Symp.* 209a4) and several times in *Laws*.

249a1 *τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν:* comparative genitive with *διαφερόντως*, “differently from”; that is, the task has been assigned to the magistrate (see next n.) “to a greater degree than” to other citizens. Some scholars, however, have taken this to mean that the magistrate is to care for the relatives of the deceased to a greater degree than for other citizens (e.g. Tsitsiridis ad loc.; Trivigno 2009: 44–5). But P. mostly uses *διαφερόντως* + genitive to single out an individual (e.g. *Phd.* 65a2, the philosopher disengages his soul from his body *διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων*); a careful writer like P., wanting to use the adverb to distinguish a group, would have inserted *διαφερόντως τ. ἄ. π.* into the clause in which the group was named. **a1–2** *ἀρχῆι ἥπερ μεγίστη ἐστίν:* that is, to the man who holds the highest magistracy, namely the eponymous archon (Stroud 1971: 289, rejecting the evidence of schol. Dem. 24.56 Dilts, where the role is assigned to the polemarch). **a2** *ὅπως ἂν οἱ τούτων μὴ ἀδικῶνται:* cf.

Rep. 4.423c2–4 τοῖς φύλαξι προστάξομεν φυλάττειν . . . ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἢ πόλις ἔσται (similarly *Gorg.* 480a3–4, *Laws* 5.736b2). The future indicative is the regular construction in object clauses of this nature, but P. occasionally uses ἄν + subjunctive with no apparent difference in meaning; e.g. *Euthphr.* 11e3 with *SMT* §348. The archon’s guardianship of the parents may be little more than an extension of his role as protector of orphans and heiresses, in which capacity the archon was charged with imposing fines or bringing charges against those who harm them (τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν, *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 56.7 with Rhodes ad loc.). In any event, this is very different from the γηροτροφία suggested by the wording at 248e4. **a3–b2 τοὺς δὲ παῖδας . . . κεκοσμημένον:** this lengthy sentence, containing nine participles (240abn.), presents serious problems of syntax and structure, none of which can be readily resolved. Its problems become apparent if we lay out its elements, followed by an attempt at translation:

- (1) τοὺς δὲ παῖδας συνεκτρέφει αὐτή,
- (2) προθυμουμένη ὅτι μάλιστα ἄδηλον αὐτοῖς τὴν ὀρφανίαν γενέσθαι,
- (3) ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι κατασταῖσα αὐτοῖς αὐτὴ ἔτι τε παισὶν οὖσιν,
- (4) καὶ ἐπειδὴν εἰς ἀνδρὸς τέλος ἴωσιν
- (5) ἀποπέμπει ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν πανοπλίας κοσμήσασα,
- (6) ἐνδεικνυμένη καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκουσα τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιτηδεύματα
- (7) <τὰ> ὄργανα τῆς πατρώιας ἀρετῆς διδοῦσα,
- (8) καὶ ἅμα οἰωνοῦ χάριν ἄρχεσθαι ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὴν πατρώϊαν ἐστίαν ἄρξοντα μετὰ ἰσχύος ὄπλοις κεκοσμημένον.

(1) As to the children, the city itself takes a hand in their upbringing, (2) being intensely concerned that their position as orphans be as unobtrusive (?) as possible, (3) assuming for itself the role of a father to them while they are still children, (4) and, when they reach adulthood, (5) it sends them off to their own estate, having equipped them with a suit of armor, (7) giving them the accouterments of their paternal heroism (6) as a display and reminder of their father’s occupation, (8) and at the same time serving as a good omen (?) as he [*sic*] begins to enter upon the ancestral hearth to take control with authority, being armed.

The position of τε in (3) appears to make it anticipatory to καὶ in (4), but καὶ connects συνεκτρέφει (1) with ἀποπέμπει (5). There is no possible construction for ἄρχεσθαι (8), the subject of which appears to be singular, since ἄρξοντα and κεκοσμημένον agree with the subject, but transition from “children” to a single child has nowhere been signaled. Editors have accepted the transmitted text, which seems the appropriate course in the absence of any acceptable suggestions for improvement. **a4 ἄδηλον:**

an odd word to use in this context, where the status of the orphans is so publicly recognized (cf. *ὄνομαστοί* in the quotation from Dem. at 248e4–5n.). If the word is correctly transmitted, it must mean something like “inconspicuous, unnoticed.” It may, however, be preferable to regard it as an error for, e.g. *ἄλυτον* (cf. *Laws* 5.729a7, where the Athenian says that a legacy of respect, even more than riches, makes life *ἄλυτον* for one’s children) or *ἀπήμον*, a largely poetic word that occurs at *Phdr.* 248c4. **a4–5** *ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι* “*in loco patris*”; cf. *Laws* 11.918e6 *ἐν μητρὸς . . . καὶ τροφοῦ σχήματι*. For this meaning of *σχῆμα*, see LSJ A.5. In his funeral oration, Lysias says that we could repay our debt of gratitude to the dead only by welcoming their children as if we ourselves were their fathers (*ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ πατέρες ὄντες*, 2.75). **a6** *ἐπειδὴν εἰς ἀνδρὸς τέλος ἴωσιν*: i.e. when they reach their majority; cf. Thuc. 2.46.1 *τοὺς παῖδας . . . δημοσίου ἢ πόλις μέχρι ἡβῆς θρέψει*, with Loraux 1986: 27. For the meaning of *τέλος*, essentially “status” or “category,” see *Epinom.* 992d5 *εἰς πρεσβύτου τέλος ἀφικόμενοις*. These two passages are unusual, however, in that the dependent genitives denote a person belonging to the category rather than the category expressed abstractly (Waanders 1983: 137), as in Eur. *Med.* 920–1 *ἡβῆς τέλος | μολόντας*. **a6–7** *ἀποπέμπει . . . πανοπλῖαι κοσμήσασα*: the ceremony at which the (male) war orphans were publicly acknowledged as adults is described by Aeschines (3.154): in the theater, before the performance of the dramas at the City Dionysia, the orphans are presented with a suit of hoplite armor and a proclamation is made, declaring them to be sons of brave men (*ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί*) whom the city is now sending forth to take possession of their patrimony (*ἀφίησιν . . . τρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν*) and inviting them to occupy seats of honor (*προεδρία*) in the theater. **a7** *πανοπλῖαι κοσμήσασα*: given the cost of a suit of hoplite armor, and in view of the comment below that this was the equipment that commemorated their fathers’ valor, it seems difficult to believe that orphans whose fathers were of less than hoplite status, e.g. rowers in the fleet, received this honor. But Bertosa (2003: 368–9) argues that such was indeed the case, noting that Pasion, an older contemporary of P.’s, donated 1,000 shields to the Athenian state (Dem. 45.85), which were likely used for just this purpose.

249b1 *οἰωνοῦ χάριν*: in his *Seventh Letter*, P. says that he will avoid saying anything negative *χάριν οἰωνοῦ* (336c1), the only other occurrence of this expression in Classical Greek. The suit of armor serves both as a reminder of the past and as a favorable omen for the sons’ future, as they set out to assume authority over their estate and, it is hoped, emulate the martial valor of their fathers. It is especially at the beginning of an enterprise that portents are regarded as significant (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 104–20, Thuc.

6.27.3); thus the placement of these words just before ἀρχεσθαι is appropriate, but the syntax of the latter is impossible to divine. **b2** ἄρξοντα: future participle with ἵεναι expressing purpose (*SMT* §840). **b4** κατὰ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν: family members were expected to ensure that the memory of the deceased was kept alive by regular, generally annual, ritual observances (Garland 1985: 104–5, 166; Wyse on Isaeus 2.46); in *Laws* the Athenian refers to τὰς κατὰ ἐνιαυτόν ἐπιμελείας, which should not be neglected (μὴ παραλείπειν, 4.717e2–718a1). The reference here to the civic commemoration of the dead is not to the funeral oration, which did not take place every year, but only in years in which Athenians lost their lives in combat (ὁπότε συμβαίη αὐτοῖς, Thuc. 2.34.7). Rather, the speaker is referring to the Epitaphia, a festival that seems to have occurred shortly after the Theseia (8 Pyanopsion), that is, in early fall (Pritchett 1985: 107–11). Thus the Epitaphia will in some years have coincided with the funeral oration, which took place after the end of the campaign season. These two events, one an annual festival and one an ad hoc celebration of those who had recently been killed in battle, constituted the commemoration common to all, corresponding to the private ceremonies held by individuals. **b4–5** κοινῇ . . . ἰδίαι: for the antithesis, here enhanced by the πᾶσιν/ἐκάστωι antithesis, see 236d6n. **b5–6** ἀγῶνας γυμνικούς καὶ ἵππικούς . . . καὶ μουσικῆς: cf. Lysias 2.80 ἀγῶνες . . . ῥώμης [= γυμνικοί] καὶ σοφίας [= μουσικοί] καὶ πλούτου [= ἵππικοί]. These contests, mentioned also in Demosthenes' funeral oration (60.36 ἀγῶνων ἀθανάτων), took place at the annual Epitaphia; see the extended discussion by Tsitsiridis (408–12). **b7** ἀτεχνῶς “in effect,” a colloquial adverb confined in the Classical period to comedy and P., appearing only here in oratory. It is frequent in P., often being used, as here, to underline the appropriateness of a figurative expression, e.g. *Apol.* 18d6, *Euthphr.* 3a7. **b7–c1** ἐν κληρονόμου καὶ υἱός μοῖραι “in the capacity of son and heir.” For this meaning of μοῖρα, see LSJ A. v. **b7–c2** υἱός . . . πατρός . . . ἐπιτρόπου: the (feminine) city, and by extension the land that “gave birth” to its citizens at the start of the oration, has taken on a noticeably masculine character at the end.

249c2–3 πᾶσαν . . . ποιουμένη: the conclusion to the speaker's remarks is signaled by hyperbaton, polyptoton (247a2–3n.) and conspicuous alliteration; the use of παρά in the relatively uncommon temporal sense (LSJ c. 1.10d; KG I 513) is dictated by its contribution to the sound of the passage. **c3** ἐπιμέλειαν ποιουμένη = ἐπιμελουμένη; for this common type of periphrasis with ποιοῦμαι (employed here to introduce yet another π-word), see KG I 106. This concludes the striking concentration of words

in ἐπιμελ- (seven times since 248c6), assuring the audience that the city exercises total (for this force of πᾶς, see 239a5n.) care of everyone through all time. **c3-4 πραιότερον φέρειν τὴν συμφορὰν:** echoing the opening words spoken by the deceased regarding their parents, that they should be encouraged ὡς ῥᾶιστα φέρειν τὴν συμφορὰν (247c6). **c5 οὕτως:** i.e. by bearing their loss more stoically. The word is postponed to make way for the topic (CGCG §60.25), which has changed from the deceased (b3) to “both the deceased and the living.” **προσφιλέστατοι:** echoing the closing words spoken by the deceased regarding their parents, that by seeing to the well-being of their widows and orphans their life will be ἡμῖν προσφιλέστερον (248d1). **c5-6 ῥᾶιστοι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι:** owing to its origin as “a case-form of a verbal abstract noun” (Wackernagel 2009: 325), the infinitive in expressions like this has neither specifically active nor passive meaning; cf. *Phd.* 62b6 (λόγος) ῥαίδιος διιδεῖν, *Symp.* 182a8 (νόμος) νοῆσαι ῥαίδιος, KG II 15-16. Here the addition of the passive infinitive, along with making the end of the sentence sound more impressive, serves to underline the reciprocal nature of the θεραπεία. The parents of the deceased have been asked to look after the widows and orphans, who will in their turn look after the parents as they age; for the legal requirement to care for parents and grandparents, see Rhodes 1981: 629, on *Ath. Pol.* 56.6; cf. Gorgias DK 82 B6, referring to the deceased as ὄσιοι πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῆι θεραπείαι, with 244e3n. P. has presumably replaced the language of ἐπιμέλεια with that of θεραπεία because ἐπιμελοῦμαι is not used in the passive voice; note also the use of θεραπεύοντας in the final sentence of Lysias’ oration, quoted below. **c6-8 νῦν δὲ . . . ἅπιτε:** the other funeral orations (the conclusion of Hyperides’ is not preserved) end in similarly abrupt fashion (Ziolkowski 1981: 164-73 and Tsitsiridis ad loc. for epigraphical parallels): νῦν δὲ ἀπολοφυράμενοι ὃν προσήκει ἐκάστῳ ἅπιτε (Thuc. 2.46.2), ἀνάγκη . . . θεραπεύοντας τὸν πάτριον νόμον ὀλοφύρεσθαι τοὺς θαπτομένους (Lysias 2.81), ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀποδυράμενοι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ὡς χρὴ καὶ νόμιμα ποιήσαντες ἅπιτε (Dem. 60.37). **c6 ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι:** i.e. the relatives of the deceased, who have been the addressees since 248d7, and the members of the audience generally. **c7 κατὰ τὸν νόμον:** ending the oration as it had begun (236d7), with reference to the πάτριος νόμος. **c7-8 ἀπολοφυράμενοι:** the force of ἀπο- in verbal compounds is sometimes that of “finishing off, completing” (LSJ D. 2), as here and in the closing sentences in Thucydides and Demosthenes just quoted. What has concluded is the communal (κοινή; cf. 236d6) lamentation; private observances (b4n.) will continue. **c8 ἅπιτε:** cf. Thucydides’ account of the ceremony, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο [i.e. after the interment and the oration] ἀπέρχονται (2.34.6).

249d1–e7: CONCLUDING DIALOGUE

M. expresses admiration for Aspasia's ability to construct such a fine oration, but he hints at his suspicion that perhaps someone else might be the real author. S. persists in attributing the speech to Aspasia and extracts a promise from M. not to betray his confidence, promising in turn to regale him with many other fine speeches from her in future. In contrast to the opening dialogue, in which a series of questions from M. prompted S. to share Aspasia's oration, M. asks no questions, seemingly transported by the oration in the manner described by S. at 235a–c. M.'s complaisance here is especially notable given S.'s characterization of the young M. in *Lysis* as "disputatious" (ἐριστικός) and *Lysis*' emphatic affirmation that he is "very much so" (σφόδρα γε, 211b8–9).

249d1 Ἀσπασίας τῆς Μιλησίας: in closing, S. asserts Aspasia's authorship of the oration with the same formality that "Herodotus the Halicarnassian" and "Thucydides the Athenian" identify their literary works. It is striking that S. expresses no evaluation of the oration, in contrast to the praise, albeit ironic, offered at e.g. *Apol.* 17a2–3, *Phdr.* 234d1, *Prot.* 328d4–e3, *Symp.* 198a3–7. **d3 Νῆ Δία:** for the oath, see 235d8n. **μακαρίαν** "lucky, blessed," as in "blessed with talent." The most common use of the adjective in P. is as a vocative, mostly in the mouth of S., who uses it as a "friendship term" with little difference in meaning from φίλε or ἀγαθέ (Dickey 1996: 140, 278–9). **d4 εἰ γυνή οὔσα:** her sex is mentioned first as the salient element; she is all the more fortunate in possessing an ability generally considered to belong with men. While S.'s comments below suggest that he regards M. as somewhat skeptical, the conditional expression does not necessarily imply doubt on M.'s part regarding Aspasia's authorship of the speech. Compare *Hp.Mi.* 364a1, where S. congratulates the sophist, saying, "You lead a charmed existence (μακάριόν γε πάθος πέπονθας) if you have so much confidence in your skill every time you go to Olympia," after Hippias has just described his self-assurance in publicly offering to answer any question posed to him at the festival. For such "resumptive if-clauses," in which the speaker reintroduces information from earlier in the context phrased in conditional form, see Wakker 1994: 125–9. **d4–5 τοιούτους λόγους . . . συντιθέναι:** plural, to include the speech that she composed (συνετίθει, 236b5) for Pericles. **d6 Ἀλλὰ εἰ μή πιστεύεις:** Wilamowitz (1919: 140) aptly compares *Euthd.* 291a, where Crito interrupts S.'s account of his conversation with Clinias to express his skepticism that someone as inexperienced as Clinias could have framed so sophisticated an argument. There are, however, two significant differences between the two passages that serve to convey P.'s differing attitudes toward the content for which, ultimately,

he is himself responsible. In the first place, Crito is quite emphatic, underlining with an oath (μὰ Δία, *Euthd.* 290e4) his certainty that it cannot have been the boy who was the author of the argument, upon which S. backs down, suggesting that his memory may be at fault and that perhaps it was after all Ctesippus who argued in this fashion (a suggestion that Crito vigorously rejects, agreeing with S. that the author may in fact have been some superior entity, τῶν κρείττωνων τις, e7–291a7); here, by contrast, S. offers to substantiate his ascription of the oration to Aspasia, an offer that M. says is unnecessary, given his familiarity with Aspasia and her abilities. In the second place, while there is little in the funeral oration that is consistent with S.’s (or P.’s) manner or method, Clinias’ contribution to the discussion contains nothing from which S. (or P.) would wish to distance himself (Finkelberg 2019: 86–7), and he turns the conversation in a productive direction: he first notes that those who create speeches do not know how to put them to use and that the τέχνη of making speeches is therefore separate from that of using them, and then he argues that the general’s τέχνη is deficient in that it requires a further τέχνη (which S. will identify as ἡ πολιτική, 291c4) for its proper employment. Thus, in *Euthydemus*, the standard Socratic practice is adopted, namely that of following the λόγος where it leads without regard to whose λόγος it is (e.g. *Chrm.* 161c, *Phdr.* 275c), while here, at the very end of the dialogue, P. goes out of his way to distance S. from responsibility for the content of the funeral oration. The reason would seem to be that P. wishes to dissociate the content of the funeral oration from the man who claims, at *Gorgias* 521d, to be just about the only Athenian who practices the true political τέχνη and who engages in τὰ πολιτικά. ἀκολουθεῖ μετὰ ἐμοῦ: for this construction, cf. μετὰ ἐμοῦ ἔπονται 235b3 with n. d10 Τί οὖν; “Well then?” As a self-contained question introducing a further question arising out of what an interlocutor has just said, this expression is very frequent in P. (ca. 100 times), especially in the mouth of S. οὐκ ἄγασαι: implying that S. senses a certain ambivalence, to put it no more strongly, in M.’s claim to know what Aspasia is like. καὶ νῦν χάριν ἔχεις: reminding us of the exchange in the opening dialogue (236c–d), where M. had begged S. to do him the favor (χαριῆι) of reciting the oration of Aspasia, or anyone else he wished, and S. responded in extravagant terms, saying that he was obliged under any circumstances to grant M. favors (δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι . . . χαρισίμην ἄν).

249e1 ἢ ἐκείνῳ ὅστις σοι ὁ εἰπών: seeming to reinforce S.’s claim (236a8) that, on his own, S. would be incapable of producing an acceptable funeral oration, so that the speech recited by S. must have been composed by either Aspasia or someone else. e2 καὶ πρὸς γε “and what’s more,” with adverbial πρὸς (LSJ D). The expression appears to be colloquial; see

Collard 2018: 123. **ἄλλων πολλῶν**: what these “many other things” are for which M. is grateful to S. (= τῶι εἰπόντι) is unclear, but the opening dialogue, along with M.’s role in *Lysis* and his presence at S.’s death, implies considerable familiarity between the two. **ε3 Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι**: Theaetetus uses the same expression (followed immediately by ἀλλὰ ὄρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν, *Tht.* 145b10) in response to S.’s disclosure that the young man has been effusively praised by Theodorus; similarly *Pol.* 277a3, *Soph.* 219a3 (καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι). The optative indicates that the speaker’s approval of the favorable statement that his interlocutor has made is subject to qualification, depending on the fulfillment of some condition. Here it is implied, in jest, that the relationship between S. and M. may be jeopardized should M. let it be known either that S. has shared Aspasia’s oration or has divulged her authorship of it. **ἀλλὰ ὅπως μου μὴ κατερεῖς**: cf. ἀλλὰ ὅπως μὴ μοι χαλεπανεῖ ἡ διδάσκαλος, 236c3 with n. **ε4 αὐθις**: other dialogues end with an expectation of future meetings and further discussion. In some dialogues, further discussion is called for because the interlocutors have not come to an agreement regarding the object of inquiry (e.g. *Cra.*, *Euthphr.*, *Lach.*, *Tht.*); in the late works *Laws*, *Philebus*, *Sophist* and *Timaeus*, agreement is either reached or assumed and it is expected that the interlocutors will meet again to build upon that agreement. Here, it seems, no unanswered questions remain, and the expectation is that S. will repeat for M. other speeches that he has learned from Aspasia in the same unquestioning manner that he learned the funeral oration. **λόγους παρά αὐτῆς πολιτικούς**: deliberately provocative. S. insists to the end that Aspasia was the author of the foregoing πολιτικός λόγος, a genre of discourse from which women in Athens were excluded. Such discourse comprised any speech delivered in a public setting (Clavud 1980: 89–91). Thus the dialogue ends with the absurd promise of many more fine πολιτικοὶ λόγοι composed by a foreign woman and transmitted by an elderly Athenian who had long since removed himself from public life; for S. absented himself from such settings, discouraged by the divine voice whose directions he invariably found beneficial (ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν, *Apol.* 31d5). This is not contradicted by S.’s claim in *Gorgias* that he is virtually alone of his contemporaries in practicing the true art of statesmanship and acting in the city’s interests (πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά, 521d7–8). An attempt to define what exactly that art is, and how it differs from what is commonly understood as τὰ πολιτικά, will be made in the course of the conversations recorded in *Republic*, *Statesman* and *Laws*. **ε6 μόνον ἀπάγγελι**: cf. 236c6–7 ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰπέ, well illustrating the distinction between the aorist and present imperatives (*CGCG* §33.65): “give a recitation (of a complete oration)” vs. “continue to transmit (an open-ended series of reports).”

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