

Plato

Ion

Or: On the Iliad

Edited with Introduction
and Commentary

By

Albert Rijksbaron

BRILL

Plato

Ion

Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology

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To the Amsterdamse Hellenistenclub

ἐπάγγελμα τῆς τελειότερας (γραμματικῆς) ἀνάπτυξιν τῶν παρὰ
ποιητῶν τε καὶ συγγραφεύσιν—Chrysippus

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PREFACE

‘Little need be said about this slight dialogue on the nature of “poetic inspiration”.’ Thus opens the brief passage on the *Ion* in Taylor’s *Plato. The man and his work* of 1928, p. 38. Taylor’s perfunctory and dismissive judgement has not exactly deterred later scholars from writing about the *Ion*. On the contrary, the literature on the *Ion* is vast and diverse, just like the literature on Plato and poetry in general, of course. By way of an illustration I may refer to the rather extensive, but by no means exhaustive bibliography to this book. For a far fuller bibliography one may consult Capuccino’s recent publication (2005). Perhaps a few words are in order, then, to justify the appearance of yet another book on the *Ion*.

The book originates from a course for first-year students of classics at the University of Amsterdam, which I taught for a number of years. At some point, I planned to turn my rather simple notes in Dutch into a more extensive but still brief commentary in English, using Burnet’s text and apparatus criticus as a basis, like many other editions (and translations) of the *Ion*. Now I knew, from the problems encountered and discussed by Dodds and Bluck in their editions of *Gorgias* and *Meno*, respectively, that Burnet’s apparatus might not be fully reliable, notably with respect to the readings of Cod. Vindobonensis suppl. graecum 39, commonly designated by the siglum F. And indeed, at the very beginning of the *Ion* (530a7) Burnet notes in his apparatus ‘γε TWf : τε F’, without specifying which of the two γε’s in that line is meant. In this case Méridier’s edition in the Budé series made it clear that the second one must be meant. But I also had to deal with the fact that, at 530b2–3, Burnet printed νικήσομεν, with nothing in his apparatus criticus, while Méridier reports that νικήσομεν is the reading of T, that of W and F being νικήσωμεν. Furthermore, at 530c2 Burnet printed ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, with F, and at 530d9 ἀκροάσασθαι, again with F, while Méridier in both cases followed TW, printing ῥαψωδός and ἀκροᾶσθαι, both naturally without comments, as is usual in editions without commentary, and likewise in several other cases of MS variation. Both these readings would seem to yield acceptable Greek. Why was what was so attractive to Burnet unattractive in the eyes of Méridier? The two scholars had used the same MSS, and while Burnet

followed Schanz in postulating ‘*ducem potissimum nobis eligendum esse Venetum T*’, he in several places preferred a reading of F (for examples see above), for no clear reason. Méridier had no such explicit preferences, but he followed T (and W) even more faithfully than Burnet. Why? What made T and W so special? Nor are these phenomena confined to the *Ion*, of course; cp. the apt remark by Bluck (1961, 139): ‘... on a number of occasions one has to choose between readings, one of which is attested by F and one by B T W, either of which, it would seem, might have been written by Plato’. Indeed, one has—but how? Finally, I had in the meantime found out that Burnet and Méridier, and indeed all editors, had somehow overlooked the quotations from the *Ion* in Proclus. Whereupon I decided I might as well try to establish a fresh text, with a revised apparatus, a revision which would also include of course the readings of the two other MSS traditionally considered primary witnesses (Marcianus graecus append. class. IV, 1 = T, and Vind. suppl. gr. 7 = W), as well as those of Marc. graecus 189 (S), for reasons set out in the Introduction. The text, then, is based upon a collation—in *situ*—of these four primary MSS.

As regards the establishment of the text, unless there were obvious palaeographical factors involved, the choice of one reading rather than another has been determined as much as possible by a detailed linguistic analysis of the readings concerned, the variants mentioned above being clear cases in point. In fact, it is perhaps primarily by taking into account linguistic factors that it is possible to make reasoned choices and to avoid arbitrariness in preferring one variant reading to another, at any rate in prose texts. (I will come back to the role of linguistics in editing a classical text in the Introduction §4.2). More in general, it will be seen that the commentary has a strong linguistic orientation.

The apparatus criticus is basically a positive one. It is also more detailed than is strictly necessary to account for the readings adopted and rejected. Like, for example, Dodds and Bluck in the editions already mentioned I wanted to give some idea of the general character of the MSS concerned, both before and after correction, if applicable.

The extensive introduction deals with, *inter alia*, Plato’s attack on poetry, the position of the *Ion* in the *corpus Platonicum*—rather late, this book argues, from a number of lexical correspondences between *Ion* and *Phaedrus*, *Meno* and *Republic*—, the title(s) of the dialogue, and the text of the Homeric quotations in the *Ion*. Also, I have seized the opportunity to discuss in detail some questions that had puzzled me already for some time, e.g. the spelling of the 2nd person singular

middle-passive thematic indicative and the variation found in the editions of Plato between $\nu\upsilon\delta\eta$ and $\nu\upsilon\nu\delta\eta$. I have paid special attention to questions of accent and punctuation, frequently referring to Byzantine practices and theories in these fields and arguing that these should be taken more seriously than is usually done in editions of classical texts. In one case (the punctuation of $\tau\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ in Plato) I argue that in many places we should abandon the current punctuation, which ultimately goes back to Stephanus' edition, and instead apply a more 'Byzantine' punctuation.

During my visits, in 2004, to the libraries in Vienna and Venice I happened to notice the name of an Italian classical scholar who had also visited these libraries to inspect the *Ion*. Indeed, when I was near the end of the preparation of this book I was informed by my colleague Professor Gerard Boter of the Free University that by an extraordinary coincidence Dr Lorenzo Ferroni of Florence was like me preparing a new edition of the *Ion*. After some correspondence by email Dr Ferroni and I decided (at the end of March of this year) to send each other the material we had prepared by then. Fortunately, it turned out that the results of our collations of the four primary MSS were very much alike. But I was also able to make a few corrections in places where I had misread (part of) the MSS, as I could check in the photocopies I had of the MSS. I should add that Dr Ferroni's edition will supplement mine in one respect. Apart from MSS TWS and F I consulted a few other MSS (cp. the Introduction §4.2), but it was not my aim to present a full picture of the textual transmission of the *Ion*. The latter may be found in Dr Ferroni's book (whose date of appearance is unfortunately not yet clear). Dr Ferroni has also written a separate piece on Venetus 189, which will appear in one of the forthcoming issues of the *Revue de Philologie*.

I am indebted to a number of institutions and persons for support, help and critical comments. The Amsterdam Center for Language and Communication of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Amsterdam supplied financial support for my visits to Vienna and Venice. The Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes in Paris provided me with photocopies of MSS W and F, and the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana with a photocopy of MS Vaticanus graecus 1030. The staff-members of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna, the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana in Venice, and the Biblio-

thèque Nationale de France in Paris helped me in various ways during my visits to these wonderful institutions. The staff of the Library of the University of Amsterdam enabled me to consult with ease and speed the Aldine and other rare editions of Plato. Daan den Hengst was so kind as to check the Latin of the apparatus criticus. In a seminar on ‘Linguistics, Interpretation and Textual Criticism’ the—then—students Bas van Bommel and Evert van Emde Boas presented papers on ἔρμηνεύς and the constructions of σχολή, respectively, while Evert van Emde Boas and Jacob Kaandorp delved into the problems presented by ὁμολογή/-εῖ at *Ion* 532b4. Iona Hogenbirk helped me in tracking the identity of F. Sydenham. Jacqueline Klooster made useful suggestions about pre-Platonic poetics, Douwe Sieswerda pointed out to me the existence of a number of recent articles on Byzantine punctuation, while Janneke Louman supplied me with much valuable information on the absence of speakers’ names in the manuscript tradition of Plato.

As for the critical comments, warm thanks are due to the members of the Amsterdamse Hellenistenclub, that indispensable society of learning and common sense, in general, and to three of its members in particular, who commented upon earlier versions of parts of the manuscript, and taken together upon the entire text. Gerard Boter commented upon the Greek text, Emilie van Opstall upon the Introduction and the Greek text, and finally Omert Schrier upon the Commentary. They saved me from many errors and inconsistencies.

To Wim Rummelink I am indebted for the skillful expertise with which he turned the complicated text of my ‘computer script’ into a book.

Finally, my thanks are due to the firm of Koninklijke Brill NV, in the person of Irene van Rossum, for their willingness to continue, after the sudden and premature death of the regretted Han Gieben, the series Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology.

Amsterdam
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Albert Rijksbaron

INTRODUCTION

1. DRAMATIC DATE; DATE OF COMPOSITION; AUTHENTICITY

‘The small dialogue called *Ion* has provoked more than its share of bewilderment, embarrassment and outrage’ (Moore 1974: 421). For a long time the discussion was dominated by Goethe’s view that *Ion*, as a personage, is so stupid that Plato cannot possibly have created him to act as a serious opponent of Socrates.¹ Accordingly, he considered the dialogue ‘nichts als eine Persiflage’ (*Sämtliche Werke*, 691); but he did not doubt in so many words that the dialogue was written by Plato. Others, however, did, one of the most prominent being Wilamowitz—at least during the greater part of his scholarly career. After he had unambiguously opposed the Platonic authorship of the *Ion* in his *Einleitung in die griechische Tragödie* (1895),² Wilamowitz towards the end of his career made a *volte-face*, leaving open the possibility that the *Ion* is a (satirical) dialogue from Plato’s youth.³ Wilamowitz thus well illustrates in one person the oscillating verdicts about the *Ion* and its authenticity over the past two hundred years.⁴ If the *Ion* is accepted as genuine, it is ‘in general placed among the first of Plato’s writings’ (Moore 1974: 421). The main objective of Moore’s paper is to show that the dramatic date often—anachronistically—assigned to the dialogue, viz. sometime between 394 and 391, and the near-contemporaneous date of composition usually connected with it,⁵ are

¹ Ion’s ‘unglaubliche Dummheit’, just as that of other Platonic characters, serves only to enable Socrates to be ‘recht weise’ (*Sämtliche Werke*, Zürich 1997, 693).

² ‘... der durch die ganze Zitatengelehrsamkeit sich kompromittierende Verfasser des *Ion* ...’ (1895: 12 n. 17).

³ Wilamowitz (1919: 32–46, esp. 36).

⁴ The positions of Wilamowitz and other scholars concerning the *Ion* are discussed in Flashar (1958: 1–16); for further criticism see Moore (1974: 421–424). Tigerstedt’s eminently readable book of 1977 provides a succinct but highly informative appraisal of the views of Wilamowitz and other scholars, both ancient and modern, on Plato in general. His article of 1969 is a useful introduction to Plato’s idea(s) about poetry, and to the various ways in which this controversial subject has been studied.

⁵ Cp. e.g. Flashar (1958: 100–101), who considers 394 ‘die fiktive Zeit des *Ion*’. However, because ‘die historischen Anspielungen ... nur sinnvoll wirken wenn sie

based upon invalid arguments, his main counter-argument being that the rule of Athens over Ephesus mentioned at 541c cannot possibly refer to the years 394–391. Moore himself (1974: 431) convincingly argues for a dramatic date ‘at a time during the war between Athens and Sparta before the Ionian revolt of 412’.⁶ As for the date of composition, at the end of his paper Moore, having observed that ‘nothing indicates an absolute date’, confesses that ‘to determine a relative date would require another essay’. For such an essay ‘we must forget the traditional date of the *Ion* and consider carefully its affinities with other dialogues in form, method and content’. To my knowledge Moore has not written this essay after 1974, the year of the publication of his article in *GRBS*. Nor is what follows here this essay, which should be left, I feel, to Platonic specialists. I present a number of observations on the form, or rather the terminology of the *Ion*, that may be of some use for establishing its affinities and thus its position in the Platonic corpus.⁷

In note 5 to his article Moore mentions a number of dissenters, scholars who did not accept the early date for the *Ion*, but placed it (much) later in Plato’s philosophical career. The scholars mentioned by Moore are: Stock, who in his student commentary on the *Ion* (1908: x-xi) puts it after the *Republic*, appealing to some ‘indications of language’; unfortunately, however, while Stock mentions some features of the *Ion* he fails to compare them with other dialogues; Pohlenz (1913: 185–189): contemporary with *Meno*; Diès (1927: 287): contemporary with *Republic*; Wyller (1958: 38): contemporary with *Gorgias* and *Meno*; Stefanini (1949: 113–118): after *Meno*; Vicaire (1960: 10, 31, 33): after *Meno*.⁸

aktuell sind, wird man annehmen müssen daß Platon den Dialog *Ion* auch um das Jahr 394 geschrieben hat’.

⁶ If this is correct, Plato must have known or assumed that the musical part of the Asclepius games, of which it is uncertain when it was added to the games, existed already at that time. Moore does not discuss this implication of his date.

⁷ The fact that parts of the quotations from the *Iliad* at 537a and 538c are also found at *X. Smp.* 4.6–7 is unfortunately of little help for the dating of the *Ion*, since it is not clear who alludes to whom, that is, if Plato and Xenophon do allude to each other. For details I may refer to Méridier’s ‘Notice’ (25).

⁸ Some other dissenters are mentioned by Méridier (24–25). Heitsch (1990: 244–247) rather unhelpfully argues that the *Ion* must have been written either before 399 or at a much later date, because the Socrates of the *Ion* is so unsympathetic that he can hardly have appealed to the public in the years following Socrates’ trial and death.—

I believe these dissenters are right, and that the *Ion* should, in fact, be reckoned among the works of Plato's (late-)middle period; more specifically, I will argue that it belongs to the same time as *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. 'The same time' should be taken as a rather elastic notion, since the *Republic*, at least, is an 'œuvre de lente élaboration et dont la composition doit naturellement s'étendre sur plusieurs années'.⁹ Thus Diès (1927: 287), who adds: 'L'*Ion*, le *Ménexène*, l'*Euthydème*, le *Cratyle* furent peut-être écrits dans les intervalles de cette préparation'. Whatever the plausibility of the dating of the other dialogues, to my mind Diès, who unfortunately does not substantiate his view, is right about the *Ion*. The point is that a number of technical terms in the *Ion*, both content terms that are used to discuss the activity of the rhapsode and the poet, and terms relating to the procedure of the dialogue, are used in similar ways in what are generally considered middle and later dialogues but not or very rarely in early dialogues.¹⁰ The terms and expressions are, I think, fairly representative of the

The reader may have wondered why the names of Campbell, Lutosławski, Ritter and the many later students of the stylometrics of Plato and its relevance for the chronology of the dialogues have so far not been mentioned. In fact, the last three decades have seen a new surge in stylometric research on Plato; see especially Thesleff (1982); Ledger (1989); Brandwood (1990), a critical survey of existing theories, but, not surprisingly, without Ledger (1989); Brandwood (1992); and, most recently, Kahn (2002), with the reply to Kahn by Griswold in the same collection of essays. For the earlier work in stylometrics Simeterre's, rather ironical, critical survey of 1945 is still useful. Unfortunately, Moore's (1974: 425) verdict that '[o]n the chronology of the *Ion* the stylometrists have little to offer' is still valid, if only because the *Ion* is often omitted from frequency analyses, since it is either considered too small or unauthentic. For further discussion of this inexhaustible subject see the, extensive and highly informative, reviews of Ledger by Paul Keyser (1991; strongly critical), of Ledger and Thesleff by Debra Nails (1992; rather sympathetic towards both authors), of Ledger and Brandwood (1990) by Tim Robinson (1992; very sceptical) and by Charles Young (1994; very sceptical). See also below in the main text.

⁹ And perhaps to the very end of his life. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Comp.* 25) it was universally known that Plato during his whole long life kept κενύζων καὶ βοστρυγίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων his dialogues, an example being the opening words of the *Republic*. See further Alline (1915: 20–22), also for other sources of this tradition. Also, the first two (or four, in a different book division) books of the *Republic* may have been published separately before the second part; cp. again Alline (1915: 14–19). As Poster (1998: 284) rightly points out, 'the results of stylometric analysis depend on (usually unstated) assumptions about Platonic revision or the lack thereof'.

¹⁰ It being a matter of dispute, of course, which dialogues are early.

terminological apparatus of the *Ion*. Here follow first the content terms.

Technical terms relating to rhapsode and poet

Preliminary remark

The results of comparisons of words and phrases in Plato are often unreliable, because all occurrences of a given word form may be simply lumped together. A case in point is τὰ νῦν. In Brandwood (1990: 65) we read (item 33 of a list established by Ritter) that ‘τὸ/τὰ νῦν instead of plain νῦν is ... frequent in the *Laws*, not uncommon in *Soph.*, *Pol.*, *Phil.*, *Tim.*, *Crit.*, and isolated in *Theaet.*, *Rep.*, *Phdo*, *Prot.*, and *Charm.*’ (And in *Ion*, but this was considered spurious by Ritter.) Very often, however, τὰ νῦν is not used ‘instead of plain νῦν’ but has uses of its own, where it cannot be replaced by νῦν, and vice versa. (See comm. at 530a1.) Moreover, for a reliable comparison all occurrences of *non-adverbial* τὰ νῦν (as in *Sph.* 231a4 τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα, *Lg.* 662c3 τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, *Lg.* 653c5 καὶ τὰ πρότερον ὀρθῶς σοι παιδείας πέρι καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρησθαι δοκεῖ) should of course be discarded.¹¹ As a matter of fact, Ritter probably did discard them,¹² but the point is that such questions of interpretation should be explicitly mentioned and discussed *before* the counting starts. Another case in point is the famous τί μήν, which is by no means used uniformly, a fact that has to be taken into account if one wants to compare occurrences. See below and note at 531d7.

In establishing the list below my aim has been to consider terms that are used in roughly the same way(s) in the dialogues concerned.

– **συνιέναι** at 530c2 εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

The verb and the noun, σύνεσις, occur also in *Cra.*, *Tht.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Prm.*, *Phlb.*, *Phdr.*, *Euthd.*, *Prt.* (338e–339a: the most important part of παιδεία is ... τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τε εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἅ μή, ...), *R.*, *Mx.*, *Epin.* (συνεῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα).

¹¹ A similar proviso is made by Young (1994: 249) with respect to counting instances of ἢ. Would this be disjunctive ἢ or comparative ἢ?

¹² In table 3 Brandwood (1992: 98–99) reports that Ritter counted 79 instances of τὰ νῦν in the *Laws*. A check learned me that this number cannot include τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, etc.

– **ἐρμηνεύς** at 530c3 τὸν γὰρ ῥαψωδὸν ἐρμηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ εἶναι, and *passim*.

These and related terms also in *Cra.*,¹³ *Tht.*, *Plt.* (see especially 290c5 οἳ τε περὶ μαντικὴν ἔχοντες ... ἐρμηνευταὶ γὰρ που νομίζονται παρὰ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις), *Phlb.*, *Smp.*, *R.*, *Lg.*, *Epin.*, *Ep.* VIII. See further comm. at 530c3. As for **ἐρμηνεύειν** at 535a3–4 καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι θεῖα μοῖρα ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ταῦτα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἐρμηνεύειν, in the meaning ‘transmit from ... to’, this verb is elsewhere only found at *Smp.* 202e3 Ἐρμηνεῦδον καὶ διαπορθμεῖδον θεοῖς τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν.

– **ἐξηγεῖσθαι** at 531a7 ἂ Ὅμηρος λέγει, 531b6, 531b8, 531b9, 533b2, 533b8.

Elsewhere in the sense ‘interpret, explain’ only in *Cra.* (407a9 ff. οἱ νῦν περὶ Ὅμηρον δεινοί. καὶ γὰρ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐξηγοῦμενοι τὸν ποιητὴν φασι ...), *Alc.* 1, *Thg.*, *Lg.* (821d9 πειρῶ σὺ μὲν ἐξηγεῖσθαι πάντως, ἡμεῖς δὲ συνέπεσθαί σοι μαθάνοντες; also 969a2).¹⁴

– **κριτής** at 532b5 κριτὴν (ἱκανὸν).

Κριτής elsewhere in *Phd.*, *Tht.*, *Phlb.* (65a8, + ἱκανός: ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ’ ἂν ὅστισοῦν κριτής), *Grg.*, *R.* (545c3, + ἱκανός: πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προυθέμεθα ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ γενέσθαι), *Ti.*, *Lg.*, *Criti.*

– **ἔνθεος** at 533e6 οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ’ ἔνθεοι ὄντες.

Ἐνθεος also in *Smp.*, *Phdr.*, *Ti.* Cp. for the opposition οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ... ἔνθεοι also *Phdr.* 245a ff. δς δ’ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη.

Compare also **ἐνθουσιάζειν** at 533e4–5 διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων ἐνθουσιάζόντων ὄρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται; also at 535c2, 536b3. Ἐνθουσιάζειν (or ἐνθουσιᾶν) occurs elsewhere in *Ap.*, *Cra.*, *Tht.*, *Phlb.*, *Phdr.*, *Men.*, *Ti.*, *Ep.* II.

– **κατέχεσθαι** at 533e7, 534a4, 534a5, 534e5 bis (+ ἐκ), 536a8, 536b5 (+ ἐκ), 536c4 (+ ἐκ), 536d5.

¹³ Here, this is not used as a technical term, however, but occurs in the derivation of the name Ἐρμῆς (*Cra.* 407e3 ff.).

¹⁴ The related noun, ἐξηγητής, occurs in *Euthphr.*, *Ti.*, *R.* and *Lg.*

Elsewhere the passive in the sense ‘be possessed’ only in *Smp.*, *Phdr.*, *Men.*, *R.*, *Lg.* Especially relevant is *Men.* 99c11 ff. Ὁρθῶς ἄρ’ ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖους τε οὖς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησιμφοδούς καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικούς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατοκωμένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ

The related noun, κατοκωχί, occurs at 536c2, and elsewhere only at *Phdr.* 245a2.

– **ἔμφρων** at 534a1, 534a2, 534a5, 535d1.

Elsewhere in *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Smp.*, *Phdr.*, *Euthd.*, *Men.*, *R.*, *Ti.*, *Criti.*, *Lg.*

– **θεία μοίρα** at 534c2 οὐ τέχνη ... ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα; cp. also 535a3, 536c2, 536d2–3, 542a4.

The phrase θεία μοίρα elsewhere in *Phdr.*, *Men.*, *Lg.*, *Ep.* II, VII. Cp. especially *Men.* 99e ff. ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα παραγινομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγηται.

Some other technical terms

– **ὁ κυβερνήτης ... ὁ ἱατρός** at 540b6–7 and c1.

The combination of κυβερνήτης/-ική and ἱατρός/-ική is elsewhere found in *Plt.*, *Alc.* 2, *R.* and *Lg.*

– **ἄρχοντι κάμνοντος** at 540b8 ὅποια ἄρχοντι κάμνοντος πρέπει εἰπεῖν.

With this rather remarkable expression compare *Plt.* 299c1 αὐτοκράτορας ἄρχειν τῶν πλοίων καὶ τῶν νοσοῦντων. Cp. also the preceding passage in *Ion* Ἄρα ὅποια ἄρχοντι, λέγεις, ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζομένου πλοίου πρέπει εἰπεῖν, ὁ ῥαψωδὸς γνώσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης;. Also relevant is *R.* 342d4 ff., where the ἀκριβῆς ἱατρός is called a σωματῶν ἄρχων.

Procedural expressions

– **τί δὲ (δ’) ὅταν** at 531e4, 538b6–7 (τί δὲ δὴ ὅταν), 538c7.

Elsewhere in *Tht.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Prm.*, *Phlb.*, *Phdr.*, *Amat.*, *Grg.*, *R.*, *Lg.*

– **διστάζειν** at 534e2 ἵνα μὴ διστάζωμεν.

Διστάζειν, which is not found before Plato, occurs elsewhere only in *Tht.*, *Sph.*, *Lg.*, *Ep.* VII (and of other classical writers only in Aristotle).

– **παντάπασί γε** (as a reply formula) at 535a9.

Elsewhere only in *Phd.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *R.* (cp. Brandwood 1990: 63).

– **τί μὴν** at 531d7 (Socr.): Τί μὴν; κάκιον;

In this use, where it follows a negative statement by another speaker and asks for further information, the combination τί μὴν is very rare. The other examples are from *Tht.*, *Phlb.*, *R.* (cp. also Denniston 333). See further comm. ad loc.

– **ἐν κεφαλαίῳ** at 531e9 Οὐκοῦν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν ὡς ...;

Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ elsewhere in *Sph.*, *Smp.*, *Phdr.*, *Euthd.*, *Hr.Mi.*, *R.*, *Ti.*, *Ep.* II.

– **(τέχνη) τὸ ὅλον** at 532c7–8 ποιητικὴ γὰρ που ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον, 532e4–5 γραφικὴ γὰρ τις ἐστὶ τέχνη τὸ ὅλον;

Elsewhere only at *Men.* 79c1 ὥσπερ εἰρηκῶς ὅτι ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον ('what virtue is in the whole'—Lamb), *Phdr.* 261a7 Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων ...;

– **λαμβάνειν λόγῳ** at 532e4 λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ.

Elsewhere only at *Lg.* 638c οἱ λόγῳ λαβόντες τι ἐπιτήδευμα 'all those who take up an institution for discussion' (Bury)

– **σχεδόν τι** at 540b1 (as a reply).

Elsewhere only at *R.* 552e11 and 564e15. See comm. ad loc.

– **ἦ ἵππεδς εἶ ἢ ἦ** κιθαριστής; at 540e2.

This use of ἦ elsewhere only at *Men.* 72b8 οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἦ μέλιται εἰσίν, ἢ ἕτερα τῆς ἕτερας. See further comm. ad loc.

– **τελευτῶν** 'at last, finally' at 541e8.

Τελευτῶν and other forms of the participle in this use elsewhere in *Ap.*, *Phd.*, *Cra.*, *Tht.*, *Plt.*, *Smp.*, *Phdr.*, *Grg.*, *Men.*, *Clit.*, *R.*, *Ti.*, *Lg.*

Also relevant is the following *grammatical feature*.

– **χρυσοῖσι** at 535d2–3 κεκοσμημένος ... χρυσοῖσι (SF : -οῖς TW) στεφάνοις.

The Ionic dative plural in -σι¹⁵ occurs elsewhere in *Phd.* (109b4; πολλοῖσι T : -οῖς ceteri), *Plt.*, *Smp.* (197d; θυσίασι W : θυσίαις BT), *Phdr.*, *Alc.* 2, *Thg.*, *R.*, *Ti.*, *Lg.*, *Epin.*, *Ep.* VII.

The fact that a number of terms in the *Ion* belong also to the technical vocabulary of the dialogues mentioned above, the vast majority of which are considered middle and late dialogues, could in itself perhaps be considered a coincidence—after all, Plato may very well have used these terms in different periods of his life. However, when this fact is seen together and in conjunction with the many correspondences between a number of procedural terms in the *Ion* and many of the same dialogues, the conclusion seems inescapable that the *Ion* belongs to the same period of Plato's intellectual and writing activity as *Meno*, *Symposium* and especially, as suggested above, *Republic* (R. II–X, that is) and *Phaedrus*. This conclusion agrees very well, moreover, with the overall stance taken by Plato towards poets and poetry in the *Ion* and the latter two dialogues, as well as in some other dialogues, as I will briefly argue in what follows.

¹⁵ For this feature cp. Campbell *apud* Brandwood (1990: 5) and Ritter *apud* Brandwood (1990: 60, 65). The forms in -οισι(ν)/-αισι(ν) from *Grg.*, *Men.* and *Hp.Ma.* do not count, since they occur in quotations.—As the instances mentioned show, the results of one's stylometric research may be influenced by MS variation.

2. SOME COMMENTS: PLATO AND POETRY

Plato takes issue with the status and value of poets and poetry in several works, notably *Ion*, *Ap.* 22a ff., *Phdr.* 245a ff., *Grg.* 502b–d, *R.* 598d–608b, *Lg.* 719c, 801c and elsewhere; also relevant is *Men.* 99c ff. The general tenor of his approach is that poetry is a matter of *μανία*, of being *ἔνθεος*, and not of *τέχνη*. There is, in fact, no room for a *τέχνη ποιητική* in Plato, i.e. in the sense of ‘art of poetry’.¹⁶ If the noun to be supplied with respect to *ποιητική* is *τέχνη*, we are not dealing with poetry but with ‘the art of production’ in general, as at *Sph.* 219b11 ff. In other instances the noun to be supplied is not *τέχνη* but *ἐπίπνοια* (*Phdr.* 265b3 ff. ... *μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοϊαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικὴν, Μουσῶν δ’ αὖ ποιητικὴν* ...); or *ἡ ποιητική* stands for ‘poetry’ (*Grg.* 502c12 *Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική*, which comes after a discussion of *ἡ ποίησις διθυράμβων* and other forms of poetry). Again, if a noun *is* present, this is not *τέχνη* but *μίμησις* (*R.* 606d3 *ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις*; cp. also 607b–c and *Lg.* 719c5 *τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως*). There are admittedly four exceptions, or so it seems, viz. *Ap.* 22d6 ff. ... *οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι*, *Phdr.* 245a5 ff. *ὃς δ’ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητῆς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελεῆς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη*, *Smp.* 196d7 *ἴν’ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην τιμήσω ὥσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος τὴν αὐτοῦ*, and, finally, *Ion* 532c7–8 *ποιητικὴ γάρ που ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον*, where *ποιητική* has the meaning ‘poetic’, and where the noun to be supplied must be *τέχνη*.¹⁷

¹⁶ In her valuable article of 2004, Stern-Gillet (2004: 184) opposes the view of e.g. Janaway (1995) ‘that, in the *Ion*, Plato genuinely assumes the existence of a *technē* of poetry’. Actually, Plato does not assume its existence anywhere. The same position is taken by Levin (2001). Focusing on *τέχνη* in *R.*, she argues (p. 134) that ‘the *Republic* rejects the *technē* status of poetry as such’. See also n. 18 below.

¹⁷ ‘for there is an art of poetry, I suppose, as a whole’—Stock. Often wrongly translated with τὸ ὅλον as subject, e.g. by Kahn (1996: 109; ‘For I suppose that the whole thing is poetry’) and Murray (‘for the whole thing is poetry, isn’t it?’), or as predicative complement, e.g. by Allen (‘The art of poetry is surely one whole’). See further comm. ad loc.

Seeming exceptions, in fact, for in the passage from *Apology* ἕκαστος ἡξίου indicates that τὴν τέχνην is presented from the viewpoint of the poets and the δημιουργοί; in the second passage ἐκ τέχνης does not belong to the words of Socrates/Stesichorus but is part of the conviction of the frenzy-less person referred to in the ὄς-clause (πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ...),¹⁸ while in the third Agathon is speaking, who naturally considers his own activity a τέχνη. It is, however, a τέχνη of a rather peculiar kind, for it is Eros who is responsible for its existence: ποιητὴς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πᾶς γοῦν ποιητὴς γίγνεται, “κἂν ἄμουσος ἦ τὸ πρῖν”, οὐδ’ ἂν Ἔρωσ ἀψήγεται. As for the passage from *Ion*, finally, τέχνη is only introduced here *argumenti causa* (cp. πού ‘I assume’),¹⁹ to demonstrate that if there were such a thing as an ‘art of poetry’, there ought to be also people who are able to judge the quality of poetry, just as there are people who can judge the products of painters and sculptors, people who are δεινοὶ ἀποφαίνειν ἃ εὖ τε γράφει καὶ ἃ μὴ (viz. the painter or sculptor); cp. *Ion* 532e3, and also *R.* 529e2, where the judge of sculptors and painters is called in more specific terms ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας. However, in the case of poetry such judges, such ἔμπειροι, do not exist, as the embarrassment shown by Ion when he is invited to explain Homer, makes sufficiently clear. In fact, what could they possibly be expert in? After all, the poets they are supposed to explain are not experts either, they write whatever they like on any subject they like, without being accountable for what they write. As Socrates puts it in a key passage of the *Republic* (602b5 ff.): Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὡς γε φαίνεται, ἐπικρικῶς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ’ εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἀπτομένους ἐν ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικούς ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. And ἡ μίμησις, Socrates adds a few lines further, πόρρω ... τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται (*R.*

¹⁸ Note the presence of ἄρα, conveying disbelief or scepticism on the part of the speaker; cp. Denniston 38. Its effect is, in a somewhat exaggerated translation: ‘... convinced, incredibly, that ...’. Finkelberg’s (1998: 1–4) discussion of the relationship between inspiration and art in *Phdr.*, *R.* and *Ion* is flawed by her ignoring the fact that ἐκ τέχνης at *Phdr.* 245a6 is part of an embedded thought. This point is also missed by Stern-Gillet (2004: 184 n. 49) when she writes, referring to *Phdr.* 245a5–8: ‘[o]nly once in the whole corpus does it refer to competence in versification’. It does indeed, but not in Socrates’ ‘own’ text.

¹⁹ See for this view Flashar (1958: 77–96) and (1963: 58). See also Murray on 532c8–9.

603a10 ff.).²⁰ What Allen (1996: 6) observes with regard to the *Ion* ('Nowhere in the *Ion* is it presupposed that poetry possesses an autonomous value') applies, I think, to Plato in general.²¹ Or, to quote another recent paper on Plato and poetry: 'Making poems is not evidence of any sort of knowledge or ability' (Woodruff 1982: 142).²² In

²⁰ Earlier (*R.* 599c7) he had already said ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδῶλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠρισάμεθα, In the *Ion*, too, Plato attacks the lack of knowledge of the poets; see *Ion* 533e5 ff. πάντες γὰρ οἳ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα. This point seems to be missed by Lowenstam (1993: 25) when he tries to defend *Ion* against Socrates' attack, by arguing that the literary critic—perhaps a slightly anachronistic term—has his own competence, e.g. to 'treat[s] the poems (*Iliad* and *Odyssey*) as totalities, investigating how the parts function toward a common goal, in contrast to Socrates' "experts", who can only expound on limited passages without regard to their organic function'. (A similar view is held by Morris (1993: 270): 'a craftsman *qua* craftsman would not be in a position to judge Homer'.) To be sure, there *ought* to be a field of expertise for the rhapsode, say the 'poetic' part of the epics, but the fact is that such a field does not exist, since Plato denies the poets the faculty of composing poetry. There is, for Plato, nothing 'poetic' about poetry, it is all a matter of μανία. (Or of 'procreation'; cp. *Smp.* 209a4, where Diotima speaks about the poets as γεννήτορες, but this can hardly be called a rational activity either. Incidentally, with Robin I take it that ὄν depends on εἶσι, not on γεννήτορες.) See also n. 22.

²¹ If Socrates, in the restricted framework of the *Ion*, where μίμησις plays no role, speaks of καλὰ ποιήματα (533e7, 534e3), this is because ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων (534d3–4). Outside the *Ion* not even this possibility is left. All this raises the difficult question as to how this poetry with only a limited value can be due to θεία μοῖρα, for this is, after all, what the *Ion* tells us. See for this question Tigerstedt (1969: 64 ff.).—As in many other cases, Aristotle was not impressed by the lessons of his teacher. As Russell and Winterbottom (1989: x) put it: 'One pregnant sentence overthrows the Platonic picture of the poet as instructor, whether of charioteering or morality', referring to *Po.* 1460b14 f. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς.

²² 'Making poems' is perhaps already saying too much; cp. n. 20. See also the other insightful discussions of Plato's attack on (mimetic) poetry collected in Moravcsik and Temko (1982). The literature on 'Plato and poetry' is of course abundant. Other recent work that has a bearing on the subject may be found in e.g. Gould (1992; who argues *inter alia* that Plato also condemns μίμησις in epic poetry and drama in a more technical sense, because, otherwise than in the case of δῦγησις, 'the poet is not there to mould the reader's reception of his story' (24)), Nightingale (1995: 60–93 'Use and abuse of Athenian tragedy', 172–192 'Philosophy and comedy'), Rutherford (1995: 228–239 'The critique of art'). Beversluis (2000: 75–93) comes to the defence of *Ion*, and of the poets (he considers the *Ion* an early dialogue). In his defence Beversluis argues, among other things, that '[t]he contention that rhapsodes and poets are devoid of all intelligence and skill and merely passive vehicles of the gods awaiting the necessary "inspiration" bespeaks an extraordinarily mechanical understanding of a

fact, above we saw that Socrates regarded μίμησις as παιδιά τις καὶ οὐ σπουδή. This, in turn, may explain why Plato portrays Ion as an unserious character: someone who is an imitator of an imitator, and must therefore be even more παίζων and οὐ σπουδαῖος than the poets, can only be fought with his own weapons. Or, in the words of Tigerstedt (1969: 20): ‘[W]hen he so chooses, the Platonic Socrates beats any Sophist at his game’.

Many scholars find it difficult to accept Plato’s uncompromisingly negative attitude toward poetry. They argue that, even if Plato’s general attitude is undoubtedly hostile, it is balanced by a more positive view of poetic inspiration. Thus Flashar (1958: 106), having observed that Plato always remained true to the position taken by him in the *Ion*, viz. that poets create their poetry in a state of ‘göttliche Begeisterung’, claims, referring to *Lg.* 719c, that Plato praises this position there ‘in feierlichen Tönen’. But he is reading far too much in that passage; for while the tone is certainly ‘solemn’, there is nothing to suggest that Plato is bestowing praise on this state of enthusiasm of the poets. On the contrary, he dismisses there the activity of the poets, since he writes in the same passage that the poet, τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως, is often forced to contradict himself: being mimetic, he can only make people oppose each other.²³ Like Flashar, Penelope Murray

skill and an adolescent, moonstruck view of the creative process’ (92). Perhaps so, but Beversluis entirely misses the point. For Plato the artistic creative process—if it exists at all; see the main text and n. 20—is, and could not but be, philosophically irrelevant and objectionable. To put it briefly: people should not waste their time on making imitations of a world which is itself an imitation, but seek knowledge of the original. According to Westermann (2002: 47–95), in the opening scene of the *Ion* Socrates is sketching an ideal, philosophically relevant, picture of the ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη, which would differ crucially from the kind of pseudo-τέχνη which Ion possesses. I do not think this is correct, for Plato does not recognize the existence of any ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη. See also comm. at 530b8–9. Ledbetter (2003) argues that the *Ion*, like the *Protagoras*, is part of a Socratic poetics, and tries to reconcile poetry and philosophy by claiming that according to these poetics ‘poetry’s contribution to the investigation of virtue depends on its own divinely inspired and inquisitively discoverable meaning’ (113), and that poetry therefore belongs to the ‘subject matter of philosophical enquiry’ (117). Stern-Gillet (2004), already mentioned, studies the *Ion* primarily in connection with the history of aesthetics and poetics.

²³ Cp. also the words of the Athenian at *Lg.* 817a ff., where he says to ‘the serious poets’ that tragedy in the true sense is not poetry but the fairest and best polity (ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης: πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὲ ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγωδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην).

believes that not everything is hostile in Plato's attitude towards poetry. For while she acknowledges (1996: 10) that 'the central speech of the *Ion* [i.e. the speech at 533d1–535a1] undermines the authority traditionally accorded to poets by depriving them of *techne*', she also calls the tone of this speech 'eulogistic'.²⁴ And on p. 11 of her Introduction she contrasts 'the low rating of the poet's life' at *Phdr.* 248d–e, where he is rated sixth in the order of merit, with the 'earlier exaltation of the recipient of the Muses' *mania*' in the 'famous passage' 245a ff. of the same dialogue. But in the latter passage the poets are not really exalted. To be sure, Socrates speaks, at 245b1, of the *καλὰ ἔργα* of the Muses' *mania*. This, however, relates only to the *form*, not to the content of poetry. For all the poet does is to adorn (*κοσμεῖν*) the *μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα* (245a4).²⁵ To my mind Allen captures the essence of Plato's views much better when he writes (1996: 7): 'The *Ion* does not present a theory of poetry, or of rhapsody, and to describe rhapsody or poetry as a matter of divine apportionment without intelligence is not to praise it but to dismiss it'.

If the above is correct, the *Ion* would seem to be an integral—and therefore authentic—part of what may be called Plato's programme to show that traditional poetry, being mimetic of the imperfect world as we know it, and *a fortiori* rhapsodes, imitators of imitators, should be rejected, and should not be admitted to a state if that state is to be well governed.²⁶ The other dialogues displaying (elements of) this programme are the *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Republic*, *Laws*.²⁷ While

²⁴ A similar ambivalence is found in Kahn (1996), who writes: 'The theory of art sketched in the *Ion* is less merely hostile [viz. than in *Republic* X], since it also takes account of the positive, "divine" impact of poetry on the audience. But that impact is seen as entirely devoid of understanding' (110).

²⁵ And if the form is taken away all that remains is *λόγοι*, words that are used to please the audience. In fact, the poets are just rhetoricians (*Grg.* 502c–d). Tigerstedt (1969: 66), too, wrongly speaks of 'the marvellous praise of *μανία* in the *Phaedrus*'.

²⁶ Only officially approved state poetry is to be allowed, *Lg.* 801c.

²⁷ Of course the *Ap.*, too, contains an attack on the poets (at 22a ff., already mentioned above), but since this attack is mentioned solely in connection with Socrates' disappointing quest for real σοφοί, it does not belong to the anti-poetry programme. Observe also that in *Ap.* 22b–c τέχνη and θεία μοίρα play no role. There, the technical terms are rather (οὐ) σοφία (22b8) and φύσει (22c1). The only term which the *Ap.* shares with the other dialogues is ἐνθουσιάζειν (22c1).

the *Ion* belongs, then, to this programme, its technical vocabulary comes closest to that of *Phaedrus* and *Republic*.²⁸

²⁸ One of the (syntactic) features that is sometimes taken as a rather sure sign of the position of a given dialogue seems to plead against this, viz. the frequencies of *πέρι* and *περί* (+ genitive). Roughly speaking, postpositive *πέρι* becomes steadily more frequent in the dialogues; see the discussion of earlier research in Brandwood (1990: 115–122). Now the *Ion* has only two instances of *πέρι* against 78 instances of *περί*; if its technical vocabulary does, indeed, resemble that of *Phaedrus* and *Republic*, one would expect the number of *πέρι*'s to be considerably higher, the ratio of *περί* : *πέρι* for *Phdr.* being 4 : 1, for *R.* 3 : 1. However, the *Ion* may be atypical, since the number of *περί*'s + genitive in its 17 OCT pages (78, or 4.6 per page) is far higher than that in e.g. the 46 odd OCT pages of the *Meno* (47, or one per page). The high incidence in the *Ion* is in part, at least, no doubt connected with the fact that the *Ion* is *περὶ* Ὀμήρου and *περὶ* other poets, painters, etc., nearly always in this stereotyped form (some 35 instances, the exception being *ἐνδὸς πέρι* at 533b2). Also, this criterion may not be really reliable in the first place. Thus, the *Laches*, which is generally not reckoned among the later dialogues, shows the same ratio of *περί* : *πέρι* as the (late) *Theaetetus* (7 : 1), and the *Euthyphro* almost the same ratio as the *Parmenides* (12/13 : 1).—With one exception, *ἐν κεφαλαίῳ*, none of the terms presented in the list above occurs in the *Hippias Minor*. This fact strongly pleads against the view that the *Ion* closely resembles the *Hippias Minor*; thus e.g. Flashar (1963: 59) in the 'Nachwort' to his translation, and Kahn (1996: 101–124), in a separate chapter on *Ion* and *Hp.Mi.* While there are doubtless a number of resemblances as to form—e.g. the way in which the dialogues are conducted—and contents—e.g. 'a concern with the notion of *technē*' (Kahn 1996: 102)—the features listed above suggest that the resemblances of the *Ion* with dialogues like *Meno*, *Phaedrus* and *Republic* are much more pervasive than those with the *Hippias Minor*.

3. TITLE(S); THE NAMES OF THE SPEAKERS

3.1 *Title(s)*

Materiam ex titulo (libri) cognosces—Pl. *Ep.* 5.12.3

In our manuscripts the *Ion*, like most Platonic dialogues, has a main title, Ἴων, and an alternative title, introduced by ἤ: ἡ περὶ Ἰλιάδος, illustrating the practice mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (3.57): (Plato) διπλαῖς τε χρῆται ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς καθ' ἑκάστου τῶν βιβλίων, τῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, τῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. Diogenes' first example is the first dialogue of the first tetralogy: Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὀσίου· ὁ διάλογος δ' ἐστὶ πειραστικός. Note that from the phrasing of this sentence it is clear that the second part (ὁ διάλογος, etc.) no longer belongs to the χρῆται part but is additional information (cp. n. 36). The double titles, as they are often called, are almost universally rejected by Platonic scholarship, the title ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος being considered the 'real' title,²⁹ and the alternative, ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος, title a later addition,³⁰ and the *Ion* is no exception.

Before I discuss the testimony of the manuscripts on this matter, I must note first of all that the modern editions I have consulted are singularly careless in reporting the data of the MSS. Thus, Méridier in his Budé edition provides the dialogue with the following title: ἸΩΝ [ἡ περὶ Ἰλιάδος· πειραστικός]. Méridier has no remarks in his apparatus,

²⁹ And even this title is sometimes rejected. Thus Schubart (1962: 90) writes: 'Von Haus aus besaß ihn (viz. the title) das griechische Buch überhaupt nicht'. According to Schubart the opening words of a work served as the title. This is most unlikely, in view of the fact that e.g. Aristotle, whenever he refers to a specific work of Plato, does so mostly by means of the title that we are also familiar with; cp. also below and especially n. 47.—Observe that the main title need not be the name of one of Socrates' interlocutors, it can also be a professional name (Σοφιστής, Πολιτικός) or an institution (Πολίτεια, Νόμοι).

³⁰ Strangely enough, in three cases Burnet does print the alternative title, viz. in the *Hipparchus*, *Minos* and *Critias*, with no information in the apparatus criticus. I am ignoring here the fact that in different sources some dialogues may have different second titles. An example is the *Phaedrus*, whose second title in B T W is περὶ καλοῦ, but in D.L. 3.58 περὶ ἔρωτος.

which suggests that the MSS used by him (T, W and F) all read, in fact, ΙΩΝ ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος· πειραστικός; since he brackets the last four words we are to understand that he considers only ΙΩΝ genuine.³¹ Lamb, in the Loeb edition, has the same title, but for a comma after Ἰλιάδος instead of a high dot, and he has capital letters throughout; he, too, brackets everything but ΙΩΝ. There is no report on the MSS, but this need not surprise us, since Lamb's edition, like most older Loeb editions, has virtually no apparatus. In fact, he followed the text of Schanz's 1885 edition. Curiously enough, however, Schanz himself has: ΙΩΝ ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος [πειραστικός]; he accepts, then, the double title. Schanz, too, has nothing in his, admittedly very succinct, apparatus. As for Burnet, he just prints ΙΩΝ above the text; there is nothing to suggest that there may be more to this title, not in the text nor in the apparatus. This strange procedure, which was followed by Burnet for the vast majority of the dialogues,³² was also followed by e.g. Dodds in his edition of the *Gorgias* (although he does mention the subtitle ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς on the first page of his commentary), by Bluck in his edition of the *Meno*, and also by the editors of the first volume of the new Plato OCT.³³ I should add, finally, that all editions fail to mention the presence of the title in T and W (and S), and its absence in F, at the end of the dialogue.³⁴

Actually, our main witnesses all have ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος, so this should appear somewhere on the first page, either in the title or, if bracketed, in the apparatus; for some further details see the apparatus to this edition. Πειραστικός, however, is *not* found in any of these MSS,³⁵ but

³¹ I should add that some volumes in the Budé series do present information on the titles in the apparatuses, notably those prepared by Robin and his successors (*Phd.*, *Phdr.*, *Smp.*).

³² Surprisingly, there are two exceptions: *Amat.* and *R.*

³³ Information on the title is also absent from e.g. the new Aeschylus and Sophocles OCT's, and from the second, but not from the first and third, volume of Diggle's Euripides OCT; the second volume appeared first.

³⁴ For the function of the titles both at the end and at the beginning of a papyrus roll (and, later, a codex) see Schubart (1962: 88–93). An excellent early example of a text having an end title is a papyrus of Menander's *Sicyonians* of the late third cent. BC, where also the name of the author is present; see Irigoin (2001: 46, ill. 29) with discussion on p. 39. The presence of πλάτωνος in the title in W may be a 'fossilized' indication that dialogues which had been published separately at some point were assembled as a *corpus* (Martinelli Tempesta 1997: 274 n. 93).

³⁵ In other dialogues the genre of the dialogue *is* sometimes present in primary MSS, but then in a different hand, e.g. ἠθικός B² ('alia manu'—Robin) in the *Phaedrus*.

only in secondary manuscripts like Bessarion's *deluxe* copy of the complete Plato, MS Ven. gr. 184, usual siglum in modern editions E; since E is a non-primary witness (see below, §4.2), this reading must be relegated to the basement (or disappear altogether). It may have been imported into Bessarion's *Prachtband* from the cardinal's own copies of Diogenes Laertius' *Vitae philosophorum*, where, in the *Life of Plato*, the genre 'titles' are always added after the alternative title; for the *Ion* see Thrasyllus *apud* D.L. 3.60.³⁶

But what about the alternative title itself? As I noted above, this is almost universally rejected in modern editions, although there are exceptions, like Schanz's, as we saw above. Perhaps Dodds' standpoint in this matter may be taken as representative of modern Platonic scholarship as a whole. On p. 1 of his commentary on the *Gorgias* Dodds writes, in n. 1: 'These sub-titles are as old as the "tetralogical" edition of Plato, and some of them are older: Aristotle already quotes the *Menexenus* by the sub-title ὁ ἐπιτάφιος (*Rhet.* 1415b30).³⁷ But despite R.G. Hoerber, *Phronesis*, ii (1957), 10 ff., the systematic sub-titling is surely Alexandrine at earliest.' The article to which Dodds here refers is entitled 'Thrasyllus' Platonic canon and the double titles', in which Hoerber, after reviewing the evidence, concludes that 'it seems clear that the double titles in the Platonic *corpus* originated long before the time of Thrasyllus³⁸—at least by the fourth century B.C., and possibly, on the basis of the *Thirteenth Epistle*, with Plato himself' (Hoerber 1957: 20).³⁹ Observe that Dodds simply dismisses Hoerber's article,

³⁶ Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος, πειραστικός. 'La classification dihéretique par genre ... est assurément plus récente et, en tout cas, postérieure à Aristote' (Irigoin 1997: 86). Differently, however, Philip (1970: 302): 'late fourth century'. For the presence in Bessarion's library of the manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius, now numbered Marc. gr. 393 and 394, cp. Labowsky (1979: 171 and 209); in modern editions the MSS have the sigla I (= Marc. gr. 393) and M (= Marc. gr. 394). For a detailed description see Martini (1899: 95 and 97). That Bessarion was the owner is mentioned both in Greek and in Latin.

³⁷ Aristotle also refers to the *Symposium* by means of ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικαῖς λόγοις, *Pol.* 1262b11.

³⁸ Or 'Thrasyllus'. This refers to the widespread belief that the double titles originated with this Platonic scholar of the first century AD; see Hoerber (1957: 10).

³⁹ In the relevant passage of this Letter, whose authenticity is accepted by scholars like Hackforth, Taylor and many others (see further Hoerber 20), Plato refers to the *Phaedo* by means of the subtitle Περὶ ψυχῆς. The text runs (*Ep.* XIII 363a) γεγραμμένος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατεῖσι λόγοις μετὰ Σιμμίου Σωκράτει διαλεγόμενος ἐν

apparently feeling no need to discuss his arguments—wrongly, I think. I shall not repeat, however, Hoerber’s arguments here, but add an observation that was hinted at by Hoerber in passing⁴⁰ and may corroborate his conclusion.

Besides Plato there were, between, roughly, 450 and 350, several other writers of λόγοι Σωκρατικοί, e.g. Antisthenes (born around 455), who is sometimes credited with the invention of the ‘Socratic dialogue’; Xenophon (born around 427); Aristotle (born 384); and Heraclides Ponticus (born around 385).⁴¹ Interestingly, quite a number of the works concerned have double titles. Some examples are: (Antisthenes) Κῦρος ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, Μενέξενος ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν (see further D.L. 6.15 ff. and the fragments collected by F.D. Caizzi, Milano 1996); (Xenophon) Ἰέρων ἢ τυραννικός; (Aristotle) Εὐδήμος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, Γρύλλος ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς; (Heraclides Ponticus) περὶ τοῦ ῥητορεῦειν ἢ Πρωταγόρας.

Now it is theoretically possible, of course, that all these double titles are Alexandrian or post-Alexandrian inventions,⁴² and that these writings in reality were right from the start of their life as books solely known by one title only, mostly the name of one of the participants in that dialogue. Such a situation, however, would confront the interested public with a great number of titles that gave nothing away about their contents, and were literally no more than names. What was the public to make of a piece of work called Εὐθύφρων? And of Ἴων? Who were these guys? And even in the case of titles like Γοργίας or Πρωταγόρας, that is, of public persons of some renown, the title did betray nothing of its content.⁴³ Again, a potential reader may have been puzzled by the presence in educated circles of at least two Μενέξενοι, one by Plato and one by Antisthenes (see above). The latter example makes it clear, I think, that without the extra information pro-

τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ. The title Περὶ ψυχῆς remained in use; see e.g. D.L. 3.37 ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ... ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς.

⁴⁰ On p. 11.

⁴¹ For other names see Christ, Schmid and Stählin (1912: 653 ff.).

⁴² According to Tsitsiridis (1998: 128) the second title of *Mx.* (ἢ Ἐπιτάφιος) goes ‘vermutlich’ back to Aristotle. He does not substantiate his supposition.

⁴³ We should not be misled by our knowledge of these persons. A passage from *Laches* shows that ‘our’ Socrates, too, for his contemporaries was only one out of many Socratesses (*La.* 180e5 ff., Lysimachus speaking): τὰ μειράκια ... τάδε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἴκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπιμέμνηται Σωκράτους ... οὐ μέντοι πόποτε αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτησα εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου λέγοιεν.—For Plato’s characters see now Nails (2002).

vided by the alternative title the reading public would simply be at a loss about the, at least general, nature of the work it might be willing to read or copy (or purchase).⁴⁴ From the perspective of the authors such a situation would be unsatisfactory too, of course, since it would be very unfavourable for the promulgation of their views. I believe, in fact, that the system of the double titles did a highly efficient job, for it worked both ways: while the alternative title provided some information on the actual contents of the dialogue, the first title made the work recognizable among the many works having the same alternative title. By simply naming your new groundbreaking dialogue *περὶ ψυχῆς*, you ran the risk of being confounded with other writers of works *περὶ ψυχῆς*, which must have been legion already in the fourth century.⁴⁵ The addition of a proper name was a simple device to put a personal tag on that particular work.⁴⁶ That this title rather than the full title or the alternative title became better known is hardly surprising, for the proper name must have been more convenient to refer to, and must have had

⁴⁴ For the copying and the purchasing of books, the latter at first on a modest scale, see e.g. Engelkes (1926: 84–109 ‘De verbreiding van het boek’; detailed and still useful), Turner (1952: 20 f.), Kleberg (1969: 6–7), Blanck (1992: 114–120).—According to Joyal (2000: 195) the subtitles ‘are unlikely to derive from Plato or even from a relatively early Academic source’. His main argument is that ‘... those scholars who wish to trace the subtitles to Plato invariably fail to reckon with a conclusion to which their hypothesis necessarily leads, namely that Plato considered each treatise to be confined to a single theme and intended his readers to approach his dialogues with the preconceptions imposed by the subtitles’. This is unconvincing, if only because Joyal, in turn, fails to reckon with the need for the recognizability, or—why not—the ‘commercial’ aspect of the titles. Moreover, Cicero and other writers added subtitles freely, for which see below. Did Cicero believe his audience to be so ill-instructed and naive as to think that e.g. the *Cato Maior (vel) de senectute* would only be about old age?

⁴⁵ On the appropriateness of the alternative title of the *Ion* (*περὶ Ἰλιάδος*) see below.—That the contents behind a title was not always immediately clear appears from an amusing anecdote in Aristoxenus (*Harm.* 39–40), who tells us that Aristotle used to say that the majority of the people who were attracted to Plato’s course (*ἀκρόασις*) *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* were so for the wrong reasons, expecting they would take away *ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ* like richness and health, only to find out that it was about *ἀριθμοί, γεωμετρία*, etc. Interestingly, we may infer from this anecdote that Plato gave separate lectures under the title *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ*; these lectures must later have found their way into the *Republic*, cf. 521e ff. It seems likely that, if these oral presentations were announced under titles like *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ*, these titles were in use for written material as well.

⁴⁶ For the titles used in classical Greek literature Lohan (1890) is still indispensable.

a greater ‘attention value’, especially if the dialogue acquired prestige, as will have been the case for Plato’s dialogues very quickly.⁴⁷

The system of the double titles was very successful;⁴⁸ many examples from late antiquity can be found in e.g. Lucian (with whom it seems to have become a kind of mannerism), in the Lists of Works of the various philosophers discussed by Diogenes Laertius, and in the Suda.⁴⁹ It was also used by Roman authors; cp. Cicero’s *Laelius vel de amicitia* (or *de amicitia*, for in most MSS *vel* is omitted) and *Cato Maior (vel) de senectute*.⁵⁰ In his brief but insightful discussion of the double titles in Cicero, Wuilleumier, the editor of the *Cato maior* in the Budé series,⁵¹ observes (‘Introduction’, pp. 11–12) that Cicero himself twice

⁴⁷ See for a probable reference in Plato’s own dialogues by means of a proper name the mention ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ at *Plt.* 284b7; for references to Plato in Aristotle see Lohan (1890: 35–36). Aristotle uses e.g. ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ (*Pol.* 1264b29), ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ (*Metaph.* 991b3), ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ (*Rh.* 1408b20), ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ (*Ph.* 209b12).—It is also worth mentioning in this connection that the titles which famous parts of the text of Homer have in our MSS are also found in Thucydides and Plato, and may have been assigned in the fifth century. Cp. ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ (*Th.* 1.10.4), ἐν Λιταίς (*Cra.* 428c3 and *Hp.Mi.* 364e8). See also Labarbe (1949: 41).

⁴⁸ One may also compare the information in Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Simplicius on what is now chapter VIII of Aristotle’s *Categories* (8b25 ff.), which, at least in their text of the *Categories*, apparently had the ‘double title’ Περὶ ποιῶν καὶ ποιότητος. Phlp. *in Cat.* XIII 1; 133.22 Busse: τί δὴ ποτε δὲ διπλῆν ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν περὶ ποιῶν καὶ ποιότητος, καὶ μὴ ἀπλῆν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν; λέγομεν οὖν ὅτι ..., Olymp. *in Cat.* XII 1; 114.22 Busse: ... Περὶ ποιῶν καὶ ποιότητος. ζητήσωμεν οὖν τίνος χάριν διπλῆ κέχρηται τῇ ἐπιγραφῇ, Simp. *in Cat.* VIII; 207.27 Kalbfleisch: Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς ζητοῦσιν, διὰ τί περὶ ποιῶν καὶ ποιότητος ἐπέγραψεν;. Whatever the authenticity of the title(s), it is clear that commenting on the works of Aristotle included a discussion of their title(s). See also the programmatic remark in Phlp. *in Cat.* XIII 1; 7.2 Busse: Πασῶν δὲ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματειῶν τὰ προλέγεσθαι ὀφείλοντα ἕξ ἐστίν, ὁ σκοπὸς τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς ἢ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως ἢ εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαίρεσις καὶ εἰ γνήσιον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ βιβλίον. Cp. also Olymp. *in Cat.* XII 1; 113.23 and Simp. *in Cat.* VIII; 8.11, and below n. 55.

⁴⁹ For Lucian see the ‘Libellorum ordo’ in Macleod’s edition (Ἰππίας ἢ Βαλανεῖον, Συμπόσιον ἢ Λαπίθαι, Κατάπλους ἢ Τύραννος, etc.). For the Suda see e.g. ss.vv. Μάρκελλος (Ἀδριανὸς ἢ περὶ βασιλείας), Τριβωνιανὸς (Διάλογος Μακεδονικὸς ἢ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας), Φιλόστρατος (Ἄγας ἢ περὶ αὐλοῦ).

⁵⁰ Probably also the *Brutus*, whose title is either *Brutus*, or *Brutus de illustribus oratoribus* or *Brutus de oratoribus claris*; there seems to be no title that has *vel* after *Brutus*. Cp. the apparatus criticus in the edition by Jahn, Kroll and Kytzler, Berlin 1962.

⁵¹ Wuilleumier (1962).

refers to this work by means of *Cato* or *Cato maior*, once with a fuller phrase, which includes the alternative title (*Amic. 4 in Catone maiore qui est scriptus ad te de senectute*), and once with the second title only (*Div. 2.3 ... liber is, quem ad nostrum Atticum de senectute misimus*).⁵² The latter facts strongly suggest that the double titles go back to Cicero himself; Wuilleumier apparently was of the same opinion, for he retained the double title on the first page of his text.⁵³

The double titles consisting of a proper name and a title ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος remained in use in later times, famous examples being Richardson's *Pamela: or, Virtue Rewarded*, Cleland's *Fanny Hill: or, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure*, Rousseau's *Emile, ou De l'éducation*, Hermann Broch's trilogy *Die Schlafwandler*,⁵⁴ Valéry's *Eupalinos ou l'architecte*, Ionesco's *Jacques ou la soumission*, Nabokov's *Ada, or Ardor: A Family Chronicle*, Kubrick's movie *Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, and, in the Netherlands, Godfried Bomans' *Erik of het klein insektenboek*. Interestingly, just as in the case of the Platonic dialogues, these works are mostly only known by their first title.

All in all I consider it plausible that the earliest written texts of Plato's dialogues were provided with two titles, both at the beginning and at the end of the dialogue, and for that reason ἡ περὶ Ἴωνος is present in both places in the text of the *Ion* printed below—and on the title page of this book.

⁵² Later, the second title was favoured both by Roman and by Greek authors; cp. Wuilleumier, 'Introduction', 12.

⁵³ Cp. also *Off. 2.31 sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius*. On this passage Rose comments: 'This, then was his own title for it' (Rose 1954: 192; I found no information on the double titles in more recent handbooks). This may be true, but does not exclude the possibility that *de amicitia* was also used by Cicero. Cp. also *Att. 16.11.4*, from which it is clear that choosing the right title was among the topics discussed by Cicero and Atticus. Columella, too, did not take the question of the title lightly; cp. the praefatio to Book 9.2: ... *quoniam tituli quem p<rae>scripsimus huic disputationi ratio reddita est* Nor is this confined to ancient writers, of course. Thus Henry James, to mention just one example, notes, writing about the novel which we know as *The Bostonians*: "I haven't even a name for my novel, and I fear I shall have to call it simply *Verena*: the heroine. I should like something more descriptive—but everything that is justly descriptive won't do—*The Newness—The Reformers—The Precursors—The Revealer*—etc.—all very bad ..." (*The Complete Notebooks*, ed. by L. Edel and L.H. Powers, New York/Oxford 1987, 30).

⁵⁴ The titles being: 1. *Pasenow oder Die Romantik*, 2. *Esch oder Die Anarchie*, 3. *Huguenau oder Die Sachlichkeit*. Also without 'or', as in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary: Mœurs de province*, or Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie*.

There is, however, still another problem connected with the double titles, viz. that some of the alternative titles seem to be at odds with the contents of the dialogue, the *Ion* being a case in point.⁵⁵ Is there a sense in which the *Ion* can be said to be *περὶ Ἰλιάδος*? Already Ficino thought not, for in his translation the alternative title is not *de Iliade* but *de furore poetico*.⁵⁶ Stephanus, too, apparently had some misgivings, for although he printed ἡ περὶ Ἰλιάδος, he added two further alternatives, viz. ἡ περὶ ποιητικοῦ χαρακτήρος and ἡ περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρμηνείας, from which source I could not find out; perhaps they were his own inventions, together with the generic classifier λογικός instead of *πειραστικός*, which we find in his text.⁵⁷ In fact, it could be argued that e.g. the third title given by Stephanus covers the contents better than *περὶ Ἰλιάδος*, one of the key terms of the dialogue being ἐρμηνεύς. Yet another suitable second title might have been ἡ περὶ ῥαψωδικῆς.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Stephanus' predecessor Cornarius saw no problem here, for the title in his translation of 1561 runs 'Platonis Atheniensis Ion, sive de Iliade. Sub tentationis specie.' I think, in fact, that the position can be maintained that in an important sense the *Ion* is 'about the *Iliad*', rather than about rhapsodes or *furor poeticus*. More specifically, it is about the ways in which, according to Socrates, the various arts contribute to our understanding of the poem.⁵⁹ Now while arts like that of the charioteer will be called upon to explain individual passages about chariot-driving, and that of the doctor for passages about food, and so on, the paradoxical net result of the discussion is that the art of the poetry specialist *par excellence*, the rhapsode,

⁵⁵ For most other dialogues the alternative title has a *prima facie* plausibility, e.g. Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὀσίου, Φαίδων ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς, Φίληβος ἡ περὶ ἡδονῆς, Λάχης ἡ περὶ ἀνδρείας.—Of course, if the second title is from the Alexandrian period the problem of its appropriateness, and indeed its very presence, remains basically the same. Why would someone, some two centuries after its publication, have added a second title to a dialogue which by that time must have been fully known by one title only? The titles were hotly debated by Neoplatonist commentators; see Alline (1915: 124–129) and cp. n. 48.

⁵⁶ For the possible source(s) of Ficino's translation see below, n. 109.

⁵⁷ For the sources of Stephanus see Boter (1989: 248–251).

⁵⁸ According to Goethe, the alternative title should have been 'oder der beschämte Rhapsode' (*Sämtliche Werke*, Zürich 1977, 693).

⁵⁹ And of the *Odyssey*, of course, but of the latter only one passage is discussed by Socrates (at 539a), against four passages from the *Iliad* (at 537a, 538c, 538d, 539b). Incidentally, the same idea may lie behind Stephanus' alternative title ἡ περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρμηνείας.

of which Ion claimed that ‘it encompasses all’ (539e6), is shown by Socrates to have no relevance at all, since it is not an art: the *Iliad*, being itself due not to an art but to *θεία μοῖρα*, as *poetry* defies all artful analysis.

3.2 *The names of the speakers*

What I said above about the inaccuracy of our modern editions with respect to the titles also applies to the names of the speakers. All modern editions have something like ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΙΩΝ (Burnet, Méridier), ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ, followed by ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΩΝ (Schanz, Lamb), and likewise for the other so-called ‘dramatic’ dialogues in Burnet’s OCT, in the Budé series, etc.; see also the first pages of Dodds’ *Gorgias*, Bluck’s *Meno*, and of the dialogues in vol. I of the new OCT. The names are also present, of course, in the text to indicate speaker change, mostly in abbreviated form. Since the apparatuses are silent, we can only conclude that all relevant MSS contain these names, or the names plus ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ. In reality, however, none of these MSS present the names, not at the beginning of the dialogue nor in the text. Thus, in MSS T, W, S and F, the text of the *Ion* comes directly after the (double) title. Speaker change is indicated by a colon, which in part of the MSS is accompanied by a *paragraphos* in the margin (in T always, in W irregularly, in S and F never),⁶⁰ and often, if a question is involved, by a question mark with an extra dot above the question mark. See also Appendix I, n. 358. For the medieval (and ancient) reader the identity of the participants was normally established in an altogether different way, viz. by the use of the vocative. See comm. at 530a3. This applies both to direct (‘dramatic’), to direct-cum-reported (‘framed’) dialogues, e.g. *Phd.*, *Euthd.*, and to reported dialogues, although in dialogues of the latter two types the names are normally also present in the narrative, as in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. Sometimes a participant for a long time

⁶⁰ Cp. Andrieu (1954: 295): ‘Jamais il (: Plato) n’a utilisé de sigles’. Dicolon and *paragraphos* are already present in the late fourth-early third cent. BC papyrus of the *Phaedo* (P. Petrie I, 5–8; Dublin 1891), a reported dialogue. See illustration 27 in Irigoin (2001: 45), with discussion on pp. 38–39. Irigoin also refers to the Menander papyrus of the late third cent. BC mentioned in n. 34, which has no speakers’ names and exactly the same system to indicate speaker change as the Plato papyrus. Cp. also Irigoin (1997: 83–84).

remains anonymous, e.g. in *Cra.* and *Tht.*,⁶¹ or even for good, as in *Prt.* Of course, after their introduction the names of the participants always recur in the ensuing dialogue proper, at what looks like irregular intervals. But they *never* have solely an identifying function, since the alternation of speakers is routinely indicated by the dicolon.⁶²

The fact that the names of the speakers are present in the opening scene of a dialogue but thereafter only at irregular intervals has important consequences for the way the original audience must have got acquainted with Plato's work. At *Tht.* 143c8 we read that a slave was called upon to read the βιβλίον written by Euclides which contained the dialogue *Theaetetus* proper. How did the slave transpose the visible signs of speaker change in his text to audible signs?⁶³ This must have been especially difficult for dialogues with multiple speakers like the *Gorgias*. Or were such dialogues performed, with different speakers for different participant roles? Or again, were they read in private, if perhaps aloud? This is clearly the situation described at *Phd.* 97b3 ff. (where, however, the books read aloud are not Platonic dialogues). In all likelihood it was only in the latter case, i.e. in an unmediated contact between text and recipient, that the course of a 'dramatic' dialogue could be followed with (some) ease, and this must therefore have been the normal way of knowing such a text, and presumably also the dialogues of the other types. For 'the mode of performance' of the Platonic dialogues see the discussion in Blondell (2002: 22–29); cp. further Usener (1994: 174–197: 'Der Leser und seine Mo-

⁶¹ In the *Cratylus* the postponement of the first mention of the name 'Hermogenes' until 384a8 is no doubt due to the playful way in which Plato treats the proper names of the other two participants, Socrates and Cratylus, as well as that of Hermogenes himself, in the opening section of the dialogue, illustrating its theme: *περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος*. This play with the names is of course ruined if the name of Hermogenes is put above the text and in front of the first line of the dialogue, as our modern editions do (since the Aldina). (I owe these observations to a thesis by Janneke Louman, who is currently investigating the history of the names of the speakers in the Plato MSS and editions). As for *Tht.*, we have to wait until the very end of the opening scene(s) before we encounter the name of the first speaker, Euclides. Could this perhaps be omitted for such a long time because his interlocutor, Terpsion, whose name is mentioned straight away, and Euclides were a regular couple, so that Euclides' name was automatically associated with that of Terpsion? Cp. their joint presence at *Phd.* 59c2 (*παρήσαν*) *Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων*.

⁶² See again comm. at 530a3, and also Appendix II.

⁶³ For the achievement of reading a text *ex tempore* Flock (1908: 7) refers to Petr. *Sat.* 75, where Trimalchio declares he has kissed a slave not because of his beauty but because he was able to read a book *ab oculo*.

tivation', esp. 192 ff.). Neither of these authors addresses, however, the problem of the recognizability of the speakers.

While they are absent, then, from the primary MSS used for our text editions of the *Ion*, participant names *are* present in Musurus' *editio princeps* of the *Ion* in the Opera omnia edition of 1513, preceded by ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ, and before that already in Ficino's translation (1484), with no further indication like 'personae', however.⁶⁴ In the apparatus criticus to the present edition I have ascribed, for want of more precise indications, the addition of the names to both Ficino and Musurus.

⁶⁴ To be sure, the words ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ, followed by the names of the participants, above the text, as well as the abbreviated names in the text, are in some dialogues also present in part of the MSS, in various hands. For examples see e.g. Schanz (1877: 5 ff.), and see also below in this note. But their systematic presence in *all* dialogues seems to be an innovation of Ficino's translation and the Aldina.—According to Janneke Louman (cp. n. 61), Ficino's source for these additions may have been twofold. Firstly, he may have followed the example of some of his predecessors, e.g. Leonardo Bruni (tr. *Phaedo*, around 1404; later also *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*) and Henricus Aristippus (tr. *Phaedo*, around 1156), who frequently inserted participant names in their translations of Plato (but in the case of Aristippus' *Phaedo* not in all MSS). More importantly, one of the MSS used by Ficino, Laur. 85.9 (cp. n. 109), has, in the *Euthyphro*, the first dialogue of the MS, names throughout, unlike other medieval manuscripts. The earliest Greek manuscript of Plato with indications of speakers in the text, however, is probably Ven. app. class. IV 54, dating from the thirteenth century. The relationship between all these sources, as well as possible influences from dramatic texts and the practice in similar cases in Latin MSS, notably those of Cicero's dialogues, remain to be clarified. Janneke Louman also observes that in Vahlen's edition of *De legibus* (1883) and in De Plinval's Budé edition of the same dialogue (1959) the apparatus criticus *does* mention that 'nomina interlocutorum desunt in codicibus'. For Cicero cp. also Andrieu (1954: 297–299).

4. THE TEXTUAL FOUNDATION OF THE PRESENT EDITION OF THE *ION*4.1 *Papyri*

To date no papyri of the *Ion* have been published.

4.2 *Medieval manuscripts used for this edition*

Nos si codices recognoscendo ad recensionem a grammatico quodam et diligenti et scienti factam pervenerimus, satis habebimus.—H. Stuart Jones, Praefatio to the Thucydides OCT (1898), p. v

Jeder auf uns gekommene Text [ist] eine Auswahl aus einer größeren Menge antiker Varianten.—Seck (1965: 20)

In thinking about works in intangible media—works of literature, music, dance, cinema (the media of which are language, sound, movement, and light)—we must keep in mind the fundamental fact that the artifacts we work with cannot be the works themselves and thus that we must constantly distinguish the texts of documents from the texts of works.—Tanselle (1995: 12)

L'éditeur qui s' imagine reproduire le texte composé par Platon risque de s'abuser et d'abuser en même temps de son lecteur.—Irigoin (1997: 74)

Naturally, in establishing the text of this edition I have, like previous editors, made use of the three MSS whose status as primary witnesses for the seventh tetralogy (and for others, of course) has been recognized at least since Schneider's and Schanz's critical activities. I have also used, however, a fourth MS, about which more will be said below. Perhaps I should add, by way of a 'statement of policy', that to my mind 'establishing the text' does not amount to establishing the text which Plato wrote.⁶⁵ Not only is this objective in practice unat-

⁶⁵ For the concept of text, the relationship between text and author, and the goals and procedures of textual criticism see the fundamental discussion in Tanselle (1995),

tainable, it is also doubtful from a methodological point of view, since it presupposes the existence of a single fixed, definitive, text written or dictated by Plato at a fixed point in time, while in reality ‘the’ text must for a long time have been in a more or less constant flux, by interventions of Plato himself and of his pupils and audience,⁶⁶ and of later readers, scribes and scholars.⁶⁷ In fact, this is how the variant readings must have seen the light. And if not in flux, the fixation may be due not to Plato but to editors.⁶⁸ I concur, therefore, with the views of Stuart Jones, Seck and Irigoin that serve as mottos to this chapter, rather than with an opinion like that of West when he writes that it is the task of an editor ‘to try to establish what the author originally wrote’ (West 1973: 47), which echoes, of course, Lachmann’s *originem detegere*. Actually, I fail to see what we gain, in terms of editorial responsibilities and philological carefulness, by setting ourself this task. It may lead to the idea, for instance, that one MS, or one group of MSS, by being old, or by presenting a beautifully written text, or by being both these things, represents ‘the’ original text more faithfully than other, younger and/or more carelessly written, MSS, an idea rejected long ago by Grenfell.⁶⁹ To my mind, ‘establishing the text’

which for classical literature should be supplemented with Tarrant’s insightful contribution to the same collection of essays (Tarrant 1995).

⁶⁶ ‘The absence of the originals permits classicists to imagine them endowed with a stable perfection that consorts poorly with the untidiness of most writers’ worktables’ (Tarrant 1995: 97). For authorial interventions after the copying of a text, and their consequences for the transmission of that text, and for wholesale revisions of a text Emonds (1941) is still indispensable. Possible revisions of *Tht.*, *R.*, and *Phdr.* are discussed by him on pp. 364–368. See also n. 9.

⁶⁷ ‘Quam memoriam (namely, that of Plato’s works) nunc est mihi quoque concedendum non uno continuoque flumine deductam fuisse ex ipsa Platonis Academia, sed per rivulos plurimos complura per saecula manasse’ (Immisch 1903b: 10). An early proof of the existence of these rivulets is the *Phaedo* papyrus mentioned in n. 60, where, at 68d1, our texts, with the medieval MSS, read Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. The papyrus omits ἔφη, and has only ἀνάγκη, surrounded by two dicola. (The omission of ἔφη is reported by Burnet, but not in the new OCT.) The text of the papyrus apparently left no traces in the further transmission of the *Phaedo*. See also below on the indirect tradition.

⁶⁸ According to Irigoin (1997: 88) ‘le corpus (: platonicien) a été établi soit au VI^e siècle soit même au IX^e’. At that time ‘le texte ... a été révisé avec le plus grand soin’. Irigoin is speaking here about the Platonic corpus as it was transmitted in the Clarkianus and Parisinus A. See also the next note.

⁶⁹ ‘The outstanding excellence of particular MSS., such as the Clarkeanus of Plato, the Parisinus of Demosthenes and the Urbinas of Isocrates, is rather to be explained as the result of an edition than as the consequence of a specially faithful reproduction of

should lead to a text which can be interpreted in conformity with the linguistic rules, the genre conventions, the philosophical, cultural and historical ideas, as well as the material conditions,⁷⁰ of the period as a whole in which the text was written and published, and in particular of other texts that are by scholarly convention assigned to the same author.⁷¹ Of course, on the assumption that Plato is the author of a dialogue named *Ion*, the text of the *Ion* in this edition—which, in spite of a certain number of divergences, is basically the same text as that of e.g. Méridier, Burnet, Bekker, Stephanus and the Aldina—in some way or other goes back to the individual named ‘Plato’. But it remains fundamentally ‘eine Auswahl aus einer größeren Menge antiker Varianten’.

The three MSS mentioned above are:

Codex Venetus Marcianus graecus appendix classis IV, 1, numero di collocazione 542; common modern siglum: **T**; the older part, which contains also the *Ion*, was probably written around 950 (see Diller (1980), Irigoin (1997: 69, 156)).

the earliest text’ (Grenfell 1919: 35). For Isocrates compare Norlin’s view (Preface to the Loeb edition, p. xlvii) that ‘[t]he discovery of Urbinas Γ by Bekker ... enabled scholars to restore, with great probability, the original Isocrates’. Something similar is implicit in Burnet’s judgement (OCT t. I [p. i]): ‘Ceteris libris Platonis cum antiquitate tum fide excellere iam pridem constat inter omnes codicem Clarkianum ...’. Another outspoken critic of the view that ‘old + beautifully written = most faithful’ is Jachmann (1942), who speaks (359) about ‘die fundamentale Rolle’ of editions or re-visions in the textual transmission in antiquity.

⁷⁰ ‘The’ in ‘the linguistic rules’, ‘the philosophical ideas’, etc. will perhaps be frowned upon. Do we know ‘the’ rules and ideas, then? Is our knowledge of them not in flux, too? This is most likely, and even most welcome, for otherwise our profession would soon be dead and buried. To quote Heath’s (2002: 11) words: ‘Dissent has a positive value. It is an integral part of the dynamic that drives enquiry forward.’ Yet I am assuming here that there is a sufficiently solid body of uncontroversial knowledge—‘the rules and ideas’ for short—so as to enable us to carry out the scholarly tasks mentioned in the text, yet not so solid as to show no cracks and fissures, giving us room to use our linguistic and interpretive plastering tools.

⁷¹ Naturally, my claim that it should not be our goal ‘to establish what the author originally wrote’ does not mean that I expel the author from the text. Interpretation includes asking questions about, for instance, authorial intentions, for which see e.g. §2 above and the notes on τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν at 530a1, Ἔχε δὲ etc. at 535b1 (especially the conclusion), and ἀλλὰ γάρ at 541e1. On authorial intentions, and the difficulties involved in defining and recognizing them, see the illuminating discussion in Heath (2002: 59–98).

Vindobonensis Supplementum Graecum 7; common modern siglum: **W**; the oldest part, which contains the *Ion*, was written in the second half of the 11th century (Boter 1989: 61, Irigoín 1997: 162).

Vindobonensis Supplementum Graecum 39, olim 55; common modern siglum: **F**; written between 1280 and 1340, according to Irigoín (1997: 163); for details about this MS see especially Dodds' introduction to his edition of the *Gorgias*, pp. 41–47, and that of Bluck to his edition of the *Meno*, pp. 135–140. Dodds' observations on the unreliability of Burnet's apparatus criticus for the readings of F (pp. 42–43), already mentioned in the Preface, are equally valid for the *Ion*, as will become clear from the apparatus to this edition.⁷²

I have collated all three MSS *in situ*. Ultimately, T and W represent one branch of the textual tradition,⁷³ while F represents a second branch, together with another manuscript in Venice, **Venetus Marcianus graecus 189**, numero di collocazione 704, at least in *Hp.Mi.*, *Ion*, *Mx.*, as well as *Clit.* The common modern siglum of this MS is **S** (Σ with Bekker, and Jonkers 1989).⁷⁴ S is a MS from the library of Bessarion ('Platonis dialogi triginta octo, et vita eius in principio'—inventory of 1468 nr. 420; Labowsky 1979: 175). This MS was used by Bekker and Stallbaum on a rather large, and by Schanz on a much smaller, scale, but it fell more or less into oblivion after F, which was used for the first time by Schneider in his edition of the *Republic* of 1830–1833 became gradually more popular; Burnet was an outspoken fan of the latter manuscript.⁷⁵ Both Schanz (in the 'Prolegomena' to his edition of the seventh tetralogy) and Burnet (in the 'Praefatio' to volume III of the OCT edition) discuss the position of S at some

⁷² Burnet relied too much on the collations made for him by Josef Král. 'The results of a fresh collation, which I have made from good photographs, are decidedly disconcerting' (Dodds, Introduction, 42).

⁷³ For details about the dating, relationship, affiliations, lay out, physical appearance etc. of these two MSS see e.g. Carlini (1972: 159–168 (T); 169–195 (W)), Boter (1989: 55 f. (T); 61 f. (W)), Murphy (1990: 316 ff. (T and W)), Irigoín (1997: 69 (T), 156 (T); 162 (W)), Joyal (2000: 159–164).

⁷⁴ For details about F see e.g. Boter (1989: 62 ff., 104 ff.), Irigoín (1997: 163 f.), and for details about S, Jonkers (1989: 76, 248 ff.), Vancamp (1996b: 45–46). In other dialogues than *Hp.Mi.*, *Ion*, *Mx.* and (perhaps) *Clit.*, S has other affiliations than with F. I mention here for the record that neither S nor F has scholia, unlike T and W. For the latter cp. Dodds 60–62.

⁷⁵ See his articles of 1902 and 1903.

length. Schanz writes (p. xi): ‘... nunc⁷⁶ hoc mihi videor posse statuere nec S ex Vindobonensi (i.e. F) nec Vindobonensem ex S esse descriptum, sed ambos libros ex uno fonte, quem nota N significare libet, descendisse. Inde hos duos libros non testium duorum loco esse, sed pro uno teste valere et testem locupletiolem S sufficere nobis in aperto est positum.’ Schanz was on the whole followed by Burnet, but Burnet regarded F as ‘aliquanto sinceriolem codice Veneto S’ (Praef. p. iii). While Schanz made no use, in fact, of F in editing *Hp.Mi.*, *Ion*, *Mx.*, Burnet made virtually no use of S. Although S had its supporters, e.g. Immisch (1903a: 65)⁷⁷ and Alline (1915: 243),⁷⁸ many editors remained sceptical about the usefulness of S. Thus, on the basis of a comparison of the readings in *Hp.Mi.* reported for F and S by Bekker, Schanz and Burnet, Slings concludes (1981: 279): ‘... I reject [Schanz’s] claim that S is a primary witness, though not with absolute confidence. A future editor of the *Clitophon* would do wise to examine this MS. *in situ*.’⁷⁹

Recently, however, Vancamp (1996a: 30 ff.) has argued for the *Hippias Minor* that S is, indeed, a primary witness;⁸⁰ he assigns the MS to the first half of the fifteenth century (Vancamp 1996a: 33 n. 15; 1996b: 43 ff.).⁸¹ After examining S *in situ* I conclude that for the *Ion*,

⁷⁶ In an earlier publication Schanz (1877: 107) had considered S a copy of F.

⁷⁷ ‘Er (: Burnet) hat die Thatsache, daß F Mitglied einer Familie ist, viel zu leicht genommen.’

⁷⁸ ‘Dans le *Petit Hippias*, le *Ménexène*, l’*Ion* et le *Clitophon*, le *Venetus S* ... doit être également consulté pour la recension du texte.’

⁷⁹ In the revised edition of 1999, however, Slings writes: ‘... the theory (viz. that S is ‘a gemellus, not a copy of F’) ... should almost certainly be rejected for the *Clitophon*’ (340). See also n. 80.

⁸⁰ In his review of Vancamp (1996b) Slings rejects the primary status of S for the *Hippias Minor*; according to Slings ‘the cases of agreement of S and F² (and later hands)’ can only be accounted for ‘by assuming that S descends from F after the latter had been corrected by F² and F³’ (Slings 1998: 612). However that may be for the *Hp.Mi.*, this argument is not valid for the *Ion*. The second list presented below shows that S has many readings where neither F nor f have these readings, so they cannot go back to F in whatever state.

⁸¹ According to Vancamp, in the case of *Chrm.*, *Amat.* and *Hipparch.* S is a direct copy of Laur. 85.9, of which it is certain that it is from the fifteenth century. Also, Plethon, Bessarion’s teacher, who was active in the first half of the fifteenth century, made annotations in Ven. 189 (= S). The latter, of course, would give us only a *terminus ante quem*. Note that S was ‘written in one hand throughout’ (Jonkers 1989: 76); he omits to mention that it is written in two columns. Jonkers dates S to the fourteenth century, as does Irigoien *apud* Joyal (2000: 166 n. 25).

too, S must be considered a primary witness.⁸² Apart from sharing quite a number of readings with F, in many places S is independent of F (and vice versa). First some shared readings against T W:⁸³

- 530c2 ἀγαθός SF Prisc. : om. T W
 530c2 συνέη SF Prisc. : συνιείη W f : συνήη T
 530d9 ἀκροᾶσθαι T W : ἀκρόασασθαι SF
 531e7 ὁ αὐτός SF (-ός) : αὐτός T W
 532d1 ἐστι T W : ἔσται SF
 533c2 ῥαψωδοῦ SF : om. T W
 533d6 ὥστε T W f Procl. Stob. : ὥστ' αὖ SF
 533e4 αὐτή SF Stob. (P, αὐτῆ F) : αὐτή T W : αὐτούς Procl.
 534a1 μὲν SF : om. T W
 534a3–4 καὶ βακχεύουσι T W : βακχεύουσι SF Stob.
 534c6 εἴπερ περὶ SF : εἰ περὶ T W Stob.
 534d1 ἵνα T W Stob. : ἵνα μὴ SF
 535d2–3 χρυσοῖσι SF : χρυσοῖς T W
 535e5 καθίσω T W : κατίδω SF
 536d7 λέγοντός τι (-ος τί) SF : λέγοντος T W
 537a1 πολλαχοῦ ὄμηρος T W : ὄμηρος πολλαχοῦ SF
 537d1 καὶ κατὰ T W : καὶ τὰ SF
 540c1 κάμνοντος SF^c : κάμνοντι T W
 540c1 γνῶσεται] γνῶ (sic) SF
 540d4 ἔγωγε SF : ἐγὼ T W
 540e2 ἀπεκρίνω SF : ἀπεκρίνου T W
 541a7 σοι T W : σοι εἶναι SF
 542a7 εἶναι ἀνήρ SF : ἀνήρ εἶναι T W
 542b1 θεῖος SF : om. T W

For a discussion of these variants, most of which *prima facie* are, indeed, real variants,⁸⁴ I refer to the commentary.

⁸² If ever, examination *in situ* is indispensable here, since S is in a bad state, and many details get lost on a photograph. Cp. Vancamp (1996a: 33): ‘... S est d’un usage plus malaisé que F: le Venetus, endommagé en maints passages, est plus d’une fois illisible’.

⁸³ Cp. Vancamp (1996a: 30–33) for comparable features of F and S in the *Hp.Mi.*

⁸⁴ And which, as the list shows, in my view often should be preferred. But there is at least one variant to which this judgment definitely does not apply, the impossible γνῶ in SF at 540c1. Since the other instances of γνῶσεται in SF in the context are unobjectionable, one wonders why this augmentless epic aorist (if this is what γνῶ represents, of course) suddenly turns up. Be that as it may, γνῶ must have been present in the *Vorlage* of S and F.

And next quite a number of readings where S and F part company:

- 530a2 ἦ T W F : ἦ S
 531e2 ὅσπερ T W S f : ὅσπερ F
 531e9 λέγομεν ὡς W S P^c f (*sic*; λεγόμεν; ὡς ex ος) : λεγόμενος F :
 λέγωμεν ὡς T
 531e9 ὁ T W S P^c : om. F
 532b4 ὁμολογεῖ T W S f : ὁμολόγει F
 532b6 τοὺς T W S : τούτους F
 532b7 ἐγὼ T W S f mg : ἔχω F
 533b6 οὐδ' ἐν T W S : οὐδὲν F
 533c7 οὔ. καίτοι T W S f (αἰτοῖsl) : οὔ. κει F
 534a4 ἀρύονται W F Stob. : ἀρύονται T S
 534a6 οὔσαι οὔ T W S f : οὔσαι F : οὔ Stob.
 535b2 ἔρωμαι T W S : ἐρῶμαι F
 535c2 οὔσιν T W F : οὔσα S
 535d3 κλαίη(ι) T W S f : καὶ ἦ F (in mg κλείει vel κλαίει add. f)
 535e6 κλαύσομαι T W S : κλαύσωμαι F
 536a2 ὅποι ἄν T W S P^c : ὁποῖαν F
 536a2–3 ἀνθρώπων T W S P^c (ἄ-; ante ἄν- lacunam ex rasura praebet;
 vide comm.) : ἀπανθρώπων F
 536d4 θαυμάζοιμι T W S P^c : θαυμάζοι F
 536d4–5 εἰ οὕτως F : οὕτως εἰ T W S
 536e1 τῶδε ὦν T W S P^c f mg : τὸ δέον S F
 537a8 ἐϋξέστω T W F (εϋ) : ἐϋπλέκτω S cum libris Hom.⁸⁵
 539e7 ἅπαντα T W S P^c (ἅ- supra οὐ) f (ἅ- supra οὐ) : οὐ πάντα S F
 540c1 πρέπει T W S : πει [*sic*] F, πρέπειν F P^c
 540d4 γνοίην T W S : γνοίη F
 540d7 ἠρόμην T W S (ἦ in ras. T, ex ἐ- W, ἦ et ο S P^c) : ἐροίμην F
 541a6 οὐκ αὖ T W S : οὐκοῦν F
 541b7 στρατηγὸς T W S : στρατηγὸς ὦν F
 541e5 ὅς γε T W S P^c : ὡς γε F
 541e6 πάλαι T W S (πά ex πο) : πολλὰ F
 subscriptio ἦν ἢ περὶ ἱλιάδος T W S : nulla subscriptio in F

We may note that, although in nine cases (531a2, 531e9, 532b4, 532b7, 533c7, 534a6, 535d3, 536e1, 539e7) S, sometimes *post correctionem*, shares a reading with f (and with T W), in the other nineteen cases S (normally with T W) is opposed to F itself. The latter is difficult to explain if S were a copy of F.

⁸⁵ For the text of the Homeric quotations in the *Ion* see below §4.3. As will be seen there, in many places S and F have different readings.

As for F, observe that in a rather large number of cases an original error in F has been corrected either by the scribe of F himself (= Fp^c) or by 'f'.⁸⁶ In fact, almost all anomalies in F involve plain errors (see further below) rather than serious alternative readings. Particularly interesting is the situation at 536a2–3. Originally, the curious reading of F (not reported by Burnet or others) was apparently also at the basis of the reading of S. Note, however, that the α of ἀνθρώπων has first a coronis and then a spiritus lenis; so the reading must have been ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων. Both ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων and ἀπανθρώπων may be due to the influence of ἀπ' ἀλλήλων at 535e8–9. In S, ἀπ was subsequently or *inter scribendum* erased,⁸⁷ but the coronis remained where it was.

What does the above *comparatio lectionum* tell us about the descent of S and F? It is often claimed that many of the errors in F can be explained by assuming that F was directly copied from an uncial exemplar, e.g. by Burnet, Deneke (1922), Dodds (1959: 41 f.: '(Burnet's conclusion) ... can be accepted as certain'), Bluck (1961: 136: '... F may certainly be regarded as a direct, or almost direct, transcript from an uncial manuscript') and Irigoien (1997: 164), who speaks of a 'translittération tardive'. This view has been called into doubt, however, by Vancamp for the *Hippias Minor* (1996a: 29). After a discussion of some of the errors in F, he concludes that 'Il est ... probable

⁸⁶ Burnet and Dodds do not distinguish between the two types of corrections, wrongly, at least for the *Ion*. The symbol 'f' is used by Burnet and Dodds for a later hand, which Dodds calls 'the' corrector of F; likewise e.g. Bluck for the *Meno*. According to Boter, however, this is misleading; at least, in the *Republic* there are no less than five different correcting hands in F (Boter 1989: 101), and he categorically states that in other dialogues, too, e.g. *Grg.*, *Men.* and *Clit.*, '... the assumption that there is only one later hand is untenable' (101). For the *Hippias Minor* Vancamp (1996a: 28 n. 7) distinguishes between corrections that are 'relativement anciennes' and later corrections. In the *Ion* I take it that there are, besides the scribe of F himself, at least two other correctors, one of them by and large being responsible for the many corrections *supra lineam*, and the other, a later hand, for the corrections *in margine*; in both cases the source of the corrections was probably a MS from the TW family (just as, incidentally, in the case of SPC). However, since the history of the various hands, as well as the source of the corrections, are immaterial to the main objective of this book, I have decided to use just 'f' for all corrections that were not made by the scribe of F himself (= Fp^c). To be complete I should perhaps add that, although it is true that f 'has no independent importance' (Dodds 44), I nevertheless, like Dodds (and Bluck), report its readings in the apparatus criticus, if only to make it clear that the many errors of F were not taken for granted by its owner(s)/user(s).

⁸⁷ Just as in the case of F, SPC = a correction by the first hand of S, sometimes with ink of a different colour (e.g. ὄς ὀ at 531e9), and s = the (rare) corrections by (a) later hand(s).

qu'il a existé au moins un intermédiaire en minuscule entre F et l'exemplaire en onciale dont il dérive.' Vancamp's judgement seems also valid for the *Ion*. Notice especially in this connection 531e9 λέγομεν ὡς WSf (λεγόμεν (*sic*); ὡς ex ος) : λεγόμενος F : λέγωμεν ὡς T; 533c7 οὐ. καίτοι] οὐ. κέτι F, αίτοι f^{s1}; 536d1 τόδε ὦν T W Spc fmg: τὸ δέον SF. In all cases phonetic-phonological⁸⁸ rather than transliteration errors may be assumed to lie behind the forms in F: λεγομενος for λεγομεν ὡς: due to the loss of distinctive vowel length between ω and ο, which was already completed by the mid-second century AD (cp. Horrocks 1997: 107, 109); κέτι for καίτοι: due to the shift of /ai/ to /e/, and of /oi/ to /y/ and later to /i/ (Horrocks 1997: 109 (αι, οι) and 205 (/y/ > /i/; 'probably completed for all speakers of mainstream dialects by the tenth/eleventh century'), τὸ δεον for τοδε ὦν: for ο/ω see on λεγομενος, with a (subsequent?) division error which may but need not involve an uncial *Vorlage*. Similar instances of ο/ω confusion occur at 531e2 ὄσπερ T WSf : ὠσπερ F, 532b4 ὁμολογεῖ T WSf : ὠμολόγει F, and 535e6 κλαύσομαι T WS : κλαύσωμαι F. On the other hand, F contains no examples of errors arising from the copying of uncials like those mentioned by Bluck on p. 136 for the *Meno*, e.g.: 71a1–2 τινα ἐθέλεις BTW : τινας θέλεις F, 80d7 εἴσῃ BTW : ἴσθι F, 90b5 σαυτοῦ BTW : ἔαυτοῦ F, 93b5 παραληπτὸν BTW : γὰρ ἀληπτὸν F.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ This need not involve dictation, but may also be due to 'subvocal murmuring' (Johnson 2004: 39–40) or to 'dictée intérieure', to use Dain's felicitous phrase. To be complete I should perhaps add that the phonetic errors mentioned above could also have been made with an uncial exemplar. But in the absence of transliteration errors there is no need to postulate such an exemplar to account for such errors as are present.

⁸⁹ Some of these cases seem rather doubtful. Thus, F's γὰρ ἀληπτὸν at 93b5 could as well be due to a minuscule error. Likewise, F's ἔαυτοῦ at 90b5 (σαυτοῦ BTWf) may be an authentic variant, or perhaps even the correct reading, since the 3rd person reflexive pronoun in the course of the fourth century (BC, that is) started to encroach upon the other reflexive pronouns. See Kühner-Gerth 1, 572: '... ἔαυτοῦ u.s.w. st. ἔμαυτοῦ, σεαυτοῦ u.s.w. häufig sowohl in der Dichtersprache ... als in der Prosa'; two of their examples from Plato are *Phd.* 101d1 σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ... τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν (ἔαυτοῦ B : σαυτοῦ B² according to Burnet; in reality, however, after the correction by B² the text in B reads σεαυτοῦ, just as in the line before, c9: ἐφῶς ἂν ... τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις ... (ἑαυτοῦ B : σεαυτοῦ B², here reported correctly by Burnet)). Remarkably, Burnet prints σεαυτοῦ at 101c9, but σαυτοῦ at 101d1, as does the new OCT; the latter in both cases fails to mention the MS variation in the apparatus criticus), *La.* 200b2 σὺ ... μοι δοκεῖς ... οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν (αὐτὸν BT : αὐτὸν W :

Not only, then, is it highly unlikely that F's errors, at least in the *Ion*, are to be ascribed to problems of transliteration, we have also to account for the text of S, which has almost none of the errors of F. Nor does S show any signs of having been copied from an uncial exemplar. The conclusion imposes itself, therefore, that in the *Ion*, and probably also in the *Hp.Mi.*, neither F nor S were copied from an uncial exemplar, and that ultimately we have to reckon, at least for the text of F in the *Ion*, with a careless copyist of a minuscule exemplar.

As to the importance of S and F for the constitution of the text, to my mind we cannot but agree with Schanz's judgement that, again at least in the *Ion*, S is 'locupletior' than F. For this reason S may be considered the main representative of the SF family (hence its position before F in the apparatus criticus), just as T may be considered the main representative of the TW family (a fact concealed by the alphabetical order).

Finally, when the four primary MSS are referred to collectively by means of TWSF, e.g. in cases where they agree against Proclus, this order, where the older family appears first, is purely conventional, and is not meant to suggest that TW represent 'a specially faithful reproduction of the earliest text' (cp. n. 69).

Other manuscripts used

Apart from TWSF, I refer in a few, rather controversial, cases to the following, admittedly derivative, MSS; I collated Ven. 186 and 184 *in situ*:

– Florentinus Laurentianus 85, 7, from the fifteenth century. Modern siglum: x. According to Boter (1989: 36), this MS 'derives from F, and is in all probability a direct transcript'. See further comm. on 541e5.

– Venetus Marcianus graecus 186, numero di collocazione 601, written around 1450, by various hands; another MS from the library of Bessarion ('Platonis omnes dialogi, in papyro, liber correctus'—inventory of 1468, nr. 429; cp. Labowsky 1979: 175). This was 'Bessarions Handexemplar für die Tetralogien I - VIII, 1' (Vancamp

σωνδὸν corr. Coisl.; Burnet and Croiset print σωνδόν). See further the monograph by Woodard (1990).

1996b: 45). There is no generally accepted modern siglum; Jonkers (1989: 75) uses Vs, Vancamp (1996a: 44; 1996b: 45) U. In some dialogues, e.g. *Ti.*, this MS is a transcript of S (Jonkers 1989: 75). This is also the case in the greater part of *Hp.Mi.*, viz. up to 373c8 οὖν (Vancamp 1996b: 46). Thereafter, Ven. 186 derives from a MS in the T tradition (Vancamp 1996b: 46). The latter also goes for the *Ion*. ‘The complete MS was revised, corrected and annotated by Bessarion’ (Jonkers 1989: 74). One of the corrections must have been imported from a MS belonging to the SF family; see below, §4.6 ‘The *editio princeps*’.

– Venetus Marcianus graecus 184, numero di collocazione 326, from the library of Bessarion; Bessarion’s *deluxe* Plato, written around 1450 at his order by Joannes Rhosos, and corrected by Bessarion himself (‘Platonis omnia opera, in pergameno, novus, pulcher et optimus liber’—inventory of 1468, nr. 411; cp. Labowsky 1979: 174). Common modern siglum: E. According to Vancamp (1996a: 45; 1996b: 46), in the *Hippias Minor* Ven. 184 derives from Ven. 186. This also goes for the *Ion*, probably after Ven. 186 had been corrected by Bessarion. Thus the readings ἀρύττονται at 534a4, εὔρημά τι at 534d8, ἔχε δὴ· καί μοι at 535b1 and τότε at 535d1 in Ven. 186 are the result of a correction, while in Ven. 184 they show no signs of having been corrected. On the other hand, ἔρχομαι at 533c8 is in both MSS visibly a correction; in Ven. 186 an ε has been written above the ἔ-, in E *in rasura*. Perhaps these corrections were made simultaneously, so to speak.⁹⁰ They also share a mistake which could have been copied either way, viz. παίνωνα (*sic*) at 534d7. A further complication is that at 540d1 Ven. 184 has νῆ, together with T W S F, while Ven. 186 has ναὶ, *ex νῆ*, no doubt a conjecture of Bessarion’s. If Ven. 184 was transcribed from Ven. 186, ναὶ in the latter was apparently ignored.

– Parisinus 1811 and Vat. 1030, both from the fourteenth century; for details see Martinelli Tempesta (2003: 53–56). These MSS are important for the *editio princeps*; see below.

⁹⁰ For similar phenomena in the *Hp.Mi.* text of E and Ven. 186 cp. Vancamp (1996b: 46–47).—Since they have no value for the constitution of the text, the readings at 534a4, 535b1, 535d1 and 533c8 are not mentioned in the apparatus criticus.

4.3 *Excursus: the text of the Homeric quotations*
(at 537a, 538c, 538d, 539a, 539b)

The five passages quoted from Homer present several textual problems of their own. I will briefly discuss some of the more important cases. Much more could, and has, in fact, been said about the presence of Homer in Plato's dialogues,⁹¹ but here I am mainly interested in the way we should handle these quotations in establishing the text of the *Ion*. For the other cases I refer to the apparatus criticus of the present edition. Whenever this seemed relevant, I quote from Labarbe's monograph (Labarbe 1949: esp. chapter II), occasionally adding some observations of my own.⁹²

First, there are cases where all primary Plato MSS have a text that differs from that of all or most of the Homer MSS. Here, the choice is rather easy: the editor of the *Ion* should print the text of the MSS of the *Ion*. But, second, there are also, and in fact more, cases where the primary Plato MSS vary, some of them agreeing with (part of) the Homeric *paradosis*, while others do not. In such cases the editor should in principle choose that variant which has the greatest chance of being 'Platonic', i.e. the variant that Plato inserted from his text of

⁹¹ Labarbe's important monograph of 1949 is still indispensable for this subject. He discusses the Homeric quotations in the *Ion* on pp. 88–135; on pp. 388–393 he devotes a separate discussion to the quotations in MSS S and F. Unfortunately, the value of his analyses is slightly diminished by the circumstance that the critical apparatuses of the editions of the *Ion* on which he bases his discussion (notably those of Burnet and Méridier) are often far from reliable. See below.

⁹² After Labarbe (1949) the quotations from Homer were again the subject of a separate study in a brief article by D. Tarrant (1951), a series of articles by G. Lohse (1964, 1965, 1967) and recently in an article by Halliwell (2000). Lohse analyzes the quotations from an interesting perspective, which is fundamentally different from that of Labarbe. He argues that in most cases Plato has consciously altered the text of Homer, adapting the lines to his own purposes; he discusses also four cases from the *Ion* (1964: 21 ff., on 538c; 1965: 263 ff., on 537a–b; 1967: 227–229, on 537a–b, 538d and 539a–b). Unfortunately, the value of his observations, too (see previous note), is diminished by the fact that he also allows for the possibility that Plato may have erred in quoting Homer, it not being clear when exactly we have to reckon with this second possibility, and, second, by the fact that he hardly ever takes account of the textual variants in the Homeric quotations in Plato. Thus, Lohse (1967: 228) discusses 'Platonic' $\pi\eta\mu\alpha$ at *Ion* 538d3 without mentioning that there is a variant $\kappa\eta\mu\alpha$ in F. Nor does Dorothy Tarrant (1951: 62) reckon with the existence of such variants when she speaks of 'verbally incorrect quotations'. Halliwell (2000: 95) discusses the ways in which Plato uses the quotations 'within his own philosophical writing', the emphasis being on quotations with ethical implications.

Homer into the text of the *Ion*, the, rather uncertain, premises being (a) that he used one text of Homer, (b) that he used a physical text instead of quoting from memory (cp. below n. 104), and (c) that there was in fact something which might be called ‘the’ text of the *Ion* (rather than a number of versions in various stages of completion; cp. p. 27 above). In actual practice this procedure is of course extremely difficult. Which road should one follow? Should one, for example, prefer the reading that is supported by the majority of the Plato MSS? Or rather the ‘Homeric’ reading? Here are some representative examples of the two ways of transmission.

First, TWSF contra ‘Homer’:

TWSF	<i>Ion</i> : Burnet, Méridier and others	libri Homerici	Homer: van Thiel, West and others
537a8 = <i>Il.</i> 23.335 Κλινθῆναι δέ ... καὶ αὐτός	Κλινθῆναι δέ ... καὶ αὐτός	αὐτός δέ κλινθῆναι	αὐτός δέ κλινθῆναι
538c3 = <i>Il.</i> 11.640 παρὰ (ἐπὶ S) δὲ κρόμμον ποτῶ ὄψον	παρὰ δὲ κρόμμον ποτῶ ὄψον	ἐπὶ δ’ ἄλφριτα λευκὰ πάλυνε	ἐπὶ δ’ ἄλφριτα λευκὰ πάλυνε
538d2 = <i>Il.</i> 24.81 ἐμμεμαυῖα et nonnulli libri Hom.	ἐμμεμαυῖα	ἐμβεβαυῖα libri Hom. plerique	ἐμβεβαυῖα
538d3 = <i>Il.</i> 24.82 μετ’ ἰχθύσι	μετ’ ἰχθύσι	ἐπ’ ἰχθύσι	ἐπ’ ἰχθύσι
539a1 = <i>Od.</i> 20.351 δαιμόνιοι	δαιμόνιοι	ᾶ δειλοῖ	ᾶ δειλοῖ
539a2 = <i>Od.</i> 20.352 γυῖα	γυῖα	γούνα	γούνα

Comments

538a8 = *Il.* 23.335

According to Labarbe (1949: 92–93) κλινθῆναι δέ ... καὶ αὐτός is the original text: ‘[Platon] nous a gardé sous sa forme authentique le premier hémistiche du vers Ψ 335’.⁹³

⁹³ Labarbe rightly adds that this may seem unlikely because of καὶ αὐτός. Since there is nobody else around who is ordered to ‘bend to the left’, one might object that the order/advice ‘you, too, must bend to the left’, is rather strange, if not impossible. Labarbe unconvincingly argues that ‘καὶ αὐτ(ός) équivaut ... à αὐτ(ός) tout court’.

538c3 = *Il.* 11.640

παρὰ δὲ κρόμμυον ποτῶ ὄψον TWS(ἐπι) F : ἐπὶ δ' ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνε
libri Homericī

Since ten lines before, at *Il.* 9.630, the Homeric text has ἐπὶ δὲ κρόμμυον ποτῶ ὄψον, the variation must be the result ‘d’une défaillance de mémoire’, of Plato, that is (Labarbe 104, 107). This is the more likely because there are many other potentially confusing correspondences between *Il.* 11.639–640 and 630–631, a fact not mentioned by Labarbe. Compare:

Ion

538c2 οἴνω πραμνεῖω, φησίν, ἐπὶ δ' αἴγειον κνή τυρὸν

538c3 κνήστι **χαλκείῃ**· παρὰ (ἐπι S) δὲ κρόμμυον ποτῶ ὄψον·

Iliad book 11

639 οἴνω Πραμνεῖω, ἐπὶ δ' αἴγειον κνή τυρὸν

640 κνήστι **χαλκείῃ**, ἐπὶ δ' ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνε,

630 **χάλκειον** κάνεον, ἐπὶ δὲ κρόμμυον ποτῶ ὄψον,

631 ἥδὲ μέλι χλωρόν, παρὰ δ' ἀλφίτου ἱεροῦ ἀκτῆν,

Notice the presence at 630 of χάλκειον and at 640 of χαλκείῃ, and that of ἀλφίτου in line 631 and ἄλφιτα in 640. Also, παρὰ TWF at *Ion* 538c3 = *Il.* 11.640 may have been influenced by παρὰ in line 631. Curiously enough, S is alone in reading ἐπὶ instead of παρὰ, with the

Καὶ αὐτός should rather be interpreted as in a case like *Il.* 12.305 ἀλλ' ὄ γ' ἄρ' ἢ ἦρ-παξε μετάλμενος, ἦε καὶ αὐτός / ἐβλητ'. Here, καὶ modifies ἦε, stressing that there is an alternative to ἦρπαξε. This is also found with ἦδέ, e.g. at *Od.* 9.231 ἔνθα δὲ πῦρ κήαντες ἐθύσαμεν ἦδὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ / τυρῶν αἰνύμενοι φάγομεν, where ἦδὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ is not, *pace* Ameis-Hentze, ‘auch selbst’ (Stanford and Heubeck et al. have no note) but rather ‘(we did X) and we also did Y’. Cp. also *Il.* 17.635. (This use of καὶ is not mentioned by Denniston, but his remarks on p. 294 about the function of καὶ in relative clauses also apply here.) Such cases are entirely different from cases like *Il.* 4.150 ῥίγησεν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρηΐφιλος Μενέλαος, which comes after (l. 148) ῥίγησεν δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων. Whether καὶ αὐτός/-οί means ‘-self/-selves, too’ is, then, entirely dependent on contextual information. In the cases mentioned above, which include κλιθῆναι δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ does mean ‘also’ all right, but it explicitly marks the second action as an addition to the first one. So at *Il.* 23.335, with the text from the *Ion*: ‘... and also/further you should yourself bend to the left’, or, with a Dutch sentence whose interpretation is as context-dependent as the Greek one: ‘en ook moet jijzelf naar links buigen’. In fact, the reading αὐτός δὲ κλιθῆναι of the Homeric tradition may be due to someone who wanted to disambiguate line 335.

Homer MSS, as often; see below. I have no explanation for this variation. Did the scribe, upon encountering *παρὰ δὲ κρόμυον ποτῶ ὄψον* look up his Homer, notice the presence of ἐπὶ both in line 640 and in line 630 of his Homer text, and decide in favour of ἐπὶ? Or did he simply copy ἐπὶ from ἐπὶ δ' ἀγγειον κνή τυρὸν in line 639? Or did he find ἐπὶ in his *Vorlage*?

538d2 = *Il.* 24.81

ἐμμεμαυῖα T W S F et nonnulli libri Hom. : ἐμβεβαυῖα libri Hom. plerique

Confusion due to the preponderance of forms in -μεμαυῖα and -μεμαῶς elsewhere in Homer (Labarbe 114). But -μ- in T W S F may simply be due to a copying error; see below at 539c5.

538d3 = *Il.* 24.82 μετ'] ἐπ' libri Hom.

‘Ni la grammaire ni le sens n’autorisent la critique à rejeter l’une ou l’autre de ces leçons’ (Labarbe 117). If μετ(ά) was the original reading, ἐπ(ί) may be due to influence from formulas with ἐπ' ἰχθυ(όεντα) (Labarbe 118).

539a1 = *Od.* 20.351 δαμόνιοι T W S F : ἄ δειλοί libri Homerici

According to Labarbe (125–126) Ἄ δειλοί was the original reading. Since the lines quoted by Plato are preceded by λέγει μάντις πρὸς τοὺς μνηστήρας, Θεοκλύμενος, and in the Homeric text by τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπε Θεοκλύμενος θεοειδής, the vocative δαμόνιοι may be due to influence from the following two formulas:

Od. 4.773–774 τοῖσιν δ' Ἀντίνοος ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπε:
“δαμόνιοι, μύθους μὲν ...”
Od. 18.405–406 τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειψ' ἱερὴ ἴς Τηλεμάχιοι:
“δαμόνιοι, μαίνεσθε ...”

539a2 = *Od.* 20.352 γυῖα T W S F : γοῦνα libri Homerici

‘Accidentellement, elle (= γοῦνα) s’est effacée devant γυῖα, nom sept fois plus fréquent à la catalexe, et dont l’intrusion ne troublait le vers en aucune manière’ (Labarbe 127).

In all these cases editors naturally prefer the reading of TWSF, the implicit assumption being that these were the forms which Plato found in his text of Homer, and that their deviant form is due to the vicissitudes of the transmission before Plato's time (cp. Labarbe's analyses), not, then, to mistakes or conscious interventions of the Byzantine copyists or their majuscule predecessors.

But when the MSS of the *Ion* are divided, the picture is entirely different. A seriously complicating factor is, moreover, that in several cases the apparatuses of Burnet and Méridier cannot be relied upon. Here follow some cases:

T	W	S (hardly used by Burnet and Méridier)	F	Burnet, Méridier	libri Hom. (as represented in the editions of West and van Thiel)
537a8 = <i>Il.</i> 23.335 ἐϋξέστω	ἐϋξέστω	ἐϋπλέκτω	ἐϋξέστω	ἐϋξέστω	ἐϋπλέκτω
537b4 = <i>Il.</i> 23.339 μή	μή ἄν post corr.	μή	ἄν	ἄν	ἄν
538d1 = <i>Il.</i> 24.80 βύσσον (πυθμέν' in margine t)	πυθμέν'	βυσσόν (ἦ πυθμέν ^a supra lin.)	βύσσον	βυσσόν	βυσσόν
538d1 = <i>Il.</i> 24.80 ἵκανεν	ἵκανεν	ἵκανεν	ὄρουσεν (ἵκανεν in margine f)	ἵκανεν	ὄρουσεν
538d3 = <i>Il.</i> 24.81 πῆμα	πῆμα (also some editions of Homer, acc. to the schol.)	κῆρα	κῆρα (πῆμα in margine f)	κῆρα	κῆρα
539c5 = <i>Il.</i> 12.206 ἐνκάββαλλ' (for details see the app. crit.)	ἐνκάμβαλ'	ἐγκάμβαλ'	ἐνὶ κάββαλ' (καββ- ex καμβ-)	ἐνὶ κάββαλ'	ἐνὶ κάββαλ'

(cont.)

T	W	S (hardly used by Burnet and Méridier)	F	Burnet, Méridier	libri Hom. (as represented in the editions of West and van Thiel)
539d1 = <i>Il.</i> 12.207 ἔπετο	πέτατο W (ἔπτα addidit supra lineam)	πέτετο	πέτετο (alt. -ε- post corr., ἦ supra p- add. f)	πέτετο	πέτετο

In three of these cases the apparatus criticus of this edition differs so strongly from those of Burnet and Méridier that I present these in a separate table:

this edition	Burnet, Méridier
538d1 = <i>Il.</i> 24.80 βυσσὸν S cum libris Homericis : βύσσον T F : πυθμέν' W tmg Ssl (ἦ πυθμέν ^α)	Burnet: βυσσὸν F (et sic libri Homerici) : βύσσον T : πυθμέν' W et in marg. t Méridier: βυσσὸν (vel βύσσον) T F (et libri Homerici) : πυθμέν ^α W et in marg. T (actually, neither W nor T (t) has a superscript α, while it <i>is</i> present in S)
538d1 = <i>Il.</i> 24.80 ἔρουσεν F cum libris Hom. : ἴκανεν T W S fmg	Burnet: ἴκανεν] ἔρουσεν libri Homerici Méridier: <i>idem</i>
539d1 = <i>Il.</i> 12.207 πέτετο SF (alt. -ε- pc, ἦ (sic) supra p- add. f) cum libris Hom. : πέτατο W (ἔπτα addidit sl) : ἔπετο T	Burnet: πέτετο libri Homerici : πέτατο W (sed suprascr. ἔπα) : πέτητο F : ἔπετο T f Méridier, who also prints πέτετο: πέτετο libri Homerici : πέτατο W (suprascr. ἔπα) F ut uidetur : ἔπετο T (f?)

Comments

Observe, first of all, that S and F have different readings at 537a8, 537b4, 538d1 bis and 539c5, which is further proof (see above p. 32), that S has not been copied from F.

537a8 = *Il.* 23.335 ἐϋξέστω TWF : ἐϋπλέκτω S cum libris
Homericis ἐϋξέστω ἐνὶ δίφρῳ] ἐϋξέστου ἐπὶ δίφρου X. *Smp.* 4.6

The reading ἐϋξέστω must be due to a ‘substitution formulaire, à l’intrusion d’une *locutio faciliior*’, due to the preponderance of ἐϋξέστος over ἐϋπλέκτος in Homer (Labarbe 98–99). He also suggests that this substitution was due to ‘un récitateur des poèmes homériques’, which must imply that it occurred before Plato. According to Labarbe (93 n. 2), ἐϋπλέκτω in S ‘ne peut y être que le résultat d’une collation effectuée sur l’*Iliade*’, i.e. by a Byzantine copyist. More in general, Labarbe is inclined to view most ‘correct’, Homeric, readings in the MSS of the *Ion*, which are always found in S and/or F, and of the other dialogues, as the result of collations against the text of Homer. (He discusses this matter in detail in an appendix (‘Accords finals’), on pp. 390–392.) In this he was preceded by, for example, Schanz and, in part, by Burnet,⁹⁴ and followed by Slings (1998: 612).

537b4 = *Il.* 23.339 ἄν WP^cF (etiam libri Homeric) : μή TWS
Modern editions prefer ἄν, and rightly so.

Labarbe’s explanation of the way in which the—impossible—variant μή may have got into the text of the *Ion* is convincing. The gist of his argument is that ‘la variante μή a été créée par un lecteur de l’*Ion*’, and more specifically a reader who had not grasped the meaning of δοάσσεται and connected this form not with Homeric δοάσσατο ‘seem’ but with a (near-)homonym which he found in a lexicon, viz. δοάζω or δοιάζω ‘be doubtful, hesitate’, for which see e.g. the Suda s.v. δοάζω and *EM* 281, 30: δοάσσατο· ἔδοξεν, δοιάσσατο· ἐδίστασε. Compare also LSJ s.v. δοιάζω (δοάζω): ‘The forms in δοα- and some meanings are due to confusion with δοάσσατο’. If this is, in fact, the way things went, Labarbe’s ‘lecteur’ must have been a Byzantine reader. I note that in this case Labarbe does not consider F’s ἄν, which

⁹⁴ In his enthusiasm for F Burnet claims (praef. t. III, p. iii), quite arbitrarily, that ‘in F loci Homeric non ad exemplar librorum Homericorum correcti sunt, quod passim in S factum videbis, ut uno alterove exemplo allato iam monuit Schanz’. Burnet must refer here to Schanz’s remark (vol. IX, p. xiii): ‘At minore vel potius nulla auctoritate est conspiratio libri S cum codicibus Homericis qualem deprehendimus 65, 3 (= 538d3) πῆμα M : κῆρα 63, 2 (= 537a8) ἐϋξέστω M : ἐϋπλέκτω.’ (M is the postulated common ancestor of T and W.) After which Schanz writes that he in such cases does not care ‘quid in S, quid apud Homerum scriptum sit’.

is also the reading of W *post correctionem*, the result of a collation, without further comment.

538d1 = *Il.* 24.80 βυσσὸν S cum libris Hom. : βύσσον TF⁹⁵ : πυθμέν' W tmg Ssl (ἦ πυθμένα)

Modern editions print βυσσὸν.⁹⁶ Cp. Labarbe 109: 'Les éditeurs de l'*Ion* adoptent βυσσὸν, comme ceux de l'*Iliade*. C'est faire preuve de bon sens.'

This is a particularly interesting instance. We may safely assume that Plato's text of the *Ion* presented uncial ΒΥΣΣΟΝ, without accent,⁹⁷ and that this remained the text until the Great Byzantine Transliteration of the 9th–10th centuries. On that occasion an accent had to be added, both in the text of Homer and in that of the *Ion*. The scribes of the *Iliad* text must have known their Herodian and other theoreticians of the Greek accent,⁹⁸ and wrote βυσσὸν. And the scribes of the text of the *Ion*? Those of TF, apparently ignoring Herodian and others (and also the text of Homer?), accented βύσσον, wrongly making this form the accusative of the very frequent βύσσος '(linen from) flax', which in the context of course makes no sense. Πυθμέν(α) should no doubt not be regarded as a serious variant but as a gloss, which in W has entered into the text.⁹⁹ Only S, then, has βυσσὸν (not F, as Burnet, Méridier and Labarbe believed). Is this due to 'une collation effectuée sur l'*Iliade*'? If one views S's ἐϋπλέκτω above at 537a8 as the result of

⁹⁵ Labarbe (109) believed that βυσσὸν was the reading of S as well as F.

⁹⁶ The paroxytone form βύσσον is found in one Homer MS; see West's apparatus criticus ad loc.

⁹⁷ Cp. Page's note on *E. Med.* 46: 'τρόχων or τροχῶν? As Eur. did not use accents, it was perhaps as difficult for a fourth century B.C. reader as for us to decide.'—Such difficulties also occurred in connection with breathings; see the telling passage in Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 1.59, where we learn that it was one of the grammarians' tasks to find out ... πῶς ἀναγνωστέον παρὰ Πλάτωνι τὴν "η δ ος" λέξιν, πότερον ψιλῶς ἐκφέροντα τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν ἢ δασέως, ἢ τὴν μὲν πρώτην ψιλῶς τὴν δὲ δευτέραν δασέως, ἢ ἀμφοτέρας ψιλῶς ἢ ἐναλλάξ. See also below, §5.2.

⁹⁸ Hdn. περὶ Ἰλιακῆς προσ. Gramm. Gr. III 2.1, p. 125, 7 (Lentz), in the section ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ Ω, line 80: βυσσόν· ἐπεκράτησε τὸ ὀξύνεσθαι τῷ τὰ εἰς ος λήγοντα ὀνόματα δισύλλαβα, ἀρχόμενα ἀπὸ συμφώνου ἢ συμφώνων, δεδιπλασιασμένον ἔχοντα τὸ σ, ὀξύνεσθαι θέλειν (= the scholion ad loc.). Also *De pros. cath.* III 1.1, p. 208, 2: Τὰ εἰς ος δισύλλαβα ἔχοντα καὶ ἔτερον σ κλιτικὸν ἐν τῇ πρὸ τέλους συλλαβῇ μὴ κατὰ πάθος ὀξύνεται (—) l. 13 Βυσσός τὸ ἔθνικόν καὶ ἡ νῆσος καὶ βυσσός ὁ βυθός ...

⁹⁹ Cp. the entry in Hdn. *De orthogr.* Gramm. Gr. III 2, p. 484, 21: βυθμός βυσσός βυθός. ἄντρον πυθμῖν, Hsch. βυσσός *βυθός ἄντρον. πυθμῖν.

such a collation, βυσσὸν, too, of course, must be due to the same source, but here Labarbe does not even mention this possibility. On the contrary, he says that adopting βυσσὸν ‘c’est faire preuve de bon sens’. And the reason is not difficult to find: the other readings make no sense. This is to my mind a rather strange way of operating, the more so because Labarbe, like Burnet and Schanz, viewed S and F as descendants of a common exemplar. Ultimately, the source of βυσσὸν in S is perhaps of secondary importance. What we know for certain is that S has the only form representing the βυσσον which Plato must have meant, so we should print βυσσὸν.

538d1 = *Il.* 24.80 ὄρουσεν F cum libris Hom. : ἵκανεν TWSfmg

Modern editions, having overlooked the presence of ὄρουσεν in F, naturally print ἵκανεν.

Misled by the entries in the apparatuses of Burnet and Méridier, Labarbe writes: ‘A la fin du premier vers, les deux traditions s’opposent radicalement. Tous les manuscrits de Platon offrent ἵκανεν ..., tous les manuscrits d’Homère ὄρουσεν.’ In spite of this misrepresentation of the MSS, his discussion of the two forms, and his conclusion, remain valid: ‘... on serait amené à conclure que ἵκανεν avait toutes les chances d’y écarter, à son profit, un ὄρουσεν originel’. His main argument is that lines ending in ἐξ ἵκανεν are much more frequent than those in ἐξ ὄρουσεν.

538d3 = *Il.* 24.81 πῆμα TWf et ἔνιαι τῶν κατὰ πόλεις (sc. ἐκδόσεων) sec. schol. Hom. : κῆρα SF et libri Homeric

Modern editions of the *Ion* prefer πῆμα.

Labarbe argues (118) that ‘si Platon offre πῆμα c’est qu’il avait trouvé cette forme dans son Homère’. This is perhaps slightly overstating one’s case; after all, the MSS are not unanimous. Labarbe prefers, then, πῆμα. He considers this the original reading, and argues that it may have been ousted in the later Homeric tradition by κῆρα due to ‘confusion formulaire’ (120), more specifically, influence from the formulas ending in (φόνον καὶ) κῆρα φέροντες. Following a scholion, Labarbe also argues that κῆρα is bizarre in connection with fishes; elsewhere it is always used of human destiny. To this it may be objected, however, that πῆμα is not used with respect to animals either. I add three other considerations. Πῆμα seems more appropriate, because

the simile in which this line occurs illustrates Iris' journey to Achilles, whom she has to order to give up the body of Hector. This will be for Achilles a πῆμα rather than a κῆρ. *Pro altera parte* I add that if we ignore the relevance of the simile, κῆρα is more appropriate since the hook will bring death, not just misery or calamity, to the fishes. A final problem is that if κῆρα was the reading taken over by Plato, it is not easy to see where πῆμα may have come from, whose combination with φέρουσα is unique; cp. for this point also Labarbe 120.¹⁰⁰ The latter is perhaps decisive. So with some hesitation I here reject the reading of SF.

539c5 = *Il.* 12.206 ἐνὶ κάββαλ' F (καββ- ex καμβ-) et libri Hom. plerique, v. West ad loc. : ἐνκάββαλλ' T (revera legitur: ἐνκάββαλ' / λ' ὀμίλωι; fort. primitus scriba post prius λ apostrophum scripsit, deinde puncto supra λ scripto hanc litteram delere voluit; λ alterum in versu inferiore adest) : ἐνκάμβαλ' W : ἐγκάμβαλ' S

Burnet: ἐνὶ κάμβαλ' F (sed μ in β mutavit f) : ἐνκάμβαλ' W : ἐγκάββαλλ' T (sed λ alterum puncto del.) T

Méridier: ἐνὶ καββαλ' f (ἐνὶ κάμβαλ' F) : ἐνκάμβαλ' W : ἐγκάββαλ' T (sed prius λ puncto del.) T

On the variation κάββ-/κάμβ- Labarbe writes (133): 'On verra en κάμβαλεν l'exacte notation d'une prononciation qui doit avoir existé dans l'antiquité à la suite d'un affaiblissement articulatoire'. Fortunately things may be somewhat simpler and less ad hoc. The μ in S and F no doubt involves a misreading of the mu-like minuscule β which is found in many early manuscripts, e.g. in MSS T and W of the *Ion*.¹⁰¹ See also the change from μ into β in F; the original μ here must also be due to a misreading of a β.¹⁰²

As for ἐνὶ against ἐν-/ἐγ-: according to Labarbe, who refers in turn to Chantraine (1961: I 96–97), the disyllabic form should be preferred, at least for the Homeric text, since spondees are avoided in the fourth

¹⁰⁰ 'Nous tiendrons πῆμα φέρουσα, non seulement pour un groupe possible, mais encore pour la fin authentique du vers étudié.' For the technical aspects of the fishing simile cp. also N. Richardson, *The Iliad. A commentary*, vol. VI (Cambridge 1993) at 24.80–82.

¹⁰¹ For the various forms of the β cp. e.g. Gardthausen (1913: II 207).

¹⁰² Which is further proof that F was copied from a minuscule rather than an uncial exemplar.

foot. In the *Ion*, however,—he continues, implausibly and without providing arguments—we should write ἐγκάββαλ',¹⁰³ and assume that this was the form which Plato found in his *Iliad*, just like Origenes.¹⁰⁴

539d1 = *Il.* 12.207 πέτετο SF (alt. -ε- pc, ἦ (sic) supra π- add. f) et libri Homerici : πέτατο W (ἔπτα addidit sl) : ἔπετο T

Here both the text and the apparatus of Burnet and Méridier are rather careless.¹⁰⁵ Burnet, who prints πέτετο in his text, mentions in his apparatus criticus: 'πέτετο libri Homerici : πέτατο W (sed suprascr. ἔπα) : πέτητο F : ἔπετο T f', while Méridier, who also prints πέτετο, has: 'πέτετο libri Homerici : πέτατο W (suprascr. ἔπα) F ut uidetur : ἔπετο T (f?)'. Note that they do not mention S. Although, then, according to both Burnet and Méridier no Plato MS reads πέτετο, they nevertheless print this form, importing it from the Homer MSS. Perhaps because of the almost identical πέτατο in W? This is of course a dubious procedure, and something they had not done at 538d1 for ἴκανεν, in a similar situation. They should rather have followed Bekker, Stallbaum and Schanz, who all three printed ἔπετο, ignoring the Homeric text. Nor did Burnet and Méridier follow the 'libri Homerici' at 537a8.

Actually, at 539d1 πέτετο is not only found in the Homer MSS but also in S and F; it may be an adaptation of a formula like *Od.* 2.148 ἐπέτοντο μετὰ πνοιῆσ' ἀνέμοιο (or vice versa, of course). W's πέτατο is either a writing error for, or an incorrect alternative to, πέτετο. Athematic πέταμαι, of which the imperfect is exceedingly rare, is not found in Homer or classical prose, for which see LSJ s.v.¹⁰⁶ Above the line the scribe of W wrote ἔπτα, apparently suggesting that πέτατο

¹⁰³ Which he believed to be the reading of T. The situation concerning this form is not very clear. There are actually two dot-like signs, one above and the other to the right of the first λ. Perhaps the scribe—as suggested in the apparatus—first wanted to elide after the λ, then saw that a second λ had to be added, on the next line, whereupon he added a dot above the first λ, indicating that this λ should be deleted, yielding ἐγκάββαλ'.

¹⁰⁴ *Cels.* 4.91. This argument may have less force than Labarbe assumed, for in another treatise (*Philocalia* 20.18) Origenes quotes the same passage from Homer, but now in the form μέσῳ δ' ἐνὶ κάββαλ' ὀμίλῳ (v.l. ἐγκάβαλλ' in one MS; cp. Robinson 1893: 143). For all we know, he may have used two different MSS of Homer.

¹⁰⁵ As a result, Labarbe's argument (134) is flawed, since it is based on the idea that W reads πέτατο and has ἔπα *supra lineam*, that F reads πέτατο as well, and that TS present ἔπετο.

¹⁰⁶ Labarbe (135) suggests influence from later prose, where πέταμαι does occur.

should be ἔπτατο, which, however, is metrically impossible. As for T's ἔπετο, this may simply be due to a copying error, perhaps but not necessarily from an uncial exemplar: ΚΛΛΓΖΔCΠΕΤΕΤΟ may have been misread as ΚΛΛΓΖΔCΠΕΤΟ. Since W's πέτατο is plainly incorrect, and T's ἔπετο can be explained otherwise, the original text of the *Ion* must have had πέτετο.

Conclusion

In those cases where the Plato MSS are divided with respect to their text of the quotations from Homer, I print, if no other considerations apply, the readings of S and/or F (which not seldom are also those of T and W), assuming that these were the forms which Plato found in his own copy of the Homeric text.¹⁰⁷ I further assume that these forms reached the time of the Byzantine transliteration and were copied then into (a) medieval MS or MSS, the ancestor(s) of S and F. If these forms coincide with those of our Homer MSS, this need not worry us. They may have been checked against Homer MSS, both in antiquity and in Byzantine times, but there is no need to assume that they were *imported* from these MSS, and replaced older readings. After all, they can very well have been present in the Plato MSS *and*, at some point of the transmission, have been checked against Homer MSS. If we assume—as we do—that S and F may continue authentic readings in the main body of the text, we must, as a matter of principle, allow for the possibility that they do so also in the text of the quotations from Homer. As for the deviant, ‘non-Homeric’, forms, which mostly occur in TW, these we should try to explain along the lines set out by Labarbe.

¹⁰⁷ The phrasing at *Ion* 537a2 ἐὰν μνησθῶ τὰ ἔπη, ἐγὼ σοι φράσω suggests that Socrates, at least, wanted to quote from memory (although the passage functions primarily as a cue line for Ion to announce that he will do the quoting). Cp. also X. *Mem.* 2.1.21. Whether or not Plato quoted from memory, and perhaps made mistakes, is immaterial to my point, which is rather how we must decide on what to print. According to Labarbe (421) ‘[Platon] avait recours, pour la majorité de ses emprunts, à un manuscrit de l’*Iliade*, à un manuscrit de l’*Odyssée*’. In fact, from *Prt.* 324e3 ff. (ἐπειδὴν αἱ γράμματα μάθωσιν (sc. οἱ παῖδες) καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν) it is clear that poems were memorized from written texts, and Plato will no doubt have possessed one or more Homer MSS. Cp. also *Lg.* 810e6 ff. and *Ep.* II 314b1 ff. (if genuine), X. *Smp.* 3.5, and Blanck (1992: 24 ff.) and Irigoien (2001: 17–21) for representations of people reading and writing in Greek (and Roman) art. Cp. also above, §3.2.

4.4 *The indirect tradition*

Passages from the *Ion* are quoted by the following authors:¹⁰⁸

– Stobaeus (early 5th cent.)

- 533d1 ἔστι—534b6 ἐνῆ: *Ecl.* 2.5.3
534c6 ἐπεὶ—534d4 ἡμᾶς: *ibidem* 2.5.3

– Proclus (412–485)

- 530b8 ἅμα δὲ—c1 ἔστιν: *in Platonis Rempublicam* 1.158 Kroll
533d1 ἔστι—d3 κινεῖ: *ibidem* 1.183
533d5 οὐ μόνον—e5 ἐξαρτᾶται: *ibidem* 1.183
533e5 πάντες γὰρ—e8 μελοποιοὶ: *ibidem* 1.184
534b3 κοῦφον—b6 ἔκφρων: *ibidem* 1.184
534b8 ἄτε οὐ—c3 ὄρμησεν: *ibidem* 1.184

– Priscian (late 5th cent.)

- 530c1 οὐ γὰρ—c3 prius ποιητοῦ: *Prisc.* XVIII 287 (= II p. 360 Hertz)

Allusions to the *Ion* occur in:

- 533d1 ἔστι—534d4 ἡμᾶς *Lucretius* (1st cent. BC), 6.906 ff.
533d1 ἔστι—534d4 ἡμᾶς *Philo* (1st cent. AD), *De officio mundi* 140 f.
534b *Athenaeus* (ca. 200 AD) 11.113, 25 *Kaibel*: ὅτι δὲ καὶ δυσμενῆς ἦν πρὸς ἅπαντας, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ Ἴωνι ἐπιγραφόμενῳ, ἐν ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν κακολογεῖ πάντας τοὺς ποιητάς, (541c) ἔπειτα καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου προαγομένους, Φανοσθένη τὸν Ἄνδριον κάπολλόδωρον τὸν Κυζικηνόν, ἔτι δὲ τὸν Κλαζομένιον Ἡρακλείδην.
530b *Proclus*, *in R.* 1.163, 11 *Kroll*: ὅτι δὲ οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν παρεκελεύσατο ζηλοῦν τὴν Ὀμήρου ποίησιν ὁ Πλάτων, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Ἴωνι γέγραπται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου διάνοιαν ἀποβλέπειν
533d *Timaeus Sophista* (1st?, 4th? cent. AD), *Lex.* s.v. Ἡρακλεία λίθος: ... ὥστε Πλάτων ἀμαρτάνει τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπολαμβάνων μαγνητικὴν καὶ Ἡρακλείαν ἐν Ἴωνι.
533d *Hesychius* (5th–6th cent. AD), s.v. Ἡρακλεία λίθος: ... ὥστε Πλάτων ἀμαρτάνει τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπολαμβάνων μαγνητικὴν καὶ Ἡρακλείαν ἐν Ἴωνι.

¹⁰⁸ The quotations in Proclus seem to have been overlooked by previous editors. The one in Priscian is mentioned by Schanz, but not by later editors.

Some comments on selected readings in the quotations

Priscian

Priscian sides with SF in reading ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδὸς and συνείη at 530c3. But in the latter instance the text is not entirely clear, for Priscian must have wrestled with the uncial exemplar used by him (or his copyists with the uncials in Priscian's text). See further comm. ad loc.

Proclus

- 530b8 δὲ] δὲ καὶ Procl.
 533d1 γὰρ T W f^{sl} Procl. Stob. : δὲ SF
 533d2 ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον om. Procl.
 (this is not a real variant of course, since this clause had no function in Proclus' text)
 533d5–6 αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις] αὐτοὺς ἄγει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τοὺς σιδηροὺς δακτυλίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ὄλκων τῶν ὁμοίων ἐντίθησιν Procl.
 533d5 ἄγει W S F Procl. Stob. : om. T
 533d6 ὥστε T W f Procl. Stob. : ὥστ' αὖ SF
 533d6–7 δύνασθαι ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος] om. Procl.
 533e1 ὥστ' ἐνίοτε T W S F Stob. : καὶ πολλάκις Procl.
 533e1 μακρὸς πάνυ T W S F : πάνυ μακρὸς Stob. : om. Procl.
 533e1 σιδηρίων SP^c(-ήριων, sic) F Procl. Stob. : σιδήρων T W S
 533e1–2 σιδηρίων(-ήρων T W) καὶ δακτυλίων T W S F Stob. : δακτυλίων ἢ σιδηρίων Procl.
 533e2 δὲ T W S F Stob. : δὲ ἄρα Procl.
 533e3 ἐξ T W S F Stob. : ἀπ' Procl.
 533e3 ἀνήρτηται T W S F Stob. : ἐξήρτηται Procl.
 533e4 αὐτὴ SF Stob.(MS P, αὐτὴ F) : αὕτη T W : αὐτούς Procl.
 533e4 ἄλλων T W S F Procl. : ἄλλος Stob.
 533e8 μελοποιοὶ T W S F P^c Procl. : μὲν λουποὶ F Stob.
 534b5 τε T W f Procl. : om. SF Stob.
 534b8 τε SF : om. T W Procl.

Stobaeus (other than the variants mentioned above)

- 533d1 ὄν] ἄν Stob.
 533e2 ἦρτηται] εἴρεται (sic) Stob.
 533e5 οἷ τε om. Stob.
 534a1–2 ὀρχοῦνται ... ὄντες om. Stob.
 534a4 καὶ T W : om. SF Stob.
 534a4 ἀρύονται W F Stob. : ἀρύτονται T S

- 534a7 πρὸς T SF Stob. : παρ' W
 534b3 πετόμενοι T W S(ut vid.) FP^c (prius o ex ω): πετώμενοι F Stob.
 534b5 τε T W f Procl. : om. SF Stob.

A rather bewildering picture, which shows, first of all, that it is impossible to speak of 'the' indirect tradition, since there is a wide gulf between Proclus and Stobaeus. The most important finding is perhaps that rather often Proclus differs from T W S F plus Stobaeus (533d5–6, 533d6–7, 533e1 (bis), 533e1–2, 533e2, 533e3 (bis)). He must have had a text of the *Ion* on his desk (or rather knees) that differed considerably from ours. The clearest proof of this is the very deviant texts at 533d5–6 and 533d6–7. Interestingly, the text of the *Ion* used by Proclus must have resembled that of Philo. Compare *De opificio mundi* 141 (Philo has just argued that the greater the distance from the ἀρχή the weaker μιμήματα are): παραπλήσιον δὲ πάθος καὶ ἡ μαγνήτις λίθος ἐπιδείκνυται· τῶν γὰρ σιδηρῶν δακτυλίων ὁ μὲν αὐτῆς ψάσας βιαίότατα κρατεῖται, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ψάσαντος ἦττον, ἐκκρέμαται δὲ καὶ τρίτος δευτέρου καὶ τέταρτος τρίτου καὶ πέμπτου τετάρτου καὶ ἑτέρων ἕτεροι κατὰ μακρὸν στοῖχον ὑπὸ μιᾶς ὀλκοῦ δυνάμεως συνεχόμενοι. Notice especially ὀλκοῦ δυνάμεως in Philo and δύναμιν ... ὀλκὸν in Proclus. Ὀλκός is a Platonic word: it occurs three times in (our text of) the *Republic* (521d3, 524e1, 527b9).

As for Stobaeus, his text was clearly much less erratic, and mostly in agreement with T W S F (see above). If Stobaeus agrees with one branch of the tradition only, this is most often SF (533e4 αὐτή, 534a4, 534b5) or F alone (533e1 σιδηρίων, also with SP^c, 533e8, 534b3). Only rarely does Stobaeus agree with T W against SF (533d1 and 533d6), both times with f and Proclus. For the question whether there is a special bond between F and the indirect tradition, notably Stobaeus, see Boter 1989: 104 f.

All in all, the indirect tradition gives us no new or otherwise valuable readings (unless we are prepared to introduce Proclus' texts in our town text), but for the history of Plato's legacy in antiquity Proclus' 'quotations' are of course of considerable importance. Their character is consonant with that of other quotations from Plato in Proclus, which point to a different tradition than the one we are familiar with. The existence of a 'miscella' or 'nondum recensita memoria' has been argued for by a number of scholars, e.g. Immisch (1903b: 15 ff.). For a survey of this view of the transmission of Plato see Alline's discussion of the indirect tradition (1915: 134–173). On p. 171 Alline writes: '... au temps de Proclus, il y avait encore des traditions diver-

ses, et non pas une vulgate uniforme, un « texte reçu » à l'exclusion de tout autre'. See also Carlini (1972: 102 ff.).

4.5 *Latin translations*

In the apparatus criticus and/or the commentary I occasionally refer to Ficino's translation of the *Ion* in the *Opera omnia* translation, which was published in 1484 in Florence,¹⁰⁹ to Serranus' translation, which accompanies H. Stephanus' Greek text (Geneva 1578), and to Cornarius' *Eclogae*, a series of emendations of the Greek text of Plato, which accompany his translation (published in 1561).

4.6 *Excursus: The editio princeps*

As is well known, the first printed edition of Plato's works was published in Venice in 1513 by Aldus Manutius, with scholarly assistance from Marcus Musurus. For a long time it has been assumed—a natural enough assumption, of course—that the basis of the editions printed by Aldus Manutius, including the *editio princeps* of Plato, were the manuscripts donated to the Republic of Venice by Cardinal Bessarion in 1468 (four years before his death), and transported from Rome, where Bessarion had a permanent residence, to the Palazzo Ducale in the spring of 1469. Surprisingly enough, however, this cannot have been the rule, for the books of Bessarion were stored in boxes in the Palazzo Ducale, and in 1485 it was decided by the authorities that for lack of room 'the boxes containing Bessarion's donation should be placed at one end of the hall (i.e. the Sala Novissima of the Palazzo Ducale), "one on top of the other, fitted tightly and closely together, so as to take up as little room as possible", and that a strong wooden wall should partition off this space from the rest of the room in order

¹⁰⁹ In the translation of the *Ion* Ficino must have used at least one MS in the W tradition, for at 530c2 he omits ἀγαθός (with T W, against SF), and at 532d1 he translates *est* (with T W (ἔστι), against SF (ἔσται)), but at 531e9 he translates *dicimus*—only with W (λέγομεν), against T (λέγωμεν). Alline (1915: 302) thinks it likely that Ficino used W itself, which happened to be in Florence at that time. The situation may be more complicated, however, as in the case of the *Republic*, for which see Boter (1989: 270–278), since it is certain that Ficino used at least two Laurentiani, 59.1 and 85.9. For the genesis of Ficino's translation see Hankins (1990: 306 ff. and 466 ff.).

to protect the library from theft. In these conditions the books were to remain for the next forty years' (Labowsky 1979: 59), in various arrangements. In fact, Bessarion's books were given to the Marcian library as an institution, not as a building, for this library building did not as yet exist and was only built from 1537 onward, until it was more or less finished in 1554. In 1531 the books were removed from the Palazzo Ducale to a room 'on the upper floor of San Marco Here they were at last taken out of their chests and placed on shelves and lecterns' (Labowsky 1979: 75). From there they were removed again after 1559 and probably before 1565, now at last to their own building, Sansovino's newly built Library (Labowsky 1979: 93).

It is clear, then, that during the years which are important for, among other things, the *editio princeps* of Plato, the Plato MSS of Bessarion were hidden from the public. The books from Bessarion's library could, it is true, be borrowed (cp. Labowsky 59, 62), but this must have been quite rare.¹¹⁰ In 1506 the authorities even issued an order forbidding to lend the books 'to anyone whatsoever, "ne cum pagar, ne senza pagar"' (Labowsky 62).

In connection with the projected transfer by Bessarion of his books to Venice, in 1468 an inventory was drawn up, in which we find, *in capsis*, the following Plato MSS:¹¹¹

- (i) as item 411: what is now known as Venetus 184 = E (see above, §4.2);
- (ii) as item 419: Venetus 185 numero di collocazione 576, ca. 12th cent.? 'Timaeus Locrus, Platonis dialogi decem et septem, et de republica eiusdem, in pergameno' = D;
- (iii) as item 420: Venetus 189, 'Platonis dialogi triginta octo, et vita eius in principio' = S (see above, §4.2);
- (iv) as item 429: Venetus 186 = Vs or U (see above, §4.2);

¹¹⁰ '... at the end of the fifteenth century and during the first third of the sixteenth, Venetian noblemen and citizens ... were able to use Bessarion's books, though the ease and the speed with which loans could be obtained probably varied very much in different cases' (Labowsky 62). The Procuratori may also have been reluctant to lend their MSS to Aldus and other printers because printers had the bad habit of adding annotations and printers' instructions to the MSS they used, with the result that many owners did not want to lend out their MSS. Aldus called them βιβλιοτάφοι (see Brown 1891: 44–45).

¹¹¹ MS App. classis IV, 1 numero di collocazione 542 (= T) was not among Bessarion's books, but belonged until 1789 to the monastery of SS. Giovanni e Paolo.

(v) as item 430: Venetus 187 numero di collocazione 742, ca 1460, ‘Platonis respublica, leges et epistolae, in pergamento, liber pulcherri-
mus’ = N.

For the presence of these MSS in inventories of 1474, 1524 and later years I refer to Labowsky’s book. Of these MSS, Ven. 184, Ven. 186 and Ven. 189 contain the *Ion*.

All this is important for the history of the printing house of Aldus, for Aldus and his associates must not have had easy access to Bessarion’s library.¹¹² As Lowry writes, in his fascinating monograph on Aldus Manutius (1979: 231):¹¹³ ‘... incredible though this may seem, all the signs suggest that Aldus never gained access to the Marciana’.¹¹⁴ As an illustration Lowry mentions Aldus’ first editions of parts of Theophrastus (1497), and Quintus Smyrnaeus (1505), for which Aldus laments that he had to use ‘torn and defective’ manuscripts. ‘Clearly, he cannot have been referring to the complete, unstained and carefully written codices of the works concerned which survive to this day in the Marciana’ (Lowry 1979: 231). There are many similar cases, e.g. Aristophanes, Plutarch, Athenaeus,¹¹⁵ Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristotle, and the *editio princeps* of Plato is no exception. This is not the place to discuss the Aldina as a whole, of course,¹¹⁶ so I will confine myself to the *Ion*.

While collating the Aldina with the Marciani it soon became clear that the main body of Musurus’ text of the *Ion* was, indeed, not based on one of Bessarion’s MSS. To show this I will follow the traces set

¹¹² This fact is briefly acknowledged by Reynolds & Wilson (1991: 155, 157), but they say nothing about the cause of its inaccessibility.

¹¹³ Lowry briefly mentions the physical state of Bessarion’s books in the Palazzo Ducale (p. 230), but he studies the library from a quite different angle, since he investigates the connections between Bessarion’s MSS and Aldus’ printing activities. By a quirk of fate, Labowsky’s and Lowry’s books appeared in the same year (1979); it is no doubt for this reason that they do not refer to each other.

¹¹⁴ There may be some exaggeration here, for some books, at least, could probably be borrowed, although not routinely; see above, and below p. 56.

¹¹⁵ ‘Detailed research on the texts of Aristophanes, Plutarch, and Athenaeus has proved that [Aldus] was unable to refer to the vital manuscripts of those authors which Bessarion had collected’ (Lowry 1979: 232).

¹¹⁶ But I note that it is highly unlikely that Ven. 187 (= N) was the main source of the Aldina in e.g. the *Republic* (contra Boter 1989: 242 f.). Other MSS from the T family must have been used, e.g. Flor. 85.6 (= b) in books I–II, and 85.9 (= c) in books III–X of the *Republic*.

out by Vancamp in his edition of the *Hippias Maior* and *Minor*. Vancamp (1996b: 49) shows that for the Aldina of these dialogues Musurus used Par. 1811 (siglum H with Vancamp),¹¹⁷ a descendant, via one or more intermediary MSS, of Par. 1808.¹¹⁸ Another candidate, Vat. 1030 (Vat), an apographon of Par. 1811, eventually had to be discarded. But Musurus made also use of one of Bessarion's manuscripts, which can be shown to have been Ven. 186 (for which Vancamp uses the siglum U). The same situation exists for the *Ion*, as appears from the following facts:

Some important readings shared by Par. 1811, Vat. 1030 and the Aldina, against the two relevant MSS from Bessarion's library, Ven. 186¹¹⁹ and Ven. 189 (S)

Ion	Par. 1811	Aldina	Vat. 1030	Ven. 186	S
534b7	ἀδύνατος πάν ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος	ἀδύνατος πάν ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος	ἀδύνατος πάν ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος	ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστὶν	ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστὶν
535a1	ἦ	ἦ	ἦ	ἦ	ἦ
535c7	τοῦ φόβου ¹²⁰	τοῦ φόβου	τοῦ φόβου	φόβου	φόβου
540e1	ἴων	ἴων	ἴων	ὦ ἴων	ὦ ἴων
541d2	ἦδη ἢ πόλις ¹²¹	ἦδη ἢ πόλις	ἦδη ἢ πόλις	ἦδε ἢ πόλις	ἦδε ἢ πόλις
541e1	ἀλλὰ σὺ γὰρ ¹²²	ἀλλὰ σὺ γὰρ	ἀλλὰ σὺ γὰρ	ἀλλὰ γὰρ σὺ	ἀλλὰ γὰρ σὺ

¹¹⁷ Immisch (1903b: 14) already envisaged the possibility that a Paris MS might be one of the exemplars of the Aldina. See also Martinelli Tempesta (2003: 83 f.)

¹¹⁸ Vancamp was preceded by Murphy (1990: 325) for *Chrm.*, by Brockmann (1992: 185–190: 'Die Druckvorlage der Aldina') for *Smp.* and followed by Joyal (2000: 167, 169) for *Thg.* To indicate the position of Par. 1808 with regard to Par. 1811, I mention in a few cases its readings.

¹¹⁹ I am ignoring, then, Ven. 184 (E), which in the *Ion* probably derives from Ven. 186; see above §4.2. Recall (n. 111) that MS Ven. app. classis IV, 1 (= T) did not belong to Bessarion's library. Nor did Musurus use this MS otherwise.

¹²⁰ Par. 1808, the ultimate exemplar of Par. 1811, has φόβου.

¹²¹ Par. 1808 has ἦδε ἢ πόλις.

¹²² Par. 1808 has ἀλλὰ γὰρ σὺ.

That eventually Par. 1811 must be considered the exemplar of the Aldina appears from the following data:

Ion	Par. 1811	Aldina	Vat. 1030
530a8	ἡγωνίζου	ἡγωνίζου	ἡγωνίζω
533c1	ὀρφέος	ὀρφέος	ὀρφέως
533d1	μο(μος	μοι
540a7–b1	ἄλλων τεχνῶν σχεδόν τι	ἄλλων τεχνῶν σχεδόν τι	ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τεχνῶν
541d1	φανοσθένη	φανοσθένη	φανοσθένην

Especially interesting is the *vox nihili* μος for μοι at 533d1 in the Aldina. This is written in Par. 1811 with a slightly rounded iota, that apparently was mistaken for a lunar sigma.¹²³

Apart from Par. 1811, Musurus must have made use of another MS, for in a number of cases the Aldina has a reading which differs from that of Par. 1811 (and Vat. 1030, for that matter). This MS may well have been, just as in the *Hp.Mi.*, Ven. 186 (which in that case must exceptionally have been on loan, or have been collated against Par. 1811 *in situ*), as appears from the following table. To enable a comparison with Ven. 189 (= S) I have added its readings in a separate column:

Ion	Par. 1811	Aldina	Ven. 186	S
530a2	ἦ	ἦ	ἦ	ἦ
531d8	καὶ πολὺ γε (sed καὶ per compendium, vix legitur)	πολὺ γε	πολὺ γε	πολὺ γε
533c8	ἄρχομαι	ἔρχομαι	ἄρχομαι, ε (sic) supra lineam	ἄρχομαι
534a4	ἀρύττονται	ἀρύττονται	ἀρύττονται	ἀρύττονται
534c8	τὸν νοῦν	νοῦν	νοῦν	νοῦν

¹²³ MS Par. 1811 must have been among the numerous Greek manuscripts purchased by ambassadors of the kings of France in Venice during the first half of the sixteenth century. In 1550 it is mentioned in the catalogue of the future Bibliothèque Royale as number 427; see Omont (1889: 143). Cp. also Lowry (1979: 244), Alline (1915: 303) and Firmin-Didot (1875: 457) on the activities of various ambassadors on behalf of kings Louis XII and François I in Venice.

(cont.)

Ion	Par. 1811	Aldina	Ven. 186	S
535b1	δή μοι	δή καί μοι	δή· καί μοι (μοι in mg add. manus post.)	ἔχε δή· καί μοι τότε εἶπέ
535d1	εἶναι τοῦτον ¹²⁴	εἶναι τότε τοῦτον	εἶναι τότε τοῦτον (τότε sl add. manus prima)	τότε εἶναι τοῦτον
536d4 540d1	σὺ μὲν οὖν εὖ νῆ	σὺ μὲν εὖ ναὶ	σὺ μὲν εὖ ναὶ (ex νῆ, manus post.)	εὖ μὲν νῆ

To be complete I should add that Ven. 184 (E) is a slightly less likely candidate than Ven. 186, since at 540d1 it has νῆ, and not ναὶ, as Ven. 186 and the Aldina. As I observed above, in one place Ven. 186 has a correction, or rather an—excellent—conjecture, which Bessarion may have based upon Ven. 189 (S), that also belonged to his collection.¹²⁵ This conjecture did not make it to the Aldina:

Ion	Par. 1811	Aldina	Ven. 186	S
534d8	εὐρήματι	εὐρήματι	εὐρημά τι (ex εὐρημό τι)	εὐρήματι (sic) s, εὐρήματι S

For the later printing history of the works of Plato I may refer to e.g. Boter (1989: 242–251) and Martinelli Tempesta (2003: 84 f.). Some characteristics of Stephanus' edition of 1578 will be discussed below, in Appendix I.

¹²⁴ Par. 1808, the ultimate exemplar of Par. 1811, has εἶναι τοῦτον τότε. In view of the facts mentioned in this note and nn. 120–122 it is clear that Par. 1811 does not derive directly from Par. 1808. In fact, the readings mentioned may be due to an intermediary MS, the Scorialiensis y. I. 13; cp. Vancamp (1996a: 40) for similar phenomena in the *Hp.Mi.*, but I have not checked this possibility. For Par. 1808 see further Martinelli Tempesta (2003: 46–53).

¹²⁵ The conjecture was later made independently (?) by Stephanus.

5. SOME EDITORIAL DECISIONS UNDERLYING THE TEXT OF THE *ION*
IN THE PRESENT EDITION

5.1 *Orthography*

(i) *The spelling of the 2nd person singular middle thematic indicative*

The *Ion* has the following 2nd person singular middle indicative (present and future) thematic forms (I give the readings of the MSS, standardizing those with η as -ηι,¹²⁶ and Burnet's text):

- 532d2 δέηι WS (Burn.) : δέει TF
 533a3 βούλει TWS (Burn.) : βούλη F
 535a2 ἄπτει TWSF (Burn.)
 535c1 γίγνηι TWSF (Burn.)
 536b5 κατέχηι WSF (Burn.) : κατέχει T
 538b2 γνώσηι WSF (Burn.) : γνώσει T
 541e7 γίγνηι TWSF (Burn.)
 542a6 βούλει TWSF (Burn.)

This variation makes one wonder what might have been the form written by Plato (or his scribes). A sobering remark by Threatte suggests that the search for an answer might be futile; in inscriptions '[c]ertain evidence for the second person singular middle termination is lacking before Roman times' (Threatte 1996: 451); incidentally, in those times both ηι and ει are found (see below). There is, then, no contemporary evidence for either form in Plato's time. There is, however, much evidence for the use of ηι and ει in other cases: '... in the earliest Attic texts in Ionic letters there is a hesitation between HI and EI as graphemes for ηι, even when H is used consistently for the simple vowel [ε:]' (Threatte 1980: 368). A clear example is the variation στήληι λιθίνει in an inscription which is dated between 425 and 412, a variation that occurs regularly afterwards.

¹²⁶ S and F always have -ηι, except at 532d2, where S reads -ηι (ex δέει ut videtur).

Now it is important to realize—a point not mentioned by Threatte—that it is the grapheme HI that is the newcomer here. In fact, things may have gone along the following lines. Before the gradual introduction of the Ionic alphabet in the last quarter of the fifth century, which was made official during the archonship of Euclides (403/402), the 2nd person middle thematic ending, whatever its phonetic value, was exclusively written as EI, just like, for example, the dative of the form which we know as βουλῆ: BOYΛEI. Next, in several cases this spelling made way to the new spelling with HI, and this will especially have been the case in forms that had paradigmatic support. Thus, parallel with the new spelling BOYΛH, BOYΛHΣ, BOYΛHN the dative BOYΛEI came to be written as BOYΛHI. This, however, was countered by another, phonetic, development, viz. the gradual closing before [i] of open [ε:] into [e:],¹²⁷ whereby for example the dative of BOYΛH was written, or rather continued to be written, as BOYΛEI. There must have been, in fact, a constant hesitation between the two forms, also, as the inscriptions show, in forms with paradigmatic support like the feminine dative,¹²⁸ and the new spelling with HI must have been seen as something incongruous; it never completely ousted the spelling with EI, as the survey in Threatte (370–383) shows.¹²⁹

Now the (contracted) 2nd person middle ending, being an anomaly in between -ομαι and -εται, had no paradigmatic support at all.¹³⁰ On the contrary: if anything, the presence of E in -ETAI may have encouraged the use of -EI rather than -HI for the second person. My guess is that in this case the original spelling EI may occasionally have been replaced by HI, but was not really given up, precisely because of the parallel phonetic development [ε:i] into [e:i]. Moreover, the acceptance of spelling reforms is a notoriously slow process and this is another factor that may have hindered the universal introduction

¹²⁷ [e:i] developed further into monophthong [e:] (and eventually into a long ι [i:]). ‘Here (i.e. in the case of non-morphemic ηι—AR) the development to monophthong [e:] was rapid, and in some cases may have occurred in the fifth century’ (Threatte 1980: 369).

¹²⁸ In an inscription from 387/386 both [τ]ῆι βολῆι and [σ]ῆι λιθίνει occur.

¹²⁹ With some near-exceptions. ‘To die’ is usually written θνήσκω in the fourth century (Threatte p. 372), perhaps by paradigmatic support from θνητός. The oldest form, however, from the fourth century mentioned by Threatte is θνείσκεις, ca. 360, in a metrical text, and to be scanned as — —.

¹³⁰ Unlike e.g. non-contracted ε in athematic τίθεσαι; cp. τίθεμαι, τίθεται.

of HI. After 375 there is a ‘continuous increase of EI at the expense of HI for η in all positions’;¹³¹ ‘it is generally universal before the end of the fourth century’ (Threatte 1980: 369, 370). A clear example is $\lambda\eta$ - $\tau\upsilon\rho\gamma$ -. ‘HI last about 330 B.C.; EI first in the second quarter of the fourth century’ (Threatte 371).

I take it, then, that Plato and his scribes predominantly wrote ΔEEI , ΓIGNEI , etc., where EI probably represented monophthong [eː] (cp. n. 127), in line with the general developments in the first half of the fourth century. Still later, however, i.e. after ca. 200 BC, ‘when etymological connections made η obvious, learned revival of HI was encouraged’ (Threatte 370), ‘... HI is gradually restored. By 100 B.C., EI for η is rare, and only a few examples from the first century can be found’ (Threatte 377; cp. also Allen 1987: 86).¹³² From the remarks in Eustathius and the scholia on Aristophanes quoted in n. 132 it is clear that in Byzantine learned circles the (Hellenistic) spelling in $-\eta$ (η) was still in use (with the exception of $\beta\acute{o}\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$, $\omicron\zeta\epsilon\iota$ and $\acute{\omicron}\psi\epsilon\iota$) and this is no doubt how the presence of $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\eta\eta$ etc. in at least part of our MSS should be explained.

All things considered I have in all cases, whatever the form in the MSS,¹³³ decided to print the forms in $-\epsilon\iota$.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Or rather, as I would prefer: ‘... EI resisted replacement by HI ever more successfully’.

¹³² The middle endings are also commented upon in lexicographers and grammarians. Their remarks are inconclusive, however. According to the Suda, s.v. $\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, ... $\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\epsilon\iota$ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνεστώτος χρόνου διὰ τοῦ εἰ λεγόμενα τῶν νεωτέρων μᾶλλον Ἀττικῶν ἐστίν. This must imply that the Old Attic writers wrote otherwise, presumably η . Under the entry $\tau\rho\acute{\omicron}\pi\alpha\iota\omicron\nu$ the Suda mentions who belonged to the New Attic writers, and who to the Old: τὸ $\tau\rho\acute{\omicron}\pi\alpha\iota\omicron\nu$ οἱ παλαιοὶ Ἀττικοὶ προπερισπῶσιν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προπαροξύνουσι. ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς ἐστίν, ἣς ἤρχεν (‘were the leaders’) $\text{Ε}\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$, $\text{Κ}\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, $\text{Ἀ}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\varsigma$, $\text{Θ}\omicron\upsilon\kappa\upsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\varsigma$; ἡ δὲ νέα Ἀτθίς ἐστίν, ἣς ἐστὶ $\text{Μ}\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\text{-}\delta\rho\omicron\varsigma$ καὶ ἄλλοι. Observe, incidentally, that there is no information on the position of, for example, Plato, Lysias, Isocrates and Demosthenes. Eustathius, on the other hand, (*Comm. ad Od.* 2.26.9, Stallbaum) speaks about τὸ $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\eta$ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὄλα, κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν Ἀτθίδα διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου γραφόμενα, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ κωμικοῦ (= Aristophanes) πέφηνεν, while οἱ ὕστερον Ἀττικοὶ γράμαντες διὰ τοῦ η σὺν τῷ ι $\acute{\omega}$ τα προσγεγραμμένῳ omitted doing so (i.e. writing η) in the case of $\beta\acute{o}\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$, $\omicron\zeta\epsilon\iota$ and $\acute{\omicron}\psi\epsilon\iota$. In other words, in the other 2nd person middle forms they wrote $-\eta$. The later Ἀττικοὶ who used an $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha$ with an adscript ι ōta must be the writers of Hellenistic and Roman times.

¹³³ I mention for the record that the Bodleianus seems to have forms in $-\epsilon\iota$ throughout.

¹³⁴ But not in quotations from other works.—In his edition of the *Theages*, Joyal, too, always prints $-\epsilon\iota$.

(ii) *The spelling of the nominative plural of nouns in -εύς*

In the MSS of the *Ion* the plural nominative of nouns in -εύς is -εῖς (532e5–6 γραφεῖς, 534e4 and 535a8 ἔρμηνεῖς). Yet I print, like other editors, γραφῆς etc., because between 403/402–350 '[t]he normal ending is certainly -ῆς, abundantly attested in all types of texts' (Threatte 1996: 240).¹³⁵

(iii) *Other cases*

In other cases 'traditioni et lectoribus peperci', to quote West, *Iliad*, p. xxiv. Thus, the adscript iota of part of the MSS after $\bar{\alpha}$, η and ω has—in the text—been ignored in favour of the subscript iota.¹³⁶ Likewise, although the MSS read ἐλλειν- at 535b6 and elsewhere, and κλαί- at 535d3 and elsewhere, I print the traditional Attic forms with ἐλει- and κλα-. Also, the σ (all MSS) and the lunar sigma (occasionally in MS T) at word-end are printed as -ς. Again, I have followed Burnet in matters of elision and the -v ephelkystikon. Crasis forms of τὰ αὐτά are always printed as ταῦτά, although the MSS may vary (see e.g. 531a5 ff.). Finally, at 541d1 I print Φανοσθένη, with T W, rather than Φανοσθένην SF, although 'there can be no doubt that -ην was the normal form of the accusative by 400 B.C.' (Threatte 1996: 174).

5.2 *Accents*

En matière d'accentuation comme dans le domaine de la ponctuation, l'érudit moderne aurait ... avantage, croyons-nous, à oublier ses habitudes, basées sur de fausses certitudes, et à ne pas trop vite croire que les copistes se trompent : les erreurs existent évidemment, mais il est sûr qu'elles ne peuvent être généralisées.—Noret (1995: 87)

(i) *Enclitics*

Following the Byzantine copyists of MSS T W S F, as well as the Aldina, and following the example of Barrett in his edition of Euripides'

¹³⁵ Cp. also Hdn. περὶ παθῶν Gramm. Gr. III 2, p. 324, 19: ... βασιλῆς Ἀττικῶς διὰ τοῦ η .

¹³⁶ F has neither adscript nor subscript iota's.

Hippolytus (Barrett 1964: ‘Appendix II: Enclitics’, pp. 424–427), I accent the series of enclitics at 532c7–8 as (ποιητικῆ) γάρ που ἐστὶν (τὸ ὄλον), not as γάρ πού ἐστιν. I concur with Barrett when he writes (427): ‘I find this (viz. series like ἀγαθὸν γέ τι, ἡγγελέ γέ μοί ποτε—AR) wholly improbable: it is at variance with the rule that two consecutive syllables cannot both be acute; and it is no natural consequence of the rule of limitation (which is satisfied by ἀγαθὸν γε τι, and requires no further accent on the γε)’. I also print therefore (in all cases with (part of) the MSS and the Aldina):¹³⁷ at 532d6 (σοφοὶ) μὲν που ἐστὲ (ὕμεῖς), 532e4–5 (γραφικῆ) γάρ τις ἐστὶ (τέχνη), 533c8 ἄρχομαι γέ σοι, 535a2 (ἄπτει) γάρ πως μου.¹³⁸ At 537b2, too, I print εἶξαι τέ οἱ, with MSS TWS. Finally, at 533c6 I print πάντες με φασὶν (with TW), at 541d6 μὲν ἐστὲ, with the MSS. Compare also, outside the *Ion*, the accents in the Bodleianus at e.g. *Prt.* 310a2 (εἶ) μὴ σε τι, *Grg.* 447b6 ἐπ’ αὐτό γε τοι, 447d8 (ὄτι) ἄν τις σε, and *R.* 487c5 νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τις σοι, in the Paris. A, etc.¹³⁹ For further discussion see Barrett’s commentary, pp. 426–427, Kühner-Blass I 341, 343 (notably on the varying precepts of the ancient grammarians and on the discrepancies between theory and practice), Reil (1910: 525), Vendryes (1945: 87 ff.), Schwyzer (1953: 389) and Noret (1989).

I also print (νυκτὶ μὲν) ὕμεων rather than ὕμέων in the quotation from *Od.* 20.351 at 539a1. Cp. again Barrett, p. 425; also West, *Iliad* p. xviii.

Another question that calls for some comment is the accentuation of indefinite τις and τι in series of enclitics. At 530a8 all primary MSS read ἡγωνίζου τί ἡμῖν, as well as πῶς τί ἡγωνίσω, i.e. τι is in enclitic position and yet oxytone. This is also found in the Aldina, in the two

¹³⁷ Only in *Ion*, not if such sequences occur in quotations from other works. See also n. 134.

¹³⁸ ‘Lange Silben der Encliticae werden in Beziehung auf die Betonung als kurze angesehen’, Kühner-Blass I 341 Anm. 2.—γάρ πως μου W : γὰρ πῶς μου T : γάρ μου πῶς F (S non legitur).

¹³⁹ Slings (Praefatio to his edition of the *Republic*, p. xiv), having remarked that he has not signalled peculiarities of accentuation with ‘[sic]’, mentions as an example (φαίη) ἄν τις σοι (Slings’ accentuation): ‘loco 487c5 dedi ‘τις A : τι DF’, quia nullus ex his tribus libris aut τις aut τί praebet, id quod regulae nostrae aetatis praescribunt’ and adds: ‘... luce clarius est scriptores medii aevi in hac re (viz. the putting or omitting of accents on enclitics) nullam regulam certam esse secutos’, wrongly. As a rule (‘vielfach, wenn auch nicht mit völliger Konsequenz’—Reil 1910: 525), the MSS do not accent two consecutive enclitics.

Basle editions, and in Stephanus' edition, with one modification, though, for in the latter the accent is τὶ. Nor is this confined to this line, for the MSS of the *Ion* are full of accentuations of this type. Here are some further examples: 531b3 λέγει τι our editions : λέγει τί TWSF, 531d12 δήπου τις our editions : δήπου τίς TWSF, 532c10 λάβη τις our editions : λάβη(ι) τίς TWSF, 534d6 ὅτου τις our editions : ὅτου τίς TWF (S is illegible), 535b6 τι TW : τί SF; also τινα after elision: 533a7 τιν' T : τίν' WSF. In part of the MSS of the *Ion* this phenomenon is also found with other monosyllables, notably πως: 535a2 γάρ πως μου W : γάρ πῶς μου T : γάρ μου πῶς F (cp. n. 138), 538c1 λέγει πως TS, λέγει πῶς WF, and του: 532b8 ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ T(του,)F : ἄλλου τοῦ, ποιητοῦ WS,¹⁴⁰ 536b7 ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ TSF : ἄλλου τοῦ, ποιητοῦ W. And I should add that MSS of other authors present similar examples, e.g. Ar. *Ra.* 1, where the Ravennas has εἶπω τί τῶν ..., Isoc. 3.17 αἰσθέσθαι τί in MS Urbinas Γ.

These accents are tacitly ignored in our texts, and omitted from apparatuses and introductions alike. Yet they conform to some precepts, at least, such as that of Herodian *περὶ κλίσεως ὀνομάτων* (Gramm. Gr. III 2, p. 640, 31 = An. Ox. 4, 336, 29) τὸ δὲ τίς διὰ τοῦ ν ἐκλίθη καὶ ὡς μονοσύλλαβον ὀξύνεται ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ συμφράσει, and Bekker *An.* II 873: 'Τὸ τίς ἐρωτηματικόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀόριστον, ἦλθέ τις (*sic*; this should rather be ἦλθε τίς). δύο οὖν τόνων ἐστὶ δεκτικόν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μονοσύλλαβος βραχεῖα λέξις οὐ δύναται δύο τόνους λαβεῖν, ἓνα λαμβάνει τὸν ὀξὺν ἀεὶ, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλαγαῖς δείκνυται τὸ διάφορον ...'. As for πῶς, the *Etymologicum Gudianum* presents (p. 243, 56) the combinations πῶς ἦλθες, ἦλθες πῶς, πόθι ἦκεις, αἶκεν πόθι, ποῦ ἀπέρχῃ, ἐὰν ποῦ, i.e. interrogative and indefinite πως etc. have the same accent. See further Kühner-Blass I 338, Mazzuchi (1979) and Noret (1987, 1989, 1995).¹⁴¹ In this case, I have followed the current practice of omitting the accent on indefinite τις etc.

¹⁴⁰ The *diastolai* after του and τοῦ no doubt serve to stress the enclitic, non-articular, character of these forms.

¹⁴¹ In this series of interesting articles the Belgian Byzantinologist Jacques Noret addresses the question of the accents on a number of enclitics in the Byzantine MSS. One of his conclusions is (1987: 195) that enclitics may be accented 'lorsque ... le sens de la phrase exige qu'ils soient mis en évidence'. He does not discuss, however, how this phenomenon should be judged in relation to the remarks of the ancient grammarians. See also comm. on 536d7.

A full treatment of this complicated matter is definitely a desideratum, but would fall outside the objective of this book.¹⁴²

(ii) *νυνδῆ/νῦν δῆ*

There are two instances of *νυν δη* (or *νυνδη*) in the *Ion*, at 533d2 and 542a2; in both cases Burnet prints *νυνδη* (*ἔλεγον*), as do many other editions, for example that of Flashar. Burnet prints *νυνδῆ* in countless other cases, too. In fact, he nearly always does so when the verb modified by *νυνδῆ* is a past tense;¹⁴³ if not, he prints *νῦν δῆ*. The same practice is found in many other editions, for example in Dodds' edition of the *Gorgias*, in the two volumes published so far of the new OCT of Plato, etc. In the nineteenth century Burnet was preceded by Schanz, who to my knowledge was the first to differentiate between the two forms on a grand scale. The differentiation itself was due to Cobet; see below.

Lamb, Méridier and Verdenius, however, and before them for example Bekker and Stallbaum, as well as the Aldina and Stephanus, in both our cases print *νῦν δῆ*, with the MSS. The other volumes of the Budé series vary; thus, when the verb is a past tense Croiset, in the *Grg.*, prints *νυνδῆ*, but Chambry, in the *Republic*, *νῦν δῆ*. LSJ only acknowledge *νῦν δῆ*.

Now since the MSS at *Ion* 533d2 and 542a2 all four have *νῦν δῆ* (incidentally, with Stobaeus), the question arises of course: where does

¹⁴² I just note that in most cases the 'deviant' accentuation not only involves monosyllables, but also the presence of paroxytone words before the monosyllable. In fact, when oxytone and proparoxytone words precede, the enclitics behave according to 'our' rules. Thus, at 534d7 the MSS read *σχεδόν τι*, at 535c5 *ἐλεεινόν τι*, at 537c5 *ἀποδέδοται τι*, etc. Sometimes the MSS are divided, e.g. at 531b6 *μάντεων τις* T : *μάντεων τίς* WSF. In the case of disyllables and (pro)perispomenon words still other problems arise; cp. 537d3–4 *εἶναι τινα* TW : *εἶναι τινὰ* S : *εἶναι τινὰ* F, 531d12 *εἷς τις* TF : *εἷς τίς* WS; yet at 531e5 all MSS have *εἷς τις*.—In her recent monograph Philomen Probert discusses the views of Herodian and other grammarians about the Greek accent (2006: 21–45) as well as, more briefly, the use of accents in papyri (45–47) and medieval manuscripts (48–52), but the emphasis is on altogether different subjects, as is indicated by the subtitle of her book ('Synchronic patterns, frequency effects, and prehistory').

¹⁴³ There is, somewhat unexpectedly, one exception, *Phlb.* 61b4 *Καὶ νῦν δῆ τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν*. Burnet also prints *νυνδῆ* with participles, e.g. *Plt.* 282b9 f. *τὰ νυνδῆ ῥηθέντα*, nouns, e.g. *Cra.* 411c5 *πάντα τὰ νυνδῆ ὀνόματα*, and with the article, *Prm.* 135b7 *πάντα τὰ νυνδῆ*.

νυνδή come from? (To the question what we should print I will come back at the end of this section.) This form is due to a conjecture of Cobet's. From an observation by '[G]rammaticus nescio quis pereruditus' quoted in the Suda, s.v. νῦν δῆ, Cobet concluded (1873: 233–234) that νυνδή should be written when it means ἀρτίως, ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν. The entry in the Suda runs: Νῦν δῆ: ἀρτίως, ἢ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν. Πλάτων Νόμοις. ἢ νῦν δῆ ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις οὐπω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν· νῦν δὲ ἐπιλελήσμεθα; (= *Lg.* 683e5–6; Cobet prints νυνδή; in the text of the *Laws* ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν is bracketed by many editors, but not by Burnet; also, the Plato MSS read οὐτω, not οὐπω), followed by two other cases 'in quibus νυνδή μὲν et νῦν inter se opposita essent'.¹⁴⁴ These cases are (Cobet both times prints νυνδή): *E. Hipp.* 233–234 νῦν δῆ μὲν (v.l. μὲν δῆ) ὄρος βᾶσ' ... ἐστέλλου, νῦν δ' αὖ ... ἔρασαι, and *Magnes Com. fr.* 6 νῦν δῆ μὲν ὤμνυς, νῦν δὲ φῆς. Then Cobet quotes a second passage from the Suda which contains a quotation from the *Laws* (ὅς δῆ etc. = *Lg.* 629d2–3): 'Utilissimum est quod Grammaticus addidit ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις διαλελυμένον εἴρηκε τὸ μὲν νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος χρόνου, τὸ δὲ δῆ ἐπὶ συνδέσμου. ὅς δῆ πάντων τῶν πολέμων χαλεπώτατος, ὡς φαμὲν ἡμεῖς νῦν δῆ', and adds: 'Perspicue enim docet coniunctim esse scribendum νυνδή, ubi significat ἀρτίως, ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, et divisim νῦν δῆ ubi νῦν nativam vim servat, quam vocula δῆ intendit, ut in τότε δῆ'.¹⁴⁵ As for the accent, he adds in a footnote on p. 234: 'Fuere olim magistri, qui νύνδη scribendum esse praeciperent: ἐπειδὴ, ὅστισδῆ, δηλαδῆ, alia, suadent ut νυνδή praeferatur'. Incidentally, at *Lg.* 629d3 the Plato MSS all read ἔφαμεν, not φαμεν. This is perhaps a rather small basis for changing the spelling and accent of νῦν δῆ. Observe that the Grammaticus implies rather than 'perspicue

¹⁴⁴ νυνδή is the form printed by Cobet. Note that μέν is absent from the text in the Suda.—In the apparatus criticus of her edition of the Suda, Adler reports that in MS M there is a superscript note γρ. νυνδή.

¹⁴⁵ Cobet also adduces a second argument, which at first sight carries more weight. He observes (p. 234) that in the three cases of νυνδή μὲν, μὲν follows rather than interrupts νυνδή (his spelling, again), while in its use with non-past tenses it may be split by μέν. In his view this proves that in the meaning ἀρτίως the true form is νυνδή. Νῦν μὲν δῆ, however, is very rare, and virtually confined to Homer (seven instances) and Xenophon (one instance). Also, it is doubtful whether δῆ really modifies νῦν here, μὲν δῆ being a quite regular particle combination; cp. Denniston 258–259 and 391–394.

doctet' that νυνδη (νυνδή?) should be written when the meaning is ἀρτίως.

Be that as it may, the passages from Cobet's *Grammaticus* should be supplemented with a number of passages from other, perhaps no less erudite, grammarians. Consider the following passage.

– Hdn. *Gramm. Gr.* III 1, p. 489, 1 ff.: Τὰ εἰς η μετὰ τοῦ ι, εἰ ἀπὸ δοτικῶν εἴη μηδὲ θαυμαστικά, ἢ βαρύνεται ἢ περισπᾶται, οὐδέποτε δὲ ὀξύνεται. περισπᾶται μὲν διπλῆ καὶ τριπλῆ, πεζῆ, πῆ, ὁμαρτῆ καὶ ἀμαρτῆ, κομιδῆ, διχῆ, τριχῆ, τετραχῆ, ἀλλαχῆ, μοναχῆ, ἡσυχῆ, ὁμῆ, σιωπῆ, ἐνωπῆ. βαρύνεται δὲ πάντῃ, ἄλλῃ, ταύτῃ· τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀμηγέπη παρ' Ἀττικοῖς. τὸ ἤδη τῶν βαρυτονουμένων χωρὶς τοῦ ι γράφεται καὶ τὸ νῦν δῆ, ὅτε σημαίνει τὸ πρὸ ὀλίγου “οὗτος ἀνὴρ νῦν δὴ ξυμβλήμενος” (ω 260), ἐστὶ σύνθετον ὡς καὶ τὸ δηλαδὴ ὀξυνόμενον. Here, in a passage on words ending in an iota, Herodian mentions words that are either barytone, i.e. not oxytone, or perispomenon. Examples of the former are πάντῃ, ἄλλῃ, etc. To this group belong also two words that are written without an (adscript) iota, namely ἤδη and νῦν δῆ. Note that νῦν δῆ, as it is printed here, is not σύνθετον nor accented as prescribed in the rest of this passage, which unambiguously indicates that composite νυνδη should be accented νύνδη, i.e. with a paroxytone accent, just like ἤδη. The idea that νυνδη when it is used for ἀρτίως is paroxytone recurs elsewhere. Compare:

– Hdn. *περὶ Ὀδυσσ. προσωδίας Gramm. Gr.* III 2, p. 151, 6: (*Od.* 11.160) ἢ νῦν δὴ Τροίηθεν: τινὲς ὡς ἐν μέρος λόγου παροξύνουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρτίως ὁμοίως τῷ “οὗτος ἀνὴρ νῦν δὴ ξυμβλήμενος”. Some MSS have, in fact, νύνδη here.

– Schol. in *Od.* 11.160: ἢ νῦν δὴ Τροίηθεν] τινὲς ὡς ἐν μέρος λόγου παροξύνουσιν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρτίως, ὁμοίως τῷ “οὗτος ἀνὴρ νῦν δὴ ξυμβλήμενος” (*Od.* ω, 260).

– Eustathius *Comm. ad Il.* 1.267, 8 (van der Valk), where we find roughly the same information as in Herodian (the brackets indicate that this part is a later addition by Eustathius himself): [Σημείωσαι δὲ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἦ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅπου σὺν τῷ ι γράφουσιν οἱ τεχνικοί, καθὰ καὶ τὸ πῆ καὶ ὄπη καὶ ἄλλῃ, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀλλαχοῦ· τὸ δὲ “ἦ θέμις ἐστὶ” δίχα προσγραφῆς τοῦ ι τιθέασι, καθὰ καὶ τὸ “φῆ νέος, οὐκ ἀπάλαμνος”, ἦγουν ὡς νέος οὐκ ἀναλκίς, καὶ τὸ μῆ, οἶον· μῆ τύψης, καὶ τὸ νῆ, οἶον· νῆ τὴν Ἀθηναίαν, καὶ τὸ ἦ τὸ σχετλιαστικὸν καὶ θαυμαστικόν, καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄνακλητικόν· οἶον· “ὦ ἡ τίς ἐν πύλαισι δωμαίων κυρεῖ” ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὦ σχετλιαστικόν καὶ τὸ ἤδη χρονικόν καὶ νύνδη ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρτίως ἐν

ἐνὶ τόνῳ, ὃ καὶ φασὶ μόνῳ παρωχημένῳ συντάσσεσθαι.] What is missing here is the information about the barytone nature of ἦδη and νυνδη, but there is also some extra information on the ἐν μέρος λόγου part of Herodian and the scholiast, viz. that νυνδη in the meaning ἀρτίως is written ἐνὶ τόνῳ and is only combined with a past tense (whereas Herodian just spoke about σημαίνει τὸ πρὸ ὀλίγου). Observe that although the accent on νυνδη here (νυνδη) is not barytone, and therefore confirms the information in Herodian, it is a circumflex, against the precept of Herodian (and against the law of limitation).

Interestingly, elsewhere, too, ἦδη is mentioned together with νυνδη, not surprisingly, for when it came to transliterating uncial ΝΥΝΔΗ and ΗΔΗ the latter caused exactly the same problems of accent and word division, as appears from a passage like Eust. *Comm. ad Il.* 1.156, 32, where Eustathius discusses the use of ἦδη with the future and gives as an example “ἦδη λoίγια ἔργα τάδ’ ἔσεται (*sic*)”. εἰ δέ τινες τοῦτο ἄλλως γράφουσιν “ἦ δὴ λoίγια ἔργα ἔσται” ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄντως δὴ, εὐρεθήσονται εἰς τοῦτο χρήσεις ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ἕτεροι. Among the ‘other uses’ are 1.234, 25 τινὲς δὲ τὸ “ἦ δὴ”, ὡς Ἀπίων καὶ Ἡρόδωρος φασιν, ἐν ἐνὶ μέρει λόγου “ἦδη” φασὶ λέγοντες ὅτι, ὡς καὶ προερρέθη, ἐπὶ τριῶν χρόνων τὸ ἦδη λαμβάνεται, ἐπὶ τε παρωχημένου καὶ ἐνεστώτος, ὡς παρεδειγματίσθη ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ μέλλοντος δέ, ὡς τὸ “ἦδη λoίγια ἔργα ἔσεται”.

All in all it is clear that if a distinction should be made between two νυνδη’s, the one that is found with a past tense should be written νύνδη. Nowhere is νυνδη treated as an oxytone word. When Cobet proposed to accent νυνδή he was simply ignoring the passages presented above.¹⁴⁶

With the ghost form νυνδή gone, we still have to decide what we should print. Although I find the idea of printing νύνδη with a past tense rather attractive, I see no reason to follow Herodian or the τινες mentioned by him and to deviate from the unanimous spelling and accentuation of the Byzantine *diorthótai*, so I prefer νῦν δὴ. As a consequence, νῦν δὴ does not have a fixed meaning, or rather referential

¹⁴⁶ As for δηλαδὴ in the passage from Herodian quoted above, a form also mentioned by Cobet: in the clause ἐστὶ σύνθετον ὡς καὶ τὸ δηλαδὴ ὀξυνόμενον the participle ὀξυνόμενον applies *only* to δηλαδὴ, not to νυνδη, i.e. we should translate: ‘(νύνδη) is composite, just as δηλαδὴ when it is oxytone’. That the accent in νυνδη should be on the υ was already sufficiently clear from what preceded.

domain, since, depending on the verb, it may be used to refer to the (recent) past (with a past tense),¹⁴⁷ to the moment of speaking (with a present or perfect indicative),¹⁴⁸ or to the (near) future (with a future indicative or an imperative).¹⁴⁹ This situation is not uncommon; τότε, for instance, is a clear parallel, since this may refer both to the past and to the future (also τότε δή, Hom. *Od.* 4.422), and cp. the remark on ἤδη (ἐπὶ τριῶν χρόνων λαμβάνεται) by Eustathius in the above quotation.

5.3 Punctuation marks and other lectional signs in the MSS

(i) Punctuation marks

‘The punctuation and accentuation of our MSS are not to be trusted over-implicitly, and frequent changes should probably be made. Editors have been rather haphazard in this matter’ (Denniston 430 on οὐκουν/οὐκοῦν).¹⁵⁰ Denniston’s position, which is, I think, representa-

¹⁴⁷ Both with impf., as here and frequently elsewhere, and with aor. ind., e.g. *Phd.* 61e6, *Phdr.* 263c10, *La.* 189d5, etc.

¹⁴⁸ E.g. *R.* 398b6 Νῦν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ..., *Phlb.* 64e5 Νῦν δὴ καταπέφηνεν ἡμῖν ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις.

¹⁴⁹ E.g. *Sph.* 221d1 Καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, *Grg.* 462b1 Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὀπότερον βούλει ποίει.

¹⁵⁰ When, during the great μεταχαρακτηρισμός of the 9th–10th centuries, the uncial manuscripts were transliterated into minuscule ones, not only accents and breathings were added but also word divisions and punctuation marks. There has been much discussion about the possible reasons why the uncial MSS were transliterated at all, and why they were provided with accents etc., a practice that had been largely absent from the transmission of the texts in the preceding centuries. After all, as Barrett puts it (1964: 60): ‘transliteration was a tedious business, involving not only the decipherment of an unfamiliar script but also a good deal of interpretation in the insertion of accents and breathings’ (and, one may add, punctuation marks). For centuries in a row the Greeks had been content with uncial texts written in *scriptio continua* and with the barest of aids to facilitate reading them (notably the *paragraphos* and/or the *dicolon* (double dot) to indicate change of speaker within a dialogic text). A striking illustration of the transliteration practices of the Byzantine scribes is the following text of Theodorus Stoudites (759–829), abbot of the Stoudiou monastery at Constantinople. The text is rule 54 from the τυπικόν, the official regulations, of the monastery, and may be found in Migne, *Patrologia graeca*, Paris 1860, column 1740C. It runs: Περὶ τοῦ καλλιγράφου. εἰ μὴ φιλοκάλως κρατεῖ τὸ τετράδιον καὶ τίθησι τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ γράφει βιβλίον, καὶ σκέπει ἐν καιρῷ ἐκάτερα, καὶ παρατηρεῖται τὰ τε ἀντίστιχα καὶ τοὺς τόνους καὶ τὰς στιγμάς, ἀνὰ μετανοίας λ’, καὶ ρ’’ (‘On the calligrapher (= copyist). If he

tive of the general attitude toward this subject, now and in the past, has perhaps too readily led to the belief that the MSS cannot be trusted at all in this matter. In the text presented below I have in a number of cases departed from the punctuation of the text in Burnet's and other modern editions, which on the whole ultimately goes back to Stephanus' edition of 1578. This notably involves cases of $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, for which see Appendix I. Sometimes these departures were inspired by the punctuation of one or more of the Byzantine MSS, in line with the advice of Huygens (2001: 57): 'Prêtez attention à la ponctuation de votre (ou de certains de vos) manuscrit(s)'.¹⁵¹ See at 533a6 and b2, 536b4–5, 537d3–4, 541a1.

Perhaps I may add here a brief survey of the Byzantine punctuation marks that will be referred to in the discussion of the passages mentioned above. The definitions have been taken from the various *Scho-*

does not keep the quaternion neatly and does not neatly put away the book that he is copying, and does not cover them both in time, and pays no attention to the lines copied, the accents and the punctuation marks, there is in each case a penalty of 130 penitential exercises'). For a general orientation to the Byzantine transliteration see Lemerle (1971: 118–128) and Wilson (1983: 65–68), and to the Byzantine book culture Hunger (1989). Recently, Gutas (1998) has advanced the theory that the massive production of minuscule manuscripts provided with all kinds of reading aids is connected with the demand of Arabic translators for clearly readable and intelligible Greek texts. Be that as it may, in all cases the accents, punctuation marks etc. do not of course belong to the text *sensu stricto* but are the result of editorial interpretive decisions. These should perhaps not be ignored too quickly, since they may have a well-argued theoretical foundation, as in the case of $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, for which see Appendix I.

¹⁵¹ For a similar position see Noret (1995: 87). Questions of punctuation are still a neglected area in editing Greek texts, although there are signs that things are changing. Thus, it is significant that at *Phd.* 92d4–5 the new OCT text adopts the punctuation of one of the papyri rather than that of the MSS. For an orientation to punctuation in the papyri Flock (1908) is still useful. Randolph (1910) is important for the presence in the MSS of the question mark; see also below, n. 358. Brief general overviews of punctuation in antiquity may be found in Gardthausen (1913: II 404–406), Schubart (1962: 74 ff.), Turner-Parsons (1987: 9–11). For punctuation in school exercises in Graeco-Roman Egypte see Cribiore (1996: 81–88). A discussion of the ancient theories of punctuation may be found in Blank (1983). Wilson (1983: 117–119) discusses Photius' worries about incorrect, heretical, ways of punctuating the Bible. Perria (1991) discusses punctuation in a number of 'philosophical' MSS, notably Par. 1807 of Plato. Gaffuri (1998) shows that on the whole there is a clear relationship between the ancient theories of punctuation and the punctuation which is found in many manuscripts. Dover (1997: 27–32) discusses some aspects of the punctuation of classical texts by modern editors. In spite of all this a Greek counterpart to Malcolm Parkes' impressive monograph of 1992 is definitely a desideratum.

lia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam (6th–10th cent.; ed. A. Hilgard, *Gramm. Gr. I 3*), which seem to represent the mainstream usage of the copyists (the page numbers refer to *Gramm. Gr. I 3*).

Στιγμαί

The *ὑποστιγμή* ('low dot') is ἐννοίας οὐδέπω ἀπηρτισμένης ἤγουν πεπληρωμένης ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐλλειπούσης σύμβολον· ὡσπερ ἐὰν εἶπω «ὅταν ἔλθω», τοῦτο μόνον εἰρηκῶς οὐ δύναμαι ὅσον χρόνον θέλω σιωπῆσαι, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀκούων ἀναγκάζει με ἐπαγαγεῖν τὸ λείπον· ἐνταῦθα οὖν πρὸ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς τοῦ λείποντος τίθεται ἡ ὑποστιγμή. (25, 19 ff.).

The *μέση* ('middle dot') resembles the *ὑποστιγμή*; cp. the following definition (313, 15 ff.): σημείον ... ἐστὶ μεσοῦσης διανοίας, μήτε λίαν οὔσης πρὸς τέλος μήτε κρεμαμένης καὶ πρὸς συμπλήρωσιν ὀλίγου δεομένης· μέσως γάρ πως ἔχει ὁ νοῦς, ὡς ἂν εἴπωμεν <A 36> Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, τὸν ἠύκομος τέκε Λητώ, καὶ πάλιν <H 93> αἰδέσθην μὲν ἀνήνασθαι, δεῖσαν δ' ὑποδέχθαι. Δεῖ γοῦν ἐν τῇ μέσῃ στιγμαῖ παρατεῖναι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα, καὶ μὴ διακόπτειν, τῆς διανοίας ἔτι μετεώρου οὔσης. The difference between *μέση* and *ὑποστιγμή* seems to be that the *ὑποστιγμή* indicates that a *dianoia* ('thought') is not complete and *must* be supplemented with a *symbolon* (the technical term for any sign that consists of two parts which only when they are put together are complete, i.e. meaningful), whereas the *μέση* indicates that a *dianoia* is semi-complete, so to speak, because it needs only ὀλίγον to be complete, like Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι or αἰδέσθην μὲν ἀνήνασθαι. The difference may roughly correspond to that between our subordinate clauses (*ὑποστιγμή*) on the one hand, and phrases and coordinated clauses (*μέση*) on the other.

Finally, (177, 7 ff.) the *τελεία* ('full dot') is used ὅτε τῆς περιόδου τέλειον καὶ ἀπηρτισμένον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνθύμημα, οἷον <K 382> τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς· καὶ πάλιν <M 243> εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης· ἰδοὺ αὕτη ἡ περίοδος τελεία.

As for their positions in the text, the *μέση* τίθεται ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τοῦ γράμματος, ἡ δὲ *ὑποστιγμή* [μεθ' ὑποκρίσεως] κάτω ἐν τῷ ἄκρῳ τοῦ γράμματος, while ἡ *τελεία* (κεῖται) ἄνω, ὡσπερ ἀναπαύουσα τὸ πνεῦμα. Some Byzantine grammarians inform us also about the effects of the *στιγμαί* on reading; see above at *μέση*, and also e.g. 314, 3 ff.: Ἐν τίνι διενήνοχεν ἡ στιγμή τῆς ὑποστιγμῆς; Ἐν χρόνῳ, τουτέστιν ἐν διαστήματι τῆς σιωπῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τελεία τέσσαρας ἔχει χρόνους σιωπῆς, ἡ δὲ μέση ἓνα, ἡ δὲ ὑποστιγμή ἡμισυν. It is clear, then, that these signs were intended to guide a reader while reading aloud, the common

practice during antiquity and a major part of the Middle Ages (for this practice see the comprehensive and illuminating study by Paul Saenger, 1997).¹⁵²

Διαστολαί

Unlike Burnet, and the modern tradition in general, but following part of the MSS, I have put διαστολαί (comma's) as a means to distinguish syntactic units at 537d3 ff.; see comm. there, and compare Slings' OCT edition of the *Republic*, p. xix. At 537d3 ff., I also mention, in the apparatus criticus, the different system of distinguishing syntactic units employed in that passage by the scribe of MS T.

(ii) Other lectional signs

Unlike for example Burnet, I have followed the Byzantine practice of putting a διάρρησις (trema) on the vowels υ and ι in ἐϋξέστω and τοῖτῷ at 537a8, b1. See also West's edition of the *Iliad*, vol. I, pp. xxiii ff.

As in all modern editions, the quotations from Homer at 537a8 ff., 538c2–3, 538d1 ff., 539a1 ff. and 539b4 ff. are printed as an indented block of hexameter lines. Curiously, information on the way in which these quotations are present in the MSS is not easy to come by. I may therefore perhaps add a few remarks on this matter.¹⁵³

The practice of indenting the quotations goes back to Stephanus' edition of 1578.¹⁵⁴ Before him the quotations were part of the running

¹⁵² Interestingly, the system is exactly like that described by Isidorus of Sevilla, *Origines* 1.20. For the ὑποστιγμή compare §3: *Vbi ... initio pronuntiationis necdum plena pars sensui est, et tamen respirare oportet, fit comma, id est particula sensus, punctusque ad imam litteram ponitur; et vocatur subdistinctio*; for the μέση στιγμή §4: *Vbi autem in sequentibus iam sententia sensum praestat, sed adhuc aliquid superest de sententiae plenitudine, fit cola, mediamque litteram puncto notamus; et mediam distinctionem vocamus, quia punctum ad mediam litteram ponimus*. Finally, for the τελεία cp. §5: *Vbi vero iam per gradus pronuntiando plenam sententiae clausulam facimus, fit periodus, punctumque ad caput litterae ponimus; et vocatur distinctio, id est disiunctio, quia integram separavit sententiam*.

¹⁵³ Gardthausen (1913: II 406) has a few remarks, also on the early history of the quotation mark, e.g. its presence in the so-called *Ilias Bankesiana* (2nd cent. A.D.), to mark the end of a direct speech (form ὄ), and its function(s) in Christian texts.

¹⁵⁴ The first Basle edition (1534) has inverted comma's (") in the right margin, the second Basle edition (1556) has no signs. Indenting (εἰσθεσις) part of a text, especially in poetry, was not unknown in ancient and Byzantine times; cp. e.g. schol. *Ar. Ach.* 204–213, *Pl.* 253, and see Reynolds & Wilson (1991: 247), Parkes (1992: 10, 97) and Turner & Parsons (1987: 8).

text, and mostly marked by quotation marks, which actually were *diplai* in various forms, in the margin of the text, a practice also followed by the Aldina. By way of an illustration I present here these marks for 537a6–8 of the *Ion*, as they are present in MS T, with the line division and punctuation of T:

- > ἐπὶ πατρόκλωι : κλινοθῆναι δέ φησι καὶ αὐτὸς, ἐπιζέ
- > στωι ἐνὶ δίφρωι· ἦκ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοῖν· ἀτὰρ τὸν

Observe that there is no further indication *in* the text of the place where the actual quotation begins, except for the dicolon after πατρόκλωι. In MSS W and S these marginal signs have the form of a single modern quotation mark ('smart quote'): '. In T and W these marks are present with all five quotations from Homer, in S only with the first two, while in F they are absent throughout (just as, incidentally, in Ficino's translation).¹⁵⁵ In the Aldina, finally, they have the form of our double quotation mark: ", which may go back to its *Vorlage*, Par. 1811 (see §4.6), since in this MS they have the same form.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Other signs were also in use. In a Chrysippus papyrus from Memphis, first half of the 2nd cent. BC, 'a special sign is used ... to indicate a poetic quotation' (Roberts 1956: 6); this sign is not a *diplê*. Recently, the Derveni papyrus (4th–3rd cent. BC) has presented us a *paragraphos* which 'serves to separate a quoted hexameter verse from the surrounding prose' (Turner-Parsons 1987: 8).

¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, in MS Par. 1807 of Plato (= A) there are two types of quotation marks, one for lines from Homer (an adorned *diplê*) and a different one for quotations from other poets (a tilde ~).

Plato *Ion*

CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM

- T Cod. Marcianus graecus appendix classis IV, 1; saec. X partis posterioris
W Cod. Vindobonensis supplementum graecum 7; saec. XI partis posterioris
S Cod. Marcianus graecus 189; saec. XIV partis posterioris vel saec. XV init.
F Cod. Vindobonensis supplementum graecum 39; saec. XIII partis posterioris vel saec. XIV initii

De ordine siglorum vide p. 35.

pc lectio scribae primi qui se ipse correxit; si lectio prima non memoratur non iam clare legitur

t, s, f recentioris aetatis correctores codd. T, S, F (qui non distinguuntur amplius)

mg lectio in margine addita

sl lectio supra lineam addita

Nonnunquam citantur

Ven. 186 Cod. Marcianus graecus 186; sub anno 1450

E Cod. Marcianus graecus 184; sub anno 1450

Flor. 85, 7 Cod. Florentinus Laurentianus 85, 7; saec. XV

Scriptores antiqui qui *Ionem* laudant

Priscianus, *Institutio de arte grammatica*, 2 voll., ed. M.J. Hertz, *Grammatici Latini* 2–3, Lipsiae 1855–1859

Proclus Diadochus, *In Platonis rempublicam commentarii*, 2 voll., ed. Guilelmus Kroll, Lipsiae 1899–1901

Ioannes Stobaeus, *Eclogae* (= *Anthologium*, I-II), rec. C. Wachsmuth, Berolini 1884

Ald. Editio Aldina, editio princeps operum Platonis omnium; in aedibus Aldi et Andreae soceri, Venetiis 1513

Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος

<ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΙΩΝ>

St. I

ΣΩ. Τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν. πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; 530a
ἢ οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου;

ΙΩΝ Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου ἐκ
τῶν Ἀσκληπειῶν.

ΣΩ. Μῶν καὶ ῥαψωδῶν ἀγῶνα τιθέασιν τῷ θεῷ οἱ Ἐπι- 5
δαύριοι;

ΙΩΝ Πάνυ γε, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης γε μουσικῆς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἠγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι ἠγωνίσω;

ΙΩΝ Τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἄθλων ἠνεγκάμεθα, ὦ Σώκρατες. b

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις· ἄγε δὴ ὅπως καὶ τὰ Παναθήνια νικήσο-
μεν.

ΙΩΝ Ἄλλ' ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν πολλάκις γε ἐζήλωσα ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥαψωδοὺς, 5
ὦ Ἴων, τῆς τέχνης· τὸ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν τὸ σῶμα κεκοσμησθαι
ἀεὶ πρέπον ὑμῶν εἶναι τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ ὡς καλλίστοις φαίνε-
σθαι, ἅμα δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔν τε ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς διατρί-
βειν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὀμήρῳ, τῷ
ἀρίστῳ καὶ θειοτάτῳ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ τὴν τούτου διάνοιαν 10
ἐκμανθάνειν, μὴ μόνον τὰ ἔπη, ζηλωτόν ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν c

Test.: 530b8 ἅμα δὲ—c1 ἐστιν Proclus *in R.* 1.158 Kroll; c1 οὐ γὰρ—c3
prius ποιητοῦ Prisc. XVIII 287 (= II p. 360 Hertz)

Titulus Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος T S F : πλάτωνος Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος W. De du-
plici titulo vide supra Exordium §3.1.

Nomina loquentium hic et in textu addidit Aldina, ad exemplum interpreta-
tionis Ficini ut videtur; vide Exordium §3.2 : desunt in T W S F.

530a1 τὰ νῦν T W : τανῦν S F a1 ἐπιεδεδήμηκας F a2 ἢ T W F : ἢ
S a4 ἀσκληπειῶν S F a7 alterum γε T W f^{s1} : τε S F a8
ἠγωνίζω S prius τί (sic, vide Exord. §5.2 (i)) T W S : τε F P^c b2–3
νικήσομεν T : νικήσωμεν W S F b4 ἐθέλη(i) T S(θέλη) F : ἐθέλοι W
b8 δὲ] δὲ καὶ Procl. b9 tert. καὶ om. S

- (530c) γένοιτό ποτε ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ. τὸν γὰρ ῥαψωδὸν ἐρμηνεῖα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· τοῦτο δὲ καλῶς ποι-
 5 εῖν μὴ γινώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς ἀδύνατον. ταῦτα οὖν πάντα ἄξια ζηλοῦσθαι.

ΙΩΝ Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐμοὶ γοῦν τοῦτο πλεῖστον ἔργον παρέσχεν τῆς τέχνης, καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἂν θρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμ
 d ψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πάποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολ-
 λὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Ἴων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ φθονήσεις μοι
 5 ἐπιδείξαι.

ΙΩΝ Καὶ μὴν ἄξιόν γε ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ κεκόσμηκα τὸν Ὀμηρον· ὥστε οἶμαι ὑπὸ Ὀμηριδῶν ἄξιός ἐστιν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθῆναι.

- ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔτι ποιήσομαι σχολὴν ἀκροᾶσθαι σου.
 531a νῦν δέ μοι τοσόνδε ἀπόκριναί· πότερον περὶ Ὀμήρου δεινὸς εἶ μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου;

ΙΩΝ Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ περὶ Ὀμήρου μόνον· ἱκανὸν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

- 5 ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὲ περὶ οὗτου Ὀμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσιόδος ταῦτα λέγετον;—ΙΩΝ Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ πολλά.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν περὶ τούτων κάλλιον ἂν ἐξηγήσαιο ἢ Ὀμηρος λέγει ἢ ἢ
 b Ἡσιόδος;—ΙΩΝ Ὀμοίως ἂν περὶ γε τούτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ ὧν ταῦτα λέγουσιν.—ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὧν πέρι μὴ ταῦτα λέγουσιν; οἶον περὶ μαντικῆς λέγει τι Ὀμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσί-

Test.: c1 οὐ γὰρ—c3 prius ποιητοῦ Prisc. XVIII 287 (= II p. 360 Hertz)

c2 ποτε om. Prisc. ἀγαθὸς SF Prisc. : om. TW συνείη SF Prisc. (CΥΝΕΙΝ vel CΥΝΘΙΝ; vide app. Hertzii) : συνείη Wf : συνίη T c3 prius τοῦ om. Prisc. (ΥΠΟΙΗΤΟΥ codd. plerique) c7 ἐμοὶ γοῦν WS : ἐμοὶ γ' οὖν T : ἔμοιγ' οὖν F d6 γε SF : om. TW d9 ἀκροᾶσθαι TW : ἀκροάσασθαι SF 531a1-2 δεινὸς εἶ μόνον S (δεινὸς εἶ ἡμόνον revera F) : μόνον δεινὸς εἶ TW a2 ἢ TW f^sl : om. SF a3 γὰρ TW f^sl : om. SF a5 ταῦτα T : ταῦτα WSF b2 prius ταῦτα T : ταῦτα W : ταῦτα F : ταῦτα S alt. ταῦτα W (sic) : ταῦτα TSF b3 τε TWF : om. S

οδος.—ΙΩΝ Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅσα τε ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα (531b)
 διαφόρως περὶ μαντικῆς λέγετον τῷ ποιητῷ τούτῳ, πότερον 5
 σὺ κάλλιον ἂν ἐξηγήσαιο ἢ τῶν μάντεων τις τῶν ἀγαθῶν;—
 ΙΩΝ Τῶν μάντεων.—ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ σὺ ἦσθα μάντις, οὐκ εἴπερ
 περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως λεγομένων οἴός τ' ἦσθα ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ
 περὶ τῶν διαφόρως λεγομένων ἠπίστῳ ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι;—ΙΩΝ
 Δῆλον ὅτι. 10

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ποτε περὶ μὲν Ὅμηρου δεινὸς εἶ, περὶ δὲ Ἡσι- 531c
 ὄδου οὐ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν; ἢ Ὅμηρος περὶ ἄλλων
 τινῶν λέγει ἢ ὧν περὶ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ περὶ
 πολέμου τε τὰ πολλὰ διελήλυθεν καὶ περὶ ὀμιλιῶν πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ 5
 δημιουργῶν, καὶ περὶ θεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώ-
 πους ὀμιλοῦντων ὡς ὀμιλοῦσι, καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων παθη-
 μάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄϊδου, καὶ γενέσεις καὶ θεῶν καὶ
 ἡρώων; οὐ ταυτὰ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν Ὅμηρος τὴν ποιήσιν πεποιή- d
 κεν;

ΙΩΝ Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων;

ΙΩΝ Ναί, ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁμοίως πεποιήκασι καὶ 5
 Ὅμηρος.

ΣΩ. Τί μήν; κάκιον;

ΙΩΝ Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄμεινον;

ΙΩΝ Ἄμεινον μέντοι νῆ Δία. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλη κεφαλῆ Ἴων, ὅταν περὶ ἀριθμοῦ
 πολλῶν λεγόντων εἰς τις ἄριστα λέγη, γνῶσεται δήπου τις
 τὸν εὖ λέγοντα;—ΙΩΝ Φημί.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς e
 ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς κακῶς λέγοντας, ἢ ἄλλος;—ΙΩΝ Ὁ αὐτὸς
 δήπου.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν τέχνην ἔχων οὗτός
 ἐστίν;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν πολλῶν λεγόντων περὶ
 ὑγιεινῶν σιτίων ὁποῖά ἐστίν, εἰς τις ἄριστα λέγη; πότερον 5
 ἕτερος μὲν τις τὸν ἄριστα λέγοντα γνῶσεται ὅτι ἄριστα

c2 ἢ S(ut vid.)F : ἢ T W F P^c c4 τε T W : γε S F d7 τί μήν· κάκιον
 dist. T : τί μήν κάκιον W S F d12 λέγη T W : λέγει S F e2 ὅσπερ
 T W S f : ὅσπερ F e5 εἰς T W f^l : εἴ S F λέγη T : λέγει W S F
 e7 ὁ αὐτός S F(-ὸς) : αὐτός T W

- (531e) λέγει, ἕτερος δὲ τὸν κάκιον ὅτι κάκιον, ἢ ὁ αὐτός;—ΙΩΝ Δῆλον δῆπου, ὁ αὐτός.—ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;—ΙΩΝ Ἰατρός.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν ὡς ὁ αὐτός γινώσεται αἰεὶ, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλῶν λεγόντων, ὅστις
 10 532a τε εὖ λέγει καὶ ὅστις κακῶς· ἢ εἰ μὴ γινώσεται τὸν κακῶς λέγοντα, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν εὖ, περὶ γε τοῦ αὐτοῦ;—ΙΩΝ Οὕτως.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς γίνεταί δεινὸς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ φῆς καὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ
 5 τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητάς, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος ἐστίν, περὶ γε τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν εὖ γε, τοὺς δὲ χεῖρον;—ΙΩΝ Καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγω.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ τὸν εὖ λέγοντα γινώσκεις, καὶ τοὺς χεῖρον
 b λέγοντας γινώσκεις ἂν ὅτι χεῖρον λέγουσιν;—ΙΩΝ Ἔοικέν γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὁμοίως τὸν Ἴωνα λέγοντες περὶ Ὀμήρου τε δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν οὐχ ἀμαρτησόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ γε αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν
 5 ἕσσεσθαι κριτὴν ἰκανὸν πάντων ὅσοι ἂν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγωσι, τοὺς δὲ ποιητάς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν;
 ΙΩΝ Τί οὖν ποτε τὸ αἴτιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν μὲν τις περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ποιητοῦ διαλέγεται, οὔτε προσέχω τὸν νοῦν ἀδυνατῶ τε καὶ ὀτιοῦν συμβαλέσθαι λόγου ἄξιον,
 c ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς νυστάζω, ἐπειδὴν δέ τις περὶ Ὀμήρου μνησθῆ, εὐθύς τε ἐγρήγορα καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν καὶ εὐπορῶ ὅτι λέγω;
 ΣΩ. Οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτό γε εἰκάσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ παντὶ
 5 δῆλον ὅτι τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη περὶ Ὀμήρου λέγειν ἀδύνατος εἶ· εἰ γὰρ τέχνη οἷός τε ἦσθα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν ἀπάντων λέγειν οἷός τ' ἂν ἦσθα· ποιητικὴ γὰρ που ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον. ἢ οὐ;

e7–8 post αὐτός (e7) lacunam ex rasura praebet S, qui et δῆλον ... αὐτός om.; lacuna angustior est quam ut litteras omissas contineat e8 τί (sic) οὗτος (sic) τί ὄνομα ex τί ὄνομα fecit f^{s1} et mg e9 λέγομεν ὡς W SPC f(λεγόμεν (sic); ὡς ex os) : λεγόμενος F : λέγωμεν ὡς T ὁ T W SPC : om. F 532a2 δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ] δῆλον δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ F, ὅτι οὐ supra δὲ add. f a3 οὐκοῦν (sic) F, οὐ f^{s1} b4 ὁμολογεῖ T W S f : ὁμολόγει F b6 λέγωσι T S F : λέγουσι W τοὺς T W S : τούτους F b7 ποτε τὸ T W S(ταῖτιον) : πότῃ τ' F ἐγὼ T W S fmg : ἔχω F c4 παντὶ T W f(τῖ^{s1}) : πάντη S F c7 ἀπάντων λέγειν om. W

ΙΩΝ Ναί.

(532c)

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴν λάβῃ τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν 10
ὅλην, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεώς ἐστι περὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν d
τεχνῶν; πῶς τοῦτο λέγω, δεῖ τί μου ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Ἴων;

ΙΩΝ Ναί μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε· χαίρω γὰρ
ἀκούων ὑμῶν τῶν σοφῶν.

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην ἂν σε ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων· ἀλλὰ σοφοὶ 5
μὲν που ἐστὲ ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψωδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς
ἄδετε τὰ ποιήματα, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τάληθῆ λέγω, οἷον
εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον. ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τούτου οὐ νῦν ἡρό- e
μην σε, θέασαι ὡς φαῦλον καὶ ἰδιωτικόν ἐστι καὶ παντὸς
ἀνδρὸς γινῶναι ὃ ἔλεγον, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σκέψιν, ἐπειδὴν
τις ὅλην τέχνην λάβῃ. λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ· γραφικὴ γάρ

τις ἐστὶ τέχνη τὸ ὅλον;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ γρα- 5
φῆς πολλοὶ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασιν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι;—

ΙΩΝ Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἦδη οὖν τινα εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν
Πολυγνώτου τοῦ Ἀγλαοφῶντος δεινὸς ἐστὶν ἀποφαίνειν ἃ
εὖ τε γράφει καὶ ἃ μὴ, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων γραφῶν ἀδύνα-
τος, καὶ ἐπειδὴν μὲν τις τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζωγράφων ἔργα ἐπι- 533a
δεικνύῃ, νυστάζει τε καὶ ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὅτι συμβά-
ληται, ἐπειδὴν δὲ περὶ Πολυγνώτου ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου βούλει
τῶν γραφῶν, ἐνὸς μόνου, δέῃ ἀποφύνασθαι γνώμην, ἐγρή-
γορέν τε καὶ προσέχει τὸν νοῦν καὶ εὐπορεῖ ὅτι εἴπη;—ΙΩΝ 5

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ; ἦδη
τιν' εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν Δαιδάλου τοῦ Μητίωνος ἢ Ἐπειοῦ
τοῦ Πανοπέως ἢ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Σαμίου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς b
ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ, ἐνὸς πέρι, δεινὸς ἐστὶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἃ εὖ
πεποιήκεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδριαντοποιῶν ἔργοις
ἀπορεῖ τε καὶ νυστάζει, οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴπη;—ΙΩΝ Οὐ μὰ

τὸν Δία, οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἐώρακα.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὡς γ' ἐγὼ 5
οἶμαι, οὐδ' ἐν ἀυλήσει γε οὐδὲ ἐν κιθαρίσει οὐδὲ ἐν κιθα-

d1 ἐστι T W : ἔσται SF d6 ὑποκριταὶ W S F : οἱ ὑποκριταὶ T d7
τὰ T W : om. S F τάληθῆ T W S F : τὰ πλήθη Madvig : εὐήθη Schanz :
εὐτελεῆ vel τὰ εὐτελεῆ H. Richards e1 νῦν] νυνδῆ Schanz e4 al-
terum γὰρ T W : om. S F e5 ναί om. W 533a2 ἔχει W S F : ἔχη T
ὅτι T W : ὅτι ἂν S F a6 ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ(1) T S F : ἀνδριαντοποιία W
a7 Μητίωνος T S F(ex μητίνοος) : Μητίωνος W b5 οὐδὲ T W : οὔτε
S F ὡς γ' ἐγὼ T W : ὡς ἔγωγε S F b6 οὐδ' ἐν T W S : οὐδὲν F

- (533b) ραψοδία οὐδὲ ἐν ραψοδία οὐδεπώποτ' εἶδες ἄνδρα ὅστις περὶ μὲν Ὀλύμπου δεινός ἐστιν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ περὶ Θαμύρου ἢ
 c περὶ Ὀρφέως ἢ περὶ Φημίου τοῦ Ἴθακησίου ραψωδοῦ, περὶ δὲ Ἴωνος τοῦ Ἐφεσίου ραψωδοῦ ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει συμβαλέσθαι ἅ τε εὖ ραψωδεῖ καὶ ἂ μή.

ΙΩΝ Οὐκ ἔχω σοι περὶ τούτου ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες·
 5 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα, ὅτι περὶ Ὀμήρου κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων λέγω καὶ εὐπορῶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες με φασὶν εὖ λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὔ. καίτοι ὄρα τοῦτο τί ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁρῶ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ ἄρχομαι γέ σοι ἀποφαινόμενος
 d ὃ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὄν παρὰ σοι περὶ Ὀμήρου εὖ λέγειν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναμις, ἢ σε κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ ἦν Εὐριπίδης μὲν Μαγνητῆν ὠνόμασεν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ Ἑρακλείαν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη
 5 ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις, ὥστε δύνασθαι ταῦτόν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν
 e δακτυλίους, ὥστ' ἐνίοτε ὀρμαθὸς μακρὸς πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται· πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ δύναμις ἀνήρτηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐν-

Test.: 533d1 ἔστι—534b6 ἐνῆ Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.5.3; d1 ἔστι—d3 κινεῖ et d5 οὐ μόνον—e5 ἐξαπτᾶται Proclus *in R.* 1.183 Kroll. Totum locum 533d1—534d4 respiciunt Lucr. 6.906 ss., Philo *De opif. mundi* 140 s.

c2 ραψωδοῦ SF : om. TW c2–3 συμβαλέσθαι WSF : συμβάλλεσθαι
 T c6 με φασὶν TW : ἐμέ φασιν S : ἐμέ φασὶν F c7 οὔ. καίτοι] οὔ.
 κει F, αίτοι f^{sl} d1 prius τοῦτο TW : ταῦτα S : τοῦ F γὰρ TW f^{sl}
 Procl. Stob. : δὲ SF τέχνη WSF Procl. Stob. : τέχνηι T ὄν] ἂν
 Stob. d2 ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον om. Procl. d5–6 αὐτοὺς ... δακτυλίοις]
 αὐτοὺς ἄγει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τοὺς σιδηροῦς δακτυλίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν
 αὐτοῖς ὄλκον τῶν ὁμοίων ἐντίθησιν Procl. d5 ἄγει WSF Procl. Stob.
 : om. T d6 ὥστε TW f Procl. Stob. : ὥστ' αὐ SF d7 δύνασθαι ...
 λίθος om. Procl. e1 ὥστ' ἐνίοτε TWSF Stob. : καὶ πολλακίς Procl.
 μακρὸς πάνυ TWSF : πάνυ μακρὸς Stob. : om. Procl. e1 σιδηρίων
 SP^c(-ήριων, sic) F Procl. Stob. : σιδήρων TWS; σιδηρῶν Jacobs e1–
 2 σιδηρίων(-ήρων TW) καὶ δακτυλίων TWSF Stob. : δακτυλίων ἢ
 σιδηρίων Procl. καὶ secl. Jacobs e2 ἤρτηται] εἴρεται (sic) Stob.
 δὲ TWSF Stob. : δὲ ἄρα Procl. alt. ἐξ TWSF Stob. : ἀπ' Procl.
 e3 ἀνήρτηται TWSF Stob. : ἐξήρτηται Procl.

θεούς μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων (533e)
 ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὄρμαθός ἐξαρτᾶται. πάντες γὰρ οἷ τε τῶν 5
 ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ
 κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ
 μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως· ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες
 οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω μὲν καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ 534a
 οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἐπειδὴν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἄρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν, καὶ
 βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, ὥσπερ αἱ βᾶκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ
 τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι, ἔμφρονες δὲ 5
 οὔσαι οὐ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ
 αὐτοὶ λέγουσι. λέγουσι γὰρ δῆπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ
 ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρῦτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ b
 ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτ-
 ται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσι. κοῦφον
 γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ
 πρότερον οἴος τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεός τε γένηται καὶ 5
 ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μήκετι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ· ἕως δ' ἂν τουτὶ ἔχη
 τὸ κτήμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησιμο-
 δεῖν. ἄτε οὖν οὐ τέχνη ποιούντες τε καὶ πολλὰ λέγοντες καὶ
 καλὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ σὺ περὶ Ὀμηροῦ, ἀλλὰ 534c

Test.: 533d1 ἔστι—534b6 ἐνῆ Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.5.3; d5 οὐ μόνον—e5
 ἐξαρτᾶται Proclus *in R.* 1.183 Kroll; e5 πάντες γὰρ—e8 μελοποιοὶ Proclus
in R. 1.184 Kroll; 534b3 κοῦφον—b6 ἔκφρων; b8 ἄτε οὐ—c3 ὄρμησεν
 Proclus *in R.* 1.184 Kroll

e4 μὲν TSF Procl. Stob. : om. W αὐτῆ SF Stob.(MS P, αὐτῆ F) :
 αὐτῆ TW : αὐτούς Procl. ἄλλων TWSF Procl. : ἄλλος Stob. e5
 οἷ τε om. Stob. e7 καλὰ TSF Procl. Stob. : κακὰ W e8 μελοποιοὶ
 TWSFPC Procl. : μὲν λοιποὶ F Stob. 534a1–2 ὀρχοῦνται ... ὄντες
 om. Stob. a1 μὲν SF : om. TW a3 alt. καὶ TW : om. SF Stob.
 a4 αἱ βᾶκχαι om. Stob. ἀρύονται WF Stob. : ἀρύτονται TS a5
 κατεχόμενοι Stob. a6 οὔσαι οὐ TWSf : οὔσαι F : οὐ Stob. a7
 πρὸς TSF Stob. : παρ' W b1 ἐκ TWSF : ἡ ἐκ Stob. b3
 πετόμενοι TWS(ut vid.) FPC (prius o ex ω) : πετόμενοι F Stob. b5
 alt. τε TWf Procl. : om. SF Stob. b6 καὶ TWSF : κἂν Stob.
 μήκετι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ TWF (S incert.) : ἐν αὐτῷ μήκετι ἡ Stob. b8 οὖν
 om. Procl. τε SF : om. TW Procl.

- (534c) θεία μοίρα, τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ' ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὃ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὃ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὃ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὃ δ' ἔπη, ὃ δ' ἰάμβους· τὰ δ' ἄλλα φαῦλος
- 5 αὐτῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ τέχνη ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ θεία δυνάμει, ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ περὶ ἑνὸς τέχνη καλῶς ἠπίσταντο λέγειν, κὰν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων· διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρεταῖς καὶ
- d τοῖς χρησμοδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς. μέγιστον
- 5 δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ Τύννιχος ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποίησε ποίημα ὅτου τις ἂν ἀξιώσειεν μνησθῆναι, τὸν δὲ παιῶνα ὃν πάντες ἄδουσι, σχεδόν τι πάντων μελῶν κάλλιστον, ἀτεχνῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει, “εὕρημά τι
- e Μοισᾶν.” ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ δὴ μάλιστά μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι ἡμῖν, ἵνα μὴ διστάζωμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπινά ἐστιν τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα ποιήματα οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεία καὶ θεῶν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν
- 5 κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν ἕκαστος κατέχηται. ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεὸς ἐξεπίτηδες διὰ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου ποιητοῦ τὸ
- 535a κάλλιστον μέλος ἦσεν· ἢ οὐ δοκῶ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων;
- ἸΩΝ Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔμοιγε· ἅπτει γάρ πως μου τοῖς λόγοις τῆς ψυχῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί μοι δοκοῦσι θεία μοίρα ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ταῦτα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἐρμηνεύειν.

Test.: b8 ἄτε οὐ—c3 ὥρμησεν Procl. in R. 1.184 Kroll; c6 ἐπεὶ—d4 ἡμᾶς Stob. *Ecl.* 2.5.3

c2 οἷός τε ἕκαστος] ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἐστι Procl. καλῶς WSF Procl. : καλῶς T c6 εἴπερ SF : εἰ T W Stob. c7 κὰν T W Stob. : καὶ SF ἀπάντων T W : πάντων SF Stob. d1 ἵνα T W Stob. : ἵνα μὴ SF d2 post λέγοντες verba τὰ οὕτω λέγοντες add. Stob.; vide Wachsmuth d3 οὕτω T W S F : τὰ οὕτω Stob. ἀλλ' ὁ T S F : ἀλλὰ ὁ Stob. : ἀλλὰ W d3–4 αὐτὸς ἐστὶν T W S F : ἐστὶν αὐτὸς Stob. d5 λόγῳ] λόγῳ γος (sic) F; post λόγῳ vestigia 3–4 litt. praebet S τύννιχος ex τύνιχος f d7 παιῶνα W : παιῶνα T S F d8 λέγει ex λέγεις F; λέγεις S εὕρημά τι Ven. 186 (ex -μό τι) E : εὕρηματι (sic) s f : εὕρηματι T W S F e1 μοισαν sine acc. F 535a2 γάρ πως μου W : γὰρ πῶς μου T : γάρ μου πῶς F (S non legitur)

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς αὖ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἔρμη- 5 (535a)
νεύετε;

ΙΩΝ Καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρμηνέων ἐρμηνῆς γίνεσθε;

ΙΩΝ Παντάπασι γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε δὴ· τόδε μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψη ὅτι **b**
ἂν σε ἔρωμαι. ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς μάλιστα τοὺς
θεωμένους, ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐδὸν ἐφαλλό-
μενον ἄδῃς, ἐκφανῇ γιγνόμενον τοῖς μνηστῆρσι καὶ ἐκχέον-
τα τοὺς οἰστοὺς πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἢ Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐπὶ τὸν Ἔκτορα **5**
ὀρμώντα, ἢ καὶ τῶν περὶ Ἄνδρομάχην ἐλεινῶν τι ἢ περὶ
Ἐκάβην ἢ περὶ Πρίαμον, τότε πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ἕξω
σαυτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἶεταί σου εἶναι ἢ **c**
ψυχῇ οἷς λέγεις ἐνθουσιάζουσα, ἢ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ οὖσιν ἢ ἐν
Τροίᾳ ἢ ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχη;

ΙΩΝ Ὡς ἐναργὲς μοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τεκμήριον
εἶπες· οὐ γὰρ σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἔρω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλεινόν **5**
τι λέγω, δακρῦον ἐμπίμπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν τε
φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἴστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ
καρδία πηδᾷ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; φῶμεν, ὦ Ἴων, ἔμφρονα εἶναι τότε τοῦτον **d**
τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃς ἂν κεκοσμημένος ἐσθῆτι ποικίλῃ καὶ χρυ-
σοῖσι στεφάνοις κλάη τ' ἐν θυσίαις καὶ ἑορταῖς, μηδὲν ἀπο-
λωλεκῶς τούτων, ἢ φοβῆται πλέον ἢ ἐν δισμυρίοις ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἐστηκῶς φίλοις, μηδενὸς ἀποδύοντος μηδὲ ἀδικούντος; **5**

ΙΩΝ Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς γε τάληθές
εἰρήσθαι.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν θεατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ταυτὰ
ταῦτα ὑμεῖς ἐργάζεσθε;

b1 ἔχε δὴ· τόδε μοι εἰπέ scripsi : ἔχε δὴ μοι τόδε· εἰπέ W : ἔχε δὴ μοι.
τόδε· εἰπέ T : ἔχε δὴ· καὶ μοι τόδε εἰπέ S F (δὴ· καὶ ex δὴ· μοι καί, μοι sl et
erasum) b2 σε ex συ S ἔρωμαι F b3 οὐδὸν W S F t : ὀδὸν T
b6 ὀρμώνται F c2 οὖσιν T W F : οὖσα S c3 ὅπως T S F : πῶς W
d1 εἶναι τότε τοῦτον W F : εἶναι τοῦτον τότε T : τότε εἶναι τοῦτον S
d2-3 χρυσοῖσι S F : χρυσοῖς T W d3 κλαίη(ι) T W S f : καὶ ἢ F (in mg
κλίει vel κλαίει add. f) d4 φοβῆται T S : φοβεῖται W F d5 φίλοις
T W : φίλοις S F d6 οὐ πάνυ s^{mg}, om. S d8-9 ταυτὰ ταῦτα T S F :
τὰ ταυτὰ W

535e ΙΩΝ Καὶ μάλα καλῶς οἶδα· καθορῶ γὰρ ἐκάστοτε αὐ-
 τοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος κλάοντάς τε καὶ δεινὸν
 ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας τοῖς λεγομένοις. δεῖ γάρ
 με καὶ σφόδρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν· ὡς ἂν μὲν κλά-
 5 οντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω, αὐτὸς γελάσομαι ἀργύριον λαμβά-
 νων, ἂν δὲ γελῶντας, αὐτὸς κλαύσομαι ἀργύριον ἀπολλύς.

ΣΩ. Οἴσθα οὖν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατῆς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ
 ἔσχατος ὢν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλειώτιδος λίθου ἀπ'
 ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν λαμβάνειν; ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ῥαψωδὸς
 536a καὶ ὑποκριτῆς, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητῆς· ὁ δὲ θεὸς διὰ
 πάντων τούτων ἔλκει τὴν ψυχὴν ὅποι ἂν βούληται τῶν ἀν-
 θρώπων, ἀνακρεμαννὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ ὥσπερ
 ἐκ τῆς λίθου ἐκείνης ὄρμαθὸς πάμπολυς ἐξήρηται χορευ-
 5 τῶν τε καὶ διδασκάλων καὶ ὑποδιδασκάλων, ἐκ πλαγίου
 ἐξηρητημένων τῶν τῆς Μούσης ἐκκρεμαμένων δακτυλίων.
 καὶ ὁ μὲν τῶν ποιητῶν ἐξ ἄλλης Μούσης, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλης
 ἐξήρηται—ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ
 b παραπλήσιον· ἔχεται γάρ—ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν πρώτων δα-
 κτυλίων, τῶν ποιητῶν, ἄλλοι ἐξ ἄλλου αὐτῶν ἠρητημένοι εἰσὶ
 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐξ Ὀρφέως, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Μουσαίου·
 οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ ἔχονται, ὢν σύ,
 5 ὦ Ἴων, εἷς εἶ· καὶ κατέχει ἐξ Ὀμήρου, καὶ ἐπειδὴ μὲν τις
 ἄλλου τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἄδη, καθεύδεις τε καὶ ἀπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς,
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ φθέγγεται τις μέλος, εὐθὺς
 ἐγρήγορας καὶ ὀρχεῖται σου ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ εὐπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς·
 c οὐ γὰρ τέχνη οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη περὶ Ὀμήρου λέγεις ἢ λέγεις,
 ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα καὶ κατοκωχῆ, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες
 ἐκεῖνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὁξέως ὃ ἂν ἦ τοῦ

e3 ἐμβλέποντας T W SP^c : ἐκβλέποντας F e5 καθίσω T W : κατίδω
 SF e6 αὐτοὺς F κλαύσομαι T W S : κλαύσομαι F ἀπολλύς f,
 ex ἀπόλλυς F e8 ὢν T W : ὄν SF ἠρακλειώτιδος SF 536a2
 ὅποι ἂν T W SP^c : ὀποῖαν F a2–3 ἀνθρώπων T W SP^c (ἄ; ante ἄν-
 lacunam ex rasura praebet; vide comm.) : ἀπανθρώπων F a8 αὐτοὶ ex
 αὐτὸ S τὸ δέ T W S : τόδ' F b2 αὐτῶν ἠρητημένοι T S F : ἀνηρητημένοι
 W b5 ὦ T W fmg : om. SF b6 ἄδη ... b7 ποιητοῦ fmg (sed ἄδει
 pro αἴδη(ι) praebet), om. F b6 λέγῃς T W S F : λέγεις WP^c (ei sl)
 b8 λέγῃς T : λέγεις W S F c2 κατοκωχῆ W S F (-χῆ) : κατακωχῆ T :
 κατακωχῆ SP^c

θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ (536c)
 σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φρον- 5
 τίζουσιν· οὕτω καὶ σύ, ὦ Ἴων, περὶ μὲν Ὀμήρου ὅταν τις
 μνησθῆ, εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπορεῖς· τούτου δ'
 ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὃ μ' ἐρωτᾷς, δι' ὅτι σὺ περὶ μὲν Ὀμήρου d
 εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ θεία
 μοίρα Ὀμήρου δεινὸς εἶ ἐπαινήτης.

ΙΩΝ Σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμάζοιμι μεντᾶν εἰ
 οὕτως εὖ εἴποις ὥστε με ἀναπεῖσαι ὡς ἐγὼ κατεχόμενος καὶ 5
 μαινόμενος Ὀμηρον ἐπαινῶ. οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαιμι,
 εἴ μου ἀκούσαις λέγοντός τι περὶ Ὀμήρου.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐθέλω γε ἀκούσαι, οὐ μέντοι πρότερον πρὶν
 ἂν μοι ἀποκρίνη τόδε· ὦν Ὀμηρος λέγει περὶ τίνος εὖ e
 λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ δήπου περὶ πάντων γε.

ΙΩΝ Εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὦν σὺ μὲν τυγχάνεις οὐκ
 εἰδώς, Ὀμηρος δὲ λέγει. 5

ΙΩΝ Καὶ ταῦτα ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ Ὀμηρος μὲν λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ
 οὐκ οἶδα;

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν μέντοι λέγει πολλαχοῦ Ὀμηρος 537a
 καὶ πολλά; οἷον καὶ περὶ ἠνιοχείας· ἐὰν μνησθῶ τὰ ἔπη, ἐγὼ
 σοὶ φράσω.

ΙΩΝ Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· ἐγὼ γὰρ μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δή μοι ἃ λέγει Νέστωρ Ἀντιλόχῳ τῷ υἱεῖ, παραι- 5
 νῶν εὐλαβηθῆναι περὶ τὴν καμπὴν ἐν τῇ ἵπποδρομίᾳ τῇ ἐπὶ
 Πατρόκλῳ.—ΙΩΝ

d4 σὺ μὲν εὖ T W : εὖ μὲν SF(σὺ add. Fmg) θαυμάζοιμι T W SPC :
 θαυμάζοι SF d4-5 εἰ οὕτως F : οὕτως εἰ T W S d7 λέγοντός τι (-
 ος τί) SF : λέγοντος T W e1 τόδε ὦν T W SPC fmg : τὸ δέον SF
 λέγει T W : εὖ λέγει SF e2 λέγεις Cornarius *Ecl.* 89 : λέγει T W SF
 537a1 πολλαχοῦ ὄμηρος T W : ὄμηρος πολλαχοῦ SF a2 ἠνιοχείας ex
 ἠνιοχίας T F

- (537a) Κλινθῆναι δέ, φησί, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐϋξέστω ἐνὶ δίφρῳ
 b ἦκ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοῖν· ἀτὰρ τὸν δεξιὸν ἵππον
 κένσαι ὀμοκλήσας, εἶξαι τέ οἱ ἠνία χερσίν.
 ἐν νύσση δέ τοι ἵππος ἀριστερὸς ἐγχριμφθήτω,
 ὡς ἂν τοι πλήμνη γε δοάσεται ἄκρον ἰκέσθαι
 5 κύκλου ποιητοῖο· λίθου δ' ἀλέασθαι ἐπαυρεῖν.
- c ΣΩ. Ἄρκεϊ. ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Ἴων, τὰ ἔπει εἶτε ὀρθῶς λέγει
 Ὅμηρος εἶτε μὴ, πότερος ἂν γνοίη ἄμεινον, ἰατρὸς ἢ ἠνίο-
 χος;—ΙΩΝ Ἠνίοχος δῆπου.—ΣΩ. Πότερον ὅτι τέχνην
 ταύτην ἔχει ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι;—ΙΩΝ Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τέχνην.—
 5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἀποδέδοται τι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ
 ἔργον οἷα τε εἶναι γινώσκεις; οὐ γάρ που ἃ κυβερνητικῇ
 γινώσκομεν, γνωσόμεθα καὶ ἰατρικῇ.—ΙΩΝ Οὐ δῆτα.—
 ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε ἃ ἰατρικῇ, ταῦτα καὶ τεκτονικῇ.—ΙΩΝ Οὐ
 d δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃ τῇ
 ἑτέρα τέχνη γινώσκομεν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα τῇ ἑτέρα; τόδε δέ
 μοι πρότερον τούτου ἀπόκριναι· τὴν μὲν, ἑτέραν φῆς εἶναι
 τινα τέχνην, τὴν δέ, ἑτέραν;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὥσπερ
 5 ἐγὼ τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅταν ἡ μὲν, ἐτέρων πραγμάτων ἢ
 ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δέ, ἐτέρων, οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν, ἄλλην, τὴν δέ,
 e ἄλλην τέχνην, οὕτω καὶ σύ;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εἰ γάρ που
 τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις, τί ἂν τὴν μὲν ἐτέ-
 ραν φαίμεν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν, ὅποτε γε ταῦτά εἴη εἰδέναι

537a8–b5: II. 23.335–340

a8 αὐτὸς δὲ κλινθῆναι libri Homerici ἐϋξέστω TWF(εὐ) : ἐϋπλέκτω
 S cum libris Hom. ἐϋξέστω ἐνὶ δίφρῳ] ἐϋξέστω ἐπὶ δίφρου X. Smp.
 4.6 b1 τοῖν TWSf : τοῖν F b2 τέ TWS : δέ F b3 νύσση
 TW(-η) : νύση S : νύσι F ἐγχριμφθήτω TWS : ἐμχριμφθήτω F
 b4 ἂν WPCF (etiam libri Hom.) : μὴ TWS c1 ταῦτα δὴ TW : δὴ
 ταῦτα SF c4 ἀλλ' ὅτι TW : ἄλλο τι SF c6 οἷα τε T : οἷά τε W : ὀ-
 ἔστε S(ὄ ἐ-)F που TW : δῆπου SF ἃ] ἂν F d1 κατὰ TW : τὰ
 SF d3 τὴν μὲν, ἑτέραν dist. WFE : τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν T : nulla dist. in
 S; de dist. vide comm. ad 537d3–4 d4 τὴν δέ, ἑτέραν dist. WSF; nul-
 lam dist. post τὴν δ' praebent TE d5–6 ἡ μὲν, ... ἡ δέ, dist. W; ἡ μὲν,
 etiam E d6 τὴν μὲν, ... τὴν δέ, dist. E : τὴν μὲν ... τὴν δέ dist. T :
 nulla dist. in WSF e1 οὕτω ex οὐ S e3 ταῦτά T : ταυτὰ W :
 ταῦτα SF

ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων; ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε γινώσκω ὅτι πέντε εἰσὶν (537e)
οὔτοι οἱ δάκτυλοι, καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, περὶ τούτων ταῦτα 5
γινώσκεις· καὶ εἴ σε ἐγὼ ἐροίμην εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ γινώ-
σκομεν τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἢ ἄλλη,
φαίης ἂν δήπου τῇ αὐτῇ.—ΙΩΝ Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔμελλον ἐρήσεσθαί σε, νυνὶ εἰπέ, εἰ 538a
κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, τῇ μὲν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ
τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γινώσκεις, τῇ δ' ἑτέρα μὴ τὰ
αὐτά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄλλη ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἕτερα γινώσκ-
εις.—ΙΩΝ Οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 5
ὅστις ἂν μὴ ἔχη τινὰ τέχνην, ταύτης τῆς τέχνης τὰ λεγόμενα
ἢ πραττόμενα καλῶς γινώσκεις οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσται;—ΙΩΝ
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐπῶν ὧν εἶπες, b
εἴτε καλῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μὴ, σὺ κάλλιον γνώσει ἢ
ἡνίοχος;—ΙΩΝ Ἡνίοχος.—ΣΩ. Ῥαψῳδὸς γάρ που εἰ ἄλλ'
οὐχ ἡνίοχος.—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ Ῥαψῳδικὴ τέχνη ἑτέρα
ἐστὶ τῆς ἡνιοχικῆς;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἑτέρα, περὶ 5
ἑτέρων καὶ ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων ἐστίν.—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τί
δὲ δὴ ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγῃ ὡς τετρωμένῳ τῷ Μαχάονι
Ἐκαμήδη ἢ Νέστορος παλλακὴ κυκεῶνα πίνειν δίδωσι; καὶ
λέγει πως οὕτως· c

οἶνω πρᾶμνείῳ, φησίν, ἐπὶ δ' αἴγειον κνή τυρὸν
κνήστι χαλκείῃ· παρὰ δὲ κρόμουον ποτῶ ὕψον·

538c2–3: II. 11.639–640

e4 ἔγωγε SF e5 ταῦτα T : ταῦτα W : ταῦτα SF 538a6 ἔχει S
b3 alt. ἡνίοχος om. F b4 εἰ TSF : ἦι W b5–6 περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ
ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων TP^c (signis transpositionis additis) WSF : περὶ
ἑτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ ἐπιστήμη T : περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ πραγμάτων
ἐπιστήμη f (signis transp. add.) b7 δὴ TWSf^{s1} : om. F ὅταν] ἂν
ὅταν F b8 ἢ TWF(ex ἦν) : ἦ (sic) S παλλακὴ TSF : πολλακὴ W
post παλλακὴ verbum ἦν add. S κυκεῶνα ex κυκεῶ S πίνειν TW
: πειν SF c2 πρᾶμνίῳ F αἴγειον F κνήι W c3 κνήστι F
(sic; κνήστι libri Hom.) : κνήστη T(ex κνήστη)WS παρὰ TWF : ἐπὶ
S παρὰ (ἐπὶ) ... ὕψον] ἐπὶ δ' ἄλιφτα λευκὰ πάλυε libri Hom.

(538c) ταῦτα εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερον ἰατρικῆς
5 ἔστι διαγνῶναι καλῶς ἢ ῥαψωδικῆς;

IΩΝ Ἰατρικῆς.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὅταν λέγῃ Ὅμηρος·

d ἢ δὲ μολυβδαίνῃ ἰκέλη ἐς βυσσὸν ὄρουσεν,
ἢ τε κατ' ἀγραύλοιο βοδὸς κέρας ἐμμεμανῖα
ἔρχεται ὠμηστῆσι μετ' ἰχθύσι πῆμα φέρουσα·

ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἀλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρι-
5 ναι ἢ ῥαψωδικῆς, ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἴτε καλῶς εἴτε μή; IΩΝ
Δῆλον δὴ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἀλιευτικῆς.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ, σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροιο με· “Ἐπειδὴ τοί-
e νυν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν Ὅμηρῳ εὐρίσκεις
ἃ προσήκει ἐκάστη διακρίνειν, ἴθι μοι ἕξευρε καὶ τὰ τοῦ
μάντεώς τε καὶ μαντικῆς, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ προσήκει αὐτῷ οἶω τ'
εἶναι διαγιγνώσκειν, εἴτε εὖ εἴτε κακῶς πεποιήται”—σκέψαι
5 ὡς ῥαδίως τε καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ σοι ἀποκρινοῦμαι. πολλαχού-
μην γὰρ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα λέγει, οἶον καὶ ἃ ὁ τῶν Μελαμπο-
διδῶν λέγει μάντις πρὸς τοὺς μνηστῆρας, Θεοκλύμενος·

538d1–3: // 24.80–82

c4 prius εἴτε TSF : εἴπερ W c4–5 ἰατρικῆς ἔστι s^{mg}, om. S c6
ἰατρικῆς f^{mg}, om. F d1 μολυβδαίνῃ] μ supra -υβ- add. F βυσσὸν
S cum libris Hom. : βύσσον TF : πυθμέν' W t^{mg} S^l (ἢ πυθμένα)
ὄρουσεν F cum libris Hom. : ἵκανεν TWS f^{mg} d2 ἢ ex εἰ S(ut vid.)F
ἐμμεμανῖα TWSF et nonnulli libri Hom.] ἐμβεβανῖα libri Hom. plerique
d3 μετ'] ἐπ' libri Hom. πῆμα TWf et ἔναι τῶν κατὰ πόλεις (sc.
ἐκδόσεων) sec. schol. Hom. : κῆρα SF et libri Homerici d4–5 κρίναι
T : κρίναι WSF post λέγει in mg εἰ add. f καὶ om. SF d7
ἐρομένου TWFP^c : ἐρωμένου SF ἔροιο (sic) με ex ἐροίωμεν F
e4 διαγιγνώσκειν] ex γιγνώσκειν S (γιν-); ex δὲ γιγνώσκειν F e6 ἃ ὁ
ex oa T signo rei notabilis ` supra a et o addito; de hoc signo v. supra
537d3 e6–7 μελαμποδιδῶν TP^cW : μελαμποδιδῶν SF(sed habet
etiam πω sl) : μελαμποδῶν T f^{mg}

δαιμόνιοι, τί κακὸν τόδε πάσχετε; νυκτὶ μὲν ὕμεων **539a**
 εἰλύαται κεφαλαί τε πρόσωπά τε νέρθε τε γυῖα,
 οἴμωγῇ δὲ δέδηε, δεδάκρυνται δὲ παρειαί·
 εἰδῶλων τε πλέον πρόθυρον, πλεῖη δὲ καὶ αὐλῆ
 ἰεμένων ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον· ἥελιος δὲ **5**
 οὐρανοῦ ἐξαπόλωλε, κακὴ δ' ἐπιδέδρομεν ἀχλύς· **b**

πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι, οἶον καὶ ἐπὶ τειχομαχίᾳ· λέγει
 γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα·

ὄρνις γάρ σφιν ἐπῆλθε περησέμεναι μεμαῶσιν,
 αἰετὸς ὑψιπέτης, ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λαὸν ἐέργων, **5**
 φοινήεντα δράκοντα φέρων ὀνύχεσσι πέλωρον, **c**
 ζῶόν, ἔτ' ἀσπαίροντα· καὶ οὐπω λήθετο χάρμης.
 κόψε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα κατὰ στήθος παρὰ δειρῆν
 ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω, ὁ δ' ἀπὸ ἔθεν ἦκε χαμᾶζε
 ἀλγήσας ὀδύνησι, μέσῳ δ' ἐνὶ κάββαλ' ὀμίλῳ· **5**
 αὐτὸς δὲ κλάγξας πέτετο πνοιῆς ἀνέμοιο. **d**

ταῦτα φήσω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ μάντει προσήκειν καὶ σκο-
 πεῖν καὶ κρίνειν.

ΙΩΝ Ἀληθῆ γέ σοι λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες.

539a1–b1: *Od.* 20.351–353, 355–357; b4–d1: *Il.* 12.200–207

539a1 δαιμόνιοι] ᾧ δειλοί libri Homericī ὕμεων T S F (de ὕ- v. Exord. §5.2 (i)) : ὕμων W a2 γυῖα] γούνα libri Homericī a3 οἴμωγῇ δὲ δέδηε, δεδάκρυνται T W (δέδηαι T) : οἴμωγῇ δε δέδη, ἐδεδάκρυνται F; S non legitur post παρειαί in libris Homericis hic versus αἵματι δ' ἐρράδαται τοῖχοι καλαί τε μεσόδμοι a4 τε] δὲ S F πλείη] πλειη (ut vid.): εἰ F a5 ἔρεβόσδε] ἔρεβος δὲ S F (-βο- pc, -β- fmg) b2 prius καὶ T W f(per comp., supra lin.) : om. S F b5 ἀριστερὰ S c1 ὀνύχεσσι T S F : ὀνύχεσι W c3 κατὰ om. F; quae sl add. f non leguntur c4 ὀπίσω W S F : ὀπίσω T ὁ om. F c5 ἐνὶ κάββαλ' F(καββ- ex καμβ-) et libri Hom. plerique, v. West ad loc. : ἐνκάββαλ' T (revera legitur: ἐνκάββαλ' / λ' ὀμίλωι; fort. primitus scriba post prius λ apostrophum scripsit, deinde puncto supra λ scripto hanc litteram delere voluit; λ alterum in versu inferiore adest) : ἐνκάμβαλ' W : ἐγκάμβαλ' S d1 δὲ T W S f^{sl} : om. F πέτετο S F (alt. -ε- pc, ἦ (sic) supra π- add. f) cum libris Hom. : πέτατο W (ἔπα addidit W^{sl}) : ἔπετο T d4 γε om. W σοι T W : σοι S F

(539d) 5 ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γε, ὦ Ἴων, ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμοί, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐξέλεξα καὶ ἐξ Ὀδυσσεΐας καὶ ἐξ Ἰλιάδος ὅποια τοῦ μάντεώς ἐστι καὶ ὅποια τοῦ ἱατροῦ καὶ ὅποια e τοῦ ἀλιέως, οὕτω καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ ἔκλεξον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐμπειρότερος εἶ ἐμοῦ τῶν Ὀμήρου, ὅποια τοῦ ῥαψωδοῦ ἐστιν, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ῥαψωδικῆς, ἃ τῷ ῥαψωδῷ προσήκει καὶ σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ διακρίνειν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους 5 ἀνθρώπους.

ΙΩΝ Ἐγὼ μὲν φημι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἅπαντα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ σύ γε ἔφης, ὦ Ἴων, ἅπαντα· ἢ οὕτως ἐπιλήσιμων εἶ; καίτοι οὐκ ἂν πρέπει γε ἐπιλήσιμονα εἶναι ῥαψωδὸν ἄνδρα.

540a ΙΩΝ Τί δὲ δὴ ἐπιλανθάνομαι;

ΣΩ. Οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι ἔφησθα τὴν ῥαψωδικὴν τέχνην ἐτέραν εἶναι τῆς ἠνιοχικῆς;—ΙΩΝ Μέμνημαι.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐτέραν οὖσαν ἕτερα γνώσεσθαι ὠμολόγεις;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.

5 —ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πάντα γε γινώσεται ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδὲ ὁ ῥαψωδός.—ΙΩΝ Πλήν γε ἴσως τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγεις πλὴν τὰ τῶν

b ἄλλων τεχνῶν;—ΙΩΝ Σχεδόν τι.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ γινώσεται, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ἅπαντα;—ΙΩΝ Ἄ πρέπει, οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἀνδρὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ὅποια γυναικί, καὶ ὅποια δούλῳ καὶ ὅποια ἐλευθέρῳ, καὶ ὅποια ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ὅποια ἄρχοντι.

5 ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὅποια ἄρχοντι, λέγεις, ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζομένου πλοίου πρέπει εἰπεῖν, ὁ ῥαψωδός γινώσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης;—ΙΩΝ Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυβερνήτης τοῦτό γε.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὅποια ἄρχοντι κάμνοντος πρέπει εἰπεῖν, ὁ ῥαψω-

c δός γινώσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ ἱατρός;—ΙΩΝ Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οἷα δούλῳ πρέπει, λέγεις;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οἷον βουκόλῳ, λέγεις, δούλῳ ἃ πρέπει εἰπεῖν ἀγριαίνουσῶν βοῶν

d7 καὶ ... ἱατροῦ iteravit F e7 ἅπαντα T W SPC (ἄ- supra οὐ) f (ἄ- supra οὐ) : οὐ πάντα SF 540b1 : σχεδόν τι : W, ergo Ioni tribuit (· σχεδόν τι : F, σχεδόν τι : T [qui in marg. paragr. praebet], σχεδόν τι· S (qui ante σχεδόν spatium praebet); de ratione distinguendi vide comm.) b2 ἃ πρέπει T W S f (ei sl) : ἀπρεπῆ F b7 ἀλλὰ ὁ W : ἄλλο F : ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ T (καὶ per compendium) f^m (ut vid.) οὐκ ... γε] οὐ κάλλιον (sic) ὁ κυβερνήτης; τοῦτό γε S (verba haec omnia Socrati tribuens; vide comm.) b8 κάμνοντος S FPC : κάμνοντι T W πρέπει T W S : πρέπειν F (ex πει [sic]) c1 γινώσεται] γνῶ (sic) S F

παραμυθουμένω, ὁ ῥαψωδὸς γνώσεται ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ βουκό- (540c)
 λος;—ΙΩΝ Οὐ δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οἷα γυναικὶ πρόποντά ἐστιν 5
 εἰπεῖν ταλασιουργῶ περὶ ἐρίων ἐργασίας;—ΙΩΝ Οὐ.—ΣΩ.
 Ἄλλ' οἷα ἀνδρὶ πρέπει εἰπεῖν γνώσεται στρατηγῶ στρατιώ-
 ταις παραινούντι;—ΙΩΝ Νῆ <Δία>, τὰ τοιαῦτα γνώσεται ὁ d
 ῥαψωδός.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη στρατηγικὴ ἐστίν;

ΙΩΝ Γνοίην γοῦν ἂν ἔγωγε οἷα στρατηγὸν πρέπει εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ εἶ καὶ στρατηγικός, ὦ Ἴων. καὶ γὰρ εἶ 5
 ἐτύγχανες ἵππικὸς ὢν ἅμα καὶ κιθαριστικός, ἔγνωσ ἂν ἵπ-
 πους εὖ καὶ κακῶς ἵππαζομένους· ἀλλ' εἶ σ' ἐγὼ ἠρόμην·
 “Ποτέρα δὴ τέχνη, ὦ Ἴων, γινώσκεις τοὺς εὖ ἵππαζομέ- e
 νους ἵππους; ἢ ἵππεὺς εἶ ἢ ἢ κιθαριστής;” τί ἂν μοι ἀπεκρίνω;
 —ΙΩΝ Ἴτι ἵππεύς, ἔγωγ' ἄν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶ καὶ τοὺς εὖ
 κιθαρίζοντας διεγίνωσκεις, ὡμολόγεις ἄν, ἢ κιθαριστής εἶ,
 ταύτη διαγιγνώσκεις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἵππεύς;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. 5
 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ γινώσκεις, πότερον ἢ στρατηγι-
 κὸς εἶ γινώσκεις ἢ ἢ ῥαψωδὸς ἀγαθός;—ΙΩΝ Οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε
 δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐδὲν λέγεις διαφέρειν; μίαν λέγεις τέχνην εἶναι 541a
 τὴν ῥαψωδικὴν καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἢ δύο;—ΙΩΝ Μία
 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἄρα ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός ἐστιν,
 οὗτος καὶ ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς τυγχάνει ὢν;—ΙΩΝ Μάλιστα,
 ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅστις ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς 5
 τυγχάνει ὢν, ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥαψωδός ἐστιν;—ΙΩΝ Οὐκ αὖ μοι

d1 νῆ Δία scripsi : νῆ TWSF : ναὶ Ven. 186 (ex νῆ, man. post.) Ald.
 d4 γνοίην TWS : γνοίη F γοῦν SF : γ'οῦν W : γ'οῦν T ἂν Syden-
 ham : ἄρ' TS : ἄρ' W : om. F ἔγωγε SF : ἐγὼ TW οἷα] οἷον F
 στρα-] στα- F, et sic saepius infra d5 εἶ TWSFPC : om. F ὦ SF :
 om. TW d6 ὢν] ex ἂν F, supra ὢν et ἂν (post ἔγνωσ) signo rei notabi-
 lis `addito; de hoc signo v. supra 538e6 et infra, annotat. 284 d7
 ἠρόμην TWS (ἠ- in ras. T, ex ἐ- W, ἠ et o SPC) : ἐροίμην F e2 ἢ
 ἵππεὺς εἶ ἢ ἢ TW : ἠ ἢ ἵππεὺς εἶ (sic) ἢ (sic) ἢ F (deinde constanter ἢ vel
 ἢ pro ἢ(ι) usque ad e9) : ἢ ἵππεὺς εἶ ἢ S ἀπεκρίνω SF : ἀπεκρίνου
 TW e3 ἢ SPC ἔγωγ' ex ἐγὼ F e4 ἢ SPC e5 ταύτη ex
 ταῦτα F e6 τὰ TSF : om. W e7 εἶ ex ἢ F (ut vid.) ἀγαθός
 secl. Schanz ἔμοιγε TW : ἐμοὶ SF 541a1 πῶς οὐδὲν λέγεις
 διαφέρειν; distinxi (διαφέρειν TWSF); vide comm. a6 οὐκ αὖ
 TWS : οὐκοῦν F

- (541a) δοκεῖ τοῦτο.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν δοκεῖ σοι, ὅστις γε
 b ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, καὶ στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι.—ΙΩΝ Πάνυ
 γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστος ῥαψωδὸς εἶ;—
 ΙΩΝ Πολύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ στρατηγός, ὦ
 Ἴων, τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστος εἶ;—ΙΩΝ Εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες:
 5 καὶ ταυτὰ γε ἐκ τῶν Ὀμήρου μαθών.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ ποτ' οὖν πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἴων, ἀμφοτέρα
 ἄριστος ὢν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ ῥαψωδός, ῥα-
 ψωδεῖς μὲν περὶ τῶν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι, στρατηγεῖς δ' οὐ; ἢ ῥαψω-
 c δοῦ μὲν δοκεῖ σοι χρυσῶ στεφάνῳ ἐστεφανωμένου πολλή
 χρεία εἶναι τοῖς Ἑλλήσι, στρατηγοῦ δὲ οὐδεμία;

ΙΩΝ Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡμετέρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πόλις ἄρχεται ὑπὸ
 ὑμῶν καὶ στρατηγεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται στρατηγοῦ, ἡ δὲ
 5 ὑμετέρα καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἄν με ἔλοιτο στρατηγόν·
 αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἰκανοὶ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Ὡ βέλτιστε Ἴων, Ἀπολλόδωρον οὐ γινώσκεις τὸν
 Κυζικηνόν;

ΙΩΝ Ποῖον τοῦτον;

- 10 ΣΩ. Ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι πολλάκις ἑαυτῶν στρατηγὸν ἤρηνται
 d ξένον ὄντα· καὶ Φανοσθένη τὸν Ἄνδριον καὶ Ἡρακλείδην
 τὸν Κλαζομένιον, οὓς ἤδε ἡ πόλις ξένους ὄντας, ἐνδειξαμέ-
 νους ὅτι ἄξιοι λόγου εἰσί, καὶ εἰς στρατηγίαν καὶ εἰς τὰς
 5 ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἄγει· Ἴωνα δ' ἄρα τὸν Ἐφέσιον οὐχ αἰρήσεται
 στρατηγόν καὶ τιμήσει, ἐὰν δοκῇ ἄξιος λόγου εἶναι; τί δέ;
 οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἐστὲ οἱ Ἐφέσιοι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ ἡ Ἐφε-
 e σος οὐδεμίᾳς ἐλάττων πόλεως; ἀλλὰ γὰρ σὺ, ὦ Ἴων, εἰ μὲν
 ἀληθῆ λέγεις ὡς τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη οἷός τε εἶ Ὀμηρον
 ἐπαινεῖν, ἀδικεῖς, ὅστις ἐμοὶ ὑποσχόμενος ὡς πολλὰ καὶ
 5 τῆς με καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖς ἐπιδείξει, ὅς γε οὐδὲ ἅττα ἐστὶ ταῦτα

a7 μὲν TWS et revera F(per comp.) : μὴν E σοι TW : σοι εἶναι SF
 γε] τε SF b3 ἢ T : ἢ WSF b7 στρατηγὸς TWS : στρατηγὸς ὢν F
 c6 οἴεσθε TWS f^{sl} : οἴεσθαι F c8 κυζικηνόν (-όν) ex κυζινόν F
 d1 φανοσθένη TW : φανοσθένην SF ἄνδριον TWSpc : ἀνδρείον F
 ἠρακλείδη W d3 στρατηγίαν SF : στρατηγίας TW d5 δοκῆ(ι)ς F
 e5 δεῖς Flor. 85, 7 : δεῖ σ' TWS Ven. 186 E : δ' εἰς F (ut vid.) ὅς γε
 TWSpc : ὡς γε F ἅττα] ἄττα (sic) T

περὶ ὧν δεινὸς εἶ ἐθέλεις εἶπεῖν, πάλαι ἐμοῦ λιπαροῦντος, (541e)
 ἀλλὰ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς παντοδαπὸς γίγναι στρεφό-
 μενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ἕως τελευτῶν διαφυγῶν με στρατηγὸς
 ἀνεφάνης, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιδείξῃς ὡς δεινὸς εἶ τὴν περὶ Ὀμήρου 542a
 σοφίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τεχνικὸς ὧν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, περὶ
 Ὀμήρου ὑποσχόμενος ἐπιδείξῃς ἐξαπατᾷς με, ἄδικος εἶ· εἰ
 δὲ μὴ τεχνικὸς εἶ, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὀμήρου
 μηδὲν εἰδὼς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ 5
 ἐγὼ εἶπον περὶ σοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖς. ἐλοῦ οὖν πότερα βούλει
 νομίζεσθαι ὑπὸ ἡμῶν ἄδικος εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἢ θεῖος.

ΙΩΝ Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, θεῖος· πολὺ γὰρ κάλ- b
 λιον τὸ θεῖον νομίζεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ κάλλιον ὑπάρχει σοι παρ' ἡμῖν, ὦ
 Ἴων, θεῖον εἶναι καὶ μὴ τεχνικὸν περὶ Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέτην.

Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος

e6 πάλαι TWS(πά ex πο) : πολλὰ F 542a4 εἶ TW : ἦ SF a7 εἶναι
 ἀνὴρ SF : ἀνὴρ εἶναι TW b1 θεῖος SF : om. TW b3 ἡμῖν T S F :
 ἡμῶν W

Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος TWS : om. F

COMMENTARY

530a1–b4

Prologue. The occasion of Ion's visit to Athens: the Panathenaic games

530a1

Τὸν Ἰῶνα χαίρειν ‘My respects to the illustrious Ion.’ Of the translations and commentaries consulted by me only that of Battegazzore renders this form of address correctly: ‘All’ insigne Ione, salute.’¹⁵⁷ ‘Illustrious’, because, as Battegazzore rightly observes, the article preceding a proper name may denote a ‘persona molto nota’. Since the other translations and commentators simply ignore the function of the article, a phenomenon that is by no means confined to the *Ion*, I will dwell at some length on its use with proper names in Plato. For the formal nature of the entire expression τὸν Ἰῶνα χαίρειν see below.

Generally speaking, the article with proper names in Plato is common only in so-called ‘turn-taking’ scenes, i.e. scenes where two, or more, speakers engaged in a discussion each in turn have the floor, and are contrasted with each other, as at *Phd.* 92a2 ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ..., 92a4 ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας ..., 92a6 Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ... ἔφη, and in many other passages of the *Phaedo*¹⁵⁸ and other dialogues. The combination ὁ + proper name is always accompanied by a verb of saying, mostly ἔφη. Another important feature of this use is that it is confined to *reported* dialogues, i.e. to dialogues that have a narrator,¹⁵⁹ either a single narrator, like the *Phaedo* (: Phaedo), the *Charmides* (: Socrates), *Lysis* (: Socrates), *Euthydemus* (: Socrates), *Protagoras* (: Socrates), the *Re-*

¹⁵⁷ Probably inspired by Battegazzore, Capuccino renders ‘Illustre Ione, salve’, where the vocative, however, gives the wrong (pragmatic) meaning. See below.

¹⁵⁸ Thus, the 38 instances of ὁ Κέβης in the *Phaedo* occur all in turn-takings. For the concept of ‘turn-taking’ cp. Brown & Yule (1983: 230–231); Levinson (1983: 296 ff.).

¹⁵⁹ Burnet, in his commentary on the *Phaedo*, already observed, at 63a2: ‘it is Plato’s almost uniform practice to insert the article with proper names in the narrative ..., and to omit it in the dialogue when directly reported ...’.

public (: Socrates), or multiple narrators, like the *Parmenides* (: Cephalus quotes Antiphon who quotes Pythodorus), and the *Symposium* (: Apollodorus quotes Aristodemus). The dialogues that have Socrates as their narrator differ from the others in as much as Socrates naturally refers to himself by means of 1st person verb forms, with or without ἐγώ. Examples from *Charmides* etc. are:

- Chrm.* 154d7 κἀγώ, Ἡρακλεῖς, ἔφην, 154d9 Τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, 154e1 ἦν δ' ἐγώ
Ly. 218c8 εἶπον, 218d1 ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, 218d2 ἦν δ' ἐγώ
Euthd. 298e6–7 ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ... ἔφη, 298e8–9 Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ... ἔφη
Prt. 317e3 ὁ Πρωταγόρας ... ἔφη, 318a1 Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, 318e6 ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν
R. 327c4 Ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, 327c6 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 327c13 ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, 328a1 Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ... ἦ δ' ὅς, 576b10 Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαύκων
Prm. 128a2 φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, 28a4 εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη
Smp. 185e4 φάναι τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, 185e6 Εἰπεῖν ... τὸν Ἐρξίμαχον, 189a1 Ἐκδεξάμενον ... ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη

Note the presence, at *R.* 576b10 and in the last example, of διαδεξάμενος and ἐκδεξάμενον, respectively, which explicitly signal that another speaker 'takes the turn'. By extension, the alternation of article + proper names is also found in scenes that prepare the ground for a turn-taking scene, e.g. *Euthd.* 273b1–8 ὁ Κλεινίας ... παρεκαθέζετο ... ὃ τε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοιν ... ἔπειτα ... ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μείρακιον ἐκαθέζετο, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὁ δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμὲ ..., οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ...

Besides full-blown expressions consisting of article + proper name plus verb of saying, other, abbreviated, expressions occur, e.g. the answer plus just a verb of saying (Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, at *Phd.* 65b8, 67d3, etc.), or just the answer (Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, *Phd.* 68e1), as well as other formulas with the same function, especially ἦ δ' ὅς, cp. *R.* 328a1 above. The conditions under which all these variants are used are entirely unclear.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ At *Tht.* 143b5 ff. Plato has Euclides comment on the difficulties created by this way of representing a dialogue in writing.

Outside turn-taking scenes the article with proper names is very rare in Plato, especially in direct discourse (cp. also Burnet as quoted in n. 159), and its function is different. In this use it expresses, or emphasizes, the idea that the person concerned is, in fact, ‘persona molto nota’, much like ‘the’ in: ‘Yesterday I’ve met Tony Blair.’—‘*The* Tony Blair?’—‘Yes, *the* Tony Blair.’, i.e. ‘the one we are all familiar with’, ‘the well-known Tony Blair’. This is, in fact, what Socrates wants to convey when he addresses Ion as τὸν Ἴωνα. Some other examples of the ‘familiarity’ use of the article from *Ion* are τὸν Ὅμηρον at 530d7, τὸν Ὀδυσσεά at 535b3,¹⁶¹ τὸν Ἑκτορά at 535b5, ὁ Πρωτεύς at 541e7. I should add that τὸν Ὅμηρον at 530d7 is the only instance in *Ion* of the article + a form of Ὅμηρος, as against 43 instances without the article. From this state of affairs it is also clear that τὸν at 530d7 is in no way necessary to refer back to ‘Homer’ (who was mentioned previously at 530b9, c9 and d3). Why Plato makes Ion use the article with ‘Homer’ precisely here is not easy to explain; perhaps the presence of the rather solemn context plays a role (ὡς εὖ κεκόσμηκα τὸν Ὅμηρον ὥστε οἶμαι ὑπὸ Ὀμηριδῶν ἄξιος εἶναι χρυσῶ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθῆναι).¹⁶²

Apart from the honorific conventions involved in τὸν Ἴωνα (χαίρειν), its function in the *text* is to identify for the reader at the outset the person who will be Socrates’ interlocutor, and to make it clear that the first words are not spoken by Ion. Recall that there were no speakers’ names in the original text; see the Introduction §3.2 and Appendix II.—The phrase τὸν Ἴωνα returns at 532b2; at that point of the dialogue this clearly has a mock-respectful effect (see also below).

For more details about the use of the article with proper names in Plato, and in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, as well as some theoretical issues connected with this use, I refer to Rijksbaron (2006).

¹⁶¹ Interestingly, we also find τὸν οὐδόν there, with the same ‘familiarity’ value: ‘the threshold’ = ‘the threshold we all know’. I should add that in the same passage from the *Ion* there are also proper names without the article (Ἀχιλλεῖα, Ἑκάβην, Πρίαμον). Although these persons no doubt were as familiar as Odysseus and Hektor, in their case this aspect is not stressed.

¹⁶² For a similar case cp. *Phdr.* 269e1–2 Κινδυνεύει, ὃ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι. Pericles is normally used without the article; here, too, its appearance may be due to the solemn context.

Τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν A unique expression in Plato. Commentators usually supply *κελεύω*, but this is a didactic rather than a syntactic solution. There is, to be sure, a more elaborate expression with *κελεύω*, at *Ar. Av.* 1581 τὸν ἄνδρα χαίρειν οἱ θεοὶ κελεύομεν, but the verb to be supplied might as well be *προσεῖπον/α*: *E. Cyc.* 101 (Odysseus addressing Silenus) χαίρειν προσεῖπα ... τὸν γεραίτατον.¹⁶³ Actually, τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν should rather be taken as an independent accusative plus infinitive expressing a command or wish; there is a parallel at *Men. Dysc.* 401 τὸν Πᾶνα χαίρειν. For infinitives in commands, etc. see K-G 2, 22, Smyth §2014, although both fail to mention our formula; nor is it discussed by Dickey in her otherwise very valuable *Greek forms of address*. The combination of the articular proper name in the accusative with the infinitive must have been very formal. Cp. van Leeuwen on τὸν ἄνδρα at *Av.* 1581, quoted above: ‘gravius hoc est quam σέ’; similarly Dunbar ad loc. (‘This formal greeting ...’); Seaford on *Cyc.* 101 (‘an elaborate formality’). The form of address τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν should therefore be translated—without a vocative—as ‘My respects to the illustrious Ion’, as in my translation above, or in a similar formal way, like Méridier’s and Flashar’s third person forms of address (‘A Ion salut’, ‘Dem Ion ein Willkommen!’). Translations like ‘Hello, Ion’ (Miller), ‘Ion! Hello’ (Woodruff), ‘Salut, Ion!’ (Canto), ‘Salut à toi, Ion!’ (Pradeau) are entirely beside the mark. Lamb’s ‘Welcome, Ion’, Allen’s ‘Greetings, Ion’, and Saunders’ ‘Good day to you, Ion’ are better but still too ‘standard’. The standard, neutral way of greeting or welcoming people was by means of ὦ + the vocative + χαῖρε, as at *Prm.* 126a3 Χαῖρ’, ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε, *Smp.* 214b4 ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε ... χαῖρε. That χαῖρε was, in fact, the common verb form in greetings appears from *Chrm.* 164d6 ff., where Charmides says he applauds the fact that Apollo addresses the visitors of Delphi with γνῶθι σαυτόν, instead of χαῖρε. The very formal way in which Ion is addressed also entails that in languages which in the singular differentiate between honorific and non-honorific ‘you’, like Dutch, French and

¹⁶³ These constructions, like εἰάν χαίρειν, may also have a strongly dismissive nuance; see LSJ s.v. χαίρω, III 2.c, e.g. *E. Hipp.* 113 τὴν σὴν δὲ Κύπριν πόλλ’ ἐγὼ χαίρειν λέγω; *Pl. Lg.* 771a3 τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα ... χαίρειν γρὴν προσαγορεύειν. This use should probably be taken as an extension of the use of χαίρειν at leavetaking (LSJ s.v. χαίρω, III 2.a), rather than of that at greeting.—The frequent formula involving the dative and the infinitive (e.g. Κύρος Κυαζάρη χαίρειν, *X. Cyr.* 4.5.27) seems to have been especially common in letters, and expresses standard politeness; note the absence of the article. Cp. also Svennung (1958: 19 ff.).

German, the second person singular forms of the *Ion* should be translated by means of the formal rather than the informal pronoun.

The solemn tone of the opening of the *Ion* is recognized by Battagzore (see above), who adds that it is ‘sottilmente ironico’. This depends, of course, on the question whether for the original audience/reader such a solemn greeting was unlikely, in view of what they knew about Socrates’, or rather Plato’s, attitude toward rhapsodes. That is, *if* Ion was a famous rhapsode. If he was as unknown to the original audience as he is to us, the greeting is perhaps patently rather than subtly ironical.¹⁶⁴ Be that as it may, in view of the way Socrates treats Ion in the ensuing dialogue, it is clear that in retrospect, at least, this form of address must be viewed as ironical.

By this formal form of address Ion is presented as someone who was known to Socrates but did not belong to the inner circle of his interlocutors. For if he did, Socrates would have addressed him by (ὦ +) a vocative, and have omitted the verb of greeting altogether; Socrates never says χαῖρε. The other dialogues that open with a sentence spoken by Socrates are:

- Cri.* Τί τῆνικάδε ἀφιζαι, ὦ Κρίτων;
Tht. The second opening, at 143d1 Εἰ ... ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ...
Plt. Ἡ πολλὴν χάριν ὀφείλω σοι ... ὦ Θεόδωρε ...
Phlb. Ὅρα δὴ, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον ...
Phdr. ὦ φίλε Φαίδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν;
Alc. 1 ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε ...
Alc. 2 ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἄρά γε ... πορεύῃ;
Hp.Ma. Ἰππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός· ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας
Mx. Ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἢ πόθεν, Μενέξενος;
Clit. Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου τις ἡμῖν διηγείτο ἔναγχος, ὅτι ...
Ti. Εἷς δύο τρεῖς· ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε Τίμαιε, ποῦ ...;

¹⁶⁴ Actually, it is even impossible to tell whether there really was a rhapsode named ‘Ion’, since he is not known from other sources. Cp. Tigerstedt (1969: 19): ‘About the “historical Ion” we know nothing, the Platonic one is a figure of comedy’. Coming from Ephesus, his name may have been chosen as a telling name to represent a particular kind of Ionian rhapsodes. Homer, too, was considered a representative of the Ionians; cp. *Lg.* 680c7 (Homer) ... τίνα ... Ἴωνικὸν βίον διεξέρχεται ἑκάστωτε.— In his discussion of the personages of the *Gorgias*, Dodds (comm. on the *Gorgias*, p. 12) notes that ‘[o]f Callicles we know absolutely nothing beyond what Plato tells us in the *Gorgias*’, and that for that reason he has often been considered a fictitious character. Dodds himself, however, rejects the idea that there are fictitious characters in Plato. Nails (2002: 316) mentions Ion without further comment.

In *Ion*, *Hp.Ma.*, *Mx.* and *Clit.* there is, then, a third person proper name, which creates, just as in the cases from drama quoted above, a rather formal setting. In the other dialogues Socrates makes a direct appeal to his interlocutors-to-be, who did, in fact, belong to the inner circle.¹⁶⁵ On the opening words of the *Clit.* Slings (1999: 40) observes that they are ‘unique in the Corpus Platonicum’, but actually this applies to the other three as well (Slings, *ibidem*, also states that ‘τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν is equivalent to a vocative’, wrongly; see above). As for the nominatives in *Mx.* and *Hp.Ma.*, we may perhaps agree with Svennung (1958: 422)¹⁶⁶ when he remarks that Menexenus and Hippias ‘sozusagen als halb Abwesender präsentiert werden’. In fact, this ‘being semi-absent’ may be the overall effect of the other two third person names as well; all four are presented rather than addressed. Observe that Ion and Hippias did not live permanently in Athens; for Ion cp. ἐπιδημηκας, for Hippias see the second part of the sentence quoted above. Observe also that third person addresses are only found in non-central, and in the case of *Ion*, *Mx.* and *Clit.* short, dialogues,¹⁶⁷ with only two speakers. Dodds (1959: 24) conjectured that the *Menexenus* ‘was designed as an afterpiece to the *Gorgias*’. Perhaps something similar applies to *Ion* and *Clitophon*, at least: they may be regarded as afterpieces, or perhaps ‘sidepieces’, to central dialogues like *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.¹⁶⁸ The form of the opening scene may thus give an indication of the nature of the dialogue that will follow, and of its status among the Platonic writings.

πόθεν Observe that Socrates does not ask Ion *why* he is in Athens. He apparently knows that Ion is a rhapsode (cp. a5), and presupposes that he is in Athens to participate in the Panathenaic games, as becomes indeed clear at b2–3.

τὰ νῦν Commentators generally claim that this is equivalent to νῦν (see e.g. Miller and Murray). Some point out that τὸ νῦν also exists, and claim that τὰ νῦν is vaguer (e.g. Stock and Verdenius) or, on

¹⁶⁵ Cp. Nails (2002: ss.vv.).

¹⁶⁶ Cp. also Tsitsiridis’ commentary on *Mx.* 234a1. Dickey does not discuss third person addresses.

¹⁶⁷ On the notion ‘short dialogue’ see Slings (1999: 18–34).

¹⁶⁸ See also the Introduction §2. The more ambitious *Hippias Maior* seems to stand on its own.

the contrary, ‘più incisiva’ (Capuccino). Actually, the plural article in τὰ νῦν turns νῦν into a series of νῦν’s, so to speak, i.e. into an ‘extended now’. Formally, τὰ νῦν is an adverbial accusative, in which τὰ still functions as an article.¹⁶⁹ There are several differences with νῦν,¹⁷⁰ e.g.:

- unlike νῦν (e.g. ὁ νῦν λόγος, 24 instances), τὰ νῦν is seldom used attributively (a rare example is *Ti.* 17a2 τῶν χθὲς μὲν δαιτυμόνων, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐστιατόρων
- while νῦν may be modified by ἤδη (e.g. *Phd.* 115a5 ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, *Plt.* 274b2 ἐπ’ αὐτῷ νῦν ἐσμὲν ἤδη), τὰ νῦν may not
- νῦν often marks the end-point of some action (e.g. *Lg.* 627b3 τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενον μαθάνω νῦν); this seems not to occur with τὰ νῦν
- after a counterfactual the ‘real’ world may be introduced by νῦν δέ (e.g. *Phd.* 107c8), but not by τὰ νῦν δέ or τὰ δὲ νῦν
- while there are some 57 instances of the opposition τότε ... νῦν, there are only two cases of τότε ... τὰ νῦν (*Criti.* 111e6 τὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως εἶχε τότε οὐχ ὡς τὰ νῦν ἔχει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ..., *Lg.* 705b8 συγχωροῦμεν τότε λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς καὶ τὰ νῦν).

All this suggests that in principle there is a difference between τὰ νῦν and νῦν. Only in cases like those from *Criti.* and *Lg.*, and in related uses,¹⁷¹ τὰ νῦν would, indeed, seem to be a simple variant of νῦν, just locating the verbal action at the moment of utterance.¹⁷² Far more often, however, it has a function of its own, viz. to specify, and often limitate, the duration of (part of) the verbal action it modifies. Its general meaning is something like ‘for the present, for the time being, for the time to come’. In this use it mostly follows the verb; cp. e.g. *Lg.* 655b8 Ὁρθῶς τε προκαλῆ καὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν οὕτως ἔχειν ἀποκεκρίσθω τὰ νῦν, *Lg.* 796d7 Ἐν εἶπον γυμναστικὴν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις ὅτι

¹⁶⁹ But see also below, *Text.*

¹⁷⁰ There is also a difference as to frequency: there are in Plato some 1,500 instances of νῦν, as against approximately 150 of adverbial τὰ νῦν and just seven of τὸ νῦν (see below). A complicating factor is that sometimes one may hesitate between an adverbial and a substantival interpretation of τὰ νῦν, e.g. *Prt.* 309b3 Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν;, *Lg.* 678a7 οὐκοῦν ... τὰ νῦν γέγονεν ἡμῖν σύμπαντα ...; See also n. 173.

¹⁷¹ E.g. *Sph.* 218a3 πρότερον ... τὰ νῦν, *Plt.* 287c6 Πῶς οὖν ποιῶμεν τὰ νῦν;— Ὁσπερ ... (—) Καὶ νῦν διὰ ταῦτὸν μὲν τοῦτο, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ τόθ’ ἡμῖν ποιητέον; note that here and at *Criti.* 111e6 τὰ νῦν is picked up by νῦν.

¹⁷² Note, however, that at *Criti.* 111e6 τὰ νῦν could very well have the meaning ‘these days, nowadays’.

δέοι διεξελεθῆναι, σχεδὸν δὴ διελήλυθα τὰ νῦν, καὶ ἔσθ' αὕτη παντελής, but it may also precede: *Phlb.* 50e1 τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων αὐριον ἔθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ('pour l'instant'—Diès; 'but for the present'—Hackforth) ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι, *Phlb.* 31a2–3 οὐ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ ..., σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται, *Lg.* 638b6 νίκας δὲ καὶ ἥττας ἐκτὸς λόγου τὰ νῦν ('for the present'—Bury) θῶμεν. The limitative function of τὰ νῦν is seen most clearly in contexts where also other limitative markers like γε are present; see *Cri.* 54d6 ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, *Chrm.* 154a5–6 τοῦ δοκοῦντος καλλίστου εἶναι τὰ γε δὴ νῦν, *Lg.* 627d6 Καλῶς μὲν οὖν (sc. λέγεις), ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν, τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ νῦν. All this is not to say that νῦν would not have been possible in most of these cases, but then the meaning would have been (slightly) different. This definitely does not apply, however, to *Chrm.* 154a5–6 and *Lg.* 627d6, where νῦν is excluded.

Now to return to *Ion* 530a1, a 'for the time to come' interpretation seems perfectly acceptable: 'From where have you come to stay with us for the time to come/these days?'; 'From where have you temporarily moved over to Athens?' Incidentally, 'the time to come' must be the time of the Panathenaic games, mentioned at 530b2. For the adverbial accusative with ἐπιδημέω cp. *Prt.* 309d3–4 ὦ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδημήμηκεν;—Τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.

As for adverbial τὸ νῦν, as noticed in n. 170 this is very rare. There are only seven instances: *Tht.* 187b7, *La.* 201c2, *Hp.Ma.* 291c2, *R.* 506e1, *Lg.* 694a1, 858a3, 900a2, twice in the formula τὸ νῦν εἶναι (*La.* 201c2, *R.* 506e1). It resembles limitative τὰ νῦν, as at *R.* 506e1 αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι, without necessarily being synonymous. Cp. Engl. 'for the present', alongside 'for the time being'.

Text. τὰ νῦν TW : τανῶν SF While both variants are used adverbially,¹⁷³ only τανῶν, where τα is not an independent word but is used proclitically, is formally an adverb. Concerning this form, which, in classical Greek, for some obscure reason is especially (or only?) found in our Sophocles texts (and if we are to believe the apparatuses apparently with MS support), Ellendt-Genthe note, in their *Lexicon Sopho-*

¹⁷³ Τὰ νῦν may also be used as a (declinable) noun phrase, as at *S.* *OC* 1195 σὺ δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνα, μὴ τὰ νῦν, ἀποσκοπεῖ, *Pl.* *Sph.* 256c Καὶ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα.

cleum, p. 475: ‘... rectius scribes τὰ νῦν, ut τὸ πρῶτον et τὸ πάλαι’; they point out that the combination of τὰ with νῦν does not become a real adverb, since it can be split by δέ. An example from Sophocles is *OC* 133. In Plato, too, τὰ δὲ νῦν occurs, *Phdr.* 266c (τὰ δὲ νῦν B : τὰ νῦν δέ T), *Lg.* 804e, *Ep.* VII, 337d. Nor is this confined to δέ: see τὰ γε δὴ νῦν at *Chrm.* 154a. The conclusion should be that both in Plato and in Sophocles τὰ νῦν is to be preferred. Τανῦν was possibly written to distinguish the adverbial use strictly from the substantival (cp. n. 173) and the adjectival uses (τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα etc.). It may reflect conventions in later Greek. At least, this is suggested by the frequency of the form τανῦν in (our editions of) authors like Joannes Chrysostomus and Procopius.

ἡμῖν Dative of interest, as in *Hp.Ma.* 281a1 ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατήρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας quoted above. For this dative see K-G 1, 417 ff., where also more examples with verbs of coming and going may be found, e.g. Th. 1.107.7 ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, 3.5.2 καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς Μελέας Λάκων ἀφικνεῖται.¹⁷⁴ By using this dative Socrates intimates that he, and indeed the Athenian community at large, might profit from Ion’s visit, an idea that reappears at 530a8 ἡγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; b1 ἡνεγκάμεθα, and b2 ἄγε δὴ ὅπως καὶ τὰ Παναθήναια νικήσομεν. He is not sincere, but this becomes clear only in the course of the dialogue.

ἐπιδημηκας Both the verb (‘come to stay’) and the aspect indicate that Socrates presupposes that Ion is going to stay for some time, as was also indicated by τὰ νῦν (see above). Note the difference with the passage from *Hp.Ma.*: with κατήρας Socrates simply ascertains that Hippias has not ‘called at’ Athens for a long time.

530a2 ἢ Stock notes: ‘How does ἢ come to have the force of an interrogative? We may suppose it to be owing to the suppression of some clause with πότερον. Thus here the full sentence may be conceived to be πότερον ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἢ οὔκοθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου; But as the former alternative is thought to be unlikely, the speaker enunciates

¹⁷⁴ When used of the first, as here, or second person this dative is usually called *dativus ethicus*. K-G discuss the latter use in a different section (1, 423), but this is rather arbitrary. Thus, S. *OC* 81 ὦ τέκνον, ἢ βέβηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ ξένος;, which is classified by them as a *dativus ethicus*, might as well be taken as a dative of interest.

only the latter.’ Unlikely indeed! Why would someone ask ‘Do you come from elsewhere or from ...?’, thereby eliciting the possible, but rather uninformative, answer ‘I come from elsewhere’?¹⁷⁵ Needless to say, such questions are not found in our texts. Nevertheless Stock was followed by e.g. Verdenius, Battezzato and Cappucino. Other commentators are silent. Perhaps they took it in the same way as the following translations, viz. as a suggested answer (see below). Méridier: ‘Est-ce de chez toi, d’Ephèse?’; Lamb, Saunders: ‘From your home in Ephesus?’; Flashar: ‘Von Hause aus Ephesos?’; Battezzato: ‘Forse (provieni) dalla sua patria ...?’

Actually, what we have here (at least with the reading ἦ; see below) is a *self-corrective* or *replacive* question. In this use a speaker, having asked a first question, does not wait for an answer, but immediately corrects himself by asking a second question, which he on second thoughts apparently considers more to the point. This second question often also provides an implicit answer to the first question.¹⁷⁶ Typically, the first question is a *wh*-question, like πόθεν here, which presents the addressee with a choice from an ‘open range of replies’ (Quirk et al. 1985: 806), and the second one a *yes-no* question, which reduces the range of possible replies to just one, since the addressee should answer *yes* or *no*. The eventual effect of such a sequence of questions is that the implied answer acquires a certain obviousness. In our case the effect may be paraphrased as: ‘From where have you come to stay with us? Or <do I not need ask this question, have you come> from home ...?’ This rather common use of ἦ is discussed by K-G at 2, 532 ff. Some other examples from Plato are: *Phd.* 70b6 ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν ...; *Prm.* 137b1 πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι; *Smp.* 173a8 ἀλλὰ τίς σοι διηγείτο; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκρά-

¹⁷⁵ Kühner-Stegmann (2, 518) observe, on a similar explanation of Latin *an*: ‘... diese Theorie ist reichlich künstlich und verlangt oft die Ergänzung von ganz nichtsagenden und geradezu törichten Gedanken’.

¹⁷⁶ Not seldom, however, the ἦ-question asks after the appropriateness of (an element of) the first question, e.g.: *Cri.* 43a1 Τί τῆνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῶ ἔτι ἐστίν; *La.* 191e11 ... πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον τί ὄν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταυτὸν ἐστίν; ἢ οὐπω καταμανθάνεις ὃ λέγω; Such meta-questions occur also after assertions: *Euthphr.* 6e1 ἔφησθα γάρ που μᾶ ἰδέα τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὄσια ὄσια: ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις; *Grg.* 454a8 ... δικαίως ... ἐπανερóμεθ’ ἂν τὸν λέγοντα...; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;

της; (but see below, *Text*), *Chrm.* 174a11 τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἅπαντα ὁμοίως;.

The obviousness of the implied answer is sometimes made explicit by the presence of δῆλον/-α (δή) after ἦ, as in *Phdr.* 227b6 τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία;, *Prt.* 309a1 πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγησίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν;,¹⁷⁷ *Mx.* 234a4 Τί μάλιστα σοι πρὸς βουλευτήριον; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι παιδεύσεως καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τέλει ἡγῆ εἶναι ...; Sometimes the second question is just ἢ δῆλα δὴ, suggesting that the implied answer is too obvious to be spelled out, as at *Euthphr.* 4b5 Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς; ἢ δῆλα δὴ; (after a *yes-no* question).

Text. Apart from the type discussed above, there exists another type of answer-question, which is introduced by the question particle ἦ.¹⁷⁸ In this use the speaker suggests an answer to his own question; cp. K-G 2, 526, Denniston 283.¹⁷⁹ Here, too, the question preceding ἦ is a *wh*-question, so in this respect the two types are similar. Some examples from Plato are: *Ap.* 37b5 τί δείσας (sc. πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαντόν γε ἀδικήσῃν); ἦ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὗ Μέλητος μοι τιμάται, ...; *Chrm.* 173d8 τίνος ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις; ἢ σκυτῶν τομῆς; *Grg.* 452a7 Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ (ὅτι F) τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; In fact, the translations of *Ion* 530a2 quoted above suggest that their Greek texts have ἦ, wrongly, for they all read ἦ.¹⁸⁰ Now at *Ion* 530a2 ἦ is indeed found in S (as well as, incidentally, in Par. 1811 and Vat. gr. 1030), and in view of the other examples from Plato this is, then, after all a possible reading. I should add that although ἦ is semantically quite different from ἦ, it may yield a rather similar interpretation, if we follow one of K-G's suggestions (2, 526): 'In sehr vielen Fällen ... tritt die versichernde Kraft der Partikel noch so deutlich zu Tage, dass der Satz nur als eine in fragendem Tone gesprochene Behauptung erscheint ... gewiss, sicherlich ...', so 'No doubt from home, from

¹⁷⁷ Lamb (Loeb-translation) captures the tone of this question very well: 'Ah, but of course you have been in chase of Alcibiades and his youthful beauty!'

¹⁷⁸ The ancient grammarians called this use ὑπερώτης 'question in reply'; see e.g. Herodian *De prosod. cath.*, Gramm. Gr. III 1, p. 520, 1.

¹⁷⁹ Denniston only discusses ἦ, not ἦ, which is, in fact, one of the two major lacunas in the *Greek Particles* (the other being *vuv*). If ἦ is mentioned at all, this is in connection with problems of accent (p. 283). Suggested answers may also be introduced by ἀλλ' ἦ, Denniston 27–28.

¹⁸⁰ The same mistake already in Stallbaum: 'an domo Epheso?'

Ephesus?’ In both cases, then, the answer has a high degree of obviousness. At *Smp.* 173a8, mentioned above, we find exactly the same situation: ἀλλὰ τίς σοι διηγείτο; ἦ (T W Y : ἦ B) αὐτὸς Σωκράτης;¹⁸¹ All in all we are dealing here with a heads or tails situation: both variants can be defended equally well. In fact, I made a coin decide that ἦ should be read.

The variation between ἦ and ἦ need not surprise us, for when our Byzantine predecessors started transliterating and accenting the—unaccented—uncial texts which had reached them, they must have had the same problems as we have in accenting such forms.¹⁸² The choices of the medieval MSS in such matters should of course be taken seriously (cp. the Introduction §§5.2 and 5.3), but ultimately the accenting of ambiguous word forms like η is a matter of interpretation, and thus open to discussion.¹⁸³

530a3

οὐδαμῶς ... ἀλλά Ion emphatically rejects the suggestion which is implied by Socrates’ question, viz. that he may have sat idly at home. Of course he comes from some festival. ‘Or have you come from your hometown, from Ephesus?—Certainly not, Socrates, from Epidaurus, from the Asclepius games’, or, with Lamb: ‘No, no, Socrates; from ...’.

¹⁸¹ I have used Robin’s apparatus criticus, since Burnet, who, with Schanz and others, reads ἦ, gives no variant readings here. Robin himself prefers ἦ. Denniston, who mentions *Smp.* 173a8 on p. 283, with variants, wrongly gives the readings in Burnet’s apparatus for 173a6. For some other problems of accent involving η in Plato see e.g. *Ion* 531c2 Τί οὖν ...; ἦ Ὀμηρος ...; (ἦ S(ut vid.) F : ἦ T W F P C), *Hp. Mi.* 366c3 ἦ οὐχ ... καλεῖς ...; (ἦ T W : ἦ F³mg : ἦ ρ’ S F (app. crit. Vancamp)), *Prt.* 359c ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἦ ἐφ’ ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί; (ἦ B : ἦ T).

¹⁸² Although they, too, just like we, had grammarians like Herodian as their guide. As a matter of fact, Herodian is full of remarks on the ways to accent η. One example out of many (*Gramm. Gr.* III 2, p. 25, 10), on *Il.* 1.232: ἦ-λωβήσαιο: τὸν ἦ περιπαστέον· βεβαιωτικὸς γάρ ἐστιν. See also comm. on 530c3 ἐρμηνέα below. Incidentally, the form of the words in our text editions, i.e. as discrete sequences of letters, is ultimately of course also due to the Byzantine scribes. After all, it is they who abandoned *scriptio continua* and applied word division (combined with accenting). See also above, nn. 97 and 150.

¹⁸³ A particularly telling example of the multiple possibilities of accenting η is Bacchylides 5.9, where Byzantine guidance is lacking. The papyrus just has η, and this has been variously accented as ἦ, ἦ, ἦ (‘where’), ἦ (a variant of εἶ), or taken as = εἶ. For further discussion of η see Chadwick (1996: 124–133), who does not mention, however, the problem presented by ἦ/ἦ in questions.

ὦ Σώκρατες After the identification of the interlocutor by means of τὸν Ἴωνα χάρειν this vocative identifies the first speaker as Socrates. The use of the vocative of a proper name is the normal way to establish participant identification at the opening of a dialogue; recall that there were no speakers' names in the original texts (Introduction §3.2). Yet this is a side effect of the presence of the vocative in this particular context. It is difficult to say what is the *basic* function of the vocative. What does its presence or absence contribute to the interpretation of a given sentence? After all, in the vast majority of the cases it does not serve as a participant identifier. As a general rule I suggest that it has a *deictic* function, in as much as it, as it were, 'points to' the addressee. By making such a direct appeal, the speaker emphatically draws the attention of the addressee to the information expressed in the sentence.¹⁸⁴ He apparently wants to emphasize that this information is of special importance to *him*, the addressee. The pragmatic value of the vocative might be paraphrased as: 'Attention now', 'I'm telling you', 'Mind you' *vel similia*, or, in questions, 'I'm asking you'. Of course, the risk of circular reasoning in establishing what is so important about that information is a serious one. Yet in a number of cases we can, in fact, understand why the speaker makes such an emphatic appeal to the addressee. I have collected several of these vocatives in Appendix II for a separate discussion. In the main body of the text I will only discuss a few vocatives that are not from a proper name, like ὦ βέλτιστε at 532b2.

530a3–4 ἐκ τῶν Ἀσκληπιείων These games were held every four years, nine days after the Isthmian games,¹⁸⁵ which were held every other year, viz. in the year before and after the Olympic games, in the spring.¹⁸⁶ Presumably, the Asclepius games were held in the fourth

¹⁸⁴ For the vocative as a form of person-deixis cp. Lyons (1977: 641–642), Levins (1983: 70 ff.) and Busse (2006: 241). Verdonk (2002: 35) provides a brief introduction to person-deixis and other forms of deixis. The recent monograph by Busse investigates various functions of the vocative in Shakespeare. Both by its theoretical framework and by the actual investigation of vocative usage, this book provides an excellent basis for similar research in 'dramatic' Greek (and Latin) texts.

¹⁸⁵ Schol. P. N. 3.84/147 τίθεται δὲ ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ἀγῶν Ἀσκληπιῶ, ... διὰ πενταετηρίδος: τίθεται δὲ ἐν τῷ ἄλσει τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ, ἄγεται δὲ μετὰ ἐννέα ἡμέρας τῶν Ἴσθμίων.

¹⁸⁶ For the season of the Ἴσθμια cp. Th. 8.9.1 τὰ Ἴσθμια, ἃ τότε ἦν with 8.7 ἅμα τῷ ἦρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους. Nissen (1887: 47) wanted to fix the date (of the beginning) of the Isthmian games on 9 April. See also n. 187.

year of the Olympiad, i.e. the year before the Olympic games. (See Edelstein & Edelstein 1945: 1, 312 ff. and 2, 208 ff.) If the scholion on Pi. N. 3.84 mentioned in n. 185 is right, and if the Isthmian games were held in (early?) spring, the Asclepius games must have been held in spring, too; so this would give us April or early May for the Asclepius games.¹⁸⁷ The athletic parts probably existed already in Pindar's time (cp. Pi. N. 3.84, but see Edelstein & Edelstein 1945: 2, 208 for some reserve and for some doubts Sève 1993: 320–321); it is unclear when the 'musical' parts were added. See also the Introduction §1 n. 5.

Text. The form Ἀσκληπείων, found in SF, is a late variant of Ἀσκληπιείων; see Threatte (1980: 417).

530a5

μῶν Here followed by a positive answer, Πάνυ γε. Although questions introduced by 'apprehensive-apotropaic' μῶν (and μή) normally expect the answer 'no', positive answers are by no means rare; cp. e.g. *Tht.* 142b4 EY. ... αὐτὸν αἰρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι. TEP. Μῶν ἢ δυσεντερία; EY. Ναί., *Prt.* 310d4 "Τί οὖν σοι," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;" Καὶ ὃς γελάσας, "Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς," ἔφη, "ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ." Just as in the Protagoras example, the tone in the *Ion* may be one of mock-disbelief: 'You don't mean to say that ...?' See further the pertinent remarks in K-G 2, 525.

¹⁸⁷ However, if *Ion* was in Athens (cp. ἐπιδημήμας at 530a1) for the Panathenaic games, as we might naturally infer from Socrates' exhortation ὅπως καὶ τὰ Παναθηναία νικήσομεν at 530b2, and if the Asclepius games were indeed held in April or May, *Ion* apparently spent about two or three months in Athens awaiting the Panathenaic games. For the latter, both the μικρά and the μεγάλη variant, were held in the month of Hekatombaion, i.e. the first month after the summer solstice, so, roughly, July. The most important day of the games was late in that month, namely the 28th. Such a long period of idleness in Athens seems rather odd, and so does the exhortation ὅπως καὶ τὰ Παναθηναία νικήσομεν two or three months before the actual games (this can hardly be called 'poco prima delle Panatenee' (Capuccino ad loc.)). Perhaps the solution to this problem is a remark by Defrasse & Lechat (1895: 235), to the effect that 'la date des jeux Isthmiques paraît avoir oscillé, suivant les cas, du printemps à l'été; la moindre variation qu'on se croit en droit de lui imputer est encore d'environ un mois, une quinzaine de jours avant et une quinzaine de jours après le solstice d'été'. These authors doubt, then, the validity of the date proposed by Nissen (see n. 186). I refer to their monograph for further discussion.

ῥαψωδῶν From this word we learn that Ion was a rhapsode. Rhapsodes were professional singers who—at least in the view which Socrates at first seems to share, but in reality is going to attack—by their τέχνη (530b5 ἐζήλωσα ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥαψωδοὺς ... τῆς τέχνης) not only knew the epic verses (530c1 ἐκμανθάνειν τὰ ἔπη) and could present them in a formally correct way (535b2 ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη) while singing (532d6–7 ὦν ὑμεῖς ἄδετε τὰ ποιήματα, 535b3–4 ὅταν ... ἄδῃς), but also understood their content (530b10–11 τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν, 530c2 συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα) and could speak meaningfully about them (530d2–3 εἰπεῖν πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου) and explain them (531a7 ἐξηγήσασθαι ἃ Ὀμηρος λέγει). See further below 530c3 on ἐρμηνεύς, and 531a7 on ἐξηγέομαι. For a discussion of the meaning and function of ῥαψωδός see e.g. Murray pp. 19–21, Capuccino (2005: 263–272).¹⁸⁸

τιθέασι Habitual present. ‘Organize’, lit. ‘cause, create’. For this meaning of τίθημι when it is combined with an (action) noun and a *dativus personae* see LSJ s.v. C2. Compare also LSJ s.v. ἀγωνοθετέω.

530a7 καὶ τῆς ἄλλης γε μουσικῆς I do not think that Denniston 157–158 (‘The effect of γε in καὶ ... γε is to stress the addition made by καί’) is right; rather γε, as usual, highlights the preceding word: ‘and of the *rest* of ...’, emphatically indicating that this was a full-blown, serious, festival. The sequence πάνυ γε καὶ ... γε is also found at *Grig.* 475a2 Πάνυ γε καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζη

Text. γε TW f^{sl} : τε SF For a discussion of τε (‘supposed sense “also”’—Denniston) in καὶ ... τε see Denniston 535. This combination occurs a number of times in all or part of the MSS of Thucydides, and apparently twice in Isaeus, one of which is corrupt, and also, then, in part of the MSS at *Ion* 530a7 (and perhaps elsewhere, for such odd combinations tend to be underrepresented in the apparatus criticus, es-

¹⁸⁸ See also Blondell (2002: 98–99) for the affinity between the activities of sophists and rhapsodes (and poets).—Nagy (2002: 22–35) is too strongly focused on the technical, mnemonic, side of the rhapsodes’ performances, and completely ignores the destructive nature of Socrates’ discussion with Ion. There is nothing ‘convivial’ or ‘competitive’ (p. 22) in Socrates’ encounter with Ion, nor is Socrates interested in ‘out-arguing’, let alone ‘out-performing’ Ion (p. 24). His sole purpose is to expose him as an ignorant mouthpiece of an equally ignorant poet. For this aspect of the *Ion* see the Introduction §1.

pecially if they occur in MSS considered of secondary importance).¹⁸⁹ Leaving aside the rather obvious palaeographical arguments concerning the alternation of γε and τε, καὶ ... τε would in itself make sense here if this means ‘and also’. On the other hand, this is perhaps slightly duller than the more emphatic γε.

530a8

Τί οὖν; In this formulaic question, τί announces that a second question will follow, while οὖν reacts to Ion’s πάνυ γε (= ‘There are rhapsodic contests in Epidaurus’), which makes it possible for Socrates to continue with a question about the contests: ‘This being so (οὖν), what more can you tell us (τί)?’,¹⁹⁰ followed by the question proper: ἡγωνίζου ...; etc. Denniston 426 on οὖν (‘Proceeding to a new point, or a new stage in the march of thought’) is too vague, for he ignores the fact that the ‘new point’ proceeds from what has been said earlier.¹⁹¹

ἡγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; ‘Did you participate for us in some part <of the contest>?’ **ἡγωνίζου:** imperfect of an action in course. **Τι** must be taken as an internal object; cp. *Ap.* 34c2 ἐλάττω ... ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος, *Hdt.* 5.22.2 ἀγωνιζόμενος στάδιον, *D.* 18.262 τῶν ἀγῶνων, οὓς ὑμεῖς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγωνίζεσθε; see also *LSJ* s.v. ἀγωνίζομαι. Since we are dealing with a contest of rhapsodes reciting Homeric poetry (cp. a4), τι must refer to one of the parts into which the epics were subdivided for such contests. For this practice at the Panathenaic games see [*Pl.*] *Hipparch.* 228b8 ff.: (Hipparchus) ἠνάγκασε τοὺς

¹⁸⁹ Also in later Greek, e.g. *Ach.Tat.* 2.6.1, 5.10.1.

¹⁹⁰ Cp., in slightly different terms, Sicking (1997: 170) on *Grg.* 498a6 (So. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν; *Pol.* Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; So. Τί οὖν; ἀπίοντων ... πότεροι ...): ‘(τί οὖν) signals that the preceding question derives its relevance from being a stepping stone to the one that is to follow’. (In our case ‘the preceding question’ would be μῶν ... οἱ Ἐπιδαύριοι;.)

¹⁹¹ Actually, Denniston’s remarks about this use of οὖν too much resemble his description of ‘progressive’ μήν, p. 336: ‘... μήν ... either adds a fresh point (“again”, “further”), or marks a fresh stage in the march of thought (“well”, “now”)’. The essential feature that distinguishes μήν from οὖν (and δέ and δὴ) in its ‘progressive’ uses, viz. that μήν ‘normally marks a new departure’, is mentioned by him all right, but only in passing (p. 352). See also below on 530b5 καὶ μήν.

ῥαψωδοῦς Παναθηναίους ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ (sc. τὰ ἔπη) διεύ-
ναι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι οἶδε ποιουσιν.¹⁹²

For ἡμῖν see above, on 530a1.

καὶ πῶς τι ἡγωνίσω; ‘And how—by and large—did your participation in the contest end?’ **ἡγωνίσω:** aorist of an action brought to a close. Here, **τι** (lit. ‘to some extent’) modifies **πῶς**; it functions as a so-called ‘downtoner’, which makes the question less direct and suggests that Socrates will be satisfied by an approximative answer; cp. also Stock: ‘[τι] ... has a deprecatory force, as the questioner is not sure of his ground’. Similar examples are: *Hp.Ma.* 297e8 πῶς τι ἄρ’ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; X. *Mem.* 3.13.6 Καὶ πῶς τι, ἔφη, ἀπήλλαχεν ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ;,¹⁹³ D. 19.242 καὶ περιῶν ἐρεῖ· πῶς τι τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπαγαγὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ὠχρόμην ...;. A good example of this use of **τι** with another adverb in **-ως** is *Tht.* 148e4 οὗτ’ αὐτὸς δύνamai πείσαι ἑμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω οὗτ’ ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύῃ. Cp. the use of **τι** in the common phrase σχεδόν τι, K-G 1, 663 f., S-D 215, LSJ s.v. τις, A. 11.

Text. All MSS read πῶς τί, just as they read ἡγωνίζου (-ζω S) τί ἡμῖν. For these accentuations see the Introduction §5.2 (i); recall that according to at least one tradition τί was always oxytone, also when it was enclitic. In the case of πῶς τί, however, there is a complication, for our grammars and texts recognize a separate use of πῶς τί. See e.g. K-G 2, 521, 5: ‘... die griechische Sprache [hat] die Freiheit, zwei oder selbst mehrere Fragwörter unter Ein gemeinsames Prädikat zu stellen’, among which πῶς and τί; at *Hp.Ma.* 297e8, quoted above, K-G prefer, in fact, πῶς τί ἄρ’ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα, and refer to Heindorf and Stallbaum for comments.¹⁹⁴ In this use, however—if it exists at all, see below—πῶς τί is always found in combination with τοῦτο, and mostly with a *verbum dicendi*, and the combination seems to be confined to Plato’s later dialogues. Cp:

¹⁹² The *Hipparchus* is generally considered a work from the fourth century. See also n. 331.

¹⁹³ Many editors bracket **τι**, without cause.

¹⁹⁴ Stallbaum explains the ‘duplex interrogatio’ here as follows: ‘πῶς ἄρ’ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; quo argumentum pugnabimus: et τί ἄρ’ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; h.e. quid erit quod contendamus’.—I note for the record that although K-G say that ‘die griechische Sprache die Freiheit [hat]’ to combine two question words it is actually the Byzantine copyists/editors who had this liberty, for it is they who added the accents.

- Tht.* 146d6 Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;—Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μὲν-
τοι οἶμαι, φράσω.
Tht. 208e1 Πῶς τί τοῦτο;—Φράσω, εἰάν
Sph. 261e3 Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;—Ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσ-
ομολογεῖν.
Plt. 297c5 Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶρηκας;—Καὶ μὴν οὐ φαῦλόν γε, ἂν
Ti. 22b6 Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις; φάναι.—Νέοι ἔστε, εἰπεῖν, τὰς ψυχὰς
πάντες.

At *Lg.* 968c8 Burnet and others further complicate matters by reading Πῶς; τί τοῦτο εἰρήσθαι φῶμεν αὖ; but this should be corrected in Πῶς τί (or πῶς τι; see below) τοῦτο εἰρήσθαι φῶμεν αὖ;—Πρῶτον μὲν See also below, at 541a1.

The question arises, of course, whether πῶς and τί do, indeed, have a function of their own, just as the combined question words in cases like: *S. Ant.* 401 ἄγεις δὲ τήνδε τῷ τρόπῳ πόθεν λαβών; (answer: αὐτὴ τὸν ἄνδρ' ἔθαπτε, which reacts to both questions at the same time), *X. Mem.* 2.2.3 Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, ὑπὸ τίνων εὔροιμεν ἂν μείζω εὐηργετημέ-
νους ἢ παῖδας ὑπὸ γονέων; (no answer, rhetorical question), and espe-
cially *E. IT* 1360 τίνας τίς ὢν <σὺ> τήνδ' ἀπεμπολαῖς χθονός; (an-
swer: ὁ δ' εἶπ' Ὀρέστης, τῆσδ' ὄμαιμος, ὡς μάθης, Ἀγαμέμνονος
παῖς, where Ὀρέστης reacts to τίς, and τῆσδ' ὄμαιμος ... Ἀγαμέμνο-
νος παῖς to τίνας). If πῶς τί in the cases mentioned above functions as
a double question word, this must be a combination of questions like
the following, where πῶς and τί operate on their own. First some ex-
amples of πῶς:

- Cra.* 393d5 Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;—Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τῶν στοι-
χείων οἶσθα ὅτι ... ('What do you mean?'—'Something
quite simple')
Smp. 202c4–6 Εἷς μὲν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δ' ἐγώ.—Κἀγὼ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτο,
ἔφην, λέγεις;—Καὶ ἦ, Ῥαδίως, ἔφη, λέγε γάρ μοι, ...
La. 190e10 Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;—Ἐγὼ φράσω, εἰάν οἷός τε
γένωμαι
Men. 73e2 Πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετὴ τις;—Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
—Ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ...
Men. 96e6 ... τίνα ποτε τρόπον γίνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.—Πῶς τοῦ-
το λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;—Ὡδε: ὅτι μὲν ...

and next of τί:

- Grg.* 462c2 ... ὁ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγων.—Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;—Ἐμπειρίαν
ἔγωγέ τινα
R. 608d2 Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις;—Οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ἦν
δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ...

From these examples it appears that πῶς and τί ask different things: while πῶς seeks an elucidation of some assertion ('How do you mean?', 'What do you mean by this?'), τί at *Grg.* 462c2 is a predicative complement ('What/How do you call this?') and at *R.* 608d2 a causal question word ('Why do you say this?'). Are these meaningfully combined, for example, in πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις? I think not. To begin with, it is not clear what might be contributed to these questions by τί. In fact, these πῶς τί questions very much resemble those introduced by simple πῶς, for they all ask the addressee to elucidate some earlier assertion. Notice especially the similarity between *Tht.* 146d6 and *Tht.* 208e1, on the one hand, and *La.* 190e10, on the other: both πῶς τί τοῦτο and πῶς τοῦτο are followed by φράσω, introducing the elucidation asked for. Observe also that in no example of πῶς τί the answer reacts to both question words, and that both at *Tht.* 146d6 Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες;—Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· and *Cra.* 393d5 Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;—Οὐδὲν ποικίλον the answer has the form of an (adverbial?) accusative. Interestingly, πῶς and τί *can* be combined with one predicate, but then they are coordinated by καί and have clearly different functions; see *Sph.* 249e1 Πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτο εἶρηκας;, which must mean 'What did you mean by that, and why have you said it?' (The answer is of no help here, for it does not react directly to these questions.) All in all, the evidence for the existence of πῶς τί questions is scant. If they exist, they must be considered a variant of πῶς questions, which for some unclear reason was preferred by Plato to simple πῶς in his later works. Alternatively, we should perhaps consider reading πῶς τι everywhere, with τι having the same downtoner function as in the *Ion*: 'What do you mean by that, broadly speaking?' Why, in that case, πῶς τι τοῦτο λέγεις etc. occurs only in the later dialogues is still unclear.

530b1

τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἄθλων 'les premiers prix' (Mérider). The plural forms, which are not, *pace* e.g. Lamb ('the first prize') and Flashar ('den ersten Preis') *pluralia tantum*, may indicate that Ion participated

and won in a number of parts. For lack of information about the details of the Asclepius games we can only guess at their nature. Perhaps for outstanding delivery and exegesis of (parts of) the Homeric epics (cp. above on ἡγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν)? Or were there several first prizes, for which cp. Hom. *Il.* 23.262 ἱππεύσιν ... πρῶτα ... ἄεθλα / θῆκε γυναῖκα ἄγεσθαι ... / καὶ τρίποδ(α) ..., / τῷ πρώτῳ? Or, finally, is Ion exaggerating? The prizes probably were laurel wreaths; see Sève (1993: 324 f.).

ἡνεγκάμεθα With this ‘inclusive’ plural Ion reacts to Socrates’ ἡμῖν in the preceding line: Socrates, too, has won the prizes. For this use of the plural cp. K-G 1, 83, 3, who mention as an example Hom. *Il.* 22.393 ἡράμεθα μέγα κῦδος· ἐπέφνομεν Ἴκτορα δῖον, spoken by Achilles. According to K-G the plural is used ‘mit einer gewissen Bescheidenheit’, but I do not think this is correct; ‘modesty’ is not a characteristic easily associated with Achilles. On the contrary, it is rather a sign of superiority: although you, other Greeks, have done nothing, I let you share in my triumph. Likewise for the *Ion*. For a similar use in English see Quirk et al. (1985: 350; ‘rhetorical’ plural), and further Corbett (2000: 101 ff.), on the ‘group’ or ‘associative’ plural.

530b2

εὖ λέγεις This formula (‘Well spoken’) mostly comes after an evaluative assertion and in that case expresses assent: ‘You’re right’; see e.g. *Tht.* 168c8 Παίξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάντῳ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.—Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, *Phd.* 77c1, *Grg.* 449d8, but here, after a statement of fact, it means: ‘Splendid news!’, ‘Bravo!’ (Macgregor). Likewise below, 530d4 and 536d4, and e.g. *Prt.* 339b7 (‘I know the poem.’—Εὖ ... λέγεις). Cp. also Burnet’s note on εὖ ... λέγεις at *Ap.* 24e9: ‘That is good news’.

ἄγε δή δή expresses the idea that the utterance is an obvious sequel to the preceding utterance or action. For this view of δή as an ‘evidential’ particle see van Ophuijsen in Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993: 140 ff.), Brugmann-Thumb (1913: 630). Its effect in an answer, as here, could be paraphrased as: ‘In view of what you said just now, it will not come as a surprise to you that I continue with ...’. Cp. also Denniston 216 on δή with the imperative: ‘(δή) sometimes implies a connexion, logical or temporal, the command either arising out of, or simply following upon, a previous action or speech’.

ὅπως ... νικήσομεν ὅπως + future indicative expresses an urgent adhortation, and is a hortative expression in its own right. Commentators usually supply ὄρα or the like, but this is again (cp. on τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν above) a didactic rather than a syntactic solution. '[W]e may doubt whether any definite leading verb was ever in mind when these familiar exhortations were used' (Goodwin 1889: §271). That ὅπως + future indicative operates independently appears from the fact that it may be coordinated with an imperative, e.g. Ar. *R.* 377 ἀλλ' ἔμβα χῶπως ἀρεῖς / τὴν Σώτειραν; it would be rather absurd to supply ὄρα here. It is true that alongside ὅπως + future indicative also ὄρα ὅπως + future ind. seems to occur (Pl. *Lj.* 211b7 ὄρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι).¹⁹⁵ But this does not mean, of course, that ὄρα should be supplied in the other cases: we are dealing here with two different constructions which each have their own meaning. Likewise, μή + subjunctive expressing an anxious assertion (e.g. Pl. *Grg.* 462e6 μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τάληθές εἰπεῖν, K-G 1, 224) is semantically related to μή + subj. after verbs of fearing, but again this does not mean that with respect to such sentences φοβοῦμαι or the like should be supplied. For more examples, and further details on the use of ὅπως (and ὅπως μή) + future indicative see Kalén (1941: 118–119), Amigues (1977: 64–78). In Plato, hortative ὅπως + fut. ind. 1st person plur. occurs also at *Grg.* 495d2–3 Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα.

Text. νικήσομεν is the reading of T, WSF having νικήσωμεν, on which Serranus notes, in the margin of his translation in Stephanus' edition: 'For. νικήσωμεν et subaud. aliquod verbum cum ὅπως'. But νικήσωμεν should be rejected, for independent ὅπως + subjunctive (a rare construction) is always accompanied by μή, and expresses an anxious assertion. Two examples from Plato are: *Cra.* 430d8 Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ἢ τοῦτο, *Euthd.* 296a9 Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ τι ἡμᾶς σφίλῃ τὸ "ἀεὶ" τοῦτο. See Amigues (1977: 192–193) for further details.

The reading of WSF is perhaps due to contamination with the construction of ἄγε (δὴ) + subjunctive without preceding ὅπως; see *Phd.* 116d7–8 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πεθώμεθα αὐτῷ, *A. Pers.* 140, *Eu.* 307, *X. Cyr.* 5.5.15, etc.; often in Homer.

¹⁹⁵ -σεις T, -σης B (ης refictum in ras. sed non videtur εις fuisse; ὄρα secl. Cobet).

530b4 ἀλλ' ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ On the assentient use of ἀλλά see the excellent discussion in Denn. 16 ff.; ἀλλά 'repudiates the very idea that dissent is possible' (16); more specifically, our passage is an example of 'Practical consent, expression of willingness to act in a required way' (17). Although ἔσται ταῦτα is impersonal, it implies, in fact, a promise on Ion's part that he will act in such a way that he shall win (god willing). For an almost exact parallel see *Hp. Ma.* 286b7–c3 ἀλλ' ὅπως παρέσῃ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξεις, οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρίναι τὰ λεγόμενα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, ὃ Ἴππία. Unknowingly, Ion anticipates Socrates' argument about the divinely inspired nature of his rhapsodic performances at 533d1 ff.

The expression ἐὰν/ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ/θέλῃ occurs all in all fifteen times in Plato (including *Alc.* 1 and *Ep.* VI), six of them in the *Laws*; there are furthermore two instances of the variant εἰ θεὸς ἐθέλοι.¹⁹⁶ Ἐὰν ... ἐθέλῃ conveys a feeling of confidence on the part of Ion, for in conditional clauses ἄν + subjunctive expresses the idea that realization of the condition is very well possible; cp. Wakker (1994: 174 ff.), Rijksbaron (2002: 69 f.). Other instances of this use of ἐάν + subjunctive in the *Ion* are 535e4–5 (combined with an implicit generic (iterative) meaning), 537a2, 541d5.

The verb of the conditional clause is always a form of ἐθέλω, never of βούλομαι. This is in accordance with the powerful status of the subject of such clauses, the gods, for only ἐθέλω implies that the subject is in control as to the realization of the action wished for: ἐθέλω = 'be willing, be prepared, intend'; βούλομαι basically = 'prefer (one alternative to another)', with no implication as to the control exercised by the subject. For further details see Allan (2003: 236–242). The difference is apparent in the following sequence: *Alc.* 1 135c12 ff. ΣΩ. Οἴσθα οὖν πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ νῦν; (—) ΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Πῶς; ΑΛ. Ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ. ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν; ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ. Human βούλεσθαι is not enough for Alcibiades to escape from his present condition, he needs the will of the gods to effectuate that. Cp. also *D.* 2.20 δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγ' ... δεῖξεν οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν, ἂν οἱ τε θεοὶ θέλωσι καὶ ὑμεῖς βούλησθε.

¹⁹⁶ Subjunctive: *Phd.* 69d6, 80d7, *Tht.* 151d5, *Alc.* 1 127e6, 135d6, *La.* 201c, *Hp. Ma.* 286c3, *Ion* 530b4, *Lg.* 632e7, 688e2, 730e5, 752a8, 778b7, 859b3, *Ep.* VI 323c5; optative: *Lg.* 799e5, 841c8.

530b5–d9

Socrates prepares the ground for his conversation with Ion; introduction of τέχνη and other key terms

530b5

καὶ μὴν *πολλάκις γε* ‘and in this connection (καὶ) I can assure you (μὴν) that ... really (γε) often’; Lamb’s succinct ‘I must say’, and Méridier’s ‘Ma parole’, convey the value of καὶ μὴν rather well. As always, καὶ expresses the idea that the information which follows is semantically and pragmatically connected with the information which precedes, while μὴν signals that the speaker vouches for the truth of his information—which need not be the case of course, as Ion will soon find out. Cp. Smyth (§2920): ‘asseverative, *in truth, surely*’. By this feature μὴν belongs to the class of what may be called, following Quirk et al. (1985: 583) for English, ‘emphasizers’, i.e. ‘subjuncts ... which have a reinforcing effect on the truth value of the clause or part of the clause to which they apply’.¹⁹⁷ Cp. for the values of καὶ and μὴν, and for a critique of Denniston’s treatment of these particles, Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993: 11–12, 15; 51, 54–55), Wakker (1997: 209–213, 226–229).¹⁹⁸ As for καὶ, ‘in this connection’ here more specifically amounts to: ‘speaking about rhapsodic contests ...’. Similar instances of καὶ μὴν in Plato are e.g. *Mx.* 234c1 ‘speaking about ἀποθανεῖν (= καὶ; cp. τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν at 234b6) I can assure you that (= μὴν) it is an honourable thing to die in a war’, and *Chrm.* 153b9 ‘speaking about the battle at Potidaea (cp. μάχη ἐγγέγονει ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ at 153b6) I can assure you that we got news that the battle was severe and that many people we know died in it’, whereby Chae-

¹⁹⁷ Denniston is not very informative on μὴν. He simply calls it ‘emphatic’ (329), like several other particles: γε (115), δαί (263), δὴ (204), δῆτα (274), μέν (359) and μέντοι (399). In a note (330) he rejects, with K-G, and like them without giving arguments, the idea that μὴν is subjective and δὴ objective, wrongly, to my mind. See also on δὴ at 530b2. Of the other particles mentioned here four are not *emphasizers* in Quirk’s sense: γε, δαί, δὴ, and δῆτα.

¹⁹⁸ Denniston is representative of many scholars when he writes (351): ‘καὶ μὴν often introduces a new argument, a new item in a series, or a new point of any kind’. Actually, it is only καὶ which has this introductory function, while μὴν expresses the attitude of the speaker towards the truth value of the information he is providing. That this information usually relates to new arguments etc. (or to new characters in a play), is a matter of usage, and thus a contingent feature of the use of καὶ μὴν.

rephon elucidates his startled question ‘how did you manage to get out of the battle?’

Finally, γε emphasizes the iterative nature of Socrates’ envy: not once (= ἐξήλωσα without πολλάκις) nor repeatedly (= bare πολλάκις) but *repeatedly*.

πολλάκις γε ἐξήλωσα ... τῆς τέχνης For some time Socrates will play along with Ion, and act as an interested and understanding interlocutor.

For the use of **πολλάκις** with an aorist indicative, which turns a single completed action into an (indeterminate) series of completed actions, see S-D 278, 5.

530b6 ὦ Ἴων See Appendix II.

530b6–c1 τὸ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν ... ζηλωτόν ἐστιν ‘The subject of this sentence is the double articular inf. τὸ ... ἅμα μὲν ... πρέπον ... εἶναι ... ἅμα δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, with ζηλωτόν ἐστιν as its predicate’ (Miller).

530b8–9 ποιηταῖς ... ἀγαθοῖς Since Plato rejects poetry and does not consider it a good idea to spend too much time on it, ‘good poets’ cannot exist, of course. (See also the Introduction §1). Yet Plato introduces them occasionally for the sake of the argument, as here, and in two other technical, programmatic, passages, *R.* 598e3–599a5 and 605c9 ff.¹⁹⁹ The central part of the first passage runs: (Socrates speaking) ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ καλῶς ποιῆσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. This view, however, is not something endorsed by Socrates himself, but is part of the investigation initiated at 598d8 with the words Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν ἀκούομεν ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα, and continued at 598e5 ff. with δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον μιμηταῖς <οἱ>οὔτοις οὗτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὀρῶν-

¹⁹⁹ Capuccino (154–169) has a useful overview and discussion of the use of ἀγαθός and related terms (εὖ, καλῶς) in the *Ion*.—‘Beautiful’ and ‘poetry’, too, are sometimes found combined, but then this beauty is due to divine apportionment, as below at 533e6–8, 534c2, e2–5.

τες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριτὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδοῖσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, φαντάσματα γὰρ ἄλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιούσιν, ἢ τι καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασιν περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν. The 'knowledge of all arts' mentioned at 598e1 will be the principal target of Socrates' attack on Ion as well as Homer in our dialogue.

The second text where we find ἀγαθὸς ποιητής (605c9 ff.) is from a larger passage, in which Socrates condemns tragedy and comedy as 'arts pernicious', to quote Chambry's words (*République*, III 100). This verdict includes the effect of the poets on 'us', the audience: οἱ γὰρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὄδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἴσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῆ. It is only in the eyes of the audience, then, (cp. ὡς) that a poet who achieves the effects mentioned is a 'good poet'. Note also the presence of σπουδάζοντες: we in earnest praise a poet who achieves the effects mentioned as a 'good poet'.²⁰⁰

Naturally, the non-existence of competent poets entails the non-existence of competent rhapsodes, and when Socrates below speaks of an ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, he, too, is only introduced for the sake of the argument, just like his 'art' at 530b6.

530b10

Θειοτάτῳ An ambiguous and ominous term, as it will turn out, for Homer is indeed the 'most divine' of all poets, i.e. the one who is the prime example of poets being possessed by the god (the Muse).

²⁰⁰ Socrates also twice uses ἀγαθὸς ποιητής in non-technical passages. At *Phdr.* 236d5 he is playfully comparing himself with such a poet: γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ιδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. In the second passage there is a moral dimension to the activity of the good poet: he must not harm himself (*Ly.* 206b8): οἶμαι ἐγὼ ἄνδρα ποιήσει βλάπτοντα ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἂν σε ἐθέλειν ὁμολογήσαι ὡς ἀγαθὸς ποτ' ἐστὶν ποιητής, βλαβερός ὢν ἑαυτῷ. I should add that ἀγαθὸς ποιητής is also used by other speakers, viz. Diotima at *Smp.* 209d2 f.: εἰς Ὀμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ζηλῶν ..., and twice by Protagoras, at *Prt.* 325e5 and 326a7. In all three cases the use is again non-technical. Diotima is speaking about the production of κλέος traditionally connected with good poetry; she is, moreover, characterized as speaking ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί (208c1). As for the *Prt.*, there Protagoras is speaking about the characteristics of a traditional education, which naturally includes getting to know 'good poets'.

τὴν τούτου διάνοιαν Διάνοια recurs at 530c4 and at 530d3. In all three cases the meaning is ‘pensée’ (Des Places, *Lexique*). Here, where διανοίαν is opposed to ἔπη (= ‘(epic) lines, verses’, the standard meaning of ἔπη in the *Ion*; cp. 533e5–6, 534c4, 535b2, 535c3, 537a2, 537c1, 538b1), διάνοια is what the poet expresses in these lines: ‘thought, spirit’. So, too, at 530c4. At 530d3, however, where Ion uses the plural and is speaking about his own διάνοιαι, and where there is no opposition with ἔπη, the meaning is rather ‘ideas, insights’. Διάνοια is probably the ‘literal thought’, as opposed to ὑπόνοια, the ‘underlying, covert, deep thought’ of the epics, which must have involved an allegorizing interpretation and whose existence is presupposed by *R.* 378d6–7 θεομαχίας ὄσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ’ ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. For ὑπόνοια cp. further *X. Smp.* 3.6, where the word is connected with rhapsodes: Οἴσθ’ αὖτις οὖν ἔθνος, ἔφη, ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψωδῶν; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’, ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, οὐκ οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ. Δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας (sc. τῶν ἐπῶν, mentioned a few lines before) οὐκ ἐπίστανται.

Διάνοια is the normal word used in the Homeric scholia for the ‘thought’ of the epics. This is important, for it gives us a clue as to what a ἔρμηνεύς does; see below.

530b10–c1 τὴν τούτου διάνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν, μὴ μόνον τὰ ἔπη Ἐκμανθάνω in principle = ‘to learn thoroughly’. With ἔπη and related words the meaning shifts into ‘to learn so thoroughly that one knows them by heart’. Cp. *Prt.* 325e5 (τοὺς παῖδας) ἀναγινώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, *Hr.Ma.* 285e6, *Lg.* 811a1, a3. But with διάνοιαν the meaning here rather = ‘to learn thoroughly’. Lamb employs two different verbs: ‘... apprehending his thought and not merely learning off his words’. The combination with διάνοια is also found at *Phdr.* 228d2 ff. ... τὰ γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδὸν ἀπάντων ... ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἕκαστον ἐφεξῆς δίδειμι

530c1 μὴ μόνον Μή, not οὐ, for the negative is part of the particular infinitive construction. ‘Der mit dem Artikel verbundene Infinitiv wirdt stets durch μή negiert ... indem er überall als ein abstrakter Begriff aufgefasst wird’ (K-G 2, 197,3).

530c1–2 οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός This γάρ sentence elaborates upon the necessity for rhapsodes to occupy themselves with good poets and especially to get thoroughly acquainted with the διάνοια of *the* poet, Homer: there is no ἐκμανθάνειν without συνεῖναι.

With the reading ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός (which should be preferred; see below) there are two ways to construe:

- 1) ῥαψωδός is subject, and ἀγαθός predicative complement; thus Murray;
- 2) supply τις as subject, with ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός as predicative complement; thus e.g. Lamb ('a man can never be a good rhapsode without ...'), and Flashar ('... es kann doch wohl keiner als tüchtiger Rhapsode gelten ...').

The first interpretation is unlikely, for predicative adjectives are normally separated from the subject noun by one or more other words, especially with non-articular subjects,²⁰¹ and either precede or—seldom—follow after γινν- (or εἰμί). Cp. e.g. *Ly.* 206b8 οὐκ ἄν σε ἐθέλειν ὁμολογήσαι ὡς ἀγαθὸς ποτ' ἐστὶν ποιητής, βλαβερὸς ὢν ἑαυτῷ, *Grg.* 491e5 πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὄταφον; *Grg.* 515a5 ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν ... διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε κάγαθός γέγονεν, *R.* 466b5 (with articular subject) εἰ οὕτως ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαίμων γίνεσθαι, *Ep.* VII 334d οὔτε γὰρ πέφυκεν ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν οὐδέεις, οὔτ' εἴ τω συμβαίῃ, γένοιτο ἂν εὐδαίμων, *Thg.* 125a8 διὰ τὴν τίνος συνουσίαν σοφὸς ἂν γένοιτο τύραννος.

We should therefore prefer the second interpretation. For the suppletion of τις see K-G 1, 35–36, Gildersleeve §78 (who mentions among other examples *Men.* 97a6 ... οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἠγεῖσθαι ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ἦ), and for similar examples of adjective + noun or noun + adjective as predicative complements with γινν- see, for example, the line quoted from Simonides at *Prt.* 339b1 ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,²⁰² *Prt.* 345a4 f. τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἱατρὸς γένοιτο;

²⁰¹ For this reason Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ ὑεῖς φαῦλοι γίνονται; at *Prt.* 326e6 should be taken as 'Then why is it that of good fathers are born many bad sons?' rather than as 'Then why is it that many sons of good fathers turn out so meanly?' (Lamb). Later on, at 328c5 οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους ὑεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθοῦς, Lamb translates, correctly, '... that bad sons are born of good fathers ...'.—The position before γινν- is the default Focus position; see Dik (1995: 12).

²⁰² Supply τινα. 'Sans doute devenir honnête homme véritablement est difficile' (Croiset), rather than 'For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard' (Lamb).

δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶ ἰατρῶ, *Men.* 93b7 Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;²⁰³ *R.* 558b3 εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὐποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὢν εὐθύς παῖζοι ἐν καλοῖς ..., *Lg.* 641b8 οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ('people') παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ γίνονται ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί. The front position of the adjective in ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, κακὸς ἰατρός, ἀγαθὸν ... ἄνδρα makes this adjective the salient element of the noun phrase; cp. Dik (1997), and it may contrast with another adjective.²⁰⁴ For similar examples with other verbs cp. e.g. *Smp.* 174b7 ποιήσας τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα διαφερόντως ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, *Grg.* 507c2 πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ... τὸν σῶφρονα ... ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως. Conversely, in the case of ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός the word order either is neutral with respect to salience (*Lg.* 641b8), or it is rather ἀνὴρ which is salient; cp. the contrast with παῖς ὢν in the εἰ μὴ clause at *R.* 558b3.

Text. ἀγαθός SF Prisc. : om. TW The text of TW, with bare ῥαψωδός, is adopted by a number of editors, e.g. Stallbaum (who believes that ἀγαθός 'ortum ex interpretatione'), Schanz (who fails to mention that there is a variant ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, and who wrongly suggests that Priscian has the text without ἀγαθός) and Méridier, who translates 'car on ne saurait être rhapsode si l'on ne comprenait ...', apparently supplying τις, as in the second interpretation discussed above. In my view this should rather be 'un vrai rhapsode', for if bare ῥαψωδός is adopted, this should be taken in the specific sense of 'a real rhapsode'. A noun which is often used in this way is ἀνὴρ = 'a real man'. See LSJ s.v. IV 'man emphatically', where 'emphatically' must be taken in the ancient sense of ἔμφασις, Latin *significatio*, = 'suggestive innuendo'; see Quintilian's definition of *significatio* at 8.3.83 *altiore[m] praebens intellectum quam quem verba per se ipsa declarant* ('revealing a deeper meaning than is actually expressed by the words'). For details I refer to Leeman (1963: 39, 300). Two examples of 'emphatic' ἀνὴρ from Plato are *R.* 550a1 ... ὅπως, ἐπειδὴν

²⁰³ Note that here, by the presence of Θεμιστοκλέα, ἀγαθὸν ... ἄνδρα must be taken as one noun phrase. In the next sentence we find the reversed order οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν ... εἶναι. In fact, having established that Themistocles is an ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ in general, Socrates now focuses on one particular manifestation of his ἀρετή, which is signalled by the front position of διδάσκαλος.

²⁰⁴ Cp. Dik's conclusion on p. 76: 'a. When the adjective is not pragmatically marked it will be postposed; b. When the adjective is contrastive or otherwise the most salient element of a noun phrase, it will be preposed'.

άνηρ γένηται, ... άνηρ μάλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός ..., and *Ep.* VII 330d4 ... φεύγοντα ... άνδρα τε ἡγοίμην καὶ ἱατρικόν ...

Although adopting bare ῥαψωδός yields an attractive and entirely plausible text, and although ἀγαθός in SF may indeed, as suggested by Stallbaum (see above), be ‘ortum ex interpretatione’, I nevertheless prefer the reading with ἀγαθός, because in several places in the *Ion* the competence of poets, rhapsodes, and other artists and interpreters is mentioned explicitly; see e.g. 530b8–9 ποιηταῖς ... ἀγαθοῖς, 530c4–5 καλῶς ποιεῖν, of rhapsodes, 531b6 τῶν μάντεων τις τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 532b5 κριτὴν ἱκανόν, 532e5–6 γραφῆς ... ἀγαθοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι, 540e7 ῥαψωδός ἀγαθός. It seems appropriate to have an explicit reference to the quality of the rhapsodes too, right at the beginning of the dialogue: (supposedly) good poets deserve similar rhapsodes.

As for the absence of ἀγαθός from TW, unless we are dealing with two original variants this may be ‘ortum ex interpretatione’, too, of course, viz. of an editor-copyist who took it that not just good rhapsodes but any rhapsode should be able to understand the thought of Homer.

530c2 εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα

Text. συνείη SF Prisc.²⁰⁵ : συνιείη Wf : συνίη T Naturally, with so many phonemes around that are liable to doubling or simplification by itacism there is some MS variation. In principle, all variants make sense; for T’s imperfect συνίη with optative + ἄν in the main clause, which was the standard text until Bekker and Stallbaum preferred S’s συνείη,²⁰⁶ see K-G 2, 467, Goodwin §503. The reason why they preferred the aorist optative remains unknown. The aorist should, in fact, be preferred, in view of the aorist form γένοιτο in the main clause; with two aorists an effect of coincidence is created: the completion of a person’s training as a rhapsode coincides with his fully having understood the poet’s words. This gives better sense than a combination

²⁰⁵ Priscian adduces the words from Plato in a discussion of the case form with which Latin *intellego* is construed. ‘Attici “συνίημι τῶν λόγων” καὶ “τοὺς λόγους”. Πλάτων Ἰωνι: οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο ποτε ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ ποιητοῦ’. The form of ‘understand’ in part of the MSS of Priscian is uncial **ϸΥΝΕΙΝ**, while in another part it is **ϸΥΝΘΙΝ**. With Hertz, we may assume that these forms represent συνείη; in **ϸΥΝΕΙΝ**, the second **Ν** stands for **Η**, in **ϸΥΝΘΙΝ**, **Θ** for **Ε** and **Ν** for **Η**.—There are some 55 references to Platonic dialogues in Priscian.

²⁰⁶ Recall that they did not use F (Introduction §3.2).

of a closed (γένοιτο) with an open, ongoing action (συνιείη, συνίη). For a similar case of coincident εἰ μή see *R.* 500e3 οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι: the becoming happy of a *polis* coincides with its having been designed in accordance with the divine plan, i.e. in no other way (cp. ἄλλως) can a *polis* become happy than by being designed in accordance with the divine plan. For the coincident use of the aorist stem, of which the classic example is the participle in the Homeric formula ὧς εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου, cp. Hettrich (1976: 77–81), Rijksbaron (1979) and (2002: 125), Barrett on *E. Hipp.* 289–292.

As for συνεῖναι, with our passage we may compare *Prt.* 338e6–339a3, where Protagoras argues that the most important part of the education for any man is to be δεινός with respect to poetry, a competence which involves τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἅ μὴ, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. Here, the present infinitive συνιέναι has generic (habitual) meaning²⁰⁷ while διελεῖν and λόγον δοῦναι relate to individual acts of division²⁰⁸ and explanations of these divisions. For ὀρθῶς see on 537c1.

530c3 ἐρμηνέα There are two main views of ἐρμηνεύς here: (a) the word refers to an interpreter, i.e. the term implies ‘knowledge and some kind of participation on the part of the rhapsode’ (Murray 102); (b) it refers to just an intermediary, someone who transmits the thought of the poets to men. Thus e.g. Flashar (‘Vermittler’) and Capuccino (““mediatore” o “portavoce””; 2005: 62 and 128 ff.).²⁰⁹ Ac-

²⁰⁷ With finite forms we would have ἀνὴρ περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα συνήσιν.

²⁰⁸ That is, word divisions. For διαιρέω = ‘divide words’ see Isoc. 12.17 λόγους ... διαροῦντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς, LSJ s.v. VI. See further below on 530c3.

²⁰⁹ There are still other views. Thus, in the introduction to his translation, Woodruff writes, (17): ‘Usually translated “interpreter,” *hermeneus* can be used of a variety of mediating roles. Here it cannot mean a person who interprets in the sense of “explains” since (a) explaining a text is not a normal part of a rhapsode’s profession, and (b) a rhapsode who is out of his mind (as Socrates argues *Ion* is) is in no position to explain anything. I have therefore translated the word as “representative.” A rhapsode presents poetry as an actor presents his lines; in doing so, he does interpret them, i.e. he gives to them a certain expression.’ There are two mistakes here. Firstly, Woodruff ignores the presence of (the forms of) ἐξηγέομαι below at 531a7 ff. and 533b2, which obviously involve the explaining of, and commenting upon, Homer’s texts. Secondly,

cording to Murray the latter meaning is only relevant later in the dialogue, and I think she is right, as I will argue below.

To establish its meaning at 530c3, ἐρμηνεύς should to my mind be studied in connection with the following terminological data, which center, on the one hand, around understanding and reciting:

– διάνοια and εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα in the present context

– γινώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητής at 530c5

– εὖ ῥαψωδεῖν (cp. 533c3) and ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη at 535b2

and, on the other, around speaking and explaining about:

– (κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων) λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου at 530c8–9 and 533c5–6

– εἰπεῖν πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου at 530d2–3, περὶ τούτων ἐξηγήσασθαι ἃ Ὀμηρος λέγει at 531a7 ff., combined with περὶ μὲν Πολυγνώτου ... ἀποφαίνειν ἃ εὖ τε γράφει καὶ ἃ μὴ at 532e7–9, and περὶ μὲν Δαιδάλου ... ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἃ εὖ πεποίηκεν at 533a7–b3

– ὅταν περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ... εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγη, γνώσεται δήπου τις τὸν εὖ λέγοντα at 531d11–e1.

In the present context, where ἐρμηνεύς appears in the company of τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν, συνεῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα and γινώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητής, there can to my mind be little doubt that it refers to an interpreter.²¹⁰ In fact, the activities of the rhapsode must have been much the same as those of the later scholiasts and other interpreters of Homer. To ensure a successful performance the rhapsode had first and foremost to make basic but important decisions about word division and accentuation, about the construal of the sentences, their declarative, interrogative or exclamative character, and about punctuation, i.e. pausing in a meaningful way while reciting the text, etc. The passage from *Protagoras* (338e6–339a3), already quoted above at 530c1–2 συνείη, points in the same direction: (... περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο) τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἃ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἃ μὴ, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον

while Socrates argues indeed that Ion is out of his mind while performing, this is strictly Socrates' view in the second half of the dialogue; after all, the discussion starts from the idea that rhapsodes do explain their texts, and this must have been the normal practice.

²¹⁰ Cp. also *Th.* 163c1–2, where ἐρμηνῆς appear in the company of γραμματισταί. Since the latter gave elementary instruction, we may infer that the former represented higher learning.

λόγον δοῦναι, where διελεῖν must be = ‘divide’.²¹¹ After all, in the time of Plato, as indeed during antiquity as a whole, the text of Homer—my argument presupposes that fifth- and fourth-century rhapsodes worked from a written text; cp. the Introduction §4.3—was in essence devoid of the interpretive aids just mentioned.²¹² All readers were their own text editors. Now διάνοια, as I mentioned above (on 530b10), was the favourite term of the scholiasts for Homer’s ‘thought’. Time and again we encounter remarks like the following: (Schol. on *Il.* 5.885–887 *a* 1) ἡ-ἦ: διαζευκτικοὶ ἀμφοτέρω· διὸ ὀξύνονται διὰ τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα ἐγκλιτικά, χωρὶς εἰ μὴ ὁ δεῦτερος βεβαιωτικός· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο μᾶλλον αἰτεῖ ἢ διάνοια, (Schol. on *Il.* 8.213 *e*) τῶν δ’ ὅσον ἐκ νηῶν ἀπὸ πύργου τάφρος ἔργε): βραχὺ διασταλτέον (‘there should be a brief pause’) ἐπὶ τὸ νηῶν· σαφεστέραν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, (Schol. on *Il.* 15.735 *b* 1, on accenting φαμεν as a present indicative or as an imperfect) } ἢε τινασ{ φαμέν } εἶναι{: τὸ φαμέν ἐντελές ἐστι καὶ ἐνεστῶτα χρόνον σημαίνει· διὸ τὰς δύο συλλαβὰς βαρυτονητέον. εἰ μέντοι παρατατικὸς γίνοιτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀποβολὴν χρόνου τοῦ κατ’ ἀρχὴν πάσχει καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν φα συλλαβὴν ἢ ὀξεῖα τάσις ἐστίν, ὅμοιον ὡς τὸ ἔφαμεν ἐντελές, ὥσπερ ἐπ’ ἐκείνου “φάμεν δέ οἱ οὐ τελέεσθαι” (δ 664), ὅπερ οὐκ ἐπιζητεῖ νῦν ἢ διάνοια. Interestingly, the technical term for ‘interpretation’ is ἐρμηνεία, as in Schol. on *Il.* 5.633–634 1 <τίς τοι ἀνάγκη / πτώσσειν ἐνθάδ’ ἐόντι

²¹¹ Cp. also *Prt.* 339b7–8 πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιθῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς (sc. τὸ ᾄσμα), ἢ οὐ;. For the meaning of ὀρθῶς see below at 537c1. Διελεῖν is generally taken as in Lamb’s translation (‘to know how to distinguish them’, viz. ‘what has been rightly and what wrongly composed’), but in that case διελεῖν merely repeats συνιέναι in another form. The object of διελεῖν is τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα, as appears from the (proleptic) position of this phrase before both οἷόν τ’ εἶναι συνιέναι and ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν. And, in fact, much of the analysis that follows involves problems of ‘dividing’ a phrase or sentence (e.g. how should ἀλαθέως, at 339b1, be construed? And how ἐκόν, at 345d4? Cp. 346e2 ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἐκόν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα). See also the next n.

²¹² See also above, p. 44, on βυσσόν/βύσσον at 538d1, and n. 97. For a near-contemporary testimony to the difficulties involved see Arist. *Rh.* 1407b13 ff.: ὅλωσ δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὐφραστον· ἐστὶν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ’ ἂ μὴ ῥάδιον διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρω πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῆ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ «τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίνονται»· ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ αἰεὶ, πρὸς ποτέρω <δεῖ> διαστίξαι. Kahn (1979: 94) argues that ‘When both readings have a good case to be made for them, it is important to leave open the possibility that the difficulty of deciding between them is itself an intended effect’.

μάχης ἀδαήμονι φωτί τίς σοι ἀνάγκη πτώσσειν καὶ δειλιᾶν ἐνθάδε ἔόντι, δηλονότι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ὡς ἀπείρω ὄντι τῆς μάχης. λείπει τὸ ὤς. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τὸ πτώσσειν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπέρχεσθαι, ἔστιν ἡ ἔρμηνεῖα οὕτως· ποία σοι ἀνάγκη The importance of having one's text well prepared is apparent from the well-known anecdote about the unfortunate actor Hegelochus, who ἐπιλείψαντος τοῦ πνεύματος mispronounced, in line 279 of Euripides' *Orestes*, γαλήν' (from γαληνὰ) ὄρῳ ('I see a calm') as γαλήν ὄρῳ ('I see a weasel'), thereby ruined the δίανοια of the line and thus became the butt for much ridicule. The fate of a stumbling rhapsode will not have been different. Like an actor, the rhapsode must indeed avoid κακῶς διατιθέναι τὰ ποιήματα, as we may infer from *Chrm.* 162d2 ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ποιητῆς ὑποκριτῆ κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα.

There can be no doubt, I think, that only after the rhapsode had thoroughly grasped the meaning of the text, or rather, had attributed his own meaning to the text, he was an ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, someone who was able to εὖ ῥαψωδεῖν (cp. 533c3) or εὖ εἰπεῖν ἔπη (535b2), 'recite them well', i.e., I take it, recite them in a meaningful way.²¹³ This, however, is not the whole story, for there was also a more specifically exegetical part to the activities of the rhapsode, which is designated first, at 530c8–9, by κάλλιστα ... λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου, then, at 530d2–3, by εἰπεῖν πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου, and next, at 531a7 ff., by περὶ τούτων ἐξηγήσασθαι ἃ Ὀμηρος λέγει, and which must have consisted in commenting upon e.g. the technical terminology of chariot driving (537a ff.) and fishing (538d), as used by Homer. It is specifically this part which is singled out by Socrates in the second half of the dialogue for his attack on Ion's claim that he is δεινὸς περὶ Ὀμήρου (thereby implicitly attacking Homer himself; cp. the Introduction §1).

Now to return to ἔρμηνεύς, this takes on an altogether different meaning in the central part of the dialogue, viz. when Socrates, with the words ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὄν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου εὖ λέγειν ... θεῖα δὲ δύναμις at 533d1–2, has stopped playing along with

²¹³ From the combination of εὖ εἰπεῖν with ἐκπλήξαι at 535b2 it is clear that interpreting the text was only part of the job. The rhapsode also had to have a talent for powerful delivery, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, in the words of Aristotle *Rh.* 1403b23, where it all comes to the voice: ἔστιν δὲ αὕτη μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὕτη δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, etc. Aristotle mentions τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψωδίαν in the context.

Ion, and has subsequently bedazzled him with his showpiece on the magnet and the Muse. Once Ion, touched by Socrates' words (535a2), has admitted that the good poets μοι δοκοῦσι θεία μοῖρα ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ταῦτα ... ἐρμηνεύειν (535a3–4) and that rhapsodes are ἐρμηνέων ἐρμηνῆς (535a8), he has effectively destroyed his own position, since θεία μοῖρα, ἕξω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι (cp. 535b8–c1) and ἐνθουσιάζειν (535c2) will now replace τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη as the central notions of the rhapsode's activity. In this passage ἐρμηνεύς = 'mouthpiece, *Vermittler*'. And the whole second part of the dialogue serves, of course, to demonstrate that Ion, in fact, knows nothing.

530c3–c5 τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἐρμηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· τοῦτο δὲ καλῶς ποιεῖν μὴ γινώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητῆς ἀδύνατον The present stem forms have generic meaning (cp. above on 530c2 συνέη) and indicate that Socrates is speaking here about the habitual, professional line of conduct of the rhapsode. For this use of the present stem, especially of the infinitive, see Stork (1982: 204, 221), Wakker (2000: 224), below on 538c5 and Appendix III on ἀκροᾶσθαι.

530c5 γινώσκοντα For γινώσκειν = 'know as the result of possessing a τέχνη' see on 537e1–4.

530c7

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες and 530d4 Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Ἴων For the vocatives see Appendix II.

530c8 ἐμοὶ γοῦν τοῦτο πλεῖστον ἔργον παρέσχεν τῆς τέχνης, καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου γοῦν '[introduces] a statement which is, *pro tanto*, evidence for a preceding statement' (the 'part proof' use: Denniston 451). In the γοῦν sentence Ion qualifies his words Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, whereby he reacts specifically to Socrates' statement τοῦτο δὲ καλῶς ποιεῖν μὴ γινώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητῆς ἀδύνατον. **τοῦτο** = γινώσκειν ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητῆς, while with **κάλλιστα** Ion picks up Socrates' καλῶς at 530c4: 'I at any rate have found this the most laborious part of my art; and I consider I speak better than anybody about Homer' (Lamb). What Ion in effect says is: 'it would have been impossible for me to become the best interpreter if had not gone through the labour of fully understanding the thought of the poet'.

Text. ἐμοὶ γοῦν WS: ἐμοὶ γ' οὖν T : ἔμοιγ' οὖν F Without much conviction I have adopted the traditional reading (Burnet's apparatus here is inaccurate). On the separation or combination of γ and οὖν Denniston writes (448): 'The number of passages where our texts give γ' οὖν is relatively small, and the following list is in all probability approximately complete'. The matter is, unfortunately, more complicated. The fact that the list is based on 'our texts' entails, of course, that Denniston mentions only those forms which are given in the texts, or reported in the apparatuses. However, possible MS variations may not have been reported at all; and this is, in fact, the case for the other instance of γοῦν in the *Ion*, at 540d4, where Burnet and others simply read: Γνοίην γοῦν ἂν ἔγωγε οἶα στρατηγὸν πρέπει εἰπεῖν, without reporting that γοῦν is the text of SF, while W reads γ' οὖν and T γ' οὖν. To have more material I checked a fair number of instances of γοῦν in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, but found no reports in the apparatuses of Dodds' and Slings' editions, respectively, on variants of the kind that could be established for the *Ion*.²¹⁴ This is too good to be true and I suspect that much more variation remains hidden in the MSS. Note, in this connection, that according to Adam at *R.* 335e10 MS Parisinus A has ἔγωγ' οὖν, a reading which is not to be found in the apparatus of either Burnet or Slings. Again, at *R.* 585a8 Burnet has γ' οὖν, while Slings reads γοῦν; neither of them refers to the MSS.

Be that as it may, the question is, of course, whether the variations mentioned above reflect semantic-pragmatic differences. Denniston also writes, *ibidem*: '... how far, and in what circumstances, γ' οὖν, *separatim*, should be retained in our texts, or imported into them, is a disputed question'. In a footnote on p. 448 he refers to the views of some other scholars about the matter. And somewhat further on (449–450) he adds: 'It is certainly significant that the MSS. give evidence for the two forms γοῦν and γ' οὖν And the distinction may well have been used to differentiate those passages in which οὖν has a connective force [Denniston probably means that in that case γ' οὖν should be written—AR]: if it was in fact so used, the copyists have

²¹⁴ There may be yet another variant, viz. γε οὖν, for which see *Euthd.* 292e8, where Burnet has ἔγωγε οὖν (and nothing in the apparatus). As for γ' οὖν (T at 530c7, W at 540d4), this obviously looks like a compromise between γ' οὖν and γοῦν, but I must admit that I fail to see its *raison d'être*.

frequently confused the forms.²¹⁵ I doubt that he is right, but in view of the unreliable state of our material I think it is presently not possible to say anything substantial about possible semantic-pragmatic differences connected with the spelling of γουν.²¹⁶

530c9 ὥς ‘in such a manner as’ (Macgregor). For this use of ὥς cp. *Alc.* 1 105b3 ἡγή ... ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίους ὅτι ἄξιος εἶ τιμᾶσθαι ὥς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ’ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πρόποτε γενομένων. For the construction I may repeat here Macgregor’s excellent note: ‘The sentence was begun apparently as a comparative one (ὥς = in such a manner as) and the predicate naturally would be ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν simply = was able to speak. But to the verb εἰπεῖν is appended an object διανοίας and thus there is added a fresh comparison οὔτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς ὅσας ἐγώ.’

Most commentators and translators take ὥς either as a causal (Miller: ‘since’, Murray, Lamb: ‘for’) or as a consecutive (Batteggazzore, Flashar: ‘so dass’, Stock) conjunction, but these views should both be rejected. As for the former, in its use as a γάρ-like connector, ὥς nearly always comes after an imperative or other expression of obligation. Two examples from Plato are *Cri.* 44b6 ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ καὶ σώθητι· ὥς ἐμοὶ, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία σύμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ..., *R.* 328d2 νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι. ὥς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι For more examples of, and further details about, this motivating use of ὥς, as it should more properly be called, see Rijksbaron (1976: 119). The consecutive view, too, cannot stand; cp. K-G 2, 501 Anm.: ‘Mit dem

²¹⁵ It should be borne in mind that the above discussion, as often, turns around Byzantine solutions to an uncial problem. Plato and his copyists of course wrote the undivided and unaccented sequence ΕΜΟΙΓΟΥΝ. As for the Byzantine copyists, just as in the case of accentuation (see the Introduction §5.2 (i)), there may have been different traditions among them. In this connection I venture the suggestion that ἔμοιγ’ οὖν and ἔγωγ’ οὖν may reflect a tradition in which the actual ἔγκλισις of enclitic elements had precedence over possible other combinations of such enclitics. In this tradition, given the elements ἐγώ, γε, and οὖν, ἐγώ combined first with γε, and then this independent unit, with a new accent, was modified by οὖν. It must have been just a graphic convention. Some support for the idea of γε forming a new prosodic unit with the preceding word may be found in Herodian, e.g. *De prosodia catholica*, Gramm. Gr. III 1, p. 474, 8: ἡ ἐγώ παρ’ Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ ἔγωγε τρίτην ἀπὸ τέλους ἔχει τὴν ὀξεῖαν, ὥς καὶ ἡ ἔμοιγε δοτικὴ, and especially *Περὶ Ἰλιακῆς προσωδίας*, III 2, p. 24, 27: ἔγωγε· οὕτως προπαροξυτονητέον τὸ ἔγωγε, ἴν’ ἢ ἐν.

²¹⁶ According to Des Places (1929: 141 n. 1): ‘les deux graphies sont équivalentes pour le sens’.

Verbum finitum findet sich ώς = ὥστε nur vereinzelt bei Herodot und Xenophon’.

530c9–d1 Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε **Στησίμβροτος** ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε **Γλαύκων** For these interpreters of Homer see the testimonia collected (and annotated) in Lanata (1963: 244–247 (Metrodorus), 240–243 (Stesimbrotus), 280–281 (the rather mysterious Glaucon, with discussion of his identity)).

530d3 διανοίας See on 530b10, *διάνοιαν*.

530d4 εἰ λέγεις ‘That’s splendid news’, as at 530b2.

530d6

καὶ μὴν ‘And in this connection (καί) I can assure you (μὴν) that ...’, as at 530b5, q.v.; cp. Miller’s ‘... and believe me, it’s ...’, or Méridier’s ‘Ma foi!’. With Jebb on *S. Aj.* 539 we might further say that ‘καὶ μὴν here announces a fact which favours the last speaker’s wish’.

ἄξιόν γε ‘(Whatever else it may be—γε) it’s *worthwhile* to ...’.

Text. γε SF : om. TW Both readings of course make perfect sense, and there are really no linguistic reasons why the one should be preferred to the other. Καὶ μὴν is followed by γε in two other instances (530b5, 536d8) in all four MSS, in a third one (530d9) in none. On balance, the emphasis put on ἄξιον by limitative γε is perhaps more in line with Ion’s overall confident behaviour in the opening section of the *Ion* than simple ἄξιον.

530d6–7 ὡς εἰ κεκόσμηκα ‘How well I have embellished’ (Murray’s ‘I embellish’ I do not understand.) Plato no doubt wanted to suggest that Ion’s κεκόσμηκα was prompted by Socrates’ κεκοσμησθαι at 530b6. The perfect denotes both that Homer is in a state of ‘permanent embellishment’ and that it is Ion who is responsible for the embellishment. For this value of the active perfect see Rijksbaron (1984), where also more examples and further discussion may be found, and (2002: 35–37).

I should add that κοσμεῖν of persons (and gods) normally = ‘honour, glorify’ (cp. e.g. *La.* 196b7, *Smp.* 177c8, *Mx.* 237c4, 246a3), so if the meaning here is ‘embellish’, τὸν Ὅμηρον should be

taken metonymically: ‘Homer’s poetry’. In that case the embellishment must be the result of Ion’s activity as a ἔρμηνεύς; it may also involve the other meaning of κοσμεῖν, ‘arrange, order’. See further Des Places, *Lexique* s.v. κοσμεῖν.

530d8 στεφάνῳ στεφανωθῆναι Contrary to what Murray and Pradeau contend (‘the exaggerated repetition emphasises Ion’s naiveté and vanity’; ‘la redondance ... accuse la lourdeur et la fatuité de Ion’), such repetitions are quite normal, and need not be a sign of ‘exaggeration’; they belong to the *figura* of paronomasia. Some other examples from Plato are *Phd.* 114e4–5 κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, *Smp.* 212e1 ἔστεφανωμένον αὐτὸν κιττοῦ τέ τι στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἴων; cp. also e.g. *Hdt.* 1.113.1 κοσμήσας δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ παντὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παιδός, 9.59 κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες οὔτε τάξι. See also S-D 700.

530d9

καὶ μὴν ‘and believe me, as far as I’m concerned, I’ll ...’. With this asseverative καὶ μὴν Socrates reacts to Ion’s implicit invitation. Cp. *Denn.* 353. For the repetition of καὶ μὴν spoken by different speakers at a short distance cp. e.g. *S. OT* 1004–1005 (Oed. καὶ μὴν χάριν γ’ ἂν ἀξίαν λάβοις ἐμοῦ. *Mess.* καὶ μὴν μάλιστα τοῦτ’ ἀφικόμην, ὅπως ...), *Denn.* 354.

ἐγώ Since there is no σύ or other (pro)noun present in the context, ἐγώ is not overtly contrastive here, and is therefore unemphatic; in fact, just ἔτι ποιήσομαι σχολὴν might have done the job perfectly well. Yet ἐγώ implicitly opposes Socrates to possible other addressees of Ion’s invitation, so it may express the idea that Socrates takes Ion’s general invitation as a personal one: ‘as far as I’m concerned’, or ‘I, for one’. See also on 539d4.

ποιήσομαι σχολὴν This is, *pace* Macgregor (‘... a periphrasis equivalent in meaning to a simple verb’), not simply an alternative for σχολάσω (just as ‘make time’ is not the same as ‘have time’), but expresses the idea that Socrates will actively seek an opportunity to listen to Ion. ‘[E]s hebt die eigene thätige Beteiligung hervor’, to quote K-G’s apt remark (1, 106). Ποιεῖσθαι is used as in ποιεῖσθαι συμμαχίαν, πόλεμον, etc., where the ‘create, make, bring about’ meaning of ποιεῖν predominates; συμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι is therefore not synony-

mous with συμμαχέω. The middle has indirect-reflexive meaning: ‘in my own interest, for my own benefit’.

ποιήσομαι σχολὴν ἀκροᾶσθαί σου

Text. ἀκροᾶσθαι TW : ἀκροάσασθαι SF For the reasons why I think the present infinitive should be preferred see Appendix III.

531a1–532c8

First part of the conversation, which runs up to 536d3. Introduction of the theme of part I: to which poets does Ion’s τέχνη apply? Surely to all poets? Ion does not answer directly, but asks how it can be that only Homer arouses his interest and makes it possible for him to know what to say. The answer is: because Ion does not possess a τέχνη. If he would, he would be an expert in all poets.

531a1–2 περὶ Ὁμήρου δεινὸς εἶ μόνον

Text. δεινὸς εἶ μόνον S (δεινὸς εἶ ἡμόνον revera F) : μόνον δεινὸς εἶ TW Leaving aside the inaccuracies involved in ἢ καὶ in SF (see the apparatus criticus),²¹⁷ both the sequences μόνον δεινὸς εἶ and δεινὸς εἶ μόνον are possible readings, with both texts the focus being on περὶ Ὁμήρου. In fact, for both types parallels exist; the sequence of TW, however, seems to be the most common one (I confine myself here to phrases with μόνον and ἢ καὶ in questions). Compare, for the sequence περὶ Ὁμήρου μόνον: e.g. *Prm.* 143a8 ἀρά γε ἐν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;, *Chrm.* 163a1 Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἐαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων;, *Euthd.* 294e6 Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ καὶ αἰεῖ;, *Grg.* 498b4 Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;, and for the sequence περὶ Ὁμήρου ... μόνον: *Euthd.* 274e1 πότερον πεπεισμένον ἤδη ὡς χρὴ παρ’ ὑμῶν μαθάνειν δύναισθ’ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἄνδρα μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μήπω πεπεισμένον ...; *Grg.* 502b4 πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρι-

²¹⁷ The scribe of F may, among other things, have started too early with ἢ καὶ, and then have omitted ἢ altogether, which was later supplied by *f supra* καὶ. In S, ἢ is just omitted.

ξεσθαί τοις θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν ...;²¹⁸ Incidentally, the position of English *only* may vary in a similar way, as appears e.g. from the translations of Lamb and Allen here: (Lamb) ‘Are you skilled in Homer only ...?’; (Allen) ‘Are you skilled only in Homer ...?’

With all that a choice between the two variants is not easy. On balance, following the principle known as *utrum in alterum abiturum erat*, I prefer (περὶ Ὅμηρου) δεινὸς εἶ μόνον, since this, being the less common sequence, may have been changed to the far more common order (περὶ Ὅμηρου) μόνον δεινὸς εἶ more readily than vice versa.

531a3 Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ Compare 530a3. Apparently Ion wants to make it emphatically clear that he is only an expert in Homer—thereby emphatically weakening his position.

531a5 Ἔστι δὲ περὶ οὗτου For such self-contained substantival phrases with ἔστι, which may be considered ‘the existential type proper’ (Kahn), see Kahn (1973: 277 ff.), K-G 2, 403–405. There is no ellipsis of an antecedent: ‘... the verb in this type asserts or denies the existence of an extra-linguistic subject ... that satisfies the condition stated in the relative clause’ (Kahn 277). That is, it is the Greek sentence form ‘that corresponds most closely to the pattern of existential quantification in logic, $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ’ (Kahn *ibidem*).

531a6

λέγετον Both the dual and the tense call for some comment. (i) Generally speaking, the use of a dual, rather than a plural, verb form when two subjects are present indicates that these subjects are considered as a pair, to the exclusion of possible third and other parties. In fact, this may explain its appearance here: having introduced, besides Homer, two other poets, Hesiod and Archilochus, Socrates now concentrates on the ‘epic pair’. Once they have been characterized as a pair, Homer and Hesiod can also be referred to by the default verb form for ‘more than one’; cp. λέγουσιν at b2 and b3. Interestingly,

²¹⁸ Of course, the sequences X μόνον and X ... μόνον occur also outside questions with μόνον ... ἢ καί. See e.g. *Ion* 534c2 τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ’ ὃ ..., *Thet.* 182c2 οὗ δ’ ἔνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, and *Sph.* 246a10 διςχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ ..., *Plt.* 293c3 τοῦτον ὄρον ὀρθὸν εἶναι μόνον ἱατρικῆς.

however, at b3 the plural λέγουσιν is followed by singular λέγει, although Homer and Hesiod are again both mentioned by name. The effect of the singular verb form with a multiple subject may be as described by K-G 1, 79: (a singular predicate is used) ‘wenn eines der Subjekte als das vorzüglichere ausgezeichnet werden soll’. At the end of this brief passage on Homer and Hesiod, their pairness is once again stressed (b5 λέγετον τὸ ποιητὰ τούτω), perhaps to emphasize that Ion ought to be able to explain both members of the pair equally well. Observe in this connection that at 531c1–2 Homer and Hesiod are again mentioned by name.

For details about the ‘pairness’ meaning of the dual I refer to the extensive discussion in S-D 46–52. A particularly clear example of this use in Plato may be found in the *Euthydemus*, where the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, after their appearance as a pair at 273a1 (... ὀλίγω ὕστερον εἰσέρχεσθον τούτω—ὃ τ’ Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος—), remain a pair up to the very end of Socrates’ report at 304b5 παραδέξεσθον. In between, dual forms referring to this pair, both nominal and verbal, occur with great regularity.

(ii) As for the *tense*, the present indicative is used here as a so-called ‘citative’ present, a variety of the omnitemporal use: ‘they say the same things’, i.e. in their works and therefore for all times. All 3rd person present indicative forms of λεγ- in the *Ion* are used in the same way. Another variety of the omnitemporal present is the ‘reproducing’ present, for which see below at 538b8. English examples of citative and reproducing present are, respectively: ‘As Plato says in the *Republic* ...’ and ‘In the *Iliad*, Achilles kills Hector’. For these examples, and for an illuminating discussion of this use of the present see Wisse (1996).²¹⁹

οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ πολλὰ From ἔστι (a5) supply εἶναι: ‘I think there are even many of such things’. Cp. *Cra.* 424b4 ff. ἴδωμεν πότερον ἄρα ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ.—Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλα (sc. εἶναι). For the ellipsis of the infinitive cp. also *R.* 608b9 σύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινον (sc. συμφάναι).

²¹⁹ Wisse assumes, however, that in this use ‘the value of the present tense is to indicate present time, i.e., contemporaneity with the moment of speaking or writing’ (178). This view must be rejected, if only because it is strictly impossible to add an adverb like νῦν to such a present.

531a7

ἤ To be connected with *πότερον*, not with *κάλλιον*, for if *ἤ* is taken as the adverb of comparison after *κάλλιον*, *πότερον* would remain in the air. There is no ambiguity here: *πότερον* instructs the reader to look for *ἤ*, *κάλλιον* does not.

ἐξηγήσαιο See on 530c3 *ἐρμηνέα*. For the meaning of *ἐξηγέομαι* cp. also *Lg.* 821d9 ff., where the verb is glossed as *δηλώσαι*: *πειρώ σὺ μὲν ἐξηγείσθαι πάντως, ἡμεῖς δὲ συνέπεσθαί σοι μαθάνοντες.*—*Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν οὐ ράδιον ὃ λέγω μαθεῖν, οὐδ' αὖ παντάπασι χαλεπὸν, οὐδέ γέ τινος χρόνου παμπόλλου. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκηκοὼς σφῶν ἂν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλώσαι δυναίμην.*

531b2–3

Τί δὲ ὧν περί μὴ ταῦτὰ λέγουσιν ‘And what of the things about which they do not say the same things?’ As usual, *δέ* signals the transition to a new Topic (= *ὧν περί μὴ ταῦτὰ λέγουσιν*, further explained in *οἷον περὶ μαντικῆς λέγει τι Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος*), while *τί* announces that a question will follow about this Topic (cp. above, on 530a8 *Τί οὖν*);). But then, after Ion’s assentient *πάνυ γε*, the question makes a new start. In this rephrased question (**τί οὖν**;) *οὖν* replaces *δέ*, since Socrates has got ‘the green light’ from Ion to continue about the Topic which has just been established (*ἡ μαντική*): ‘What of it, then?’, followed by the real question: *ὅσα ... πότερον ...*;

Observe that *τί δέ* is not itself followed by a question mark, but is immediately followed by the relative clause. On the importance of punctuation for the interpretation of *τί δέ* see Appendix I.

μή For generalizing *μή* in relative clauses cp. K-G 2, 185, Rijksbaron (2002: 90).

531b3 λέγει See on 531a6.

531b5 τὸ ποιητὰ τούτω When anaphoric *οὗτος* follows the head noun, we are dealing with ‘weak anaphora’, when it precedes, as at 536b7 *τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ*, with ‘strong anaphora’. In the latter use *οὗτος* emphasizes the identity of the referent; there is often a contrast with another item, like *ἄλλου τοῦ ποιητοῦ* at 536b6. In the former, *οὗτος* is almost an enclitic pronoun, and ‘this/that’ could be paraphrased as ‘just mentioned’. For details about the pragmatic differ-

ences between οὗτος ὁ Noun and ὁ Noun οὗτος I refer to Rijksbaron (1993).

531b6 σὺ ... ἢ τῶν μάντεων τις τῶν ἀγαθῶν Murray writes: ‘the word order places the emphasis on τῶν ἀγαθῶν’. If this were right, the result would be: ‘you ... or one of the *good* seers?’, which is only possible if Ion is also a seer, and a bad one at that; but a seer he becomes, for the sake of the argument, only in Socrates’ next question. Actually, it is exactly the other way round: the order places the emphasis on τῶν μάντεων, or rather, in pragmatic terms, it turns τῶν μάντεων into the contrastive Focus of the question, on a par with σύ. For this there are three formal indications: (a) the presence of the preceding σύ, which establishes a contrast between ‘you’, a rhapsode, and ‘the seers’, another professional group; (b) the presence of postpositive τις, which separates τῶν μάντεων from τῶν ἀγαθῶν, and thus turns τῶν μάντεων into an independent information unit;²²⁰ (c) Ion’s answer: τῶν μάντεων; if the emphasis in the question were on τῶν ἀγαθῶν, the answer should have been τῶν ἀγαθῶν. To have ἀγαθῶν as the Focus of the question the order should have been τῶν ἀγαθῶν μάντεων (as opposed to the bad ones). Cp. above on 530c2 ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, and an example like *Prt.* 327b6–7 οἷε ἄν τι ... τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀύλητῶν ἀγαθοῦς ἀύλητὰς τοὺς ὑεῖς γίνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων;

In our passage the position of the adjective ἀγαθῶν has a different effect, for it establishes a contrast between *good rhapsodes* (e.g. Ion, by his own saying) and *good seers*, rather than between *good* and *bad* seers.²²¹ For a similar example one may compare e.g. *Smp.* 209d1–2 εἰς Ὅμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοῦς ζηλῶν, where an interpretation à la Murray, viz. ‘the other poets, the *good* ones’, would attribute to Diotima a rather remarkable view of Greek poetry.

531b7 εἴπερ Not ‘if really’ (e.g. Denniston 487) but ‘precisely in the case that’. For εἴπερ introducing an exclusive condition see Wak-

²²⁰ For postpositives as boundary markers see Dik (1995: 35 ff.). See also her article of 1997 on adjective positions.

²²¹ In more technical terms: with the word order τῶν μάντεων ... τῶν ἀγαθῶν there is a set-external opposition, viz. between good rhapsodes and good seers, whereas with the word order τῶν ἀγαθῶν μάντεων there is a set-internal opposition, viz. between good and bad seers. Cp. also above on ἀγαθός at 530c2.

ker (1994: 315 ff.), for the difference between εἴπερ and εἴ γε *ibidem* 323.

531b7–9 Εἰ δὲ σὺ ἦσθα μάντις, οὐκ, εἴπερ περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως λεγομένων οἴός τ' ἦσθα **ἐξηγήσασθαι**, καὶ περὶ τῶν διαφόρως λεγομένων ἠπίστω ἂν **ἐξηγείσθαι**; Again a problem of verbal aspect; cp. Appendix III, on ἀκροᾶσθαι/ἀκροάσασθαι. The values that are found to be relevant there are also relevant for these infinitives. I take it that the aorist infinitive ἐξηγήσασθαι continues the two aorist optatives κάλλιον ἂν ἐξηγήσαιο (531a7 and 531b6), and that in all three cases we are dealing with an action that is presented *in abstracto*. With ἐξηγείσθαι, on the other hand, we pass into the domain of concrete action. More specifically, the present infinitive indicates that Socrates, via Ion as an imaginary seer, is going to continue about the διαφόρως λεγόμενα rather than about the ὁμοίως λεγόμενα. And this is, in fact, what happens, for in what follows the discussion turns basically on the issue of the differences between Homer and the other poets. The same pragmatic difference is apparent in several other passages where a sequence 'aorist stem form : present stem form' of the same verb stem occurs. Cp. e.g.:

- Ap.* 20e3–5, 21a5 καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, **μὴ θοροβήσητε**, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν' ... καί, ὅπερ λέγω, **μὴ θοροβεῖτε**, ὦ ἄνδρες
- Plt.* 257c8–10 ΕΞ. Διαναπαύσωμεν αὐτὸν **μεταλαμβάντες** αὐτοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστήν τόνδε Σωκράτη; ἢ πῶς συμβουλευεῖς;—ΘΕΟ. Καθάπερ εἶπες, **μεταλάμβανε**
- Phlb.* 24a6 **Σκέψαι** δὴ. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ **σκόπει**.
- La.* 180d6–8 ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου, ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν **συμβουλευσαι**, χρηὶ **συμβουλεύειν**.
- R.* 436b3–6 ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ χαλεπὰ **διορίσασθαι** ἀξίως λόγου.—Καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη.—Ὡδε τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν αὐτὰ **ὀρίζεσθαι**, εἴτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις εἴτε ἕτερα ἔστι.—Πῶς;

Outside Plato:

- Hdt.* 3.74.3–75.1 κείνον δ' ἐκέλευον ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ πύργον **ἀγορευσαι** ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ Κύρου Σμέρδιος ἄρχονται καὶ ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. (—) ... οἱ μάγοι ἀνεβίβασαν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πύργον καὶ **ἀγορεύειν** ἐκέλευον.

Th. 2.83.1, 3 ἀλλ' ἠναγκάσθησαν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης **ναυμαχῆσαι** πρὸς Φορμίωνα καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων (—) οὕτω δὲ ἀναγκάζονται **ναυμαχεῖν** κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν.

In all cases the abstract aorist ‘paves the way’ for the concrete present. *Ap.* 20e3–5, with 21a5, *Plt.* 257c8–10 and *Phlb.* 24a6 are particularly interesting, since the present stem forms are accompanied by a comment clause (ὄπερ λέγω; καθάπερ εἶπες; ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν), which makes us expect that the present tense form repeats an earlier present tense form, while in fact that form was an *aorist* form. This clearly shows that the difference between aorist and present here is not of a semantic but of a pragmatic nature: the present and aorist forms are used in different communicative situations. This is also shown by the fact that μὴ θορυβήσητε is qualified by a conditional clause (μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν) that specifies the, non-actual, situation in which Socrates' request is relevant, while μὴ θορυβεῖτε is used when he is about to say the ‘big thing’ announced at 20e3 (viz. Chaerephon's question at Delphi whether there is anybody who is wiser than Socrates). Something similar applies to the passage from Herodotus: *what* Prexaspes (= κείνον) must say has been specified in the ὡς-clause with ἀγορευσαί, *that* he indeed must speak is conveyed by ἀγορεύειν.

531c1 Τί οὖν ποτε ‘By using τί ποτε a conversation partner may indicate that he himself finds it difficult to think of a satisfactory answer to his question’ (Sicking 1997: 172).

531c2 ἦ

Text. ἦ S(ut vid.)F : ἦ T W Fpc For the problems and possibilities involved I refer to the discussion at 530a2. Again, the translators generally suggest that their text has ἦ (Lamb: ‘Does Homer speak of ...?’, Allen: ‘Does Homer tell of other things ...?’, Méridier: ‘Homère traite-t-il ...?’, Flashar: ‘Redet denn Homer ...?’), although they all read ἦ; F's ἦ is nowhere reported. Saunders, however, who used Burnet's text (with ἦ), correctly renders ‘Or does Homer have themes ...?’ Again, I had a coin decide. As a result I now read ἦ.

531c2–3 περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν λέγει ἦ ὄνπερ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί
If commentators comment on this phrase, they take it, not surprising-

ly, as an abbreviation of *περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν*περ, but this is once again a didactic rather than a syntactic solution, and a misleading one at that. Actually, not only ἄλλων τινῶν but the whole phrase is in the scope of *περὶ*. This is the normal construction in Attic prose, and the full phrase is very rare, for which see K-G 1, 550, 4, Smyth §§1667–1674. Smyth observes that the preposition is often omitted in clauses of comparison with ὡς and with ἢ ‘than’, as in D. 19.263 *περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος*. Our example belongs of course also to this category. Nor is this phenomenon confined to Greek, as Smyth’s translation of the sentence from Demosthenes ‘to deliberate about the future rather than the present’ shows.²²² To the clauses of comparison also belong examples with ὁ αὐτὸς ὅς, like *Grg.* 453e1 *ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὧν*περ *νυνδὴ* and *X. Ages.* 2.1 *ἐπορεύετο διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν*περ ὁ Πέρσης, and with οὗτος ὅς, as in D. 21.155 *κατὰ ταύτην ἡλικίαν ἣν ἦν ἐγὼ νῦν*.

Observe that in all these examples not only the preposition but the verb, too, does double duty, so to speak, since there is only one verb. In fact, if the relative clause has a verb of its own, we are not dealing with an omitted preposition but with other constructions. See examples like

- Phd.* 76b8–9 ... *διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν* *νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν*
 ὧν is object of *ἐλέγομεν*, *attractio relativi*
- Tht.* 208d8 *ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἦ*
 ὧν is a partitive genitive, dependent on *κοινότης*
- Grg.* 487e8 *περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπετίμησας*
 ὧν is object of *ἐπετίμησας*, *attractio relativi*
- R.* 526a6 *περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ὧν* *διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ*
 ὧν is object of *διανοηθῆναι*, *attractio relativi*
- R.* 533d8 *οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται*
 ὅσων is subject of *πρόκειται*, *attractio relativi*²²³

In still other cases where the relative clause has its own verb the relative pronoun (with *attractio*) seems to function as a general marker of subordination, just like, in the present English sentence, ‘cases where’ may alternate with ‘cases in which’. See:

²²² For English see further Quirk et al. (1985: 968–969).

²²³ For the, rare, attraction of the nominative cp. K-G 2, 409 Anm. 4.

- Th. 1.28.2 δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι ... παρὰ πόλεσιν αἷς ἂν ἀμφοτέρω
 ξυμβῶσιν ('which they would agree upon')
- X. *Smp.* 4.1 ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ᾧ ὑμῶν ἀκούω ἀπορούντων ..., ἐν τούτῳ ...
 ποιῶ ('during the time/period that')

For 'that' in 'during the time/period that' and for other subordinating devices in English, which has quite a variety of such devices, see Quirk et al. (1985: 1253 ff.). Cp. also Latin *Incidit in eandem invidiam quam pater suus* (Nep. 5.3.1),²²⁴ Dutch *in de tijd dat (ik in Parijs was)*, German *während die Zeit daß (ich in Paris war)*, French *pendant le temps que (j'étais à Paris)*.

531c3–4 οὐ περὶ πολέμου τὰ πολλὰ διελέλυθεν Διελέλυθεν should probably be construed with περὶ πολέμου etc., with τὰ πολλὰ as an adverbial modifier ('predominantly, for the most part, mostly'): 'Has he not predominantly spoken about/treated ...?' Cp. for a similar construction *Phlb.* 18a6 Δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, and for διελθεῖν περὶ τινος in general *Prt.* 347a7 Εὐ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ᾧ Σάκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναί, *R.* 506d4 ... κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διήλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθης.

As for the tense of **διελέλυθεν**, this expresses the idea that Socrates is now speaking about the lasting result of Homer's poetic activity, the finished product, and no longer about Homer as a 'permanent' speaker, as at c3, where he used citative λέγει.

531c7 ὁμιλούντων ὡς ὁμιλοῦσι For this construction, in which a relative clause, in this case a clause of manner, modifies a main clause which has the same verb, see K-G 2, 436, 1; it is mainly found in poetry, 'besonders mit ὡς, ὅπως'. Some other examples are: *S. OC* 273 ἰκόμην ἴν' ἰκόμην, *E. Med.* 889 ἐσμὲν οἷόν ἐσμεν, *El.* 288–289 Or. ὁ ... πατήρ τύμβου κυρεῖ; / *El.* ἔκυρσεν ὡς ἔκυρσεν, ἐκβληθεὶς δόμων, *IA* 649 γέγηθά σ' ὡς γέγηθ' ὄρων. Some examples from prose are *Lys.* 13.53 νῦν δὲ πεισθεὶς ὑφ' ᾧν τότε ἐπείσθης, with Frohberger ad loc., *D.* 3.8 ἐχόντων ... ὡς ἔχουσι Θηβαίων, 23.182 τῆς Καρδιανῶν πόλεως ἐχούσης ὡς ἔχει. Cp. further Rehdantz-Blass (1886: 80, s.v. ἔχειν),

²²⁴ Cp. Kühner-Stegmann 1, 581–582, Touratier (1980: 216), Lehmann (1984: 221–222).

where our passage from *Ion* is indeed also mentioned. Following the examples quoted above I put no comma after ὀμιλούντων.

According to K-G the relative clause makes the verb in the main clause ‘unbestimmt’, to avoid ‘eine unangenehme Sache’, but this is too vague. Actually, the relative clause expresses the idea that the main verb used is perhaps not really the correct term for the verbal action in question. Its effect is well described by Mastrorarde on E. *Med.* 889: ‘[a] type of reticent euphemism, sometimes deprecatory, sometimes resigned in tone, refusing to go into specifics’. Likewise in our passage: ‘... about the gods, while they are interacting with each other and with men, in whatever way’. Macgregor and others take the whole of *περὶ θεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀμιλούντων* as a proleptic element with respect to ὡς ὀμιλοῦσι, but this is unlikely, for in proleptic constructions, notably those involving *περί*, the proleptic (pro)noun typically does *not* have its own verb (type: *περὶ Φιλίππου λέγω ὅτι/ὡς πολεμεῖ ἡμῖν*). For ‘real’ prolepsis see the fundamental article by Chanet (1988), pp. 73–74 on *περί*.

531c7–8 *περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων παθημάτων* ‘the heavenly experiences/vicissitudes’ = ‘the experiences/vicissitudes of the heavenly gods’. For οὐράνιος cp. *Criti.* 107d6 τὰ μὲν οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα, *Lg.* 828c7 τὸ τῶν χθονίων καὶ ὄσους αὖ θεοῦς οὐρανίους ἐπονομαστέον.

Elsewhere, *παθήματα* is mostly used in connection with body, soul and φύσις, but it resembles *Ion* 531c7 at *R.* 393b3 διήγησιν περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλη Ὀδυσσεΐα παθημάτων. Cp. also *Phd.* 98a5 of the stars: ... τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων.

531c8 *γενέσεις* From the construction with *περί* + genitive Socrates switches to the (far more common) construction of *διελθεῖν* with object. For the latter construction cp. e.g. *R.* 372e7 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, 466c7 τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν.

531d1–2 *πεποίηκεν* The same resultative perfect as *διελήλυθεν* above (c4). Likewise below at d5, 533b3 and 538e4 (pass.).

531d7 *Τί μῆν; κάκιον;* ‘What *is* the word, then? (Have they written) worse (poetry)?’ While τί asks for a more correct term, μῆν conveys the idea that Socrates expects Ion to come up with something of

which he is certain, something which *does* apply, after his earlier negative statement. Dutch has a closely parallel construction with the particle *wél* (with heavy stress): *als niet x, wat dan wél?* This use, where the combination of τί (or another question word) with μήν comes after a negative statement by another speaker and asks for further information, is very rare in Plato. The examples given by Denniston (333) are *Tht.* 142a5 ‘I couldn’t find you’—Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.—Ποῦ μήν; (‘Well, where *were* you?’—Denniston), *Phlb.* 44b11 τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὐ φασι εἶναι.—Τί μήν; (Dutch: ‘Hoe zit het dan wél?’)—Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι etc., *R.* 523b8 Οὐ πάνυ ... ἔτυχες οὐ λέγω.—Ποῖα μήν ... λέγεις;—Τὰ μὲν οὐ ...; also *Plt.* 263b7. Our case, which comes closest to *Phlb.* 44b11, is not mentioned by Denniston. There is also an alternative, and slightly more frequent, construction, in which τί μήν etc. is preceded by ἀλλά, for which see Denn. 532; e.g. *Smp.* 202d10 (What can Love be?) θνητός;—ἥκιστα γε.—ἀλλὰ τί μήν;—Ὡσπερ τὰ πρότερα, ἔφη, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. *Ion* 531d7 seems to be the only instance where τί μήν is followed by a suggested answer. Since this answer lies of course upon the surface, Socrates is playing the ingénu.

531d10 μέντοι ‘certainly, surely, of course, in truth’ (Smyth §2918). Strongly asseverative. In this use, i.e. in answers, μέντοι is a modal particle, where μέν, like μήν, is an emphasizer (for this term see on 530b5), which reinforces the truth value of (part of the) clause,²²⁵ while ‘τοι brings home the truth to another person’ (Denn. 399). Here, as often in Plato, μέντοι ‘mark[s] assent by echoing a word ... of the previous speaker’ (Denn. 401): ‘truly better’. Some other examples are *Phd.* 93c1–2 καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;—Ἀληθῶς μέντοι, *Euthd.* 287c8 Ἡ καὶ δίκαιον;—Δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη, *La.* 190c5 Φαμὲν ἄρα ...;—Φαμὲν μέντοι, *Plt.* 295a9, *Prm.* 144c2, *Hp.Ma.* 290a8, *R.* 387e6. For the use of μέντοι outside answers see below on 536d4.

531d11

Οὐκοῦν ‘Οὐκοῦν is used by Socrates for switching from preliminary or subsidiary material to its actual application’ (Sicking 1997: 162). In our case, οὐκοῦν signals that Socrates is going to apply Ion’s ideas about epic poets to other—and as it will turn out, real—τέχνηαι.

²²⁵ Μέν in μέντοι, like μήν, denotes subjective rather than objective certainty (*contra* Denniston 399): it is the speaker’s truth which is reinforced here.

For further details about the use of οὐκοῦν and other argumentative particles in Plato (notably ἄρα, ἄρ' οὖν, ἄρα) I refer to Sicking's thorough and illuminating article.

Text. In the passage that follows, οὐκοῦν returns six times, at e3, e9, 532a3, a4, a8, and b2. The instance here and those at e3, 532a3 and a4 are followed by a question mark in Burnet's and other editions, while e9, 532a8 and b2 are followed by a period. This seems rather arbitrary. Denniston (433) convincingly argues that οὐκοῦν in Plato always introduces a question and should therefore be followed by a question mark. I have inserted them, in fact, where they were lacking.

ὦ φίλη κεφαλή This elaborate 'friendship term' is used to redress beforehand the Face Threatening Act (FTA) which Socrates is about to commit by submitting Ion to a series of questions by which he will try to convince him of the untenability of his views. (For the terminology see below.) Since it will turn out, however, that in what follows Socrates in no way treats Ion as φίλος, there is something ominous about the elaborateness of the friendship term. In fact, I believe that ὦ φίλη κεφαλή in connection with Ion has a potentially insincere and condescending tone, just like its counterpart 'my dear soul/my dear chap' in English translations of this passage (something which must have escaped Ion, however, just like the potential irony of the elaborate greeting formula τὸν Ἰωνα χαίρειν at 530a1). There are two other instances of (ὦ) φίλη κεφαλή in Plato; in both cases Socrates is speaking to far more congenial figures, to Callicles at *Grg.* 513c2, and to Phaedrus at *Phdr.* 264a8 Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλή (no doubt modelled after *Il.* 8.281 Τεῦκρε, φίλη κεφαλή). In these cases there is nothing condescending about this form of address. See also below on ὦ βέλτιστε at 532b2.

The use of friendship terms, and of FTAs, in classical authors can profit much from an analysis within the framework of Politeness Theory, as shown for Sophocles by Lloyd (2006). Lloyd also presents (225–228) a brief introduction to Politeness Theory. On p. 229 he observes, moreover, with respect to Plato: 'When Socrates uses φίλε or any other friendship term, he is invariably doing an FTA (e.g. refuting one)'. For a general introduction to Politeness Theory see Brown & Levinson (1987). Watts (2003) presents an interesting, socially oriented, alternative to the, primarily linguistically oriented, theory of Brown & Levinson, by focusing on the role of politeness in social interaction.

531d12 λέγη

Text. λέγη TW : λέγει SF The reading of SF, and of WSF at 531e5 below, betrays influence from post-classical Greek, since from Hellenistic times onwards ὅταν is frequently followed by an indicative. See LSJ s.v. ὅταν 2 ('generally, ὅταν supersedes ὅτε in Hellenistic Greek'), Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf (1979: 310).

531d12–e1 γνώσεται τὸν εὖ λέγοντα Γινώσκειν with direct object = 'know, recognize'.

531e4–5 Τί δ' ὅταν ... λέγη; πότερον ... ἢ ὁ αὐτός; For the punctuation τί δ' ὅταν ...; see Appendix I.

531e9 λέγομεν

Text. λέγομεν ὡς WSPcf(λεγόμεν (sic); ὡς ex ος) : λεγόμενος F : λέγωμεν ὡς T The latter variant was adopted e.g. by Bekker, Stallbaum, Schanz and Lamb. But the reading of WSPcf should be preferred, for the (present) subjunctive is not elsewhere used to summarize (part of) a discussion, but rather to continue a discussion by reopening it, or by opening an additional line of reasoning, and it points therefore forward. Cp. e.g. (additional line of reasoning:) *Phlb.* 55a12 ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆδε ἔτι λέγομεν, (reopening of the discussion:) *Grg.* 453e1 ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὄνπερ νυνδὴ, *R.* 559d4 Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγομεν ὡς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. The aorist subjunctive is used in a similar forward pointing way, not, however, to continue but rather to change the course of a discussion, cp. e.g. *Plt.* 287e2 ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἐν πόλει κτημάτων εἶπωμεν τόδε, *Tht.* 197b3 Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἶπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσιν. For the comparable uses of λέγε and εἶπέ cp. Rijksbaron (2000: 159 ff.); cp. also Vassilaki (2000: 184) on the aorist imperative as the marker of 'un tournant, un changement radical dans la façon dont la discussion doit être menée'. For the summarizing use of λέγομεν cp. e.g. *Phlb.* 47d1 νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὡς ..., *Hp.Ma.* 295e5 Ὁρθῶς ἄρα νῦν λέγομεν ὅτι ..., *Lg.* 643d8.

532a7 εὖ γε

Text. This is also the text of S, *pace* Burnet and Méridier, who claim that S omits γε.

532b2–4 οὐκοῦν ... οὐχ Lit. ‘Is it not the case, then, that we will not be mistaken if we say that ...?’ = ‘Surely, then, we won’t be mistaken, if we ...?’ While οὐκοῦν is the question word of the sentence as a whole, οὐχ functions as a local negative with ἀμαρτησόμεθα. As always, οὐκοῦν expects an affirmative answer, in this case, then, to a negated question. Such questions are rather frequent in Plato. The answer may be lexically affirmative, or may repeat the negative from the question, confirming its correctness, or there may follow no answer at all, as here.²²⁶ Some other examples are:²²⁷

with a lexically affirmative answer:²²⁸

- Ion* 538a5–7 Οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἂν μὴ ἔχη τινὰ τέχνην, ταύτης τῆς τέχνης τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα καλῶς γιγνώσκειν οὐχ οἴός τ’ ἔσται; (‘Surely, then, he won’t be able ...?’)—*ION* Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
- Euthphr.* 15c8 Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα;—Ἔοικεν.
- Prm.* 134c10 Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;—Ἀνάγκη.
- Ly.* 220b4 Οὐκοῦν τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἔνεκα φίλον ἐστίν;—Ἀληθῆ.
- Euthd.* 293c6 Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ;—Ἐκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.
- R.* 402b5 Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασι ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνονται, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ...;—Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.²²⁹

²²⁶ While οὐκοῦν ... οὐ = ‘Is it not the case, then, that not X ...?’ = ‘Surely, then, not X ...?’, the combination μὴ οὐ in principle expects a negative answer to a negated question: ‘It is not the case, then, is it, that not X ...?’. In actual practice this functions as a formula which expects an affirmative answer: ‘Surely, then, X ...?’ E.g. *Lg.* 657c6 μὴ οὐχ οὕτως;—Οὕτω μὲν οὖν, *S. OC* 1659 μὴ οὐχ ὀρθῶς; ‘It is not the case, is it, that you do not see ...?’ = ‘You surely see ...’. In Plato, μὴ οὐ only occurs in *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Lg.* and *Ep.* III.

²²⁷ Burnet frequently puts a full stop after such sentences, which I have replaced with question marks; cp. above on 531d11.

²²⁸ Curiously enough, K-G 2, 164, Smyth §2651 a. and Denniston 435 all say that οὐκοῦν ... οὐ questions expect a negative answer. See also n. 226.

²²⁹ The answer may also be elliptic Πῶς γάρ; or πῶς γὰρ ἄν; as at *Prm.* 165e4 Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τᾶλλα;—Πῶς γάρ; *Phlb.* 43d4 Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταῦτὸν τῷ χαίρειν;—Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;.

with repetition of the negative in the answer:

- Phd.* 105e4 Οὐκοῦν ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;—Οὐ.—Ἄθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή.—Ἄθάνατον.
Men. 89a5 Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί;—Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
Men. 98d4 Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν;—Οὐ δῆτα.²³⁰

no answer:

- Ion* 537d1–2 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃ τῆ ἑτέρα τέχνῃ γινώσκουμεν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα τῆ ἑτέρα; τότε δέ μοι πρότερον τούτου ἀπόκριναί·
Cra. 406d7 Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὄνομα αὐτῆς οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν δι’ ὃ κεῖται.—Τὸ ποῖον;
Tht. 204a5 Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι;—Τί δῆ;—Ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἦ μέρη

ὦ βέλτιστε ‘Βέλτιστε and (to a lesser extent) ἄριστε are used primarily in moments of triumph for Socrates’ (Dickey 1996: 111), being again (cp. at 531d11) a means to redress beforehand the Face Threatening Act which Socrates is about to commit.

ὁμοίως Although ὁμοίως is ultimately to be connected with δεινόν, it is, by its position in front of all the other constituents, the Focus of the sentence, and thus emphasizes Socrates’ idea that Ion cannot possibly maintain the position that he is only competent to judge Homer. This emphasis seems appropriate in a sentence where Socrates is drawing the balance of the preceding discussion, which was, in fact, from 531b1 onward dominated by Socrates’ view that if Ion is competent to judge (the quality of) one poet, he ought to be equally competent to judge other poets.

²³⁰ The οὐ in these answers is *not* a negative answer, but repeats the οὐ from the question, confirming thereby the correctness of the negation. The nature of such answers can be most clearly seen from *Phd.* 105e4, where Οὐ is not ‘No’, but shorthand for οὐ δέχεται. ‘Surely, then, the soul does not admit death?’—‘(It does) not (admit death)’, just as the answer in the next questions is also repeated from the question (and is not ‘Yes’, as generally in translations). To be sure, ‘no’ and ‘yes’ may often be convenient words in English translations, but this is a matter of English rather than of Greek syntax.

532b4 αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ ‘il est le premier à convenir’ (Mérider); ‘since he himself agrees’ (Allen).

Text. ὁμολογεῖ TWSf : ὁμολόγει F Burnet, who reads ὁμολογῆ, and Mérider, who reads ὁμολογεῖ, have nothing in their apparatus, nor have Bekker, Stallbaum and Schanz, who all read ὁμολογεῖ. Lamb, Verdenius, Flashar, Battagazzore and Murray have the same form as Burnet.²³¹ Not surprisingly, Lamb, Verdenius and Flashar take ὁμολογῆ as a 2nd person middle; they translate: ‘you admit’, ‘je erkent’, ‘du gibst ... zu’. No doubt Burnet, Battagazzore and Murray have taken this form as a middle form, too.²³² And we must assume that the ὁμολογεῖ of Bekker, Stallbaum and Schanz represents a middle form as well.²³³ But this view must be rejected, for the—rare—middle forms of ὁμολογ- have *reciprocal* meaning. i.e. they express mutual agreement between two participants on some subject of discussion.²³⁴ See *Cra.* 439b6 ὄντινα ... τρόπον δεῖ μαθάνειν ..., μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατ’ ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι ..., *R.* 436c9 ἔτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησόμεθα ... (διομολογησόμεθα Galenus), and 544a5 καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι (ADM : ἀν- F, adopted by Slings) ἐπισκεψάμεθα²³⁵ And last but not least, there is nothing amiss with ὁμολογεῖ = 3rd person sing. ind. act., as Mérider saw: the third person continues the third person introduced at 532b2 by τὸν Ἴωνα.²³⁶ I note also that Ficino translates

²³¹ According to Flashar 65, TF have ὁμολογῆ and W ὁμολογεῖ, wrongly.

²³² In fact, they will have subscribed to Stock’s words ad loc.: ‘-ῆ, not -εῖ, is now considered to be the classical form for the 2nd pers. sing. in the mid. and pass. voices’.

²³³ They also print e.g. γίγναι at 535c1, and γνώσει at 538c2. For the spelling of the 2nd person middle ind. see further the Introduction §5.1 (i).

²³⁴ For this use of the middle cp. Allan (2003: 84 ff.).

²³⁵ With ὁμολογ- only in the aorist. The compounds ἀνομολογέομαι and διομολογέομαι are used in a similar way, also in the present and future stems; see e.g. *Smp.* 200e7 ἀνομολογησόμεθα (‘convenir en recapitulat’—Des Places, *Lexique*), *R.* 348b3 ἀν δὲ ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, *R.* 442e4, (διομολ-:) *Sph.* 260a8 δεῖ ... ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, *Grp.* 500e3 διομολογησαί μοι, *R.* 603d4 τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι, *R.* 392c2 διομολογησόμεθα.

²³⁶ Brandwood, too, in a footnote on p. 628 of his Index, observes on the form here: ‘generally taken as a 2nd pers. med., but Plato’s use of the word in the middle makes this unlikely. Ion continues to be referred to in the 3rd person as in the preceding clause.’—As for F’s ὁμολόγει, this reading has the advantage of being an unambiguous 3rd person form, but it should nevertheless be rejected, for the imperfect would seem to occur only in reported dialogues. For a similar case of MS variation

‘quandoquidem ipse ... confitetur’. There is a clear parallel for this way of indirectly addressing a participant by referring to him in the third person at *Gr.* 495d7: ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἄλωπεκῆ-θεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ.

532b5 κριτὴν ἱκανὸν ‘a competent judge’. If we may adduce *Lg.* 669a7 ff. for comparison (see also below, at 537c1–2), a sane κριτής should have three competences: ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ περὶ ἐκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὃ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γινώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ’ ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτίσουν ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς;. So he must possess ‘first, a knowledge of the original; next, a knowledge of the correctness of the copy; and thirdly, a knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed’ (translation Bury). Below, e.g. at 539e3 ff., Socrates will argue that Ion cannot possibly be considered a κριτής. See further on 537c1. For the, predominantly late, dialogues in which κριτής occurs see the Introduction §1.

532b6 τοὺς δὲ ποιητὰς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν Since ποιεῖν does not mean ‘treat of’ or ‘deal with’, τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν should be translated as ‘do the same things’, rather than as ‘treat of the same things’ (Lamb), ‘traitent les mêmes sujets’ (Mérider), ‘deal with the same things’ (Allen) or ‘take the same themes’ (Saunders). ‘Treat’ is rather expressed by ὅσοι ἂν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγωσι in the first part of the sentence, as it is by λέγει at 531c2–3 ἢ Ὅμηρος περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν λέγει ἢ etc. Ultimately, τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν refers back to περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν, but this does not mean, of course, that it has the same meaning. For τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν picking up another expression cp. *R.* 475a5 τοὺς φιλοῖνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιῶντας ὀρθῶς;, which refers back to πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθῆ at 475a1.

532b7 τί οὖν ποτε See on 531c1.

532b7–8 ὅταν μὲν τις περὶ ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ διαλέγεται When διαλέγομαι is construed without a dative constituent, its meaning is ‘to discourse’, LSJ s.v. 1, *sub finem*.

see *Men.* 75d6–7 (προσομολογῆ BTW : προσωμολόγει F, sed o supra ω scr. f—Bluck).

532b7–c2 ὅταν μὲν τις περὶ ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ **διαλέγεται**, ... ἐπειδὴν δέ τις περὶ Ὀμήρου **μνησθῆ** Διαλέγεται of an iterative, ongoing action, μνησθῆ of a single, completed action, which interrupts the former one. ‘Tandis que le PR après ὅταν μὲν déploie un moment inachevé, en cours de déroulement, où règnent l’ennui et la léthargie qu’il entraîne, au contraire ἐπειδὴν et l’AO signalent l’irruption d’un procès après lequel la situation s’inverse du tout au tout’ (Mortier-Waldschmidt 2000: 144).

532b8–9 οὐτε προσέχω τὸν νοῦν ἀδυνατῶ **τε** For οὐτε ... τε (‘... why I pay no attention and am at the same time unable ...’) see Ruijgh (1971: §181): ‘Le parallélisme des deux faits est souligné par -τε ... τε’.

532b9 καὶ ὅτιοῦν For καὶ ‘marking a minimum (descending climax)’ see Denn. 293. Another example is *Ap.* 28b7–8 ... ἄνδρα ὅτου καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν.

532c1 ἀτεχνῶς Roochnik (1987) plausibly argues that since for Plato there was in writing no visible difference between what was (much) later differentiated as ἀτέχνως and ἀτεχνῶς, there being only one, unaccented, word-form (ΔΤΕΧΝΩΣ), one has to reckon with the possibility that Plato intended a pun whenever he used this word. Thus, here and elsewhere in *Ion*, which is, after all, a dialogue about τέχνη, behind the primary meaning ‘simply’ the meaning ἄνευ τέχνης is evoked. ‘When Ion takes a little nap during a discourse on Hesiod or Archilochos he does so because he is ἄνευ τέχνης’ (Roochnik 1987: 261). A real τεχνίτης does not doze off in such a case.

532c2 εὐθύς τε ἐγρήγορα Not ‘I wake up at once’ (Lamb) but ‘aussitôt me voilà éveillé’ (Mérider), ‘(daß ich) ... sofort wach bin ...’ (Flashar), ‘I’m immediately wide awake’ (Allen) or ‘I’m awake in a flash’ (Saunders), for the perfect denotes a state which is at once completely realized. For this use of the perfect cp. K-G 1, 150: (the perfect) ‘wird mit rhetorischem Nachdrucke so gebraucht dass eine noch nicht eingetretene Handlung als bereits vollendet, der daraus sich ergebende Zustand als schon vorhanden antizipiert wird’.

532c4 ἑταῖρε ‘In meaning there is no discernable difference between ἑταῖρε and φίλε’ (Dickey 1996: 138); ἑταῖρε is therefore a mild friendship term which ‘can be used at any time by the character dominating the argument’ (113). The exact conditions, however, under which ἑταῖρε (and φίλε, for that matter) appears in the text remain to be investigated. Observe that ὦ ἑταῖρε is used here at a point where Socrates in the most explicit terms attacks the professional status of Ion; ὦ ἑταῖρε may therefore be meant to ‘redress’ the harshness of Socrates’ words, a harshness which is underlined by παντὶ δῆλον; see the next note. See also on ὦ φίλη κεφαλή at 531d11 and ὦ βέλτιστε at 532b2.

532c4–5 παντὶ δῆλον An *argumentum ex auctoritate*. ‘One resorts to it when agreement on the question involved is in danger of being debated’ (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 308). Our case is an example of the ‘argument from number’. Socrates uses this form of powerplay some twelve times, in *Euthphr.*, *Ap.*, *Phd.*, *Cra.*, *Phdr.*, *Alc.* 1, *Men.*, *Ion*, *R.* and *Ti.* Of his interlocutors, Cebes uses it in *Phd.*, Thrasymachus and Glaucon in *R.*, and Timaeus in *Ti.* Adeimantus ascribes παντὶ δῆλον in indirect discourse to Socrates at *R.* 449c5. It is used, furthermore, by the Stranger in *Plt.*, the Athenian in *Lg.* and once by Plato himself in *Ep.* VIII. Once, at *R.* 529a1 ff., Socrates refuses to accept the—cautious—universal claim of his interlocutor, Glaucon: παντὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον ὅτι ...—’Ισως, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοί γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. Socrates’ own universal claims are never called into doubt. There is, finally, a variant, spoken by the Athenian, at *Lg.* 685c1 οὐ Πελοποννήσω μόνον ..., σχεδὸν δῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν πᾶσιν.

532c5 τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ‘With skill and knowledge’. Murray ad loc. claims that ‘these words are virtually synonymous in this dialogue’, but does not substantiate this claim.²³⁷ Actually, ἐπιστήμη here is the knowledge of the skill and its subject matter; it also involves the ability to account for what one knows. For ἐπιστήμη as = ‘knowledge

²³⁷ Why ‘virtually’? In which respect are they not synonymous? And why would Plato use two near-synonymous terms rather than just one term? ‘Synonymy’ is a concept that is perhaps invoked too easily in literary and philological studies. ‘It is by now almost a truism that absolute synonymy is extremely rare—at least as a relation between lexemes ...’ (Lyons 1995: 60–61).

of a τέχνη' cp. *Grg.* 448c2 Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνας τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;, *Hp.Mi.* 367e9; for ἐπιστήμη relating to the subject matter of a τέχνη cp. below 538b4 ff.: ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη ἕτερα ἐστὶ τῆς ἡνιοχικῆς;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἕτερα, περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων ἐστίν; cp. also 537d4 ff.; and, finally, for ἐπιστήμη involving the ability to account for what one knows, i.e. in our case to give an account of how a τέχνη works, cp. *Phd.* 76b5 ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχει ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ;—Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη It will turn out that Ion fails on all three counts: he has no knowledge of a particular τέχνη, the τέχνη he presumedly possesses has no content, and he is not able to give an account of what he 'knows'.

The combination τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη recurs at 536c1 (οὐ ... οὐδέ) and 541e2, and elsewhere at *Prt.* 357b4 ff. and *R.* 522c7–8.

532c8–533c3

Corroboration of Socrates' view that Ion does not possess a τέχνη by examples taken from real τέχναι

532c7–8 ποιητικὴ γάρ που ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον 'for there is an art of poetry, I suppose, as a whole' (Stock), 'since there is an art of poetry, I take it, as a whole' (Lamb), 'Car il existe, je suppose, un art de la poésie en général' (Mérider), 'there exists an art of poetry as a whole' (Saunders). This sentence should, indeed, be taken as an existential-presentative sentence, in which Socrates, for the sake of the argument, assumes (που) the existence of a ποιητικὴ (τέχνη). See further the Introduction §1. Τὸ ὅλον is an adverbial accusative: 'as far as the whole is concerned', 'taken as a whole', 'generally speaking'; see also LSJ s.v. I.4. Three clear parallels for this use of τὸ ὅλον in a similar context are 532e4–5 below: γραφικὴ γάρ τις ἐστὶ τέχνη τὸ ὅλον;, *Phdr.* 261a7 Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ('the science of rhetoric as a whole'—Rowe) ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, and *Men.* 79c1 ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φησὶ πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκῶς ὅτι ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον ('what virtue is in the whole'—Lamb). Compare also ὅλην below at 532c10–d1 ἐπειδὴν λάβη τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ὅλην.

The sentence is often translated with τὸ ὅλον as subject and ποιητική predicatively as ‘poetry’, e.g. by Macgregor (‘Surely it is the whole that is poetry’), Miller (‘The whole (= the good and the bad) is poetry (sc. τέχνη), I presume’—a rather bizarre translation), Kahn (1996: 109) (‘For I suppose that the whole thing is poetry’), Murray (‘for the whole thing is poetry, isn’t it?’), or with ποιητική as subject and τὸ ὅλον as predicative complement, e.g. by Flashar (‘Dichtung besteht doch irgendwie als Ganzes’), Allen (‘The art of poetry is surely one whole’), Canto, Pradeau (‘la poésie forme un tout’) and Capuccino (‘l’arte poetica è un tutto’).²³⁸ But in view of the parallels mentioned above these translations should be rejected. Observe especially that at *Phdr.* 261a7 and *Men.* 79c1 τὸ ὅλον *must* be taken as an adverbial modifier, since the subject and predicate positions are taken by ἡ ῥητορική τέχνη and ψυχαγωγία τις, and ἀρετή and ὅτι, respectively. Also, what could ‘the whole (thing)’ possibly refer to? And what is, in the translations of the second type, the function of τό? And, finally, Socrates is not interested in poetry at all, but only in its ‘technical’ side.

532d1 ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεώς ἐστι

Text. ἐστι TW : ἔσται SF The future ἔσται is preferred by e.g. Burnet and Flashar, while Lamb and Méridier read ἐστι. Although in principle both forms are acceptable, the future being an instance of the so-called ‘futur de raisonnement’ (Magnien 1912: II 168–169) or ‘logical-inferential’ future (Bakker 2002: 199 ff.), I prefer (generic) ἐστι, because when Socrates repeats this sentence below in indirect discourse he uses εἶναι rather than ἔσεσθαι to represent the verb of his original sentence (532e3, cp. ὃ ἔλεγον).

532d2 δέξει τι For the spelling of the 2nd person singular middle forms see the Introduction §5.1 (i). For ‘deprecatory’ τι see on πῶς τι, 530a8.

532d5–7 σοφοὶ ... τάληθῆ The fact that Socrates here opposes being σοφός to speaking the truth is heavily ironical, for elsewhere

²³⁸ But at 532e4–5 Murray, Allen, Pradeau and Capuccino translate, correctly: ‘is there an art of painting as a whole?’, ‘there’s an art of painting as a whole?’, ‘y a-t-il une technique picturale qui forme un tout?’, ‘c’è un’arte della pittura come un tutto?’.

Socrates equates σοφία with ἀλήθεια. For this relationship cp. *R.* 335e4 οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν, 485c10 Ἡ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὔροις;

532d6 ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταί

Text. ὑποκριταὶ WSF : οἱ ὑποκριταὶ T As far as I know the reading of T has found no supporters, and rightly so. With οἱ ὑποκριταί a separate group would be created, distinct from ‘you the rhapsodes’, and while this in itself is of course not impossible, it appears from 535e9–536a1 that Socrates considers Ion both a rhapsode and an actor: σὺ ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής. As Stallbaum puts it in the apparatus to 532d6: ‘utrique nunc una notione comprehenduntur’. For coordinated noun phrases with one and with two articles see K-G 1, 611, and the extensive discussion in Rijksbaron (1991: 115–117), on *E. Ba.* 893–896. For ὑποκριτής = ‘actor’ (rather than ‘interpreter’) see Battezzare and Murray ad loc., with references to further literature.²³⁹

532d6–7 ὦν ὑμεῖς ἄδετε τὰ ποιήματα This elaborate periphrasis for ‘οἱ ποιηταί’ once again puts emphasis on the role of Ion and his fellow rhapsodes; note the repetition ὑμεῖς ... ὑμεῖς. For Socrates’ argument here the poets are only relevant in as far as they provide the material for the performances of the rhapsodes.

532d7 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τᾶληθῆ λέγω ‘I’m only speaking the truth.’ Following Wilamowitz many scholars have found fault with τᾶληθῆ, and several conjectures have been proposed (although none of these have been adopted in modern editions). In fact, if translated as by Lamb and Méridier, there is something peculiar about Socrates’ statement: ‘It is you ... who are wise; whereas I speak but the simple truth’; ‘Les savants, c’est vous, j’imagine ...; moi, je me borne à dire la vérité’. These translations suggest that Socrates is speaking here just about his behaviour in general, i.e. outside the present discussion with Ion.

In my view the clause can stand, if it is interpreted along the following lines. Although οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τᾶληθῆ λέγω is a statement about Socrates’ behaviour in general, and the present indicative is therefore a habitual present, I think the clause has a bearing on the

²³⁹ To Murray’s references should be added Zucchelli (1962).

present discussion as well, and for that reason I have preferred the progressive to the simple present in the translation. For Socrates is implicitly elucidating here his earlier statement (couched as a question) at 532c10–d1 οὐκοῦν ... ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεώς ἐστι περὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν;. He now assures Ion that he spoke the truth when he said that the method of inquiry is the same for all arts, a statement that any non-specialist would make; λέγω refers back, then, to πῶς τοῦτο λέγω at 532d2. And to reinforce the connection between the two λέγω's Socrates repeats, in a different form, at e3 the statement of c10–d1, while adding that seeing its validity is indeed something belonging to an ἰδιώτης. Finally, to show that he spoke the truth he turns to a—real—τέχνη, the art of painting.

There are no direct parallels for this use of τἀληθῆ λέγειν in a comment phrase on one's own or other people's words in Plato, but the variant ἀληθῆ λέγειν is very frequent, especially the formula ἀληθῆ λέγεις. For first person ἀληθῆ λέγω cp. e.g. above, 532a7 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ φῆς καὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητάς ... περὶ γε τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν εὖ γε, τοὺς δὲ χεῖρον;—ΙΩΝ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγω (note φῆς ... λέγω), *Cra.* 418a6 EPM. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ “ζημιῶδες” τί ἂν εἴη; ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν εἴη ποτε “ζημιῶδες”; θέασαι, ὦ Ἐρμόγενης, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω λέγων ὅτι ..., *Prt.* 342d4, 349d5, *Hp.Ma.* 285a2, *Hp.Mi.* 372a6. Also with τἀληθές: *Ti.* 37c5 τούτω δὲ ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἂν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἄλλο πλὴν ψυχρὴν εἴπῃ, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθές ἐρεῖ.

There is, finally, a semantic difference between τἀληθῆ λέγω and ἀληθῆ λέγω, for the latter expression, without the article, applies only to ‘local statements’, so to speak, while (οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ) τἀληθῆ λέγω has a much wider, indeed a universal, application. It is therefore only by entailment that τἀληθῆ λέγω at *Ion* 532d7 refers back to λέγω at d2: if Socrates always speaks the truth, he necessarily did so too in this case.

532e1 ἐπεὶ καί motivates why Socrates said οἶον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον. Ἐπεὶ is preferred to γάρ as a motivating connector in a number of cases, e.g. in combination with καί. For ἐπεὶ καί ‘for also’, and its advantages over καὶ γάρ, see Rijksbaron (1976: 82).

532e4 λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ This sentence seems to have been generally misunderstood, and has led to rather fanciful translations and explanations, where τῷ λόγῳ sometimes is invisible, like ‘Prenons

un exemple' (Mériquier, Pradeau), 'Let us just think it out thus' (Lamb), 'Fassen wir es doch in unserer Erörterung' (Flashar); '[τῷ λόγῳ] in thought, as opposed to fact' (Stock), 'τῷ λόγῳ by reasoning or argument' (Murray), 'Let us grasp (the point) by means of argument' (Miller), etc. Actually, the sentence elaborates upon the preceding sentence, ἐπειδὴν τις τέχνην λάβη, so the object of λάβωμεν is τέχνην: 'For let us take one (= an art)', while τῷ λόγῳ = 'for the benefit of, in aid of our discussion'. The construction has a close parallel at *Lg.* 638c2 οἱ λόγῳ λαβόντες τι ἐπιτήδευμα 'all those who take up an institution for discussion' (Bury).

λάβωμεν **γάρ** ... γραφικὴ **γάρ** τις ἐστὶ τέχνη τὸ ὅλον; The two γάρ's have the same function. The first γάρ explains θέασαι ὡς φαῦλον ... γνῶναι ... ἐπειδὴν τις ὅλην τέχνην λάβη, by introducing an instance of the procedure of ὅλην τέχνην λαβεῖν, while the second one introduces an instance of such a τέχνη. In this use γάρ combines the uses mentioned by Denniston on p. 59 ('After an expression ... conveying a summons to attention') and p. 66 (8) ('An example of a proposition constitutes an element in the explanation of it'; incidentally, Denniston himself does not mention our examples there). Similar examples of summons combined with instancing (with single γάρ) are *Ap.* 24c3 τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γάρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα, *Phd.* 100c4 Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῆ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, ..., *Phlb.* 37a2 διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστιν γάρ πού τι δοξάζειν ἡμῖν; *Grg.* 495e2, *R.* 358b2, 453e2. See also below on 533d1 and 535c5, with further examples.

532e4–5 γραφικὴ γάρ τις ἐστὶ τέχνη τὸ ὅλον The same construction as at 532c7–8. Naturally, που is absent here: a γραφικὴ τέχνη *does* exist.

533a1–5 καὶ ἐπειδὴν μὲν τις ... ἐπιδεικνύη, νυστάζει ..., ἐπειδὴν δὲ ... δέη ἀποφίνασθαι γνώμην, **ἐγρήγορέν τε ...**; The subject of νυστάζει, ἀπορεῖ and οὐκ ἔχει is still ὅστις in the preceding clause, and likewise for ἐγρήγορεν, προσέχει and εὐπορεῖ in the second half of the sentence.

533a4 τῶν γραφέων, ἐνὸς μόνου, In part following MSS SF (which have a middle dot after γραφέων), and the Aldina, which has a comma after γραφέων, I have put comma's around ἐνὸς μόνου, thereby turning this phrase into an apposition to the nameless and arbitrary painter just introduced, stressing that the important thing is his singleness: 'just one'. See also below, the note on 533b2.²⁴⁰

533a6 τί δὲ ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ; ἤδη ...; 'And how is it in the case of sculpture?' For the punctuation, indicating a Topic shift, see Appendix I. For the combination τί δὲ ἐν ...; see again Appendix I.

533b2 , ἐνὸς πέρι, Again, now in part following MS T, which has a μέση στιγμή after ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ, I punctuate (comma) after ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ, as well as after πέρι, turning this phrase, too, into an apposition to the nameless and arbitrary sculptor just introduced. Méridier, correctly: '... ou tout autre sculpteur, mais sur lui seul ...'. This effect is perhaps enhanced by the front position of ἐνός. For a similar apposition cp. *La.* 198d6 περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ... οὐκ ἄλλη τις (sc. ἐπιστήμη) ἢ ἰατρική, μία οὔσα, ἐφορᾷ. Lamb translates 'or any other single sculptor', but this would rather be ἢ ἄλλου ἐνός τινος ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ; cp. *Lg.* 894b11 ἄλλη μία τις αὐτῶν πασῶν κινήσεων.

533b5

(533a1 ἤδη οὖν τινα εἶδες ...) ... Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐδὲ τοῦτον **ἑώρακα** Ion gives Socrates more than he asked for, for he reacts to Socrates' semelfactive aorist indicative εἶδες 'have you (ever) seen anyone who ...?' (or perhaps rather 'Did you ever see ...?') with a totalizing-iterative perfect indicative,²⁴¹ i.e. a perfect which combines stative with iterative meaning. Thereby he turns a neutral answer like οὐκ εἶδον, which might have sufficed, into a rather emphatic denial, for οὐ(δέ) ... ἑώρακα signifies that Ion, up to and including the speech moment, at no time has seen that man. In a translation the meaning can perhaps be conveyed by 'I definitely have not seen that man either'. The force of οὐ(δέ) ... ἑώρακα is further enhanced by the emphatic οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία

²⁴⁰ For the value of the punctuation marks in the MSS cp. the Introduction §5.3 (i).

²⁴¹ For this term, which was coined by Ruijgh (1991: 209 f.), see Rijksbaron (2002: 37 v. 3). Cp. further Rijksbaron (1984) and the discussion (with partly diverging views) in Sicking & Stork (2002: 159 ff.).

(an expression of which Ion is rather fond, for it is also found at 533a6 and 535d6).²⁴²

Some other examples from Plato of negated *ἑωρακ-* with a similar interpretation are *Sph.* 239e1 Φανερός, ὃ Θεαίτητε, εἰ σοφιστήν οὐχ ἑωρακῶς, and, with ‘at no time’ overtly present, *Phd.* 109d2 διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακῶς εἴη, *Smp.* 220a5 Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν ἀνθρώπων, *Prt.* 310e4 ... οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ’ ἀκήκοα οὐδέν, *R.* 499a1 ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον ..., δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρα τοιαύτη, οὐ πώποτε ἑωράκασι, οὔτε ἕνα οὔτε πλείους.²⁴³ I should add that οὐ (...) πώποτε may also modify an aorist, as at *Grg.* 503b1 ἀλλ’ οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικὴν, *R.* 498d8 οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον and below 533b7 οὐδ’ ἐν αὐλήσει ... οὐδεπώποτ’ εἶδες ἄνδρα ὅστις The difference with the perfect is that this is still presented as one single (non-)action, although naturally an implication is present that the ‘not-seeing’ occurred more than once (but not up to the speech moment). The emphasis provided by the perfect is, then, an optional, rhetorical, feature.

The totalizing-iterative meaning is also found with other negated perfects of perception verbs,²⁴⁴ e.g. (ἀκούω) *Phd.* 61e9 σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα (which is preceded by semelfactive ἤκουσα: ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα), (αἰσθάνομαι) *La.* 197d1 καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ ἠσθησθαι ὅτι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου παρείληφεν. It also occurs with ‘positive’ perfects; see e.g. (ὁράω) *Ap.* 35a4 οἴουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας ὅταν κρίνονται, (ἀκούω) *Ap.* 19d3 ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγόμενου (—) φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πώποτε ἢ

²⁴² The classic example of the totalizing-iterative use of the perfect is *ἔοργε* at Hom. *Il.* 2.272, as opposed to semelfactive *ἔρεξεν* at line 274: ὃ πόποι ἦ δὴ μυρὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργε / βουλὰς τ’ ἐξάρχων ἀγαθὰς πόλεμόν τε κορύσσων / νῦν δὲ τότε μέγ’ ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν.

²⁴³ Compare totalizing-iterative οὐ πῶ ... ὄπωπα at *Il.* 2.799 ἤδη μὲν μάλα πολλὰ μάχας εἰσῆλυθον ἀνδρῶν, / ἀλλ’ οὐ πῶ τοιόνδε τοσονδέ τε λαὸν ὄπωπα (West’s text). A particularly clear example is Arist. *Insomn.* 462b2 ἤδη δέ τισι συμβέβηκεν μηδὲν ἐνύπνιον ἑωρακεῖν κατὰ τὸν βίον, τοῖς δὲ πόρρω που προελθούσης τῆς ἡλικίας ἰδεῖν πρότερον μὴ ἑωρακόσιν.

²⁴⁴ In fact, the negation strongly favours a totalizing-iterative reading of the perfect, just as in Engl. *I haven’t seen him in years.*

μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου (notice ἀκηκόατε, recurrent hearings, as opposed to ἤκουσε, a single hearing), *Tht.* 144b8 Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὕ, *Ti.* 26b6 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ μὲν χθὲς ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἂν οἶδ' εἰ δυναίμην ἅπαντα ἐν μνήμῃ πάλιν λαβεῖν· ταῦτα δὲ ἂ πάμπολυν χρόνον διακήκοα, παντάπασι θαυμάσαιμ' ἂν εἴ τί με αὐτῶν διαπέφευγεν (notice again the presence of semelfactive ἤκουσα), and finally in questions: *Prt.* 350b1 Ἦδη δέ τινας ἐώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων;²⁴⁵

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ‘But surely’: μὴν indicates that Socrates feels quite confident that his opinion (cp. ὥς γ' ἐγὼ οἶμαι) about the other arts is correct. For ἀλλὰ μὴν modifying οἶμαι cp. *La.* 193c8 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι γε, *R.* 370b7 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι καὶ τόδε δῆλον.

533b5–6 ὥς γ' ἐγὼ οἶμαι This is another instance of an implicitly contrastive ἐγὼ (cp. 530d9): (I don't know what your opinion is but) ‘I, for one’. Note that this effect does not depend on γε; cp. the note on the Text below.

Text. ὥς γ' ἐγὼ TW : ὥς ἔγωγε SF If comment clauses with a verb of opinion introduced by ὥς are modified by γε, the particle overwhelmingly comes immediately after the conjunction, e.g. ὥς γε ἐγὼ

²⁴⁵ The perfect of perception verbs may also have a non-iterative stative meaning, as at *Cri.* 44a7 τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἕκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός. Here, the perfect probably expresses the idea that the dream is still present with Socrates as he is speaking: ‘a dream which I have seen and am still seeing’. (Cp. Stahl (1907: 112) on *πέπονθα*: ‘Das Vergangene kann in seiner gegenwärtigen Wirkung dargestellt werden.’) Likewise at *Smp.* 216e6 σπουδάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνοιχθέντος οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἐώρακεν τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἦδη ποτ' εἶδον, καὶ ... (ἐώρακεν = ‘has seen and is still seeing them mentally’, εἶδον = ‘got a glimpse of them, noticed them’), and perhaps at *Cra.* 399c3 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὄρα οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὃ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ἐώρακεν ... καὶ ἀναθρεῖ ... (ἐώρακεν = ‘has seen and mentally stored’; note the opposition with ὄρα in the preceding clause: the other animals just ‘see’ things), and *Euthd.* 273c1 Ἦσπαζόμεν οὖν αὐτῷ ἅτε διὰ χρόνου ἐωρακώς (lit. ‘since I had seen them <and had still my eyes on them> after quite some time’); contrast *Phdr.* 247d3 ἰδοῦσα (sc. θεοῦ διάνοια) διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὄν (‘having noticed’; cp. ‘lorsqu’ avec le temps elle a fini par apercevoir la réalité’—Robin).

λέγω; see further below.²⁴⁶ In analysing its function I follow Denniston, who argues (146) that '[w]hen γε follows a conjunction ... we may, if we like, say that it stresses the whole clause : but it is perhaps more accurate to say that it stresses the logical relationship expressed by the conjunction: thus, εἴ γε emphasizes the hypothetical nature of a statement: "I assert a truth subject to the validity of a hypothesis, but not independently of it."'²⁴⁷

Likewise, in the case of comment clauses γε expresses the idea that, in principle, the assertion made in the main clause is *strictly* subject to the validity of the speaker's (or somebody else's) view, 'at least, that's what I (you, he) think(s)', etc.; this view may also be expressed in an objectified form (e.g. by εἰκός). Here are some examples of the relevant comment clauses (as printed in the OCT):

- ὥς γ' ἐγὼ οἶμαι: *Ion* 533b5–6 in T W, no parallels
- ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ²⁴⁸ and variants: *Ap.* 18a2, *Cri.* 44b4 (γέ μοι βδ : ἐμοὶ T), *Cra.* 417d2, *Alc.* 2 138a7, *Grg.* 482d5, *Men.* 80a2 (γέ μοι B : γ' ἐμοὶ T W : ἔμοιγε F), 80b3; Burnet once prints γε ἐμοί, *Lg.* 627d6 ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν
- ὥς γέ μοι φαίνεται and variants: *Thet.* 151e2, *Plt.* 291a8, *Prt.* 324c8, *Hp. Mi.* 365b8, *R.* 602b6;²⁴⁹ once γ' ἐμοί, *Lg.* 625e1

²⁴⁶ For comment clauses in English see the discussion in Quirk et al. (1985: 1112–1118). Comment clauses 'hedge, *ie* they express the speaker's tentativeness over the truth value of the matrix clause' (1114).

²⁴⁷ See also K-G 2, 177, and Wakker (1994: 310 ff.) on εἴ γε.

²⁴⁸ This should rather be ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ. In fact, with or without MS support, I think ὥς γ' ἐμοί should be read everywhere, since the normal form of this clause without γε is ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκ- (40 instances, including *Alc.* 1 and *Hp. Ma.*), not ὥς μοι δοκ-. (Nor was ὥς ἔμοιγε δοκ- a viable alternative; see below on ὥς ἔγωγε οἶμαι.) There are only two possible instances of ὥς μοι δοκεῖ in a comment clause, *Chrm.* 164e2 and *R.* 409e1, but in both cases we should probably read ὥς ἐμοί as well, at *Chrm.* 164e2 with Stobaeus, at *R.* 409e1 with F and Stobaeus. Cp. also *Grg.* 502b3 ὥς σοὶ δοκεῖ. (At *Cra.* 422c2, *Sph.* 249d2, *Phdr.* 228c7, *Grg.* 521c3 ὥς μοι δοκ- occurs in other types of ὥς-clause.) Also, with ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, etc., these types of comment clauses are parallel to clauses like ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὥς γ' ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν; cp. also *Hp. Ma.* 298c9 Ἐγὼ σοὶ φράσω ὃ γ' ἐμοὶ καταφαίνεται. The parallel constructions to the ὥς γε μοι δοκῶ etc. of our editions, with enclitic, unemphatic, μοι, should be *ὥς γε λέγω, etc., but these do not occur.

²⁴⁹ Again, we should read ὥς γ' ἐμοί, for the same reason as with δοκ-: ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίν- 11 instances, only one instance of ὥς μοι φαίνεται, *Prt.* 343c5 (no variant readings reported).

- ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω *Grg.* 470e9, ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις *Grg.* 492e7, ὥς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ *Smp.* 183b5, ὥς γε νῦν λέγεται *Ly.* 220e6, ὥς γε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα *Lg.* 665d6, ὥς γε λέγεται τὸ τοῦ μύθου *Lg.* 683d2
 – ὥς γ' ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν, *Phlb.* 36e13 (ὥς γ' T : ὥς B)
 – ὥς γε (τὸ) εἰκόσ; *Euthphr.* 3a4, *Plt.* 307e1, *R.* 610e9; also ὥς γ' ἔοικεν *Smp.* 202d6 (ὥς γ' BT : ὡς γε Oxy. : γ' ὥς W : ὥστ' Stob.).

Such clauses with ὥς γε + μοι (or rather γ' ἐμοί) / ἐγὼ and/or a verb of opinion are, then, rather common.

But what about the reading of SF, ὥς ἔγωγε οἶμαι? There is a parallel clause at *Phd.* 77a8 ὥς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, apparently without variant readings, and there are two instances of ὥς σύ γε οἶει, both from the *Gorgias*, 473b1 ΣΩ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Πῶλε, 495b7 ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, but that is all there is. The latter two cases can be discarded, I think, as parallels, for they are *sui generis*: they do not qualify an assertion made by the speaker, but rather an answer given by the interlocutor in the preceding sentence, with heavy contrast: 'That is what *you* think'. As for the other verbs mentioned above, I have only found one possible instance of γε following a pronoun: ὥς ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει at *Ep.* XIII 360a6 (ἔμοιγε AZO : ἐμοί τε O²).²⁵⁰ ὥς ἔγωγε δοκῶ, ὥς ἔγωγ' ἄν φαίην (or φαίην ἄν), etc., do not occur, then. At *Phd.* 77a8 we should therefore probably change ὥς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, e.g. into ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι; see also n. 251; -γε may be due to ἔγωγε at 77a2 and ἔμοιγε at 77a5.

My conclusion concerning *Ion* 533b5 is, that in spite of the absence of direct parallels for ὥς γ' ἐγὼ οἶμαι and the presence of a parallel for ὥς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, the former reading is to be preferred.²⁵¹

533c1–2 περὶ Φημίου τοῦ Ἰθακησίου ῥαψωδοῦ, περὶ δὲ Ἴωνος τοῦ Ἐφεσίου ῥαψωδοῦ

Text. ῥαψωδοῦ SF : om. TW (Burnet: τοῦ Ἐφεσίου [ῥαψωδοῦ])
 Something went wrong here with Burnet's text and apparatus, for in his text he has brackets around the second ῥαψωδοῦ, while according to Naber's conjecture mentioned in his apparatus they should be

²⁵⁰ As against some 40 instances of ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκ-. We should therefore probably read ἐμοί τε.

²⁵¹ I should perhaps add that the regular forms of ὥς clauses with οἶμαι in the *corpus Platonicum* are ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι (63 instances), ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι (19), and ὥς οἶμαι (12). Plato has quite a variety of comment clauses with οἶμαι. Besides the clauses with ὥς discussed above, also bare οἶμαι occurs, in the *Ion* at 536d6 and 540b2. See there.

around the first ῥαψωδοῦ. Be that as it may, both readings probably yield an acceptable text. Yet I prefer the more elaborate expression of SF, for the reading of TW could also mean ‘the Ephesian’ rather than ‘the Ephesian rhapsode’. For another case where SF have a more elaborate expression see above, 530c2, and for a parallel cp. the repetition of αὐτῆς at *Phdr.* 246a3 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ τῆς ιδέας αὐτῆς ᾧδε λεκτέον.

533c2–3 οὐκ ἔχει **συμβalέσθαι** ἅ τε εὖ ῥαψωδεῖ καὶ ἃ μὴ

Text. συμβalέσθαι WSF : συμβάλλεσθαι T Since the infinitive is accompanied by an object, the aorist infinitive is to be preferred. Elsewhere in Plato, too, in the construction (οὐκ) ἔχω *et sim.* + dependent infinitive, the aorist infinitive is frequently accompanied by an object or other restrictive constituent. The present infinitive tends to lack such elements. Cp. Basset on ἔχεις λέγειν/εἰπεῖν (2000: 307): ‘[A]vec l’aoriste, l’attention est habituellement attirée sur les circonstances de la réponse De telles précisions restrictives n’apparaissent pas avec l’infinitif PR.’ For restrictive constituents with the aorist stem see also above on 531b7–9 and Appendix III. Compare, in the *Ion*, ἀδυνατῶ τε καὶ ὅτιοῦν συμβalέσθαι (532b9), and also the aorists in the related constructions οὐκ ἔχει ὅτι συμβάλλεται (533a2–3) and οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴπη (533b4). See further e.g. *R.* 398c9 οὐκουν ἱκανῶς γε ἔχω ἐν τῷ παρόντι συμβalέσθαι ποῖα ἄττα δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν.²⁵²

533c4–535a10

Ion admits that Socrates has a point, but repeats that he is only skilled in Homer, and asks Socrates how that can be. Socrates now formally denies that Ion possesses a τέχνη, and will prove that he is moved by a θεία δύναμις. Explanation of the working of this δύναμις by a comparison with the force of the magnet. Conclusion: the Muse makes the poets ἔκφρων and causes each of them to be possessed by a different god; they are therefore just mouthpieces of the gods. The rhapsodes in turn are mouthpieces of mouthpieces.

²⁵² If restrictive constituents *are* present with the present infinitive, the infinitive generally has iterative meaning, e.g. *Lg.* 905c3 ἢν τις μὴ γινώσκων οὐδ’ ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην.

533c5 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐμαυτῷ σύννοϊδα, ὅτι ... In the rather rare correlative construction ἐκεῖνο ... ὅτι/ὡς, instead of the common τοῦτο ... ὅτι/ὡς, ἐκεῖνο has the connotation 'that special, remarkable fact/phenomenon ... that ...'. For related uses cp. *Euthphr.* 2b2 (spoken by Euthyphro) οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἕτερον ('that unimagineable thing ...', viz. that Socrates is the accuser), *Phdr.* 234b2 ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι ..., *R.* 600b3 ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν ('that special thing, pleasure'); outside Plato e.g. *S. Aj.* 94 Καλῶς ἔλεξας· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό μοι φράσον, / ἔβαψας ἔγχος εὖ πρὸς Ἀργείων στρατῷ; ('this unimagineable deed'), *Ph.* 310 ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐδέεις, ἡνίκ' ἂν μνησθῶ, θέλει, / σῶσαί μ' ἐς οἶκουσ. This nuance of ἐκεῖνος is an effect of the general meaning 'that far away ...', 'that ... which is out of my reach', 'that unattainable ...', for which see K-G 1, 641 ff. Other clear cases of this meaning of ἐκεῖνος are its uses to refer to a dead person, and, in Plato, to refer to the Forms. For the latter see e.g. *Prm.* 130d9 ἐκέισε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω, *Phdr.* 249c2 ἀνάμνησις ἐκεῖνων ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ ..., *R.* 454c9 ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, *R.* 511a1 ζητούντες δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ, etc., for the former *Ap.* 21a8 ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν, *Mx.* 248d7 Ταῦτα οὖν, ὧ παῖδες καὶ γονῆς τῶν τελευτησάντων, ἐκεῖνοί ... ἐπέσκηπτον ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλειν, *Mx.* 235b5. Compare Smyth §1254, S-D 209, 1.

533c6–7 οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες με φασὶν εὖ λέγειν

Text. με φασὶν TW : ἐμὲ φασὶν F : ἐμέ φασιν S With με the emphasis is on πάντες, which has Focus position (see on 531b6 with n. 220). This is perhaps more appropriate than the emphasis provided by the readings of SF. The latter would be more appropriate in a context of—explicit or implicit—contrast with other persons, as at e.g. *Ap.* 21b5 τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; and *Smp.* 173d1–3 ἴσως αὖ ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ ἡγεῖσθε κακοδαίμονα εἶναι, καὶ οἶομαι ὑμᾶς ἀληθῆ οἶεσθαι· ἐγὼ μέντοι ὑμᾶς οὐκ οἶομαι ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα, *Grg.* 491b5–7 Ὁρᾶς, ὧ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταῦτά σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς ἀεὶ ταῦτά λέγειν, καὶ μέμφη μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντίον ..., etc. etc.

For the accents cp. the Introduction §5.2 (i).

533c7 **καίτοι** ὄρα τοῦτο τί ἔστιν Adversative **καίτοι** may be used ‘by a speaker in pulling himself up abruptly’ (Denn. 557): ‘But see what that means’.

533c8–d1 Καὶ ὁρῶ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ **ἄρχομαι** γέ σοι **ἀποφαινόμενος** ὃ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι ‘And I start the presentation of my views with my view of that matter.’ In the construction of **ἄρχομαι** + supplementary participle the participle denotes an action that is to be continued, and **ἄρχομαι** refers to the initial phase of that action;²⁵³ **ἄρχομαι** is usually accompanied by an adverb of origin or manner, a prepositional phrase or an (instrumental) dative specifying the nature of the initial phase,²⁵⁴ and the participle is intransitive or used absolutely. See e.g. (adverb of origin + prepositional phrase) *R.* 596a Βούλει οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου;, (adverb of manner) *Phlb.* 28e3 ἀρξώμεθα δὲ πῶς ὧδε ἐπανερωτῶντες, (prepositional phrase) *Smp.* 186b2 ἀρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων (= ‘the starting point of my λόγος will be the art of medicine’), (instrumental dative) *R.* 376e Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ μουσικῇ πρότερον ἀρξώμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ;. See further e.g. *Cri.* 49d6 (ἐντεῦθεν), *Cra.* 397a5 (πόθεν), *Phlb.* 28d3 (ὧδε), *La.* 187c5 (ἐντεῦθεν), *Euthd.* 283a3 (ὀπόθεν), *Mx.* 237a2 (πόθεν). In a few cases, however, the specification is provided by an object (clause) rather than by one of the constituents mentioned above. See our text and *Sph.* 265a4 Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἡρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι; (cp. Diès’ fine translation in the Budé edition: ‘Ne commençons-nous pas alors nos divisions par l’art de production et l’art d’acquisition?’). At *La.* 187c5 ἐντεῦθεν ἡρχόμεν λέγων, ὅτι ... (= ‘the beginning of what I said was that ...’) adverb of origin and object clause are combined. The overall semantic effect is the same as with the adverbs etc.; thus, in our case Socrates is presenting an extended argument, of which the first element is his view of ‘τοῦτο’. For further details about **ἄρχομαι** + participle (and + infinitive) I may refer to Rijksbaron (1986).

Text. **ἄρχομαι** ... **ἀποφαινόμενος**. Starting with Cobet, editors have rejected either **ἄρχομαι** or **ἄρχομαι** ... **ἀποφαινόμενος**. The latter was the text printed by Bekker and Stallbaum. Cobet replaced **ἄρχομαι**

²⁵³ Cp. K-G 2, 75: “*Ἀρχεσθαι c. part.* im Anfange einer Thätigkeit begriffen sein (im Gegensatz zu dem Ende oder der Mitte ebenderselben Handlung) ...”.

²⁵⁴ In technical terms: the action of the participle is presupposed, while **ἄρχομαι** + modifier specify the initial phase of that action.

(the unanimous reading of TWSF) with ἔρχομαι, which he resuscitated from the ‘vulgata’,²⁵⁵ and ἀποφαινόμενος with the future participle ἀποφανούμενος.²⁵⁶ With respect to ἄρχομαι he was followed by all subsequent editors. As for ἀποφαινόμενος, however, editors were divided. It was either retained, e.g. by Méridier, Flashar and Murray, yielding a rather peculiar construction,²⁵⁷ or, following Cobet, replaced with ἀποφανούμενος, e.g. by Burnet, Lamb, Verdenius and Battagazzore. On the interpretation given above, however, there is no need to change the text of TWSF.

533d1 ff.

Text. The following passage is quoted, or alluded to, by a number of later authors. See the Introduction §4.4 *The indirect tradition*.

533d1–2 ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὄν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὅμηρου εἰ λέγειν Ἔστι must be connected with παρὰ σοί, = πάρεστι σοί, τοῦτο = περὶ Ὅμηρου εἰ λέγειν, and τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὄν is a circumstantial participial phrase, with τέχνη used predicatively. Literally: ‘This (speaking well about Homer) is by you, not being an art (but a power) ...’ = ‘This (speaking well about Homer) is at your command while it is not an art (but a divine power)’. Many commentators interpret this sentence as if it comes straight from the *Parmenides* or the *Timaeus*, most explicitly Stock (who reckoned the *Ion*, in fact, among Plato’s later works; see the Introduction §1): ‘Here the analytic tendency, which is characteristic of Plato’s later style, reaches its extreme limit when ἐστὶ itself is analysed into ἐστι ... ὄν, “For this is not (being) an

²⁵⁵ I.e. all printed editions before Bekker, for which see Bekker (1823: 145). Ultimately ἔρχομαι goes back to Ven. 186 (rather than to E (= Ven. 184), as Bekker believed). Cp. the Introduction §4.6. Burnet wrongly thought that ἔρχομαι is the reading of F.

²⁵⁶ Cobet (1858: 286). With characteristic aplomb—he was a master of the *argumentum ex auctoritate*—Cobet writes: ‘In re tam certa quam nota [viz. that only the combination of ἔρχομαι + future participle is allowed] miror quomodo in PLATONIS *Ione* doctos homines turpis soloecismus fugerit p. 533 C. Καὶ ὁρῶ, ὁ Ἴων, καὶ ἄρχομαί γέ σοι ἀποφαινόμενος ὃ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι, nihil certius est quam legendum ἔρχομαί γέ σοι ἀποφανούμενος.’

²⁵⁷ They take ἔρχομαι ἀποφαινόμενος as if it were ἔρχομαι ἀποφανούμενος, but this is impossible. The parallel often adduced to support this view (*Phd.* 100b3 ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος) is better taken as Rowe ad loc. takes it: ‘I am setting about trying to show you’. Or should we on that interpretation perhaps read ἄρχομαι in the passage from *Phaedo*?

art in you”’. This is highly unlikely: the verb phrase ἔστι ... ὄν is never used as some analytic variant of ἔστι,²⁵⁸ but always in an ontological sense, with ὄν used predicatively. See e.g. *Sph.* 256d7 f. Οὐκ οὖν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, ἐπεὶ περ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει; *Prm.* 162a1 Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν, *Ti.* 38c2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, *Lg.* 894a6 ἔστιν δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένη, μεταβαλὼν δέ But for the rather convoluted word order, the syntax of our text should rather be compared with that of *R.* 441a2 οὕτως καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὄν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει.

For the metaphorical use of locative ἔστι ... παρὰ σοί with an abstract subject (‘be at one’s command’) cp. *Chrm.* 158b5 εἰ μὲν σοι ἦδη πάρεστιν ... σωφροσύνη, also 158e7, *R.* 364b6 πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σοφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπωδαίς.

Finally, γάρ introduces a so-called embedded description, as often after verbs of saying. See further at 535c5.

Text. γάρ T W f^{sl} Procl. Stob. : δὲ SF Although the chances that γάρ, as a gloss, replaced an original δέ are far greater than the other way round—cp. the scholia’s frequent ὁ δέ ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ—the lack of parallels for ἀποφανοῦμαι, ἐρῶ or φράσω + a sentence introduced by δέ in Plato made me adopt the reading of T W f^{sl} Procl. Stob. There are, moreover, according to Denniston (169 n. 1), also cases of γάρ having been corrupted to δέ.

533d2 ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον For the form νῦν δὴ see the Introduction §5.2 (ii).

533d2–3 θεία δὲ δύναμις, ἣ σε κινεῖ ἣ σε κινεῖ being a non-restrictive relative clause I have put a comma after δύναμις.

533d3 ἐν τῇ λίθῳ For feminine ἡ λίθος, denoting a ‘besondere Art Stein’, see Kühner-Blass 1, 408.

533d4 καὶ γὰρ Not ‘For this stone ...’ (Lamb), ‘Cette pierre n’attire pas ...’ (Mérider), ‘In fact, this stone ...’ (Allen), ‘E infatti’ (Capuccino), but ‘Denn auch dieser Stein ...’ (Flashar), ‘For this stone, too, ...’, the point of resemblance being the transmission of

²⁵⁸ And what would Plato gain by choosing ἔστι ... ὄν instead of ἔστι?

power, a point that will be further elaborated upon in οὕτω δὲ καὶ ... at 534e3 ff. For some other examples of καὶ γάρ meaning ‘for ... too ...’, in passages of the general structure ‘x ὥσπερ γ’ ‘For y too, ... So x too ...’ see *Ap.* 22c2 ἔγνω οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν (= x) ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί (= y)· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι (= y) λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιούτων τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ (= x) πεπονθότες, *Prt.* 313d1 ff. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστῆς (= x) ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν (= y), ὁ ἔμπορος τε καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι (= y) που ὧν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασι ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε ... οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περι-
ἀγοντες (= x) κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες²⁵⁹

533d6 ὥστε

Text. ὥστε TWf Procl. Stob. : ὥστ’ αὖ SF Because ὥστε αὖ (ὥστ’ αὖ does not seem to occur at all) is extremely rare and is only found in later authors (Longus 2.2.2, Plot. 6.36, *Phlp. in GA*, vol. 14.2, 139, 3), ὥστε should be preferred; (ὡσ)ταυ may be due to anticipation of -ταυ- in ταυτόν.

Since ὥστε δύνασθαι is an optional modifier (a satellite), I have, in accordance with modern conventions (and with e.g. Stallbaum, Schanz and Lamb), put a comma after δακτυλίους.

533d6–8 ὥστε δύνασθαι ... 533e2 ὥστε ... ἤρτηται In ὥστε δύνασθαι ... ποιεῖν (= ‘so that it is possible for them to have the power to do the same thing’) δύνασθαι resumes δύναμιν at 533d6; the clause expresses the possible consequence more forcefully than just ὥστε ... ποιεῖν would have done. Ὡστε ... ἤρτηται, on the other hand, tells us what actually happens (or rather sometimes (ἐνιότης) happens) if the possible consequence of the preceding lines becomes reality. For the constructions of ὥστε see K-G 2, 501–515, Smyth §§2249–2278, Rijksbaron (2002: 63–66).

²⁵⁹ See further *Phd.* 91a3, *Cra.* 407b1, *Sph.* 253a1, *Euthd.* 277d8, *Grg.* 456c8, 471e3.

533e1–2 σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων

Text. σιδηρίων SP^C(-ήριων, sic) F Procl. Stob. : σιδήρων TWS
Both σίδηρος and σιδήριον can be used for anything made of iron, but the plural σίδηροι would seem to be avoided, both in Plato and elsewhere, while σιδήρια is quite common. Cp. in Plato *Euthd.* 300b4 Ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, and also b6. Σιδηρίων must therefore be the correct reading. (There is no need to adopt Jacobs' σιδηρῶν [καὶ] δακτυλίων.)

533e2–3 ἕξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου 'from that (far away) stone'

533e3–4

ἐνθέους ... ποιεῖ Supply τινας 'people'; for the omission of an indefinite object cp. e.g. *Prt.* 312c5–7 Τί ἂν εἴπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; 312d9 περὶ οὗτου ὁ σοφιστῆς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν and other examples in the same passage, *Grg.* 449e4–5 Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς, 450a1–2, 478d6.

αὐτή Not 'the Muse herself' (Lamb, Saunders, Allen), but 'la Muse par elle-même', (Mérider), 'à elle-même' (Canto), i.e. without help, just like the magnetic stone. For αὐτός 'von selbst, *sua sponte*' see K-G 1, 652 Anm. 2.

Text. αὐτὴ SF Stob.(P, αὐτὴ F) : αὐτὴ TW : αὐτούς Procl. Anaphoric αὐτὴ is meaningless here. Proclus' αὐτούς, which must have been introduced to provide ἐνθέους with an object, is impossible, since it has no referent.

533e5–6 οἷ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιητὰι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ For the word order cp. the discussion on 531b6.

533e5 πάντες—534a7 λέγουσι Reading with T and W καὶ βακχεύουσι at 534a4, I interpret this long, and perhaps, as suggested to me by Omert Schrier, iconically corybantic, sentence, along the following lines:

(i) ὠσαύτως 'looks backwards', to quote Stock's words, which means that it is a substitute for the whole of οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ... ποιήματα; to bring this out I put a high dot after ὠσαύτως, with e.g. Mérider, and Lamb in his translation; at the same time the high dot announces the remainder of the sentence;

- (ii) in fact, what follows is one extended elaboration of ὡσαύτως;
- (iii) ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἀρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν balances οὐκ ἔμφορες ὄντες; the construction mirrors οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες at 533e6, and ἐπειδὴν ἐμβῶσιν modifies therefore ποιῶσιν at 534a1: 'they do not compose their poems when in their senses, but after they ...' etc.;
- (iv) the καί at 534a3 adds a new element, viz. βακχεύουσι (the subject is still οἱ μελοποιοί), to the preceding sentence, while the καί at a4 adds another new element, viz. κατεχόμενοι ... ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, which in a syntactically regular construction would have been κατεχόμενοι ... ἐργάζονται; the καί before τῶν μελοποιῶν at 534a6 = 'also'.

Consequently I would translate, in the first part following Lamb: 'For all the good epic poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed, and the good lyric poets likewise: just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not compose those fine poems when in their senses but after they have started on the melody and rhythm, and they are frantic, and while they are possessed, just as the bacchants draw honey and milk from the rivers while they are possessed, but not while they are (still) in their senses, so, too, the soul of the lyric poets does this ...'.

Text. With e.g. Stallbaum, I prefer, at 534a3–4, T W's καὶ βακχεύουσι to the variant without καί of SF and Stobaeus, because the latter text more or less invites us to take ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἀρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν not as a modifier of ποιῶσιν but rather of βακχεύουσι, thereby destroying the balance with οὐκ ἔμφορες ὄντες, and creating a false contrast. For an example see Lamb's translation: '... so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their senses, but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic ...' etc.

534a1 μὲν

Text. μὲν SF : om. T W For μὲν *solitarium* modifying pronouns see Denn. 381. I have preferred (οὕτω) μὲν because the likelihood of its having been omitted in T W, intentionally or accidentally, especially in abbreviated form, seems stronger than that of its having been inserted in SF.

534b6–7 **τουτί** ... τὸ κτήμα By the deictic -ί, **τουτί** τὸ κτήμα refers back emphatically to ὁ νοῦς. **Τουτί** is, in fact, doubly emphatic: both by the deictic iota and by its front position; for the latter cp. the note on 531b5. Some other examples of the deictic iota used with anaphoric pronouns are *Ap.* 22e6 Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, *Phd.* 95a7 τουτονὶ ... τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἄρμονίαν, *Smp.* 215e7 ὑπὸ τουτουὶ τοῦ Μαρσίου.²⁶⁰

The idea that νοῦς is something which is acquired is frequently found elsewhere in Plato, especially in the later dialogues. Cp. e.g. *Ly.* 210b6 εἰς ἃ δ' ἂν νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα, *Sph.* 227b1 τοῦ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν, *R.* 494d5 ἕάν τις ἡρέμα προσελθὼν ἀληθῆ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, *Lg.* 900d7 τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτήσθαι φαμεν ἀρετῆς. Nor is this idea confined to Plato; cp. e.g. *S. Ai.* 1256 Καὶ σοὶ προσέρπον τουτ' ἐγὼ τὸ φάρμακον / ὀρῶ τάχ', εἰ μὴ νοῦν κατακτήσῃ τινά. Compare also *Aristot. EN* 1097b2 τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, from which it appears that νοῦς belongs to the things that can be chosen.

534b8–c1 ποιοῦντές **τε καὶ** πολλὰ λέγοντες καὶ καλὰ

Text. **τε καὶ** SF : καὶ T W Procl. I have adopted the reading of SF because **τε καὶ** expresses the idea that ‘composing’ (ποιοῦντες picks

²⁶⁰ Because in the anaphoric use emphatic -ί clashes with the unemphatic end position of οὔτος, we should read, at *Cra.* 396c6–7, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην τῆς σοφίας ταύτης εἴ τι ποιήσει, with **βδ**, rather than ταυτησὶ τί ποιήσει, the reading of T, which is adopted by Burnet, Duke et al. and others. Cp. *Cra.* 418b3 ἡ μὲν νέα φωνὴ ἡμῖν ἡ καλὴ αὐτῇ (all MSS), where Burnet wrongly printed αὐτῇ, believing that this is the reading of B.

In the strictly deictic use οὔτος etc. may occur both before and after the noun; see e.g. *Ap.* 21a8 ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὔτος μάρτυρήσει, *Ap.* 34c2 ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα, *Ap.* 26c1 καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τουτοισί, *Phdr.* 237a10 ὁ βέλτιστος οὔτος, *Chrm.* 176c4 ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος, *Prt.* 310a4 ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί, *Grg.* 469d4 τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὀρέσ.

At *Lg.* 629b8 ἀνεράμεθα κοινῇ τουτονὶ τὸν ποιητὴν οὔτωςί πως: “ὦ Τύρταιε, ...” we find the anaphoric and the deictic use combined: τουτονὶ τὸν ποιητὴν refers back to Τύρταιον at 629a4, but at the same time it evokes the presence, so to speak, of that poet, as appears from the words spoken to him that follow. For a number of fundamental observations on the use of οὔτος, as opposed to that of ὕδε and ἐκεῖνος, see now Ruijgh (2006).

up absolute ποιεῖν at b6) and ‘uttering’ are two sides of the same coin more forcefully than single καί. For this effect of τε ... καί see Ruijgh (1971: §170): ‘τε — καί sert à exprimer l’idée de la combinaison avec un peu plus d’emphase que καί non corresponsif’. A similar coupling by τε ... καί of ποιεῖν and λέγειν is found at *Ly.* 205c5 ταῦτα ποιεῖ τε καὶ λέγει, where ταῦτα refers to epinician poems. For the hyperbaton of πολλά ... καὶ καλά cp. πολλά ... καὶ χεῖρω at *Hp.Mi.* 369c5 τὸν δὲ δολερὸν τε καὶ πολλὰ ψευδόμενον καὶ χεῖρω Ἀχιλλέως. Note also the coordination there by τε ... καί of δολερὸν and ψευδόμενον.

534c2–3 τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ’ ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν For the idea cp. *R.* 394e8–9 Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμῆσθαι εὖ ὥσπερ ἐν οὐ δυνατός; together with 395a3 ff. οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγυὲς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμῆσθαι, οἷον κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματε ἄρτι τούτῳ ἐκάλει;—Ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί.—Οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψωδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα. I should add, however, that Socrates expresses the opposite view at *Smp.* 223d3 ff.: τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη (Aristodemus), προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοῦς (Agathon and Aristophanes) τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγωδοποιὸν ὄντα <καὶ> κωμωδοποιὸν εἶναι.²⁶¹

534c3–5 ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ’ ἔπη, ὁ δ’ ἰάμβους Murray rightly observes that ‘[i]t is striking that P. emphasises the genres of choral lyric, iambic and epic, but makes no reference to dramatic poetry. Perhaps this is in order to sustain the close identification of poet and performer.’ More specifically, the genres mentioned here are all non-mimetic or, like the epics, only partly mimetic. In fact, μίμησις, which is so important elsewhere in Plato in discussions of poetry (cp. the Introduction §1) is entirely absent from the *Ion*. Interestingly, the Homeric passages criticized by Socrates are

²⁶¹ Dover ad loc. observes: ‘The argument, strikingly unlike what is said by Socrates in *Ion* 531e - 534e, is not developed elsewhere in Plato, and reconstruction of the form it might take is a useful exercise for students of ancient philosophy’. (Dover does not mention the passage from *R.*)—Robin may be right when he observes, on p. vii of the ‘Notice’ to his edition of *Smp.*, that the end of the dialogue may be meant to show that ‘si un même homme doit exceller dans l’un et l’autre genre, ce ne peut être que le Philosophe’.

either—to use the terms of *R.* 394c—διὰ μιμήσεως (537a8 ff., 539a1 ff.) or δι’ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (538c2–3, 538d1–3, 539b4 ff.). But for the Socrates of the *Ion* the distinction is irrelevant, for it is only Homer who is the ‘maker’ of these lines. Socrates can therefore smoothly rephrase λέγει Νέστωρ (537a5) as λέγει Ὅμηρος (537c1–2).

As for the credibility of the claim made here, Murray (on c5–7) points out that ‘[i]t would not be difficult to refute P’s argument: of the genres mentioned, Pindar, for example, composed dithyrambs, encomia and ὑπορχήματα’. To this, however, the Socrates of the *Ion* might reply: ‘True enough. But was what he made always καλός?’ Cp. ποιεῖν καλῶς at c2.

534c6 εἶπερ περὶ

Text. εἶπερ SF : εἶ TW Stob. Another instance of two unobjectionable readings, where the presence or absence of περ may be due to dittography in the first case and haplography in the second. I have adopted the reading of SF because at 531b7–8, in a very similar sentence, we find εἶπερ περὶ in all MSS.

534c7

κᾶν Supply: καλῶς ἠπίσταντο λέγειν.

Text. κᾶν TW Stob. : καὶ SF Kᾶν is the correct reading, for just as in the corresponding passage at 531b8 a counterfactual main clause is needed.

διὰ ταῦτα δέ Since δέ introduces a new information unit, διὰ ταῦτα is used cataphorically rather than anaphorically, i.e. it prepares for ἵνα ... εἰδῶμεν etc. Similar cases are *Men.* 73e5 διὰ ταῦτα δέ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα, and *Lg.* 659a2 διὰ ταῦτα δέ ἀρετῆς φαμεν δεῖσθαι τοὺς τούτων κριτάς, ὅτι Cp. also δέ at *Euthd.* 278b4 παιδιὰν δέ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, ..., *R.* 535c6 Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρτημα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ... διὰ ταῦτα προσπέτωκεν, ... ὅτι οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἄπτονται.²⁶² In cases without δέ, e.g. *Plt.* 275b1 Διὰ ταῦτα μὴν καὶ

²⁶² Cataphoric διὰ ταῦτα occurs also in other contexts, for new information units need not be marked by δέ, of course. Thus, at *La.* 187c6 διὰ ταῦτα occurs at the beginning of a stretch of indirect discourse, where it cannot cross, so to speak, the boundaries of the quotation and cannot, therefore, refer backward: ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἠρχόμην λέγων, ὅτι εἰς συμβουλήν διὰ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέσαμεν, ὅτι μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν

τὸν μῦθον παρεθέμεθα, ἵνα ἐνδείξαιτο ... μὴ μόνον ..., διὰ ταῦτα does double duty, i.e. it looks both backward and prepares for ἵνα, as in Diès' excellent translation ('Or, c'est pour cela même que nous avons introduit notre mythe: nous ne voulions pas seulement ...'). Other examples are *Hp.Ma.* 297b3 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ..., ὅτι, *Ti.* 69d6 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ..., ὅτι, *Plt.* 275b1, *R.* 341e4, *Ti.* 74b3.

534d1 ἵνα

Text. ἵνα T W Stob. : ἵνα μὴ S F S F's reading should be rejected, if only because below, at 534e2, this ἵνα-clause is rephrased in a different form as ἵνα μὴ διστάζωμεν, which points to ἵνα εἰδῶμεν rather than to ἵνα μὴ εἰδῶμεν. ἵνα μὴ may be due to dittography combined with inversion: ΙΝΑΗΜΕΙC → ΙΝΑΜΗΗΜΕΙC.

534d3 οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν For the value of μὴ see on 531b2.

534d7 παιῶνα This form, found only in W, seems to have been the correct Attic form. See Chantraine *DE* s.v. παιάν.

534d8 εὔρημά τι

Text. εὔρημά τι Ven. 186(ex -μό τι) E : εὔρήματι (sic) s f : εὔρήματι T W S F

Stephanus' emendation εὔρημά τι was anticipated by Bessarion in the two Plato MSS that were in his library and were corrected by him. See further the Introduction §4.6.

534e4 ἐρμηνῆς Here 'mouthpieces'. See on 530c3.

535a2 ἅπτει γάρ πῶς μου For the spelling of ἅπτει see the Introduction §5.1 (i), and for the accentuation of γάρ πῶς μου §5.2 (i).

535b1–e6

Socrates confronts Ion with the implications for himself of his admission that rhapsodes are the mouthpieces of the (possessed) poets. Is he

ἡγούμεθα, ὡς εἰκόσ, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων; likewise at *Phd.* 98c6, *Prt.* 346c1. At *Men.* 74c1 the new unit is introduced by οὐκοῦν, at *Smp.* 207c5 by ἀλλά.

ἔμψρων *when he is successfully performing, or outside himself? And what about the audience? Ion admits that both he himself and the audience are not ἔμψρων in such cases.*

535b1 Ἔχε δὴ· τόδε μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃς ...

Text. ἔχε δὴ· τόδε μοι scripsi : ἔχε δὴ μοι τόδε· εἰπέ W : ἔχε δὴ μοι τόδε· εἰπέ T : ἔχε δὴ· καὶ μοι τόδε εἰπέ SF(δὴ· καὶ ex δὴ· μοι καὶ, μοι sl et erasum) As far as I know all editors since Bekker have preferred the reading of T W.²⁶³ Before Bekker, Ἔχε δὴ καὶ μοι τόδε εἰπέ (*sic*, i.e. without a high dot after δὴ) was the generally accepted reading (Aldina [from Ven. 186?], Basle 1 and 2, Stephanus, who, however, put a comma after δὴ; see also the Introduction §4.6).

Commentators and translators follow in principle two ways in construing ἔχε δὴ μοι τόδε εἰπέ:

(i) ἔχε functions as a hortative particle meaning ‘Come on’, like φέρε at *Cra.* 385b Φέρε δὴ μοι τόδε εἰπέ. (See further below.) Thus, for instance, Méridier (‘Or cà’ (= ‘speak out’), dis-moi encore ...), Verdenius (‘welaan (lett. ‘houd stand’)’) and Battagazzore (‘Orbene, allora’). But this is a *pis-aller*, for ἔχε is not used elsewhere as a hortative particle.²⁶⁴

(ii) ἔχε is a normal imperative, = ‘Stop’ or ‘Hold on’. But what about εἰπέ? Since this is another 2nd person imperative, it should in principle be coordinated with εἰπέ. In that case, however, we would have the text of SF. Lamb was well aware of this, at least in his translation, for this runs: ‘Stop now and tell me’, although in his Greek text there is no καὶ. This will not do, of course; the same verdict applies to Miller’s note: ‘Hold on ... and ...’. Murray’s note: ‘Hold on, then’, is not much of a help either, for she does not explain how the remainder of the sentence should be construed. If we want to avoid inserting ‘and’, there is only one solution, viz. to follow Stock’s note, which runs: “‘hold then.’ A colloquialism common in Plato.’ He then refers to a number of other instances, and concludes with ‘It is generally disjoined from the rest of the sentence’. If the latter is true, we ought to punctuate after μοι, by a comma or by a high dot—in the latter case creating an asyndeton—because this is the only possible place, since

²⁶³ Which is, indeed, reported as one reading, in spite of the differences in punctuation, and reduced to: μοι T W : καὶ μοι F.

²⁶⁴ Hermann, ad Vigerum, *de idiotismis linguae graecae*, 753, already observed (the reference 252 to Vigerus’ text should be 254): ‘ἔχε δὴ non significat *agedum*’.

enclitic μοι cannot be separated from δή. This would give us: Ἔχε δὴ μοι, τόδε εἰπέ. Is ἔχε δὴ, in fact, ‘generally disjoined from the rest of the sentence’? And is Ἔχε δὴ μοι an acceptable reading? Here are all the examples (all spoken by Socrates, but in the *Laws* by the Athenian; the punctuation is that of Burnet); I have included three cases where ἔχε is modified by an adverb (αὐτοῦ, ἡρέμα), but that otherwise are similar:

- Cra.* 435e6 Ἔχε δὴ, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτ’ ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος οὗτος ...
- Cra.* 439a1 Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὠμολογήσαμεν ...;—Ναί.—Εἰ οὖν ... ποτέρα ἂν εἴη ...;
- Tht.* 186b2 Ἔχε δὴ· ἄλλο τι ... αἰσθήσεται ...;
- La.* 198b2 Ἔχε δὴ. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ἃ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς ἠγούμεθα, φράσομέν σοι (—) c2 ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακὰ φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σὺ δὲ ταύτη ἢ ἄλλη περὶ τούτων λέγεις;
- Prt.* 349e1 Ἔχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι;
- Grg.* 460a5 (to Gorgias) Ἔχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. εἴπερ ῥητορικὸν σὺ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη ...
- Grg.* 490b1 (to Callicles) Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὐτὸν νῦν λέγεις;
- Hp.Ma.* 296a8 Ἔχε δὴ ἡρέμα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε· ὡς φοβοῦμαι τί ποτ’ αὐτὸν λέγομεν. ΠΙ. Τί δ’ αὐτὸ φοβῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ νῦν γέ σοι ὁ λόγος παγκάλως προβέβηκε; ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ἀλλὰ μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι· ἄρ’ ἂν ...;
- Hp.Mi.* 366a2 Ἔχε δὴ· ἀναμνησθῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ὃ λέγεις. τοὺς ψευδεῖς φησὶ εἶναι ...;
- Ion* 535b1 Ἔχε δὴ μοι τόδε εἰπέ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅτι ἄν σε ἔρωμαι· ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς μάλιστα τοὺς θεομένων, ... τότε πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ...;
- R.* 353b4 Ἔχε δὴ· ἄρ’ ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκίαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν;
- Lg.* 627c3 Ἔχε δὴ. καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα πολλοὶ ἀδελφοί που γένοιτ’ ἂν ...;
- Lg.* 639d2 Ἔχε δὴ· τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνιῶν συμπότας καὶ συμπόσια θεῖμεν ἂν μίαν τινὰ συνουσίαν εἶναι;
- Lg.* 895d1 Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· ἄρ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;

There are, finally, two cases of ἔχε without δῆ, and one of ἔχε οὖν:

- Cra.* 399e4 εἰ δὲ βούλει—ἔχε ἡρέμα· δοκῶ γάρ μοί τι καθορᾶν
πιθανώτερον τούτου τοῖς ἀμφὶ Εὐθύφρονα. τούτου μὲν γάρ,
ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καταφρονήσαιεν ἂν καὶ ἡγήσαιντο φορτικὸν
εἶναι· τόδε δὲ σκόπει ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἀρέσῃ. EPM. Λέγε
μόνον.
- Alc.* 1 109b3 Ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν τί διαφέ-
ρει τὸ ᾧδε ἢ ᾧδε.
- Alc.* 1 129b5 Ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός. τῷ διαλέγῃ σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

We may conclude that ἔχε δῆ (ἔχε, ἔχε οὖν) is, indeed, ‘disjoined from the rest of the sentence’, since it is never followed by a connective particle (for the apparent exceptions *Cra.* 439a1 and *Lg.* 627c3 see below). To put it in positive terms: ἔχε δῆ is in all cases followed by asyndeton, and this is reflected in the traditional punctuation, with a colon (high dot) or a period after δῆ (and once, rather arbitrarily, a comma, at *Cra.* 435e6).

I further note that ἔχε δῆ always indicates that a question will follow. By asking the interlocutor to ‘hold his position’, the speaker gives himself and the interlocutor more room, so to speak, to focus on the question he is about to ask, than by just asking it. He apparently considers the question of special importance for the argument. A clear example of this effect is *Grg.* 460a5, where Dodds on ἔχε δῆ aptly observes: ‘The exclamation indicates that Socrates has now got what he wanted, the lever which will overturn Gorgias’ position’. The question announced by ἔχε δῆ may follow immediately: *Tht.* 186b2, *Grg.* 490b1, *R.* 353b4, *Lg.* 639d2 and 895d1, or it may be introduced by an exhortation to cooperative action: *Cra.* 435e6 ἴδωμεν, *La.* 192e1 Ἴδωμεν δῆ, *Hp.Mi.* 366a2 ἀναμνησθῶμεν, *Lg.* 627c3 καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα; also, in a slightly different form *Prt.* 349e1 ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι. πότερον ...;. Four times the question comes after more or less lengthy intervening remarks, which at the same time may serve to motivate the order/request ἔχε δῆ: *Cra.* 439a1 Ἔχε δῆ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὠμολογήσαμεν ...;—Ναί.—Εἰ οὖν ... ποτέρα ἂν εἴη ...;,²⁶⁵ *La.* 198b2 Ἔχε δῆ. ... γάρ ... ἐπισκεψώμεθα ... φράσομεν ..., the question eventually following at 198c2 σὺ δὲ ταύτη

²⁶⁵ Here δέ does not connect, of course, ἔχε with ὠμολογήσαμεν. It introduces a new Topic: ‘But what about the names, did we not ...?’ For a similar case see *Phdr.* 267c4 Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαυτ’ ἄττα;

ἢ ἄλλη περὶ τούτων λέγεις; *Grg.* 460a5 Ἔχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σὺ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη ..., ²⁶⁶ and, finally, *Hp.Ma.* 296a8 Ἔχε δὴ ἡρέμα ... ὡς φοβοῦμαι ΠΙ. Τί δ' αὖ φοβῆ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ...; ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ἀλλά μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι· ἄρ' ἄν ...;

As for the three cases without δὴ, *Alc.* 1 109b3 and 129b5 (ἔχε οὖν) are exactly like the cases of ἔχε δὴ discussed above; *Cra.* 399e4 is much like *Hp.Ma.* 296a8: the question comes at 400a3 σκόπει. ²⁶⁷

How does *Ion* 535b1 fit into this picture? I note first of all that the overall structure is the same as in several of the above examples: ἔχε δὴ is followed by an imperative, εἰπέ, which in turn is followed by a question: τότε πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ...; at 535b7. Yet the imperative εἰπέ is unlike the other imperatives, and it makes our passage crucially different, for it is a sign that Socrates' behaviour towards *Ion* is very rude. Whatever the text, εἰπέ is the only unadulterated imperative in the whole collection of passages. The nearest parallel is *Alc.* 1 109b3 πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, but this is, of course, much more polite than just εἰπέ. Moreover, at *Ion* 535b1 εἰπέ is followed by the perhaps even ruder prohibition μὴ ἀποκρύψης. ²⁶⁸ In the other instances of ἔχε (δὴ) there is mostly some mitigating device at work: a helpful 1st person plural subjunctive: ἴδωμεν, ἐπίσκεψώμεθα, ἀναμνησθῶμεν, a sympathetic imperative: ἀλλά μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι, a cautious potential optative: (ἴδωμεν) τίς ποτ' ἄν εἴη ...; ποτέρα ἄν εἴη ...; ἄρ' ἄν ...; γένοιτ' ἄν ...; θεῖμεν ἄν ...; ἄρ' οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλοις ...; a complimentary phrase: ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι, καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις, ὡς φοβοῦμαι. It is true that at *Tht.* 186b2, *Alc.* 1 129b5 and

²⁶⁶ At *Grg.* 460a5 the sentence is generally punctuated as a statement, but this is doubtful. Statement or not, it serves as an invitation to answer.

²⁶⁷ Burnet put a dash after εἶ δὲ βούλει, rightly, for Socrates interrupts himself. Εἶ δὲ βούλει is only continued at 400a2, with σκόπει. (If one wants to avoid the dash as a lectional sign, a high dot should be put after βούλει.) This was apparently not understood by the editors of the new *Plato OCT* vol. I, for they print a comma, which makes ἔχε ἡρέμα the main clause to εἶ δὲ βούλει, as also in Fowler's text. To be sure, Fowler translates: 'But—please keep still a moment', but this does not correspond to the Greek, since εἶ δὲ βούλει is not 'please' (which is rather εἶ δοκεῖ). Fowler's text can only mean 'If you wish, keep quiet', a rather nonsensical request, as Fowler must have realized, after all.

²⁶⁸ The latter, it is true, is also found at *Euthphr.* 11b2, again combined with εἰπέ (εἶ οὖν σοι φίλον, μὴ με ἀποκρύψῃ ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπέ ἐξ ἀρχῆς), but there it is mitigated by εἶ οὖν σοι φίλον, which makes all the difference.

Grg. 490b1 such devices are lacking. In the first two cases, however, ἔχε δὴ is directly followed by the question, which is a sign that Socrates, rather than giving orders, seeks the cooperation of his interlocutor, perhaps with a hint of impatience. As for *Grg.*, in a different way this may be as rude as *Ion*, for although a question follows, this is not a question to advance the investigation, but a comment clause on the interlocutor's behaviour, and a pretty cantankerous one at that ('Once more, what is your meaning this time?'—Lamb)..

From Socrates' way of addressing *Ion* it is clear that he in no way considers him a real interlocutor, with whom he is conducting a serious discussion. Finally, as for the function of ἔχε δὴ at precisely this point of the discussion, it may indicate, as in the instance from *Gorgias* mentioned above (460a5), that Socrates, after *Ion*'s answer Παντάπασί γε, 'has now got what he wanted, the lever which will overturn' *Ion*'s position, the lever being *Ion*'s admission that he is 'a mouthpiece of a mouthpiece' and that it may all be a matter of being possessed and of θεία μοῖρα (cp. 535a4).

Text. Note that the combination ἔχε δὴ μοι is not found elsewhere. *Μοι* could perhaps be defended as a *dativus commodi*, but in view of the highly formulaic character of ἔχε δὴ this is an unattractive solution. I believe, then, that ἔχε δὴ μοι is unsound. It must be due to contamination of ἔχε δὴ, on the one hand, and φέρε δὴ μοι, ἴθι δὴ μοι, on the other. The latter collocations are rather frequent, and are always followed by imperatives like εἰπέ, ἀπόκριναι, σκόπει, etc. See e.g. *Cra.* 385b Φέρε δὴ μοι τόδε εἰπέ (already mentioned above), *Euthd.* 302e6 Ἴθι δὴ μοι εὐθύς, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰπέ, *Euthd.* 293b7 Φέρε δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη, *Phdr.* 262d8 Ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν. See further *Prt.* 352a4, 352a8, *Grg.* 449d8, 495c3, *R.* 577c1. In such cases *μοι* must be construed, not with the hortative particle, but with the *verbum dicendi*; it owes its position to Wackernagel's law. More in general we may note that the combination δὴ μοι is frequently used in appeals to the interlocutor, especially at the opening of a new move in the argumentation: λέγε δὴ μοι (7 instances), πάλιν δὴ μοι λέγε (1), εἰπέ δὴ μοι (4), τόδε/ὧδε δὴ μοι ... εἰπέ (2), ἔτι δὴ μοι ... εἰπέ (1), θες δὴ μοι (1), ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ πᾶς (1). All this leads to the conclusion that ἔχε δὴ μοι τόδε εἰπέ should be rejected. Recall that ἔχε cannot be taken as a hortative particle like φέρε or ἴθι (but it may have been taken as such at some point in the transmission of the text).

Should we adopt, then, SF's Ἔχε δὴ· καί μοι τόδε εἰπέ, or the vulgate variant with δὴ καί? And if so, how should we construe? Actually, whether we take καί as a coordinator—with or without a colon after δὴ—or as an adverb—with a colon after δὴ—, both approaches should be rejected. Observe that among the above examples there is just one where ἔχε δὴ is followed by καί, viz. *Lg.* 627c3 Ἔχε δὴ· καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. In view of the fact that ἔχε δὴ is elsewhere *always* followed by asyndeton, Burnet's full stop, or the colon of e.g. Bury, after δὴ (Ἔχε δὴ· καὶ τόδε ...), are no doubt right. This means that they take καί adverbially; compare, indeed, Bury's translation: 'Stay a moment: here too is a case we must further consider'.²⁶⁹ There is, therefore, no parallel for the coordination ἔχε δὴ ... καὶ ... εἰπέ. Nor can we take καί in καί μοι τόδε at *Ion* 535b1 as = 'also', as in the example from the *Laws*, for καί can neither modify τόδε nor μοι. Καὶ ... τόδε is excluded because adverbial καί cannot be separated from its *régime* by clitics. Some instances of the, obligatory, word order καί + pronoun + clitic are: *Prt.* 352b2 καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ, *Tht.* 149d5 καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἦσθησαι, *Hipparch.* 227d7 καὶ τόδε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, *R.* 351c7 καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι. As for καί modifying μοι: adverbial καί cannot modify clitics. If καί is immediately followed by a pronoun, the latter is orthotonic, and in the case of the dative of ἐγώ the form is of course ἔμοί. Cp. *Lg.* 751d8 καὶ σοὶ τοῦτο νῦν ποιητέον καὶ ἔμοί. Moreover, 'me too', would be meaningless here.

All things considered I think we should read either ἔχε δὴ· τόδε μοι εἰπέ or ἔχε δὴ· καὶ τόδε μοι εἰπέ, with adverbial καί. In our MSS, μοι may have moved to the left under the influence of expressions like φέρε δὴ μοι, ἴθι δὴ μοι. Subsequently, in part of the tradition καί was added, possibly to bring ἔχε and εἰπέ in line. The text without καί seems slightly ruder and should therefore perhaps be preferred.

535c4 τοῦτο ... τὸ τεκμήριον 'How clear is this proof which you just mentioned to me.'²⁷⁰ What does 'this proof' refer to, and what is it proof of? It must refer specifically to the phrase τῶν περὶ Ἀνδρομάχην ἔλεινῶν τι ἢ περὶ Ἐκάβην ἢ περὶ Πρίαμον, since *Ion* seizes on ἔλεινῶν

²⁶⁹ For a similar adverbial καί see *Smp.* 199c6 ff. ἴθι οὖν μοι περὶ Ἐρωτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τᾶλλα καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς διήλθες οἴος ἐστι, καὶ τόδε εἰπέ.

²⁷⁰ Lamb translates: 'How vivid to me ...', connecting ἐναργές with μοι, but μοι should rather be connected with εἶπες. For the position of μοι cp. on ἔχε δὴ· τόδε μοι above.

to start his answer: ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλαινόν τι λέγω And his being full of pity when he speaks of pitiful things is clear proof that he is indeed, as suggested by Socrates in the second part of his question, with the things he describes.

Ion's soul is like the soul discussed, and dismissed, at *Phd.* 83c5: Ὅτι ψυχή παντός ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ δ' ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον.

535c5

οὐ ... ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρώ Ion complies with Socrates' order of 535b1. 'I will speak without holding (anything) back from you', lit. 'by not holding back anything', for this is an instance of the coincident use of the aorist participle: Ion's speaking consists of not hiding anything. For the coincident use of the aorist stem see above on 530c2 συνείη.

οὐ **γάρ** σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρώ. **ἐγὼ γάρ** ... For the function of the two γάρ's compare 532e4. The first γάρ clause explains why Ion said ὡς ἐναργές, the second presents the content of ἐρεῖν and explains what the τεκμήριον consists of. For an example that is quite similar to our passage see *Prt.* 319a10 Ἡ καλόν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρὸς γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἅπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ Some other examples are *Ap.* 32a8 ff. ἐρώ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ..., *Phd.* 96a6 Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ..., ..., *Prt.* 319b3 δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γάρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημί

Γάρ may also be thus used to introduce a narrative passage, as at *Tht.* 201d8 Ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὄνειρατος. ἐγὼ γάρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν A well-known instance of this use outside Plato is *Lys.* 1.6 ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ἐπιδείξω τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράγματα Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, ... οὕτω διεκέειμην This function of γάρ has recently been discussed in detail by Sicking and van Ophuijsen (1993: 20–21) and especially by de Jong (1997).

535d1

Τί οὖν; φῶμεν ... Since Ion has not really answered Socrates' question about his state of mind when he is performing, but has only

described what happens to him then, Socrates repeats the question in a different form.

ἔμφρονα εἶναι τότε τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃς ἂν ... This is apparently a combination of ἔμφρονα εἶναι τότε ἄνθρωπον ὅταν ... (or ἔμφρονα εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τότε ὅταν ...) and ἔμφρονα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃς ἂν As a result, both τότε and τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον point forward to ὃς ἂν ... κλάη.

Text. εἶναι τότε τοῦτον WF : εἶναι τοῦτον τότε T : τότε εἶναι τοῦτον S
All three collocations seem acceptable, and the difference may be due to a simple mechanical permutation. Yet τότε εἶναι τοῦτον of S, which yields ἔμφρονα τότε εἶναι, is less likely than the other two, for with this order the predicative constituent (ἔμφρονα) is separated from εἶναι by τότε, whereas usually such a constituent, being the Focus of the sentence or clause, (directly) precedes the form of εἶναι, as in *Ap.* 41d4 ἀλλά μοι δηλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ..., *Grg.* 485c5 ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον; this is especially frequent in the interrogative formula which is the model for this word order: τί(ς) ἐστι x, e.g. *Euthd.* 273d7 εἶπετόν μοι τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν, 292d4 λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν αὕτη. See also above 530c1–2 on ἀγαθὸς γίνεσθαι, etc. Ultimately, the effect described here is a consequence of εἶναι being a postpositive boundary marker, like enclitic ἐστί. For enclitics as boundary markers see on 531b6.

As for choosing between εἶναι τότε τοῦτον and εἶναι τοῦτον τότε, this is basically a heads or tails situation. Yet I have preferred the reading of WF, for when οὗτος is used cataphorically, announcing a relative clause which modifies a noun phrase, it seems to prefer a position immediately before ὁ + noun. See e.g. *Ap.* 40d3 εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ἧ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ..., *Cri.* 46c7 εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν ὃν σὺ λέγεις ..., 50b7 εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου ὃς ... προστάττει ..., *Phd.* 88a8 ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῇ τυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον, *Grg.* 500c6 πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, *Tht.* 170e9, *Prm.* 148e6, *Prt.* 319e2, etc. The word order of T, on the other hand, is preferred when οὗτος is used anaphorically, as in—with τότε, which refers back as well—*Plt.* 269a3 ὅθεν μὲν ἀνατέλλει νῦν εἰς τοῦτον τότε τὸν τόπον ἐδύετο, *Ti.* 24c4 ταύτην οὖν δὴ τότε σύμπασαν τὴν διακόσμησιν καὶ σύνταξιν; also with three anaphoric constituents: *Ti.* 68e1 Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τότε ταύτη πεφυκότα. With the word order τότε τοῦτον the emphasis is rather on τότε; at least this is

suggested by (again anaphoric) collocations like *Phdr.* 248c8 ὅταν ..., τότε νόμος ταύτην (sc. ψυχῆν), *R.* 566c3 ὅταν ..., τότε δὴ οὔτος, *Ti.* 43e6 ὅταν ..., τότε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει. This is perhaps less appropriate here, where a relative rather than a temporal clause follows.

535d2–3

ἔσθῆτι ποικίλῃ ... χρυσοῖσι στεφάνοις Why the difference in number? Perhaps the costume was the same at the various performances, while the rhapsodes wore different crowns on different occasions? Be that as it may, from this sentence we may infer, since crowns were only bestowed *after* a contest, that rhapsodes performed wearing a crown won on a previous occasion.

χρυσοῖσι For the form see the Introduction §1. I prefer this form, with e.g. Burnet, since it was more liable to be changed to χρυσοῖς than χρυσοῖσι to χρυσοῖσι.

535d3–4 τ(ε) ... ἦ For this ‘irregular corresponson’ see Denn. 514.

535d4–5 πλέον ἢ ἐν δισμυρίοις ἀνθρώποις As Stock observes, ‘the inversion of order seems to be due to a desire to keep the preposition next to the noun it governs’. As a parallel Stock mentions *Phd.* 110c2 καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων. Another parallel is *Cra.* 414c8 πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ εἰμι. Compare also X. *Oec.* 21.3 πλέον ἢ ἐν διπλασίῳ χρόνῳ, mentioned by Macgregor. This ‘inverted order’ seems to be more frequent in Plato than the ‘normal’ order, with the adverb placed in between preposition and noun. Of the latter I found only one instance, *Phdr.* 261e6 ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;, where there may be contrastive Focus at play (πολὺ ... ἢ ὀλίγον). I should add, finally, that another arrangement was possible, as in *Smp.* 175e6 ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρίοις. See also K-G 1, 522 ff.

535d5 ἐν δισμυρίοις ἀνθρώποις ἔστηκώς **φιλίοις**

Text. φιλίοις TW : φίλοις SF²⁷¹ Φίλοις is preferred by all modern editors, no doubt rightly. Φύλοις would express the idea that Ion had the amazing number of 20,000 friends. '(Philos) designates a party to a voluntary bond of affection and good will, and normally excludes both close kin and more distant acquaintances, whether neighbors or fellow-citizens' (Konstan 1997: 53). Φύλιος, apart from being used five times as an adjective with Zeus as = 'of the friendship', is used six times with the meaning 'well-disposed, friendly, supportive': here, at *Smp.* 221b4, *Mx.* 243c5, *R.* 414b3, in all three cases contrasted with πολέμιος (see also LSJ s.v. I), and finally at *Lg.* 865a5 and 876e6, in a legal context.

Intrigued by this passage, and by the words καθορώ ... ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος at 535e1–2, Boyd (1994) has asked himself the question where Ion, or rather rhapsodes in general, may have stood during their performances at the Panathenaic games. He arrives at the conclusion (113) that both the Odeion (which was situated at the SE slope of the Akropolis) and the Pnyx were suitable places. In my view perhaps rather the latter, since Ion says τοῦ βήματος, the platform *par excellence* being that of the Pnyx, the seat of the ἐκκλησία (cp. *Ar. V.* 31–32, *Th.* 8.97.1). See D. 22.68 βοῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος, and [Pl.] *Ax.* 369a2 ff. καίτοι γε σὺ μόνος αὐτοῖς ἤμυνες καὶ Εὐρυπτόλεμος, τρισμυρίων ἐκκλησιαζόντων.—ΑΞ. Ἔστιν ταῦτα, ὃ Σώκρατες· καὶ ἔγωγε ἐξ ἐκείνου ἄλλις ἔσχον τοῦ βήματος ...

535d5 μηδενὸς ἀποδύοντος μηδὲ ἀδικοῦντος The participles have conative meaning: 'although nobody tries to strip or wrong them'.

535d6–7 ὥς γε τάληθές εἰρήσθαι This is not 'to tell the truth', *vel sim.*, for ὥς + infinitive does not have purpose value, nor is εἰρήσθαι 'to tell', but 'if the truth be told' (Saunders), or, more exactly, 'in as much as the truth can be told', with limitative ὥς, in our case reinforced by γε, just as ὥς εἰπεῖν is 'so weit man das sagen kann', ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν 'wenn man das Wort gebrauchen darf'. For these expressions, whose semantics are often misunderstood, see K-G 2, 508.

²⁷¹ It is doubtful whether f has really corrected φίλοις into φιλίοις, as reported by e.g. Burnet.

Other Platonic examples of ὥς ... εἰρήσθαι are *Euthd.* 307a1 ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθῆ εἰρήσθαι, *Prt.* 339e3 ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσθαι τάληθῆ, *Grg.* 462b8.

With these words Ion cautiously qualifies his negative answer to Socrates' question whether rhapsodes like Ion are ἔμφρων when performing. No, he is not, but he cannot afford to be *entirely* outside himself, since he must keep his νοῦς (e4) on the audience, to see whether they are in tears and the box office is laughing.

535e4 ὥς Introducing an independent sentence (or clause): = 'for'.

535e4–5 εἰάν μὲν κλάοντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω

Text. καθίσω TW : κατίδω SF Again, both readings are acceptable.²⁷² With TW's καθίσω the meaning is 'if I have brought them in a state of crying', with perhaps a nuance of 'make to sit down'. For καθίζω 'to bring in a certain condition, situation' cp. K-G 2, 73, Goodwin (1889: §898). The combination of καθίζω + the participle of κλάειν seems to have been an idiomatic one, and is especially frequent in later Greek. For classical parallels see Eur. fr. 92.110 καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κλάοντα καθέσω σ' [ἐ]ν γεκ[ροῖς, X. *Smp.* 3.11.4 ... Καλλιπίδης ὁ ὑποκριτής, ὃς ὑπερσεμνύεται ὅτι δύναται πολλοὺς κλαίοντας καθίζειν, *Cyr.* 2.2.14 ... αὐτοῦ τοῦ κλαίοντας καθίζοντος τοὺς φίλους πολλαχοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐλάττονος ἄξια διαπράττεσθαι ὁ γέλωτα αὐτοῖς μηχανώμενος, ... πολίτας διὰ τοῦ κλαίοντας καθίζειν ἐς δικαιοσύνην προτρέπονται; also *Mem.* 2.1.12.

As for SF's κατίδω, although as such it gives an acceptable reading, it may ultimately be a mistake, due to a copyist who, with καθορῶ still in his mind, read καθίσω as κατίδω.

535e7–536d3

Application by Socrates of the image of the magnet to Ion himself, his audience and 'his' poet, Homer. Socrates repeats that Ion does not

²⁷² That F has κατίδω remained apparently unnoticed. Bekker (1823: 147) duly notes: κατίδω Σ (= modern S).

say what he says about Homer by skill or knowledge, but by *θεία μοῖρα*. End of the first part of the conversation.

535e8 ἔσχατος ὧν Just as in other cases of *attractio relativi* (cp., in the *Ion*, 532e1, 535c2) there should be no comma before ὧν, a common convention being that before restrictive relative clauses there is no comma. In fact, *attractio relativi* is confined to this type of relative clause. See Smyth §2524, Rijksbaron (2002: 91) and especially Rijksbaron (1981).

535e9–536a1 ὁ ῥαψωδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής See on 532d6.

536a2–3 ἀνθρώπων

Text. ἀνθρώπων TWS(᾿ά; ante ᾿άν- lacunam ex rasura praebet) : ἀπανθρώπων F

(For convenience' sake I repeat here the observations from p. 33.) Originally, the curious reading of F (not reported by Burnet or others) was apparently also at the basis of the reading of S. Note, however, that the *a* of ἀνθρώπων has first a coronis and then a spiritus lenis; so the reading must have been ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων. Both ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων and ἀπανθρώπων may be due to the influence of ἀπ' ἀλλήλων at 535e8–9. In S, ἀπ was subsequently or *inter scribendum* erased, but the coronis remained where it was. Incidentally, ἀπάνθρωπος 'inhuman, unsocial, misanthropic' does not occur in the genuine works of Plato, but only at *Ep.* I 309b7.

536a6 ἐξηρητημένων τῶν τῆς Μούσης ἐκκρεμαμένων δακτυλίων Ἐξηρητημένων governs τῶν ... δακτυλίων, ἐκκρεμαμένων governs τῆς Μούσης: 'suspended from the rings that hang down from the Muses' (Lamb).

536a8–b1

τὸ δέ For anaphoric τὸ δέ see K-G 1, 584 c. Note that τὸ δέ is a nominative and the subject of ἔστι. This use is not to be confounded with the adverbial use. In the latter no clear antecedent is present, nor can τὸ δέ be taken as a nominative, because it introduces a sentence which already has a subject: 'as a matter of fact, however'. An example is *Ap.* 23a5 οἷονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἂν ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.

536b1 τὸ δέ ἐστι **παραπλήσιον**. I.e., κατέχεσθαι comes close to ἐξηρητησθαι, for both are forms of ἔχεσθαι ‘to be held’.

536b4 ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ ἔχονται ‘they are possessed by him and depend on him.’

536b4–5 οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ ἔχονται, ὧν σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἷς εἶ· καὶ κατέχει ἐξ Ὀμήρου ... καὶ ἐπειδὴν ... Following MS T,²⁷³ I have changed the traditional punctuation of this sentence, which is: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ ἔχονται. ὧν σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἷς εἶ καὶ κατέχει ἐξ Ὀμήρου. To this punctuation it may be objected that by the full stop before ὧν the whole of the preceding sentence becomes the antecedent of the relative pronoun, wrongly, for Ion does not belong to those who are dependent on Orpheus or Musaeus, but exclusively to the Homerids. The new punctuation reflects this fact. Also, the sequence οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται ... ὧν σύ ... κατέχει ἐξ Ὀμήρου is rather awkward. With the new punctuation, the sentence καὶ κατέχει etc. is an application to Ion of the preceding general statement, and it explains why Socrates reckons him among οἱ πολλοί, hence the asyndeton; the καὶ before κατέχει corresponds to the καί before ἐπειδὴν. Καὶ κατέχει ἐξ Ὀμήρου is an instance of οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται, while the whole of καὶ ἐπειδὴν μὲν τις ... ἄδη, καθεύδεις ..., ἐπειδὴν δὲ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ φθέγγεται τις μέλος ἐγρήγορας ... exemplifies ἐξ Ὀμήρου ... ἔχονται: ‘you are both possessed by Homer and your behaviour makes it clear that without Homer you are helpless’ (to paraphrase the second part of the sentence).

536b5 ὦ Ἴων

Text. ὦ TWfmg : om. SF The omission of ὦ in S and F *ante corr.* may be due to haplography of the ω in between ὧν and Ἴων: ΩΝΣΥΩΙΩΝ → ΩΝΣΥΙΩΝ. On the other hand, it may of course also be due to dittography in TWf. Or, thirdly, it may have been added there by someone who wanted to bring this instance of Ἴων in line with the majority of the vocatives Ἴων in the dialogue (and indeed of

²⁷³ Which clearly has a low dot. W and F probably have a high dot, while S may have either a middle or a high dot. For the values and positions of these dots see the Introduction §5.3 (i).

the vocatives in all dialogues). Ultimately, however, the question is whether single Ἴων can be defended. Perhaps it can, but in the absence of a satisfactory semantic or pragmatic distinction between the uses with and without ὦ, I have with some hesitation adopted the reading of TW. The most recent treatment of this matter is that of Dickey (1996: 199–206), who is very sceptical of all the distinctions suggested in the grammars. She points out, for instance, that the fact that Demosthenes in the speech *On the crown* generally addresses his opponent as Αἰσχίνη, without ὦ, may not express contempt, as is argued e.g. by S-D 61, but may simply be due to Demosthenes' ambition to avoid hiatus.

536b5–6 ἐπειδὴν μὲν τις ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ ἔδη The genitive does not depend on μέλος at the end of the following line (thus e.g. Stock, Murray), which would create a very awkward hyperbaton, but directly on ἔδη. For ἔδειν + genitive 'sing something of/from' cp. Ar. *V.* 269 ἔδων Φρυγίχου; there is no need to assume there, with Macdowell, an ellipsis of μέλος. Cp. also *Nu.* 721 φρουρᾶς ἔδων with Dover's notes.

536b6–7 The omission of b6 ἔδη ... b7 ποιητοῦ in F is a nice example of a *saut du même au même*.

536c2 κατοκωχήι

Text. κατοκωχήι WSF(-χή) : κατοκωχήι T : κατακωχή SP^c Of these three forms that of T does not seem to be attested elsewhere. As for the other two, κατοκωχή must be considered the original form; see Chantraine, *DE* s.v. ἔχω 5. The spelling ἀνακωχή, κατακωχή 's'est répandue par oubli de la forme redoublée originelle'.

536c7–d3

τούτου δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὃ μ' ἐρωτᾷς, δι' ὅτι σὺ περὶ μὲν Ὀμήρου εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα Ὀμήρου δεινὸς εἶ ἐπαινέτης.

This sentence brings us back to Ion's words at 532b7 ff. (Τί οὖν ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ... ὅτι ἐγὼ ... περὶ Ὀμήρου ... εὐπορῶ ὅτι λέγω;), and to his last words, at 533c5–7, before Socrates' speech on the magnet and its application to poetry: ... περὶ Ὀμήρου κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων λέγω καὶ εὐπορῶ ..., περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ. καίτοι ὅρα τοῦτο τί ἔστιν. As for

the syntax, τούτου is the antecedent of the entire clause ὃ μ' ἐρωτᾷς, δι' ὅτι σὺ περὶ μὲν Ὅμηρου εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ, which repeats, or rather rephrases, for clarity's sake Ion's original problems of 532b7 ff. and 533c5–7. The genitive depends on τὸ αἴτιον, which is the subject of ἐστί. Finally, ὅτι οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα Ὅμηρου δεινὸς εἶ ἐπαινέτης is the predicative complement to τὸ αἴτιον. 'The cause of this phenomenon after which you are asking, why you speak fluently about Homer but not about the others, is that you are such a formidable eulogist of Homer not by any art but by divine dispensation'.

δεινὸς ... ἐπαινέτης Note that Socrates no longer uses the phrase δεινὸς περὶ Ὅμηρου but replaces this with δεινὸς ἐπαινέτης. In fact, since Socrates has established that Ion does not possess a skill, the phrase δεινὸς περὶ could no longer be used. This sentence concludes the first part of the conversation, which had started, at 531a1–2, with the question περὶ Ὅμηρου δεινὸς εἶ μόνον ...:.

536d4–e1

Transitional scene.

Ion attempts to convince Socrates that he is not possessed and outside himself when he is eulogizing Homer, and implicitly invites him to come listen to him. Just as at 530d6 ff., Ion's invitation to Socrates is countered by the latter with a request to settle first a preliminary point. This announces the second major part of the dialogue, which starts at 536e1.

536d4 Σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις ... θαυμάζοιμι μεντᾶν ... For εὖ λέγεις ('Well spoken') see above at 530b2. For μὲν followed by μέντοι compare e.g. *Ap.* 20d5 καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν· εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ, *Cra.* 402a1 Γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχον, *Tht.* 146d6 Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω, *Euthd.* 286d1 Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι ἔστιν;, Denniston 404.

For the value of **μέντοι**, which is used here within a sentence and has connective force (for its use in answers see on 531d10), see Slings (1997: 114): 'Within the clause μέντοι is entirely different from ἀλλά. Unlike ἀλλά, μέντοι is not used for replacing false statements with

true ones ...: in A μέντοι B both A and B are true statements Normally, B is a denial of an expectation raised by A ...; what matters most is the imbalance between them: the speaker attaches more value to B than to A'. Thus, in our case the μέντοι clause counters an expectation which may have been raised in Socrates by Ion's affirmative statement Σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις.

I should add that μέντοι not only differs from ἀλλά but also from δέ (not discussed by Slings). While ἀλλά replaces A with B, and μέντοι attaches more value to B than to A, δέ 'balances two opposed ideas' (Denn. 165); they are equally true, so to speak.

Text. σὺ μὲν εὖ T W : εὖ μὲν S F (σὺ add. Fmg) Again, both readings are possible. Of modern editors, only Stallbaum preferred εὖ μὲν. Note that F has essentially the same text as S, for although σὺ is present in the margin, it is not clear what its position would be in the body of the text.

To T W's σὺ μὲν εὖ it might be objected that this creates a false contrast, since there is no contrastive pronoun or noun in the next clause. This situation, however, is found elsewhere too; cp. *Chrm.* 165b5 Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρῃ πρὸς με, καὶ ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσότης σοι· τὸ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ γὰρ ..., *Hr.Ma.* 295b1 σὺ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ῥαδίως αὐτὸ εὐρήσεις, ἐπειδὴν μόνος γένῃ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν ἐμοῦ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἔξευρε, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐμοὶ συζητεῖ, *R.* 531b2 Σὺ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας· ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἢ εἰκὼν γίγνηται ..., παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνοσ. Likewise, in our passage it is the whole of σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις, rather than just σύ, which is opposed to θαυμάζοιμι μεντᾶν etc.; there is perhaps also a weak contrast between σύ and ἐγώ in the second part of the sentence. There are no other instances of σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις.

As for the reading εὖ μὲν λέγεις, this creates a straightforward contrast with the θαυμάζοιμι μεντᾶν clause. There are two parallel passages: *Phlb.* 24e3 Ἄλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν. νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει ..., *La.* 190e7 Εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ αἴτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπὼν, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο δὲ διανοοῦμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλ' ἕτερον; cp. also *Prt.* 347a6 Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὖ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἕσματος διεληλυθέναι ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπίδειξω, ἂν βούλησθε.

All in all I prefer the more elaborate, and more emphatic, $\sigma\delta\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \epsilon\iota$ of T W.

Palaeographically, the text of S F, if not an original variant, may ultimately go back to uncial $\Sigma\Upsilon\text{ΜΕΝΕΥ}$, which may have been read and copied as $\epsilon\Upsilon\text{ΜΕΝΕΥ}$, followed by the deletion of the second $\epsilon\Upsilon$.

536d4–5 $\epsilon\iota\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$

Text. $\epsilon\iota\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$ F : $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota$ T W S The word order of F is probably the correct one. With the word order $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota$, $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$ would be used proleptically, and therefore emphatically, having focus, but such a use of $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega(\varsigma)$ seems not to exist. The closest parallel I could find is *Prm.* 138b7 $\text{Ὅρα δὴ, } \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\iota\ \omicron\iota\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota\ \eta\ \kappa\iota\nu\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, where semantically $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$ ‘belongs to’ the $\epsilon\iota$ -clause; but here (a) $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$ does not stand on its own, and (b) $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$ refers back, which may have facilitated its displacement to the left of the $\epsilon\iota$ -clause.²⁷⁴ The transposition of $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$ in T W S may be due to influence from developments in later Greek, where the combination $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota$, in various uses, is quite frequent. See e.g. *Alex.Aphrod. in Metaph.* 226, 32 $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$, and *passim*, and likewise in the other *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Athanasius, Joannes Chrysostomus, Galen, Libanius, etc.

536d6 $\omicron\iota\mu\alpha\iota$ This $\omicron\iota\mu\alpha\iota$ is analysed by K-G (2, 351, 1.a) as a comment clause followed by an object clause without $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ or $\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. One may compare English object clauses without *that*, as indeed in Saunders’ translation of our passage: ‘And I reckon *you* wouldn’t think so either’. Alternatively, it could be taken as semi-parenthetical. For fully parenthetical $\omicron\iota\mu\alpha\iota$ see below, 540b2.

536d7 $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\iota$

Text. $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\iota$ (-ος τί) S F²⁷⁵ : $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ T W $\Lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\iota$ has two main uses, (i) a neutral, unmarked one, = ‘say something’, as in *Euthphr.* 3c1 $\acute{\omicron}\tau\alpha\nu\ \tau\iota\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \theta\epsilon\iota\acute{\omega}\nu$, *Phd.* 107a3

²⁷⁴ Theoretically, with the text of T W S $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$ might also be taken as introductory of $\epsilon\iota$, a construction that has some parallels (not, however, with $\epsilon\iota$ following directly after $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$). Cp. e.g. *Chrm.* 162d4, *Men.* 75c1 $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\iota\pi\omicron\iota\varsigma$.

²⁷⁵ For the accent on τί see the Introduction §5.2 (i), and n. 277.

Οὐκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν ... ἄλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Συμμίας ὄδε ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγήσαι, *Smp.* 212c5 τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, etc., and (ii)—more frequently—a marked, pregnant, one, = ‘say something valuable, important’, e.g. in *Phd.* 63a5 νῦν γε²⁷⁶ δοκεῖ τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβητος, *Phd.* 87b3 πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω, *Sph.* 248c10 Οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι, *La.* 195c3–4 ΣΩ. Τί δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; ἔοικεν μέντοι λέγειν τι.—NI. Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε, *La.* 199e2 Λέγειν τί ὦ Σώκρατες μοι δοκεῖς, etc., also in opposition to οὐδέν, as in *Tht.* 193a3 λέγω τί ἢ οὐδέν;, etc.²⁷⁷ In the latter use λέγειν τι typically qualifies a statement that is part of the argument, either something that is going to be said (e.g. at *Phd.* 87b2) or something that has already been said (the other examples quoted above at (ii)), a feature that is absent from the former use.

With the reading of SF we are dealing with the former use, which is perfectly acceptable: ‘if you heard me say something about Homer’. On the other hand, this might perhaps be considered too restricted, too modest, so to speak, when compared with the reading without τι of TW. Compare also Ion’s words above at 531c8–9 καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου.

The decisive argument comes perhaps from syntax. The point is that in the construction of the aorist of ἀκούω + the participle of λέγω, in all other instances an object or another restrictive (‘binding’) con-

²⁷⁶ The new OCT has γέ, apparently a remnant of an earlier version with μοι following γε.

²⁷⁷ I have printed τι as I found it in the various OCT volumes. Observe that both Burnet (*La.* 199e2) and Duke et al. (*Tht.* 193a3) sometimes print τί, for no obvious reason. According to Kühner-Blass I, 346: ‘Wenn ... τίς, τί bedeutet “ein Tüchtiger”, “etwas Bedeutendes”, ... so wird es nicht betont’. Likewise, but more explicitly K-G I, 664 Anm. 1: ‘Sicherlich ist für den Griechen in den genannten Wendungen (viz. τι εἶναι, τι λέγειν) das Indefinitum ebensowenig betont wie für den Deutschen das entsprechende e t w a s in Fällen wie: er bildet sich ein etwas zu s e i n, während er doch ein N u l l ist. ... Daher hat die Schreibung τί εἶναι, τί λέγειν keine Berechtigung.’ Yet, having investigated a number of MSS, Noret (1987) concludes that the accent on enclitics was frequently used to convey emphasis, and this might explain, *pace* K-G, its presence on τί in SF. In medieval Greek the accent was of course a stress-accent. On the other hand, if the accent on τί was an automatism (cp. the Introduction §5.2 (i), with n. 144), this explanation fails. See also n. 294. As for the role of stress, both sentence stress and word-stress, with respect to the melodic accent in classical Greek, see the discussion in Allen (1987: 131 ff.: ‘The question of stress in classical Greek’). With all that it is not clear how we should accent in our passage. Pending further research I have decided to print the traditional τι.

stituent is present; cf. for this phenomenon also above, on 533c2–3 συμβαλέσθαι, and Appendix III on ἀκροᾶσθαι vs. ἀκροάσασθαι. See *Tht.* 148e4 οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πείσαι ἑμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω οὐτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύη, *Smp.* 217e2 τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἂν μου ἠκούσατε λέγοντος, εἰ μὴ ..., ²⁷⁸ *Phdr.* 241d2 οὐκέτ' ἂν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσῃς ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἤδη σοι τέλος ἐχέτω ὁ λόγος, *Chrm.* 161b5 ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην—ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος—ὅτι ..., *Chrm.* 162b1 ἢ τινος ἠλιθίου ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος ..., *Ly.* 115c4 Ἦδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμνήσκομαι, ὅτι ..., *Prt.* 342a3 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, *Hp.Ma.* 304e5 ἐπειδὴν οὖν εἰσέλθω οἴκαδε εἰς ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ μου ἀκούσῃ ταῦτα λέγοντος, *Lg.* 719b4–5 ἄρα οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν σου λέγοντος ὡς ... (all examples). Since with the reading of T W *Ion* 536d7 would be the only passage where such a restrictive constituent would be lacking, I prefer the reading of S F.²⁷⁹

536d8

Καὶ μὴν ἐθέλω γε ἀκοῦσαι, ... For καὶ μὴν ... γε see on 530b5. Here: 'and in this connection' (καί) I can assure you (μὴν) that ... I am really (γε) willing ...'.

μέντοι For its value see on d4 above. Here, by using μέντοι Socrates is countering the expectation which he may have raised in *Ion* by his emphatic statement that he is willing to listen to what *Ion* has to tell about Homer.

²⁷⁸ Τὸ ἐντεῦθεν = τὸ ἐντεῦθεν τοῦ λόγου; cp., in the preceding sentence, μέχρι μὲν οὖν δὴ δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς ὄντινον λέγειν (sc. τὸν λόγον). It is probably an *accusativus respectus*: 'as for the sequel of my tale'. Likewise for τὸ πέρα in the next example.

²⁷⁹ In this construction, the aorist expresses a momentaneous action that occurs while the action of the participle goes on, just as in εἶδον αὐτὸν τρέχοντα, etc. When the matrix verb is in the present stem, on the other hand, the action of that verb and the participle are co-extensive, as in *Euthphr.* 9b9 εἰάνπερ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.—Note that I do not consider περὶ Ὀμήρου at *Ion* 536d7 an object-like 'restrictive' constituent. In fact, λέγειν περὶ = 'speak about in a general, non-specified way'.

536e1–540b2*Part II of the conversation.*

The theme now is: does Ion speak equally well about all subjects, and especially the τέχνη, mentioned by Homer in the epics? Socrates makes Ion admit that judgements about chariot driving, medical and other specialized matters mentioned by Homer are better left to the respective specialists. What, then, is the specific expertise of the rhapsode?

536e1–2 περὶ τίνος εὖ λέγεις;

Text. λέγεις Cornarius *Ecl.* 89 : λέγει TWSF Cornarius' λέγεις has been generally adopted in later editions and gives, in fact, the sense required, for we need a reference to Ion here, since the upcoming discussion, or rather interrogation, will be about the need for Ion rather than Homer to be knowledgeable about a subject if he wants to speak well about that subject. To speak well about Homer, Ion must be able to judge εἴτε ὀρθῶς (or καλῶς) λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή; cp. 537c1. Λέγεις is confirmed, I think, by Socrates' λέγεις at 542a5, where he, in drawing the balance of the preceding discussion, gives Ion the opportunity to agree or disagree with his conclusion εἰ δὲ μὴ τεχνικὸς εἶ, ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὀμήρου μηδὲν εἰδῶς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖς.

536e3 Εὖ ἴσθι Used absolutely, a strongly asseverative answer formula. It may characterize Ion as sophist-like, since εὖ ἴσθι 'is uttered by sophists in answer to a question in *Euthd.* 274a and *Hippias Major* 287c ... and Plato evidently regards it as characteristic of them' (Dover on *Smp.* 208c1).

537a1

καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν namely besides the subjects mentioned by Socrates at 531c3 ff.

Οὐ ... μέντοι ...; For the value of μέντοι in an answer(-question) see on 531d10; cp. also Denn. 403 on these '[q]uestions of *nonne* form (common in Plato)'. Some other examples are *Phdr.* 261c5 ... οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι;, 267c4–5 Πρωταγόρεια δέ ... οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαύτ' ἄττα;, *Chrm.* 159c1 οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἢ

σωφροσύνη ἐστίν;. By using μέντοι, the speaker reinforces the truth value of the assertion implied by his question.

537a1 πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος

Text. πολλαχοῦ ὅμηρος T W : ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ S F Generally speaking, in collocations of the type πολλ- καὶ πολλ-, the two forms of πολλ- appear as closely as possible to each other; see e.g. *Sph.* 251b3 αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν, *Phlb.* 41a7 τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλακίς ἐνούσας, *Lg.* 639d8 ἐγὼ δὲ ἐντετύχηκά τε πολλαῖς καὶ πολλαχοῦ, and this situation would point to the reading of S F being the correct one.²⁸⁰ Yet I prefer T W's πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος, because the separation of πολλαχοῦ from πολλά by Ὅμηρος gives a certain prominence to πολλαχοῦ. This seems appropriate, since Socrates will, in fact, mention many places where Homer speaks about τέχνη. For this light hyperbaton, too, there are parallels; cp. *Men.* 85c10 εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλακίς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῆ, *Criti.* 121a9 πολλῶ τῷ θνητῷ καὶ πολλακίς ἀνακεραυνυμένη.²⁸¹ See also the discussion of διανοίαις πολλαῖς καὶ παντοδαπαῖς as against πολλαῖς διανοίαις καὶ παντοδαπαῖς at *Isoc.* 3.16 in Worp & Rijksbaron (1997: 256–257).

The knowledge Homer himself supposedly has of the τέχνη is scrutinized at *R.* 598d7 ff. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδὴ τινων ἀκούομεν ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα.

537a8 ff. For the textual problems connected with this and the following Homeric quotations see the Introduction §4.3.

537c1 Ἀρκεῖ. ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Ἴων, τὰ ἔπη

Text. ταῦτα δὴ T W : δὴ ταῦτα S F T W's text should be preferred. Ἀρκεῖ is a comment clause, as at *Euthd.* 293b8 Ἀρκεῖ, ἔφη, while

²⁸⁰ See further *Plt.* 306e4, *Men.* 84b11, *R.* 423b1, 538d8, 561e5, *Lg.* 639d8, 931e9; *R.* 439c4 Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλακίς is *sui generis*, because there are no competing constituents.

²⁸¹ Also *Phd.* 91d4, and probably *Euthd.* 286c1 πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλακίς, and *Ti.* 21b4 πολλῶν μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέχθη ποιητῶν ποιήματα (a rather heavy hyperbaton), where the intervening elements are particles.

ταῦτα δὴ establishes a connection with what precedes. There are many parallels for a form of οὗτος being followed by δὴ at the opening of an answer; see e.g. *Cra.* 392e2 διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν (after a quotation from Homer), *Tht.* 157c5 ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἠδέα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, *Tht.* 185b7 Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῆς, etc. There are no parallels for ἀρκεῖ δὴ in such a comment clause. The position of δὴ in SF may be due to perseveration of the δὴ in Εἰπέ δὴ at 537a5.

537c1–2 εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή Ὅρθῶς is probably not just a variant of εὖ and καλῶς, but = ‘correctly’, i.e. ‘in conformity with reality’, at least if we are justified in adducing *Lg.* 668b1 to explain its meaning. There we read: Καὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῖς τὴν καλλίστην ᾧδὴν τε ζητοῦσι καὶ μοῦσαν ζητητέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐχ ἥτις ἠδέα ἄλλ' ἥτις ὀρθή· μιμήσεως γὰρ ἦν, ὡς φαμεν, ὀρθότης, εἰ τὸ μιμηθὲν ὄσον τε καὶ οἶον ἦν ἀποτελοῖτο. Ὅρθότης has precedence over other qualities, as appears from the sequel to the passage just quoted: 668d1 Ὁ δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς μὴ γινώσκων ἄρ' ἂν ποτε τό γε εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς δυνατὸς εἶη διαγνώσκειν. See further on 532b5.

537c3–4 τέχνην ταύτην lit. ‘he has that as his art’. Ταύτην is the object of ἔχει and τέχνην a predicative noun. The form of the object is ταύτην rather than τοῦτο because it is adapted to the form of the predicative noun. Cp. K-G 1, 74.

537c6 οἶα τε

Text. οἶα τε T : οἶά τε W : ὁ ἔσπε S(ὁ ἐ-)F The strange text of SF must go back to a misreading of uncial ΟΙΔΙΤΕ (with ε for ΔΙ?), or to ΟΙΔΤΕ, but the details are irrecoverable.

537d1 κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ‘with respect to ...’, also below 538a1–2 εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, but earlier περὶ τεχνῶν λέγει (537a1) and ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεως ἔσται περὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν (532d1–2). While the idea behind περί is ‘from all sides’ (K-G 1, 488), κατὰ rather suggests that Socrates will ‘go through’ the arts. For this use of κατὰ + genitive cp. S-D 479. Other instances are *Phd.* 70d7–8 Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων ... σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο ... ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, *Sph.* 253b5 Καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν τοιαῦτα εὐρήσομεν ἕτερα, *Chrm.*

169a5 κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαιρήσεται, *Hr. Mi.* 368a8 ἀνέδην οὕτως ἐπίσκειναι κατὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, εἰ ...

537d1–538a5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃ τῇ **ἐτέρᾳ** τέχνῃ γινώσκουμεν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα **τῇ ἐτέρᾳ**; τόδε δέ μοι πρότερον τούτου ἀπόκριναι· τὴν μὲν, **ἐτέραν** φῆς εἶναι τινα τέχνην, τὴν δὲ, **ἐτέραν**;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὡσπερ ἐγὼ τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅταν ἡ μὲν, **ἐτέρων** πραγμάτων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δὲ, **ἐτέρων**, οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν, **ἄλλην**, τὴν δὲ, **ἄλλην** τέχνην, οὕτω καὶ σύ;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εἰ γάρ που τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις, τί ἂν τὴν μὲν **ἐτέραν** φαίμεν εἶναι, τὴν δ' **ἐτέραν**, ὅποτε γε ταῦτά εἴη εἰδέναι ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων; ὡσπερ ἐγὼ τε γινώσκω ὅτι πέντε εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ δάκτυλοι, καὶ σύ, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ, περὶ τούτων ταῦτα γινώσκεις· καὶ εἴ σε ἐγὼ ἐροίμην εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ γινώσκουμεν τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἢ **ἄλλῃ**, φαίης ἂν δήπου τῇ αὐτῇ.—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ὁ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔμελλον ἐρήσεσθαί σε, νυνὶ εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτω σοὶ δοκεῖ, τῇ μὲν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γινώσκειν, **τῇ δ' ἐτέρᾳ** μὴ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ **ἄλλη** ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ **ἕτερα** γινώσκειν.

This rather perplexing collection of instances of ἕτερος and ἄλλος is universally ignored in the commentaries. I will therefore, on the basis of what I believe is a representative number of examples, try to shed some light on the uses of ἕτερος and ἄλλος here and elsewhere in Plato. I will focus on the singular, since this is the dominant form in the passage from *Ion*.

While both ἕτερος and ἄλλος express 'otherness', they in principle have distinct uses. ἕτερος typically occurs in pairs, often natural pairs, referring to the one or the other entity of a class of two, generally accompanied by the article: ἡ ἐτέρα χεῖρ, ὁ ἕτερος ὀφθαλμός, τὸ ἕτερον σκέλος, etc.²⁸² Ἄλλος, on the other hand, refers to any other entity out of all entities of some class; thus, ἄλλη χεῖρ = 'another

²⁸² Cp. the value of the suffix -τερος in πότερος, ἐκάτερος and δεύτερος. More in general one may compare the suffix -τερο-, 'ein Suffix für Kontrastbegriffe' (Schwyzer 1953: 533), 'suffixe différentiel' (Chantraine *DE* s.v.), which is also found e.g. in the comparative. In fact, ἕτερος, too, basically involves a comparison between two entities of the same class. See also n. 288.

hand/arm (= belonging to somebody else)', e.g. S. *OT* 1023, E. *Med.* 1239.

Outside natural pairs, and mostly without the article, ἕτερος often involves a contrast between any two individual members of a class, or between two classes, in which case it is frequently accompanied by a *genitivus comparationis* or, more seldom, a construction with ἤ.²⁸³ Examples from Plato are e.g. (between two individual members:) *Euthphr.* 8b5 καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ (for ἄλλος see below), *Tht.* 184c3 τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἠγγεῖται εἰδέναι (with the (generic) article), *Phd.* 102e3 ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν (contrast with itself); (between two classes:) *Phd.* 103d2 Ἄλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν;, *Sph.* 257d11–12 ὁ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως. But ἕτερος may also involve, again with a *genitivus comparationis*, a contrast between one single member and the other members of the class collectively, the latter often referred to by the plural ἄλλοι: *Chrm.* 171a8 Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἑτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ὠρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη, *R.* 346a2 οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν;, *R.* 438d1 ff. οὐκ ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι;—Τί μήν;—Ἄρ' οὐ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἷα ἑτέρα οὐδεμία τῶν ἄλλων (*genitivus partitivus*, dependent on οὐδεμία);. The latter example clearly shows that there is a fundamental semantic difference behind the various uses of ἕτερος and ἄλλος: while ἕτερος highlights *difference* (i.e., although οἰκοδομική shares with other ἐπιστήμαι the property of being an ἐπιστήμη, it is considered here as different from the other ones; cp. διήνεγκε),²⁸⁴ ἄλλος rather highlights *similarity* (τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν = the class of all entities which, although they are different from each other, share the property of being an ἐπιστήμη). Ἄλλος and ἕτερος may therefore also apply simultaneously, as at *Sph.* 239d7 τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἶδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ

²⁸³ Ultimately, the *genitivus comparationis* may be considered an *ablatival genitive*. See K-G 1, 401, 3, and below, n. 288. Compare *different from*, Dutch *verschil-lend van*, etc.

²⁸⁴ Cp. Arist. *Top.* 143b8 πᾶσα γὰρ εἰδοποιὸς διαφορὰ μετὰ τοῦ γένους εἶδος ποιεῖ, and the later *differentia specifica*.

τὰλλα ὅσα πού τοιαῦτ' ἔσθ' ἕτερα ('the other things which are of that nature while being different (from each other)').

In 'specialized' dialectical or ontological discussions (τὸ) ἕτερον is often opposed to τὸ αὐτό, e.g. at *Tht.* 159b1 Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄψοῦν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῆ ἕτερον, *Prm.* 148a7 τὸ ἕτερον is ἐναντίον τῷ ταῦτῳ.²⁸⁵ And in another passage in the *Parmenides* (164b8) it is argued that to be ἄλλος a thing has to be ἕτερος: Εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερα ἔστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον;²⁸⁶

As for ἄλλος, in the singular this is predominantly used without the article as a pronominal adjective with τις or οὐδεῖς, or, more rarely, as an independent pronoun. Often a *genitivus partitivus* is present. It may also occur with a comparative construction, but only with ἢ,²⁸⁷ predominantly in stereotyped phrases like τίς ἄλλος ἢ, οὐδεῖς ἄλλος ἢ, etc.²⁸⁸ Typical examples are *Euthphr.* 8b5 καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν,

²⁸⁵ Cp. Arist. *APr* 97a11 οὐ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταῦτόν εἶναι τοῦτω, οὐ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου, *Metaph.* 1058a8 λέγω γὰρ γένους διαφορὰν ἑτερότητα ἢ ἕτερον ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτό.

²⁸⁶ In this difficult passage on 'One' and 'Others' ἄλλος and ἕτερος play an important role, but a full treatment would fall outside the scope of the present discussion. I confine myself to observing that at 164c1–2 ἕτερος, with a comparative genitive, = 'different from', while ἄλλος = 'other of', with a partitive genitive; see also below and the next n. As for the sentence quoted in the text, Fowler, in the Loeb edition, wrongly translates ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον as 'Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?' Translate rather, with R.E. Allen (1983): 'Or don't you call the same things other and different?', i.e. one and the same object can be both 'different' and 'other', e.g. οἰκοδομική, discussed above. Cp. ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ at *Cra.* 434c7 Οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μὲν φάμεν "σκληρότης", Ἐρετριῆς δὲ "σκληροτήρ";, and *Sph.* 244c1.

²⁸⁷ LSJ mention just one instance of ἄλλος + *genitivus comparationis*, viz. *X. Mem.* 4.4.25 τὰ δίκαια ... ἢ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων. Perhaps ἢ was exceptionally avoided here because of the preceding ἢ?

²⁸⁸ There is an important conceptual difference between the two comparative constructions. That with the genitive rests upon a *comparison* between two objects, starting from the one in the genitive, which is the norm: 'la construction avec cas ... sert à évaluer la qualité variable d'un objet par référence à un autre objet pris comme norme immuable' (Benveniste 1975: 135; emphasis original; compare also S-D 98 and n. 283 above). The construction with ἢ, on the other hand, rests upon a *choice*: 'le domaine propre de ce type de comparaison est celui du choix entre deux objets C'est donc une alternative, signalée par une véritable disjonction' (Benveniste 1975: 137; emphasis original). It may therefore be no coincidence that ἄλλος is (almost) exclusively construed with disjunctive ἢ. If ἄλλος singles out some entity, to the exclusion of other entities, it involves, in fact, a choice.

Phd. 78c4 τούτω μόνω προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ;, *Phd.* 99b3 ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, *Grg.* 458a6–7 μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι, *Phd.* 72e5 ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα. With the article—a rather rare construction, at least in the singular—ἄλλος expresses a partitive relationship of the noun with respect to itself, so to speak, e.g. at *Euthphr.* 16a3 τὸν ἄλλον βίον ‘the rest of my life’.²⁸⁹

While there are, then, in principle important differences between ἕτερος and ἄλλος, in many contexts, especially those of a non-specialized character, these differences are blurred. More specifically, ἄλλος encroaches upon the uses of ἕτερος, notably when non-articular pairs and series are involved. Here follow some illustrative examples: *Plt.* 262a3 καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἕτερα τις εἶναι, τῶν δ’ αὖ θηρίων ἄλλη τροφή,²⁹⁰ *Smp.* 196e6 ἃ γὰρ τις ἢ μὴ ἔχει ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, οὔτ’ ἂν ἐτέρῳ δοίη οὔτ’ ἂν ἄλλον διδάξειεν, *Alc.* 1 116e9 Οἶει ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῶ ἢ σε δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἢ τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτά;, *Clit.* 409c2 Οὗτος μὲν, ὡς οἶμαι, τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ δέον, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, ὁ δὲ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν,²⁹¹ *R.* 342a6 καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστη τέχνη ἄλλης τέχνης ἥτις αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέπεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπούμενῃ ἕτερας αὖ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀπέραντον;, *R.* 439b10 ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθοῦσα χεῖρ, ἕτερα δὲ ἢ προσαγομένη, *Lg.* 872a1 ἐὰν δὲ ..., βουλευσῆ δὲ θανάτον τις ἄλλος ἐτέρῳ. Also in the plural: *Cra.* 394c3 καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐστὶν ἃ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει· καὶ ἄλλα γε αὖ στρατηγόν, οἶον “Ἄγις” καὶ “Πολέμαρχος” καὶ “Εὐπόλεμος”. καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, “Ἰατροκλῆς” καὶ “Ἀκεσίμβροτος”· καὶ ἕτερα ἂν ἴσως συχὰ ..., *Chrm.* 157e6 ὑπ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν, *Plt.* 288d4 πολλῶν ἑτέρων τεχνῶν, *Phdr.* 239b1 πολλῶν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν, etc. In these cases ἕτερος and ἄλλος seem to be used in free variation, presumably to vary the phrasing.

²⁸⁹ Compare the clearly partitive use of ἄλλος in *Cra.* 422e5 ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι ‘the rest of’ = ‘all remaining parts of the body’.

²⁹⁰ Outside Plato compare e.g. *Hdt.* 1.32.8 χώρα οὐδεμία καταρκέει πάντα ἐωυτῇ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπιδέεται.

²⁹¹ Compare *Hdt.* 5.68.1 Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ Ἀρχέλαοι ἐκαλέοντο, ἕτεροι δὲ ὕαται, ἄλλοι δὲ ὄνεᾶται, ἕτεροι δὲ χοιρεᾶται, 1.181.3, 7.23.1.

Now to return to our passage from the *Ion*, the uses of ἕτερος and ἄλλος can be explained as follows. The central adjective in this passage no doubt is ἕτερος, of which there are ten instances, as against four instances of ἄλλος. With and without the article, ἕτερος predominantly appears in pairs (cp. above), opposing one τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη to a different τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη; see d1–2, d3–4, d5–6, e2–3 (eight instances). The article is found twice (536d1–2), in the pair τῆ ἑτέρα ... τῆ ἑτέρα; the articles refer back to κυβερνητικῆ ... ἰατρικῆ at c6–7 and ἰατρικῆ ... τεκτονικῆ at c8, respectively. When Socrates, with the words τόδε δέ μοι πρότερον τούτου ἀπόκριναι at d2–3, passes on to τέχνη in general, the articles are absent, ἑτέραν ... ἑτέραν being used predicatively. Note that at e4 the pairness of ἕτερος is lexically reinforced by the phrase ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων. The remaining two instances, one of which is articular, occur at 538a3–4, where they are opposed to some form of ὁ αὐτός, for which see above, p. 198.

Like ἕτερος, ἄλλος appears (once) in a pair (d6–e1), without the article and thus used predicatively. Ἄλλην ... ἄλλην τέχνην may be used to stress the similarity of the various τέχνη: for all their being different they are still *other* τέχνη. Cp. p. 197 above. Again like ἕτερος, ἄλλος is twice opposed to τῆ αὐτῆ (at e7 and 538a4), but unlike ἕτερος, it does not have the article, but appears as an indefinite pronominal adjective: 'some other τέχνη'. At 538a4, ἄλλη may again express the idea that the ἑτέρα τέχνη in question is indeed still a τέχνη.

537d3–4 τὴν μὲν, ἑτέραν φῆς εἶναί τινα τέχνην, **τὴν δὲ, ἑτέραν**; lit. 'Do you agree that the one (sc. skill) is a skill of this nature (whatever it is—τινα), and the other of another nature?' Qua construction, τέχνην has to be supplied as a subject with τὴν μὲν from the predicative complement ἑτέραν τινα τέχνην. A fully specified sentence would run: τὴν μὲν τέχνην ἑτέραν φῆς εἶναί τινα τέχνην, τὴν δὲ τέχνην ἑτέραν τινὰ τέχνην;. See also the next note. For the phenomenon of the subject being taken from the predicative complement or vice versa see K-G 2, 564. One of their examples is *Men.* 89a6 ... οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί (sc. ἀγαθοί), where see Bluck.²⁹²

²⁹² This type of brachylogy is not mentioned by S-D, Gildersleeve or Smyth.

Text. In the passage 537d3–e3 in part of the MSS διαστολαί (comma's) are present after the first instances of τὴν μὲν, etc.,²⁹³ apparently to facilitate the syntactic break-up of the sentences involved.²⁹⁴ Since these are useful lectional signs, I have decided to adopt them in the present text as well.²⁹⁵ See also the Introduction §5.2. The use of these signs in Byzantine MSS is discussed by Noret (1995). With regard to the punctuation in ἀποστρεφόμενοι τοὺς, δύο Υἱοὺς ἢ Χριστοὺς δοξάζοντας (MS Vatopedinus 236, 12th-13th cent., f. 225^v, l. 18) he observes (74): 'Cette ponctuation veut évidemment éviter qu'on lise d'abord «rejetant les deux Fils». L'éditeur moderne hésite à reprendre une telle ponctuation, mais à tort, me semble-t-il'.

537d4–e2 Ἄρα ὡσπερ ἐγὼ τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅταν ἢ μὲν, ἐτέρων πραγμάτων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ δέ, ἐτέρων, οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν, ἄλλην, τὴν δέ, ἄλλην τέχνην, οὕτω καὶ σύ;—ΙΩΝ Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εἰ γάρ που τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις, τί ἂν ... Here (see preceding note), ἐπιστήμη should be supplied as a subject with ἢ μὲν, and next with ἢ δέ, from the predicative complement ἐπιστήμη, and likewise for τέχνην in τὴν μὲν, ἄλλην, τὴν δέ, ἄλλην τέχνην. 'Just as I, while I am making inferences, when one form of knowledge is the knowledge of these things, and another form the knowledge of different things, call this art such an art and that art another art, would you do the same?' I.e., whenever there are two different forms of knowledge, I infer that there are also two corresponding arts. The same syntactic principle lies behind Εἰ ... τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις = Εἰ ... τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη <ἐπιστήμη> τις 'If some form of knowledge were the knowledge of the same things ...'.

The syntax seems to have been missed by Lamb and Méridier, but not by Flashar. Lamb and Méridier take τέχνη as the subject both of

²⁹³ Not after τὴν μὲν and τὴν δ' at 537e2–3, probably because the model of the previous examples was by now considered sufficiently established.

²⁹⁴ MS T has a different system to indicate the syntactic structure, viz. by what looks like a gravis on the last letter of μὲν (μὲν) at 537d3 and d6, and of δέ (δέ) at 537d6. This system is discussed by Noret (1995); there are 'deux accents sur μεν et sur δε lorsque ὁ μὲν ... et ὁ δέ ... sont pronoms. Cela représente sûrement une prononciation plus appuyée de μὲν et de δέ, et il y a toute chance que cela corresponde à la langue réellement parlée' (80). See also the text of T at 538e6. The scribe of F, too, once uses this sign, at 540d7.

²⁹⁵ Interestingly, these *diastolai* must have been of a strictly 'abstract' nature, and not the sign of e.g. a pause, for in the latter case the accent on μὲν should have been μέν. I have left the accents intact.

ὅταν ἢ μὲν ... ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ δέ at d5–6 and of ἐπιστήμη εἴη at e2: (d5–6, Lamb) ‘Do you argue this as I do, and call one art different from another when one is a knowledge of one kind of thing and another a knowledge of another kind’ (observe that Lamb abandons the word order of the Greek to arrive at this translation), (d5–6, Méridier) ‘Pour moi, c’est en me fondant sur ce que celui-ci (namely: art—AR) est la science de tels objets, et celui-là de tels autres, que je donne aux arts des noms différents’; (e2, Lamb) ‘If it (= a τέχνη—AR) were a knowledge of the same things ...’, (e2, Méridier) ‘Car, n’est-ce pas? si c’était une science des même objets ...’. Similarly Stock and Battagazzore in their notes: ‘if any art were the knowledge of the same subject-matter (as any other art)’ and ‘quando l’una (arte) è conoscenza di ...’. But this interpretation runs counter to the tenor of the whole passage (537d2–e8), where τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη as general concepts are in principle kept apart and dealt with separately. As for Flashar, he correctly translates: ‘Also, wie ich folgerichtig, wenn das eine Sachwissen (= ἐπιστήμη—AR) sich auf diese, das andere aber auf jene Gegenstände bezieht, dann das eine dieses, das andere aber jenes Fachwissen (= τέχνη—AR) nenne, würdest so auch du vorgehen? Ion: Ja. Sokrates: Wenn es nämlich irgendwie von denselben Gegenständen ein bestimmtes Sachwissen gäbe, wozu sollten wir denn ...?’

In concreto, the argument goes as follows. Socrates intended to discuss the τέχνηαι (537d1), but changes his plan and starts with distinguishing any two ἐπιστήμαι (537d3), then, corresponding with these, any two τέχνηαι (537d6), taking ἀριθμητική as an illustration (537e6–7). When he eventually returns to the τέχνηαι, at 538a1, he follows the reverse order, using the insights gained from the discussion of the ἐπιστήμαι. He starts with distinguishing τέχνηαι in general (538a2–7), then turns to Ion’s (supposed) τέχνη (538b1–5), and ends with the conclusion that if the specific τέχνη of Ion is different from other τέχνηαι, it is also, i.e. corresponds with, a specific ἐπιστήμη.

537d4–e1 ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ... ὅταν ... οὕτω καλῶ ..., οὕτω καὶ σύ; ‘The first οὕτω sums up the ὅταν clause ; the second οὕτω answers to ὥσπερ’ (Macgregor).

537e1–4

Εἰ γάρ που τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις, τί ἂν ..., ὁπότε γε ταυτὰ εἴη εἰδέναι ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων Observe that when Socrates uses causal-inferential ὁπότε γε ‘since, seeing that’ after the main

clause, he conveniently ‘forgets’ that just before he had presented the content of the *ὅποτε γε* clause as a pure hypothesis. For the causal-inferential use of *ὅποτε* (and *ὅτε*) cp. *Phd.* 84e2, *La.* 196d5, *Lg.* 655a3, Rijksbaron (1976: 131–132).

Εἰ γάρ που τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις ... ὅποτε γε ταῦτα εἴη εἰδέναι ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων Not surprisingly, the principal verbs connected with ἐπιστήμη are εἰδέναι, as here, and ἐπίστασθαι. Compare e.g. the remarks at *Phd.* 75d9 τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέκεναι, *Tht.* 196e10 ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ’ οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ μὴ εἰδόμενος ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν;, *Chrm.* 172c7 ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην, *La.* 198d2 περὶ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος εἰδέναι ὅπη γέγονεν, etc.

Τέχνη, too, however, can be shown to have its favourite verb, which is γινώσκειν. The present passage provides an excellent illustration of this. For after having used ἐπιστήμη in connection with εἰδέναι, Socrates uses γινώσκειν as soon as he, in the next sentence (537e4), starts speaking about the τέχνη of counting: γινώσκω ... γινώσκεις ... τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ γινώσκομεν τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ. The joint appearance of τέχνη and γινώσκειν occurred before at 531d12–e4: Ὁ αὐτὸς δήπου (sc. γνώσεται).—Οὐκοῦν ὁ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν τέχνην ἔχων οὗτός ἐστιν;, and recurs several times in the next section (538a1–c5): τῇ μὲν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ ... γινώσκειν, τῇ δ’ ἑτέρα ... γινώσκειν ... τινὰ τέχνην, ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ... γινώσκειν ... γνώση ... διαγνῶναι (538c5; for the opposition γινώσκειν : διαγνῶναι see below on 538c5), and it is also found in the preceding passage, at 537c2–d2, and elsewhere in the *Ion*, e.g. at 540d6–e7. In fact, at 537c5 the link between τέχνη and γινώσκειν is explicitly established: Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἀποδέδοται τι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργον οἷα τε εἶναι γινώσκειν;²⁹⁶ Nor is this phenomenon confined to the *Ion*; cp. e.g. *Tht.* 149e1 ff. τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης οἷε τέχνης ... τὸ γινώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον, *Sph.* 253b3 ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γινώσκειν μουσικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ συνιεὶς ἄμουσος;, *Plt.* 269e3 Γνούση δὴ λογιστικῇ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς διαφορὰν μὴν τι πλεον ἔργον δώσομεν

²⁹⁶ A few times other verbs are used in connection with τέχνη: 538d4 ἀλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μάλλον κρίναι, 539d2–3 σκοπεῖν καὶ κρίνειν, 539e4 σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ διακρίνειν.

ἢ τὰ γνωσθέντα κρίναι;, *R.* 527b7–8 τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἢ γεωμετρικῆ γνώσις ἐστίν, *R.* 402b7.

537e4 ὥσπερ At the beginning of an independent sentence, i.e. when no οὕτω(ς) follows, relative ὥς may introduce an instance illustrating some statement: = καὶ οὕτως, ‘thus’. See K-G 2, 436 Anm. 5.

537e5 οὗτοι οἱ δάκτυλοι rather than οἶδε οἱ δάκτυλοι, οὗτοι indicating that Socrates shows his fingers to Ion. For this ‘addressee-oriented’ use of οὗτος, where one might expect ὅδε, see the illuminating discussion in Ruijgh (2006: 157 ff.).

537e6–8 εἰ σε ἐγὼ ἐροίμην εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ γινώσκωμεν τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἢ ἄλλῃ, φαίης ἂν δήπου τῇ αὐτῇ.—*ΙΩΝ* Ναί. This is the first of three hypothetical, or ‘fictitious’, questions in the *Ion*;²⁹⁷ the others occur at 538d7 and 540e1. In such questions Socrates either gives the floor to himself and asks himself the hypothetical question, as here and at 540e1, or he gives the floor to the interlocutor, as below at 538d7 εἰ ἔροίό με, or, finally, to an anonymous τις, a type not represented in the *Ion*, for which see e.g. *La.* 192a8 Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο· “ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πάσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτήτα εἶναι;” εἵπομι’ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι²⁹⁸ Furthermore, such questions have, generally speaking, a protasis introduced by εἰ, which is followed either by an optative or by a past tense. In the first case the main clause normally has an optative + ἄν (potential

²⁹⁷ For a survey of these constructions, ordered and discussed according to the (supposed) chronology of the dialogues, and their relationship with the regular, non-hypothetical, questions of the Platonic dialogue see Longo (2004).

²⁹⁸ These three main types have several subtypes:

- A. The principal speaker, predominantly Socrates, gives the floor to himself:
1. the addressee is the interlocutor, as in our example, and below at *Ion* 540e1 εἰ σὺ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην; also e.g. *Euthd.* 291e4, *Men.* 72b3 (see the main text);
 2. the addressee is a third person; e.g. *Grg.* 452a6 εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην;
- B. Socrates gives the floor to the interlocutor and the addressee is Socrates himself; e.g. *Ion* 538e1 εἰ ἔροίό με, *Euthphr.* 12d7 (see the main text);
- C. Socrates gives the floor to an anonymous τις:
1. the addressee is Socrates himself; e.g. *La.* 192a8, mentioned in the main text;
 2. the addressee is his interlocutor; e.g. *Tht.* 203a7 (see the main text), *Prt.* 311b7 εἰ τίς σε ἤρετο;
 3. the addressee is Socrates himself and his interlocutor is the main speaker; e.g. *R.* 378e4 εἰ τις αὐτὸ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῶη ἡμᾶς.

construction), in the second case a past tense + ἄν (counterfactual construction). But the main clause may also have other verb forms, e.g. τί ἀποκρίνεται. The verb of the protasis is overwhelmingly a form of ἐρωτᾶν, or, more often, ἐρέσθαι; πυνθάνοιτο is found at *Smp.* 204e2.

Hypothetical questions typically enable Socrates to make it easier for his interlocutor to answer a certain question by presenting him with a similar but apparently more manageable question as a model for his answer to the original question;²⁹⁹ Socrates may also ask a couple of such questions; see *Euthd.* 291e4 ff., *Men.* 72b3 ff. below. Sometimes the interlocutor admits that he found the original question rather difficult; see below *Smp.* 204d8 ff. The subjects of the hypothetical questions are generally borrowed from a domain of knowledge related to that of the discussion at hand, but the domain may also be quite different (see *Men.* 72b1 below). Our passage illustrates the former situation: having asked Ion hypothetically about the art of arithmetic, using his fingers as an example, Socrates next asks Ion to apply the results to all arts: 538a2 εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τέχνων οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ. Expressions like οὕτω σοι (καὶ σοί) δοκεῖ, πειρῶ καὶ σύ, etc., are common features of the sequel to these questions (see *Euthphr.* 12e1, *Tht.* 203b1, *Men.* 72c5 below), but need not be present (see *Euthd.* 291e4). That these questions are based on exploiting similarities appears from the fact that they may be introduced by ὥσπερ εἰ (e.g. *Euthd.* 291e4 below), or ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ (e.g. *Alc.* 1 126a6) rather than just εἰ. In the following, rather elaborate, examples, already referred to above, the original question and the application of the hypothetical question to the original question are in bold type:

Euthphr. 12d5 ff. ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ **μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου**, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν **τὸ ποῖον μέρος** ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν **σύ με ἠρώτας** τι τῶν νυνδῆ, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, **εἶπον ἂν** ὅτι δεῖ ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ἢ ἀλλ' ἰσοσκελῆς ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;—ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.—(e1) ΣΩ. **Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ** ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι **τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν** ἐστίν, ...

Tht. 203a1 ff. βασιανίζωμεν φέρε πρῶτον· ἄρ' αἰ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ **στοιχεῖα ἄλογα**;—ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.—ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ

²⁹⁹ For this model function cp. also Longo (2000: 106, 139–140). Occasionally somebody else is the main speaker, e.g. Diotima at *Smp.* 204d8, for which see below, or Protagoras at *Prt.* 350c9.

ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτως· “ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστὶ ΣΩ”; τί ἀποκρινῆ;—ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σίγμα καὶ ὦ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;—ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.—(b1) ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως εἶπε καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίγμα λόγον.

Euthd. 291d6 ff. ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡδέ πως· Φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τί ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον ἢ οὐδέν; Πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;—ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὥσπερ εἰ σὲ ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἢ ἰατρικὴ ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίαιαν <ἂν> φαίης;—ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἢ γεωργία; πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει, τί [ἔργον] ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφήν ἂν φαίης τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;—ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ βασιλικὴ πάντων ἄρχουσα (292a1) ὧν ἄρχει; τί ἀπεργάζεται;

Men. 71d5 ff. τί φῆς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; (—) 72b1 ff. εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγεσ αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· “Ἄρα τούτω φῆς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτω μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλω δὲ τῷ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλω τῷ τῶν τοιούτων;” εἶπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθεῖς;—ΜΕΝ. Τοῦτ’ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἢ μελίτται εἰσίν, ἢ ἕτερα τῆς ἕτερας.—(c1) ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· “Τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἶπέ, ὦ Μένων· ὧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῆς εἶναι;” εἶγες δῆπου ἂν τί μοι εἰπέιν;—ΜΕΝ. Ἐγώ γε.—(c5) ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν·

The working of the hypothetical questions is demonstrated by Socrates himself at *Smp.* 204d8 ff., where it is Diotima who is asking the questions: Ἄλλ’ ἔτι ποθεῖ, ἔφη, ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἐρώτησιν τοιάνδε· Τί ἔσται ἐκείνω ὧ ἂν γένηται τὰ καλά;—Οὐ πάνυ ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.—Ἄλλ’, ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μεταβαλὼν ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρώμενος πυνθάνοιτο· Φέρε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί ἐρῶ;—Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αὐτῷ.—Καὶ τί ἔσται ἐκείνω ὧ ἂν γένηται τὰ γαθὰ;—Τοῦτ’ εὐπορώτερον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαίμων ἔσται. And it is mildly ridiculed at *Cra.* 421c4 ff. EPM. Ταῦτα μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τις σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ “ἰδόν” καὶ τὸ “ῥέον” καὶ τὸ “δοῦν”, τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα—ΣΩ. “Τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα;” λέγεις; ἢ γάρ;, and especially at *Tht.* 163d1 ff. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο· “Ἄρα δυνατὸν ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σφζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται;” (“Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?”—

Fowler). μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι εἰ μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε.

538a1

τοίνυν ‘Well then.’ While τοι ‘arrest[s] the attention’³⁰⁰ of the interlocutor, νυν signifies that the speaker is coming to the point,³⁰¹ the point being: εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ...³⁰² This point was raised earlier (537d1 Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ...;) but left unfinished because first some preliminary matter had to be settled.³⁰³ There are three other instances of τοίνυν in clauses which refer back to a point left unfinished and are followed by a directive expression or a question: *Phd.* 104e7 Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ...,³⁰⁴ *R.* 413c5 Ὁ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ζητητέον ..., and *R.* 485a4 Ὁ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν. A related use is *Phd.* 104b6 Ὁ τοίνυν ... βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει.

This use of τοίνυν is not discussed separately by Denniston, but it is similar to that discussed by him on p. 577: ‘... a general proposition is formulated, or implied, and followed, first by a preliminary instance of its application, and then by the crucial instance introduced by τοίνυν’.³⁰⁵

Ὅν is used in a comparable way, but its semantic value is ‘this being so’ (see on 530a8) rather than ‘I’m coming to the point’. See *La.* 184b1 ὁ οὖν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπον, εἴτε οὕτω σμικρὰς ὠφελίας ἔχει μάθημα ὄν, εἴτε μὴ ὄν φασὶ καὶ προσποιοῦνται αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, and *R.* 434e3 ὁ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἕνα.

³⁰⁰ Denniston 547 on τοι.

³⁰¹ Cp. S-D 571: νυν ‘knüpft solche (viz. Aufforderungen und Fragen) an die vorliegende Situation an’.

³⁰² In fact, the scope of τοίνυν is the whole of εἰπέ, εἰ etc. rather than just the relative clause.

³⁰³ The overall effect of τοίνυν here may well be as described by van Ophuijsen (1993: 164): ‘[τοίνυν is used] in cases in which it is intimated that the other participant cannot, in view of his own admissions, reasonably deny a point or reject a proposal which is now to be made’.

³⁰⁴ Translated wrongly by Fowler as: ‘Now I propose to determine what things ...’. Ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι refers back to 104c7 Βούλει οὖν ... ὀρίσασθαι ὅποια ...

³⁰⁵ As often, Denniston only mentions the circumstances in which a particle appears, while he is silent on the exact function of that particle. Cp. also n. 303.

ἔμελλον ἐρήσεσθαι ‘I was going to ask.’ For the differences between μέλλω + future infinitive, expressing future realization of a present, or, with ἔμελλον, past, intention, μέλλω + present infinitive ‘be about to, be on the point of’ and μέλλω + aorist infinitive ‘be destined to, be doomed to’ see Rijksbaron (2002: 34 n. 3 and 103 n. 2).

538a5–7 οὐκοῦν ... οὐχ See on 532b2–4.

538a6–7 ταύτης τῆς τέχνης τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα A rather remarkable use of both the genitive and the participle. On the analogy of, for example, *Smp.* 221d8 οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, *Cra.* 386e7 αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, etc., ταύτης τῆς τέχνης should probably be taken as a *genitivus subiectivus* or *auctoris* with τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα, suggesting that the τέχνη itself speaks and acts. For this use of the genitive see S-D 119; one of their examples is *S. El.* 1333 τὰ δρώμεν’ ὑμῶν, for which see also Moorhouse (1982: 52). In Plato, I found only one more or less parallel construction, *Ep.* II 314c3 (if genuine) τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἐστὶν καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος, where Σωκράτους, however, is a predicative complement.

For the combination τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα cp. *Phd.* 58c7, *Phdr.* 241a6 τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, *Phdr.* 233a7 τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα.

538b1–3 Πότερον οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐπῶν ... σὺ κάλλιον γνώση ἢ ἠνίοχος; The question word πότερον instructs us to look for ἢ and to connect this with πότερον rather than with κάλλιον; see also on 531a6. Differently below, at 540b6, where πότερον is lacking.

538b4–5 Ἡ δὲ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς ἠνιοχικῆς; Just as in the case of ποιητικὴ at 532c8, q.v., Socrates introduces ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη for the sake of the argument. Of course, since there exists no ποιητικὴ τέχνη, there is *a fortiori* no ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη.

538b5–6 περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων ἐστὶν

Text. There is here quite some variation in the MSS as to the word order, with several transposition signs around, e.g. in T περὶ ἑτέρων “πραγμάτων ζ” ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, indicating that πραγμάτων should come after καὶ ἐπιστήμη (ζ = καὶ). The text of Tpc WSF seems preferable to the other ones, because it is the only one which puts ἑτέρων in the Topic, and ἐπιστήμη in the Focus position, which seems appro-

priate: ἐτέρων continues ἐτέρα, while ἐπιστήμη has additive Focus (notice καί before ἐπιστήμη) with respect to the implicit subject, τέχνη.

538b8

πίνειν

Text. πίνειν TW : πιεῖν SF Once again both readings yield acceptable texts (with a semantic difference, since πιεῖν puts emphasis on the finishing ('drink (up)') and πίνειν on the process of the drinking ('(be) drink(ing)'). Although the presence of an object may favour the aorist (cp. on 533c2–3), I prefer πίνειν, because the Homeric text, too, has a present infinitive, right after the quotation; cp. *Il.* 11.642 ff. οἶνω πραμνεῖω, ἐπὶ δ' αἴγειον κνή τυρὸν / κνήστι χαλκείῃ· ἐπὶ δ' ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνε, / πινέμεναι δ' ἐκέλευσεν.

δίδωσι ... λέγει For the 'reproducing' present δίδωσι and the 'citative' present λέγει see on λέγετον at 531a6.

538c5 διαγῶναι After γνοίη at 537c2, γιγνώσκειν at 537c6, 538a3 and 538a4–5, we now encounter another aorist form, διαγῶναι. This is followed at 538a7 by γιγνώσκειν. Then, at 538d4–5, follows an aorist, κρίναι, which is followed again by a present infinitive, at 538e2, διακρίνειν, and another one at 538e4, διαγιγνώσκειν. At 539d2–3 follow two more present infinitives, σκοπεῖν and κρίνειν, then, at 539e4, σκοπεῖσθαι and διακρίνειν, and finally, at 540e5, διαγιγνώσκειν.

What is the rationale behind this alternation of forms? (Cp. also Appendix III on ἀκροᾶσθαι.) Perhaps the following. All present infinitives have generic (habitual) meaning. In fact, they indicate that Socrates is referring here to the habitual, professional, line of conduct of the various professionals. As for the, rare, aorist forms, they all three come immediately after the recitation of a specific passage from Homer; they express, therefore, a bounded action, a 'token' of the 'type' expressed by the present infinitive. To be sure, σκοπεῖν and κρίνειν at 539d2–3, too, appear after Homeric quotations, but these present infinitives indicate rather that Socrates is not referring to the specific Homeric passages just quoted, but to Homer in general; note the presence of τὰ τοιαῦτα.

538d5

ἄττα This is the regular nominative/accusative neuter plural of ὄστις in Plato (33 times); ἄτινα occurs only once (*Chrm.* 169a5).

ἄττα λέγει καὶ εἴτε **καλῶς** εἴτε μή After ταῦτα ... τὰ ἔπη εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή (537c1–2) and ταῦτα εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή (538c4) we may wonder why the phrasing has changed. Perhaps κρίναι ... ἄττα λέγει covers what is described at *Lg.* 669a3 (... τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὃ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γινώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ' ὡς εὖ (for this passage cp. also 532b5)) as ὃ τέ ἐστι ... γινώσκειν as well as ὡς ὀρθῶς, while **καλῶς** expresses the same idea as εὖ.

538d7 σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροιό με ‘The hypothetical clause repeats in another form the force of the Genitive Absolute. “When you ask me, if you were to do so”’ (Macgregor).³⁰⁶ This explanation and translation seem basically correct, although ‘repeats’ misses the point (nor does ‘if’ simply ‘repeat’ ‘when’). Εἰ ἔροιο rather specifies how the ambiguous participial phrase should be taken; for the hypothetical question see on 537e6–8. In fact, such participial phrases tend to function as temporal modifiers, not only in narrative discourse, as may be expected, but also in interactive discourse. For the former see e.g. *Phd.* 118a11 Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, for the latter *Prt.* 360e1 Αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.—“Ἐν γ’, ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σε,

With all that it is not clear why Plato at *Ion* 538d7 uses this complex expression in the first place. Since he decided to leave both σοῦ ἐρομένου and εἰ ἔροιό με in the text, this must tell us something. But what? That Socrates has to spell out everything for Ion, even the wording of the question that he, Ion, is going to ask? Be that as it may, it is noteworthy and certainly ironical, to use a word that has perhaps been used too easily in connection with the *Ion*, that the only time Socrates allows Ion to really contribute to the discussion is in a hypothetical question through the mouth of Socrates himself. And irony

³⁰⁶ Definitely *not* ‘suppose you were questioning me and should ask’ (Lamb) or ‘If you were questioning me and were to ask me’ (Murray), since, first, the aorist forms ἐρέσθαι, ἐρομένου, etc., cannot have imperfective, ‘progressive’, meaning, and, second, ‘and’ is not in the Greek.

turns into sarcasm when Socrates in the next sentence says that it will be quite easy for him to answer Ion's question.

538e2 τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν ... ἃ προσήκει ἐκάστη διακρίνειν
Compare the discussion on what is appropriate for the various craftsmen at *Euthd.* 301c6 ff. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προσήκει ἐκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν; πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα; etc.

538e5 ῥαδίως τε καὶ ἀληθῆ Stallbaum draws attention to this 'adverbium cum adiectivo iunctum'. The coordination of a manner adverb and a substantivized neuter plural object, whereby the functional differences between them are blurred, involves a mild zeugma and occurs more often; see (also taken from Stallbaum) *Prt.* 352d4 Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ, *Phd.* 79d8 καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, *Phdr.* 234e7 σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα (predicative accusatives), καὶ ἀκριβῶς ... ἕκαστα ἀποτετόρνενται. More examples may be found in Ottervik (1943: 70–79, who does not treat Plato, however), e.g. X. *HG* 5.3.10 πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως χρήματα ἔδοσαν, D. 1.18 δεῖ δὴ πολλὴν καὶ διχῆ τὴν βοήθειαν εἶναι. Compare also Latin *recte et vera loquere* (Plaut. *Capt.* 960), with the extensive discussion in Pinkster (1972: 108–133), and for 'ill-assorted coordination' in English Quirk et al. (1985: 971–973).

539d2 φήσω Socrates continues his answer to Ion's 'question'.

539d4

Ἀληθῆ γε σὺ λέγων 'Whatever else it may be (γε), it's *true* what you just said.' Syntactically, λέγων is a circumstantial participle with φήσεις, to be supplied, through σὺ (see below), from φήσω, and functions as a kind of comment clause. For other examples see e.g. *Euthd.* 273a5 ὃν σὺ φῆς πολὺ ἐπιδεδωκέναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων, *R.* 613e1 ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων, also with other *verba dicendi*, e.g. *Grg.* 450c2 διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. Λέγων may also be attached loosely to the preceding statement, as at *Prt.* 352d4 Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.—Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ, where λέγων must refer to αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ... φάναι For this

use of the participle and for examples of other verbs (*ψευδόμενος*, *εὐ/καλῶς ποιῶν* and others) see K-G 2, 86–87.

Ἀληθῆ **γε σὺ** λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες The use of *σὺ* as a ‘postpositive, unemphatic’ pronoun in Plato is discussed in a recent article by Helma Dik (2003: 541 ff.). She observes that in cases like the present one *σὺ* is syntactically necessary, since ‘there are simply no finite verbs that will “take care” of the identification of the subject.’ Both *γε* and *σὺ* are positioned to give extra prominence to *ἀληθῆ*.

539d5 Καὶ **σὺ γε**, ὦ Ἴων, ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγεις ‘And (whatever else you may be or do—*γε*) *you*, Ion, were right in saying those words.’ Socrates emphatically turns from Ion’s truth to Ion himself. Note that here the order is *σὺ γε*, not *γε σὺ*, as in the preceding sentence.

539e4–5 **παρὰ** τοῦς ἄλλους *παρά* of comparison: ‘when put next to, when compared with’ = ‘beyond, more than’. Cp. K-G 1, 514–515.

539e6

Ἐγὼ **μέν** φημι An instance of ‘Contrasted idea not expressed’, Denniston 380 ff. However, as Macgregor observes, ‘... *μέν* comes to be used to emphasize the pronoun = “I, Socrates, say everything.”’ And Denniston himself leaves open the possibility that this *μέν solitarium* conveys emphasis, since he writes elsewhere, in a rather contradictory sequence of thoughts (p. 364): ‘In Attic the use of emphatic *μέν* is extremely limited. It is often difficult to decide whether *μέν* is to be taken as purely emphatic, or as suggesting an unexpressed antithesis’ In the latter case, too, emphasis is of course involved. In fact, by the absence of the contrastive second member the attention is directed exclusively toward the first one, as here: ‘I, for one’. Observe that in the next sentence Socrates reacts to Ion’s *ἐγὼ μέν* with *σὺ γε*, where limitative *γε* has much the same focusing effect as *μέν* in the first sentence. For a similar instance of *μέν solitarium* followed by *γε* later in the sentence see *σὺ μέν* *ἐγώ γε* at *Euthd.* 284e5 *Σὺ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, λαιδορῆ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λαιδορῆ.—Μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἐγώ γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.* Compare also *ἐγώ γε* ... *σὺ γε* at *Grg.* 466e5–6 ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημι μέν οὖν ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν—οὐ *σὺ γε*, ἐπεὶ

ἅπαντα With the claim made here by Ion one should compare the passage *R.* 598c6 ff., where the same claim, but now ascribed to the poets themselves, is vigorously attacked by Socrates: Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ὦ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι ἐπειδὴν τις ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλῃ περὶ του, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὅσα εἰς ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον ὄτουσιν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὐήθης τις ἄνθρωπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχῶν γόητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθῃ, ὥστε ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ πάσσοφος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἶός τ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἐξετάσαι.—Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν τε τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδὴ τινὸν ἀκούομεν ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα; ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ καλῶς ποιήσῃ, εἰδόμενα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. The same thought occurs at *X. Smp.* 4.6 (Niceratus speaking) Ἀκούοιτ' ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοῦ ἂ ἔσεσθε βελτιόνες, ἂν ἐμοὶ συνῆτε. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου ὅτι Ὅμηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικὸς ἢ δημηγορικὸς ἢ στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι ἢ ὅμοιος Ἀχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσσεῖ, ἐμὲ θεραπεύετω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.³⁰⁷ See also on 541b5 μαθῶν.

539e7 σύ γε ἔφησ

Text. Virtually all editors since Baiter (1839) have adopted here Baiter's conjecture φῆς, against ἔφης T W S F, Verdenius being an exception. Stallbaum still had no qualms about ἔφης. At *Grg.* 466e6 Dodds, referring to, among others, Kühner-Blass 2, 211, considers ἔφης, for ἔφησθα, 'questionable Attic', and for that reason he prefers φῆς, again due to Baiter, against all MSS. Ἐφης is also found in all MSS at *Grg.* 497a1, where Dodds and others again prefer Baiter's φῆς. At *Grg.* 466e6 Dodds adds: 'I know of no other instances of ἔφης in Plato; γ' ἔφης at *Ion* 539 e 7 must be divided γε φῆς, as the context shows'. The MSS, however, have γε ἔφης, not γ' ἔφης, so this argument fails. Moreover, there are, in all or part of the MSS, more examples than Dodds assumed; see *Euthphr.* 7e10 φῆς βT : ἔφης δ, *Prm.* 128a8 ἐν

³⁰⁷ For the question of the possible relations of this passage with the *Ion* see above, n. 7.

φής (*sic* Burnet) T : ἐν ἔφης B Proclus, *Phlb.* 26b10 φής vir doctus in Kidd. Misc. Porson p. 265 : ἔφης codd. (see Burnet's apparatus for details), *Alc.* 1 104d7 φής T Proclus : ἔφης B, and also *Euthd.* 293c1 ἔφη Stephanus : ἔφης BTW. So although the support for ἔφης is not overwhelming, it can certainly not be ignored. In fact, the situation is not different from that of the aorist forms based on the stem εἶπα- in Plato. There are seven of such forms, *Sph.* 240d5, 261e3,³⁰⁸ *Phlb.* 60d4, *La.* 187d1, *Euthd.* 294c7, *Prt.* 353a6, 357c8, as well as two of προσεἶπα-, *Sph.* 250b10, *Alc.* 1 115e11, against hundreds of instances of thematic forms. If this anomaly, which is also found outside Plato, for example in Xenophon, is accepted, I see little reason not to accept the variation ἔφησθα/ἔφης as well.³⁰⁹

There is, moreover, something odd about the conjecture φής, since one would expect it to have been ἔφησθα, if ἔφης is 'questionable Attic'. Or, to reverse the argument by taking φής as our starting point: why would someone in the course of the transmission occasionally have changed the perfectly normal and very frequent φής into ἔφης? For this is what Baiter's conjecture implies, of course. If we keep ἔφης at *Ion* 539e7, its use is in accordance with that of the more frequent 2nd person imperfect, ἔφησθα; indeed, ἔφης is picked up by the latter three lines further, at 540a2 Οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι ἔφησθα ...; which refers back to 538b5. As for the proximity of ἔφης and ἔφησθα, compare εἶπες at *Sph.* 261c5 and εἶπας at *Sph.* 261e3 (on the assumption that this is the reading of the principal MSS; cp. n. 308), and προσεἶπας at *Alc.* 1 115e11, followed by προσεἶπες at 116a8; see also n. 309.³¹⁰

³⁰⁸ εἶπας Burnet, no variant readings mentioned; εἶπας Diès (εἶπας : -ες Y); εἶπες Duke et al., no variant readings mentioned.

³⁰⁹ Compare also the double aorist forms of φέρω, ἦνεγκον and ἦνεγκα. The forms in -κα are sometimes found side by side with thematic forms, e.g. at *Plt.* 275e1 τῷ πολιτικῷ δὲ οὐ μετὸν ἐπηνέγκαμεν τοῦνομα, δέον τῶν κοινῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν τι σύμπασι, also at *Ar. Th.* 742 <Καὶ> δέκα μῆνας αὐτ' ἐγὼ / ἦνεγκον. KH. Ἦνεγκας σύ;. See further Chantraine (1961: 165).

³¹⁰ Functionally, Baiter's conjecture is all right, of course, for φής may also be used to refer back to words spoken by the interlocutor in the preceding context, especially in the comment clause ὡς or ὥσπερ φής, e.g. *Euthd.* 273b2 ΣΩ. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Κλεινίας ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου μόνον καθήμενον, ἀντικρὺς ἰὼν παρεκαθέζετο ἐκ δεξιᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ φής, which refers back to 271a8 KP. Ὅν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ καθήστο.

The other instances of ἕφης are like that at *Ion* 539e7,³¹¹ and should probably be adopted in our texts as well.³¹²

540b1 ΣΩ. Τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγεις πλὴν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν;—**ΙΩΝ**
Σχεδόν τι.

Text. : σχεδόν τι : W, ergo Ioni tribuit (· σχεδόν τι : F, σχεδόν τι : T [qui in marg. paragr. praebet], σχεδόν τι· S [qui ante σχεδόν spatium unius litt. praebet]) With W's dicolon both before and after σχεδόν τι these words are spoken by Ion in reaction to Socrates' question ('Pretty nearly these'), and something similar may lie behind the, slightly confusing, text of the other MSS.³¹³ This must be the correct reading (for details see below), for the traditional text (πλὴν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν σχεδόν τι) runs counter to the normal syntax of σχεδόν τι. In fact, σχεδόν τι always, and mostly immediately, *precedes* the constituent it modifies.³¹⁴ This constituent may be a (pronominal) adjective, demonstrative pronoun, adverb, or a whole clause. Only clitics may intervene. Here follow some representative examples:

(Pronominal) adjectives and pronouns

Euthphr. 11c7 Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος

Cri. 46b8 ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι

³¹¹ The three cases of φής found in part of the MSS (*Euthphr.* 7e10, *Prm.* 128a8, *Alc.* 1 104d7) are perhaps due to ancient conjectural activity, but they might as well be authentic variant readings going back to Plato. Observe that in these cases, too, it is most unlikely that φής was the original reading and afterwards changed into ἕφης.

³¹² And in my view also *Euthd.* 293c1 (ἕφη Stephanus : ἕφης BTW). Stephanus' conjecture introduces an otiose ἕφη, for from Ἄρκεῖ, ἕφη at 293b8 up to ἕφην ἐγὼ at 293c5 the turns taken by Euthydemus and Socrates just follow each other, without intrusion of ἕφη's and ἕφην's. If ἕφης is adopted, this must be taken parenthetically, as ἕφησθα at *Ep.* III 319c3, and many instances of φής, e.g. *Tht.* 151e6, 200a1, *Sph.* 240b10, *Men.* 83a7. Alternatively, one might consider reading ἐπίστασθαι for ἐπίστασαι, resulting in Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἕφης ἐπίστασθαί τι. Cp. the use of ἕφησθα at *Alc.* 1 131e6 and *Grg.* 469a2 in a question asking for confirmation of something said earlier by the interlocutor.

³¹³ Actually, with the punctuation of T the words τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγεις πλὴν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν σχεδόν τι are spoken by Socrates, and ἀλλὰ ποῖα etc. by Ion. This cannot be correct of course.—To avoid confusion between the dicolon of the MSS and that of the apparatus criticus, I have exceptionally put parentheses round the readings of F, T and S.

³¹⁴ There are in the Platonic corpus 63 instances of σχεδόν τι and σχεδόν ... τι (σχεδόν μὲν τι, σχεδόν γάρ τι, etc.), two of them in *Alc.* 2 and *Eryx.*

- Cri.* 53b3 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσὶ γε ..., σχεδόν τι δῆλον
Prm. 128b5 ... ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκεῖναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγον-
 τας ταῦτά
Chrm. 166d5 ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἶε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
Grg. 472c7 f. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ συμ-
 κρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν ...

Adverbs

- Phd.* 59a8 καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκέιμεθα
R. 393b3 καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω πεποιήται διήγησιν

Verb phrases

- Phd.* 115a6 καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὄρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν·
Smp. 211b6 ὅταν δὴ τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδευαστεῖν ἐπιανῶν
 ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδόν ἂν τι ἄπτοίτο τοῦ
 τέλους.
Alc. 1 106e4 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄ γε μεμάθηκας σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα·
Euthd. 297e7 οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνῆς ἐρωτῶν, σχεδόν τι ἐγὼ τοῦτ' εὖ οἶδα
La. 199c6 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπι-
 στήμη ἢ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγα-
 θῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων ... ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.
Prt. 345d9 ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο
Lg. 720c2 τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δοῦλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατροῦ-
 σιν.³¹⁵

Interestingly, translators have often felt uncomfortable with the tradi-
 tional text at *Ion* 540b1 ff. How, indeed, should one construe *σχεδόν*
 τι? Méridier translates: '... sauf ce qui appartient aux autres arts, à peu
 près'. But why should Socrates weaken his point by this expression of

³¹⁵ Single *σχεδόν*, which is the preferred form in the later dialogues (most clearly
 in the *Laws*: only one instance of *σχεδόν* τι (720c2) against 125 of *σχεδόν*) is used in
 much the same way; cp. e.g. *Ion* 532b6 τοὺς δὲ ποιητὰς σχεδόν ἅπαντας, *Sph.* 219a8
 Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδόν εἶδη δύο, 226d4 Σχεδόν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν
 φαίνεται, *Grg.* 471b4 σχεδόν ἡλικιωτῆν, etc., although our texts have some instances
 where *σχεδόν* seems to modify a preceding constituent, e.g. *Cri.* 44d4 τὰ μέγιστα
σχεδόν, ἔάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἦ, *Lg.* 705d8 τὸ δὲ ὅτι πρὸς μέρος ἄλλ' οὐ
 πρὸς πᾶσαν σχεδόν, οὐ πάνυ συνεχώρουν. Here, too, however, *σχεδόν* should rather
 be taken as a preposed modifier, and we should punctuate accordingly. Thus, at *Cri.*
 44d4 read τὰ μέγιστα, *σχεδόν* ἔάν, for which cp. *R.* 388e5 *σχεδόν* γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐπιῆ,
 and at *Lg.* 705d8 read πᾶσαν, *σχεδόν* οὐ πάνυ συνεχώρουν; for *σχεδόν* οὐ cp. *Ti.* 61d2
 τὸ δὲ ἅμα *σχεδόν* οὐ δυνατόν, *Lg.* 636a2 Σχεδόν οὐ ῥάδιον.

uncertainty? That is, if this is a viable expression at all, for what is ‘to belong more or less to’? Méridier himself apparently was not satisfied with this translation, for he adds in a note: ‘Πλὴν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν σχεδόν τι commente τὰ τοιαῦτα. Mot à mot « Tu dis : (sauf) les cas de ce genre, c’est-à-dire : sauf ce qui concerne à peu près les autres arts (autres que celui du rhapsode) »’, which is not very illuminating. ‘A peu près’ is still very odd. Lamb’s translation: ‘By “those instances” you imply the substances of practically all the other arts’ makes perfect sense, of course, but he can only arrive at this translation by deviating from the text, for ‘all’ is not in the Greek. Again, Flashar translates: ‘Mit “solcherlei Gegenständen” meinst du vielleicht die, die nicht den anderen Fachkenntnissen zugehören?’ This, too, makes sense, but Flashar, too, deviates from the text, for ‘vielleicht’, which apparently is meant to render σχεδόν τι, does not belong to the meanings of σχεδόν τι in classical Greek.³¹⁶

As for the new text, this is supported by the use of σχεδόν τι as an answer in the *Republic*, at 552e11 Ἄλλ’ οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἢ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω.—Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη, and at 564e15 Πλούσιοι δὴ οἶμαι οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται κηφόνων βοτάνη.—Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη. Compare also single σχεδόν as an answer at *Sph.* 250c8, 255c4, 256a3, 263b10, a use not found elsewhere in Plato. I have also put a question mark after the preceding sentence, following the current practice in such δὲ λέγεις sentences asking for further information; cp. e.g. *R.* 333a13 Πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες.—Συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο;—Κοινωνήματα δῆτα. Finally, the new text has led to some adjustments in the

³¹⁶ Apart from *Ion* 540b1–2 in the traditional text, there seems to be one other exception to the rule that σχεδόν τι precedes the constituent it modifies, viz. *Prt.* 348c3 τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, that is, of course, if σχεδόν τι modifies τῶν ἄλλων, for the construction of σχεδόν τι is hardly less unclear than at *Ion* 540b1–2. What are we to make of ‘approximately the others present’? And indeed, here, too, translators have recourse to manipulating the Greek: ‘together with almost the whole of the company’ (Lamb), but σχεδόν τι does not mean ‘almost’, nor τῶν ἄλλων ‘the whole’; ‘la plupart des assistants’ (Croiset), but where is σχεδόν τι? And again, τῶν ἄλλων does not mean ‘la plupart’. I suspect there is something wrong with the text, and I propose to read τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι <πάντων> τῶν παρόντων. There are five other instances of σχεδόν τι modifying πᾶς, e.g. above, 534d8–9 σχεδόν τι πάντων μελῶν κάλλιστον; see further *Tht.* 143a5, *Chrm.* 166d5, *Hp.Ma.* 295d5, *Ti.* 26b2. Πάντων may at some point have fallen out because of the following παρόντων.

lay-out of the passage, and consequently in the line numbering, when compared with that of Burnet.

540b2–542b4

Part II, continued.

The question was, then, what is the specific expertise of the rhapsode? Ion answers that he will know what it befits a man and a woman to say, and a slave and a freeman, a subject and a ruler. Next, Socrates applies this claim to a number of concrete representatives of the types mentioned by Ion, the last one being the ἀνὴρ στρατηγικός. The net result of the ensuing discussion is that Ion claims to be such a man, and the best one, too. In that case, Socrates retorts, he ought to be a στρατηγός either of Ephesus or of Athens. Since he is not, he cannot be what he claims to be, τεχνικός. Socrates breaks off the discussion, but offers Ion the comfort of being considered θεῖος instead of τεχνικός.

540b5 λέγεις, c2 λέγεις, c3 λέγεις³¹⁷ Parenthetical, or semi-parenthetical (540c3), second person comment clauses. These ‘are used to claim the hearer’s attention. Some also call for the hearer’s agreement’ (Quirk et al. 1985: 1115). Observe that λέγεις at 540a7 is not a parenthesis, since it must be construed with τὰ τοιαῦτα.

540b5–6 Ἄρα ὅποια ἄρχοντι, λέγεις, ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζομένου πλοίου πρέπει εἰπεῖν

Observe that Socrates is trivializing here Ion’s ἄρχοντι of b4, for Ion will hardly have had in mind ‘rulers of ships’ or ‘rulers of the sick’. For ἄρχειν πλοίου, and ἄρχειν κάμνοντος below at b8, = ‘to be in charge of’ compare *Plt.* 299c1 αὐτοκράτορας ἄρχειν τῶν πλοίων καὶ τῶν νοσοῦντων, *R.* 488c6 τῆς νεῶς ἄρχειν, *R.* 342d6 ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἰατρός σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ’ οὐ χρηματιστής. Compare also the coupling of κυβερνήτης/κυβερνητική and ἰατρός/ἰατρική at *Plt.* 298d6, *R.* 346a7 and elsewhere.

As regards the syntax of χειμαζομένου πλοίου, this is often taken as an indefinite noun phrase dependent on ἄρχοντι; thus e.g. Lamb (‘a

³¹⁷ In the text I have put comma’s around this λέγεις, since it is not different from the λέγεις at b5.

ruler of a storm-tossed vessel at sea') and Méridier ('... qui gouverne en mer un vaisseau battu par la tempête'). While this is not impossible, I prefer taking it, with Flashar ('wenn das (rather: 'ein') Schiff auf See in Sturm gerät'), as a genitive absolute, for the separation of ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζομένου πλοίου from ἄρχοντι suggests that the participial phrase is an independent unit.

540b7 Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυβερνήτης τοῦτό γε

Text. ἀλλὰ ὁ W : ἄλλο F : ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ T (καὶ per compendium) fmg(ut vid.)

οὐκ ... γε] οὐ κάλλιον (sic) ὁ κυβερνήτης; τοῦτό γε S (verba haec omnia Socrati tribuens).

F's text must be due to dividing, and accenting, an original ΟΥΚΑΛΛΟ as οὐκ ἄλλο instead of οὐκ ἀλλ' ὁ. The impossible καί of T and f may rest upon a misreading of κάλλιον. Finally, the complicated text of S must be due to a conflation of οὐκάλλο (cp. F), and κάλλιον in the preceding line.³¹⁸

540b8 κάμνοντος Again (see on b5–6 above), this can be taken either as an indefinite substantival participle: 'a sick man', or as an indefinite genitive absolute: 'when someone is ill'. Here, too, I prefer taking it in the latter way. For this use of the genitive absolute see K-G 2, 81 Anm. 2 and Smyth §2072. K-G argue, perhaps rightly, that there is no need to supply a noun in such cases. In our case, κάμνοντος contains its own subject, so to speak, for it can only refer to a human being (unlike χειμαζομένου, which could not do without an explicit subject, unless in the context a ship has already been mentioned).

³¹⁸ There is, moreover, no dicolon-cum-question mark in S after the first κυβερνήτης of line 540b7, but a ὑποστιγμῆ; as a result, at 540b5–7 the text of S runs Ἄρα ... ὁ ῥαψωδὸς γνῶσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης. οὐ κάλλιον ὁ κυβερνήτης; τοῦτό γε ;, which means that formally all of these words are spoken by Socrates, and that Socrates, with οὐ κάλλιον etc., suggests an answer to his own question (which in itself is not impossible, of course). If τοῦτό γε at b7 is meant to be Ion's answer, this is not visible in the punctuation. I should add that in F, too, there is no dicolon(-cum-question mark) after the first κυβερνήτης of line 540b7; actually, there is no punctuation mark at all. The situation in S and F suggests that their texts go back to an original text like (speakers' names added): <ΣΩ.> Ἄρα ὅποια ἄρχοντι, λέγεις, ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζομένου πλοίου πρέπει εἰπεῖν, ὁ ῥαψωδὸς γνῶσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης; οὐ κάλλιον ὁ κυβερνήτης;—<ΙΩΝ> Τοῦτό γε.—.

Text. κάμνοντος SF : κάμνοντι TW On the latter, the vulgate reading in the older editions but also to be found in e.g. Schanz's text, Stallbaum notes 'sine sensu', no doubt rightly. Note that κάμνοντι *can* be construed, as a modifier of ἄρχοντι. This would give us: 'Well, the sort of thing a sick ruler (or: a ruler when sick) should say, will the rhapsode be a better judge of that than the doctor?', and this is how Ficino took it ('Sed ea quae decens est ut princeps in morbo loquatur, recitator melius quam medicus intelliget?'). But this translation is, indeed, 'sine sensu'. -οντι in κάμνοντι may be due to perseveration of the preceding -οντι.

540c2 Οἷον Exemplifying an earlier statement, = 'such as, for instance', a frequent use in Plato. Often, as here, at the beginning of an independent sentence: *Cra.* 387a2, 393e4, *Prm.* 133d7, 136a4, *Phlb.* 46a8, *Smp.* 181a1, *Grg.* 495e11, *R.* 360e6, 537e9, etc., but also in other constructions, e.g. *Phd.* 113e7, *Cra.* 385a6, 394c4, *Tht.* 143c2, *Phlb.* 26b5, etc.

540c3–4 ἀγριαίνουσῶν βοῶν παραμυθουμένῳ Sc. αὐτάς, 'trying to calm them down'. Compare X. *Cyn.* 6.10 τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν κυνῶν παυέτω, μὴ ἀπτόμενος ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος.

540c5–6 οἷα γυναικὶ πρέποντά ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ταλασιουργῷ περὶ ἐρίων ἐργασίας; In view of the hyperbaton ταλασιουργῷ should be taken as an apposition, as in Lamb's translation ('the sort of thing a woman ought to say—a spinning-woman—...'), or perhaps as a predicative modifier: 'a woman when she is a spinning-woman'. See the next note.

540c7 ἀνδρὶ ... στρατηγῷ Here the hyperbaton clearly points to στρατηγῷ having predicative function, viz. with στρατιώταις παραινοῦντι, as in Lamb's translation: 'But he will know what a man should say, when he is a general exhorting his men?' By introducing here 'a man', i.e. any man, when he is general, and by giving στρατηγῷ such a prominent position, Socrates is preparing the ground for the analysis of the rhapsode as general that comes next. For the 'sophisticated techniques' displayed by Socrates in that analysis see Kahn (1996: 112–113).

Since Plato considers Homer's own competence in military matters nil (see *R.* 600a1 Ἄλλὰ δὴ τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὀμήρου ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἄρχον-

τος ἢ συμβουλευόντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημονεύεται;—Οὐδέεις), a rhapsode, being a ἔρμηνεὺς ἔρμηνέως, is of course *a fortiori* incompetent in this field, as Socrates is going to point out extensively in the final part of the dialogue.

540d1 νῆ <Δία>

Text. νῆ Δία scripsi : νῆ TWSF : ναὶ Ven. 186 (ex νῆ, man. post.) Ald. Since νῆ would not seem to occur in Plato (and other classical authors) on its own, i.e. without the support of the name of a god in the accusative, there must be something wrong with the text of the MSS. I propose to add Δία, which may have fallen out before τά. Alternatively, one may read ναί, the vulgate reading since the Aldine edition, which is ascribed e.g. in Burnet's apparatus to 'scr. rec.'. It is not exactly clear which manuscripts are meant. Of the MSS collated or consulted by me (see the Introduction §4.2) only Ven. 186 has ναί. This is not an independent reading, however, for it has been written by a second hand as a correction of νῆ, and must therefore be a conjecture, possibly by Bessarion, the owner of the MS.³¹⁹ I prefer the more forceful νῆ Δία. For νῆ Δία in answers which repeat or echo a word or words of the preceding question see e.g. above 531d10, *Cri.* 50c3, *Phd.* 73d11, 81a11, *R.* 469e6, 588a11, and especially, with initial νῆ Δία, *Phd.* 94e7 Νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, which echoes ἄρ' οἶε at 94e2. Finally, I must admit that palaeographically, neither the omission of Δία nor the misspelling of ναί as νῆ are easy to account for.³²⁰

540d3 τί δέ; 'What about it?' Since ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη continues, as an inferrable Topic, ὁ ῥαψωδός of the preceding sentence, τί δέ does not mark a Topic shift. In such a case τί δέ indicates that the speaker is going to ask for further details about the Topic at hand. Cp. also Denniston's 'And what (of this that follows)?' (176), and e.g.

³¹⁹ Which must also be the basis of ναὶ in the Aldina. See the Introduction §4.6.

³²⁰ Of the 211 ναί's checked by me in *Grg.*, *Men.*, and *R.*, the apparatuses of Dodds, Bluck and Slings, respectively, do not mention a single νῆ as variant reading. In medieval Greek, ναί was pronounced as [ne:], with a long, and later a short, open mid vowel (Allen 1987: 79, Horrocks 1997: 104), i.e. the vowel which was originally present in νῆ. The latter, however, by that time was pronounced as [i] (Allen 1987: 74), so that there was no phonetic overlap between ναί and νῆ. In the case of αι, confusion of letters virtually always involves the short open mid vowel ε, not η.

Cra. 386a EPM. Ἦδη ποτὲ ... ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει ...—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐς τόδε ἦδη ἐξηνέχθης, ...;.³²¹ See further at 531b2, and Appendix I.

540d4

γοῦν See on 530c7.

ἄν

Text. ἄν Sydenham : ἄρ' T S : ἄρ' W : om. F Sydenham's conjecture³²² has been generally adopted, and seems, in fact, inevitable, both because of the combination of γοῦν and ἄρα,³²³ since this is not found elsewhere in Greek literature,³²⁴ and because of the use of the bare optative γνοίην in a statement, i.e. as a potential optative. The fullest discussion of the possible use of the optative without ἄν as a potential optative in Attic Greek is that in Stahl (1907: 298–302; he does not mention *Ion* 540d4, however), to which I may refer; cp. also K-G 1, 226. Stahl refuses to accept any of these optatives, and believes that everywhere ἄν should be added.³²⁵

³²¹ This is not really different from E. *Hel.* 1240 θάψαι θέλω.—Τί δ'; ἔστ' ἀπόντων τύμβος;, where τύμβος picks up θάψαι, although the latter instance is mentioned by Denniston under a different label, viz. 'Expressing surprise or incredulity' (Denniston 175). 'Surprise or incredulity' are not expressed by τί δέ, however, but are a matter of (subjective) interpretation.

³²² Proposed by Floyer Sydenham (1710–1787) in his translation of the *Ion* and some other dialogues, which was published in London in 1767, and reprinted in the translation of Plato's collected works by Thomas Taylor (London 1804).

³²³ Ἄρα is already impossible in itself; see Denniston 44.

³²⁴ Although οὖν ἄρα does occur, in Plato at *Th.* 149b10 and *Chrm.* 160e13.

³²⁵ He was preceded and followed by many others, but occasionally a dissentient voice is heard. Thus Verdenius, in a note on *Phdr.* 239b8, where Burnet and others read <ἄν> εἴη, with V against BT εἴη, simply writes, with characteristic aplomb: 'The addition of ἄν is not necessary' (1955: 273), referring to several other cases where ἄν would be superfluous. (His reference to K-G 1, 230, however, is not very helpful, for on that page possible instances of the potential optative without ἄν in *questions* are discussed, upon which K-G remark, incidentally, 'Höchst zweifelhaft bei Prosaikern'.) Note also that at *Ly.* 211e7 δεξάμην is maintained by Burnet and Croiset ('je préférerais'), and at *R.* 437b3 θείης by Slings. In some cases an interpretation as an optative of wish might be envisaged. The subject deserves to be studied afresh. I should add that if the optative in our example could after all be defended, the text of F must be preferred (but with γνοίην for the impossible γνοίη) to avoid the unacceptable *γοῦν ἄρα (ἄρα) of T S and W, respectively.

γοῦν ... ἔγωγε The double emphasis provided by γοῦν ... γε has parallels at *Ap.* 21d6 ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε ..., *Hp.Ma.* 298a9 Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ νῦν γε,

Text. ἔγωγε SF : ἐγὼ TW Although ἐγὼ is of course also acceptable, ἔγωγε is perhaps more in line with Ion's fondness of this combination elsewhere in the *Ion*; cp. 531a6, 532d3, 540b2, 540d4, 540e3; also ἔμοιγε at 535a2, 540e7 (ἔμοιγε TW : ἐμοὶ SF), 541a3, and ἐμοὶ γοῦν at 530c7 (with the discussion there).

540d5

Ἴσως γὰρ εἶ καὶ 'Yes, for (γὰρ) perhaps you are good at generalship, too', i.e. as well as at performing as a rhapsode. For γὰρ cp. Deniston 73 ff.

ὦ Ἴων For the variation ὦ Ἴων : Ἴων see on 536b5.

καὶ γὰρ 'For also if you happened to be ...', Ion would be an expert in both fields. Καὶ = 'also', because Socrates is establishing a parallel with another, imaginary, situation.

540d5–6 εἰ ἐτύγγανες ... ὦν ... ἔγνωσ ἄν Εἰ ἐτύγγανες ... ὦν (= 'if you happened to be') denotes a (hypothetical) present state. Ἐγνωσ ἄν = 'you would recognize'; the aorist expresses a single, momentaneous action, which occurs within the state expressed by εἰ ἐτύγγανες ... ὦν. For this use of imperfect and aorist cp. e.g. *S. Ant.* 755 εἰ μὴ πατήρ ἦσθ', εἶπον ἄν σ' οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν, K-G 2, 470 β), Goodwin (1889: §414), Smyth § 2310 and Bluck on *Meno* 72a7–b2. Macgregor takes ἔγνωσ ἄν as having past reference: 'If you *were* skilled in horses (Imperfect), you would have known (Aorist) good and bad driving (viz. in the *past*, when you had your opportunity, *supr.* 538 B)' (emphasis original), and likewise for εἴ σ' ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ... τί ἄν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; below ('both tenses Aorist referring to the past, viz. 538 B'). This is impossible, for at 538b the discussion was about chariot driving in the world of the epics, and Ion's ability to judge *Homer*, not about horses being well or ill ridden in some hypothetical world. Also, this analysis ignores the function of the counterfactual sequence, which is to create a world which prepares for the next move on the part of Socrates, that on military skills.

For similar counterfactuals see below on 540e3–5.

540d7–e2 εἴ σ' ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ... τί ἄν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; For this type of question see above on 537e6. Εἰ ... ἠρόμην denotes, still within the state denoted by εἰ ἐτύγχανες ... ὄν, a single question, while τί ἄν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; elicits a single answer. For a similar sequence of ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ + imperfect followed by two semelfactive aorist indicatives, one of the question and the other of the answer, see *Prt.* 311b7 ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐπενόεις ..., εἴ τις σε ἤρετο: “Εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἴπποκράτες, Ἴπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνοι ὄντι;” τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω; “Ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ σι εἰ + imperfect may also be followed by just an aorist + ἄν in the apodosis, as at *Euthphr.* 12d7 εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ με ἠρώτας ..., εἶπον ἄν, *Smp.* 199d4 ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ ... ἠρώτων ... εἶπες ἄν ..., εἰ ἐβούλου καλῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι, *Prt.* 356d1–2 Εἰ οὖν ... ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν ..., τίς ἄν ... σωτηρία ἐφάνη ...; and *Grg.* 447d3–4 ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὄν ..., ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν Compare, by way of contrast, the following all-aorist counterfactual situation, which is located exclusively in the past: *Prt.* 350c9 εἰ (‘whether’) δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην—εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἄν

Text. ἠρόμην TWS (ἦ in ras. T, ex ἐ- W, ἦ et ο SpC) : ἐροίμην F As appears from the corrections in the three MSS which read ἠρόμην, these MSS originally must have had, or attempted, ἐροίμην. Observe that S and F part company here. It is of course impossible to tell whether the corrections go back to one single corrected exemplar, or were made independently. Should, in view of this situation, F’s ἐροίμην be preferred? Probably not. The fact is, that in Plato εἰ ἐροίμην/ἔροιο/ἔροιτο is not elsewhere followed by an aorist indicative or imperfect, but either by an optative, e.g. *Ion* 537e6,³²⁶ *Alc.* 1 106c6 εἰ οὖν ... ἐροίμην ... τί ἄν ἀποκρίναιο;, 125d10, 126a6, 126b2, *Chrm.* 165c10, *Prt.* 312d1, d4, etc.,³²⁷ or, more seldom, a future indicative, e.g. *Phd.* 105b8 εἰ γὰρ ἔροιο με ... οὐ ... σοι ἐρῶ, *Tht.* 203a7, *Hp.Ma.* 298d6.

Text. ἀπεκρίνω SF : ἀπεκρίνου TW The aorist should be preferred, since there are no parallels for εἰ ἠρόμην/ἤρου/ἤρετο followed

³²⁶ Compare also the ‘model sequence’ at *Cra.* 421c4, discussed above at 537e6–8: εἰ δὲ τις σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ “ἶδν” καὶ τὸ “ρέον” καὶ τὸ “δοῦν”, τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα—ΣΩ. “Τί ἄν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναιμέθα;” λέγεις; ἦ γάρ;.

³²⁷ At *R.* 526a1 Τί οὖν οἶει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἴ τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς; ... τί ἄν οἶει αὐτούς ἀποκρίνασθαι; the infinitive + ἄν must represent an optative + ἄν.

by an imperfect + ἄν in the main clause.³²⁸ For the aorist see the parallels at *Prt.* 311b7 εἴ τις σε ἤρετο... τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω;, *Prt.* 311c5 εἴ τις σε ἤρετο... τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω;, *Men.* 72b3 τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην... εἶπέ, τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;, *R.* 332c5 εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο... τί ἄν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι;. Unless ἀπεκρίνου is due to the intervention of a *diorthôtes*, -ου may simply be a mistake for -ω. For such confusions see e.g. Worp & Rijksbaron (1997: 36).

540d7 ἵππαζομένουσ is an attributive rather than a supplementary participle: ‘You would recognize horses that are well and <horses that are> ill ridden’; cp. Méridier’s ‘tu connaîtrais les chevaux qui sont sont bonnes ou mauvaises montures’.

As for the verb, although ἵπάζομαι is a *medium tantum* (= ‘drive, ride’), it may also have passive meaning. For the passive meaning of *media tantum*, which is mostly found in the perfect and aorist tenses, and but rarely in the present and imperfect, see K-G 1, 120–121.³²⁹

540e2 ἧ ἵππεδς εἶ ἢ ἧ καθαριστής; This relative clause continues Ποτέρῃ τέχνῃ in the preceding question, and ἧ is therefore a dative, and the same applies to ἧ in Ion’s answer, as well as to ἧ in Socrates’ next question: Οὐκοῦν... ὠμολόγεις ἄν, ἧ καθαριστής εἶ, ταύτῃ διαγιγνώσκειν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἧ ἵππεύς; (note also the presence of the dative ταύτῃ). Interestingly, however, in the next question, at 540e6–7, πότερον ἧ στρατηγικός εἶ γιγνώσκεις ἢ ἧ ῥαψωδὸς ἀγαθός;, the formal connection with ποτέρῃ τέχνῃ is lost, which is indicated by the change from ποτέρῃ τέχνῃ to πότερον. In other words, in this case ἧ is no longer a relative pronoun but a relative adverb (= ‘in as much as’), i.e. we have here an instance of what was to become a very popular procedural term in philosophical texts, notably in Aristotle, and was taken over as a calque in Latin *qua*. But it has not yet fully acquired the latter function here, for ἧ still occurs in an (adverbial) relative clause.³³⁰ There is a similar use at *Men.* 72b8, also mentioned by LSJ: οὐδὲν

³²⁸ There is actually only one instance of ἀπεκρίνου in Plato, which clearly has iterative meaning: *Alc.* 1 112e18 Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἠρώτων, σὺ δ’ ἀπεκρίνου;.

³²⁹ Alternatively, ἵππους... ἵππαζομένουσ might be taken intransitively; cp. Engl. *The horse rides very well, The car drives well.*

³³⁰ Also, τέχνῃ is still present in the background.

διαφέρουσιν, ἧ μέλιται εἰσίν, ἢ ἕτερα τῆς ἕτερας.³³¹ The first instance in LSJ is X. *Mem.* 2.1.18 οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τὰ ἐκούσια τῶν ἀκουσίων, ἧ ὁ μὲν ἐκὼν πεινῶν φάγοι ἄν, again in a relative clause.³³² It is only in Aristotle that ἧ need no longer occur in a clause. Two typical examples from Aristotle are *EN* 1170a8 ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἧ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεισι χαίρει, and *Metaph.* 1016b5 εἰ ἧ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν, εἷς ἄνθρωπος.

Text. The, but all too understandable, confusion as regards the spelling of ἧ in this passage (e2–7) is also found elsewhere in the MSS, e.g. at *Phd.* 112d5, *Tht.* 161a6, *Smp.* 173a6. Compare also n. 183.

540e3 ἔγωγ' ἄν Supply ἀπεκρινάμην.

540e3–5 Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τοὺς εἶ κιθαρίζοντας διεγίνωσκες, ὁμολόγεις ἄν ... διαγιγνώσκεις; With this question³³³ Socrates returns to the 'normal' counterfactual questions with which he opened his examination of Ion's claims. Since ὁμολόγεις ἄν is the only instance of ὁμολογ- in Plato with counterfactual meaning, it is difficult to explain the choice of the imperfect here, after ἔγνωσ ἄν at 540d6. There is perhaps a tinge of iterativity, just as in the infinitive διαγιγνώσκεις (for which see at 538c5).

540e6 ἐπειδὴ ... γινώσκεις Not 'When you judge ...' (Lamb), 'when you make a judgement ...' (Saunders)—which is rather ἐπειδάν + subj.—but 'Since you know ...' (Allen), 'Puisque tu connais ...' (Mériquier), 'Da du nun ...' (Flashar). This is a so-called 'indirect reason' clause: 'The reason is not related to the situation in the matrix clause but is a motivation for the implicit speech act of the utterance' (Quirk et al. 1985: 1104). Compare their example 'As you're in

³³¹ A third instance in the Platonic corpus occurs at [Pl.] *Hipparch.* 230b9 οὐδὲν ἐκεῖνη γε διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἧ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν; On the *Hipparchus* Taylor notes: 'By general admission the language and diction of the dialogue are excellent fourth-century Attic, not to be really discriminated from Plato's authentic work' (1926: 534). LSJ do not mention the *Ion* nor the *Hipparch.*

³³² Note that in both these cases, as well as in the instance from the *Hipparchus* mentioned in n. 331, ἧ may be a dative rather than an adverb, since the clause is governed by a form of διαφέρειν. The date of the *Memorabilia*, or rather that of its various parts, is not certain, but it is probably not early; cp. Lesky (1971: 557 f.), also Kahn (1996: 30).

³³³ See on 531d11.

charge, where are the files on the new project? [“As you’re in charge, I’m asking you ...?”].

541a1 Πῶς οὐδὲν λέγεις διαφέρειν; μίαν λέγεις ...; ‘What do you mean, “it makes no difference”? Do you mean that ...?’ In this use a πῶς comment clause asks the interlocutor to elucidate a word or phrase used by him, which is repeated in the question (in what is called ‘mention’), and is followed by a suggested answer. Πῶς must be construed with λέγεις, not with διαφέρειν, just as at *R.* 416a1 Πῶς, ἔφη, αὐ τοῦτο λέγεις διαφέρειν ἐκείνου;. There may be a hint of incredulity. For similar instances, but without λέγεις, see *Grg.* 466b4 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἕμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; (Dutch has an exact parallel: ‘hoezo “niet geacht worden?”’) οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;, *Grg.* 466c8 ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο (‘hoezo “twee?”’);. Compare the use of Πῶς λέγεις; followed by a question which asks for elucidation, as at *Smp.* 201e8 ἤλεγχε ... ὡς οὔτε καλὸς εἶη ... οὔτε ἀγαθός.—Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Διοτίμα; αἰσχρὸς ἄρα ὁ Ἔρωσ ἐστὶ καὶ κακός;.

Text. I have restored the punctuation of the MSS, which from the Aldine edition onward had been current until Schanz, without further comment, changed it to Πῶς; οὐδὲν λέγεις διαφέρειν;. To my knowledge he was followed by all subsequent editors. No doubt the change was meant to make πῶς an expression of incredulity, as indeed in Lamb’s ‘What, no difference, do you say?’, and Méridier’s ‘Comment? aucune différence, dis-tu?’ I see no reason, however, why the perfectly acceptable older punctuation should be rejected. There is, moreover, no other case in Plato where bare πῶς must be followed by a question mark and would express incredulity.³³⁴ To be sure, at *Lg.* 968c8 we find, in Burnet’s text and elsewhere, Πῶς; τί τοῦτο εἰρήσθαι φῶμεν αὐ;, but there too there should be no question mark after πῶς. Πῶς τί τοῦτο is used as at *Tht* 146d6 Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; (Burnet’s punctuation), and cp. *Sph.* 261e3, *Plt.* 297c5. For πῶς τί see further above, at 530a8.

³³⁴ In cases like *Phlb.* 43c3 ΣΩ. Ὡδ’ ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον.—ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;—ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλα μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονᾶς ποιῶσιν, and *Lg.* 711a2 Πῶς; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνομεν, πῶς has its common modal-instrumental meaning.

541a7

Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν An instance of the use of ἀλλὰ ... μὲν discussed by Denniston 378, in which '[t]he μὲν clause is contrasted with what precedes, not with what follows' (: 377). For other examples with demonstrative pronouns see *Cra.* 436c7 Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, ὡγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀπολόγημα, *Phlb.* 33d11 ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς αὐθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, *R.* 475e2 τούτους οὖν ... φιλοσόφους φήσομεν;—Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Cp. also *Grg.* 462e3 Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως, and see further Denniston 378. Also without ἀλλά, e.g. *Euthphr.* 8e2 Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Text. μὲν is the reading of all primary MSS, and was also the vulgate text until Bekker preferred μήν, which he took from his MS Ξ (now E; see Bekker 1823: 147)³³⁵ and is therefore no doubt a conjecture. This was adopted by all subsequent editors, e.g. Stallbaum, who notes: 'V. μὲν, quod ex Ven. Ξ. praeunte Bekkero correxi'. Why Bekker preferred μήν is quite a riddle, for unlike ἀλλὰ ... μὲν, ἀλλὰ ... μήν is virtually absent from prose: 'The particles are sometimes separated in verse: hardly ever in prose, except ἀλλ' οὐ μήν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μήν' (Denniston 341). To these should be added, at least for Plato: ἀλλ' οὐ τι μήν, ἀλλ' οὐ πη μήν, ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ἀλλὰ τίνα μήν and other question words, ἀλλ' ἔστι (γε) μήν. But apart from these fixed expressions there is just *one* instance where a lexical word separates ἀλλά from μήν, viz. the adjective αἰσχρόν at *Clit.* 407a1 Ἄλλ' αἰσχρόν μήν.³³⁶ Of ἀλλὰ μήν there are some 190 instances.

ἐκεῖνο 'that remarkable thing'. See at 533c5. For neutral τοῦτο with δοκεῖ see examples in the next note.

σοι

Text. σοι T W : σοι εἶναι S F Editors universally print σοι, and the text of S F should in fact be rejected, for if εἶναι is present with δοκεῖ a predicative complement seems to be *de rigueur*, as in e.g. *Ap.* 19e1 καὶ τοῦτό γε μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις ..., *Grg.* 454a8 ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ

³³⁵ Burnet's apparatus is incorrect here.

³³⁶ In his commentary ad loc. Slings notes: 'The split form is somewhat curious here', but he does not doubt the correctness of the text, among other things because he accepts *Ion* 541a7 as a parallel.

σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι, *Grg.* 454c1 Πότερον οὖν ταῦτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, *Grg.* 462b10 Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι. The latter sentence may be called the model sentence of this construction. In the construction at *Ion* 541a7, on the other hand, no predicative complement is present, the subject of δοκεῖ being ἐκεῖνο plus the infinitive construction ὅστις γε ἀγαθὸς ῥαψωδός, καὶ στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. Parallels for this construction are e.g. *Cra.* 424a5 Τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν, οὗτος ἂν εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός, *R.* 334b8 τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς.

541b4 Εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες For εὖ ἴσθι see on 536e3.

541b5

καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐκ τῶν Ὀμήρου μαθῶν καὶ ταῦτά (γε) is an idiomatic phrase, which mostly modifies participles, as here μαθῶν, but it is also found with adjectives and noun phrases. (Morpho-)syntactically, ταῦτα is detached from the rest of the sentence, since it does not depend on a verb. It should probably be considered an appositional absolute nominative, which expresses something like: ‘and this situation obtains with the proviso (γε) that ...’. For absolute nominatives cp. appositions like τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τὸ κεφάλαιον (K-G 1, 285 Anm. 8). As for γε, if present, this indicates that the speaker is focusing on the specification added by the participle (or adjective or noun). Cp. Denn. 157 on καὶ ... γε: ‘... stress[es] the addition made by καί’. Denniston does not discuss καὶ ταῦτά γε.

Generally speaking, the combination of καὶ ταῦτα + participle etc., functionally a *conjunct*,³³⁷ refers back to some earlier piece of information and serves to comment upon that information, by adding a specification or circumstance which the speaker apparently feels is needed for a correct interpretation of the earlier information. So here: καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐκ τῶν Ὀμήρου μαθῶν explains how Ion’s military skill came about. When the καὶ ταῦτα conjunct contradicts expectations raised by the earlier information, a concessive value is present. By way of an explanation Latin *idque* is sometimes adduced; see K-G 2,

³³⁷ For conjuncts in English cp. Quirk et al. (1985: 631 ff.); conjuncts ‘indicate how the speaker views the connection between two linguistic units’ (633).

85 Anm. 8; 2, 247.³³⁸ Some examples: *Ap.* 36d3 τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι ...,³³⁹ *Sph.* 238a2 Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι. ΞΕ. Μήπω μέγ' εἵπης· ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη,³⁴⁰ *Euthd.* 299d3 Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρυσίον, ἧ δ' ὅς, ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν;—Πάνυ, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.³⁴¹ Καὶ ταῦτα is also found without γε, e.g. *Ap.* 34c6 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων (concessive, since there is a contradiction between 'doing nothing' and 'being in danger'),³⁴² *La.* 200b5 (Damon) οὐδ' σύ που οἶει καταγελᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἰδὼν πόποτε τὸν Δάμωνα (concessive, since there is a contradiction between 'ridiculing someone' and 'not having seen someone at all'),³⁴³ *Grg.* 487b5 and elsewhere.

Translating this specifying καὶ ταῦτα in English is difficult (cp. n. 338). In our case Lamb ('and that I owe to my study of Homer') and Saunders ('that too I learnt from the works of Homer') take καὶ ταῦτα as the object of μαθῶν, but this is highly unlikely, in view of its fixed, idiomatic, use elsewhere. Perhaps 'and that, because I have learnt it from Homer'? Méridier and Flashar render, correctly: 'et cela, parce que je l'ai appris dans Homère', 'und zwar habe ich das aus dem Ho-

³³⁸ For *idque* cp. Kühner-Stegmann (1912–1914: 1, 619 Anm. 3). Interestingly, in Latin this use is also found with *isque* (K-St, *ibidem*), which suggests that *id*, in *idque*, should be taken as a nominative, too. Modern languages have various devices to express the value of καὶ ταῦτα. In Dutch *en wel*, and in concessive contexts *en dat nog wel*, suit most instances, in German *und zwar*, for which cp. K-G *ibidem*. As for English, in some cases *and that (too)* will do, which is Goodwin's general translation (1889: §859), in others a suitable equivalent seems to be lacking; it is perhaps for this reason that in the Loeb translations καὶ ταῦτα is often ignored or misunderstood. Something similar applies to French, where *et cela* is sometimes used, but in other cases an equivalent apparently was lacking.

³³⁹ Dutch: 'en wel een dergelijk goede behandeling als ...'; Croiset, Budé: 'et, sans doute, un bon traitement qui ...'; Fowler, Loeb, ignoring καὶ ταῦτα: 'and the good thing should be such ...'. Burnet, in his commentary *ad loc.*, translates: 'Yes, and that too', and adds, correctly: 'In the sense of *idque*, *et quidem*'.

³⁴⁰ Dutch: 'en wel de grootste en belangrijkste van allemaal'; Diès: 'et la difficulté qui reste est la plus grande ...', καὶ ταῦτα ignored; Fowler: 'For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities', καὶ ταῦτα ignored).

³⁴¹ Dutch: 'en wel veel'; Méridier: 'et même beaucoup'; Lamb: 'Certainly, and—here I agree—plenty of it too'.

³⁴² Fowler, correctly: 'though I am'; Croiset: 'bien que ...'.

³⁴³ Lamb: 'and that without ever having seen ...'.

mer gelernt'; Dutch: 'en wel omdat ik dat uit Homerus heb geleerd'. With μαθών, supply ἄριστός εἰμι as finite verb, and 'being the best *stratēgos*' as—grammatical or mental—object from the preceding sentence: 'having got this instruction', as at *Prt.* 319d5 οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, sc. the competence to give advice, mentally to be supplied from the preceding sentence.³⁴⁴

ἐκ τῶν Ὁμήρου μαθών For the question as to what extent the contemporary audience of Plato saw Homer as their instructor I refer to the section 'Homer and the Generals' in Ford (2002: 201–208).

541b6 Τί δὴ ποτ' οὖν See on τί οὖν πότε at 531c1.

541b8 ἦ Self-corrective ἦ. With this question Socrates provides an implicit answer to his first question. See above on 530a2.

541c3 Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡμετέρα 'No, it is because our city ...'. Ion answers Socrates second question, thus rejecting his implicit answer. For γὰρ as = 'Yes, for' or 'No, for' see Denn. 73–74.

541c7 ὦ βέλτιστε Ἴων See on 532b2.

541c7–8 Ἀπολλόδωρον ... τὸν Κυζικηνόν; 541d1 Φανοσθένη τὸν Ἄνδριον καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Κλαζομένιον For these successful immigrants I may refer to the extensive discussion in Nails (2002; ss.vv.).

541c9 Ποῖον τοῦτον; 'What sort of man is he?', 'what might he be?' (Lamb). Since the name and provenance of the man concerned have just been mentioned, Ion asks after his qualities, qualities which apparently entitle him to be mentioned by Socrates in the middle of the dialogue he is having with Ion. There is therefore a hint of suspicion or surprise in Ion's question.³⁴⁵ For some other examples of ποῖος combined with οὗτος see *Cra.* 416a5 ΣΩ. ... ἐπάγω ... ἐκείνην τὴν

³⁴⁴ For omitted definite objects in Greek cp. K-G 2, 561 f. and especially Luraghi (2003).

³⁴⁵ According to LSJ s.v. 2 a nuance of 'scornful surprise' appears when ποῖος is 'used in repeating a word used by the former speaker'; as an example from Plato they give *Tht.* 180b9 (ΣΩ. ... τοῖς μαθηταῖς ...—ΘΕΟ. Ποίους μαθηταῖς ...).

μηχανήν.—EPM. Ποίαν ταύτην; *Cra.* 417d4 ΣΩ. Ὅσα μὲν ... οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτα διεξιέναι.—EPM. Ποῖα ταῦτα; *Grg.* 449e1 ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους.—ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία;.

541c10

Ὅν ... ἤρηνται An autonomous relative clause may answer questions introduced by τίς and ποῖος. Cp. *Euthphr* 4a1 EYΘ. Διώκω.—ΣΩ. Τίνα;—EYΘ. Ὅν διώκων αὖ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι, *Phlb.* 43c10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἦκοι. ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος; ΣΩ. Ὅν ἄλυπὸν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι, and elsewhere.

πολλάκις ἑαυτῶν στρατηγὸν ἤρηνται Totalizing-iterative perfect; see on ἐώρακα at 533b5. Temporal modifiers like πολλάκις, οὐ ... πώποτε may or may not be present with such perfects; see again on 533b5.

541d3–4 εἰς στρατηγίαν καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς

Text. στρατηγίαν SF : στρατηγίας TW Another instance of two equally acceptable readings. There are parallels both for αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρχαί being contrasted with a singular, and with a plural noun. For the singular see e.g. *R.* 345e5 ... ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. (—) Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ...; ³⁴⁶ for the plural e.g. *Ap.* 36b7 στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν. There is a difference in meaning: the singular στρατηγίαν = 'the office of (official) general/admiral', i.e. the abstract function of one of the ten official generalships, while the plural στρατηγίας = 'generalships', i.e. concrete realisations of the function. For this use of the plural see K-G 1, 17: 'Die Prosa unterscheidet streng den Gebrauch der Singularform (viz. of abstract nouns) von dem Pluralform, indem durch jene stets der wirkliche abstrakte Begriff, durch dies stets einzelne Arten, Fälle u.s.w. der abstrakten Thätigkeit bezeichnet werden, oder der abstrakte Begriff auf Mehrere bezogen wird'. So the plural στρατηγίας can refer both to several generalships of one person and to single, and perhaps repeated,

³⁴⁶ This should rather be Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς; οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ...; See Appendix I.

generalships of different persons. Both these interpretations of the plural are of course possible here, and so is the singular.

Although this is basically a textual heads or tails situation, since either form may be authentic, I have preferred the singular: in view of the presence of τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς, this must have been more liable to becoming a plural than the other way round.

541d4 δ' ἄρα Expressing ‘the surprise attendant upon disillusionment’, Denniston 33, and see *ibidem* 35 for instances with verbs in the future tense, e.g. *Ap.* 37d3 ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως;.

541d6

τί δέ; See on 540d3. No Topic shift: Socrates is going to continue about Ephesus.

Ἀθηναῖοι **μέν** *Μέν solitarium*, because Socrates does not finish his question but breaks it off. See on ἀλλὰ γάρ at e1.

541d6–e1 οὐκ ... ἢ Ἐφεσος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων πόλεως; ‘isn’t it true that Ephesus is second to no other city?’ For οὐκ ... οὐ(δεμιᾶς) see on 532b2–4.

541e1 ἀλλὰ γάρ Socrates interrupts himself and in fact stops questioning Ion. With this powerful and, when it is used in addressing an interlocutor, potentially rather impolite device, Socrates effectively deprives Ion of the opportunity to continue the discussion. On the other hand, Socrates had already prepared Ion for this abrupt move, for his last two questions (Ἰωνα δ' ἄρα ... οὐχ αἰρήσεται στρατηγὸν ...; τί δέ; οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἐστε ... καὶ ἢ Ἐφεσος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων πόλεως;); were of a highly rhetorical nature and not really meant to be answered by Ion. With ἀλλὰ γάρ Socrates clears the path for the summary of the dialogue, or rather of Ion’s role therein, which follows, and thus for the *finale*, where Socrates confronts Ion with the seductive proposal to stop pretending to be a τεχνικός and to opt rather for a status as θεῖος. For the vocative ὦ Ἰών see Appendix II.

Socrates uses ἀλλὰ γάρ several times with a similar purpose, also with respected interlocutors; see: *Tht.* 196d11 ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ' οὐκ ἀνανδὸς δοκεῖ μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι, *Phlb.* 43a6 ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γάρ

ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι, and especially *Alc.* 1 114a4 οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν αὖ τὰ συμφέροντ' ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντ' ἐκείνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μὴ ἐρωτήσῃ; ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς εἰς ταῦτον ἦξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδεῖξαι.

541e1–2 εἰ μὲν ἀληθὴ λέγεις By using an indicative conditional clause Socrates conveys scepticism, one of the many signs in this passage (cp. the previous note) of his unfriendly attitude toward Ion. For this use of εἰ + indicative cp. Wakker (1994: 125 ff.), Rijksbaron (2002: 68 n. 2).

541e3 ἀλλὰ γὰρ σύ, ... ἀδικεῖς, ὅστις ... ἐξαπατᾷς με Digressive relative³⁴⁷ clauses often have a causal value. Cp. K-G 1, 399, Smyth §2555, Rijksbaron (2002: 93).

541e4 φάσκων ᾿ρτερ. φάσκων, inf. φάσκειν fréquents en attique où φάσκων ... remplace pratiquement φάσ' (Chantraine *DE* s.v. φημί II). Of the 72 forms of φάσκ- in Plato only one is a finite verb (ἔφασκεν, *Lg.* 901a4), all others are participles. Φάσκων is indeed a substitute for φάσ, since of the latter there are only two instances, both from the spurious *Alc.* 2 (φάντες, at 139c3 and 146b2).

541e5 πολλοῦ δεῖς ἐπιδείξαι lit. 'you are far from having shown ...'. This entails 'you have not shown' (Ion has in fact not given a demonstration), and the aorist infinitive has therefore past reference. This means that semantically πολλοῦ δεῖς functions as a kind of emphatic variant of the negative. The same use of πολλοῦ δεῖς + aorist infinitive occurs at *Men.* 79b8 ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν: Meno has, in fact, not told Socrates what virtue is. Likewise, the present infinitive ἀγνοεῖν at *Ly.* 204e5 ἐπεὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι πολλοῦ δεῖς τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ παιδός: ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τούτου γινώσκεισθαι (δεῖς B (sed ζ erasum) W : δεῖ σε T) has present reference, since πολλοῦ δεῖς ἀγνοεῖν entails:

³⁴⁷ Not, then, restrictive clauses. The difference is often ignored. Since digressive clauses are not necessary for identifying the (referent of the) antecedent, they may develop other functions, for example, as in our example, that of combining, so to speak, the semantics of ὅστις with that of causal ὅτι: while the ὅστις clause assigns a characteristic feature to σύ, it at the same time explains ἀδικεῖς.

οἶσθα or γινώσκεις. Compare also, with δεῖ, e.g. πέτεσθαι at *Euthphr.* 4a3 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;—ΕΥΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὧν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης, where πολλοῦ δεῖ πέτεσθαι entails: οὐ πέτεται.³⁴⁸ The negative may also appear itself, in a slightly different construction, where both the negative and πολλοῦ δεῖ are present, as at D. 18.300 οὐδέ γ' ἠττήθην ἐγὼ τοῖς λογιμοῖς Φίλιππου, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, where πολλοῦ ... δεῖ intensifies the force of the preceding negative.

Text. δεῖς Flor. 85, 7 : δεῖ σ' TWS Ven. 186 E : δ' εἰς F (ut vid.) I have taken δεῖς from Stallbaum ('Vulgo δεῖ σ' ἐπ., quod ex uno Flor. x. (= Flor. 85, 7) correctum'). This MS 'derives from F, and is in all probability a direct transcript' (Boter 1989 : 36). In that case δεῖς must be a conjecture. It is not clear what Burnet's 'scr. rec.' after δεῖς refers to. It should be noted that at *Men.* 79b8, quoted above, all MSS have δεῖς, apparently without variants, whereas at *Ly.* 204e5, also quoted above, the scribes have split up, since B and W have δεῖς (although in B the ζ is erased), while T reads δεῖ σε. Apparently the scribes, when the original uncial sequence ΠΟΛΛΟΥΔΕΙΣ was converted into minuscule letters and had to be provided with lectional signs, chose different solutions, and sometimes hesitated about the result (see B at *Ly.* 204e5). As for *Ion* 541e5, δεῖς should, in fact, probably be read, for the impersonal construction πολλοῦ δεῖ + *accusativus cum infinitivo* occurs elsewhere in Plato only once (*Euthd.* 289b7, not with σε),³⁴⁹ while the personal construction is quite frequent.

541e5–6 ὅς γε οὐδὲ ... ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν Again a digressive relative clause with causal value; cp. K-G 1, 176, and Denniston 141 on ὅς γε. Γε 'denotes that the speaker or writer is not concerned with what might or might not be true apart from the qualification laid down in the subordinate clause'. In other words, ὅς γε expresses the idea that

³⁴⁸ At *Phd.* 93a8 Burnet reads Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινήθηναι ἂν ἢ φθέγγασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν (κινήθηναι ἂν Stob. : κινήθηναι BTW). Incidentally, in his commentary Burnet does not comment upon the text, and his translation suggests that he ignores ἂν ('to move (vibrate) or give out a sound ...'). The new OCT omits ἂν, with BTW. Stobaeus' text must be right, however; κινήθηναι ἂν etc. represents a potential optative, the entailment being: οὐκ ἂν κινήθῃ etc. With the text of BTW the (entailed) meaning is 'it has not moved', which gives the wrong sense.

³⁴⁹ Πολλοῦ ... δεῖ ... ἡμᾶς λυροποιοῦς δεῖν εἶναι. There is perhaps a *jeu de mots* with the following δεῖν 'be obliged to'.

the relative clause alone suffices to explain Ion's behaviour denoted by πολλοῦ δεῖς ἐπιδειξαι: 'you ... who—that much is sure—are far from displaying ...'.

541e7–542a1 γίγναι..., ἕως ... ἀνεφάνης A rare, if not unique, use of ἕως, in Plato and possibly in classical Greek literature as a whole. Normally, ἕως + aorist indicative (= 'until') is preceded by an imperfect and occurs in narrative discourse. Naturally, this is rare in Plato. The examples are: *Phlb.* 18c5 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα ..., ἕως ... ἐπώνομασε, *Chrm.* 155c2 ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν ... τὸν πλησίον ἐόθει σπουδῆ, ἵνα παρ' αὐτῷ καθέζοιτο, ἕως ... τὸν μὲν ἀνεστήσαμεν, τὸν δὲ πλάγιον κατεβάλομεν, *La.* 184a1 ἐφίει τὸ δόρυ διὰ τῆς χειρός, ἕως ἄκρου τοῦ στύρακος ἀντελάβετο, *Prt.* 314c7 διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις, *Criti.* 115d1.³⁵⁰ On the other hand, if a present indicative is followed by ἕως + an aorist form, the latter is always a subjunctive + ἄν, and the present has generic (habitual) meaning. Cp. e.g. *Phd.* 108c1 (the soul) πλανᾶται ... ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται ..., *Tht.* 157d1 σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα συνεξαγάγω, *R.* 424e2 (ἡ παρανομία) ὑπορρεῖ ..., μείζων ἐκβαίνει, ... ἔρχεται ἐπὶ ..., ἕως ἂν τελευτῶσα πάντα ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀνατρέψῃ.

As for *Ion* 541e7–8, I submit that this combines habitual meaning (: παντοδαπὸς γίγναι στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω) with an aorist indicative having semelfactive meaning, which, just as the rhetorical questions and the ἀλλὰ γάρ sentence, is a sign that the discussion is over.³⁵¹

542a1 ἵνα μὴ ἐπιδείξῃς This purpose clause modifies παντοδαπὸς γίγναι στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω rather than στρατηγὸς ἀνεφάνης, since (i) the purpose clause has a subjunctive, and (ii) a verb like ἀναφαίνομαι, which has non-volitional (non-controllable) meaning, cannot easily be connected with a purpose clause. Cp. the oddity of

³⁵⁰ Cp. also imperfect followed by ἕως + iterative aorist optative at *Phd.* 59d4 περιεμένον οὖν ἕκαστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθεῖ τὸ δεσμοτήριον.

³⁵¹ The value of the aorist is much like that of the gnomic aorist in generic contexts, where it may close a series of generic present indicatives, as in *Hdt.* 3.823 ἐς ἔχθεα μεγάλα ἀλλήλοισι ἀπικνέονται, ἐξ ὧν στάσιες ἐγγίνονται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν στασιῶν φόνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μουναρχίην. Cp. S-D 283, Rijksbaron (2002: 31 ff.).

Engl. *You turned out to be general, in order not to (need) to display your skill, or ... to avoid having to display* I may also refer, in this connection, to *Chrm.* 155c2, quoted in the note at 541e7 above, where we find ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν ... τὸν πλησίον ἐώθει σπουδῆ, ἵνα παρ' αὐτῷ καθέζοιτο, ἕως Although ὠθεῖν seems to denote an action that in principle is brought about volitionally (cp. LSJ s.v.) rather than accidentally, σπουδῆ must have been added to ensure the volitional interpretation, which was needed in view of the presence of the purpose clause.

542a3–6 εἰ δὲ μὴ τεχνικός εἶ, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὀμήρου μηδὲν εἰδὼς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ εἶπον περὶ σοῦ Socrates can say with good reason ὥσπερ ἐγὼ εἶπον περὶ σοῦ, for all the important themes of the discussion, and indeed of the whole dialogue, are present in the conditional clause:

– μὴ τεχνικός refers back to 532c5 τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη περὶ Ὀμήρου λέγειν ἀδύνατος εἶ, as well as 533d1 ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὄν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου εὖ λέγειν

– μὴ τεχνικός + θεία μοῖρα κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὀμήρου refers back to 536b5 κατέχει ἐξ Ὀμήρου and to 536c1–2 οὐ γὰρ τέχνη οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη περὶ Ὀμήρου λέγεις ἂ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα καὶ κατοκωχῆ

– μηδὲν εἰδὼς refers back to 536e4–5 περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ μὲν τυγχάνεις οὐκ εἰδὼς

– πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ refers back to 530c8–9 οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου, as well as, with Cornarius' λέγεις, to 536e1–2 ὧν Ὀμηρος λέγει περὶ τίνος εὖ λέγεις.

542a6 ἐλοῦ οὖν πότερα βούλει With ἐλοῦ οὖν πότερα cp. *Lg.* 858a6 αἰρώμεθα οὖν πότερον δοκεῖ.

542a7 εἶναι ἀνήρ

Text. εἶναι ἀνήρ SF : ἀνήρ εἶναι TW I have preferred the reading of SF, since it puts ἄδικος directly in front of εἶναι and thereby in the Focus position. This seems appropriate, because it makes the contrast with θεῖος more salient. For the sequence 'Focus—εἶναι' see on 535d1.

542b1 Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, θεῖος ('Choose therefore which of the two you prefer us to call you, dishonest or divine.')

'Divine, Socrates, by far.'

Text. θεῖος SF : om. TW Although, as far as I know, the text without θεῖος has been universally adopted, I will argue that the text of SF should be preferred.

There are four parallels for the question-answer sequence of our example:

- Cra.* 403c4 πότερος ἰσχυρότερός ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπιθυμία;—EPM. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιθυμία.
- Grg.* 478b5 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις];—ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις;—ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.—ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἢ δίκη.
- R.* 585c7 ὦδε δὲ κρίνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ γιγνόμενον;—Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει, τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.
- R.* 604a4 τόδε ... εἰπέ· πότερον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἶε τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτενεῖν, ὅταν ὀράται ..., ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἔρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν γίγνηται;—Πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὀράται.

In all five cases πολὺ διαφέρει (διοίσει) functions as an intensifying formula which modifies either a superlative, as at *Grg.* 478b5, or a comparative, as in the other instances; at *Ion* 542b1 the comparative meaning is conveyed by βούλει at a6. Superlative and comparative have to be supplied from the preceding question with respect to the constituent following πολὺ διαφέρει, which provides the answer to the question, i.e. in our case θεῖος. Πολὺ διαφέρει is an impersonal verb phrase, which literally means ‘There is a vast difference, it makes a big difference’ = ‘by far’, Dutch ‘met afstand’, and is syntactically independent. Semantically, one may compare the use of bare πολὺ as an intensifier of comparatives and superlatives, as indeed in the next sentence at *Ion* 542b1. Our examples should therefore be interpreted as follows:

- Cra.* 403c4 EPM. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιθυμία.—‘Desire, by far, Socrates’, sc. ἰσχυρότερα ἐστίν.
- Grg.* 478b5 Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἢ δίκη.—‘Justice, by far’, sc. καλλίστη ἐστίν.
- Ion* 542b1 ΙΩΝ Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὧ Σώκρατες, θεῖος. ‘Divine, by far’, sc. βούλομαι νομίζεσθαι, = ‘I prefer by far to be considered divine’.

- R. 585c7 Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει, τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.—‘That which is concerned with the invariable, by far’, sc. ‘exists more’ (μᾶλλον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ).
- R. 604a4 Πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁρᾶται.—‘When he is seen, by far’, sc. μᾶλλον οἶμαι μαχεῖται τε καὶ ἀντιτενεῖ.

As to the syntax, observe that in the last example ὅταν ὁρᾶται cannot possibly be taken as the subject of διαφέρει. From this it may be inferred that when the constituent which follows διαφέρει is a noun (*Cra.* 403c4, *Grg.* 478b5, *R.* 585c7), this is not the subject of διαφέρει either; at *R.* 585c7 there should therefore be a comma after διαφέρει. Rather, with the noun (adjective) of the answer the verb of the preceding question should be supplied. A related use is that of intensifying διαφερόντως ... πολύ with a comparative at *Lg.* 862d3 ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν διδάξει ... τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ μηδέποτε ἐκόντα τολμῆσαι ποιεῖν ἢ διαφερόντως ἦττον πολύ ‘... or else to do it ever so much less often’ (Bury). In fact, πολὺ διαφέρει in our five examples could be paraphrased by πολὺ διαφερόντως.

This use of πολὺ διαφέρει is generally misunderstood. Thus Dodds, apparently not aware of the existence of the other instances of πολὺ διαφέρει, notes at *Grg.* 478b5: ‘διαφέρει sc. κάλλει’, clearly taking ἡ δίκη as subject. This is impossible, for the reasons just set out, and also because there is no κάλλος present from which κάλλει might be supplied. Likewise Lamb: ‘Justice, Socrates, is far above the others’, and Jowett: ‘Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others’. Croiset, however, correctly translates: ‘La plus belle de beaucoup, Socrate, c’est la justice’.

As for the reading of T W, πολὺ διαφέρει without θεῖος, this yields a rather odd sequence of thoughts. Naturally, πολὺ διαφέρει must be the answer to the preceding question, but this gives us (translation Lamb): ‘Choose therefore which of the two you prefer us to call you, dishonest or divine.’—‘The difference is great, Socrates; for it is far nobler to be called divine.’ Unlike θεῖος in the text of S F, this is no real answer to ‘Would you prefer to be called dishonest or divine?’, consequently, Socrates’ question is not answered at all. There is one parallel in Plato for the text of T W at *Ion* 542b1, viz. at *R.* 582b2, in a rather complicated passage. The part which is important for our passage from *Ion* runs (*R.* 582a7 ff.): Σκόπει δὴ ... πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδῆς ... ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν;—Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ,

... There are no variants reported. This is like the text of T W at *Ion* 542a7; note also the presence of the γάρ clause after πολλὸν διαφέρει. Shorey (Loeb) translates: (Is *x* more experienced in *p* than *y* in *q*?)—‘There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds from childhood; but the lover of gain ...’. But to my mind ‘There is a vast difference’ is no more felicitous as an answer than ‘The difference is great’ at *Ion* 542b1. See also n. 352.

In view of the peculiarities involved in the text of T W, and of the existence of the examples of πολλὸν διαφέρει discussed above, there can to my mind be little doubt that the reading of S F, with θεῖος, should be preferred. With that text there is a perfectly straightforward answer: ‘Do you prefer to be called unjust or divine?—Divine, by far, Socrates’. The omission of θεῖος in T W may be due to the presence of θεῖος at the end of the preceding sentence, either accidentally or by someone who considered the second θεῖος redundant. The omission may have been the more easy if copyists took offense at what they saw as the combination Σώκρατες θεῖος.³⁵²

542b3 παρ’ ἡμῖν This picks up, and varies on, νομίζεσθαι ὑπὸ ἡμῶν at a7: ‘in our eyes, in our minds’; cp. e.g. Lamb’s ‘Then you may count on this nobler title in our minds’. This qualification turns the last sentence into a potentially dubious compliment. As Murray puts it: “‘in our eyes’ ironically suggests that the idea of *Ion* being inspired is merely a convenient hypothesis on S’s part’. Thus, the dialogue ends on a similar potentially ironical note as it begins: from ὁ Ἴων ‘illustrious *Ion*’, which is his status at the beginning of the dialogue (at least, Socrates makes him think so), he may now even be-

³⁵² In view of the considerations put forward above I am inclined to introduce ὁ φιλόσοφος after πολλὸν ... διαφέρει in the passage from *R.* 582a7 ff. This would give us: Σκόπει δὴ ... πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής ... ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν;—Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει, <ὁ φιλόσοφος> (sc. ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι): τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη ... = ‘Does the lover of gain ... to your mind have more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields, or the philosopher of that which results from gain?’ (Because of πότερον the ἢ after ἡδονῆς must be taken as ‘or’, not ‘than’, as in most translations). ‘The philosopher, by far (sc. is more experienced); for ...’ Observe that just as in the other examples a comparative notion is present in the question. As in the case from *Ion*, the omission of ὁ φιλόσοφος may be due to the presence of ὁ φιλόσοφος in the preceding sentence.

come θεῖος Ἴων—but only in the minds of people like Socrates, who do not take him seriously.

542b4 θεῖον ... καὶ μὴ τεχνικόν These final words bring us back to the first words spoken by Socrates after the proem, at 530b5–11. By choosing to be θεῖος Ion comes close to ‘his’ poet, but, being a rhapsode, he does not equal him. After all, Homer was called θεϊότατος by Socrates (530b10). And it is fitting that Socrates at the very end of the dialogue, with the words μὴ τεχνικόν formally cancels the presupposition carried by his words ἐξήλωσα ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥαψωδοὺς ... τῆς τέχνης at 530b5–6, namely that Ion possesses a skill.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: ΤΙ ΔΕ AND THE PUNCTUATION OF THE PLATO TEXT

It's tough being a stickler for punctuation these days.—Lynne Truss

At *Ion* 531b2 all modern editions punctuate as follows: Τί δὲ ὧν πέρι μὴ ταῦτά λέγουσιν; οἷον περὶ At 531d4, however, some of them print Τί δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων;, but others Τί δέ; οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ οὐ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων;³⁵³ Again, at 531e4, they all print: Τί δ'; ὅταν πολλῶν λεγόντων περὶ ὑγιεινῶν σιτίων ὁποῖά ἐστιν, εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγη, πότερον ... ἢ ...;. The MSS and the Aldina, on the other hand, have no question mark (or other punctuation mark) after any of these τί δέ's. In what follows, I will try to clarify these discrepancies, which are less trivial than they may seem. I can perhaps best illustrate my point by reviewing Burnet's text of a long passage from the *Hippias Minor* (373c8–376b6) where the punctuation phenomena involved are represented on a larger scale than in the *Ion*. At the end of the discussion of this passage I will come back to the cases of τί δέ from the *Ion*. Naturally, Burnet's punctuation stands in a long tradition, which started with Stephanus' edition of 1578. I will discuss Stephanus' views on how to punctuate the Plato text in a separate section at the end of this Appendix. By way of a caveat I add that the phenomena to be discussed relate to the form the Byzantine and later scribes and scholars gave to the Plato text. Since Plato himself and the scribes of his time used hardly any punctuation marks at all (see above p. 68 n. 150), the ultimate question is how Plato's readers were able to perceive and appreciate these phenomena. I will briefly discuss this point in the final section of this Appendix.

³⁵³ Méridier has Τί δὲ (*sic*); οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί (*sic*) οὐ ...;, which probably means that he follows Bekker, Stallbaum and Schanz, who print Τί δέ;.

I.1 τί δέ as a marker of *Topic shift*³⁵⁴

While questioning an interlocutor, Socrates frequently makes use of the following procedure. Having introduced, by means of a certain noun or noun phrase, an entity to illustrate his argument from, and having asked questions for some time about this entity, he shifts from this entity to another one, which illustrates his point from a different angle. The shift is marked by τί δέ, and I will argue that in such a series of questions the new entity is immediately introduced after τί δέ, and that this should be formally indicated by *not* printing a question mark after τί δέ, which would separate τί δέ from the text that follows. This procedure is well illustrated by the passage mentioned above, *Hp.Mi.* 373c8–376b6, where Socrates is going to investigate (διασκέψασθαι) the question (373c6 ff.) πότεροι ποτε ἀμείνους, οἱ ἐκόντες ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνοντες. In pragmatic terms: διασκέψασθαι tells us what type of Discourse will follow (an *Investigation*),³⁵⁵ while the question πότεροι etc. introduces the overall *Discourse Topic* of the Investigation. Within the framework of this Discourse Topic (‘who are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily?’) Socrates seeks answers from Hippias to questions about two classes of human activities: (a) the use of the body parts (373c9–374e2), and (b) the use of instruments, which includes the use of the soul (374e3–376b6). In actual practice, the investigation focuses on a number of *Paragraph Topics* belonging to these two classes, which illustrate the overall Discourse Topic, in the following way.

³⁵⁴ Much of what I am going to say in this Appendix is an elaboration of the following brief but pertinent remark in K-G 2, 518 Anm. 4: ‘Um den Gegenstand der Frage bei einem Gegensatz oder Übergange der Rede nachdrücklich hervorzuheben, werden oft die Worte, welche diese Gegenstand bezeichnen, mit τί δέ vorangestellt, und dann das Prädikat des eigentlichen Fragsatzes gemeinlich mit einem zweiten Fragworte gesetzt’. One of their examples is *R.* 332e3 Τίς δὲ πλεόντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον (sc. εὖ ποιεῖ);—Κυβερνήτης.—Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει ... δυνατότατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;. Observe that the nominative form ὁ δίκαιος both continues the preceding nominatives and anticipates the subject function of ὁ δίκαιος in the question that follows. This τί δέ-‘format’ is abundantly present in the passage from *Hp.Mi.* to be discussed.

³⁵⁵ ‘Investigation’ may be called a ‘staging’ element, and evokes a *Scenario*. For Staging, Scenario and the other terms used here see Brown & Yule (1983; Staging 134–152, Scenario 245–247, Discourse Topic 71–83, Paragraph, in a semantic-pragmatic sense, 95–100).

After Hippias has declared his willingness to cooperate with Socrates (Ἄλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι ... ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει), Socrates assures Hippias, at 373c8, that for his investigation the procedure, or *Scenario*, he is going to follow is the best one (οἶμαι οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν ὀρθότατ' ἂν ᾧδε ἐλθεῖν). ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναί· καλεῖς τινα δρομέα ἀγαθόν;³⁵⁶ With this sentence Socrates introduces the runner, who will be the Topic of his questions up to 373e6, where he summarizes the discussion so far by means of Ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα This concluding formula ends the first paragraph and paves the way (μὲν) for a second Topic, which is introduced at 374a1: Τί δ' ἐν πάλλῃ; πότερος ...;. The transition from δρόμος to this Topic, πάλλῃ, is formally marked by τί δ(έ). By its form, ἐν πάλλῃ continues ἐν δρόμῳ, while syntactically it anticipates its function in the πότερος question, a 'format' that will be repeated in most other cases of τί δέ (cp. also n. 354). The πότερος question is followed by another question, and this part is summarized at 374a5: Καὶ ἐν πάλλῃ ἄρα Then Socrates passes on to the use of the human body in general, 374a7 Τί δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ τῇ τοῦ σώματος χρειᾶ; οὐχ ...;, which functions in the same way as ἐν πάλλῃ above. This involves first ἰσχὺς, then grace, 374b5 Τί δὲ κατ' εὐσχημοσύνην, ᾧ Ἰππία; οὐ ...;,³⁵⁷ thereafter the voice, 374c2 Τί δὲ φωνῆς περὶ λέγεις; ποτέραν ...;, next follows limping, which is not introduced by τί δέ, however, but by a simple δέ: χολεῖα δέ. So far I have followed the punctuation of Burnet and others. (Henceforth, 'Burnet' = 'Burnet and modern editors in general'.) Then we read to our surprise at 374d2 Τί δέ; ἀμβλωπία οὐ πονηρία ὀφθαλμῶν;. Since this is simply the next item in the series about the uses and properties of the (parts of the) body there is no reason to change the punctuation here all of a sudden. So we should punctuate: Τί δὲ ἀμβλωπία; οὐ πονηρία ὀφθαλμῶν;, with the Aldina,³⁵⁸ and render 'What about dimness of sight? Isn't this faultiness of

³⁵⁶ 'Does there exist someone whom you call a good runner?', 'Dis-moi: y a-t-il selon toi de bons coureurs?' (Croiset), rather than 'Do you call someone a good runner?' (Fowler) or 'might you call anyone a good runner?' (Allen), for we are dealing here with 'l'emploi existentiel du verbe onomastique' (Ruijgh 1976: 368). See also LSJ s.v. καλέω 3a and b.

³⁵⁷ Which continues κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν at 374b3. The break between b4 and b5 in Burnet's text wrongly suggests that there is a caesura in the argument.

³⁵⁸ Actually, the Aldina prints: Τί δὲ ἀμβλωπία, οὐ πονηρία ὀφθαλμῶν;. In the Aldina, as well as the more recent MSS, like S, F, Par. 1811 and Vat. 1030, the διαστολή (comma) has by and large replaced the ὑποστιγμὴ as a means to indicate an 'incomplete thought'. For the latter cp. the Introduction §5.3 (i), for the διαστολή see at 537d3 ff. In not printing a question mark after τί δὲ ἀμβλωπία, the Aldina contin-

the eyes?’³⁵⁹ The text with Burnet’s punctuation is rendered by Fowler as ‘Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes?’, but this suggests, as it does in Greek, I suppose, that Socrates was already speaking about ‘dimness of sight’, in other words, that ἀμβλωπία was already the Topic—which it was not. Next, Socrates continues speaking about the qualities of the eyes, but when he sums up he broadens the conclusion so as to include other sensory organs: 374d8 Οὐκοῦν πάντα, οἷον καὶ ὄτα καὶ ῥίνας καὶ στόμα καὶ πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις εἰς λόγος συνέχει. With this sentence he formally ends the discussion about the use of the body parts which he started at 373c9 with the runner. Then Socrates continues, at least with Burnet’s punctuation, with Τί δέ; ὀργάνων ποτέρων βελτίων ἢ κοινωνία, οἷς ἐκὼν τις κακὰ ἐργάζεται ἢ οἷς ἄκων;, (Fowler:) ‘Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those instruments with which a man does bad work voluntarily or involuntarily?’ But again this suggests that Socrates was already speaking about instruments, which, again, he was not. Here, too, there is, after the conclusion of the discussion about the body parts, a switch to a new Topic, which now, since the body is no longer on the agenda, naturally is a new class-denoting noun. So the punctuation should be (again with the Aldina):³⁶⁰ Τί δὲ ὀργάνων; ποτέρων βελτίων ἢ κοινωνία, οἷς ἐκὼν τις κακὰ ἐργάζεται ἢ οἷς ἄκων;, ‘What about instruments? Which ones are ...?’, etc. Syntactically, the genitive ὀργάνων loosely continues the construction at 374d6 Βελτίω ἄρα ἦγησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ ..., and anticipates the genitive of the ποτέρων

ues the practice of the Byzantine MSS, since as a rule these question marks are *not* added if the interrogative character is already clear from introductory question words like τί(ς), πῶς, πότεν, πότερον, etc. If the interrogative character is not clear from the form of the sentence, i.e. in *yes/no*-questions, the MSS may or may not add question marks. For these phenomena I refer to Randolph’s fundamental article about the question mark in Greek MSS from 1910. The variation in punctuation after the two question types—specifying, *x*- or word-questions on the one hand and *yes/no*-questions on the other—is no coincidence, for the two types were strictly distinguished in antiquity, and called πύσματα (or πύσεις) and ἐρωτήματα (or ἐρωτήσεις), respectively. I have discussed them in Rijksbaron (2003).

³⁵⁹ The nominative ἀμβλωπία continues the nominative of χωλεία and, once again, anticipates its function in the question that follows.

³⁶⁰ Τί δὲ ὀργάνων ποτέρων βελτίων ἢ κοινωνία. Twice a μέση στιγμή; for its value cp. the Introduction §5.3 (i). For the absence of the question mark after ποτέρων see n. 358.

that comes next.³⁶¹ There follows a short list of instruments—oars, bows, lyres, flutes καὶ τὰλλα σύμπαντα—which are all of a concrete nature, and then we find Τί δέ; ψυχὴν κεκτηῖσθαι ἵππου, ἢ ἐκὼν τις κακῶς ἰπεύσει, ἄμεινον ἢ ἢ ἄκων;. However, we must assume that once again Socrates passes over to another type of instruments, viz. horses, and more specifically their soul, so we should once again punctuate: Τί δέ ψυχὴν κεκτηῖσθαι ἵππου; ἢ ἐκὼν τις κακῶς ἰπεύσει, ἄμεινον<ος>³⁶² ἢ ἢ ἄκων;, ‘What about the possession of the soul of a horse? Is it of a better horse, the soul whereby one voluntarily, or (whereby one) involuntarily will drive badly?’ = ‘Does the soul which makes you voluntarily drive badly belong to a better horse, or the soul which makes you do so involuntarily?’ Note that the dative ἢ in the relative clause is an instrumental dative.³⁶³ Likewise, and with a similar syntactic format, at 375a7, where the punctuation should be: Τί δέ δὴ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν ἐκτηῖσθαι τοξότου; ἄμεινονός ἐστιν,³⁶⁴ ἢ τις ἐκουσίως ἀμαρτάνει τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἢ ἦτις ἀκουσίως;. After Hippias’ reply: Ἦτις ἐκουσίως, Socrates concludes that the soul which ἐκουσίως

³⁶¹ For the use of the genitive after τί δέ cp. also K-G 1, 363 Anm. 11: ‘Wie gesagt werden kann τί κρίνεις, ἡγεῖ, οἷτι τινός, so auch elliptisch: τί δέ τινος;’. Observe that in the *Hr.Mi.* ἡγησαι is present in the context, at d6.

³⁶² I propose to read ἄμεινον<ος>, with which ἵππου should be supplied; cp. below, n. 364. T W’s ἄμεινον wrongly suggests that this is about ψυχὴ; this, however, is the next step, at a3. As for the syntax, here the format is being varied. I take it that ψυχὴν κεκτηῖσθαι represents a nominative, which continues ἡ κοινωνία at e3, κεκτηῖσθαι being a permanent form of κοινωνία. The accusative ψυχὴν, however, does not have a clear function in the question that follows.

³⁶³ Syntactically, with the following question ‘... ἢ ...;’ πότερον should be supplied, from the ποτέρων ... ἢ ... question at e3–4. For horses as instruments cp. the combination of forms of χρῆσθαι with ἵππῳ/ἵπποις, in *Ap.* 25b4, *Lg.* 625d2; frequently in Xenophon, e.g. *Mem.* 2.6.7, *Oec.* 2.11, *An.* 1.9.5, etc. For the idea of the soul as an instrument cp. *Tht.* 184d3 ff.: ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά, *Clit.* 408a5 ὅστις ψυχῆ μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι (which comes after a passage where the proper use of eyes, ears, lyres and other ὄργανα and κτήματα (408a3) has been mentioned).

³⁶⁴ Ἀμεινονος, with T W, not ἄμεινον, with F; with ἀμεινονος, τοξότου should be supplied: ‘What about the soul of an archer? Is it of a better archer, the soul which misses ... or which ...?’ = ‘Does the soul which misses the target voluntarily belong to a better archer, or the soul which misses it involuntarily?’ Both at a2 and at a7 the argument has two stages: first the ‘owner’ of the soul is discussed, than its/his soul; cp. Ἀμεινον ἄρα ἐστίν (sc. ἡ ψυχῆ) at 375a3 and Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὕτη ἀμεινων εἰς τοξικήν ἐστιν; at 375b2.

ἀμαρτάνει is also better εἰς τοξικὴν. After Hippias' affirmative answer Socrates strikes the balance of this part of the discussion (375b3): Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀκουσίως ἀμαρτάνουσα πονηρότερα ἢ ἔκουσίως;, which at the same time refers back to the conclusion reached at 373e6 Ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα πονηρότερος Just as Hippias replied there with Ἐν δρόμῳ γε, so he now answers Ἐν τοξικῇ γε. And just as Socrates had introduced there a new Topic with Τί δ' ἐν πάλλῃ;, so he now, still speaking about ψυχὴ, goes on with another skill: Τί δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ; οὐχὶ ἢ ἔκοῦσα ... ἐργαζομένη ... ἰατρικωτέρα;. Here, after four instances of τί δέ;, Burnet reverts, correctly but quite unexpectedly, to the punctuation without a question mark after τί δέ, only to resume τί δέ; three lines further at 375b8: Τί δέ; ἢ κιθαριστικωτέρα καὶ αὐλητικωτέρα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχναις τε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, οὐχὶ ἢ ἀμείνων ...;, quite misleadingly. For thus punctuated, the sentence suggests that it is not the soul but rather τέχναι or τέχνη which is the subject of the ensuing question, as indeed in Méridier's translation: 'De même, pour la citharistique, pour l'aulétique, et en général pour toutes les techniques et toutes les sciences, la supériorité n'est-elle pas à l'art qui peut ...' etc., while in fact Socrates is still speaking about the ψυχὴ. Actually, with τί δέ Socrates turns from the soul which is ἰατρικωτέρα to the soul which is κιθαριστικωτέρα etc., so the translation should run (with the question mark after ἐπιστήμας): 'And what about the soul which is more expert at the lyre or the flute, and all the other things which concern the arts and sciences? Is not that soul better which ...?' The next question concerns 'our own' soul (375c6), i.e. the souls of Socrates and Ion, so again the punctuation should be: Τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν; οὐ βουλοίμεθ' ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι;. ³⁶⁵ This part on the soul is concluded by Οὐκοῦν ...; at 375d1, which is followed by a brief interlude, an exchange of opinions on the enormous consequences of the discussion so far.

Thereupon Socrates, still within the general framework of his original question πότεροί ποτε ἀμείνους, οἱ ἔκόντες ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνοντες, repeats his original request (ἀπόκριναι, 373c9) while at the

³⁶⁵ Significantly, Méridier, who prints τί δέ;, ignores this punctuation in his translation: 'Et notre âme à nous? ne devons nous pas désirer que ...?' As for the accusative τὴν ἡμετέραν see the second part of the remark in K-G 2, 518 Anm. 4, which continues the part quoted in n. 354: 'Auch bei dem Akkusative mit Rücksicht auf das Verb des folgenden Fragsatzes. Pl. Soph. 266, c τί δέ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἀρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν εἶναι;'.

same time turning to a new Topic (δέ) illustrating the soul as instrument: *πάλιν δὲ ἀπόκριναι ἢ δικαιοσύνη ...*; which is either a δύναμις or an ἐπιστήμη or both. He asks Ion to consider first the possibility that it is a δύναμις (375e1 Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς ...), next that it is an ἐπιστήμη (375e4 Τί δ' εἰ ἐπιστήμη (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς); οὐχ ...), and thirdly that it is both (375e6 Τί δ' εἰ ἀμφοτέρα; οὐχ ...). In both cases Burnet prints τί δέ without a question mark, rightly, since τί δέ marks the shift to a new Topic. Thereafter Socrates confronts Hippias with a number of consequences of the various positions, which brings him to the conclusion that the man who voluntarily errs, if such a man exists, is the good man.

I hope I have shown that in this passage τί δέ is consistently used to mark the shift from one Topic to another Topic;³⁶⁶ to bring this out there should be no question mark after τί δέ. By this use of τί δέ, Socrates' investigation is organized in a predictable and transparent way, according to the standard pattern Τί δὲ *x*;, followed by a question about *x*. With the punctuation of the τί δέ questions in our modern editions, however, where τί δέ sometimes is, and sometimes is not, followed by a question mark, this transparency has completely disappeared.

Other, less elaborate, instances of inconsistent punctuation occur in dozens of other passages in our Plato editions; I can present here only a few examples (the punctuation is that of the OCT volumes). See:

Euthphr. 7d9 Τί δὲ οἱ θεοί, ὧ Εὐθύφρων; οὐκ ... διαφέρουσιν' ἄν;—rightly, since Socrates shifts from humans to the gods.

Euthphr. 8b10 Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὧ Εὐθύφρων, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας ...;—wrongly, for here Socrates shifts from the gods (τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα, b7–8) to human beings, so the punctuation should be Τί δὲ ἀνθρώπων, ὧ Εὐθύφρων; ἤδη ...;

Phd. 71a6 Τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;—wrongly, for after 70e10 Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;. Socrates now shifts to a new, contrasting Topic, which is, like ἔλαττον, an adjective;³⁶⁷ so read Τί

³⁶⁶ To be complete I should add that τί δέ does not always mark a Topic shift. See below on *Ion* 540d3 and 541d5.

³⁶⁷ In fact, although the constituent after τί δέ is not a noun but an adjective, this has still Topic function, since the second part of the sentence is a question about 'χεῖρον'.

δὲ ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται; οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;.

Phd. 71a12 Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι ...;—rightly, for τί δέ is not followed by a new noun or other potential Topic, contrasting with an earlier Topic (as in the examples above), but by ἔστι, which introduces an altogether new class of entities.³⁶⁸

Grg. 454c8–9 καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκένας;—*ΓΟΡ.* Καλῶ.—*ΣΩ.* Τί δέ; πεπιστευκένας;—*ΓΟΡ.* Ἐγωγε., wrongly, for πεπιστευκένας is the next item to which the question 'καλεῖς ... τι' applies.³⁶⁹ So Τί δὲ πεπιστευκένας; 'And what about "being full of faith"?'

Grg. 454d6–7 Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;—wrongly, for ἐπιστήμη is opposed to πίστις (cp. 454d5 Ἄρ' ἔστιν τις, ᾧ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;); so read Τί δὲ ἐπιστήμη; ἔστιν ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;

Now to return to the *Ion*, I conclude this section with a survey of all instances of τί δέ in the dialogue, with, if applicable, a new punctuation:

531b2 Τί δὲ ᾧν πέρι μὴ ταῦτὰ λέγουσιν; οἷον περὶ μαντικῆς λέγει τι Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος. So Burnet, rightly, since the τί δέ question is opposed to 531a5 *ΣΩ.* Ἔστι δὲ περὶ οὗτου Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος ταῦτὰ λέγετον;.

531d4 Τί δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων; So Burnet, rightly. Homer and the other poets were both introduced at c1–2; after questions about Homer Socrates now turns to the other poets.

531e4 Τί δ'; ὅταν πολλῶν λεγόντων περὶ ὑγιεινῶν σιτίων ὁποῖά ἐστιν, εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγη, πότερον ἕτερος μὲν ...; So Burnet, wrongly. Read: Τί δ' ὅταν πολλῶν λεγόντων περὶ ὑγιεινῶν σιτίων ὁποῖά ἐστιν, εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγη; πότερον ἕτερος μὲν ...;. While discussing the quality of speaking, Socrates here turns from a Topic borrowed from counting (531d11 Οὐκοῦν, ᾧ φίλη κεφαλή Ἴων, ὅταν περὶ ἀριθμοῦ πολλῶν λεγόντων εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγη, γινώσεται δήπου τις τὸν εὖ

³⁶⁸ This is not connected with the presence of αὖ, for αὖ may also occur when a Topic shift is involved, as at *Alc.* 1 115a1 Τί δ' αὖ τὰ καλά; πότερον ...;, where Socrates turns from τὰ δίκαια to the other item mentioned in the preceding context, τὰ καλά.

³⁶⁹ For the use of καλεῖν cp. above 245, on καλεῖς τινα δρομέα ἀγαθόν.

λέγοντα;) to a new Topic, the quality of speaking in health care. So we should, with manuscripts T and W, the Aldina and Stephanus, punctuate accordingly, opposing ὅταν περὶ ὑγιεινῶν σιτίων εἰς τις ἄριστα λέγη to ὅταν περὶ ἀριθμοῦ εἰς τις ἄριστα λέγη.

533a6 Τί δέ; ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ ἤδη τιν' εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν Δαιδάλου ...; So Burnet, wrongly. Read: Τί δὲ ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ; ἤδη τιν' εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν Δαιδάλου ...; Having introduced γραφικὴ (532e4) and having spoken about painters (Ἦδη οὖν τινα εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν Πολυγνώτου τοῦ Ἀγλαοφώντος ...;) Socrates now passes on to another τέχνη: 'What about the art of sculpting? Have you ...?' Compare Serranus' translation: 'Quid vero in arte statuaria, quenuquamne ... vidisti ...?', and n. 374.

538b6 Τί δὲ δὴ ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγη ὡς τετρωμένῳ τῷ Μαχάονι Ἑκαμήδη ἢ Νέστορος παλλακὴ κυκεῶνα πίνειν δίδωσι; καὶ λέγει πως οὕτως ... So Burnet; rightly, since Socrates shifts from what Homer said about chariot driving (537c1–2 ταῦτα δὴ ... τὰ ἔπη εἶτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἶτε μή, πότερος ἀν γνοίη ...) to another Topic relating to words said by Homer. The eventual πότερον question follows at 538c4. Note that here the new Topic is an implicit ἔπη, evoked by ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγη.

538c7 ff. Τί δέ, ὅταν λέγη Ὅμηρος ...; (d4) ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἀλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρίναι ἢ ῥαψωδικῆς, ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἶτε καλῶς εἶτε μή; For some reason Burnet and others print a comma here, not a question mark, after τί δέ, but the construction is the same as at 538b6 (and 531e4), so read: Τί δὲ ὅταν λέγη Ὅμηρος ...; (d4) ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἀλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρίναι ἢ ῥαψωδικῆς, ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἶτε καλῶς εἶτε μή;.

540d3 Τί δέ; ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη στρατηγικὴ ἐστίν; So Burnet, rightly, for here Socrates does *not* turn to a different Topic but continues speaking about ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη, which had been, in fact, the Topic of the discussion from 539e1–3 onwards: ἐκλεξον ... ὅποια τοῦ ῥαψωδοῦ ἐστίν, ὧ Ἴων, καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ῥαψωδικῆς. Here, τί δέ indicates that the speaker is going to ask for further details about the Topic at hand. So not: 'And what about the art of the rhapsode?', but 'Well? Is the art ...? etc. Or there may be a hint of incredulity: 'What?! Is the art ...?', as in the next instance. See also comm. ad loc.

Whether or not τί δέ marks a Topic shift depends, then, crucially on the pragmatic status of the constituent after τί δέ. If this constituent was already the Topic in the preceding context, there is no Topic shift but Topic continuity. (This continuative use of τί δέ is not found in the passage from *Hippias Minor* analysed above.)

541d5 τί δέ; οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἐστε οἱ Ἐφέσιοι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ ἡ Ἐφεσος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων πόλεως; So Burnet, rightly. Again there is no Topic shift. Here, no real questioning is involved, nor is τί δέ followed by a noun or other potential Topic candidate; note also that τί δέ is both preceded and followed by a rhetorical question: Ἴωνα δ' ἄρα τὸν Ἐφέσιον οὐχ αἰρήσεται στρατηγὸν καὶ τιμήσει, ἐὰν δοκῇ ἄξιος λόγου εἶναι; τί δέ; οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἐστε οἱ Ἐφέσιοι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ ἡ Ἐφεσος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων πόλεως;. As a result, τί δέ gets an altogether different interpretation, probably conveying a mixture of (mock) incredulity and (mock) indignation. I should add that the context need not be rhetorical to arrive at this interpretation; cp. above, 540d3, and cases like *Phd.* 61c6 Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος;, where τί δέ indicates that something in the words of the previous speaker prompts the present speaker to ask the question οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος;. Frequently, the second question is introduced by οὐ.³⁷⁰ See further Denniston 175.³⁷¹

1.2 τί δέ in the *MSS* and the *Aldina*

Above I pointed out that neither the primary *MSS* of the *Ion* nor the *Aldina* punctuate directly after τί δέ.³⁷² In omitting punctuation marks the scribes must have been guided by the views of Byzantine gram-

³⁷⁰ Some other examples are: *Phd.* 61d6 τί δέ, ὦ Κεβης; οὐκ ...; *Cra.* 427e5 τί δέ, ὦ Ἐρμόγενης; δοκεῖ σοι ...; *Phdr.* 227b9 Τί δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἶει ...; 234e5 τί δέ; καὶ ταύτη ...; *Alc.* 1 114e2 τί δέ; οὐχ ...; *Euthd.* 272b5 τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβῆ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἦδη πρεσβύτερος ἦς; *R.* 343a5 Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ...; *R.* 413a5 τί δέ; οὐ ...; *R.* 450b4 τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Θρασύμαχος; ... οἶει ...;

³⁷¹ Who in such cases speaks of 'elliptical' τί δέ, the full expression being τί δ' ἔστι;.

³⁷² I should add, however, that this also holds good for the cases where I *did* argue for a question mark after τί δέ, i.e. when there is no Topic shift, as at *Ion* 540d4 Τί δέ; ἡ ῥαψωδικὴ τέχνη στρατηγικὴ ἐστίν; and 541e5 τί δέ; οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἐστε ...; See also the final section of this Appendix.

marians and rhetoricians about the use of δέ, for example those of Arethas (the well-known bishop of Caesarea and the commissioner of the Bodleianus B, completed in 895), from whom I quote the following passage, which has a surprisingly modern, pragmatic, ring (*Scholia in Porphyrii eisagogen*, 53, ed. M. Share, Brussels 1994. Note on Τὸ δὲ εἶδος λέγεται μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκάστου μορφῆς (3.22–4.4)):

Ἀκολουθῶς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἐπαγγελίᾳ τὸν περὶ εἶδους λόγον μεταχειρίζεται, διὸ δὴ καὶ τῷ ἀκολουθητικῷ κέχρηται συνδέσμῳ, ἅτε δὴ συνεχῆ τὴν διδασκαλίαν ποιῶν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἄνω φησὶν ἔοικεν δὲ μήτε τὸ γένος μήτε τὸ εἶδος ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ τέλος μὲν ὁ περὶ γένους λόγος ἀπείληφεν, λοιπὴ δὲ ἡ περὶ εἶδους διάσκεψις, ἀναγκαίως τῷ κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ εἶδους λόγῳ ὁ δέ, ἀκολουθητικὸς ἢ μεταβατικὸς σύνδεσμος, παρελήφθη.

'Following his own announcement he (: Porphyrius) (now) takes the argumentation concerning εἶδος in hand, and that is why he employs the conjunction of linkage; naturally, he makes his instruction coherent. For in view of the fact that above he said 'it would seem that neither γένος nor εἶδος are used in one sense', and that the argument on γένος has been concluded, but that the investigation of εἶδος is still due, it was necessary for the start of the argument on εἶδος to use δέ, the conjunction of linkage or transition.'

Similar observations occur in other Middle-Byzantine authors, like Michael Syncellus (8th–9th cent.), *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου συντάξεως* 187: ὁ δέ ... ἐπακολουθητικὸς καλεῖται· ἔστι δὲ καὶ μεταβατικὸς ἐπεὶ δι' αὐτοῦ ποιούμεθα μεταβάσεις νοημάτων καὶ διηγημάτων, and the commentators on Dionysius Thrax; cp. the comments on Δέ.] ... Καλεῖται δὲ καὶ μεταβατικὸς· ἀπὸ προσώπου γὰρ εἰς πρόσωπον ἢ ἀπὸ πράγματος εἰς πρᾶγμα μεταβαίνοντες αὐτῷ κέχρηται πάντες (*Schol. in Dion. Thr. artem grammaticam*, Gramm. Gr. I 3, p. 62, 8). They stand in a long tradition, which goes back at least to Apollonius Dyscolus; see ὁ δέ ... μετάβασιν ... τοῦ πράγματος σημαίνων ... (A.D. *Adv.*; Gramm. Gr. III 1, p. 182, 16).

When seen against this background it is quite understandable that the MSS and the Aldina do not punctuate after δέ in τί δέ (except for an occasional comma), for this would conspicuously clash with the transitional function of δέ.

The Byzantine traditions in this field fell into oblivion, however, after the appearance of Stephanus' Plato edition.

I.3 τί δέ in *Stephanus' edition*

When Henri Estienne published his three volume edition (Geneva 1578), he introduced a number of innovations with respect to the Aldine edition.³⁷³ The most important of these was no doubt his decision to divide the text into sections, which, together with the volume and page numbers of his edition, became *the* means to refer to the Plato text. As for the text itself, '[a]s a rule, Stephanus follows the text of the previous editions' (Boter 1989: 250)—the text, indeed, but not the punctuation. In fact, Henri Estienne had a very low opinion of the editing practices of his predecessors, and especially of the way they punctuated. The vehement rhetoric of the *Annotationes* in the third volume of his edition (p. 9) speaks volumes: 'In ... locis quamplurimis, et propemodum infinitis, lectionem quae hîc est, ab ea quam illae [viz. those of his predecessors] habent differre, si conferre libeat, comperies (—). Ut de maximo aliorum taceam locorum numero, qui ob praepostere positas interpunctiones in illis editionibus, omnino depravati erant: qui quantum mihi negotii exhibuerint, vix credi potest.' As a result, he frequently changed the punctuation, indeed 'in ... locis quamplurimis, et propemodum infinitis'—but not necessarily for the better. He must have been entirely ignorant of the Byzantine traditions in this matter, and especially of the underlying theoretical considerations. Be that as it may, the punctuation introduced by Stephanus in the Plato text was there to stay, largely unaltered, into modern

³⁷³ And with respect to the subsequent, Aldine-like, editions, viz. the Basle editions of 1534 and 1556. For Stephanus' use of these editions (which included plagiarizing of the second Basle edition, and of Cornarius' *Eclogae*, the emendations accompanying Cornarius' translation, published in 1561) see e.g. Boter (1989: 247–251) (Schreiber (1982: 170) and Kecskeméti et al. (2003: 413) wrongly say that Stephanus mentions both Basle editions). Perhaps I should add, however, that, although the Aldina still looked like a MS that happened to be printed, the most important innovations had already been introduced there, notably: (a) the replacement of the dicolon (double dot), and the *paragraphos*, to indicate speaker change, by the name of the speaker in an abbreviated form, for which see also the Introduction §3.2; (b) the fairly consistent use of the question mark in *yes/no*-questions (which was also already present in the *Vorlage* of the Aldina in the *Ion*, viz. Par. 1811); (c) the use of a capital letter for the first letter of the first word spoken by some speaker; and (d) the use of a dot (period) on the line after the last letter of the last word of a complete utterance, rather than a high dot (στυγμῆ τελεία) above the last letter of the last word. In the MSS the dot on the line, the ὑποστυγμῆ, is used after incomplete utterances; see Introduction §5.3 (i).

times.³⁷⁴ Occasionally later editors, notably Bekker and Burnet, deviated from Stephanus' punctuation,³⁷⁵ but on the whole the punctuation of modern editors is the same as that of Stephanus. In nearly all cases from the *Hp.Mi.* and the *Ion* where I argued against the question mark after τί δέ, this question mark is due to Stephanus.

I.4 τί δέ in Plato's own text

The above discussion was conducted, so to speak, with the Byzantine copyists, with Aldus and Musurus, and finally with Stephanus and later editors of the Plato text. This was inevitable, of course, for the text we are editing has passed through their hands, which have left indispensable but also virtually ineffaceable marks on it, as regards word division, accentuation and punctuation. Behind this text, however, lies the, visually altogether different, text of Plato. (For the notion 'text of Plato' cp. the Introduction §4.2.) Was the function of τί δέ also recognizable in that text, without the help of punctuation marks? I think, in fact, it was. There are three syntactic-pragmatic clues that must have steered the interpretation, without being dependent on punctuation marks. Indeed, it is some such clues that ultimately must have led to the theories and practices of the Byzantine scholars and copyists concerning τί δέ. We must assume that readers of Plato were familiar with, and alert to, the occurrence of these clues. They are:³⁷⁶

³⁷⁴ Remarkably, Serranus' translation often ignores Stephanus' punctuation. Thus, at *Ion* 533a6, opposite Stephanus' text Τί δ'; ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ ἦδη τιν' εἶδες ...; Serranus presents the following translation: 'Quid vero in arte statuaria, quenquamne ... vidisti ...?' Serranus ignores, then, Τί δ'; and treats ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ as the Topic of the sentence, as in my analysis above (p. 251). In fact, from a remark near the end of Stephanus' preface we learn that Serranus had ordered ('iussit') Stephanus to leave intact any deviations as to text and 'interpungendi ratio' he might detect in Serranus' translation, just as he, Serranus, had accepted to have Stephanus' translation in the margin of his own translation in those cases where Stephanus did not agree with that translation. This does not exactly point to an atmosphere of friendly cooperation, and Stephanus and Serranus entertained indeed a cold and difficult relationship. At one point during their work on Plato, Serranus called Stephanus 'infaustus ille cacographus'. For this and other details about Stephanus see Reverdin (1956).

³⁷⁵ Thus, the punctuation Τί δέ; ὄταν ... at 531e4 seems to be due to Bekker, and Τί δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ ... at 531d4 to Burnet.

³⁷⁶ To simulate the original situation I use uncials in *scriptio continua*, and the *paragraphos* and dicolon for change of speaker; the line division and the size of the

General function: **ΤΙΔΕ** signals that during a conversation the speaker is making a new move. Then either

(i) **ΤΙΔΕ** is followed by a noun or other constituent that differs from the constituent that had been the Topic of the discussion so far: there is, then, a *Topic shift*; **ΤΙΔΕ** is also the sign that the reader may expect that a question will follow about that constituent. This situation yields the ‘standard’ or ‘default’ pattern of the *Hippias Minor*, e.g. at 374a1 ff.:

_ ΕΝΔΡΟΜΩΓΕ : ΤΙΔΕ ΕΝ ΠΑΛΗ
 ΠΟΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΗΣ ΑΜΕΙ
 _ ΝΩΝΟ ΕΚΩΝ ΠΙΠΤΩΝ ΗΘΑ ΕΚΩΝ :
 _ Ο ΕΚΕΝΩΣΘΕ ΟΙΚΕΝ : etc.

or (ii) **ΤΙΔΕ** is followed by a noun or other constituent that had already been the Topic of the discussion so far; there is, therefore, *no Topic shift*. Here, too, **ΤΙΔΕ** is the sign that the reader may expect that a question will follow about that constituent. This is the type represented by *Ion* 540d3 (see comm. ad loc.):

ΝΑΙ ΤΑ ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ ΓΝΩΣΕΤΑΙ
 _ ΟΡΑΨΩΙΔΟΣ : ΤΙΔΕ ΗΡΑΨΩΙΔΑΙ
 _ ΚΗΤΕΧΝΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ :
 ΓΝΟΙΗΝ ΓΟΥΝ ΑΝ ΕΓΩ ΓΕ etc.

or, finally, (iii) **ΤΙΔΕ** is not followed by a noun or other potential Topic candidate at all, but e.g. by **ΟΥ**. In this case, the reader can infer that **ΤΙΔΕ** has an *altogether different* function. This type is represented by *Ion* 541d5 ff. (see comm. ad loc.):

ΙΩΝ ΑΔΑΡΑ ΤΟΝ ΕΦΕΣΙΟΝ ΟΥΧ
 ΔΙΡΗΣΕΤΑΙ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ
 ΜΗΣΕΙ ΕΑΝ ΔΟΚΗΙΑΣΙΟ ΣΛΟΓΟΥ ΕΙ
 ΝΑΙ ΤΙΔΕ ΟΥΚ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ etc.

column are of course entirely *exempli gratia*; they were inspired by the second-century BC Chrysippus papyrus mentioned in n. 155.

Although the clues are there, such a text will not have made for easy reading; indeed, no ancient text ever did.³⁷⁷ Especially in the latter case, where τί δέ does not occur in a context of question and answer but in a monologue, the uncertainties must have been legion, and one understands why, in Petronius' *Satyrica*, Trimalchio considered reading a text *ab oculo* quite an achievement (cp. n. 63). In the fourth century BC this will not have been different.

³⁷⁷ Cp. Introduction §5.2 (ii) on v̄n δή, the notes on ἦ (530a2), ἐρμηνεία (530c3), and nn. 97, 150 and 212.

APPENDIX II: SOME REMARKS ON THE USE OF THE VOCATIVE

The following continues, and elaborates upon, the general remarks made at 530a3.

530b1 ὦ Σώκρατες This vocative—which is not necessary for participant identification—may serve both to make a direct appeal to Socrates to pay attention to Ion’s important achievement, and to suggest that the ‘we’ of ἠνεγκάμεθα is meant to include Socrates. Other examples of the ‘appeal’ use in connection with something which for the speaker has a special importance are 530d6 ἄξιόν γε ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες (the impersonal recommendation ‘it is worthwhile to hear how ...’ is really meant for Socrates) and 541c3 Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡμετέρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πόλις ἄρχεται ὑπὸ ὑμῶν (ὦ Σώκρατες pragmatically = ‘may I point out to you’), while the ‘inclusion’ use is also found at 530b5–6 ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥαψωδοῦς, ὦ Ἴων, 535d1 φῶμεν, ὦ Ἴων and 539e2–3 ὅποια τοῦ ῥαψωδοῦ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἴων.

530c7 Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες Here the vocative asks the explicit attention of the addressee for the fact that he, the speaker, answers affirmatively to a question of, or complies with a request by, the addressee. This is a very frequent use. See also 531d3 Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, 532d3 Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, 532d5 Βουλοίμην ἄν σε ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων (potentially affirmative only), 533c4 Οὐκ ἔχω σοι περὶ τούτου ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 533c8 ἸΩΝ ... καίτοι ὄρα τοῦτο τί ἐστίν.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ὀρώ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ ..., 536d4 Σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, 536e3 Εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὔ, 538a5 Οὔτω μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 538d6 Δῆλον δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ..., 539d4 Ἀληθῆ γε σὺ λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, 539d5 Καὶ σύ γε, ὦ Ἴων, ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγεις, 539e6 Ἐγὼ μὲν φημι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἅπαντα, 540d5 Ἴσως γὰρ εἶ καὶ στρατηγικός, ὦ Ἴων (not really affirmative of course; cp. ἴσως), 541a4–5 Μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, 541b3 Πολύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, 541b4 Εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, 542b1 Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, θεῖος.

A striking, but on reflection perhaps not really surprising, result of this survey is that Socrates never says ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Ion, except once, at 539d5 Καὶ σύ γε, ὦ Ἴων, ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγεις. But this is

heavily ironic, because Socrates here tells Ion that he, Ion, was right when he said that Socrates was right (at 539d4 Ἀληθῆ γε σὺ λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες). It is Ion himself who has to say to Socrates that he, Ion, is right: 532a7 Καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγω. See also on σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροίό με at 538d7.

The instances at 539d4 and d5 also illustrate another phenomenon, viz. that one vocative seems to react to an earlier vocative, perhaps by some conventional rule of politeness. Such ‘paired’ vocatives occur also at 530d4–6, 535a1–3, 535d1–6. They are also found in series of three (532d2–3–5), and six (541b3–3–4–6–c3–7). The latter series occurs toward the end of the dialogue, and is perhaps rather a sign of impoliteness: there may just be a bit too much appealing here. For the special status of the last item in this series see at 541c7.

Related uses are those where a speaker is making a compliment (530d4 Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Ἴων, 535a2–3 Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔμοιγε· ἄπει γὰρ πως μου τοῖς λόγοις τῆς ψυχῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, 535c4 Ὡς ἐναργές μοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ...), is voicing an objection (531d5 Ναί, ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁμοίως πεποιήκασι καὶ Ὅμηρος, 539e7 Οὐ σύ γε ἔφης, ὦ Ἴων, ἅπαντα), or where a proviso is added (531b1 Ὅμοίως ἂν περὶ γε τούτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ ὧν ταῦτά λέγουσιν, 540a6–7 Πλήν γε ἴσως τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες).

While the factors mentioned above may at least in part explain the presence of the vocative of a proper name, they cannot have been decisive, for in that case one might expect the vocative to occur always with certain expressions, which is not the case. Thus, there are two instances of the ‘You’re right’ type without a vocative (as against five instances with a vocative): 535a7 Καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς λέγεις, and 538b1 Ἀληθῆ λέγεις (and one of ‘I’m right’: 532a7 Καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγω). In other words, the presence or absence of a vocative is an optional feature of our dialogue (and no doubt of other dialogues). Why are they absent here? Very tentatively I would suggest that at 535a7 there may be no vocative because this answer still falls under the scope of the vocative ὦ Σώκρατες at 535a3; note the presence of καί ‘also’. As for 538b1, unlike the other ἀληθῆ λέγεις answers, this answer is part of a series of staccato answers, a series which begins at 538a5 Οὐκοῦν ...;, the answers being Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—Ἠνίοχος.—Ναί.—Ναί.—Ναί.—Ἰατρικῆς. Possibly, the presence of ὦ Σώκρατες with Ἀληθῆ λέγεις would have made this answer too different from the other ones. Much

more research is needed, however, to confirm or invalidate this suggestion, as indeed the other suggestions made above. This research must also include possible effects of the various positions of the vocative in the sentence.

I mention three uses of the vocative separately:

– the vocatives in the fictitious questions at 538e1 and 540e1 probably have their own rationale, since they have primarily an identifying function

– the vocatives ὦ φίλη κεφαλή at 531d11, ὦ βέλτιστε at 532b2 and 541c7, and ὦ ἑταῖρε at 532c4, are discussed in the main text

– finally, while all uses discussed or mentioned so far were part of the direct interaction between the two speakers, there are three instances of ὦ Ἴων in the middle of a monologue by Socrates, in all cases preceded by σύ: 536b4–5 ὦν σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἶς εἶ, 536c6 οὕτω καὶ σύ, ὦ Ἴων and 541e1 ἀλλὰ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Ἴων. These vocatives, which are of course referentially superfluous, since there can be no doubt who is the σύ, have an eminently rhetorical deictic function: they serve to re-identify Ion emphatically at crucial moments of the dialogue. At 536b4–5 the passage begins in which Socrates explicitly deprives Ion, as someone being possessed by Homer, of professional independence, so to speak: οὐ γὰρ τέχνη οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη περὶ Ὀμήρου λέγεις ἂ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα καὶ κατοκωχῆ, a verdict which is reiterated at 536c6 and will dominate the remainder of the dialogue. The third instance occurs at a point (541e1) where Socrates is about to deliver the fatal blow to Ion by summarizing the discussion, including notably Ion's failure to live up to his claim that he is δεινὸς ... τὴν περὶ Ὀμήρου σοφίαν (542a1–2).

APPENDIX III: ΑΚΡΟΑΣΘΑΙ OR ΑΚΡΟΑΣΑΣΘΑΙ (530D9)?

The choice between the present infinitive and the aorist infinitive in the dynamic use, i.e. after verbs of volition, commanding, having time, ability, etc., belongs to the most intriguing and elusive parts of Greek syntax, which poses special problems when the MSS present both forms, as here, which both yield good Greek.³⁷⁸ In such cases Greek scholars as a rule stand helpless. The problem is either ignored—massively—or it leads to puzzling remarks like the following one by Dodds, on *Grg.* 448a5, where F reads λαβεῖν, and BTWf λαμβάνειν: ‘F’s λαβεῖν is more appropriate than λαμβάνειν, and is confirmed by Olympiodorus (18.12 Norvin)’. *Why* λαβεῖν is more appropriate Dodds does not say. Burnet preferred λαμβάνειν. And this is understandable enough, for two reasons. First, whether we read λαβεῖν or λαμβάνειν at *Grg.* 448a5, or ἀκροάσασθαι or ἀκροᾶσθαι in our case, and in countless similar cases, the interpretation in terms of denotation is, or at least seems to be, the same. Related to this point is the fact that in our translations present and aorist infinitives are usually translated in the same way.³⁷⁹ Second, a generally accepted theory of such differences was not available in Dodds’ days nor is it now. Yet in recent times some new light, at least, has been shed on this aspectual distinction in two extensive and at the same time in-depth studies of this subject, the dissertation by the Dutch scholar Peter Stork (1982), on the dynamic infinitive in Herodotus, and Jacquinod (ed.; 2000), a collection of papers written by a French-Dutch group of scholars, that for the greater part deal with the use of this infinitive in Plato. In the ‘Présentation’, the introduction to this book (17), the editors aptly speak of a ‘projet de capturer Protée’. Anyone interested in the actual state of research on this matter I may refer to this introduction, and to the book as a whole, where the notions used below and

³⁷⁸ The same holds, incidentally, for the choice between present and aorist imperative, and present and aorist subjunctive and optative in purpose clauses.

³⁷⁹ Nor is this surprising, since after verbs of volition, etc., modern European languages (but also Latin, for that matter) simply do not have two infinitives that would correspond semantically to the two Greek infinitives.

elsewhere in the present book in connection with aspectual oppositions are all discussed in detail.

Before I return to our passage, I must mention one further complicating factor, now of a codicological nature. The fact is that if there is manuscript variation involving the dynamic infinitive, MSS S and F virtually always have the aorist infinitive, and T always and W mostly the present infinitive. This is not only the case in the restricted corpus of the *Ion*, but also in the *Gorgias*, which I checked by way of comparison, using Dodds' edition with its full apparatus (where, however, of the SF family, for reasons proper to this dialogue, only F is mentioned, and TW are accompanied by B).³⁸⁰ Consider the following facts:

Ion

- 530d9 ἀκροάσασθαι SF: ἀκροᾶσθαι TW
 533c2–3 συμβαλέσθαι WSF (all three with aorist accent) : συμβάλλεσθαι
 T
 538b8 πειῖν SF: πίνειν TW

Gorgias

- 448a5 λαβεῖν F (Olymp.) : λαμβάνειν BTWf
 448d7 ἀποκρίνασθαι F : ἀποκρίνεσθαι cett.
 493d1 μεταθέσθαι F : μετατίθεσθαι BTWf
 513a8 ἀπεργάσασθαι F : ἀπεργάζεσθαι cett.
 505d1 καταλείπειν PF : καταλείπειν BTWf

Once the reverse is found: *Grg.* 475d6 ἀποκρίνεσθαι F : ἀποκρίνασθαι cett.

I must confess that I fail to see how this bias towards either the aorist or the present infinitive, depending on one's starting point, should be explained. If ever, it is of course impossible here to establish an 'original' reading. There were apparently different traditions, which for all we know may both go back to 'Plato'. Or then again one tradition may

³⁸⁰ This phenomenon is also found with non-infinitive forms, e.g. *Ion* 530c2 συνείη SF Prisc. : συνιείη Wf : συνίη T, 540e1 ἀπεκρίνω SF : ἀπεκρίνου TW, *Grg.* 511d5 διαπραξαμένη F (Olymp.) : διαπραττομένη cett. Cp. further e.g. *Hp.Mi.* 363c5 ἀποκρίνεσθαι TW: ἀποκρίνασθαι SF, *Men.* 84a6 ἀπεκρίνετο BTWf : ἀπεκρίνατο F, 85d6 ἀναλαμβάνειν] ἀναλαβεῖν F, 87e4 ἀναλαμβάνοντες] ἀναλαβόντες F. For the, less frequent, reverse situation cp. e.g. *Hp.Mi.* 367a7 ψεύσαιτο TW : ψεύδοιτο SF, *Men.* 72c7 ἀποκρινόμενον WF : ἀποκρινάμενον BT.

have been dominant, the problem, however, being that we are not in the position to decide which one. I should mention at least one other phenomenon, however, viz. that in Byzantine Greek from late antiquity onwards the forms of the aorist stem seem gradually to have encroached ever more upon those of the present stem.³⁸¹ As a consequence, the copyists of the late Byzantine MSS S and F (or those of their immediate predecessors) may have tended unconsciously to replace present stem forms with aorist forms (although the dynamic infinitives in question had by that time almost disappeared).

Be that as it may, we still have to decide whether ἀκροάσασθαι or ἀκροᾶσθαι should be preferred. A fairly thorough investigation both of the dynamic use of ἀκροάσασθαι and ἀκροᾶσθαι and of that of σχολή + infinitive, in Plato and elsewhere, leads to the following picture.³⁸²

Ἀκροᾶσθαι

Ἀκροᾶσθαι presents the ‘listening’ as an open-ended (unbounded, atelic) action, i.e. as an action ‘in course’ (in technical terms: an *activity*);³⁸³ one might also say that it is ‘process-oriented’. It has frequently iterative (habitual) meaning; in that case the infinitive denotes a general line of conduct. Typical examples are:

- Ly.* 205d4 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἂ οὗτος λέγων τε καὶ ἄδων ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀκροᾶσθαι—repeatedly; cp. the generic presents ἄδει ... ποιεῖ τε καὶ λέγει at 205c2–6.
- Grg.* 488c2 Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἶός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγοις, πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους—in general; note δεῖ and the generic articles τοὺς, τοῦ and τοῦς.

³⁸¹ See Lallot (2000: 261) on the preponderance of aorist subjunctives as replacers in Modern Greek of present stem dynamic infinitives in Ancient Greek.

³⁸² ‘Elsewhere’ = Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Isaeus, Aeschines. Ἀκροάομαι does not occur in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotus and Xenophon. It does occur in Aristophanes, but not in the infinitive.

³⁸³ For *activity* and *accomplishment*, used below, see Rijksbaron (1989: 17 ff.).

- Th. 6.17.3 καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄμιλον οὔτε λόγου μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι—note generic τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄμιλον.
- And. 1.69 Οὐτωςὶ δὲ ἔχει, ὧ ἄνδρες· μέχρι τούτου ἀναβήσονται καὶ λέξουσιν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἂν ἀκροᾶσθαι βούλησθε, ἔπειτα δ' ἐγὼ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολογήσομαι—unbounded (durative) 'listening' *tout court*.
- Lys. 13.79 ἀνάγκη δὲ ἦν στρατηγοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀκροᾶσθαι, εἴπερ ἔμελλον σωθήσεσθαι—the necessity to listen (obey) existed in general; note indefinite, generic, στρατηγοῦ ἀνδρός.
- Isoc. 15.20 Ὡς χρὴ μεμνημένους μὴ προπετῶς πιστεύειν τοῖς τῶν κατηγορῶν λόγοις, μηδὲ μετὰ θορύβου καὶ χαλεπότητος ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν ἀπολογουμένων—in general, with implications for the actual situation; note the generic article in τῶν κατηγορῶν and τῶν ἀπολογουμένων.

Also with the lexical variant ποιείσθαι τὴν ἀκρόασιν:

- Isoc. 15.12 Χρὴ δὲ τοὺς διεξιόντας αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ὄντος μικτοῦ τοῦ λόγου καὶ πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς ὑποθέσεις ταύτας γεγραμμένου ποιείσθαι τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ἔπειτα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς λέγεσθαι μέλλουσιν ἢ τοῖς ἤδη προειρημένοις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μὴ ζητεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπελθόντας ὄλον αὐτὸν διελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μέρος ὅσον μὴ λυπήσει τοὺς παρόντας.

Other examples are: Th. 2.21.3, Lys.12.55, D. 8.23, 9.55, Aeschin. *Epp.* 7.4.

Ἀκροάσασθαι

Ἀκροάσασθαι, on the other hand, presents the 'listening' as a completed (bounded, telic) action, i.e. as an action in its entirety, from beginning to end (as an *accomplishment*). One might also say that it is 'result-oriented'. It is frequently used by the orators at the end of the *exordium*, in appeals to the jury to listen to the speaker to the very end. There may also be another nuance involved, viz. that the verbal action is considered without any thought of it being carried out (unlike the present infinitive), and thus *in abstracto*. (Cp. also on ἐξηγήσασθαι at 531b7-9.) (See also on 531b8-9.) The aorist infinitive does not occur in the genuine works of Plato, with the possible exception of our passage.

Typical examples are:

- Lys. 16.9 δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν μετ' εὐνοίας ἀκροάσασθαί μου (i.e. my defence). ποιήσομαι δὲ τὴν ἀπολογίαὶν ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι διὰ βραχυτάτων.
- D. 18.2 Πρῶτον μὲν ... τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχόμεαι ... τοσαύτην (sc. εὐνοίαν) ὑπάρξει μοι παρ' ὑμῶν ..., ἔπειθ' ..., τοῦτο παραστήσει τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, μὴ τὸν ἀντίδικον σύμβουλον ποιήσασθαι ... ἀλλὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸν ὄρκον, ἐν ᾧ ... καὶ τοῦτο γέγραπται, τὸ ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν ἀκροάσασθαι. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον τὸ μὴ προκατεγνωκέναι μηδέν, οὐδὲ τὸ τὴν εὐνοίαν ἴσην ἀποδοῦναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ ἀπολογία, ὡς βεβούληται καὶ προήρηται τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἕκαστος, οὕτως ἔασαι χρήσασθαι.— Here, τὸ ... ἀκροάσασθαι, just like the other aorist infinitives, denotes the action *in abstracto*;³⁸⁴ notice that it is the content of a legal provision. The ‘from beginning to end’ nuance is also present, however; cp. μὴ προκατεγνωκέναι in the next sentence.
- [D.] 47.3 δέομαι δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ ἐγὼ μετ' εὐνοίας μου ἀκροάσασθαι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα, ἵνα ἐκ τούτων εἰδῆτε ὅσα ἐγὼ τε ἠδικήθη καὶ ἐξηπατήθησαν οἱ δικασταὶ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ψευδῆ ἐμαρτύρησαν.

Also with the lexical variant τὴν ἀκρόασιν ποιήσασθαι:

- And. 1.9 τάδε δὲ ὑμῶν δέομαι, μετ' εὐνοίας μου τὴν ἀκρόασιν τῆς ἀπολογίας ποιήσασθαι, καὶ μήτε μοι ἀντιδίκους καταστήναι μήτε ὑπονοεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, μήτε ῥήματα θηρεύειν, ἀκροασαμένους δὲ διὰ τέλους ('from beginning to end') τῆς ἀπολογίας τότε ἤδη ψηφίζεσθαι τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἄριστον καὶ εὐορκότατον νομίζετε εἶναι.

Also relevant is

- Lys. 19.11 ὅμως δὲ καὶ τούτων ὑπαρχόντων ῥαδίως γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ κατηγορημένα. δέομαι δ' ὑμῶν πάση τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανῇ μετ' εὐνοίας ἀκροασαμένους ἡμῶν διὰ τέλους, ὅτι ἂν ὑμῖν ἄριστον καὶ εὐορκότατον νομίζετε εἶναι, τοῦτο ψηφίσασθαι.

³⁸⁴ Butcher, and Dilts in the new Demosthenes OCT, therefore rightly prefer ἀκροάσασθαι to the variant ἀκροᾶσθαι.

Note that at [D.] 47.3 ἀκροάσασθαι is construed with two restrictive ('binding') constituents, by which the implicit 'from beginning to end' value of the aorist is made explicit: the object ἅπαντα, and the temporal modifier ἐξ ἀρχῆς; for such restrictive constituents cp. also 533c2–3. In a different way, this implicit 'from beginning to end' value of the infinitive ποιήσασθαι is made explicit in the context by ἀκροασαμένους διὰ τέλους at And. 1.9, and by τὸ μὴ προκατεγνώκῃναι μηδὲν ('do not have made up your mind before the end') at D. 18.2.

Other examples of ἀκροάσασθαι are: [Pl.] *Demod.* 383b3, *Lys.* 30.1, *Isoc.* 14.6, 15.28, *Aeschin. De falsa leg.* 62, *In Ctes.* 59–60, [D.] 43.2, *Is. De phil.* 2.

Next, the constructions of σχολή will be discussed.

Σχολή + present infinitive

Σχολή is mostly followed by a present infinitive; it is often negated. Generally speaking, the present infinitive has the same value as that found above for ἀκροάσασθαι: it presents the action denoted by the infinitive as open-ended (unbounded, atelic), i.e. as an action 'in course' (an *activity*), which has frequently iterative (habitual) meaning; in the latter case the infinitive denotes a general line of conduct. The examples from Plato are:

- Phdr.* 227b8 ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς ὁ Λυσίας εἰστία; ΦΑΙ. Πεύση, εἴ σοι σχολή προΐοντι ἀκούειν.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἶε με κατὰ Πίνδαρον “καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον” πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ τεῖν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι;
ποιήσασθαι Par. 1811 : ποιήσεσθαι BT
R. 406c5 καὶ οὐδενὶ σχολή διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένῳ.

Observe that at *Phdr.* 227b8 Socrates reacts to Phaedrus' ἀκούειν with the aorist infinitive ἀκοῦσαι. While Phaedrus wants to know from Socrates whether he has the time to listen in the situation at hand, to lend him his ear, so to speak, as they continue their walk, Socrates assures him that he is interested in hearing the whole conversation; notice, again (cp. above on ἀκροάσασθαι), the presence of an object with ἀκοῦσαι.

The other examples from Plato are: *R.* 406d4 and 500b8.

From other authors:³⁸⁵

- A. A. 1055 οὔτοι θυριαία τῆδ' ἐμοὶ σχολή πάρα / τρίβειν
 S. Aj. 816 ... εἴ τω καὶ λογίζεσθαι σχολή
 Ar. Ach. 409 καταβαίνειν δ' οὐ σχολή.
 X. An. 5.1.9 σχολή τοῖς πολεμίοις λήζεσθαι—right now, in the situation
 at hand
 X. Mem. 1.6.9 ἐὰν δὲ ... δέη, ποτέρω ἢ πλείων σχολή τούτων ἐπιμελεῖ-
σθαι—general line of conduct
 X. Cyr. 2.1.16 εἴ τι χεῖρους ἡμῶν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἦτε, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· οὐ
 γὰρ ἦν ὑμῖν σχολή τούτων (sc. certain weapons) ἐπιμέλε-
σθαι

See further X. Cyr. 1.6.17, 4.3.12 bis, 7.5.50, 8.3.48, Hier. 10.5.

Σχολή + aorist infinitive

Σχολή is rarely followed by an aorist infinitive; it is always negated, with the possible exception of ἀκροάσασθαι in our passage. The aorist presents the action denoted by the infinitive as completed (bounded, telic), i.e. as an action in its entirety (an *accomplishment*). In actual practice, i.e. in the context of οὐ/μὴ σχολή, the aorist expresses the idea that full realization of the infinitive action did not or should not come about.³⁸⁶ The examples are:

- Ar. 23b9 οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ἄξιον
 λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων
 X. An. 4.1.17 σχολή δ' οὐκ ἦν ἰδεῖν παρελθόντι τὸ αἴτιον τῆς σπουδῆς
 ('but there was no time to go forward and find out (rather:
 'establish'—AR) the reason for his haste'—Brownson,
 Loeb)
 X. Cyr. 4.2.22 μὴ δῶμεν αὐτοῖς σχολὴν μῆτε βουλευσασθαι μῆτε παρα-
σκευάσασθαι ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῖς μηδὲν ...

³⁸⁵ Σχολή + infinitive is not found in Euripides, Lysias, Herodotus, Thucydides, Andocides, Lysias, Demosthenes, Isaeus, Aeschines.

³⁸⁶ Why is positive σχολή + aorist infinitive non-existent or rare? Perhaps because it is slightly odd to say, upon completion of some action, that you have had the time to bring about this action. Having completed an action entails that you have had the time to do this. Interestingly, negated σχολή + infinitive has the reverse entailment; thus, οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ... οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων (Ar. 23b9) entails (ἀσχολία) οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔπραξα ... οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων.

Also relevant is:

Isoe. 4.112 ... ἐπανσάμεθ' ἀλλήλους ἐλεοῦντες, οὐδενὶ γὰρ τοσαύτην σχολὴν παρέλιπον ὥσθ' ἑτέρῳ συναχθεσθῆναι ('... since there was no man to whom they allowed enough of respite so that he could share another's burdens'—Norlin, Loeb)

Conclusion

The main characteristics of, on the one hand, ἀκροᾶσθαι and ἀκροάσασθαι, and, on the other, σχολή + infinitive can be summarized as follows.

- ἀκροᾶσθαι presents the 'listening' as an open-ended (unbounded, atelic) action, i.e. as an action 'in course' (in technical terms: an *activity*)
- ἀκροάσασθαι presents the 'listening' as a completed (bounded, telic) action, i.e. as an action in its entirety, from beginning to end (an *accomplishment*).
- σχολή is mostly followed by a present infinitive; it is often negated. The action denoted by the infinitive is open-ended (unbounded, atelic), i.e. it is an action 'in course' (an *activity*)
- σχολή is rarely followed by an aorist infinitive; it is always negated, with the possible exception of ἀκροάσασθαι in our passage. The aorist presents the action denoted by the infinitive as completed (bounded, telic), i.e. as an action in its entirety (an *accomplishment*).

What conclusions can be drawn from these features for the text at *Ion* 530d9?

Reading ἀκροάσασθαι, the listening is presented as a bounded action, 'from beginning to end'. Does this make sense in our passage? Perhaps it does, if ἀκροάσασθαί σου refers to Ion's words ἄξιόν γε ἀκοῦσαι ὡς εὖ κεκόσμηκα τὸν Ὅμηρον at 530d6–7, where ἀκοῦσαι denotes a bounded action. A similar correlation exists below, at 536d6 ff. οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαιμι, εἴ μου ἀκούσαις λέγοντός τι περὶ Ὅμηρου.—ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐθέλω γε ἀκοῦσαι, οὐ μέντοι πρότερον πρὶν ἂν μοι ἀποκρίνη τόδε. The fact, however, that ἀκροάσασθαι does not occur elsewhere in Plato, and that σχολή is elsewhere only followed by an aorist infinitive when it is negated seems to plead against the aorist infinitive here. I prefer therefore the present infinitive. Also,

one wonders why Socrates would use ἀκροάσασθαι here, instead of picking up Ion's ἀκοῦσαι *verbatim*, as at 536d8. Ἀκροᾶσθαι presents the listening as an unbounded action, indicating that Socrates in a general way is willing to lend Ion his ear, and is not interested in anything in particular.

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