

Greek Forms of Address

From Herodotus to Lucian

ELEANOR DICKEY

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Dedicated to the people who inspired me to write this work and
did not live to see its completion

Thomas Atherton Dickey

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY

By convention the abbreviations marked * are used for both singular and plural, while a plural marker is added to the others when they stand for a plural expression: e.g. KTs.

AT	Age term
FN*	First name(s)
FNLN*	First name and last name(s)
FT	Friendship term
KT	Kinship term
T	Familiar form, 'tu' (see Sect. 1.1)
TLN*	Title and last name(s)
T/V	Familiar/formal distinction (see Sect. 1.1)
V	Formal form, 'vous' (see Sect. 1.1)

II. MODERN WORKS

Kühner-Gerth	R. Kühner and B. Gerth (1898-1904), <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache</i> (Hanover).
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. McKenzie (1940) <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , 9th edn. (Oxford).
OED	J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (edd.) (1989), <i>The Oxford English Dictionary</i> , 2nd edn. (Oxford).
P. Herm.	B. R. Rees (1964), <i>Papyri from Hermopolis and Other Documents of the Byzantine Period</i> (London).
P. Oxy.	B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (1898), <i>The Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i> , part 1 (London).
Schwyz- er- Debrunner	E. Schwyz-er and A. Debrunner (1939-71), <i>Griechische Grammatik</i> (Munich).

III. ANCIENT AUTHORS AND WORKS

Ach.	Achilles Tatius
Aesch.	Aeschylus
<i>Ag.</i>	<i>Agamemnon</i>
<i>Cho.</i>	<i>Choephoroe</i>
<i>Pers.</i>	<i>Persae</i>
<i>PV</i>	<i>Prometheus Vincetus</i>
Aeschin.	Aeschines
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Ἐπιστολαί</i>
<i>Ktes.</i>	<i>Κατὰ Κτησιφώντος</i>
<i>Par.</i>	<i>Περὶ τῆς παραπρεσβείας</i>
<i>Tim.</i>	<i>Κατὰ Τιμάρχου</i>
Andoc.	Andocides
<i>Alc.</i>	<i>Κατὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου</i>
<i>Kath.</i>	<i>Περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καθόδου</i>
<i>Lac.</i>	<i>Περὶ τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰρήνης</i>
<i>Myst.</i>	<i>Περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων</i>
Antiph.	Antiphon
<i>Chor.</i>	<i>Περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ</i>
<i>Her.</i>	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φονοῦ</i>
<i>Pharm.</i>	<i>Φαρμακείας κατὰ τῆς μητρύας</i>
<i>Tetr.</i>	<i>Τετραλογία</i>
Ar.	Aristophanes
<i>Ach.</i>	<i>Acharnenses</i>
<i>Av.</i>	<i>Aves (Birds)</i>
<i>Eccl.</i>	<i>Ecclesiazusae</i>
<i>Eq.</i>	<i>Equites (Knights)</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysistrata</i>
<i>Nub.</i>	<i>Nubes (Clouds)</i>
<i>Plut.</i>	<i>Plutus (Wealth)</i>
<i>Ran.</i>	<i>Ranae (Frogs)</i>
<i>Thes.</i>	<i>Thesmophoriazusae</i>
<i>Vesp.</i>	<i>Vespae (Wasps)</i>
Arist.	Aristotle
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
<i>Poet.</i>	<i>Poetica</i>
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Rhetorica</i>
Char.	Chariton

Abbreviations

Dio Chrys.	Dio Chrysostom (speeches referred to by number)
Din.	Dinarchus
Ar.	<i>Κατ' Ἀριστογείτονος</i>
Dem.	<i>Κατὰ Δημοσθένους</i>
Phil.	<i>Κατὰ Φιλοκλέους</i>
Dem.	Demosthenes (speeches referred to by number)
Pr. Dem.	<i>Προοίμια Δημηγορικὰ</i>
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Diod. Sic.	Diodorus Siculus
Epict.	Epictetus
Ench.	<i>Enchiridion</i>
Eur.	Euripides
Andr.	<i>Andromache</i>
Bacch.	<i>Bacchae</i>
Cyc.	<i>Cyclops</i>
Hec.	<i>Hecuba</i>
Hipp.	<i>Hippolytus</i>
IA	<i>Iphigenia Aulidensis</i>
IT	<i>Iphigenia Taurica</i>
Med.	<i>Medea</i>
Or.	<i>Orestes</i>
Phoen.	<i>Phoenissae</i>
Rhes.	<i>Rhesus</i>
Supp.	<i>Supplices</i>
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hom.	Homer
Il.	<i>Iliad</i>
Od.	<i>Odyssey</i>
Isae.	Isaeus
Apol.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Ἀπολλοδώρου κλήρου</i>
Ar.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου κλήρου</i>
Ast.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Ἀστυφίλου κλήρου</i>
Dik.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Δικαιογένους κλήρου</i>
Euph.	<i>Ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου</i>
Hag.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Ἀγνίου κλήρου</i>
Kir.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Κίρωνος κλήρου</i>
Kln.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Κλεωνύμου κλήρου</i>
Men.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Μενεκλέους κλήρου</i>
Nik.	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Νικοστράτου κλήρου</i>

Abbreviations

<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Φιλοκτήμονος κλήρου</i>
<i>Pyr.</i>	<i>Περὶ τοῦ Πύρρου κλήρου</i>
Isoc.	Isocrates (speeches referred to by number)
Joseph.	Flavius Josephus
<i>AJ</i>	<i>Antiquitates Iudaicae</i>
<i>Ap.</i>	<i>De Iudaeorum Vetustate, sive Contra Apionem</i>
<i>BJ</i>	<i>De Bello Iudaico</i>
<i>Vit.</i>	<i>Iosephi Vita</i>
Long.	Longus
Lucian	(numbers in brackets refer to the order in the Oxford Classical Text)
<i>Abd.</i>	<i>Abdicatus</i> (54)
<i>Adv.</i>	<i>Adversus Indoctum</i> (31)
<i>Alex.</i>	<i>Alexander</i> (42)
<i>Amor.</i>	<i>Amores</i> (49)
<i>Anach.</i>	<i>Anacharsis</i> (37)
<i>Apol.</i>	<i>Apologia</i> (65)
<i>Asin.</i>	<i>Asinus</i> (39)
<i>BA</i>	<i>Bis Accusatus</i> (29)
<i>Cal.</i>	<i>Calumniæ non Temere Credendum</i> (15)
<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Cataplus</i> (19)
<i>Char.</i>	<i>Charidemus</i> (83)
<i>Cont.</i>	<i>Contemplantes</i> (26)
<i>Cyn.</i>	<i>Cynicus</i> (76)
<i>DC</i>	<i>Deorum Concilium</i> (52)
<i>Dem.</i>	<i>Demosthenis Encomium</i> (58)
<i>Demon.</i>	<i>Demonax</i> (9)
<i>DI</i>	<i>Dearum Iudicium</i> (35)
<i>Dial. D.</i>	<i>Dialogi Deorum</i> (79)
<i>Dial. Mar.</i>	<i>Dialogi Marini</i> (78)
<i>Dial. Meret.</i>	<i>Dialogi Meretricii</i> (80)
<i>Dial. Mort.</i>	<i>Dialogi Mortuorum</i> (77)
<i>Dom.</i>	<i>De Domo</i> (10)
<i>El.</i>	<i>Electrum</i> (6)
<i>Eun.</i>	<i>Eunuchus</i> (47)
<i>Fug.</i>	<i>Fugitivi</i> (56)
<i>Gall.</i>	<i>Gallus</i> (22)
<i>Halc.</i>	<i>Halcyon</i> (72)
<i>Harm.</i>	<i>Harmonides</i> (66)
<i>Herc.</i>	<i>Hercules</i> (5)

Abbreviations

<i>Hermot.</i>	<i>Hermotimus</i> (70)
<i>Hes.</i>	<i>Hesiodus</i> (67)
<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Quomodo Historia Conscribenda sit</i> (59)
<i>Icar.</i>	<i>Icaromenippus</i> (24)
<i>Imag.</i>	<i>Imagines</i> (43)
<i>Iupp. Conf.</i>	<i>Iuppiter Confutatus</i> (20)
<i>Iupp. Trag.</i>	<i>Iuppiter Tragoedus</i> (21)
<i>Laps.</i>	<i>Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum</i> (64)
<i>Lex.</i>	<i>Lexiphanes</i> (46)
<i>Lis</i>	<i>Lis Consonantium/Iudicium Vocalium</i> (16)
<i>Luct.</i>	<i>De Luctu</i> (40)
<i>Macr.</i>	<i>Macrobian</i> (12)
<i>Merc.</i>	<i>De Mercede Conductis</i> (36)
<i>Nav.</i>	<i>Navigium</i> (73)
<i>Nec.</i>	<i>Necyomantia</i> (38)
<i>Ner.</i>	<i>Nero</i> (84)
<i>Nigr.</i>	<i>Nigrinus</i> (8)
<i>Par.</i>	<i>De Parasito</i> (33)
<i>Pereg.</i>	<i>De Morte Peregrini</i> (55)
<i>Phal. 1</i>	<i>Phalaris 1</i> (1)
<i>Phal. 2</i>	<i>Phalaris 2</i> (2)
<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philopseudeis</i> (34)
<i>Phpt.</i>	<i>Philopatris</i> (82)
<i>Pisc.</i>	<i>Piscator</i> (28)
<i>Pro Imag.</i>	<i>Pro Imaginibus</i> (50)
<i>Prom.</i>	<i>Prometheus</i> (23)
<i>Psd.</i>	<i>Pseudologista</i> (51)
<i>Rhet.</i>	<i>Rhetorum Praeceptor</i> (41)
<i>Sacr.</i>	<i>De Sacrificiis</i> (30)
<i>Salt.</i>	<i>De Saltatione</i> (45)
<i>Sat.</i>	<i>Saturnalia</i> (61)
<i>Scy.</i>	<i>Scythia</i> (68)
<i>Sol.</i>	<i>Soloecista</i> (18)
<i>Somn.</i>	<i>Somnium/Vita Luciani</i> (32)
<i>Symp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i> (17)
<i>Syr. D.</i>	<i>De Syria Dea</i> (44)
<i>Tim.</i>	<i>Timon</i> (25)
<i>Tox.</i>	<i>Toxaris</i> (57)
<i>Tyr.</i>	<i>Tyrannicida</i> (53)
<i>VA</i>	<i>Vitarum Auctio</i> (27)

Abbreviations

<i>Verb.</i>	<i>Prometheus es in Verbis</i> (71)
<i>VH₁</i>	<i>Verae Historiae</i> 1 (13)
<i>VH₂</i>	<i>Verae Historiae</i> 2 (14)
<i>Zeux.</i>	<i>Zeuxis</i> (63)
<i>Lycurg.</i>	<i>Lycurgus</i>
<i>Leocr.</i>	<i>Κατὰ Λεωκράτους</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysias</i> (speeches referred to by number)
<i>Men.</i>	<i>Menander</i>
<i>Dis</i>	<i>Dis Exapaton</i>
<i>Dysk.</i>	<i>Dyskolos</i>
<i>Epitr.</i>	<i>Epitrepontes</i>
<i>Georg.</i>	<i>Georgos</i>
<i>Mis.</i>	<i>Misoumenos</i>
<i>Pk.</i>	<i>Perikeiromene</i>
<i>Sik.</i>	<i>Sikyonios</i>
<i>Philo</i>	<i>Philo Judaeus</i>
<i>Abr.</i>	<i>De Abrahamo</i>
<i>Aet.</i>	<i>De Aeternitate Mundi</i>
<i>Agr.</i>	<i>De Agricultura</i>
<i>Cher.</i>	<i>De Cherubim</i>
<i>Conf.</i>	<i>De Confusione Linguarum</i>
<i>Congr.</i>	<i>De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia</i>
<i>Dec.</i>	<i>De Decalogo</i>
<i>Det. Pot.</i>	<i>Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat</i>
<i>Flacc.</i>	<i>In Flaccum</i>
<i>Fug.</i>	<i>De Fuga et Inventione</i>
<i>Gig.</i>	<i>De Gigantibus</i>
<i>Heres</i>	<i>Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres sit</i>
<i>Immut.</i>	<i>Quod Deus sit Immutabilis</i>
<i>Jos.</i>	<i>De Josepho</i>
<i>LA</i>	<i>Legum Allegoriarum</i>
<i>Leg.</i>	<i>Legatio ad Gaium</i>
<i>Migr.</i>	<i>De Migratione Abrahami</i>
<i>Mos.</i>	<i>De Vita Mosis</i>
<i>Mut.</i>	<i>De Mutatione Nominum</i>
<i>Plant.</i>	<i>De Plantatione</i>
<i>Post.</i>	<i>De Posteritate Caini</i>
<i>Prob.</i>	<i>Quod Omnis Probus Liber sit</i>
<i>Sacr.</i>	<i>De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini</i>
<i>Somn.</i>	<i>De Somniis</i>

Abbreviations

<i>Spec.</i>	<i>De Specialibus Legibus</i>
<i>Virt.</i>	<i>De Virtutibus</i>
Pind.	Pindar
<i>Nem.</i>	<i>Nemean Odes</i>
<i>Ol.</i>	<i>Olympian Odes</i>
<i>Pyth.</i>	<i>Pythian Odes</i>
Plato	
<i>Alc. 1</i>	<i>Alcibiades I</i>
<i>Alc. 2</i>	<i>Alcibiades II</i>
<i>Apol.</i>	<i>Apology</i>
<i>Aret.</i>	<i>De Virtute</i>
<i>Ax.</i>	<i>Axiochus</i>
<i>Chrm.</i>	<i>Charmides</i>
<i>Cleit.</i>	<i>Cleitophon</i>
<i>Cra.</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>
<i>Crit.</i>	<i>Critias</i>
<i>Epin.</i>	<i>Epinomis</i>
<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
<i>Erast.</i>	<i>Erastai</i>
<i>Euth.</i>	<i>Euthyphro</i>
<i>Euthd.</i>	<i>Euthydemus</i>
<i>Grg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Halc.</i>	<i>Halcyon</i>
<i>Hipp.</i>	<i>Hipparchus</i>
<i>Hp. Maj.</i>	<i>Hippias Major</i>
<i>Hp. Min.</i>	<i>Hippias Minor</i>
<i>Lach.</i>	<i>Laches</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysis</i>
<i>Menex.</i>	<i>Menexenus</i>
<i>Min.</i>	<i>Minos</i>
<i>Parm.</i>	<i>Parmenides</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Phlb.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politicus</i>
<i>Prot.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>Republic</i>
<i>Soph.</i>	<i>Sophista</i>
<i>Symp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>
<i>Theag.</i>	<i>Theages</i>

Abbreviations

<i>Tht.</i>	<i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Tim.</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>
<i>Plut.</i>	<i>Plutarch</i>
<i>Aem.</i>	<i>Aemilius Paulus</i>
<i>Ag. & Cl.</i>	<i>Agis and Cleomenes</i>
<i>Ages.</i>	<i>Agesilaos</i>
<i>Alc.</i>	<i>Alcibiades</i>
<i>Alex.</i>	<i>Alexander</i>
<i>Ant.</i>	<i>Antonius</i>
<i>Arat.</i>	<i>Aratus</i>
<i>Arist.</i>	<i>Aristeides</i>
<i>Art.</i>	<i>Artaxerxes</i>
<i>Brut.</i>	<i>Brutus</i>
<i>Caes.</i>	<i>Caesar</i>
<i>Cam.</i>	<i>Camillus</i>
<i>Cato</i>	<i>Cato Minor</i>
<i>Cic.</i>	<i>Cicero</i>
<i>Cim.</i>	<i>Cimon</i>
<i>Cor.</i>	<i>Marcius Coriolanus</i>
<i>Crass.</i>	<i>Crassus</i>
<i>Dem.</i>	<i>Demosthenes</i>
<i>Demetr.</i>	<i>Demetrius</i>
<i>Eum.</i>	<i>Eumenes</i>
<i>Fab.</i>	<i>Fabius Maximus</i>
<i>Gal.</i>	<i>Galba</i>
<i>Gracc.</i>	<i>Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus</i>
<i>Luc.</i>	<i>Lucullus</i>
<i>Lyc.</i>	<i>Lycurgus</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysander</i>
<i>Mar.</i>	<i>Marius</i>
<i>Marc.</i>	<i>Marcellus</i>
<i>M. Cato</i>	<i>Marcus Cato/Cato Maior</i>
<i>Mor.</i>	<i>Moralia</i> (references to individual works follow the standard numbering)
<i>Nic.</i>	<i>Nicias</i>
<i>Num.</i>	<i>Numa</i>
<i>Oth.</i>	<i>Otho</i>
<i>Pel.</i>	<i>Pelopidas</i>
<i>Per.</i>	<i>Pericles</i>
<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philopoimen</i>

Abbreviations

<i>Phoc.</i>	<i>Phocion</i>
<i>Pomp.</i>	<i>Pompeius</i>
<i>Publ.</i>	<i>Publicola</i>
<i>Pyrrh.</i>	<i>Pyrrhus</i>
<i>Rom.</i>	<i>Romulus</i>
<i>Sert.</i>	<i>Sertorius</i>
<i>Sol.</i>	<i>Solon</i>
<i>Sull.</i>	<i>Sulla</i>
<i>Them.</i>	<i>Themistocles</i>
<i>Thes.</i>	<i>Theseus</i>
<i>Tim.</i>	<i>Timoleon</i>
<i>Tit.</i>	<i>Titus</i>
<i>Polyb.</i>	<i>Polybius</i>
<i>Quint.</i>	<i>Quintilian</i>
<i>Inst. Orat.</i>	<i>Institutio Oratoria</i>
<i>Soph.</i>	<i>Sophocles</i>
<i>Aj.</i>	<i>Ajax</i>
<i>Ant.</i>	<i>Antigone</i>
<i>El.</i>	<i>Electra</i>
<i>Ichn.</i>	<i>Ichneutae</i>
<i>OC</i>	<i>Oedipus Coloneus</i>
<i>OT</i>	<i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i>
<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philoctetes</i>
<i>Thuc.</i>	<i>Thucydides</i>
<i>Xen.</i>	<i>Xenophon</i>
<i>An.</i>	<i>Anabasis/Expeditio Cyri</i>
<i>Ap.</i>	<i>Apologia Socratis</i>
<i>Cyn.</i>	<i>Cynegeticus</i>
<i>Cyr.</i>	<i>Cyropaedia/Institutio Cyri</i>
<i>Hell.</i>	<i>Hellenica/Historia Graeca</i>
<i>Hier.</i>	<i>Hiero</i>
<i>Mem.</i>	<i>Memorabilia/Commentarii</i>
<i>Oec.</i>	<i>Oeconomicus</i>
<i>Symp.</i>	<i>Symposium/Convivium</i>

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I

Introduction

In the first book of his *Histories*, Herodotus tells the story of Adrastus, the unfortunate exile who killed Croesus' son by accident after promising to protect him. At three key points in the story—Adrastus' arrival, Croesus' request for help, and Adrastus' appearance before the bereaved monarch—Herodotus switches from third-person narrative to direct speech, and the characters use vocatives to address one another. Adrastus always addresses Croesus with ὦ βασιλεῦ 'O king', but the king employs three different forms of address in return: ὦνθρωπε 'O man', Ἀδρηστέ 'Adrastus', and ὦ ξείνε 'O stranger/guest' (1. 35. 3, 41. 1, 42. 1, 45. 2). In choosing these particular vocatives, was Herodotus trying to communicate something about the king's feelings towards Adrastus, or did he use different terms merely for the sake of elegant variation?

In Plato's *Phaedo*, all of the characters tend to address each other by name: ὦ Σιμμία, ὦ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, etc. When between 80b and 81c Socrates three times uses φίλε 'friend' to Cebes, is this change of address meaningful? Does it matter that at 81a Socrates addresses Cebes as ὦ Κέβης 'Cebes'?

Let us take a better-known example. In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates addresses the jury at frequent intervals throughout his speech, using either ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι 'O men of Athens' or ὦ ἄνδρες 'O men'. But at the end, when he turns to speak to those members of the jury who voted for his acquittal, he introduces and repeats a new form of address, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί 'O jurymen' (40a). In this case there is no doubt that the address switch was deliberate and meaningful, for Socrates comments upon it: ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην 'for in calling you judges I may address you rightly'.¹ If we then accept that address usage can be significant, more questions emerge. Is it always significant? How important is address usage in comparison with other evidence? Does it merely serve to confirm observations we can make from other clues in the text, or are some

¹ For more discussion of this passage see pp. 177–80.

nuances carried by the vocative alone? How can we tell what address usage is communicating? Does it make a difference to our understanding of the passage from the *Apology* cited above if we know whether Athenian defendants usually addressed juries as ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, as ὦ ἄνδρες δικάσται, or with a mixture of both terms?

Greek is not the first language about which this type of question has been asked. Address usage has often mattered a great deal to ordinary people, and our own times are no exception. In 1977 a German woman who addressed a policeman as *du* rather than *Sie* was fined 2,250 DM for this improper address, and in 1983 a German bus driver was fined 100 DM for saying *du* to a Turkish student (Kretzenbacher and Segebrecht 1991: 31). The last thirty years or so have seen the evolution of a new form of research on address usage, aiming at the scientific study of address forms in a wide variety of languages and the discovery of underlying rules governing address usage. Linguistic studies of forms of address are usually concerned with modern languages, but their results are applicable to older ones as well. About Shakespeare studies before the advent of address theory it has been said (Replogle 1973: 172):

We have seen insults where there are none and have ignored them where they exist. We have agreed with a point of view which Shakespeare was mocking and have laughed where he was utterly serious. We have missed disparaging as well as flattering innuendos; revealing bits of character portrayal; subtle signs of emotional distress, elation, and compassion; and symbolic reflections of fluctuations—both actual and imminent—in rank and prominence, in relationships of amity and enmity.

If even a quarter of the claims made by this author are true for Shakespeare, it is worth seeing what address research can do for ancient Greek.

Our study of addresses in Greek will combine the traditional methodologies of classics with ideas and methods taken from that branch of linguistics which covers address theory, sociolinguistics. Such a combination has three potential benefits: it may help classicists by enabling us to understand some aspects of Greek literature better and by shedding some light on Greek social structure, and it may benefit sociolinguists as well by making it possible to test certain assumptions which were based on analysis of modern languages and have been argued to be universal (see Sect. 6.4).

1.1 SOME BACKGROUND TO SOCIOLINGUISTIC WORK
ON ADDRESS

Sociolinguistics is the study of the way that language is used in society. It includes the study of regional and class dialects and accents, bilingual speakers who use different languages in different situations, differences in language used by or to men and women, and a host of similar topics. The sociolinguistic study of forms of address is generally agreed to have begun in 1960, with an article by Roger Brown and Albert Gilman entitled 'The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity'. This piece discussed the use of *tu* and *vous* in French, *du* and *Sie* in German, and the equivalent familiar and formal second-person pronouns (called 'T pronouns' and 'V pronouns' from the Latin *tu* and *vos*) in other European languages. The authors observed that one form was used both to intimates and to inferiors, while another was used both to non-intimates and to superiors. Brown and Gilman maintained (1960: 254-61) that the choice of pronouns was determined by the dimensions of power and solidarity in the relationship between speaker and addressee.

These important observations were followed in 1961 by an article by Roger Brown and Marguerite Ford in which they showed that the distinction in English between address by first name ('John') or by title and last name ('Mr Smith') functioned in the same way as the distinction between T pronouns and V pronouns (called a 'T/V distinction') in European languages. A number of other relatively early articles on addresses are usually considered to have been important in the development of address theory. These include a 1969 article by Susan Ervin-Tripp which explained American English addresses by means of flow charts, a 1975 study of pronominal address in Italian by Bates and Benigni, and a 1976 study of children's pronominal address systems in French and Spanish by Lambert and Tucker.

A number of more recent works have devoted immense amounts of time and energy to exhaustive surveys of addresses and are worth mentioning for their detail and length. These include books by Agnieszka Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak (1992) on Polish and English, Sylvia Başoğlu (1987) on Turkish, Dilworth Parkinson (1985) on Egyptian Arabic, and Susan Bean (1978) on Kannada, as well as a dissertation on Korean by Juck-Ryoon Hwang (1975). It is, however, important to note that not all of these books are consistently reliable. Perhaps the best work in recent years has come from a project at Kiel University

which has produced the most comprehensive bibliography on the subject (Braun, Kohz, and Schubert 1986) and by far the best overview of address theory (Braun 1988). The project has also produced numerous works on address in individual languages, most of which are clear and accurate.²

Especially important from the point of view of our study are those works which have concentrated on earlier forms of language and on the history of addresses. Of these the best known is Paul Friedrich's study (1966) of pronominal address in nineteenth-century Russian, but dozens of others exist as well, on Old English, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Old French, and many other languages and periods.³ The vast majority of these studies, however, have concentrated on relatively recent historical periods, and almost no serious sociolinguistic work has been published on addresses in Latin, Greek, or other comparatively ancient languages.

One major difficulty with applying address theory to ancient Greek is that Brown and Gilman's initial study, as well as the vast majority of later work, discussed only the T/V pronoun distinction, which does not exist in classical Greek any more than it does in English. As Brown and Ford pointed out, English has an equivalent of the T/V distinction in its nominal addresses, but this too seems to be absent from Greek (see Sect. 6.4), making much of the best sociolinguistic work on addresses largely irrelevant to our topic. Nevertheless, there are enough studies of nominal address forms in other languages to give us ample comparisons.

1.2 ADDRESS AND ITS ANALYSIS

A number of theories and findings from sociolinguistics will be particularly helpful to the present inquiry.

1.2.1 *Definitions*

A crucial issue for all new disciplines is the delineation of the subject being studied. There is no question among linguists as to the

² For complete bibliography see Braun (1988: 5-6).

³ Bakos (1955), Breuer (1983), Brown and Gilman (1989), Drown (1979), Evans (1967), Finkenstaedt (1963), Grimaud (1989), Guðmundsson (1972), Joseph (1987), Kempf (1985), Kisbye (1965), Lyons (1980), P. Mason (1990), Morrison (1988), Nathan (1959), Phillipps (1984), Replogle (1973), Salmon (1967), Wales (1983), Waterhouse (1982), Whalen (1982), Wolff (1986, 1988).

definition of 'address', which is 'a speaker's linguistic reference to his/her collocutor(s)' (Braun 1988: 7; see also Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 13). This definition includes not only nouns (*Mary*, how are you? Would *Your Majesty* care to read this letter?) but also pronouns (Could *you* close the window?) and second-person verb endings in inflected languages. It does not include words used to get the addressee's attention but not actually referring to him or her, such as 'hey' or 'excuse me'. Speakers of English may not see the point of classifying pronouns and verbs as addresses, because in English the pronoun 'you' can be used to anyone, but none the less these forms are references to the addressee and as such can be exploited in many languages to carry social meaning. In German the difference between the pronouns *du* and *Sie* is highly significant, and this distinction can be carried by the verbs alone. The order 'Gib es mir!' is just as clearly a use of the *du* form as if the pronoun had been expressed.

This definition is clearly a very broad one and needs further division. An obvious classification is one by parts of speech, into nouns, pronouns, and verbs, but this division is usually rejected by linguists on the grounds that it obscures the most fundamental distinctions among addresses (Braun 1988: 303; Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 18). Instead, addresses are classified into syntactically 'bound' and 'free' forms (see Braun 1988: 11–12; Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 20). Bound forms are those integrated into the syntax of a sentence, and free forms are those not so integrated. Thus in the request 'Mary, could you please open the window?' 'Mary' is a free form and 'you' a bound form.

In English, as in most European languages, free forms tend to be nouns and bound forms are usually pronouns or verbs, but in the sentence, 'You! Open the window!' the pronoun 'you' is a free form of address. Conversely, in 'Would Your Highness care to open the window?' a noun is used as a bound form of address. Verbs, however, are always bound forms. In Greek, this distinction between free and bound forms corresponds fairly closely to the distinction between vocatives and non-vocatives. The only difference is that it is possible in Greek to have 'nominatives for vocatives' and 'vocatives for nominatives'.⁴ Yet the very existence of such terms shows that there are some syntactic constructions which scholars agree ought to be

⁴ 'Nominative for vocative' is a construction in which a word which has a distinct vocative form is found in the nominative as a free form of address, as *ὦ φίλος* for *ὦ φίλε*. 'Vocative for nominative' is the use of the vocative case when the word concerned ought, from the syntax of the sentence, to be in the nominative. Cf. Schwyzler-Debrunner (ii. 63–4) and Kühner-Gerth (i. 46, 50).

vocatives, even if they are not filled by vocatives, and others which ought not to be vocatives, even if they are. This category of 'things that ought to be vocatives' consists of addresses not integrated into the syntax of the sentence and therefore corresponds exactly to the category of free forms of address.

Some of the advantages of the bound/free classification can be seen from the English examples above. 'You' when used as a bound form has very little social meaning in English, but when used as a free form it strongly suggests a lack of respect for the addressee. Such a difference between bound and free meaning is also found in pronouns in other languages and can occur with nouns as well (Braun 1988: 11-12).

A less vital distinction, but one that is very useful in explaining some of the peculiarities of Greek addresses, is the distinction between addresses used to get someone's attention and those used once contact has already been established. There is no generally accepted terminology for expressing this division, although it is often made⁵ and can account for significant differences in usage; thus for example 'sir' can be used in American English to get the attention of virtually any unknown man, but it is rarely used in conversation once the addressee's attention is secured. Some types of address can only be used to attract someone's attention, as 'gentleman in the green shirt', spoken for example by a photographer arranging a group photograph (cf. Zwicky 1974: 791).

1.2.2 *Factors affecting rules of address*

One of the most important conclusions reached by sociolinguists about address usage is that it is governed by rules stating which forms are used in which circumstances.⁶ The rules of address usage are far from inviolable; indeed they can be broken to produce powerful effects, but the very fact that their violation is meaningful shows that they exist and that speakers are using them (cf. Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990: 161-2; Braun 1988: 49-50). Indeed, one recent study of modern address usage has concluded that, 'Knowledge of the proper use of terms of address is . . . as important to the overall success of communication as knowledge of the conjugation of verbs would be' (Parkinson 1985: 225).

The rules governing address usage in various cultures are often

⁵ e.g. Fasold (1990: 3); Zwicky (1974: 790-1); Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak (1992: 20).

⁶ Brown and Ford (1961: 234); Philipsen and Huspek (1985: 94).

extremely complicated, and it is frequently difficult to work out which factors do or do not influence the choice of addresses (cf. Mehrotra 1981: 135; Coulmas 1979: 242-3). None the less, two elements will almost always play a part: the relationship of speaker and addressee and the social context of the utterance.

The relationship of speaker and addressee is made up not only of the identity of the addressee, but also of that of the speaker: age, sex, status, familiarity, kinship, and membership of a group all play a part. Previous studies of Greek addresses have often attempted to find a simple correlation between the identity of the addressee and the address used (see pp. 18-19), but such procedures are bound to lead to erroneous conclusions. Although one person's position may sometimes be so unusual that he or she receives the same address from all possible speakers, it is usually the case that address usage 'is not predictable from properties of the addressee alone and not predictable from properties of the speaker alone but only from properties of the dyad' (Brown and Ford 1961: 234). In English it is not only acceptable but even normal for one person to receive many different addresses from different speakers: a teacher could be addressed as 'Mrs Dillon' by her pupils, as 'Sarah' by her colleagues, as 'Sal' by her family, and as 'Mum' by her children. We should not assume that Greek will be different.

The importance of context (setting, audience, and topic of discourse) in determining address usage is less universally recognized by linguists than that of speaker-addressee relationship, partly because surveys conducted by means of questionnaires or interviews often overlook this factor. Nevertheless, a number of recent studies have shown that although in certain dyads contextual factors may never be strong enough to outweigh speaker-addressee relationship in determining address usage, their influence can be crucial.⁷ Some settings require certain forms of address: 'If he [your brother] is acting as the judge in a law court then calling him *Tom* will be considered disrespectful, while at the dinner table calling him *Your honour* will be perceived as equally rude' (Holmes 1992: 297).

The factor of audience is often difficult to separate from that of setting, but when this can be done audience is shown to be a significant influence on address usage. Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990: 145) report the case of a woman who addressed her mother-in-law with a familiar

⁷ Kridalaksana (1974: 19, 20); Friedrich (1966: 229); Howell (1968: 554); Southworth (1974: 183); Jaworski (1982: 262); Holmes (1992: 297).

pronoun only when two other daughters-in-law, who used a formal address form, were not present. In a study of address between members of the US Marine Corps, it was found that 'perhaps the most influential single factor in determining the form of address employed is the audience . . . most of the time, address forms are drastically (but predictably) affected by the presence of others' (Jonz 1975: 79-1).

The effect on address usage of the topic of discourse is much less clear than that of the other factors mentioned, but it too has been found to be important in some languages, including Indonesian (Kridalaksana 1974: 20) and nineteenth-century Russian (Friedrich 1966: 229). Humorous purpose can also affect the addresses used, for example by inflating the number and variety of terms.

At this point it might be objected that a crucial factor has been omitted, namely the feelings of the speaker towards the addressee and the general emotional level of the interaction. Of course this element does affect address usage, but it is not part of a sociolinguistic rule like the other factors mentioned. Expression of emotion occurs when the rules determined by these other factors are broken. A number of interesting studies have shown that even the choice of T or V pronouns can be caused by emotional factors (e.g. Friedrich 1966: 229), but every English speaker knows that whether a girl calls her brother 'David' or 'you pig' depends on what she is trying to express. One of the main purposes of our study is to identify the effects of the other factors so that we can tell when the address is being used to express a particular feeling.

1.2.3 *Variation in address rules*

The above discussion of the factors affecting address choice has been simplified by assuming that both speaker and addressee have the same set of sociolinguistic rules. This assumption was made by the early researchers of address theory, but it is now thought to be a rash one. Speakers of the same language are divided into a multitude of subgroups by regional dialects, age differences, social class, rural or urban origin, ideological or religious principles, etc., and these subgroups may have different norms of address usage. Many address studies have used only the upper-middle-class, adult, educated informants who are conveniently available in a university setting, and within this group there is relatively little variation in most modern European languages, owing to a long process of standardization (Braun 1988: 23-4).

Elsewhere, however, far greater differences are observable, so that often one cannot really speak of a single standard set of rules governing address behaviour in a given language (Braun 1988: 23). Some spectacular examples of this phenomenon can be observed even in earlier versions of European languages. Thus in medieval English 'in the 14th century, the lowest classes would say *thou* to everybody, even to kings and queens . . . because the honorific pronoun [*you*] was still outside their repertoire of address pronouns' (Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 79). A similar situation existed in Tolstoy's Russian, where 'a bilingual, blue-blooded aristocrat became so inured to *vy* [the Russian V pronoun] that he used it even to peasant children, while receiving *ty* [the Russian T pronoun] from their parents' (Friedrich 1966: 231).

We should certainly expect to find this variation in ancient Greek as well. The diversity of Greek dialects is well known, and even within the same dialect one might well expect the language to be less standardized than those of modern Europe, since the Greeks lacked the unifying influences of radio, television, and printed books. This diversity could be visible both in differences between one character's speech and another's within a given work (as in Tolstoy), and in differences between the various authors. The first type of difference might well not appear in works which depicted only Athenian citizens, for the Athenian citizen body was a fairly small and homogeneous group in the classical period. If no address variation can be found between Athenians and foreigners, however, we need to worry that our texts are not accurately reflecting the situation in the non-Athenian dialects. The second type of difference presents more complications. Attic, Ionic, and later (Koine) Greek are used in this survey, and we might expect to find different address rules in different authors corresponding to these three groups. But since the writers also had widely different regional backgrounds and levels of education, and since some of the later authors were certainly writing in a language very different from the one they spoke (indeed a few were not even native speakers of Greek), we can expect more complex variation in our evidence.

1.2.4 *Lexical versus address meaning*

An important observation about addresses in modern languages is that the meaning of a word when used as an address may differ considerably from its 'lexical' or 'referential' usage. Thus in American English

'lady' as an address implies scorn or ill-will on the part of the speaker, but in referential usage it has no such connotations (cf. Zwicky 1974: 790). A similar discrepancy occurs in British English with the word 'love', which when applied referentially to a person implies that strong affection is felt for him or her, but as an address is used freely to total strangers by bus or train conductors, clearly without any implications of strong affection (cf. Holmes 1992: 300). Indeed foreigners who take the word in its lexical meaning and react with alarm are met with total bafflement on the part of native speakers. Another example is 'madam', which in reference is applied to brothel-keepers but as an address is a polite way of speaking to superiors or strangers (*OED*: s.v. 'madam').

This distinction between lexical or referential and address meaning has long been generally accepted by sociolinguists (e.g. Zwicky 1974: 790-1; Bean 1978: 63-6), and it is usually employed without comment. It functions in a number of ways. As we have seen, some words have greatly differing lexical and address meanings. A word may also be used only referentially and not as an address, as 'physician' and 'great-aunt' in English (compare 'doctor' and 'grandmother', which have similar basic meanings but can be used in address).⁸ The reverse is also possible, for *ὦ τὰν* in Greek occurs only as a vocative. It is, however, important to realize that the examples commonly cited to illustrate a difference between lexical and address meaning, words like French *Monsieur* and German *Herr* which originally meant 'my lord' but no longer have that force when used in address, really reflect diachronic rather than synchronic variation, for they no longer mean 'my lord' in referential usage either. Nevertheless such diachronic variation can be very striking, as in the case of Romanian *dumneata*, which comes from *domnia tua*, meaning 'your lordship', but is currently used as the less polite pronoun of address contrasted with *dumneavoastră* and is 'a symbol of inferiority or juniority' of the addressee (Braun 1988: 307-8).

Problems arise because, although lexical and address meaning are separate, they are not unrelated. Indeed the difference between the two arises only gradually:

When words start to be used as forms of address, it is mostly because of their lexical meaning, which qualifies them for certain situations and certain types of addressees ... But once a word has entered the system of address, its

⁸ Zwicky (1974: 790-1); the examples are his, and the point about 'great-aunt' may be debatable, but this does not affect the argument as a whole.

development is less and less affected by its literal meaning; the former connection of lexical and social content is loosened, and the social meaning comes to be entirely determined by the interplay and interdependency of variants . . . There is no necessary correlation of social and lexical component, even less may social meaning be equated with the lexical one. (Braun 1988: 260-1)

In other words, there may be a stage in the development of an address form when it is not appropriate to distinguish the lexical and social meanings, but at other stages they must be kept apart. Braun concludes (1988: 264-5) that

it is not a reasonable procedure to go by the lexical meanings of variants when analysing address systems in different languages. If a certain nominal variant indicates superiority or seniority in its lexical meaning, this does not justify the conclusion that it expresses superiority or seniority when used as a form of address as well . . . Under favorable circumstances, lexical meaning may thus be a hint for evaluating the position of an address variant, but no more than that. As long as one does not know which is the stage of development of the form in question, one has to be very careful about the lexical meaning.

Nevertheless the influence does not go in only one direction, a fact which few linguists have noticed. As we have observed, the original lexical meaning of *Monsieur* was 'my lord', but *Monsieur* can now be used referentially in sentences like 'Je ne connais pas ce monsieur.'⁹ In this case it seems likely that the modern referential meaning, which is certainly not 'my lord', has come from the address usage of *Monsieur* for any unfamiliar adult male, not from the original lexical meaning.

A further complication is that the way that one person refers to another is related to the way that they address each other. Thus if three Englishwomen are friends and address each other by first names, they will also use first names when one is talking to another about the third: 'Jane, you'll never guess what Mrs Jones said to me yesterday!' is inconceivable if both Jane and the speaker normally address Mrs Jones as 'Sarah'. Because of this similarity between the way that person A *refers* to person B and the way that A *addresses* B, some scholars have failed to distinguish between address and referential usage of words, particularly of variants like 'Mr' and 'Mrs' versus first names.¹⁰ Yet such lack of distinction leads to erroneous conclusions, for the way a person is referred to in conversation depends not

⁹ Information from native speakers.

¹⁰ e.g. Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990: 142); cf. Conant (1961: 19-21).

only on the way that A, the speaker, addresses B, the person referred to, but also on the way that B is addressed by the person that A is currently talking to. The sentence given above, which was impossible if Jane was a woman who normally addressed B as Sarah, is perfectly normal if Jane is the speaker's 8-year-old daughter who normally addresses B as Mrs Jones.

This factor has been researched by Dietrich Hartmann (1972, 1975), who concluded that both the relationship between speaker and person referred to and that between speaker and addressee contribute to determining the way that B is referred to. A number of other linguists have since noted this point (e.g. Hook 1984: 188 n. 10; Fasold 1990: 3), but it has received less general attention than it deserves. In a language like Greek where adequate evidence of address forms may be lacking, it is very tempting to equate referential and address usage, and while in certain cases this may work, in others it will be misleading. Only the line of research taken by Hartmann can help us decide where referential usage can tell us something about addresses and where it cannot.

1.2.5 *Register*

The concept of register is one often used by linguists but which can be defined in a number of different ways (cf. Biber 1994: 32, 51-3). Essentially, register refers to the use of different types of language in different situations; for example, a student may not employ the same vocabulary and syntax in talking to her friends in her room as she does when talking to her professor in his office, and the language she uses to write an essay will be still another variety. This type of variation can also be called 'style' or 'genre', provided one remembers that it applies to non-literary forms of language just as much as to literary forms.

It is a basic tenet of linguistics that all forms of a language are equal; none can be considered 'higher' or 'better' than another. Speakers of a language, however, very often do make such value judgements about registers, and an understanding of these judgements is essential to an understanding of how particular registers work in their social contexts. We know that the Greeks considered some forms of language more 'elevated' than others, and thus I shall refer to particular vocatives as belonging to 'higher' and 'lower' registers whenever the evidence suggests that the Greeks themselves made such a classification.

Registers appear to work according to a rule called the 'style axiom': 'variation on the style dimension within the speech of a single speaker

derives from and echoes the variation which exists between speakers on the "social" dimension' (Bell 1984: 151; cf. Rickford and McNair-Knox 1994: 241). In other words, certain linguistic characteristics belong to a high register because they are associated with people who occupy a high status in the community; others belong to a low register because they are associated with speakers of lower status. But in fact each individual speaker is capable of producing more than one register (although not necessarily all of the registers used in the community) and will use the forms associated with high-status people when he/she is aiming at a high style, and the forms associated with lower-status people when aiming at a lower style.

The assumption is sometimes made that there is only one register which each speaker can use without a conscious effort and that only this one counts as that person's natural language. This assumption, if it is valid at all, only holds true for a very crude division of registers. Studies have shown that the speech of completely illiterate people can display measurable variation in register within the genre of casual conversation and without any conscious effort, according to the topic of conversation, the setting, and the identity of the addressee (Dorian 1994; Rickford and McNair-Knox 1994). These variations in register often consist of smaller differences than those requiring conscious effort, but such is not always the case. An extreme case of register variation is bilingualism, and just as people do exist who can shift without effort between two languages, so there are people who have had sufficient experience of two radically different registers of the same language to enable them to shift without conscious application. The prevalence of such people in a community depends on the extent to which they are required to use different registers and the age at which these registers are learned.

It is sometimes assumed that a person's 'real' language can be equated with the lowest of the registers he/she controls, but in fact this assumption is seriously flawed. Most, if not all, people have more than one register which they use without conscious effort, and all of these must be accepted as their 'natural' language. Moreover, it is by no means certain that those registers which do require effort will always be 'higher' than those which do not. True, they will usually be higher, because in most societies it is more advantageous to imitate people of higher status than those of lower status. The reverse, however, does occur; in fact it is particularly notable among younger, educated people in the late twentieth century. The trend in the use of

forms of address in some parts of Italy has been for certain higher-status members of society to use the forms they associate with the lower-status speakers, while the latter adopt the forms previously associated with the higher-status speakers. This results in an inversion of address usage, apparently without either party noticing that the other does not in fact use the forms being imitated (Bates and Benigni 1975: 276-9). A similar phenomenon can be observed with 'can' and 'may' and with the use of the subjunctive in British English. The use of 'may' and of the subjunctive is natural to certain people of educated backgrounds and is considered correct; precisely for this reason, several students of my acquaintance have with considerable effort trained themselves not to use 'may' or subjunctives in order to avoid the stigma of sounding pretentious.

In dealing with Greek, then, we shall accept that register variation existed and that the types of language associated with higher-status members of the society were related to those considered high style by people who were shifting registers. We shall not, however, assume that each Athenian was comfortable with only one register, nor that they were incapable of using registers below the ones with which they were comfortable.

1.2.6 *Reciprocity*

Some other distinctions among addresses are relevant as well. As set out by Brown and Gilman, the difference between a 'T pronoun' and a 'V pronoun' is that the former is used to intimates and inferiors and the latter is used to non-intimates and superiors. A language which has only one second-person pronoun, such as English, can still have a T/V distinction in nominal address forms (address by first name in English being equivalent to T, and title and last name to V).

Closely connected to the idea of T and V is that of reciprocity or symmetry. Reciprocal address is a situation in which both speakers in a dyad use the same addresses or the same type of addresses to one another (Braun 1988: 13). Thus if speaker A uses *du* and speaker B uses *du*, or if A uses 'Mrs Smith' and B uses 'Mrs Jones', or if A uses 'Jane' and B uses 'Lisa', the addresses are reciprocal, but if A uses *du* and B uses *Sie*, or if A uses 'Mrs Smith' and B uses 'Lisa', or if A uses 'Jane' and B uses 'Mother', the addresses are non-reciprocal. In a non-reciprocal situation at least one speaker does not have the option of using the type of address that the other uses. If a T pronoun is used

reciprocally, it may indicate intimacy, but if it is used non-reciprocally, it usually shows the addressee's inferiority. Reciprocity is thus an important concept to keep in mind, for the meaning of a term of address in a given context can depend on the way that the recipient of that term addresses the speaker.

1.2.7 *Politeness*

Another area of sociolinguistics, the study of politeness phenomena, is closely related to address studies and has much to contribute to it. In particular it is useful to know that there are two types of strategy which can both be called 'politeness'. One, known as 'negative politeness', consists of efforts to avoid hindering the addressee in any way or annoying him/her by undue familiarity; the other, 'positive politeness', is a strategy in which the speaker tries to gratify the speaker in some way (Brown and Levinson 1987: 101, 129). One of the commoner forms of positive politeness is the use of 'in-group identity markers', such as address forms which remind the addressee that he or she has a connection to the speaker (Brown and Levinson 1987: 107-9), and in Greek kinship terms in particular tend to be used in this way (see pp. 69, 82).

1.2.8 *Address change*

In address systems, as in other aspects of language, changes may occur over time; the question then arises whether there are detectable regularities in the way in which address systems change. Until recently very little work had been done on the diachrony of address systems (even works on historical forms of address tended to confine themselves to relatively short periods of time), although Brown and Gilman did discuss this issue in their article. In 1992, however, a book appeared which was devoted to historical address change. The author, Agnieszka Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak, concluded (1992: 48) that address change was brought about by 'the universal human trait to honour—and to reach for—power', which led people to try continually to address their superiors with more and more deference. Thus address change was initiated by the inferior in a given dyad and took the form of new terms being introduced as polite, being used more and more and losing their connotations of politeness, until a new and more deferent form was introduced and the old one was relegated to the

status of a less polite address such as a T pronoun (1992: 48, 87, 117–18). This view is supported by her study of the history of address systems in Polish and English and by statements made by Braun (1988: 57) and Head (1978: 194). For the addresses she is discussing, Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak's explanation seems to be the only sensible one.

Other evidence, however, has led to opposite conclusions. Also in 1992 another sociolinguist, Wardhaugh, asserted (1992: 271) that in a hierarchy

those at the bottom seek to minimize their difference in status from those at the top and those at the top seek to maximize that difference. In trying to do this, members of each group use address terms as a resource in the resulting 'power' struggle, with those at the bottom using the most familiar terms they can manage to use and those at the top the most formal ones.

This statement is supported by far less documentation than the one above, but it too seems intuitively obvious, and it would be well for us to bear in mind both hypotheses when investigating Greek addresses.

One more point should be remembered when considering historical address change. In the words of Romaine (1982: 122),

The working principle of sociolinguistic reconstruction must be the 'uniformitarian principle'. In other words, we accept that the linguistic forces which operate today and are observable around us are not unlike those which have operated in the past.¹¹

This principle, it must be noted, cuts both ways. It allows us to apply to Greek the above theories of address change, which were developed for relatively modern languages, but it also means that if we find that they do not apply to Greek, then they need to be re-examined, since they claim to explain address behaviour by means of supposedly universal human tendencies (see Sect. 6.4).

1.2.9 *Addresses and social structure*

A belief long held by linguists is that 'there is a correlation between the form and content of a language and the beliefs, values, and needs present in the culture of its speakers' (Saville-Troike 1989: 32). This theory is established beyond any serious doubt, and it clearly ought to apply to addresses as well as to other elements of language. A recent book states that, 'The claim that address usage reflects a part of social

¹¹ Cf. also Comrie (1989: 9) and Labov (1972: 101).

reality—the relationships between the speaker and the addressee—is hardly questionable.¹² Indeed, it has been argued that there are instances in which address usage provides a more accurate guide to social reality than does referential usage. Thus Jarawa referential usage does not provide different words for older and younger siblings, but address usage does make such a distinction, and the distinction can be seen from extralinguistic evidence to be important in the society (Conant 1961: 29).

Certainly address usage does provide clues about social relations which could not be gathered from referential usage. In Chinese, for example, the absence of any vocative for address by a woman to her husband's elder brother or elder male cousin reflected the fact that a woman was not supposed to meet these relatives at all (Chao 1956: 230). Nevertheless, the information encoded in address usage is not straightforward and needs to be handled with caution. Perret's blithe assertion (1968: 9) that 'un usage réciproque des termes d'adresse est le signe d'une égalité entre les deux personnes'¹³ has been thoroughly refuted by those who pointed out that two Germans who use *Sie* to one another may have a very unequal status, and that children who use *du* to their parents are not equal to them (Başoğlu 1987: 50). Lambert and Tucker argued (1976: 74) that, 'In France, then, widespread norms of address appear to cut across social class boundaries, making France, in this sense, a classless society compared to French Canada', although this conclusion seems intuitively to be wrong when compared with other information on the two societies involved.

The moral we ought to draw from these cases is that, while address usage does reflect social reality in the culture concerned, it may not provide a complete view of that reality.¹⁴ In our study of ancient Greek, then, we can be encouraged by the knowledge that we may be able to shed new light on Greek society and values, but we must beware of assuming that we hold the universal key to social relationships; other evidence about Greek culture cannot be disregarded.

¹² Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak (1992: 8); see also Hwang (1975: 16), Başoğlu (1987: 299), and Braun, Kohz, and Schubert (1986: xvii).

¹³ 'A reciprocal usage of address terms is a sign of equality between the two members of a dyad.'

¹⁴ See Gates (1971: 36, 42–3) for some salutary warnings against overdoing extrapolation from linguistic to social structure.

1.3 PREVIOUS WORK ON GREEK ADDRESSES

Greek forms of address present a wide field for study, and they have been the subject of scholarly attention for more than 100 years. Many of the works on the subject, however, are concerned primarily or exclusively with problems peripheral to the issue with which we are concerned, such as the nominative for vocative construction, the use of plural for singular, and the use of ω . In 1955 it was noted that very little work had been done on the more important issue of the meanings of the vocatives themselves and the tone they give to a passage (Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 38), and the situation has not changed greatly since then.

Of the literature which does discuss Greek addresses, about half is concerned only with a very late period of Greek. The late Roman and Byzantine periods saw an extraordinary proliferation of complex and elaborate titles, providing a range of addresses far exceeding that attested at any other period in the history of Greek and yielding a rich field for scholarship. Because of the large amount of data, however, many of the works of this type tend to seem like lists rather than detailed studies. Characteristic of these books is attention to the recipients of various titles with little regard for any differences between speakers (or writers) or contexts. The most important works in this area are those of Zehetmair (1912), Hornickel (1930), and Dinneen (1929).

We are left with rather few useful works dealing with classical Greek. Several studies whose main focus is elsewhere provide some good observations on the meaning of various addresses: Zilliacus (1949) discusses Homeric and classical addresses while searching for the origins of the Byzantine abstract titles, and both Wackernagel's short treatise *Über einige antike Anredeformen* (1912) and Svennung's book *Anredeformen* (1958) give important insights into the meaning of certain addresses, though they are primarily concerned with the problem of nominatives for vocatives. Bassett (1934) explores the issue of when addresses are used or omitted, although he does not discuss the meanings of the individual terms. A number of articles are devoted to problems associated with particular vocatives, such as $\omega \tau\alpha\nu$, although they often concentrate on etymology more than on meaning.¹⁵ Two studies of women's language, by Sommerstein (1995) and McClure

¹⁵ Diggle (1967), Glucker (1966), Gregor (1957), Griffith (1968), Halliwell (1995), Maas (1939), de Vries (1966), M. West (1965, 1966).

(1995), contain sections on forms of address, but they deal only with those addresses which may be sex-preferential and discuss only a few authors. More centrally concerned with the object of this study are the works of Paul Menge (1905), who treats the referential and vocative use of kinship terms in Greek drama, and Eibel (1893) and Rockel (1884), who offer good but somewhat old treatments of the plural vocatives in oratory. Halliwell (1995) discusses the use of certain types of address in Plato. A long article by Kambylis (1964) discusses vocatives in Pindar but is concerned with forms and mechanics rather than meaning, and two unpublished dissertations by Katharine Black (1985) and Elizabeth Weise (1965) treat vocatives in Sophocles and the *Iliad* respectively. Unfortunately these studies of individual authors tend to ignore the larger picture, and thus some of their conclusions are suspect. The most useful books are Brunius-Nilsson's detailed discussion (1955) of *δαίμονες* and a few other addresses in a wide range of authors, and Thilde Wendel's extensive treatment (1929) of the addresses in epic, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes.

Of these, all but Eibel and Rockel concentrate on poetry, and Wendel's book, which is the only detailed and systematic treatment of Greek vocatives, ignores prose altogether. Moreover, most of these analyses make several assumptions which can be considered serious mistakes from a linguistic point of view: they often fail to distinguish vocative from referential meaning,¹⁶ and they tend to discuss addresses with reference only to the addressee, not the speaker. From a sociolinguistic viewpoint, as we have seen, differences in speaker are crucial, for the point of investigating questions such as the distinction between address by first name and by title with last name in English lies in the fact that different speakers use different addresses to the same person and therefore reveal something about their relationship to him/her. It thus seems that most of these scholars have overlooked some key criteria governing speakers' choice of addresses, and in this the present discussion covers new ground.

¹⁶ Cf. complaints in Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 5, 6), but note that some authors do make this distinction.

I.4 THE SCOPE OF THIS SURVEY AND THE NATURE OF THE DATA

Any study which is not dedicated to extremely rare linguistic phenomena or a very poorly preserved language must limit its scope in subject-matter, sources, and chronological range, and the current survey is no exception. The areas it will cover have been determined in an attempt to deal with the most interesting or unexplored aspects of the Greek system of address, as far as is practicable in a work of this length.

I.4.1 *Choice of texts*

The first restriction has to do with the texts used as sources of data. This study is based on a corpus of texts; all the addresses found in those texts have been analysed, and references for all of them (except proper names) are given in Appendix B. All the major address phenomena occurring in the corpus will be discussed, but phenomena occurring in other texts will be treated only when directly relevant to ones found in our data. The texts in the corpus have all been taken from literary prose, excluding poetry, inscriptions, and papyrus documents.

Although the wealth of addresses preserved in poetry is very tempting for anyone undertaking a study of this type, one of the goals of this analysis is an understanding of addresses in ordinary colloquial speech in ancient Greece, and the elevated language and metrical constraints of most forms of poetry clearly make it less suitable than prose from this point of view (see 2.4). As a result, no poetic texts are included in the corpus, but reference will frequently be made (following Wendel) to usage in poetry, particularly comedy; as Wendel's information on Aristophanes is often misleading and much of Menander was unavailable to her, I have collected my own data on these two authors. Usage in documentary papyri and inscriptions will also be noted where relevant, but it seemed impractical to include them in the corpus: in addition to problems arising from uncertain dating and fragmentary contexts, inscriptions have virtually no addresses, and each individual papyrus contains too few vocatives to give a clear idea of the tendencies of its author.

The field of literary prose is still too large to cover in a single book, necessitating a chronological limit as well; thus no works are included

which were probably written after the end of the second century AD. Since the first author in the corpus is Herodotus, this limit gives us a chronological span of over 600 years. In addition, since authors' individual styles could greatly affect address usage in their works, it was not possible to use data from any author who did not provide at least thirty addresses, so that some idea could be gained of his general tendencies. The importance of context and of knowing the identity of speaker and addressee generally prohibited the inclusion of fragments and excluded any authors whose work consisted entirely of fragments. The Septuagint and the New Testament could not be included because of uncertain amounts of Hebrew and Aramaic influence and severe problems with textual tradition in some sections, but they are used for comparison where possible.

The final corpus does not include all authors who fit the above criteria, but it represents those necessary to gather a sufficiently large body of data. The authors included (in chronological order), the number of addresses provided by each, the length in pages of the works surveyed,¹⁷ and the density of address usage in different authors¹⁸ are given in Table 1. More precise dates for each author and a list of the works included in the survey (whenever feasible, all works of the authors included were used) may be found in Appendix A.

The editions used were Oxford Classical Texts whenever those existed; failing that, I used the texts listed in the *TLG Canon* (Berkowitz and Squitier 1990) unless there was a more recent edition which seemed to be preferable. A complete list of the texts used may be found in Appendix A. In the course of data collection a number of comparisons between different texts were made, and it seemed clear that, for most authors included in this sample, textual differences did not seriously affect the range and distribution of the addresses used. Thus, although adherence to the chosen text has been rigid, it would not in fact have made much difference if a different text had been used.

¹⁷ This figure represents the number of pages taken up by the works of each author in the Oxford Classical Text or the nearest equivalent in format; it is given so that readers may know the basis on which the density figure has been calculated. Since the amount of text per page differs not only from one edition to another but even among different authors within the OCT series (e.g. those dialogues of Plato in which a new line is used for each change of speaker will have fewer words per page than a book of Herodotus), this figure can only be a very rough estimate.

¹⁸ This figure represents the average number of addresses per 100 pages of text and is given so that readers may have some idea of the differences in address frequency from one author to another. Since the number of pages is only an approximation, the density figure as well must be regarded as very rough.

Table 1. *Corpus of authors surveyed*

Author	Century	Sing. addr.	Plural addr.	Total addr.	OCT pages	Density
Herodotus	V BC	219	72	291	802	36
Antiphon	V BC	—	36	36	96	38
Thucydides	V-IV BC	2	58	60	602	10
Lysias	V-IV BC	13	290	303	274	110
Andocides	V-IV BC	9	82	91	85	107
Isocrates	IV BC	7	34	41	569	7
Plato	IV BC	3,348	139	3,487	2,549	137
Xenophon	IV BC	834	258	1,092	1,368	80
Isaeus	IV BC	10	163	173	155	112
Aeschines	IV BC	30	115	145	301	48
Lycurgus	IV BC	5	66	71	53	134
Demosthenes	IV BC	147	1,362	1,509	1,322	114
Dinarchus	IV-III BC	14	70	84	61	138
Polybius	II BC	21	23	44	1,682	3
Diodorus Siculus	I BC	17	19	36	2,553	1
Dionysius of Halicarnassus	I BC-I AD	157	179	336	1,547	22
Philo Judaeus	I BC-I AD	136	32	168	1,824	9
Flavius Josephus	I AD	148	47	195	2,265	9
Dio Chrysostom	I-II AD	83	55	138	646	21
Plutarch	I-II AD	863	126	989	5,124	19
Epictetus	I-II AD	167	17	184	431	43
Lucian	II AD	1,931	110	2,041	1,484	138
Achilles Tatius	II? AD	124	4	128	161	80
Chariton	II? AD	190	11	201	127	158
Longus	II? AD	38	6	44	105	42

The exception to this generalization is some of the Attic orators, notably Aeschines, in whose works the differences between one edition and another were very great but still did not usually affect the basic content of the addresses.

1.4.2 *Method of data collection and choice of addresses*

The data have been collected by reading through each text and noting all addresses. When all the works of an author had been analysed, they

were searched electronically for ω and for the addresses which had turned up in the manual search. Each text has thus been searched twice, and the effect should be close to 100 per cent accuracy.

One of the most difficult decisions in determining the corpus of data concerned which addresses to collect. The examination was limited to free forms of address, as defined in Section 1.2.1, for a variety of reasons. In the corpus chosen addresses carrying interesting social meaning are almost always free rather than bound, for there is no T/V variation in Greek second-person pronouns, and nominal address forms rarely occur in bound position. (In other types of literature, particularly letters, nominal bound forms are much more common, but these bear little or no relationship to the addresses in our corpus and have been studied elsewhere.) Furthermore, Wendel's study of poetic addresses deals only with vocatives, and there are great advantages in having results comparable with hers. Another factor is that data collection would have been far more difficult and time-consuming if bound forms had been included, and this would have resulted in a drastic reduction in the amount of data collected.

This restriction inevitably forced a close examination of the exact limitations of the category of free addresses. In theory, all nominatives for vocatives ought to have been included and vocatives for nominatives excluded,¹⁹ but this limitation would in turn require an examination into these two categories to decide where their own boundaries were. Since these issues are a thoroughly separate problem and have been studied in detail elsewhere,²⁰ it seemed better to include nominatives for vocatives only in those cases where there is absolutely no way that anyone could possibly construe them as bound forms and to exclude all doubtful cases. These phenomena, however, being primarily poetic (Hedberg 1935: 73), are extremely rare in the works surveyed and could not significantly affect the statistics for such a large corpus of data.

A useful factor in distinguishing between bound and free forms has been the particle ω . This word is often prefixed to free addresses, exclamations, and other words or phrases which are not integrated into the syntax of the sentence, but in classical Greek it is never used with syntactically integrated forms such as bound addresses. Thus a nominative address preceded by ω can be safely taken to be a free

¹⁹ This method is used with good results by Vuorenjuuri (1969: 147 n. 1).

²⁰ e.g. Wackernagel (1912, 1926-8: i. 306-10); Svennung (1958); Hedberg (1935: 73-80).

form of address. On the other hand, not all words preceded by ω are necessarily addresses. Some are exclamations, as ω δειλαιος ἐγώ 'woe is me'. Expressions such as ω Ζεῦ 'O Zeus' can also be exclamations, although they can be addresses too, depending on the context. Similarly in English one can use 'God' in exclamations ('Oh God, I can't believe I missed it again!') or in genuine addresses ('Oh God, please help me ...'). In the current survey, all actual prayers and addresses to the gods have been included, and all exclamations have been excluded, judging from the context when the expression itself was ambiguous. This decision is in accordance with the practice of others who have studied addresses in general and Greek addresses in particular.

The greatest difficulty with the bound/free distinction in Greek is the status of the pronouns. Personal pronouns are never grammatically required in the nominative in Greek but may be freely used for emphasis, so it is very hard to tell whether they are bound or free forms of address, especially as they have no separate vocative forms. Thus when Herodotus has the Median king say to a peasant boy: $\Sigma\upsilon$ δὲ ἐὼν τοῦδε τοιοῦτου ἐόντος παῖς ἐτόλμησας τὸν τοῦδε παῖδα ἐόντος πρώτου παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀεικεῖν τοιῇδε περισπεῖν; 'You indeed, being the son of this man who is of such low condition, have you dared to treat with such unseemly outrage the son of this man, who is of first rank at my court?' (1. 115. 2), one could make a good case for $\sigma\upsilon$ being either a bound or a free form, since it could be syntactically integrated into the sentence as the subject of ἐτόλμησας but could also stand by itself.²¹

In this situation one needs to clarify the definition of 'free' and 'bound' somewhat to deal with the case of the Greek pronouns, and two factors will help us decide how to do this. One is that Greek is not the only language posing such a difficulty; it occurs in a number of modern languages as well, such as Polish, and there linguists consider optional subject pronouns to be bound addresses (e.g. Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 17–18, 20). Another criterion is the use of the particle ω . Although different authors at different periods make more or less use of ω , it generally occurred very frequently in the data collected for this survey, and it is clear that there is no word which is unmistakably

²¹ The type of sentence in which $\sigma\upsilon$ stands the greatest chance of being a free form of address is that in which it accompanies an imperative, as ἐπιβαίνει $\sigma\upsilon$ 'you, get on board' (Lucian, *Cat.* 8). I doubt, however, that any Greek would have felt this use of $\sigma\upsilon$ to be any different from that in the other example quoted, and it seems unwise to study only the very small number of pronouns which follow imperatives in isolation from those which occur with second-person verbs.

a free form of address and *cannot* be preceded by ω . Among the pronouns, demonstratives such as $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ are often preceded by ω and used in positions which make them indubitably free forms of address, but personal pronouns such as $\sigma\upsilon$ are never preceded by ω in our data.

Both of these criteria point to the classification of Greek personal pronouns as bound forms of address, and in consequence they are omitted from this study.²² $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and the other demonstratives, on the other hand, are considered free forms and included. These rules of pronoun inclusion and exclusion agree with the practice of other students of Greek addresses (e.g. Wendel 1929), although these scholars were not thinking about free and bound forms.

Some restrictions have also been imposed for the sake of consistency within the corpus. All quotations from one author in the text of another have been excluded, as have all poetic oracles, inscriptions, and passages in verse. Quotations from historical personages, however, like the speeches or letters in Thucydides and Herodotus, have all been included, provided they are not in verse.

1.4.3 *Nature and size of the corpus*

Even with these limitations, the resulting corpus is 11,891 addresses, with 525 addresses of additional data from Menander and 1,168 from Aristophanes.²³ Since an address may be a phrase and not a single term, as ω $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon$ $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ 'dear child' which provides information on both $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon$ and $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}$, the total number of terms collected is even larger than this. To gain a sense of the scale of this sample, one can compare it to sociolinguistic studies of addresses in modern languages. Most such studies do not define exactly the extent of the data collected, but Parkinson (1985: 6, 8) is very clear on this point, probably because (unlike some other researchers) he had nothing to hide. After a year's work of address collection on the part of several people, over 5,000 Arabic addresses were gathered, a total which the author clearly felt to be huge in comparison with other address studies. A similar total is estimated for Wendel's data, although she does not herself specify a number, and reviewers consider it very large (Anon. 1930: 59–60;

²² Vairel (1986: 56), considering whether Latin *tu* is to be considered a nominative or a vocative, concludes after a thorough examination of the apparent vocative uses that *tu* is 'toujours et exclusivement un nominatif'.

²³ For full information on the editions of Aristophanes and Menander used and the fragments included, see Appendix A.

Körte 1931: 203). Our corpus is thus more than twice the size of the largest similar studies.

The corpus is extensive not only in number of addresses but in the number of different terms occurring. Omitting all names and ethnics, counting singular and plural and masculine and feminine together (thus οὗτος, οὗτοι, αὐτή, and αὐταί would all count as one term), and counting combinations simply as their component parts (thus φίλε παῖ would not count if παῖ and φίλε had occurred separately), we have approximately 350–70 different terms. If combinations and plurals were counted separately, the number would clearly be much higher. This figure, however, represents a time-span of over 600 years, and the number of terms actually used by any one author is much smaller.²⁴

1.4.4 *Limits of discussion*

Clearly a work of this size could not discuss in detail each of these different terms, nor would it be productive to do so, since many are probably unique, not only in the present corpus but also in Greek as a whole. In such situations the categories of addresses and the rules for choosing categories become more important than the individual terms used. Thus, although all terms are listed separately in Appendix B, unique addresses are not discussed in the text unless they have some intrinsic interest.

Another limitation on discussion exists in the case of plural addresses. One might at first assume that an address would always have the same meaning in the singular and plural, but in many modern languages this is not the case. In American English, for example, one does not normally use 'gentleman' as a vocative, and 'lady' when so used is generally rude, but the plural 'ladies and gentlemen' is a common and perfectly polite way of starting a speech. A similar gap between singular and plural occurs in the equivalent expressions in several modern European languages and in some other English expressions (Albrecht 1971: 357; Zwicky 1974: 794–5). In Greek, many vocatives occur only in the singular (ὦ τᾶν), only in the plural (ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί), or have different uses in the singular and plural (ἄνερ 'man, husband' is used almost exclusively by a woman to her husband, but ἄνδρες 'men' is a common way for a man to address a

²⁴ The largest number of different addresses in one author is 140 in Lucian, but there is good reason to believe that Lucian was drawing on the address usage of a variety of different types of Greek in his works.

group of men). This difference means that the singular and plural uses of many terms will have to be examined separately.

Faced with this problem, a number of researchers on modern languages have decided to ignore the plural forms to a greater or lesser extent and concentrate on the singular (e.g. Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 49). The reason for this choice is that singular addresses generally offer much more interesting information to the sociolinguist. Only a singular address can reflect the relationship between two people in a dyad; plural addresses rarely make fine distinctions of age or rank, for the group of addressees normally contains a mixture of people who would be addressed in different ways in the singular. Furthermore, there is often a greater number and variety of distinctions in singular addresses. In this work plural addresses will not be omitted, but those which differ in meaning from the singular will be discussed separately in Section 3.9 and examined in less detail than the singular.

Much of the earlier work on Greek vocatives is concerned with the use or omission of the particle *ὦ*. Many scholars consider *ὦ* to be an integral part of an address, but Wendel does not separate addresses with *ὦ* from those without, and this decision is one of the factors which enabled her to make much more useful observations than many of her predecessors.²⁵ From a linguistic point of view, it is really the term used that matters, and the difference between *παῖ* 'child' and *νεανία* 'youth' is much more important and interesting than that between *παῖ* 'child' and *ὦ παῖ* 'O child'. All addresses will therefore be quoted without *ὦ* and treated without regard for the presence or absence of *ὦ*; a brief summary of the factors affecting the use of *ὦ* is given in Section 4.3.

1.4.5 Organization

A study of forms of address can begin from either of two angles. One can classify the addresses semantically, for example into names, kinship terms, etc., and observe the ways in which these different groups are employed, or one can classify the speakers and addressees on the basis of age, sex, rank, etc. and observe the different addresses used by each group (cf. Romaine 1982: 139). In either case one must have some other information on which to base the initial division, and this information is much easier to acquire in the case of the linguistic forms

²⁵ More recent scholars tend to follow the same policy; see Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 5 n.).

than in the case of the social subgrouping of the addressees. For example, in many cultures an addressee is treated differently if he or she is older than the speaker, but the linguistic definition of 'older' varies greatly, being set (it is said) at an age difference of at least two years in Korean, at least fifteen years in American English, and as little as one day in some cultures (Ervin-Tripp 1969: 227-8, 231).

Our independent evidence for such divisions among speakers of ancient languages is not usually firm enough to allow us to know for certain how they would have divided their addressees into classes, and thus it is safer to begin from the terms themselves, as is usual in historical sociolinguistics (e.g. Romaine 1982: 139 ff.). This is also the system which has been used by most of those who have previously written about Greek addresses, except in some discussions of titles of office in a very stratified Egyptian bureaucracy or in the hierarchy of the Christian Church (e.g. Dinneen 1929).

Nevertheless, when one has identified a group of addressees who receive a given term or a group of speakers who use it, it is necessary to use extralinguistic evidence to determine what they have in common. Here the criteria of contextual information and common sense have been applied. Thus a king is assumed to be socially superior to his attendants, and an uncle is assumed to be older than his nephew. In short, whenever the context indicates that the speaker or addressee is being treated as a superior, an inferior, an equal, a child, an old man, a relative, or a member of a similar social group, I have assumed that he or she is in fact a member of such a group.

Similarly the types of statements in which addresses are used, and thus their social meanings, have had to be gathered from the contexts in which they occur. In some cases it is possible to say that an address expresses affection, contempt, or another specific emotion, but often such fine distinctions are not justified by the evidence. In those cases we shall make a general division into positive, negative, and neutral statements: a positive address is taken to be one which is regularly used in expressions of praise, affection, solidarity, respect, or another 'positive' emotion, while a negative address is one which generally occurs in statements implying anger, hostility, contempt, or similar emotions. A neutral address is one which is often found in statements where neither positive nor negative emotion is apparent; such addresses may also be used in positive or negative statements from time to time.

Greek words have been quoted in the vocative when their address usage is being discussed, which is most of the time. When referential

usage is the point at issue, however, the words will be quoted in the nominative. The spelling and accentuation of addresses follows that of the editions listed in Appendix A unless otherwise noted, as do the texts of all Greek passages quoted. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.

In order to make quantitative assertions checkable without drowning the text in thousands of references, all occurrences of all vocatives (except personal names) in the works surveyed have been listed in Appendix B, with enough classification and context to support the most important assertions made about them. As a result, references to addresses in the corpus are not given in the text unless a specific passage is discussed.

1.4.6 Conclusion

There are a large number of different elements which will have to be kept in mind when analysing Greek addresses. The interplay of these different factors may be illustrated by a situation described by Plutarch (*Alex.* 64. 12), in which a captive addresses Alexander the Great as βασιλεῦ 'king'. The fact that Alexander is a king obviously helps determine the form of the address, but the fact that the speaker is a captive also matters, because some people in Plutarch are entitled to call Alexander Ἀλέξανδρε 'Alexander' or even παῖ 'child'. The fact that the captive is just getting the upper hand in an argument about whether or not he is to be executed is also relevant, because the captives had previously spoken to the king five times in a row without using any term of address at all, and here the vocative marks the climax and final speech of the argument. Moreover, the fact that by Plutarch's individual address rules βασιλεῦ can be used as an address from captives to kings also makes a difference, for Herodotus might well have used δέσποτα 'master' in the same situation, while Xenophon could have used Ἀλέξανδρε. All of these factors must therefore be taken into account if a valid and useful account of the addresses is to be given.

Sociolinguistics and Written Texts

A recent book on address usage points out that, 'Address research based on literary sources, to the extent that it aspires to portray language practice and/or the social structure of a period in history, cannot really escape being confronted by the question of whether this task is at all feasible' (Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 40). Although this argument applies to many other aspects of sociolinguistic research as well, the point will be discussed here specifically with reference to address theory, and the term 'sociolinguistics' will be used to refer primarily to research on address usage. In fact, addresses in many languages which exist only in written form have been studied by sociolinguists without any discussion of this question (e.g. Östör 1982, Phillipps 1984) though it is certainly worthy of consideration.¹

2.1 NATURE AND VALIDITY OF THE SPOKEN/WRITTEN DISTINCTION

The core of the objection to written sources is that the written usage of a language is not always the same as the spoken usage. This fact is undeniable, but the difference between the two has proved very elusive. An increasing number of studies has attempted to define the difference between spoken and written language in terms of syntactic or other linguistic features, but these works have produced contradictory results—some found no significant difference, others great differences manifested in a variety of ways.² A new and increasingly popular explanation for this situation is that the most important linguistic differences exist not between written and spoken language

¹ For the larger issue of applying other types of linguistics to texts, see D. Stein (1992).

² See discussion of this issue in Biber (1988: esp. 47–58). An unbiased overview of previous work on speech and writing, with an extensive bibliography, can be found in Chafe and Tannen (1987).

as such, but between different genres within a language, whether spoken or written.³ Thus the language of academic speeches is very close to that of journal articles, but both are significantly different from casual conversation or from the language of tabloid journalism (cf. Biber 1988: 52–3).

This observation is particularly applicable to ancient Greece, where due to the custom of reading aloud to an audience rather than silently to oneself⁴ the distinction between spoken and written media was even less clear than in our society. Indeed, it is not even possible to draw a line between spoken and written Greek without encountering absurdities. Are the comedies of Menander to be considered 'written language' because they were written down, even though they were meant to be performed orally?⁵ If so, do we contrast them with the 'spoken language' of the orally composed Homeric poems, and how do we then deal with the fact that Menander's language is universally recognized to be closer than Homer's to colloquial spoken Attic? Or do we argue that on the day that the Homeric poems were written down they became written rather than spoken language? Did they remain spoken language in Sparta after being written down in Athens? If two orators spoke in court, and one was brilliant enough to speak extemporaneously while the other had to write his speech out in advance and memorize it, did the first produce spoken Greek and the second written Greek?⁶ On the other hand, if works which are written down only as an aid for future oral delivery do *not* count as 'written language', was there any such thing as written language in ancient Greece?

The Greeks themselves certainly considered the main linguistic division to be one of genre (cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1447^a), and great differences are found between the languages of genres such as tragedy and comedy. It is very unlikely that the language of tragedy, comedy, epic, oratory, or any other literary genre was significantly different in oral performance from the written versions we possess, and therefore, once we accept that genre difference is a far more fundamental classification of language than written versus spoken, it seems certain that we

³ See Chafe and Tannen (1987: 389–91). Arguments in favour of this view include Biber (1988: *passim*), Green (1982: 151), Tannen (1982a: 18), Beaman (1984: 79), Hymes (1986: 50–2).

⁴ See Thomas (1992: 4) and Svenbro (1993); Knox, despite his vigorous argument that silent reading did occur in the ancient world, concedes that 'ancient books were normally read aloud' (1968: 435).

⁵ Sifianou (1992: 6–7) argues that drama should be considered part of spoken rather than written language.

⁶ The answer to this question may be 'yes'; see Arist. *Rh.* 1413^b.

will have very good access to a wide variety of types of Greek usage for our sociolinguistic study.

2.2 THE QUESTION OF CONVERSATIONAL LANGUAGE

We cannot, however, claim to have access to all genres of spoken Greek; that of spontaneous, non-literary conversation might well be entirely absent from the literature we have. Indeed it is likely that most of the linguists who argue that we cannot recover the spoken form of ancient languages are simply being less careful than they should have been in their choice of words; they probably mean that we cannot recover conversational usage from literary works. In that case, their objections have not yet been answered.

One answer which can be made is that there is no particular reason why we should prefer conversational language to any other type of language. Long before the spoken/written distinction began to be superseded in linguistic theory by that of genre, it was argued that written language is not merely a reflection of spoken language, but a separate and equally valid expression of what linguists are really seeking to understand: language (Vachek 1939; Romaine 1982: 14, 126). This argument can equally well be applied to literary versus conversational language. One recent work (Romaine 1982: 122) argues:

If we accept Labov's view . . . that texts can be understood only in terms of their relation to the spoken language and that the only worthwhile linguistic theories are about the language that ordinary people use on the street, then we must content ourselves with a sociolinguistic theory which is very restricted in scope and application. And I would add that such a sociolinguistic theory could not make any serious claims about being a theory of 'language'.

The extent to which we accept these arguments will, it seems to me, have to depend on the purpose of our study and the claims we wish to make for the results. We have argued that the present research can be useful in three ways: first and foremost to aid in the interpretation of Greek literature, secondly to shed light on Greek social structure, and lastly to test certain sociolinguistic assumptions which were based on modern languages. For the first goal, the question of conversational language is irrelevant. If we establish that the address *παῖ* 'child' has different shades of meaning in Platonic dialogue and in Aristophanic comedy, this finding will help our understanding of both authors even if we do not know which usage was more prevalent in conversation.

The primary purpose of this study will thus be largely unaffected by our ability or inability to recover conversational Greek.

The second goal, however, causes more problems. All types of language may be equally valid representatives of possible linguistic structures, but do all the types of language used by a given community equally reflect the assumptions on which its social structure is based? Perhaps not. A literary language used only passively by the majority of a population may not reflect that population's social structure as well as a conversational genre learned by all speakers as children, and this is particularly true if the literary language differs from the conversational one in its inclusion of foreign words and phrases, or archaic expressions which reflect the culture of an earlier age. I do not think we can dismiss the idea that

ordinary conversation is the prototypical form of language, the baseline against which all other genres, spoken or written, should be compared. Conversation is, after all, the one kind of language that all normal people produce quite naturally most of the time; all other kinds, whether spoken or written, require some special skill or training. (Chafe and Tannen 1987: 390-1)

In order to gain an understanding of Greek social structure, therefore, we shall have to be concerned with the way in which the largest part of the population spoke when they were not thinking about their use of language; that is, with conversational more than with literary genres.

The third point also is difficult, for sociolinguists are rarely specific enough about the claims they make for their theories. If a feature which is alleged to be universal is not found in literary genres in Greek, does that prove that it is not universal, or do we have to show that the feature is absent from conversational Greek as well? In this case, I think that the point about the equal validity of all types of language is fully applicable. If something is universal, it must exist in *all* genres of all languages; its absence from even one shows that it is possible to have a language which excludes the feature. Moreover, sociolinguistic studies are often concerned with genres other than conversation, so our results should be comparable to those of other sociolinguists even if we do not discuss conversational language.

2.3 PROBLEMS OF METHODOLOGY

Before examining the issue of whether we can in fact learn anything about conversational Greek from our data, let us examine the methods

used by sociolinguists to study modern languages.⁷ It seems reasonable to measure our data not only against actual usage, but also against the data gathered by other sociolinguists. This difference is an important one, for in recent years more and more attention has been paid to the problem that linguists often obtain data which is not in fact representative of the type of language they think they are studying.

There are five methods used for obtaining data on modern languages: introspection, questionnaires, interviews, observation, and text analysis. Introspection has the advantages that it is the fastest, easiest, and cheapest way of collecting data. Yet it is severely restricted in its applications: only the boldest of linguists would attempt to draw conclusions from their intuitions about languages of which they were not native speakers, and even a native speaker's intuitions are fully valid only for that speaker's age, sex, region, and social class. Since one of the main purposes of sociolinguistics is to examine variations in language caused by these very factors, introspection is clearly of limited usefulness. Moreover, according to several recent studies, 'intuition about language behavior in certain situations has been shown to differ widely from actual behaviour' (Kempf 1985: 223). Thus a study based on introspection is open to the charge of studying thoughts and linguistic targets rather than actual spoken language.

Unlike introspection, which has never been a really reputable sociolinguistic method,⁸ the written questionnaire enjoyed great popularity in the early days of address research. Brown and Gilman's initial study was based on a questionnaire, as were a number of the most important works that followed it. Questionnaires have the advantage that they allow the researcher to collect a large amount of data with a minimum of effort and without having to learn any of the languages concerned. Yet the potential problems with this method are even worse than those affecting introspection. Questionnaires test intuitions and not behaviour, and, as we have seen, speakers' intuitions may differ from their actual practice. Moreover, the subjects filling in a questionnaire may not even be trying to give an accurate picture of their intuitions. Lambert and Tucker (1976: 121 n. 3) admit to several cases of children who reported that they addressed their grandparents with a T pronoun and received a V pronoun in return, an address pattern which cannot have been realistic even in the subjects' minds. Another problem is that the format of the questionnaire may bias the answers. As one researcher

⁷ On sociolinguistic methodology in general see Milroy (1987).

⁸ The criticisms expressed by Saville-Troike (1989: 118-19) are standard.

complained, 'Sometimes informants have the impression that you want them to give a different form for each item in the questionnaire, and, helpful as they want to be, try to supply you with them' (Braun 1988: 74). Still another difficulty is that since a questionnaire is a written text, and the subjects often write down their answers, it represents a genre very different from that of conversation, and the data being collected may reflect this other genre.

The disadvantages of written questionnaires were soon recognized, and attempts have been made to overcome them by administering questionnaires orally in interviews or by replacing them with less structured interviews. Nevertheless, as long as interviewers are asking subjects what they would say to a given addressee rather than observing what they actually do say, the problem of the difference between intuition and performance remains as severe as it was for the other methods of data collection. Bias caused by questionnaire format may still be found in structured interviews, and subjects may still be uncooperative, although this problem is much more easily detectable in an interview. Another difficulty is that subjects tend to give answers which they think will make them appear in a good light to the interviewer, rather than revealing their normal speech patterns (Braun 1988: 73; Bates and Benigni 1975: 284). It is even possible for researchers collecting data to overhear asides by the informants or members of their families which completely contradict the informants' assertions about their speech (Southworth 1974: 178-9). There is also evidence that the process of acting as an informant and devoting intense scrutiny to language use can change a native speaker's intuitions, making him or her more tolerant of variation and/or bringing the informant's speech closer to that of the interviewer (Dale 1978: 159).

In view of these considerations, the opinions of sociolinguists devoting serious thought to the question of interview data have been almost universally negative. Braun, who collected almost all of her data through interviews, concludes that 'the great disadvantage of this method . . . is the fact that the data are not natural. They are, at best, a true picture of the informants' awareness, but not a reliable picture of address reality . . .' (1988: 310; cf. Milroy 1987: 41-51). Other scholars put the point even more forcefully: 'the method of collecting sociolinguistic data by means of formal, scheduled interviews is at best inadequate and at worst counterproductive' (Wolfson 1976: 202).

Observation is generally considered to be the best method of collecting sociolinguistic data. It is the only one which tests behaviour

as opposed to intuition, and it eliminates the problems of uncooperative informants, biases caused by the type of questions asked, and changes in the speakers' intuitions. Yet observation is not a perfect method either. Apart from the fact that it makes large demands on the researcher in terms of time and linguistic competence in the language being investigated (it will be recalled that questionnaires and interviews are often administered to bilingual informants by researchers who do not speak the language being investigated), some speech situations are not frequent enough to be observed by a researcher who has only a limited amount of time to devote to a study, and others occur only in contexts which are difficult for an observer to enter (Parkinson 1985: 10). Labov asserts that, 'Most of the syntactic forms that we would like to study do not occur often enough in ordinary conversation to be subjected to quantitative analysis.'⁹

The most serious objection to observation as a sociolinguistic method, however, is that people who know that they are being observed do not behave as they would if no observer were present. To verify the truth of this objection, one need only think of one's own childhood and ask oneself if family interaction was the same when guests were present as when the family was alone. Labov has formulated this problem as 'The Observer's Paradox: To obtain the data most important for linguistic theory, we have to observe how people speak when they are not being observed' (1972: 113; cf. Milroy 1987: 60-1). The obvious solution to this problem is the tape recorder, but recording people's speech without their prior consent poses ethical problems (Milroy 1987: 88-90), and subjects' speech patterns seem to be disturbed by the knowledge that they are being recorded just as much as by the knowledge that they are being observed (Wolfson 1976: 200-1; but cf. Milroy 1987: 90). Researchers attempting to gather data by observation thus find themselves faced with the rule that they 'should share as closely as possible the same linguistic background and competence as the members of the community under observation' (Saville-Troike 1989: 120), in other words that they should only attempt to observe those situations into which they can blend inconspicuously. Yet this restriction can make the scope for data collection by observation almost as limited as that for introspection.

Analysis of written texts is gaining popularity as a method of obtaining data on modern languages. Indeed it has been in use almost since the beginning of address research, for Brown and Ford's important

⁹ Quoted in Kramer (1975: 199).

study was based primarily (though not exclusively) on analysis of texts, and with the recognition in recent years that it is wiser to use as many different methods of data collection as possible (Labov 1972: 102, 119), use of texts has increased steadily.¹⁰ By 1992 it was possible to say that 'literary text analysis is a method quite commonly applied by students of contemporary address' (Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak 1992: 36).

The advantages of collecting data from written sources are numerous. It is often possible in this way to gain larger and more varied samples of data than are usually obtained from studies of live informants (cf. Romaine 1982: 109–11), and one can sometimes collect data on situations which are difficult or impossible to observe in real life. Still more importantly, data obtained from written works, if collected in any intelligent method, will accurately reflect the usage in those works. Whether it is possible to find in literary works the languages of all non-literary genres may be debatable, but at least one does not run the risk of having one's data restricted to the genres of the questionnaire and the interview.

Another important advantage of texts is that they are available to be checked by other linguists, thus making proof of one's conclusions far easier. Data gathered from live informants must be kept confidential to protect the subjects, with the result that assertions based on them are forever unprovable (Milroy 1987: 91). As Labov has said (1972: 100), 'The most important of [the canons of critical scholarship] . . . is *reference*—the act of making the original texts available for the inspection of others who may have other biases and prejudices. In insisting on the checkability of data, historical linguists are considerably ahead of the average descriptive linguist.'

Sometimes the fact that the language of a literary text was composed by an author rather than produced by informants is a benefit to the researcher, for each word in the text is likely to have a purpose, and the information necessary to understanding that purpose should be given us by the author. The value of the author's design has been pointed out by Brown and Gilman (1989: 208): 'Dramatic texts . . . offer wide social and characterological scope, and because the speech is not elicited from informants but was invented by authors for purposes of their own, dramatic texts can surprise analysts . . . into discoveries they had not envisioned.' Likewise, it is an advantage of most literary texts that the context of an address is given. The importance of setting,

¹⁰ e.g. Kramer (1975) and Jaworski (1986). There are explicit defences of texts in Kempf (1985: 236), Kramer (1975: 200), and Halliday (1964).

audience, topic of conversation, etc. in determining address usage is well known (see Sect. 1.2.2), and one of the difficulties with elicited data is that these factors are absent. One of the recognized benefits of literary works is the presence of such information (Kramer 1975: 205; Sifianou 1992: 6).

Thus, when we evaluate the possibilities of gathering data on conversational Greek from our texts, we should consider that we are using a method which, although not perfect, is probably no more inaccurate than the collection of data from spoken sources. Linguists note that 'both in the case of diachronic evidence from written records and the synchronic data in the linguistic interview, our access to language can be considered indirect. In other words, there is a sense in which the analysis of linguistic variation, whether approached through the standard sociolinguistic interview or through the extant written texts of a language no longer spoken, involves a similar problem of reconstruction' (Romaine 1982: 126). Braun, evaluating the various methods, asserts that data gathered from written texts are 'more realistic than the interview data, but not as reliable as the observation of natural communication' (1988: 310; see also Labov 1972: 109). If one takes this statement in the context of her opinion (1988: 69, 310) that observation of a reliable type is too difficult and time-consuming to be generally practical,¹¹ and the fact that only a small minority of address studies (not including Braun's) have relied primarily on observation for the collection of data, one is faced with the possibility that analysis of texts can in fact be as good a method of recovering the address patterns of conversational language as most of those currently in use, perhaps even the best one which is thoroughly practical.

2.4 OUR ACCESS TO CONVERSATIONAL GREEK

Yet how should we go about reconstructing the conversational genre of ancient Greek from our literary texts? The first problem is likely to be that there was more than one conversational genre in Greece, indeed even in Athens. It would be surprising if slaves and metics talked in exactly the same way as the most educated Athenians. Our answer to this problem can only be that if we are able to reconstruct

¹¹ The validity of this statement of course depends on the linguistic feature being studied; Milroy (1987) clearly does find observation to be a practical method, but she is thinking of features which occur much more frequently than address forms.

more than one conversational genre, we shall be very grateful; if not, we shall be content with the speech of the educated Athenian citizen in the fourth century, the type which we stand the best chance of reconstructing.

Linguists using literary data on modern languages have the advantage that they can conduct analyses of other genres as well, and/or check their conclusions with native speakers, to see which features of literary address systems seem to be excluded from conversational genres. They also have access to literature which consciously attempts to imitate ordinary conversational speech, a feature which is often claimed as a recent innovation (e.g. Sifianou 1992: 7). Yet our task is not impossible. After all, it is widely agreed that we can reconstruct the pronunciation of ancient languages (cf. Allen 1987), even to the point of being able to assert with confidence that at certain times and in certain places words were pronounced very differently from the way that they were written. It is thus not impossible that we may be able to reconstruct the address system of conversational Greek as well.

Indeed, it is likely that some genres of Greek for which we possess written evidence made a conscious attempt to imitate extemporaneous speech. The rhetorician Alcidas, writing in the fourth century BC, maintained that

οἱ . . . εἰς τὰ δικάσθηρια τοὺς λόγους γράφοντες φεύγουσι τὰς ἀκριβείας καὶ μιμοῦνται τὰς τῶν αὐτοσχεδιαζόντων ἐρμηνείας, καὶ τότε κάλλιστα γράφειν δοκοῦσιν, ὅταν ἤκιστα γεγραμμένοις ὁμοίους πορίσωνται λόγους.¹²

Those writing speeches for the lawcourts avoid pedantic precision and imitate the expressions of people who speak offhand, and the times when they are thought to write best are those when they provide speeches least resembling written ones.

It must be admitted that the context of this statement is Alcidas' condemnation of those speech-writers in other genres who do use formal language in their orations, so it will not give us the right to take all Greek oratory as representative of conversational Greek. Nevertheless, it does indicate that at least some orators considered adherence to conversational language an important goal.

The same cannot, however, be said of all literary genres. In Aristotle's works, 'A fundamental distinction is drawn between colloquial

¹² Alcidas, *Περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτὰς λόγους γράφοντων ἢ περὶ σοφιστῶν*, 13, in Rademacher (1951: 137). For a more complete examination of the attitude of Alcidas and his contemporaries to spoken and written language, see O'Sullivan (1992: 42–62).

and prose speech on the one hand and poetry on the other. Poetic diction is remote from, and raised above, the language of everyday life' (Palmer 1980: 134; cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1458^a). Our first task in reconstructing conversational Greek is to choose the genres which are likely to resemble it most closely, thus necessarily omitting all poetic genres. As Aristotle states, most poetry used a style of language remote from ordinary conversation. Although it could easily be argued that comedy is an exception to this generalization, the metre of comedy is still a problem for us. The difficulty of determining in a verse text where an address form was used or omitted partly because of the metre is a serious one (cf. Wendel 1929: 104), and there is no doubt that metre could have had a major effect on the addresses used in Greek poetry. For example, if the one and only appropriate address to use in speaking to a king in the time of Homer had a pattern of syllables which could not be fitted into a dactylic hexameter, that address would be entirely omitted from Homer for that reason, and we would not know about it at all. Furthermore, the very use of metre implies, even in the case of comedy, that the speech depicted is not intended to resemble conversational language in every detail, for Athenians certainly did not conduct their ordinary daily affairs in verse. The problem of metre has long worried linguists, and one solution often adopted is that used here, to restrict one's data to prose passages, even if that restriction eliminates some otherwise tempting works.

Metre, however, is not the only factor which could cause literary language to differ from conversational speech. An important characteristic of conversation is that it normally involves more than one person talking, and thus we shall have to be cautious when approaching long monologues in our texts, lest they have some characteristics which are caused by their essentially non-conversational form. Another factor is humorous purpose. It has been said of addresses in Aristophanes that, 'A good technical means for the author to achieve his purpose is to combine situations, characters and words which do not belong together. A coarse word is used in a formal scene and a serious word in a colloquial scene' (Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 83). This is another good reason for us to avoid comedy, but at the same time it can also be applied to Lucian, whose works are included in this survey, and we shall have to keep it in mind when evaluating Lucian's usage.

A further difficulty attached to drama is the use of addresses as stage directions and/or to identify characters to the audience (cf. Wendel

1929: 76–80). Black (1985: 51; cf. Olson 1992: 305) found that the vocatives at the beginnings of Sophocles' plays were carefully chosen to convey to the audience the most important information about the characters; they are therefore unlikely to be what those characters would have said if the audience had not been present. On occasion it is likely that this need for identification resulted in an address which would have been inadmissible in real life. In a non-dramatic work where such information can be provided by the narrator, these problems do not arise (see pp. 192–3).

It thus seems that the best place to look for conversational Greek will be in prose dialogues which are not especially humorous, and fortunately the works of Plato and Xenophon provide us with just such material.¹³ This does not mean that we can take Plato and Xenophon as exact replicas of conversational Attic, but it does mean that we should place more faith in their language than in that of other authors, unless we have evidence to the contrary in a given situation. Nevertheless it is important not to rely exclusively on one or two authors, for linguists dealing with texts have found that variety is crucial in producing accurate results. Braun (1988: 298) says, 'It goes without saying ... that address usage in the work of one author cannot be representative for address behaviour in the entire speech community.' This is true, as is Bakos's more general observation (1955: 296) that 'il faut avoir recours à des genres littéraires différents pour ne pas tomber victime des particularités de style de tel ou tel genre littéraire'.¹⁴ If, then, we take data from as many different prose genres and authors as possible, we should be able to see which aspects are due to the peculiarities of each genre and author, which appear to be common to the language as a whole, and which may be traceable to conversational language.

Despite the drawbacks of poetry already noted, comparison of the findings from prose with those from poetry may be helpful, because we know certain things about the language of poetry. Homer, for example, is archaic by the period of our earliest prose, and we would expect the address system to have changed considerably between Homer and Plato. If we find it has not, it is possible that Plato does not represent current usage. Likewise it is known that the language of

¹³ Dover, discussing how to find colloquial Attic, turns first to Plato, Xenophon, and the orators (1981: 16–17). See also Hirzel (1895: i. 247).

¹⁴ 'We must have recourse to different genres to avoid falling victim to the stylistic peculiarities of one literary genre or another.'

comedy was closer to conversational speech than was that of tragedy or epic. If therefore we find similarities between prose and tragedy on points where comedy differs, we need to consider whether there might be some reason for prose to avoid ordinary language on those points, but when similarities between prose and comedy are found and tragedy differs, we can feel more confident of reconstructing conversational language.¹⁵

The literary prose used in this survey can also be compared with other non-literary sources, such as inscriptions and documentary papyri, to see how its language differs. Although non-literary texts contain few addresses and thus are of little direct use to us, they can often give us other clues as to the register of language with which we are dealing.

Perhaps the most useful check will be comparisons within the prose sample. We would expect to find differences between the language of the lawcourts (Isaeus, for example) and that which purports to be casual conversation (Plato). Since normal speech situations in Athens did not involve addressing foreign monarchs or talking to dolphins when shipwrecked, we shall look for clues to spoken language in those works which provide dialogue in a realistic Athenian setting, and we must be more cautious about addresses in unusual situations. We can expect the address system to change over time, as well, and if we see no difference between Plato and Lucian, we should worry. At this point we cannot say how well these procedures will allow us to reconstruct conversational Greek; we must first proceed with the reconstruction and return to this issue in the Conclusion (6.2).

¹⁵ Cf. Stevens (1976), a convincing study of Euripides' language relying on this comparative method.

3

Forms of Address

In the following chapters the addresses will be examined in groups arranged according to lexical meaning. The classification used here is based on that developed by Braun (1988: 9–11) for modern languages, but her categories had to be modified to fit the Greek system. Previous discussions of Greek addresses (e.g. Wendel 1929; Kambylis 1964: 109) have often tried to arrange the terms by grammatical categories or to divide them into simple and complex addresses on the basis of the number of words in the address, but these classifications cause great difficulties for the reader, who may have to locate three separate discussions in order to find the meaning of one word (e.g. *φίλε* as a noun, *φίλε* as an adjective, and *φίλε* as part of complex addresses). Moreover, since this study has excluded from consideration personal pronouns and verb forms, the remaining grammatical categories rarely seem to make any difference to the meaning or function of the vocatives. Lexical meaning, which does make a significant difference, is a much more useful basis of classification.

Appendix B, which lists references to the vocatives in question, has been arranged in exactly the same order as this chapter, in order to facilitate checking of the assertions made in the text.

3.1 NAMES

CIRCE. . . . ἰδού, τούτῳ διαλέγου.

ODYSSEUS. Καὶ τίνα τούτον, ὦ Κίρκη, προσαγορεύσομεν; ἢ τίς ἦν οὗτος ἀνθρώπων;

CIRCE. Τί γὰρ τούτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ κάλει αὐτόν, εἰ βούλει, Γρύλλον. ἐγὼ δ' ἐκστήσομαι ὑμῖν, μὴ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοὶ δοκῇ χαριζόμενος διαλέγεσθαι.

FIG. Χαίρε, Ὀδυσσεύ.

ODYSSEUS. Καὶ σὺ νῆ Δία, Γρύλλε. (Plutarch, *Mor.* 986b)

CIRCE. Look, speak with this one.

ODYSSEUS. And what shall we call him, Circe? Who was he when he was a man?

CIRCE. What difference does that make? But you can call him Grunter if you want. I shall withdraw from you, so that you don't think that he is speaking against his own opinions for the sake of pleasing me.

PIG. Greetings, Odysseus.

ODYSSEUS. Greetings to you too by Zeus, Grunter.

In this extract from Plutarch's *Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti*, Circe offers Odysseus the chance to speak with one of her enchanted animals, in order to prove that they have no desire to return to human form. Odysseus accepts the offer, but he feels that he cannot converse with an enchanted pig without being able to address it. Once Circe gives him a name for the pig, he is satisfied and uses it, although the name carries with it no information about the former identity of his interlocutor.

Addresses by name were a very important element in greetings and conversations in Greek.¹ The use of addresses by name was so expected in certain situations that authors sometimes felt uncomfortable if they did not know the name of the person addressed. Thus when Lucian relates how the philosopher Demonax silenced a boastful Sidonian sophist, he says, ἀναστὰς οὖν ἐκ μέσων τῶν ἀκροωμένων, Οὗτος, ἔφη προσειπὼν τὸ ὄνομα, καλεῖ σε Πυθαγόρας (*Demon.* 14) 'and standing up in the middle of the audience he said, "Hey you" (addressing him by name), "Pythagoras is calling you."'

This nearly obligatory use of names in the Greek address system poses a number of problems. When was a name obligatory, and when was it optional or even perhaps unusable? What form of the name did the Greeks use, and did they use different forms in different situations? Is the Greek tendency to use names part of a universal address rule that affects other languages as well?

We can begin to answer these questions by looking at the Greek system of nomenclature. In English, where address by name is also common, there are two principal forms of names: address by first name, for example 'Susan' (henceforth 'FN'), and by a title such as 'Mr', 'Ms', or 'Dr' followed by the last name, for example 'Dr Smith'

¹ The history, meaning, and (referential) usage of Greek names are discussed in detail in Hirzel (1918), but this work is not always reliable.

(henceforth 'TLN').² Other combinations are possible, such as first name and last name (Susan Smith), last name alone (Smith), or nicknames (Sue), but they are not nearly as widespread as FN and TLN, except in the case of people whose nicknames essentially replace their first names. In reference, one can use FN, TLN, or both names together for a more precise identification.

In Greek, however, the system of nomenclature was fundamentally different. Each person had only one name, and the normal means of referring to a man was to use that name alone, as *Σωκράτης εἶπε* 'Socrates said'. If a more precise identification was necessary, there was no standard way of giving it. Usually Greeks added a patronymic or a word referring to the place a person came from (demotic or ethnic), as *ἐνταῦθα συνέτυχον Ἴπποθάλει τε τῷ Ἱερωνύμου καὶ Κτησίππῳ τῷ Παιανιεῖ* 'There I met Hippothales the son of Hieronymus and Ktesippus the Paeanian' (Plato, *Lys.* 203a), but any other distinguishing feature could also serve to identify a person further, as *Σωκράτης ὁ νεώτερος* 'the younger Socrates' (Plato, *Pol.* 257a).

This system of nomenclature had important consequences for Greek address usage. In address, as in reference, the usual form was the given name alone, as *ὦ Σώκρατες* (henceforth FN), and patronymics or ethnics were rarely used in address.³ There was nothing corresponding to the English distinction between FN and TLN, for Greek FN was used as the equivalent of both FN and TLN in English.

Although English differs from Greek in this respect, several modern dialects of Arabic have a system remarkably similar to that of Greek. In Arabic, as in Greek, FN is by far the most common form of the name to be used in address (Parkinson 1985: 49; Yassin 1978: 53-4). In referential usage, a man is identified by his own single name, followed if necessary by that of his father and sometimes that of his grandfather. It is claimed that this system is connected with the Arabic custom of naming boys after their grandfathers but not after their fathers (Parkinson 1985: 48-9), a custom which was observed in ancient Athens as well.⁴

² These abbreviations are standard among sociolinguists; see Braun (1988: 16).

³ This statement applies to poetry as well as to prose; see Wendel (1929: 76).

⁴ See Demosthenes' first oration against Boeotus, in which a man sues his half-brother over which of them should have the right to bear their grandfather's name.

3.1.1 Address by FN (ὦ Σώκρατες)

Address by FN in Greek, then, was more universally applicable than any kind of address in English.⁵ Indeed address by FN alone was by far the most common form of address to individuals in Greek; in the

Table 2. *Number of addresses in each author using first name (FN) alone*

Author	FN addr.	Total sing. addr.	% of all sing. addr. by FN alone
Herodotus	52	219	24
Antiphon	0	0	—
Thucydides	1	2	50
Lysias	11	13	85
Andocides	8	9	89
Isocrates	7	7	100
Plato	2,481	3,348	74
Xenophon	655	834	79
Isaeus	9	10	90
Aeschines	26	30	87
Lycurgus	0	5	0
Demosthenes	109	147	74
Dinarchus	12	14	86
Polybius	16	21	76
Diodorus	5	17	29
Dionysius	118	157	75
Philo	10	136	7
Josephus	41	148	28
Dio Chrys.	27	83	33
Plutarch	410	863	48
Epictetus	17	167	10
Lucian	1,350	1,931	70
Achilles Tatius	36	124	29
Chariton	39	190	21
Longus	19	38	50
TOTAL	5,459	8,513	64

⁵ The issue of address by the nominative of the FN preceded by the article is beyond the scope of this study, which as explained in the introduction is confined to vocatives. It has been dealt with elsewhere; see Svennung (1958: 218–19).

works surveyed it occurs 5,459 times and accounts for 64 per cent of all singular addresses. In all authors, address by FN was the rule in dialogue between known adult males of roughly equal status. Nevertheless, there was considerable variation in the frequency of FN addresses between one author and the next: the percentage of all singular addresses which consisted of FN alone ranged from 7 per cent to 90 per cent in those authors who used ten or more singular addresses.

This variation seems to be at least partly connected with the date and dialect of the authors. Among the classical Attic authors surveyed, the only two authors to have less than 70 per cent of their singular addresses by name were Thucydides, who uses singular addresses on only two occasions, and the orator Lycurgus, who does so only five times. In the Attic orators in general, although there are comparatively few singular addresses, a very high percentage of them are by FN, up to 100 per cent in the works of Isocrates, and Plato and Xenophon both showed a strong preference for addresses by name. In Herodotus and in later authors, however, this preference is not always so strong. Polybius, Dionysius, and Lucian follow the classical Attic authors, but the other authors never use names for more than half of their singular addresses, sometimes considerably less.

A logical conclusion might be that dialectal differences were responsible for this situation, since classical Attic authors and many of the later writers who imitated them most assiduously preferred FN, while others did not. A look at poetry, however, shows that other factors are at work. Wendel (1929: 56) found that address by name in Homer and Attic tragedy was less frequent than other forms of address, except in the *Iliad*,⁶ and this despite the fact that her definition of 'name' was much broader than mine. (Wendel's category of *Namenanreden* includes patronymics, epithets, and ethnics as well as personal names with and without modifiers (1929: 56-7, 65, 67), whereas FN is here restricted in meaning to unmodified personal names.) In Menander FN address accounts for only 40 per cent of the addresses, and in Aristophanes the figure is only 12 per cent.

Why is there such a big difference between prose and poetry in the usage of FN address? The explanation that springs to mind is that poets had difficulty fitting proper names into verse, but in fact the problem seems to be more than a simple metrical issue. The

⁶ Zilliacus (1949: 12) implies that the situation in the *Iliad* is the more normal one in Greek poetry, but his analysis is not as thorough as Wendel's.

tragedians, working with characters whose names already existed and did not always fit tragic metres, may well have avoided names partly from metrical considerations, but comic poets used more flexible metres and were free to make up their characters' names. Had Aristophanes wanted to use addresses by name more than 12 per cent of the time, he could certainly have done so.

A much more important factor was probably the poets' desire to avoid normal, humdrum addresses. There is no question that tragedians often preferred unusual words to common ones,⁷ and even a casual look at Aristophanes' addresses reveals that they are very often made deliberately absurd for the sake of humour. Menander's language is neither particularly humorous nor particularly elevated, and he uses FN addresses much more often than Aristophanes and the tragedians.

Menander still does not use FN nearly as often as the Attic prose writers, however, and this seems to be due to a third factor governing the use of names: some categories of addressee do not often receive FN, and such addressees appear more frequently in some types of literature than in others. Women, children, slaves, monarchs, foreigners, and close relatives of the speaker are all liable to be addressed by terms other than FN under many circumstances (see Sects. 5.1–5.4), and addressees belonging to these categories are in fact more common in Menander than in Plato. They are also frequent in Homer, tragedy, Aristophanes, Herodotus, and the novelists, but not in Xenophon or the Attic orators.

Moreover, in Greek as in any other language, FN cannot be used in situations where the addressee has no name or where the name is not known to the speaker. In normal conversational English, we sometimes have occasion to address people whose names we do not know, but we rarely speak to addressees who have no name at all. The same was undoubtedly true of normal conversational Greek, but some of the authors included in this survey frequently described situations in which nameless or unknown characters were addressed. We saw at the beginning of this chapter that such situations could make authors uncomfortable, but under some circumstances they were difficult to avoid.

In practice, all addresses to abstract ideas (τύχη 'fortune', φαντασία 'imagination'), inanimate objects (πικρὸν ὕδωρ 'bitter water', δίκηλλα 'pick'), hypothetical opponents (ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις ... ἐγὼ δὲ

⁷ See Palmer (1980: 134) and Arist. *Poet.* 1458^a.

τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι “Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ...” (Plato, *Apol.* 28b) ‘And perhaps someone would say ... but I would justly reply to him that, “You do not speak well, O man ...”’), and most addresses to animals (ἀλεκτρονίων ‘cock’, δελφίν ‘dolphin’) fall into this category. Thus for example in Philo, where addresses to non-human entities and abstractions are frequent, addresses by name are rare. The same is true of Epictetus, whose shadowy interlocutors rarely speak and almost never have a name or any other distinguishing feature.

It thus seems that the basic rule for the use of names in address remained constant from one author to another, certainly among the prose authors, and partially even between prose and poetry. The essential principle was that if the speaker knew the addressee’s name, he would use it, unless the addressee belonged to a category of people who did not normally receive FN. This rule applies only partially in Homer, tragedy, and Aristophanes, where considerations of style reduced the numbers of FN addresses, but it works for Menander as well as for prose. Nevertheless, the precise rules of FN usage do differ slightly from author to author, for the extent to which FN can be used to women, children, and the other exceptional categories varies among the different authors. Thus in classical authors women rarely receive FN, but in Lucian they often do; in Herodotus rulers are rarely addressed by name, but in Xenophon this often occurs. The details of these differences will be explored in later chapters.

In all authors, however, it is possible for another address to be used in a situation where FN would normally be expected. Such is often the case when the speaker is insulting the addressee, feeling especially affectionate, or making a subservient request. In these situations the address is expressive; the breaking of the normal rules allows something specific to be communicated. Individual examples of this phenomenon will be discussed under the headings of the addresses concerned. It is also possible to create an expressive address by using FN in a situation where another term is expected, for example a boy addressing his father by name, but in practice this type of usage is rare in Greek.⁸

The fact that the first rule of address in Greek is to use FN whenever possible will seem natural to an English speaker (provided one remembers that Greek FN is the equivalent of both FN and TLN in

⁸ See pp. 224 and 234 for examples.

English), for English too is a language in which names are a common type of address. Not all languages, however, function in the same way. Among the Penan, usage of personal names is severely restricted: 'If they are present . . . the names of most people should not be mentioned . . . The use of personal names is more strictly governed in the case of direct address, in which situation few other than small children will normally be called by their names' (Needham 1971: 211). We should therefore beware of taking the Greek usage of names for granted.

3.1.2 Variations of FN (*Ἑρμάδιον*)

Nicknames and other alterations of names are infrequent in our data, being restricted to a few diminutives and one insulting name.

Table 3. Variations of first name (FN)

Type of variation	Lucian	Other authors	Total
Diminutives, to prostitutes	20	—	20
Diminutives, to others	2	2	4
Other variations	1	—	1
TOTAL	23	2	25

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 263–4, for greater detail.

The diminutives⁹ are formed by adding a standard diminutive suffix to the FN of the addressee, as *Ἑρμάδιον* for Hermes, *Ἀμπελίδιον* for Ampelis, *Πολυδεύκιον* for Polydeuces, or *Κωλωτάριον* for Colotes; one peculiar effect of this construction is to give all diminutive names a neuter gender. Such diminutives fall into two groups, addresses to prostitutes and to others. The addresses to prostitutes all come from Lucian's *Dialogi Meretricii*, and in all but one case the prostitute's name, if once found as a diminutive, is always used as a diminutive, in both reference and address. It is hard to say whether these addresses were thought of as diminutives, or whether they were merely felt as FN addresses where the name concerned happened to have a diminutive ending (compare the US president Jimmy Carter). In the case of

⁹ This section discusses only diminutives of FN; diminutives of kinship terms also occur and are discussed on pp. 71–2, 80–1.

Ἀμπελίδιον, however, the non-diminutive address *Ἀμπελί* also occurs in the same dialogue (8. 1), and there could be a difference in tone between the two addresses. The use of diminutives for prostitutes is not confined to Lucian; such diminutives are also found in Alciphron's letters of courtesans (18. 17, 19. 2), and a number of women in Plautus (many, but certainly not all, prostitutes) have names with the diminutive ending *-ium*.¹⁰

For characters other than prostitutes, diminutives are very rare and are used only as expressive addresses, never as the normal term for a given dyad. Greek diminutives are never used to children in the works surveyed, although their English counterparts are commonly found in such contexts. A diminutive can be used as a term of endearment when making a request (Lucian, *Cont.* 1, *Dial. Mort.* 1. 3) or praising the addressee (Char. 3. 1. 8), rather like the modern Greek use of diminutives of FN to show a 'strong emotional bond' between speaker and addressee (Sifianou 1992: 70). It can also function as an expression of contempt (Plut. *Mor.* 1112d, see also 1107d).¹¹ Most of the addressees are people for whom a diminutive is incongruous—a god, a seer, and a philosopher—and the addresses are probably intended to be humorous.

In poetry, diminutives of FN are strictly a feature of comedy (Wendel 1929: 56, 58). They are generally used in attempts to cajole the addressee (e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 475 *Εὐριπίδιον* 'little Euripides', *Pax* 382 *Ἑρμῆδιον* 'little Hermes', *Eq.* 1199 *Δημίδιον* 'little Demos', *Lys.* 872 *Μυρρινίδιον* 'little Myrrhina') and appear to function as terms of endearment. Prose and poetry seem to reflect essentially the same usage, that of diminutives as affectionate addresses which had some undignified, comic overtones. The connection between affection and grammatical diminutives can also be seen in the verb *ὑποκορίζομαι* and its derivatives, which can refer either to the use of grammatical diminutives (Arist. *Rh.* 1405^b) or to terms of endearment and positive references in general, whether or not these involve diminutives (Plato, *Rep.* 400e).

The insulting name, *Δύσπαρι* (Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 27. 1), was formed by adding a negative prefix to the vocative of the name 'Paris'. The formation is unusual; in this case the vocative is presumably borrowed from Homer (*Il.* 3. 39, 13. 769).

¹⁰ e.g. Philaenium in *Asinaria*, Selenium in *Cistellaria*, Erotium in *Menaechmi*.

¹¹ These diminutives are parodies of the affectionate diminutives with which Epicurus addressed Colotes, and they do not necessarily show that diminutives could be used negatively in the absence of such material for parody.

3.1.3 *Patronymics* (παῖ Σωφρονίσκου)

Address by patronymic was more frequent than address with a diminutive, but still much less common than FN, for it occurred only 55 times in the works surveyed. Patronymics were occasionally found in combination with FN, as παῖ Ἱερωνύμου Ἱππόθαλες 'Hippothales son of Hieronymus' (Plato, *Lys.* 204b), but they usually occurred alone. Fifty per cent of all patronymics in the works surveyed came from Plato, but a substantial percentage was found in Herodotus, and scattered instances can be seen in many later authors, especially Lucian.

There are two ways of forming patronymics in Greek: adjectives built on the father's name with a distinctive patronymic ending such as -ιάδης, and noun phrases formed with παῖς 'child', υἱός 'son', etc. and the genitive of the father's name.¹² In the vocative, patronymics found in Homer are almost all of the first type, but in Attic tragedy the use of this formation is reduced in favour of the second one. In the course of time the percentage of forms of the second type, particularly those containing παῖ 'child', increased greatly, until in Sophocles and Euripides they formed the vast majority of all patronymic addresses (Wendel 1929: 68-9).

In our corpus of data the formation of patronymics resembles that in Euripides. Only one adjectival patronymic address occurs, Ἀμφιτρωνιάδῃ to Hercules (Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 11. 5), although a number of characters have names in -ιάδης which are clearly their own given names rather than patronymics (e.g. Μιλτιάδης, Ἀλκιβιάδης). The other patronymic addresses are all noun phrases, a few being formed with θυγάτηρ 'daughter', υἱέ 'son', or τέκνον 'child' and the rest with παῖ 'child'. The few plurals all use παῖδες 'children'.

The noun after παῖ or its equivalent is usually the genitive of the father's name, but the mother's name or those of both parents can also be used. When the mother's name is employed, there is usually a special reason why the father's name would be less appropriate in context. A few genitive phrases do not include the name of a parent at all, but rather periphrases describing a parent, such as ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός 'of that man' (Plato, *Rep.* 368a, *Phlb.* 36d);¹³ these periphrases are not

¹² In Pindar a third type is also found, combining παῖ and an adjectival derivative of a different type, as ὦ Δεινομένειε παῖ (*Pyth.* 2. 18). Cf. Kambylis (1964: 152).

¹³ There has been some controversy about these addresses. Adam (1896: 237-9; cf. 1963: ad loc.) argues that they refer not to the biological fathers of the addressees, but to the fathers of their arguments, i.e. to the characters who began the discussion the

Table 4. *Patronymics*

Author	Context	Formed with the name of a parent			Formed otherwise
		Using <i>παί/παῖδες</i>	Using <i>υἱέ/θυγατέρ</i>	Adjectival	Total
Plato	Spoken by Socrates or the Athenian	19	1	—	20
	Other speakers	2	—	—	2
Other authors	Respectful/formal contexts	10	1	—	11
	Negative statements to important people	5	1	1	7
	Other	4	—	—	4
Total.		40	3	1	44

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 264–5, for greater detail.

strictly speaking patronymics, but their principle is basically the same.

There is also a small group of addresses which are formed from *παῖ* or *παῖδες* and a genitive which does not simply replace the name of a parent. Several of these are commendatory terms, as *παῖδες ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν* 'children of noble men' (Plato, *Menex.* 246b), but they can also be less complimentary, as *παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔκγονοι* 'children born of feeble Muses' (Plato, *Laws* 817d). There are also a number of ethnics, such as *παῖδες Κρητῶν* 'children of the Cretans' (Plato, *Laws* 752e); this type is related to a formation not found in our corpus but used referentially, *μάγων παῖδες* 'children of magi' (Dio Chrys. 36. 40). In this last example the phrase does not really refer to ancestry at all but is a periphrasis for 'magi', and it seems likely that *παῖδες Κρητῶν* is also in essence a periphrasis for 'Cretans'.¹⁴ There is one more type, *παῖδες Ἰσραήλου* 'sons of Israel', with the genitive of the name of an ancestor; this is probably a Hebraism where it occurs in the works surveyed (Joseph. *AJ* 4. 180).

Such phrases are not really patronymics and are thus omitted from Table 4 and from the following discussion of usage.

In English, address by TLN indicates greater formality or distance than does FN, while FNLN (first name and last name) is generally restricted to a limited range of situations, such as children being scolded by their parents (Fasold 1990: 24). In Arabic, which as previously noted has a system of nomenclature much closer to Greek than is that of English, patronymic addresses with a definite article indicate respect, while those without an article show seniority or greater rank on the part of the speaker (Yassin 1978: 57). In Vietnamese, patronymics indicate greater respect than is attached to FN (Luong addressees are continuing. Other commentators think that the biological fathers are indeed alluded to (Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc.; Taylor 1956: 11 n., 145 n.) and say that the phrase is used because the father is dead, although no evidence is cited for the avoidance of dead men's names elsewhere and although it is not known whether the biological father in the *Philebus* passage was dead or not. Allan (1949) would separate the two passages and sees a reference to a biological father in the *Republic* and to the father of the argument in the *Philebus*; he suggests that the address may be an allusion to the Pythagorean practice of avoiding the name of the master. Since the father in the *Republic* passage is Plato's own as well as that of the addressees, it could be that the periphrasis there is caused by Plato's reluctance to mention the name of his own dead father as much as by any factors connected with speaker or addressees.

¹⁴ Cf. Russell (1992: ad loc.) and pseudo-Plutarch, *De Vita et Poesi Homeri* 29, who argues that the Homeric *υἱας Ἀχαιῶν* 'sons of the Achaeans' is simply an equivalent of *Ἀχαιοῦς* 'Achaeans'.

1990: 102). Does the use of patronymic addresses in Greek have any significance, and if so, what is it?

Greek patronymics do not seem to have been restricted to a particular group of addressees. Most of those found were addressed to adult men, but a few were used to boys or young men, and a metronymic is once used to a goddess. No other characteristics of the addressee seemed to be any more relevant; indeed it was not even necessary for him or her to have a distinguished father.¹⁵ An investigation of the contexts in which patronymics are used is more enlightening, but here it is necessary to look at Platonic and non-Platonic addresses separately. Outside Plato, the uses of patronymics fall into three groups. One consists of addresses to monarchs, requests, and other statements in which the speaker is clearly being very respectful towards the addressee. This group makes up 50 per cent of patronymics outside Plato. A second group, comprising 32 per cent of the patronymics, consists of very negative statements made to important people, and the remaining 18 per cent are used in basically neutral situations.

At first glance it would therefore seem that patronymics can be used in any context, but this is an oversimplification. In the works surveyed, most non-patronymic addresses were in essentially neutral contexts, and the infrequent use of patronymics in such contexts suggests that they were deliberately avoided in neutral statements. This idea is supported by the fact that the patronymics in neutral statements come from late authors, while most of the others come from Herodotus or Xenophon. The negative statements, moreover, are not ordinary insults or angry words, but are all addressed to important people and spoken in a polite if forceful manner, or in an ironic imitation of politeness. It seems likely that, at least until a late period, patronymics were part of especially formal, deferential, or courteous speech, and this would fit well with the usage in poetry, where patronymics as addresses are virtually confined to epic and tragedy and are frequently used in solemn situations (Wendel 1929: 69–71). That a patronymic honoured the addressee is implied by *Iliad* 10. 68–9, πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον, πάντας κυδαίνων 'naming each man with his patronymic, honouring every one', and when Homeric patronymics are used in hostile statements, the addressee is often of high rank (e.g. *Il.* 1. 232).

In Plato, however, the situation is somewhat different. In about half

¹⁵ But Plato (*Lys.* 204e) implies that boys with famous fathers were referred to by patronymics more than boys whose fathers were unknown.

of the occurrences it would be possible to claim that the context suggested formal or polite speech or that a patronymic was required for the full identification of the addressee (e.g. *Cra.* 429e). In the rest of the cases, however, there is no evident difference between the speech containing the patronymic and other speeches in the same dialogue.¹⁶ These addresses are all, without exception, spoken by Socrates, as are all but two of the other patronymic addresses in Plato. It seems likely that a wider use of patronymics than usual was one of the peculiarities of Socrates' address system, a problem which will be discussed more fully later (see Sect. 3.4.2).

In Plato, and to a lesser extent in other authors, patronymics may be combined in address with adjectives such as *φίλε* 'dear' or with proper names.

3.1.4 Roman names (*Ἀππιε Κλαύδιε*)

Those authors discussing Roman characters encountered a very different system of nomenclature from that described above. In Latin, a Roman would always have at least two names, a *praenomen* or given name (Publius) and a *nomen gentilicium* (usually called *nomen* or *gentilicium*) or inherited name (Vergilius). Many also had a *cognomen*, which was in origin an individual nickname but often became part of the inherited name (Maro). A few had several *cognomina* (Kajanto 1965: 20). This system of nomenclature distinguished Roman men from women, who in the Republican period had only *gentilicia*, and from slaves (cf. Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 7.3.27). Characters bearing only one name would pose no problems for a Greek writer, who could use the FN address system with which he was familiar, and thus this discussion will ignore women, slaves, and early heroes such as Romulus who had only one name.

A Roman man with three names did not use all of them in every situation, and complex factors determined which ones were used. The only Latin writer whose use of names has been systematically studied is Cicero,¹⁷ in whose speeches and letters use of three names in address or reference was confined to extremely formal situations (Adams 1978: 145). Two names were used for most formal settings such

¹⁶ The difference between Plato's patronymic addresses and those found elsewhere has also been noted by Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 110).

¹⁷ By J. N. Adams (1978); for other work on Roman names, see Kajanto (1963, 1965), Wiseman (1970), Syme (1958), Axtell (1915), Schulze (1904); *L'Onomastique Latine* (1977), esp. C. Nicolet, 45-61.

as orations in the senate or assembly, and a single name was the rule for address or reference in informal situations and for the speaker's opponents in legal speeches (Adams 1978: 145–6). The choice of one name rather than another was also significant, and reflected the fact that the *cognomen* was originally an invention of the aristocracy and only gradually spread to the lower classes (Kajanto 1965: 19; Adams 1978: 149). When address by a single name was used, nobles tended to receive *cognomina* and members of lower classes *gentilicia*, except in especially intimate dyads or in expressions of contempt, where *praenomina* were used (Adams 1978: 150, 161–2, 165; Axtell 1915: 398–9). When two names were called for, aristocrats were usually addressed with *praenomen* and *cognomen*, others with *praenomen* and *gentilicium* (Adams 1978: 150). A person whose status was ambiguous, such as Cicero, might be addressed with his *cognomen* by those who accepted him as a noble and with *gentilicium* by those who did not (Adams 1978: 150).

Starting in the late Republic and becoming more frequent in the Empire was a third combination of names, *nomen* and *cognomen* (often, for reasons which have been variously explained, in the order *cognomen* + *nomen*). This system may originally have been a device for addressing and referring to people of ambiguous status, since it combined both noble and plebeian nomenclature (Adams 1978: 165). It soon became usable for people of all ranks, however, to the point where the *cognomen* essentially replaced the *praenomen*, and at a later period the *gentilicium* disappeared as well (Kajanto 1963: 3, 14).

The system of nomenclature in historical works does not seem to be exactly the same as that in Cicero's works or in inscriptions. Like Cicero, Livy tends to use the same name(s) for a given character in address as in reference, but in Livy considerable variation in naming can occur (e.g. *Marcus Coriolanus* 2. 34. 8, but *Cn. Marcio* 2. 35. 1), and when a single name is used, it is often the *gentilicium* even when the character concerned is an aristocrat (e.g. *Marcus*, 2. 37. 2); sometimes it is the *praenomen* even where neither intimacy nor contempt is apparent (e.g. *Tullus*, 1. 23. 4). This is particularly the case with the Roman kings, who may have constituted a special case as regards names. The most striking difference between Livy and Cicero is Livy's infrequent use of *cognomina*, and this is probably because the characters in the early books of Livy lived at the very beginning of the evolution of the *cognomen*. Many did not have *cognomina* at all, and it is possible that even those who did have them were usually referred to by *gentilicium*.

The Greeks initially had some difficulty in handling the Latin system of nomenclature. The first Greek authors to write about Romans tended to equate the *praenomen* with the Greek FN and use it alone in reference to Romans, but owing to the very small number of Latin *praenomina* this was not a very good means of identification, and by the time of Polybius Greek writers were using *gentilicium* alone as well as *praenomen* alone to refer to Romans.¹⁸ Later authors such as Plutarch had no difficulty in referring to men by two, three, or more names in the Latin fashion.

Greek vocative usage of Latin names varied considerably. In Dionysius there are 122 addresses involving Roman names; of these, 76 per cent are by *gentilicium* alone, 15 per cent by *praenomen* alone, 6 per cent by *cognomen* alone, and 3 per cent use more than one name. Most of Dionysius' characters are in fact of very high rank, and in order to fit with Cicero's usage he ought to use a much higher percentage of *cognomina* than he actually does. In some respects, however, Dionysius' usage fully conforms to Cicero's. Although he may use address by two or three names less often than Cicero would have done, he does use it only in formal, respectful settings. His only use of an address by three names (*Κόιντε Φάβιε Ούιβολανέ*, 11. 4. 7) is an appeal in the senate to a powerful noble, which indicates that he saw this address as especially formal and polite. Moreover, the only character who is addressed with more than one form of his name, Appius Claudius the decemvir, is addressed as *Ἀππιε* by all his opponents (e.g. 11. 5. 2), but as *Ἀππιε Κλαύδιε* by a client who is being respectful (11. 29. 1).

There is also a certain pattern in Dionysius' choice of names for single-name addresses. He avoids *cognomina*; not only are there only seven examples of address by *cognomen* alone in his works, but four of those are clearly used only because the *gentilicium* would be confusing: they are addressed to Lucretia's husband Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, who shared a *gentilicium* with the tyrant he helped overthrow (4. 70. 3, 4. 73. 1, 5. 9. 3, 5. 10. 7). Dionysius never uses *cognomina* in his addresses with two names, which are all by *praenomen* and *gentilicium*. *Praenomina* too tend to be avoided except in special cases such as Appius Claudius, who had to be distinguished from two other Claudii (11. 5. 2 ff.), but the Roman king Tullus Hostilius is always addressed as *Τύλλε*, although it is clear from the context that neither intimacy

¹⁸ Meister (1916: 97). For more discussion of Greek treatment of Latin names in referential usage, see Herzog (1897).

nor contempt is intended (3. 7. 5 ff., 3. 17. 1, 3. 24. 4). On the other hand, *praenomina* are not used in some intimate settings where we might expect them, such as Coriolanus' mother's appeal to her son to spare his native city, which consistently uses *Μάρκιε* rather than *Γάιε* (8. 46. 2 ff.).

In almost every case, the name by which each of Dionysius' characters is addressed is also the name which Dionysius consistently uses to refer to him when one name is used, and thus the reason for his address usage should probably not be sought in the contexts of the individual addresses. Although his use of names does not completely coincide with Cicero's, it tends to agree with Livy's where it diverges from Cicero. When Livy uses single names, Tullus Hostilius is consistently addressed and referred to as 'Tullus' (1. 23. 7 ff.), Appius Claudius as 'Appius' (3. 45. 6 ff.), Tarquinius Collatinus as 'Collatinus' (1. 58. 7), and Marcius Coriolanus as 'Marcius' (2. 33. 6). This parallelism does not apply to every character in Dionysius, but it does apply to most of those who receive a name unexpected by Ciceronian standards, and in particular to the large number of aristocrats who possess *cognomina* but are nevertheless addressed only with *gentilicia*.

Plutarch's usage is different from that of Dionysius. Of the 127 addresses in the *Lives* and the *Moralia* using Roman names, 20 per cent use *gentilicium* alone, 5 per cent *praenomen* alone, 57 per cent *cognomen* alone, and 17 per cent two names; there are no addresses using three names. Considering that Plutarch's characters, like Dionysius', are mostly aristocratic, these percentages are much closer to what we would expect to find in Cicero, and Plutarch's use of two-name addresses is reminiscent of Cicero as well. All of them occur in contexts in which it would be appropriate to use two names in Latin, and the only two which are addressed to people of obviously low status use *praenomen* and *gentilicium* (*Cam.* 14. 3; *Caes.* 44. 10). The rest,¹⁹ which are mostly dedications, use *gentilicium* and *cognomen*, which as we have seen was the direction in which Cicero's system had evolved by Plutarch's day. Plutarch's use of the *praenomen* is very Ciceronian, since when used alone it is addressed almost exclusively to close relatives (*Publ.* 6. 2; *Gracc.* 22. 7, 36. 3). In Plutarch's use of the other two names, however, a split can be observed between those addressees who are contemporaries of Plutarch (characters in the dialogues and dedicatees) and historical characters: the former almost always receive *cognomina*, while many of the latter receive *gentilicia* despite an

¹⁹ Except *Mor.* 14d, which has a textual problem affecting its classification.

aristocratic background (e.g. *Cor.* 18. 9, 23. 9; *Pomp.* 59. 1 ff.). It looks as though in Plutarch's addresses to his contemporaries he used a very close approximation of the Latin address system which was current in his day, but in his historical works he used a slightly different system, closer to that of Livy and Dionysius than to Cicero's.

Other authors use many fewer Roman names than do Plutarch and Dionysius, and they never use addresses involving more than one name. The usual form of the vocative is *cognomen* alone, particularly in Lucian; this usage probably reflects the development of the Latin name system in his time.

It thus seems that there is no significant difference between the Greek and Latin usage of Roman names in address. None of the Greek authors surveyed used names precisely the way that Cicero did, but they all agreed with the probable state of the Latin address system in their own time, except when depicting address between historical characters. In this, though they did not use Cicero's system, they tended to use Livy's.

In any case, it appears that all three historians tended to pick one name for each character and use it consistently whenever they employed single names, in both address and reference. It is very likely that the name chosen was determined largely by the historian's sources and the way that he had previously been accustomed to speak of that character, just as we speak of Plautus, Vergil, and Lucretius rather than Maccius, Maro, and Carus. There was clearly some divergence among these sources, for Plutarch and Dionysius do not always use the same name (cf. *Ιούλιε*, *Dion. Hal.* 2. 63. 4, and *Πρόκλε*, *Plut. Rom.* 28. 2), but in almost every case where Plutarch and Dionysius use a name which seems odd, Livy uses that name as well. The force of tradition can be seen perhaps most clearly in the name of the Volscian leader to whom Coriolanus flees; Dionysius and Plutarch both refer to him consistently as *Τύλλος* and have him addressed as *Τύλλε* (*Dion. Hal.* 8. 13. 1; *Plut. Cor.* 23. 3); they both agree that this name is a *praenomen*, although they do not agree on what his full name was, Dionysius giving *Τύλλος Ἀττιος* (8. 1. 4) and Plutarch *Τύλλος Ἀμφίδιος* or *Ἀντίδιος* (22. 1).²⁰ Livy refers to the man consistently as Tullius but seems to make this his *gentilicium*, as he gives his name as Attius Tullius. It is clear that the tradition that this man was called Tullus or Tullius was much more fundamental for these authors than

²⁰ Thus MSS, but replaced with *Τύλλος Ἀττιος* by most editors on the analogy of Dionysius and Livy.

a tradition of whether he should be addressed or referred to by *praenomen* or *gentilicium*.

3.2 KINSHIP AND AGE TERMS

... δέῃ γὰρ εἶναι κολακικὸν
τὸν δεόμενόν του. πρεσβύτερός τις τῇ θύρῃ
ὑπακήκο· εὐθὺς πατέρα καὶ πάππα[ν λέγω.]
γραῦς· μητέρ'. ἂν τῶν διὰ μέσου τ[ις ἢ γυνή,]
ἐκάλεσ' ἱερέαν. ἂν θεράπων[
βέλτιστον. ὑμεῖς δὲ κρεμαν[
ῶ τῆς ἀμαθίας. . . .

You need a soft approach when you want a favour. An older chap answers the door: I promptly address him as 'Father' or 'Dad'. If it's an old woman, then 'Ma'. If it's a middle-aged woman, I call her 'Madam'. If a youngish servant, then 'My dear chap'. You all deserve to be strung up. Such ignorance!²¹

In this excerpt from Menander's *Dyskolos* (492–8), where one servant lectures another on the proper way to get someone to lend a pot, the 'polite' approach rests on the assumption that perfect strangers will be flattered to be addressed with terms meaning 'father' or 'mother'.²² Modern English speakers virtually never use such addresses to strangers, and it is unlikely that the addressee would feel very flattered if they did. What is the reason for this difference between English and Greek? Can we take Menander's statement as an accurate picture of Greek usage? Is Greek unusual among the world's languages in this respect? A close scrutiny of the evidence is necessary to answer these questions.

Words expressing kinship and age form one of the most important categories of address terms in many languages, and Greek is no exception. These addresses are especially interesting from a sociolinguistic point of view, for recent work has shown that the area of kinship terms is one in which words are particularly likely to be used in address in ways radically different from their lexical meaning.²³ Thus in Jordanian Arabic a father may address his child as *bāba* 'father' (Braun 1988: 265 ff.), in Hindi a man may address his wife as *bhāi* 'brother'

²¹ Trans. N. Miller, *Menander: Plays and Fragments* (London 1987), 35.

²² General discussions of the referential usage of Greek kinship terms can be found in Gates (1971), Miller (1953), W. Thompson (1971), and Vartigian (1978).

²³ See the general discussion of the difference between lexical and address meaning in the Introduction (1.2.4).

(Mehrotra 1977: 125), and in Egyptian Arabic there is a word which means 'uncle' but can only be used in address to people who are *not* the speaker's uncle (Parkinson 1985: 116). In Kannada *tande* and *taayi* mean 'father' and 'mother' in referential usage but can be used in address only to non-relatives (Bean 1978: 79–80). Similar differences between referential and vocative usage of kinship terms are attested in many other languages.²⁴ In Greek, although the lexical meaning or meanings of a kinship term can certainly influence its address usage, the two are often distinct, and it is unfortunate that many scholars have failed to realize the difference between vocative and other uses of Greek kinship terms.

Kinship terms (henceforth KT) and addresses by age (henceforth ATs) are two distinct categories, but it is necessary to discuss them together because some individual words belong to both groups. For the purposes of this discussion, a kinship term will be defined as any term which, in its lexical or vocative meaning, can imply relationship by blood or marriage.²⁵ Thus English 'daughter' and Latin *filia* are always KT, English 'girl' and Latin *puella* are not KT but references to age, and 'child' can imply kinship or not according to the context.²⁶ In many languages, the difficulty of separating KT from ATs is great or even insuperable (Braun 1988: 255), but in Greek a distinction is usually possible.

This section will not discuss KT which occur as part of patronymic addresses,²⁷ for there is a fundamental difference between a KT implying relationship between speaker and addressee and one which designates a relationship between the addressee and someone else. If Athena were to address Odysseus as *Λαέρταο υἱέ* 'son of Laertes', she would indicate that he was Laertes' son, but if she addressed him as *υἱέ* 'son', she would imply that he was her own son. Patronymic addresses have already been discussed (see 3.1.3).

²⁴ e.g. Bengali (Das 1968: 25–6), Turkish (Başoğlu 1987: 89).

²⁵ This is a standard classification; see Braun (1988: 9), Parkinson (1985: 65).

²⁶ For example, in the sentence, 'That child is a disgrace', 'child' is not a KT, and one could not replace it with 'daughter'. But in the sentence 'I cannot believe that any child of mine would do a thing like that', relationship is certainly implied, and 'daughter' could easily be substituted for 'child'.

²⁷ This restriction is in accordance with the practice of others who have discussed Greek kinship terms; see Gates (1971: 68 n. 40).

3.2.1 *Terms for younger addressees*

The largest group of kinship and age terms consists of those used for children or young adults.²⁸ These words are *υιέ*, *θύγατερ*, *τέκνον*, *παῖ*, *νεανία*, *νεανίσκε*, *μειράκιον*, *νεώτεροι*, *παρθένη*, *κόρη*, *βρέφος*, and their diminutives. Not all of these words, however, were in use as addresses for the whole of the period under consideration, and some of them are extremely rare.

Table 5. *Terms for younger addressees*

Term	Used by relatives	Used by others	Total
<i>υιέ</i> 'son'	2	—	2
<i>θύγατερ</i> 'daughter'	14	1	15
<i>θυγάτριον</i> 'little daughter'	1	—	1
<i>παῖ</i> 'child'	83	57	140
<i>παῖδες</i> 'children'	20	21	41
<i>παιδίον</i> 'little child'	4	2	6
<i>παιδάριον</i> 'little child'	—	1	1
<i>τέκνον</i> 'child'	55	13	68
<i>τέκνα</i> 'children'	2	—	2
<i>νεανία</i> 'young man'	—	15	15
<i>νεανίαι</i> 'young men'	—	1	1
<i>νεανίσκε</i> 'young man'	—	14	14
<i>μειράκιον</i> 'young man'	—	14	14
<i>νεώτεροι</i> 'younger men'	—	1	1
<i>ἄνδρες νέοι</i> 'young men'	—	1	1
<i>παρθένη</i> 'maiden'	—	6	6
<i>κόρη</i> 'maiden'	—	1	1
<i>κοράσια</i> 'girls'	—	1	1
<i>βρέφος</i> 'baby'	1	—	1

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 265–8, for greater detail.

In discussing addresses to children one inevitably faces the issue of the age at which children become adults. Ideally, a study of address usage would help us determine that age, but this is only possible if the

²⁸ The Homeric use of these terms is discussed by Gates (1971: 11–13); for Attic usage see Vartigian (1978: 42–4, 117); for Koine, Stanton (1988: i. 463–80); for later usage, Shipp (1979: 430–5, 530).

ages of addressees are known. Although it does occasionally happen that Greek authors give the exact ages of their characters in the text, such information is rare, and in most cases it is necessary to conjecture a character's age from contextual evidence. I have therefore taken my clues from the activities the addressees are engaged in, the way they are treated by the people around them, and whether they are referred to as being a *παῖς* 'boy', a *μειράκιον*, *νεανίας*, or *νεανίσκος* 'youth', or an *ἄνθρωπος* 'man'. If a person is engaged in a clearly adult activity such as commanding an army, and there is no evidence that he is not a full adult, he is assumed to be one.

3.2.1.1 *Υἱέ and θυγάτερ*

One of the more straightforward terms to analyse is *υἱέ*. The referential meaning of *υἱός* is 'son', with a definite implication of kinship but none of age. This is clearly the vocative usage as well, although the term is rare in our corpus. It is found only in classical authors and is used only by fathers to their sons who are not yet adults. Because of the scarcity of examples, it is possible that *υἱέ* could be used to adult sons as well.

In papyrus letters, the usual salutation for a letter from a parent to a son is *τῷ υἱῷ* in the dative case; nevertheless, the vocative used inside the letter is *τέκνον*, not *υἱέ* (Eisner 1913: 52; Stanton 1988: 464), producing a situation similar to that in classical prose, where *υἱός* is common in cases other than the vocative. In some types of late Greek, *υἱέ* came to be used as a more general term of familiar address applicable to juniors in age or rank, a usage which may have its roots in the New Testament (Dinneen 1929: 75).

In classical poetry the vocative *υἱέ* is never found alone, but it is common as part of patronymic addresses in epic (Wendel 1929: 98).

Θύγατερ 'daughter' is considerably more common than *υἱέ*, although it is still not one of the most frequent KT's. It is found in Herodotus and late authors only, but the lack of attestation in classical Attic prose is due to a scarcity of addresses to daughters rather than to a preference for any other mode of address. The speaker is almost always the actual father or mother of the addressee, and the addressees range in age from children to women who have been married for some time.

In poetry, *θύγατερ* with a genitive is the usual way of forming patronymics for women, but *θύγατερ* alone is rare except in Euripides (Wendel 1929: 98; Gates 1971: 13).

There is also a diminutive, *θυγάτριον* 'little daughter', which occurs only once in the prose works surveyed. It is addressed to an absent child, now grown up, which the speaker had exposed in infancy and not seen since. *Θυγάτριον* does not occur as an address in the works studied by Wendel, but it is found twice in Menander. In both cases the daughter is old enough to marry, so the diminutive element need not carry much literal meaning; indeed Knemon's daughter in the *Dyskolos* is addressed by her father both as *θύγατερ* (740) and as *θυγάτριον* (700), with no perceptible difference in meaning.

Plurals of *υιέ* and *θύγατερ* do not occur in our data, nor are these vocatives ever combined with adjectives, names, or other words, except as parts of patronymic addresses.

3.2.1.2 *Παῖ and τέκνον*

Much more common than either *υιέ* or *θύγατερ* are *παῖ* and *τέκνον*. These terms have the lexical meaning 'child', and both are gender-neutral in referential usage. *Παῖς* can also be used for slaves, both referentially and in the vocative. The main question in dealing with these two vocatives is whether there is a difference between them, and if so, what it is.

Wendel does not see any important difference between *παῖ* and *τέκνον*, and she points out (1929: 98) that there seems to be an element of author preference determining which term is used. Aeschylus, Euripides, and Homer prefer *τέκνον*, while *παῖ* and its diminutives are more common in Sophocles and Aristophanes. It is of course possible that Wendel is right, but nevertheless other scholars have seen more meaningful factors at work.

One possibility is that the gender of the speaker determines the address used. David Bain has suggested that *τέκνον* in Menander is 'female speech', an archaism which had been lost from the language used by men but was retained somewhat longer by women (1984: 38-9; cf. Sommerstein 1995: 76). A related idea is that of Paul Menge, that in tragedy *παῖς* is used by the father with reference to his sons or daughters or by others with reference to the father's offspring, while *τέκνον* is used by, or with reference to, the mother (1905: 7, 12-14). Thus Achilles is addressed as *ὦ τέκνον Νηρηΐδος, ὦ παῖ Πηλέως* (Eur. *IA* 896). This distinction has been included in several lexica,²⁹ but it is not universally accepted (cf. Golden 1985: 91 n. 1), and not even Menge thought that it applied anywhere but in tragedy.

²⁹ LSJ, s.v. *τέκνον*; Chantraine 1968-80: s.v. *παῖς*, *τίκτω*.

Neither explanation seems to fit our data very well. In prose, the vocative *τέκνον* does not occur at all in the classical period, and in the post-classical period it is not obviously women's language, since it is spoken by men just over half the time. On the other hand, women do use *τέκνον* more often than they use *παῖ* (see Table 6).

Table 6. *Gender of speakers using παῖ and τέκνον*

Work	Speaker	Address (omitting those to servants)	
		<i>παῖ/παῖδες</i>	<i>τέκνον/τέκνα</i>
Classical prose	Male speakers	97	—
	Female speakers	8	—
Post-classical prose	Male speakers	52	38
	Female speakers	9	32

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 266–7, for greater detail.

Our data are certainly not incompatible with the theory that *τέκνον* may have been an element of female speech in the classical period, but that theory alone will not explain our statistics.

Addressee gender, however, is definitely a relevant factor in the choice of vocatives. In prose and Menander the addressee of *παῖ* in the singular is always male, although *παῖδες* 'children' can be used to a group of mixed gender. *Τέκνον*, by contrast, is applied to addressees of either sex, although in prose it is more often used to men than to women. In tragedy and paratragic passages in Aristophanes both these addresses are gender-neutral.

Another suggested distinction comes from the etymology of the words. *Τέκνον* is clearly connected with the verb *τίκτω* 'bear, give birth' and as such ought to be more of a KT than *παῖς* which, it is argued, originally emphasized age rather than kinship (Gates 1971: 11). This distinction does not always hold, and in fact its validity varies with different literary genres, but in general *τέκνον* does appear to be more of a KT than is *παῖς* in referential usage.³⁰ It seems to me that this factor is an important one in determining the address usage of the terms as well, for a number of reasons.

³⁰ See Golden (1985: 93–6), Gates (1971: 11), Menge (1905: 7–9, 13).

Table 7. *Παί*, *τέκνον*, and related words

Term	Used by parents		Used by other relatives	Used by non-relatives	Used to servants	Total
	Living addressee	Dead/dying addressee				
<i>παί</i>	66	1	16	45	12	140
<i>τέκνον</i>	38	14	3	13	—	68
<i>παῖδες</i>	19	—	1	18	3	41
<i>τέκνα</i>	1	1	—	—	—	2
<i>παιδίον</i>	4	—	—	2	—	6
<i>παιδάριον</i>	—	—	—	—	1	1

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 266–7, for greater detail.

Speakers not related to the addressee are far more likely to use *παῖ* than *τέκνον*, whereas parents addressing their own sons or daughters use *τέκνον* only slightly less often than *παῖ* (see Table 7). Moreover, speakers other than parents who use *τέκνον* are usually in some sense *in loco parentis* for the addressees: tutors, old nurses, friends of their parents, etc. The interaction in which the address is embedded is almost always a friendly one, and on several occasions it involves the use of KT from the younger person to the older one as well. *Παῖ*, on the other hand, can be used by speakers who have no particular connection with the addressees and even by those who do not know them at all. On many occasions when it is used to unrelated children, *παῖ* seems to be purely an AT, but it can also function as a KT.³¹

When the speaker is in fact the parent of the addressee, *τέκνον* is far more likely than *παῖ* to be used in very emotional scenes or in those where the kinship of speaker and addressee is particularly emphasized.³² Thus parents addressing a dead or dying son or daughter use *τέκνον* 94 per cent of the time, and there is also a certain preference for *τέκνον* among parents who are comforting their sons or making requests of them. There is, however, no situation in which *παῖ* cannot be used, merely some in which it is rarer than *τέκνον*.

Another point concerns the ages of those addressed as *παῖ* or *τέκνον*. When *παῖ* is used by parents, the addressees range from the middle-aged down to children of about 12. There is a definite preponderance of adult addressees over children and youths, probably because children in general appear much less often than adults in Greek prose. When *παῖ* is used by relatives other than parents, however, all the addressees seem to be under 20 years of age, and when it is used by unrelated speakers most of the addressees are children or youths, with a few young men. Speakers other than the addressee's parents, no matter how old and respected they are, never use *παῖ* to middle-aged men. *Τέκνον* is different: not only can it be used by parents to offspring of any age, but when used by people

³¹ Most notably at Diodorus 17. 51. 1-2, where a priest indicates to Alexander the Great that he is the son of a god by addressing him with *παῖ*. Other versions of this story, however, use different vocatives: the *Alexanderroman* (Von Lauenstein 1962-3, Bergson 1965) uses *τέκνον* (1. 30), and Plutarch has *παιδίον* but thinks that the priest simply intended the address as a friendly AT; Alexander's interpretation was based on a mispronunciation (*Alex.* 27. 9).

³² This tendency has also been observed in early poetry (Golden 1985: 95-6).

other than parents it is generally addressed to adults. The oldest addressee, the Roman decemvir Appius (Dion. Hal. 11. 13. 5), is over 40 years old.³³

All of these differences in usage can be explained by the hypothesis that the vocative τέκνον is purely and emphatically a KT, while παῖ can indicate both youth and kinship. Thus speakers other than the addressee's parents use τέκνον only when they want to indicate a special bond with the addressee, and parents prefer τέκνον in emotional scenes where their relationship with their children is particularly emphasized. The AT implications of παῖ prevent its use to full adults (except by parents), but there are no such restrictions on the use of τέκνον.

Although very often παῖ is used by an older speaker to a younger addressee, this is not always the case. There are several examples of παῖδες used by a boy to his playmates, an address which is parallel to the ἄνδρες 'men' used by a man addressing a group of men and γυναῖκες 'women' used by a woman speaking to other women.³⁴ There is also one passage in which a sister addresses her brother as παῖ, although both he and she are adults (Hdt. 3. 53. 3). In tragedy, παῖ can be used between siblings even when the addressee is older than the speaker,³⁵ and similar addresses occur in modern languages as well.³⁶ Παῖ is not, however, the normal address between siblings in Greek (see 5.2.3), and in this passage it appears to be used as a positive politeness strategy (see 1.2.7) to emphasize the family connection between the sister and her brother, since she is attempting to reconcile him to their father and draw him back into the family.

A completely separate usage of παῖ is found only in Menander, where the term can be used as an exclamation not really connected to the addressee. This is reminiscent of 'boy' in the American English 'boy oh boy!', which does not imply anything about the addressee's age or sex.³⁷

The widespread use of παῖ and τέκνον as addresses in Greek may

³³ Appius had been chosen consul for the following year (10. 54. 4), and the minimum age for holders of the consulship was normally 42.

³⁴ In Theocritus (13. 52), παῖδες is used to a group of adult men, as 'boys' or 'lads' can occasionally be used in English.

³⁵ Menge 1905: 7-8 (Soph. OC 1420, 1431; cf. 1255).

³⁶ A young Englishwoman has told me that she often addresses her (adult) older brother as 'boy', and a native speaker of Italian informed me that as a child she had often called her brothers *bambini*, although they were all older than she.

³⁷ Cf. Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Dysk.* 500, *Samia* 360, 678.

seem odd to English speakers, for in English children are generally addressed by name. Greek is not unusual among the world's languages, however. In Egyptian Arabic the terms *walad* and *bint*, meaning 'boy' and 'girl' respectively, are a very common way of addressing children, whether the speaker's own or not, and *ibni* and *binti*, meaning 'my son' and 'my daughter', can be used to unrelated children as well as to the speaker's own offspring. When used to unrelated children, these KT's are often spoken by older speakers acting for the moment in the role of a parent, as was the case with τέκνον in Greek. With reference to the use of παῖ and παῖδες between age-mates, it is notable that *ibni* (and to a lesser extent *binti*) can also be used between young people of the same age (Parkinson 1985: 72, 81-2).

Other languages too share these phenomena, such as Kazakh, in which elders customarily address any young man or woman as 'my child', 'my son', or 'my daughter' (Laude-Cirtautas 1979: 91). In Kannada, children whose names are unknown to the speaker receive ATs (Bean 1978: 109). Even in English it is possible to use 'son' or 'sonny' as an address to one's own son or to an unrelated boy, and 'daughter' can be used in expressions like 'my darling daughter' (Jaworski 1986: 50).

We have so far ignored the use of παῖ to slaves, which is very frequent in comedy but less common in prose and rare in tragedy (Wendel 1929: 101-2).³⁸ In this usage the addressee does not have to be the speaker's own slave, but the speaker is usually in a position of power over him, and the term is often used in giving orders. This does not, however, imply that παῖ has unfriendly connotations, for the vast majority of speeches to slaves in our corpus are orders in any case, and παῖ can even be used in thanking a slave (Joseph. *AJ* 18. 193). The address can be used to slaves whose names are well known both to the speaker and to the audience (e.g. Men. *Samia* 202), as well as to slaves who are certainly fully adult and perhaps even elderly (e.g. Men. *Aspis* 305). Παῖ is also used by speakers who are almost certainly younger than the addressee (e.g. Men. *Dysk.* 551), and by one slave to another (e.g. Men. *Dysk.* 959).

It has been suggested that the use of παῖ for slaves developed from its use as a KT (Golden 1985: 93), but the argument that it arose from the AT sense of the word (Menge 1905: 10-11) is more convincing. Aristophanes explains the address as παῖδα γάρ, κᾶν ᾗ γέρων, καλεῖν

³⁸ For more information on this use of παῖς see Golden (1985: 91), Garlan (1988: 21), Kästner (1981: 307).

δίκαιον ὅστις ἂν πληγὰς λάβῃ 'for it is right to call "child" anyone who receives blows, even if he is an old man' (*Vesp.* 1297–8), which suggests that he at least saw the address *παῖ* to slaves as meaning 'boy' rather than 'son'. Moreover, *τέκνον* and other terms which are purely KT's are not used for servants in Greek (Menge 1905: 10; cf. Stanton 1988: 477), while AT's denoting youth are so used in many languages; thus in a survival from the days of slavery 'boy' in American English is used to black men of any age by some whites, although the term is rarely used by anyone to adult whites.³⁹

Both *παῖ* and *τέκνον* can sometimes be combined with an adjective or a name in the vocative. The most frequent of such combinations are those with terms of affection, such as *φίλε παῖ* 'dear child', *παῖ καλέ* 'beautiful child', or *τέκνον ἡδιστον* 'sweetest child'. Dionysius sometimes combines *τέκνον* with names; the one occurrence of *παῖ* combined with a name is addressed to a servant (*παῖ Συλλογισμέ*, Lucian, *Pisc.* 39), and such combinations are also used to slaves in comedy.⁴⁰ It is likely that *παῖ* combined with a name was normally used for slaves and *τέκνον* for children.

There is also one instance of *παῖ* addressed to a slave and followed by the genitive of his master's name, *παῖ Μένωνος* (Plato, *Meno* 85b). The address seems inherently prone to misinterpretation, given the widespread use of *παῖ* in patronymics, and I have no evidence of similar uses elsewhere.

Two diminutives of *παῖς* appeared in the works surveyed. *Παιδίον* 'little child' is used by parents to sons and daughters ranging in age from unborn babies to full adults and by unrelated speakers to young men and women. It is notable that this term is not restricted to male addressees as is *παῖ*, and also that, as in the case of *θυγάτριον*, the diminutive ending does not restrict *παιδίον* to children. In this word, in fact, the diminutive appears to indicate affection rather than age. *Παιδάριον*, which has the same lexical meaning as *παιδίον*, is used only to a slave in our data (*Epict.* 2. 20. 29).

In Menander, *παιδάριον* occurs twice, both times apparently addressed to slaves, and *παιδίον*, which is fairly common, is generally addressed to slaves but can also be used to the speakers' long-lost daughters.⁴¹ The feminine diminutive *παιδίσκη* also occurs once

³⁹ Ervin-Tripp (1969: 229), Frank and Anshen (1983: 51–3); cf. also French *garçon* for waiters.

⁴⁰ e.g. *Men. Aspis* 305, *Samia* 189, 358, *Dysk.* 401, 551, 959; *Ar. Plut.* 624, *Pax* 255.

⁴¹ *παιδάριον*: *Aspis* 222, *Mis.* 459; *παιδίον*: *Mis.* 212, *Pk.* 802 (daughters), *Dysk.* 459, 911, etc. (slaves).

(*Mis. A* 53), but unfortunately the identity of the addressee is unclear. In Aristophanes *παιδίον* is not infrequent and is used both to slaves and to children of either sex; *παιδάριον* is also used to one of the free boys addressed with *παιδίον*,⁴² so there cannot have been a great deal of difference between the two terms.

In New Testament and later non-literary Greek, *παιδίον* and *παιδάριον* are often interchangeable in both referential and vocative usage and are usually employed for children, although they can both be used for slaves as well, as can the feminine *παιδίσκη*.⁴³ *Παιδίον* as an address to children survives in the modern Greek addresses *παιδιά* and *παιδί μου*, which are used freely to younger people of either sex unrelated to the speaker.⁴⁴

In summary, our conclusions about the uses of *παῖ*, *τέκνον*, and their diminutives in prose are as follows. *Παῖς* as a term of reference is applied to males or females and can indicate youth, kinship, or servile status, while *παῖ* as a vocative preserves all three meanings but can only be used to males. *Τέκνον* in referential and vocative usage always implies kinship, and unlike *παῖ* the vocative retains the neutrality of gender attached to the lexical meaning. The use of *παῖ* both as a KT and as an AT, but *τέκνον* only as a KT, resulted in the use of these terms to different groups of addressees: *τέκνον* but not *παῖ* can be used to unrelated adults, *παῖδες* but not *τέκνα* can be used by a child to a group of children, and *παῖ* and its diminutives can be used for servants, while *τέκνον* cannot.

3.2.1.3 *Νεανία*, *νεανίσκε*, and *μειράκιον*

These three addresses are purely ATs with no implications of kinship. *Νεανία*, which occurs in a wide range of authors, has a lexical meaning of 'youth' or 'young man',⁴⁵ and in our data the addressee does normally come from this age group. At first glance it would seem that *νεανία* has no positive or negative meaning at all, for even within one author it is found in situations ranging from Sulla's sharp rebuke to the young Pompey (Plut. *Pomp.* 15. 5) through a factual explanation devoid of praise or hostility (Plut. *Mor.* 592e) to an

⁴² *παιδίον*: *Pax* 111, 1268, *Thes.* 731, etc. (children); *Ran.* 37, *Nub.* 132 (slaves); *παιδάριον*: *Pax* 1288, *Plut.* 823.

⁴³ See Shipp (1979: 433-4), Stanton (1988: 469-77), Golden (1985: 91), Spicq (1978: 223).

⁴⁴ Shipp (1979: 433) and information from native speakers.

⁴⁵ For a discussion of the etymology and lexical meaning of *νεανίας*, see Szemerényi (1987: 578-70) and Schwyzler (1938).

envoy's request for assistance from the young Cato (Plut. *Cato* 2. 3). Yet if one looks more closely at the circumstances, a pattern emerges.

Pompey in the first case cited is a triumphant general, and although he is in fact still too young to be a senator, he is clearly acting as an adult. The address *νεανία* is therefore insulting because it robs him of his adult status. Timarchus, the addressee in the second instance quoted, is simply an ordinary youth and can easily be addressed as one, hence the address is neutral. Cato is still a child at the time of the third case cited, small enough to be picked up and dangled out the window by the speaker. He is too young to be referred to as a *νεανίας*, and hence the address is flattering, for the same reasons that it was insulting when used to Pompey. All the derogatory uses of *νεανία* are directed to people who were acting as adults (e.g. Plut. *Sull.* 34. 8, *Mor.* 201d), but this address is not always insulting when so used: sometimes it seems merely to emphasize the superior age and wisdom of a speaker who is giving important advice (e.g. Plut. *Ages.* 39. 4). There are no other examples of *νεανία* addressed to children.

Νεανίσκε is about as frequent as *νεανία* and is used in a very similar manner. Its referential meaning is the same as that of *νεανίας*, and indeed in Herodotus the same youth is referred to both as *νεήνις* (3. 53. 2) and as *νεηνίσκος* (3. 53. 7). In the vocative, *νεανίσκε* is used by Plato and Xenophon, but the majority of examples come from later authors. It is primarily a neutral term but is always insulting when used to adults or those acting as adults. *Νεανίσκε* is one of the few terms used by Epictetus which is never part of a rebuke or an insult in his works. It is always addressed by the philosopher to a young student, and given the real rarity of addresses in Epictetus which are not part of rude or derogatory statements, it seems that this is a term which Epictetus reserved for the moments when he was not being unpleasant. It is therefore virtually certain that *νεανίσκε* had no negative connotations when used to youths. There are no cases of *νεανίσκε* addressed to a child.

Μειράκιον is about as frequent as *νεανίσκε* and has the same meaning. Indeed the two terms are interchangeable: in Lucian the same youth is addressed both as *νεανίσκε* and as *μειράκιον*, both by the same person and without an appreciable time lapse (*Asin.* 8, 9), and the story of Caesar threatening Metellus is told by Plutarch with the address *μειράκιον* (*Caes.* 35. 10) and by pseudo-Plutarch with the address *νεανίσκε* (*Mor.* 206c). *Μειράκιον* is found in negative statements to adults more often than is either *νεανία* or *νεανίσκε*, and it is

sometimes used in rebukes even to people who seem young enough to receive the term as a neutral one. Nothing, however, would prevent a neutral term from being part of a negative statement occasionally, and *μειράκιον* is also used to youths as part of friendly speeches. It is once addressed to a child, Ganymede at his abduction by Zeus (Lucian, *Dial. D.* 10. 1), in an especially friendly and reassuring context.

The three addresses *νεανία*, *νεανίσκε*, and *μειράκιον* clearly have much in common, and except for the points noted above they can be treated as a group. All three are used only for males in both referential and vocative functions. The speaker is generally a man but can occasionally be a woman, and he or she is never related to the addressee. Usually the speaker is older than the addressee, but these terms can also be used in a polite address from one young man to another. There are also a few instances of *νεανίσκε* and *μειράκιον* used by a girl to her young lover; the girl is unlikely to be significantly older than the lover, but she is in a position of power over him (Lucian, *Asin.* 6, 8, 9).

In Menander, *νεανία* and *νεανίσκε* do not occur, but *μειράκιον* is not infrequent. The addressee is always a young man, and the speaker is often an older man but can also be another young one.⁴⁶ The term appears to be a neutral one, and the usage from one youth to another, as in Lucian, is more polite than otherwise. Aristophanes uses both *νεανίσκε* and *μειράκιον*,⁴⁷ and the works of Euripides contain *νεανία* and a variety of other ATs; in both tragedy and comedy these terms seem to be used as in prose (Wendel 1929: 87).

The Greek system whereby ATs indicating that the addressee is a youth are flattering when used to children and insulting when used to adults or those functioning as adults is not unique. It is paralleled in English, where a boy might be addressed as 'young man' in an exhortation, but an adult would only be so addressed in a rebuke by an older person. In Elizabethan English, the address 'sirrah' was affectionate when used to a child, but derogatory when used to adults (Brown and Gilman 1989: 176). The implication in all of these situations is that adulthood is a desirable characteristic for males in the culture concerned: those who do not have it can be flattered by being addressed as though they had, and those who do have it can be insulted by an implication that they do not. This state of affairs is probably connected to the use of *παῖ* for slaves in Greek and 'boy' for blacks in English.

⁴⁶ Older: e.g. *Dysk.* 729, 843, *Samia* 718; younger: e.g. *Dysk.* 269, 299, 311.

⁴⁷ *Nub.* 990, 1000, 1071, *Av.* 1362, *Plut.* 1071.

3.2.1.4 *Νεανία, νεανίσκε, and μειράκιον versus παῖ*
as addresses for young men

In Plato's *Euthydemus*, Cleinias is referred to seventeen times as a μειράκιον⁴⁸ and seven times as a νεανίσκος.⁴⁹ We might therefore reasonably expect that, if he is addressed with an AT, the term used will be μειράκιον, νεανίσκε, or νεανία, but in fact these addresses are never used, and the only AT he receives is παῖ (289b). It is true that Cleinias is twice referred to as a παῖς (276a, c), but in both cases the reference is to Cleinias when he was younger and at school, so these passages cannot have any bearing on the problem of the address. Why is παῖ used and not μειράκιον or another AT?

The first thing one notices when exploring this problem is that the usage in the *Euthydemus* is not an isolated phenomenon in Plato. In the *Theaetetus*, Theaetetus is referred to both as a μειράκιον⁵⁰ and as a παῖς or παιδίον (166 a, 168 c, d), but the latter references are always in derogatory and diminutive contexts, not merely in casual descriptions like μειράκιον. In address, however, the only AT which Theaetetus receives is παῖ,⁵¹ never μειράκιον or παιδίον. The *Sophist* and *Politicus* contain no references to Theaetetus or the younger Socrates as being a παῖς, νεανίσκος or μειράκιον, but since the dialogues are set immediately following one another and since the younger Socrates is stated to be a schoolmate (συγγυμναστής, *Pol.* 257c) of Theaetetus, Theaetetus in the *Sophist* must be the same age as in the *Theaetetus*, and the younger Socrates cannot be very far off in age. Yet in these dialogues as well, the only AT found is παῖ, addressed both to Theaetetus and to the younger Socrates.⁵²

It is not the case that Plato simply does not use ATs other than παῖ, for both νεανία and νεανίσκε occur in his works.⁵³ Nor is it the case that Plato does not use παῖς referentially, for this is the term which normally designates the two youngest interlocutors in Plato, Lysis and Menexenus (*Lys.* 204e, 205c). It seems that Plato used παῖς to refer to children and the other terms to refer to youths, but that both children and youths were then often addressed as παῖ.

Although the evidence is much more extensive in Plato than

⁴⁸ 271b, 273b, 275a, b, d, e, 276a, b, c, d, 277b, d, 278d, 282e, 285b, 290e, 293a.

⁴⁹ 275a, c, 277d, 282e, 283a, b (*bis*).

⁵⁰ 142c, 143e, 144c, 146b, 168e.

⁵¹ 145d, 148b, 151e, 156a, 158a, 162d, 184d, 200c, 209e.

⁵² *Soph.* 230c, 232e, 237a, 242b, 244b; *Pol.* 280e.

⁵³ e.g. *Phdr.* 257c, *Prot.* 318a.

elsewhere, other authors too appear to use the address *παῖ* for people too old to be referred to as *παῖς*. Thus in Plutarch's *De Pythiae Oraculis* the visitor Diogenianus is referred to both as a *νεανίσκος* (*Mor.* 395a) and as a *νεανίας* (395e, 401a), but never as a *παῖς* or a *παιδίον*; despite this, the only AT he receives is *παῖ* (395e, 397d, 404b). A similar situation occurs elsewhere in Plutarch (*Mor.* 530d), where Alexander's son is referred to both as *μειράκιον* and as *νεανίσκος* but is addressed only as *παῖ*. In Lucian, the dedicatee of the *Rhetorum Praeceptor* is addressed both as *μειράκιον* and as *παῖ* within the first page. In Dio, a youth is referred to as *μειράκιον* (13. 67, 68, 69) and *νεανίσκος* (13. 70, 71), but addressed only as *παῖ* (13. 72).

We might expect *παῖ* to be derogatory when addressed to youths, since *νεανία*, *νεανίσκε*, and *μειράκιον* were negative when used to people too old to be referred to as *μειράκια*. The contexts, however, show clearly that *παῖ* used to young men unrelated to the speaker is not a negative address; if anything, it is slightly affectionate and seems to emphasize not so much the youth of the addressee as the age, wisdom, and benevolence of the speaker. This situation has a parallel in English, where an older adult who calls a younger one 'young man' will nearly always be saying something negative, but one using 'child', 'lad', or 'my boy' is probably being friendly. In modern Greek *παιδί μου* 'my child' is a very common address from older to younger adults, or even between contemporaries,⁵⁴ and although it is certainly not derogatory, rather friendly and benevolent, it is also true that 'a telling point in discussion is clinched by calling the listener "my child", thus asserting the speaker's superiority' (Kenna 1976: 361). In Section 3.4 it will be argued that another group of addresses also assert the speaker's superiority without being unfriendly.

3.2.1.5 Other terms

All other addresses to young people are too rare in our corpus to enable any firm conclusions to be drawn about their usage. *Παρθένη* 'maiden' and *κόρη* 'maiden' both occur in our sample only in authors of the second century AD, but they are also found as addresses in Attic tragedy and Aristophanes, where there does not seem to be any difference in meaning between the two (Wendel 1929: 87).⁵⁵ All of the

⁵⁴ Information from native speakers.

⁵⁵ For the referential meaning and possible etymology of *παρθένος*, see King (1983) and Klingenschmitt (1974); for *κόρη*, see Daux (1973), Davison (1966), and Menge (1905: 17-18).

instances of *παρθένη* and *κόρη* in our data are used to unmarried girls unrelated to the speaker, and it is possible that these were the standard feminine equivalents of *νεανία*, *νεανίσκε*, and *μειράκιον* and the usual way of addressing unrelated girls.⁵⁶

A few other ATs occur once each and are not enlightening. *Νεώτεροι* 'younger men' is found in Xenophon, and *ἄνδρες νέοι* 'young men' in Plutarch; there is no reason to suppose that they are not equivalent in meaning to *νεανία*, *νεανίσκε*, and *μειράκιον*. *Κοράσια* 'girls', the plural of a diminutive of *κόρη*, is addressed to a group of castrated men under circumstances which give us no idea of its normal usage. *Βρέφος* (a vocative of a neuter s-stem) occurs once in Josephus (*BJ* 6. 205). It is normally a poetic word (Golden 1985: 93), having a referential meaning of 'new-born baby' or 'foetus', and in this case it is used by a mother to her nursing baby of unknown sex. The address occurs in an unusual situation, for the starving mother is about to eat her baby. It thus can hardly be taken as indicative of the way that ancient Greek women usually addressed their babies.⁵⁷

None of these rarer terms is found in Menander, but he does provide evidence of another AT not found in prose. This term is *τρόφιμε*, which has a lexical meaning of 'nursling' or 'foster-child'. In Menander it is used not infrequently by servants to their young masters.⁵⁸ This address seems to occur primarily in situations where the servant is stressing his long association with, affection for, or superior knowledge compared to the addressee.

3.2.2 Terms for older addressees

The addresses used to persons older than the speaker present far fewer complexities than the group just examined. There are also fewer terms available, so that there was rarely more than one possible term for a given addressee.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ In poetry these terms can occasionally be addressed to relatives (Eur. *Phoen.* 1539; Ar. *Pax* 119), but such usage is rare and probably results from poetic licence. See Menge (1905: 20-1).

⁵⁷ There are parallels, however: Eur. *Andr.* 722; Theocritus 24. 7.

⁵⁸ *Aspis* 2, *Pk.* 292, *Kolax* 86, *Phasma* 41, 85, fr. 740 lines 1 and 16.

⁵⁹ For the referential meaning and etymology of terms in this category see Gates (1971: 5-8, 20), Chantraine (1946-7: 234-50), and Vartigian (1978: 33-9, 52-3, 110, 116).

Table 8. *Terms for older addressees*

Term	Used by relatives	Used by others	Total
πάτερ 'father'	115	7	122
μήτερ 'mother'	36	3	39
πατέριον 'little father'	—	1	1
μαμμίδιον 'little mother'	1	—	1
μαννάριον 'little mother'	2	—	2
θείε 'uncle'	3	—	3
πάππε 'grandfather'	15	—	15
γέρον 'old man'	—	1	1
γέροντες 'old men'	—	1	1

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 269–70, for greater detail.

3.2.2.1 Πάτερ and μήτερ

Πάτερ 'father' and μήτερ 'mother' are both common KT's and are primarily used to address the speaker's parents, both in prose and in poetry (Wendel 1929: 95–6). They can be spoken by males or females of any age, in any context. Neither appears in the plural as a KT, but *πατέρες* does occur in Dionysius with the meaning 'senators'. This usage, found only in Roman contexts, is based on Latin addresses to senators, such as *patres conscripti*. Generally speaking, neither *πάτερ* nor *μήτερ* can be combined with other vocatives, but this rule does not hold when a name needs to be attached to *πάτερ* in order to make clear who the addressee is, nor in the poetic address *Ζεῦ πάτερ* (*Iliad* 1. 503, etc.).

There is only one difficulty about these addresses, and that is their precise meaning when used to people other than parents. Such usage, although not common, occurs in a wide variety of authors and genres and appears in two distinct types of situation. Sometimes the address seems to indicate that the relationship between speaker and addressee is equivalent to actual kinship, as when Diodorus has Alexander address Darius' captive mother as *μήτερ* (17. 37. 6) and comments on the address:

οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ τὴν πρεσβύτιν μητέρα προσαγορεύσας διὰ τῆς φιланθρωποτάτης
προσηγορίας προεσήμεινε τοῖς προητυχηκόσι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι

φιλανθρωπίαν. διαβεβαιωσάμενος δ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρξειν δευτέραν μητέρα τοῖς ἔργοις εὐθὺς ἐκύρωσε τὴν διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐπαγγελίαν.

Calling the old woman 'mother' in this way, he revealed by his exceptionally kind address to those who had previously been unfortunate the kindness which was about to befall them. Asserting that she would be his second mother, he at once confirmed in deeds the promise of his words.

In Plutarch's life of Fabius Maximus (13. 8), Minucius' use of *πάτερ* to the dictator Fabius is justified by the speaker:

πατέρα δὴ σε χρηστὸν προσαγορεύω, τιμιωτέραν οὐκ ἔχων προσηγορίαν, ἐπεὶ τῆς γε τοῦ τεκόντος χάριτος μείζων ἢ παρὰ σοῦ χάρις αὕτη· ἐγεννήθην μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' ἐκείνου μόνος, σῶζομαι δ' ὑπὸ σοῦ μετὰ τοσούτων.

Indeed, I call you my excellent father, since I have no more respectful form of address, for this benefit I have from you is greater than that from my father. I alone was begotten by him, but I and so many other men are saved by you.

It is, however, also possible for *πάτερ* to be used as a general polite address for older men, one which certainly indicates some respect and/or affection but does not suggest any special bond between speaker and addressee. This is the meaning of the term when used to non-relatives in Homer, tragedy, and comedy.⁶⁰ In Menander, and for the most part in Homer,⁶¹ *πάτερ* in this sense is used only to complete strangers, but this restriction does not hold in Aristophanes or in tragedy. This usage of *πάτερ* is the one referred to in the passage from Menander quoted at the beginning of this chapter, where a slave advised that one could flatter unknown old men by calling them *πάτερ*. The slave's advice also included using *μήτερ* to flatter old women, although no examples of such usage occur in the surviving works of Menander or Aristophanes.⁶² In another comic fragment, Xenarchus indicates that *πατρίδιον* 'little father' was an enticing address used by courtesans to older men;⁶³ Eustathius quotes this line as evidence for a specifically comic usage.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Wendel (1929: 96). These addresses are rare in Aristophanes (*Eq.* 725, 1215 (*παππίδιον*), *Vesp.* 556) but frequent in Menander (e.g. *Dysk.* 107, 171, *Epitr.* 231); see Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Epitr.* 231.

⁶¹ Gates (1971: 6). Noting (1971: 65 n. 10) that the restriction of *πάτερ* to strangers was not found in 'later Greek', Gates thought that it might be a coincidence in Homer, but since the restriction is also found in Menander (for whom Gates had no statistics), it seems worth taking the Homeric evidence seriously.

⁶² But see Theocritus 15. 60.

⁶³ Fr. 4, line 15, in Kassel and Austin (1989).

⁶⁴ *Commentarii ad Homerī Iliadem Pertinentes*, 886. 34.

Πάτερ as a general polite address is also attested in later Greek, where it is found both in papyri (Preisigke 1924-7: s.v.) and in literary prose. One of Achilles Tatius' characters comments on the exemplary and reformed behaviour of a young man courting his niece, saying καὶ γάρ με σφόδρα ἐθεράπευε καὶ ἐκάλει πατέρα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐδορυφόρει 'for he was very attentive to me and used to call me "father" and escort me around the agora' (8. 17. 8). This usage of *πάτερ* is also found in Lucian (*VH* 33). In another passage in Lucian, however, when Hermes is addressed as *πάτερ Ἑρμῆ* by Pan, whom he has never seen before, he does not assume that the address is a polite formula but asks, ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐγὼ σὸς πατήρ; 'But how am I your father?' (*Dial. D.* 2. 1).

Lucian's evidence shows that it was indeed possible for both uses of *πάτερ* to coexist, and the most likely explanation for our data is that they did coexist for a long period of time. In the fourth century *πάτερ* as a general polite address must have been current to some extent, for if it had not been familiar to Athenian audiences both the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter and that in Xenarchus would have been baffling rather than humorous. At a later period the papyri show that this usage was not confined to literary language, and it is more likely to have remained current than to have disappeared for a while and then re-emerged. Nevertheless, it seems that the address *πάτερ* was still clearly connected in speakers' minds with the referential meaning of *πατήρ* 'father', and that it was therefore always possible to use this vocative in its lexical meaning.

The works surveyed also contained three diminutive terms for parents, *μαμμίδιον* 'little mama', *μαννάριον* 'little mama',⁶⁵ and *πατέριον* 'little father'. All of these terms are rare in Greek literature as a whole, in both referential and vocative usage. *Μαμμίδιον* and *μαννάριον* are used by adult daughters to their mothers in the context of particularly intimate conversations, and it seems likely that these addresses were meant to emphasize the closeness of the relationship between mother and daughter and to show special affection. *Πατέριον* is addressed by Lucian's Menippus to the shade of Teiresias (*Lucian, Nec.* 21), in an ironical but superficially polite request for help, and is probably connected with the general polite usage of *πάτερ* to strangers.

⁶⁵ For a defence of this form against an emendation to *μαμμάριον*, see Shipp (1979: 380-1).

The formations of these diminutives are also interesting in themselves, for although πατέριον can easily be derived from πατήρ, the other two clearly come not from μήτηρ or μάτηρ, but from μάμμη, μαμμία, or μάννα, terms which do not occur in the works surveyed. Μάμμη and μαμμία, however, are found in comedy,⁶⁶ while μάννα is attested in later Greek (Shipp 1979: 380).

Such diminutive addresses and terms from children's language are rare in tragedy but not uncommon in comedy, where πατρίδιον, πάππα, παππία, παππίδιον, μαμμία, and μάμμη occur, usually as expressions of affection.⁶⁷ The first four of these terms seem to function in much the same way as πάτερ, in that they can be used in affectionate address to an actual father or in respectful (or ironically respectful) address to an unrelated old man. Homer uses πάππα and also ἄττα and μαῖα, which are probably not KT's and which do not occur in our data.⁶⁸

In English, 'mother' and 'father' and terms like 'Mama', 'Mum', 'Mom', etc. are generally restricted in address to the speaker's own parents, but the Greek extension of such addresses to other older men and women has parallels in a number of other languages. KT's which in their lexical meaning refer to the speaker's older relatives are a common mode of polite address to non-relatives in many cultures. Sometimes these terms are used only to elders, as in Greek, and sometimes to people of the speaker's own age as well (Laude-Cirtautas 1981: 246; Bean 1978: 81). In Kannada, the equivalents of πάτερ and μήτηρ are frequently used to non-kin and when so used are always polite, but not highly deferential (Bean 1978: 80).

3.2.2.2 Θείε and πάππε

The other two KT's for older addressees, θείε and πάππε, mean 'uncle' and 'grandfather' respectively, both in referential and in vocative usage.⁶⁹ Both are found only in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in our data, θείε being used by Cyrus to his uncle Cyaxares and πάππε to his grandfather Astyages. The age of Cyrus when he uses πάππε ranges

⁶⁶ Pherecrates fr. 76 (Kassel and Austin 1989); Ar. *Lys.* 879.

⁶⁷ See Wendel (1929: 95–6, 103); Chantraine (1946–7: 243); Golden (1995). References: πατρίδιον: Ar. *Vesp.* 986, Men. *Dysk.* 499, 930; πάππα: Men. *Mis.* 213, 248, 439; παπ(π)ία: Ar. *Pax* 128, *Vesp.* 297, Men. *Dysk.* 856, 930; παπ(π)ίδιον: Ar. *Eq.* 1215, *Vesp.* 655.

⁶⁸ See Chantraine (1946–7: 241–5), Gates (1971: 32–3), Golden (1995), Wendel (1929: 86).

⁶⁹ On words for 'uncle' in referential usage, see W. Thompson (1971: 110).

from 12 to 15 or 16; after that age he no longer addresses Astyages. The first instance of *θεῖε* occurs when Cyrus is 14, but the other two are used when he has long been an adult in full command of an army and at a time when he is used to addressing Cyaxares by name. They occur in a very emotional scene in which Cyrus is trying to soothe his uncle and reconcile him to himself (*Cyr.* 5. 5. 8, 5. 5. 35) and are certainly further examples of positive politeness (see 1.2.7).

In poetry, these addresses are not at all common, but there are few situations in which their use would be appropriate. Menander does produce one example of *θεῖε*, which fits perfectly with the prose usage: a young man sadly addresses his dead uncle (*Aspis* 504). The address is also found in Euripides (*Or.* 674), at the climax of a plea. There is no evidence of the use of these terms for anyone other than actual uncles or grandfathers, although *θεῖε* and other words meaning 'uncle' are often used to non-relatives in modern Greek.⁷⁰

3.2.2.3 *Γέρον*

Γέρον 'old man' is the only AT for older people found in our corpus, and it is very rare, occurring once in the singular and once in the plural. In poetry, where *γέρον* is more common than in prose, it is generally a polite term in Homer but becomes a neutral one in Sophocles and Euripides and is often negative in Aristophanes (Wendel 1929: 84–6). As the one example of *γέρον* in the singular in the works surveyed is embedded in a rebuke, it is possible that prose agreed with comedy on this point, but the evidence is too slight to be certain. The plural *γέροντες* occurs as part of the generic address *γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες* 'noble boys and old men' (Plato, *Tht.* 162d). In prose, *γέρον* and *γέροντες* are not used to the speaker's relatives, but in poetry such usage is occasionally found (Wendel 1929: 85–6).

In Menander and Aristophanes there are also a number of other ATs for old people, such as *γραιῦ* 'old woman', *γράδιον* 'little old woman', *γεραιέ* 'old man', *πρέσβυ* 'old man', and *πρεσβῦτα* 'old man'; taken together, these terms make ATs to old people common addresses in comedy. They often, but not always, occur in negative contexts. In Menander *γραιῦ* and *γράδιον* are addressed only to elderly female servants, generally in orders or rebukes,⁷¹ but the one

⁷⁰ Information from native speakers.

⁷¹ *Dysk.* 427, 587, etc.; *Epitr.* 1064, 1122; *Georg.* 54; *Mis.* 228.

instance of *γεραιέ* is addressed to a (male) citizen in a civil request (*Sik.* 169). It is possible that *γεραιέ* was usually a polite address and that *γρᾱῦ* and *γρᾱδιον* were not, especially since *γεραιέ* does not occur in Aristophanes and is an address typical of tragedy rather than comedy.⁷² ATs indicating old age are also common in tragedy and Homer, where *γέρον*, *γεραιέ*, *γεραιά* 'old woman', *γρηῦ* (= *γρᾱῦ*), and *πρέσβυ* occur (Wendel 1929: 12–13).

In Wendel's data ATs expressing youth are more often used to female addressees, while those denoting old age are usually addressed to men. She explains this phenomenon as follows (1929: 87):

Die Dichter des ernsthaftens Stils tragen damit dem allgemein menschlichen Gefühl Rechnung, wonach Bezeichnungen für die alte Frau und den allzu-jungen Mann nicht angenehm empfunden werden. Und eben deshalb werden diese Wendungen in der Komödie in umgekehrter Weise benutzt, da dort entweder Verachtung oder Spott zum Ausdruck gebracht werden soll.⁷³

This explanation is repeated and accepted by Svennung (1958: 231), but to me the appeal to an 'allgemein menschlichen Gefühl' (general human feeling) seems inadequate as an explanation. Wendel's generalization may apply to both German and English society in the twentieth century, but it is not universal even within Europe. In medieval French villages, where young women had very little power and young men a great deal, women's standing within the family increased with age while that of men diminished as their physical strength waned. Old men were thus not respected, whereas old women commanded far more deference (Le Roy Ladurie 1975: 322–3).

Nevertheless, it is likely that Wendel's generalization did apply to ancient Greek society to some extent, and this may be the best explanation for the undeniable fact that in Greek comedy ATs indicating old age are on average ruder when addressed to women than when addressed to men. The principle should not be taken further than that, however, for it is possible to find examples of such feminine ATs which are certainly not rude (e.g. *Ar. Lys.* 637, and cf. Wendel 1929: 86), and ATs indicating youth, whether masculine or feminine, are basically neutral addresses (Wendel 1929: 87).

⁷² Wendel (1929: 103); Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Sik.* 169.

⁷³ 'Poets in the serious style thereby take account of the general human feeling, according to which expressions denoting old women and very young men are not felt to be agreeable. It is just for this reason that these usages are employed in comedy in the opposite way, because there it is either contempt or scorn that has to be expressed.'

The scarcity of ATs for older people is one of the most conspicuous features of the Greek prose address system, when compared to the variety and abundance found in poetry. This contrast is the more surprising when one considers the large number of ATs for younger addressees in prose, for in all poetic genres ATs indicating old age are much more common than those indicating youth (Wendel 1929: 84). At this point the obvious question is: how were ATs used in conversational Attic?

Both Aristophanes and Menander agree that *γραιῦ* was used as a less than polite address to old women; as our data contain very few negative addresses to old women, of any type, prose does not really contradict comedy on this point. We can thus assume that *γραιῦ* could probably be used as an unflattering address in conversational Attic as well, although it does not follow from this that such addresses were as frequent in conversation as in comedy. When it comes to ATs for old men, however, the comedians are not in agreement. None of the terms found in Aristophanes (*γέρον*, *πρέσβυ*, and *πρεσβύτα*) appears in Menander, and the one term which does occur (once) in Menander, *γεραιέ*, seems to be part of a more elevated type of language and is not found at all in Aristophanes. Old men as addressees are fairly common in prose, and it cannot be coincidence that they virtually never receive ATs. In this case the evidence of prose and Menander together suggests that the Aristophanic ATs were not as frequent in conversational Attic as they are in Aristophanes.

3.2.3 *Terms for same-generation addressees*

When the speaker and addressee were approximately the same age, ATs were not often used in Greek.⁷⁴ There are, however, a number of KTs for members of one's own generation or of an unspecified generation, namely *ἄνερ*, *γύναι*, *ἄδελφε*, *ἄδελφή*, and *σύγγενες*.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ But note the use of *νεανίσκος* and *παῖδες* by children and youths (pp. 69, 74, 210).

⁷⁵ For the etymology and referential meaning of these terms, see Chantraine (1946-7: 219-34), Gates (1971: 14-19), and Vartigian (1978: 45, 111-13).

Table 9. *Terms for same-generation addressees*

Term	Used to relatives	Used to others	Total
ἄνερ 'man, husband'	10	—	10
γύναι 'woman'	43	32	75
ἄδελφε 'brother'	4	5	9
ἀδελφή 'sister'	1	—	1
ἀδελφοί 'brothers'	—	2	2
σύγγενες 'kinsman'	1	—	1
συγγενεῖς 'kinsmen'	—	1	1
(ἄνδρες) ὁμόφυλοι 'fellow-tribesmen'	—	5	5
ὁμοεθνεῖς 'people of the same race'	—	1	1

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 270–1, for greater detail.

3.2.3.1 Ἄνερ

Ἄνερ is a relatively uncommon KT, but an interesting one because it shows a clear discrepancy between lexical meaning and address usage. The main referential meaning of ἀνὴρ is 'man' (in the sense of 'a male person', *vir*, rather than 'a human being', *homo*), and the plural ἄνδρες is certainly used to mean 'men' in both referential and vocative usage. The singular vocative ἄνερ, however, virtually always means 'husband'. In our corpus ἄνερ is not found in classical authors, but in later ones it can occur either alone or combined with φίλε 'dear' or φίλτατε 'dearest'. It is used only by wives to husbands, often in situations where the connection between the couple is emphasized, as for example in grief for a dead husband, praise, or appeals.

In poetry ἄνερ occurs in all genres but is frequent only in comedy (Wendel 1929: 83, 97). In Menander it is found only in fragmentary contexts (*Sik.* 306, *Phasma* 103), but in other authors one can see that the meaning 'husband' is standard in poetry as well as prose. Occasionally, however, ἄνερ is used by a woman not married to the addressee.⁷⁶ Euripides also uses the address πόσι 'husband', which does not occur in prose (Wackernagel 1912: 25; Wendel 1929: 97).

In all genres, then, the vocative singular ἄνερ has a specific meaning which is distinct both from normal referential usage and from the

⁷⁶ *Ar. Plut.* 1025, *Thes.* 614; Theocritus 15. 52; cf. Wackernagel (1912: 25).

vocative plural. To be sure, no one would deny that *ἀνὴρ* can mean 'husband', but this is not the primary meaning of the word, whereas it is virtually the only meaning of the vocative *ἄνερ*.

The idea of addressing one's husband as 'husband' may seem bizarre to modern English speakers, but one need go no further than the Elizabethan period to find the address 'husband' alive and well in English (Salmon 1967: 50).

3.2.3.2 *Γύναι*

Γύναι, which is much more common than *ἄνερ*, has at the same time a wider range of usage (cf. Wackernagel 1912: 25-6). It occurs in most authors from Herodotus to Lucian, and its lexical meaning is 'woman' or 'wife'. The general opinion of scholars is that *γύναι* is 'a term of respect or affection, *mistress*, *lady*' (LSJ, s.v. *γυνή*), and one editor of Theocritus goes so far as to translate it as 'O carissima!' (Wüstemann 1830: 220). This interpretation, however, seems to be more polite than the evidence warrants and was perhaps influenced by the way that early classicists felt that women ought to be addressed.

In our data *γύναι* is used 57 per cent of the time by a man to his wife, and 43 per cent of the time to an unrelated woman. When used to wives, *γύναι* is clearly a neutral term which can be attached to any type of speech, from Plutarch's loving consolation to his wife (*Mor.* 608b, etc.) to Amasis' angry threat to execute his wife (*Hdt.* 2. 181. 3), but which is generally used in fairly neutral statements. It does not seem to be used to emphasize the connection between the couple as is *ἄνερ*, nor is it especially affectionate, and it certainly does not indicate respect.

When used to women who are not married to the speaker, *γύναι* also seems to be a neutral term, although here it is less likely to occur in strongly negative statements. The speaker can be a man or a woman. *Γύναι* is often used by a man in a position of power to a suppliant or captive woman; in none of these interactions is the man actually hostile, but he is not always friendly. Less common are passages in which the addressee is of higher status than the speaker, and here again the attitude of speaker to addressee can vary. The contexts range from an invader disregarding the priestess who has forbidden him to enter a temple (*Hdt.* 5. 72. 3) to a philosopher respectfully advising queen Arsinoe (*Plut. Mor.* 112a). In the novelists *γύναι* is also addressed to female slaves.

The usage of *γύναι* in the novelist Chariton illustrates the range of

meanings the address could have within the language of one author. Chariton often uses *γύναι* from husbands to wives, and that this address is intended to mean 'wife' is shown by a passage in which a man whose wife has married someone else says *σὺ μὲν εὐτυχοίης, ὦ γύναι· γυναῖκα γάρ σε καλῶ, καὶν ἕτερον φιλήεις* 'may you be happy, wife; for I call you my wife even though you love another' (5. 10. 7). Yet *γύναι* is also used freely to women other than the speaker's wife. In this sense the speaker can be male or female, and the context can range from a master addressing a slave (2. 5. 4, etc.) to a servant addressing her mistress (2. 10. 1, etc.).

In poetry, the usage of *γύναι* seems to be much the same as in prose, and the address appears again to be a neutral one; Homer has Odysseus use *γύναι* both in praising Nausicaa (*Od.* 6. 168) and in rebuking a shameless maid (*Od.* 19. 81). In Menander and Aristophanes *γύναι* is often used by a man to his wife, in positive, neutral, and negative contexts,⁷⁷ but it also occurs from men to unrelated women, in contexts ranging from respectful to scornful,⁷⁸ and between two women.⁷⁹ In Menander *γύναι* can be used reciprocally by women (*Epitr.* 864, 866). When used by a man to a woman, *γύναι* in Menander is not very positive unless combined with a flattering adjective, as *γεννικὴ καὶ κοσμία γύναι* 'well-bred and elegant woman' (*Georg.* 42). In poetry *γύναι* can be used to unmarried as well as to married women (Wackernagel 1912: 25; Wendel 1929: 82).

Most of the instances of *γύναι* in prose were unmodified by names or adjectives, although in poetry adjectives could more easily be added. Under certain circumstances it was also possible for *γύναι* to be followed by the genitive of the husband's name, in a formula reminiscent of the patronymics formed from *παῖ*. This address type occurs only once in our data (*γύναι Ἱεροβοάμου* 'wife of Jeroboam', *Joseph.* *AJ* 8. 269), where it is suited to the special circumstance that the addressee has come in disguise to a prophet: in greeting her with this address he shows that he knows who she is. The form is none the less paralleled in poetry, for example *ὦ γύναι αἰδοίῃ Λαερτιάδεω Ὀδυσῆος* 'revered wife of Odysseus son of Laertes' from the disguised Odysseus to Penelope (*Od.* 19. 165).

Although speakers of modern English rarely use 'wife' or 'woman' as addresses, both occur in Shakespearian English, where 'wife' was

⁷⁷ *Ar. Nub.* 55, *Ach.* 262, *Pax* 1329; *Men. Epitr.* 303, 376, fr. 592.

⁷⁸ *Ar. Ran.* 555, *Ach.* 1063, *Vesp.* 1399; *Men. Epitr.* 933, *Georg.* 42.

⁷⁹ *Ar. Lys.* 95; *Men. Epitr.* 858, 859, 864, 866, 873.

used to wives and 'woman' to women (Salmon 1967: 50). Greek γυναί thus should not appear too strange to us.

3.2.3.3 Ἀδελφε, ἀδελφή, and σύγγενες

The addresses ἀδελφε⁸⁰ 'brother' and ἀδελφή 'sister' are used between siblings, but they are not common, for brothers and sisters often addressed each other in other ways (see 5.2.3). The earliest examples of these vocatives in our sample come from Josephus, but ἀδελφε is also found in classical poetry (e.g. Ar. *Ran.* 58; Eur. *Med.* 1272). Ἀδελφή and about half of the examples of ἀδελφε in our data are used between siblings or half-siblings;⁸¹ the remaining half are used between unrelated men. The use of ἀδελφε (and ἀδελφός in other cases) for non-relatives is also common in the Septuagint, New Testament, and papyrus letters.⁸² It thus seems likely, since most examples of this usage in our data come from Epictetus, that ἀδελφε in this sense was current in the conversational Greek of his day but that it was not used by authors trying to write 'proper' Greek. Ἀδελφε between non-relatives is not a term of special affection and is used even to total strangers. At a later period, ἀδελφή could be used to wives in letters; it is claimed that this usage is Egyptian and arose from sibling marriage (Zilliaccus 1943: 30-1; Zucker 1950: 149), but such addresses also occur in the Septuagint (Tobit 5: 21, 7: 15, 8: 4) and are attested in other languages without the historical explanation of sibling marriage. In Greek this phenomenon probably grew out of the widespread use of ἀδελφός/ή for people other than siblings.

In poetry, ἀδελφε is used to actual siblings, but it is not a very common term and does not appear before Sophocles. Other KTs for siblings, such as κασίγνητε, are often used instead of ἀδελφε in Homer and tragedy, and siblings as addressees are rare in comedy (Wendel 1929: 96-7).

The use of ἀδελφε to unrelated men should not strike English speakers as peculiar, for such addresses occur in English as well, where the uses of 'brother' to non-relatives may outnumber the uses to real brothers (Jaworski 1986: 50). In Hindi, the address *bhāi* 'brother' 'has become a neutralized form of address which can be used both for

⁸⁰ This vocative is often accentuated ἀδελφέ, but ἀδελφε is probably correct: see O'Callaghan (1971).

⁸¹ In referential usage as well, ἀδελφός and ἀδελφή were often used for half-siblings; see W. Thompson (1971: 112) and Vartigian (1978: 112).

⁸² Dihle (1952: 175), Preisigke (1924-7: s.v. ἀδελφός), Arndt and Gingrich (1979: s.v. ἀδελφός).

kin and non-kin whether male or female, young or old' and can even be used reciprocally by husbands and wives (Mehrotra 1977: 125).

Σύγγενες means 'kinsman'.⁸³ In the singular it occurs only once in our data, in Xenophon (*Cyr.* 1. 4. 28), where it is addressed by the young Cyrus to a man who has said that he is Cyrus' kinsman but has not specified the relationship further. Since Cyrus does not know the man's name, a situation which is unusual in addressing relatives, he has little choice of addresses. It is not surprising that we do not find σύγγενες elsewhere. The plurals συγγενεῖς 'kinsmen', ὁμόφυλοι 'fellow-tribesmen', and ὁμοεθνεῖς 'people of the same race' are used in our data not to members of an extended family but to groups of compatriots who could be kin only in the most distant sense of the word.

3.2.4 Conclusion

In Greek, some KTs (πάτερ, μητερ, ἄδελφε, τέκνον) were used on occasion to addressees outside the family, and when so used they generally (but not always) implied a special closeness between speaker and addressee. Other KTs (νιέ, θείε, πάππε) were never used except to the relative designated by the lexical meaning of the term. In modern Greek it is still the case that some KTs are used for non-relatives and others are not, but the terms themselves have shifted: 'uncle', 'grandfather', and 'son' are now used outside the family, while 'father' is not.⁸⁴

Moreover, the way that KTs are used to non-relatives differs between ancient and modern Greek. In the works surveyed, πάτερ, μητερ, and τέκνον were used outside the family not as the usual way of addressing a given person, but as a way of expressing particular feelings. The modern Greek situation, however, has been described as follows: 'Kinship terms such as *theios* or *barba*, "uncle"; *theia*, "aunt"; *pappous*, "grandfather"; are systematically extended to particular unrelated individuals with whom the speaker comes into frequent contact' (Kenna 1976: 360).

It is, however, also possible for KTs in modern Greek to be used to people whom the speaker normally addresses in other ways. In these circumstances terms for older addressees can express either affectionate respect or complete lack of respect, while terms for younger ones

⁸³ For the exact type of kin covered by this word, see Vartigian (1978: 15-17, 88-96).

⁸⁴ Sifianou (1992: 70) and information from native speakers.

can express either simple affection or an expectation of co-operation and obedience on the part of the addressee.⁸⁵ The dual meaning of these KT's recalls that of AT's in ancient Greek, where γέρον could be positive or negative and where μειράκιον was negative but παῖ positive when addressed to people older than the referential usage of the terms implied.

3.3 TITLES

Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ βασιλεῦ· βασιλεὺς γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνῃ φυόμενος τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμών . . .

But I, O king—for to me you seem to be a king by nature, no less than is the leader of the bees in a swarm . . .

In this speech from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (5. 1. 24), one of Cyrus' Median followers addresses Cyrus as βασιλεῦ 'king', a title which Cyrus does not normally receive, since his uncle Cyaxares is actually the king of the Medes. The speaker is obliged to justify his address by reference to Cyrus' innate royalty, an explanation which sheds light on the meaning and value of βασιλεῦ and other titles in Greek. In some languages titles are frequently used to address people who would not be accurately described by the lexical meaning of those titles, as in Hindi where one normally refers to a cook as *rasoiyā* 'cook' but addresses him as *maharaj* 'emperor' (Mehrotra 1981: 128). The quotation above implies that at least some Greeks expected titles to be used in a fashion closer to their lexical meanings, but, as we shall see, the lexical and address usages of titles were not always identical in Greek.

3.3.1 Βασιλεῦ

By far the most common title is βασιλεῦ 'king', which is one of the most frequent of all singular addresses in the works surveyed. It occurs in a wide range of authors, but the majority of the examples come from Herodotus and Plutarch. Βασιλεῦ is occasionally followed by a genitive, changing the address from 'king' with relation to the speaker to 'king of x', a type of address as different from βασιλεῦ alone as patronymics formed with παῖ were from παῖ used alone (see p. 62). All instances of βασιλεῦ followed by a genitive are thus omitted from this discussion and will be dealt with separately.

⁸⁵ Kenna (1976: 360-1) and information from native speakers.

Table 10. *Titles*

Term	Not followed by genitive		Followed by genitive	Total
	Divine addressee	Human addressee		
βασιλεὺ 'king'	1	173	14	188
δέσποτα 'master'	32	95	1	128
βασίλεια 'queen'	—	1	—	1
βασίλισσα 'queen'	—	1	—	1
δέσποινα 'mistress'	21	14	—	35
κύριε 'lord, master'	3	12	—	15
κυρία 'lady, mistress'	—	2	—	2
ἄναξ 'lord'	5	—	—	5
στρατηγέ 'general'	—	5	—	5
προφήτα 'prophet'	—	3	—	3
κεκτημένη 'owner, mistress'	—	1	—	1
αὐτοκράτορ <i>imperator</i>	—	14	—	14
Καῖσαρ 'Caesar'	—	20	—	20
δίκτατορ 'dictator'	—	1	—	1
ὕπατε 'consul'	—	2	—	2

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 271–4, for greater detail.

A difference between the referential and vocative uses of βασιλεύς becomes apparent as soon as one begins to investigate the term. The lexical meaning of βασιλεύς is a king of any nationality, or certain religious officials in the Greek city-states,⁸⁶ and in the works surveyed βασιλεύς is used without distinction to describe Spartan, Roman, Persian, Jewish, and Macedonian kings, as well as those of many other countries. In the vocative, however, the situation is very different, for only 4 per cent of the occurrences of βασιλεὺ are used for Greek and Roman kings (excluding Macedonians and the successors of Alexander). What is the reason for this avoidance? It cannot be that Greek and Roman kings are not addressed in the works surveyed, for Spartan kings in particular are common characters, and both they and the Roman kings in Dionysius regularly receive FN or other addresses rather than βασιλεὺ.

⁸⁶ For a more detailed discussion of the referential meaning of βασιλεύς, see Drews (1983) and Carlier (1984: 142–50).

If there was some element in the meaning of βασιλεῦ as an address which restricted it to certain types of kings, what was it? The passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter may provide the answer. A person addressed as βασιλεῦ should by his nature stand out from, and command the absolute deference of, his followers, as the queen bee does among other bees. These two factors—the great natural difference between a king and his subjects, and the absolute obedience of his followers—were characteristic of the way that Persian kings were regarded in the ancient world, but much less characteristic of Spartan and Roman kings. In an oriental monarchy, the king's power over his subjects was absolute and usually vast in geographical extent, and the king was physically separated from ordinary people by his palace, attendants, and unusual lifestyle. In Sparta and early Rome, however, a king was much closer to his subjects, because of the limitation of his power, the actual contact he would have had with the citizens, and the greater similarity between their lives and his.

As an address, then, βασιλεῦ implied a very high degree of subordination of the speaker to the addressee and a very great distance between them. As such it could be applied not only to Persian kings, but also to other oriental monarchs such as Egyptians, as well as to Etruscan, Macedonian, Jewish, and Epirote kings. Although some of these kings were far less powerful than Persian kings, they are described in the authors concerned as being substantially more absolute and isolated than Spartan or Roman kings, and sometimes as being divinely chosen, a factor which also serves to isolate a king from his followers. Alexander and his successors, who could well be called Greek in terms of language and culture, were much closer to Persian than to Spartan kings in the extent and nature of their power, and in consequence they are often addressed as βασιλεῦ. This fact alone should show that the difference between someone who could be addressed as βασιλεῦ and someone who could not was one of power, not merely nationality.

The restriction of the vocative βασιλεῦ to oriental rulers may perhaps be connected to a peculiarity of the referential usage of βασιλεύς, that this word was used without the article to refer to the Persian king, and with the article to refer to other rulers. Since vocatives have no article, Greek speakers may have felt that the vocative βασιλεῦ naturally tended to designate those rulers who received βασιλεύς without the article in referential usage.

Although most of the occurrences of βασιλεῦ are spoken by a

subject of the monarch addressed, it is also possible for the address to be used by others. In the works surveyed, foreigners who address a powerful monarch usually have good reasons to want to be polite, and therefore even Greeks and Romans generally address an oriental monarch with great deference and use βασιλεῦ, unless they are being particularly defiant. The address can also be used by non-submissive foreigners in a sarcastic imitation of politeness (Plut. *Crass.* 17. 2, *Mar.* 31. 5). Even other monarchs can occasionally use βασιλεῦ to an oriental ruler if they want to communicate particular respect for the addressee.⁸⁷

A particularly striking example of the meaning conveyed by the address βασιλεῦ is found in Josephus, where two kings use βασιλεῦ reciprocally (*AJ* 20. 56, 20. 59). One might think that reciprocal usage could not possibly convey the kind of submission and distance that we have claimed for βασιλεῦ, but in fact it does. Two kings meet after a period of separation. The first to speak, while originally more powerful than the second, has recently been dethroned and is seeking aid. He makes gestures of submission and calls the first king βασιλεῦ because of the humble state to which he is reduced in his plea for help. The second king, however, at once reassures him by reciprocating both the address βασιλεῦ and the gestures of submission, τιμὴν ἀπονέμων ταυτηνὶ ὡς ἂν μείζονι βασιλεῖ 'giving him this honour as one would to a greater king' (*AJ* 20. 60). In this situation, then, it is the respect implicit in the use of βασιλεῦ that makes the actions of both kings meaningful in a way that they would not have been if βασιλεῦ had merely been the standard way of addressing anyone who could be referred to as a βασιλεὺς.

On rare occasions βασιλεῦ is also used to Greeks and Romans. Several of these examples are addressed in jest to someone imagining himself to be an oriental monarch (Lucian, *Nav.* 30, 33). Most of the rest are addressed to Spartan kings or Greek tyrants such as Polycrates of Samos. All of the speakers are trying to persuade the addressee to do or say something or are professing humility or fear of the monarch, and therefore they use a more deferential address than would normally be warranted.

⁸⁷ e.g. the queen of Sheba to Solomon, Joseph. *AJ* 8. 171.

Thus a poor fisherman, bringing his magnificent catch to Polycrates, says,

ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἐγὼ τόνδε ἐλὼν οὐκ ἐδικαίωσα φέρειν ἐς ἀγορὴν, καίπερ γε ἐὼν ἀποχειροβίτος, ἀλλὰ μοι ἐδόκεε σεῦ τε εἶναι ἄξιος καὶ τῆς σῆς ἀρχῆς· σοὶ δὴ μιν φέρων δίδωμι. (Hdt. 3. 42. 2)

O king, I did not think it right to bring to the market this fish I have caught, although I am a poor worker, but it seemed to me to be worthy of you and of your power, and therefore I am bringing it to give to you.

In this situation the humility expressed by the speaker is so great that βασιλεῦ is clearly the appropriate address, even though the addressee is Greek. Although there are no examples in the works surveyed of the use of βασιλεῦ to a Roman emperor, this usage does occur elsewhere.⁸⁸

The evidence for the use of βασιλεῦ in poetry is slim and inconclusive. In Menander βασιλεῦ does not occur, and in the works examined by Wendel it is very rare and virtually never appears alone (1929: 88). Its most common usage in poetry is as part of the phrase Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ 'Zeus the king', which occurs in both Aeschylus (*Pers.* 532) and Aristophanes (*Nub.* 2). As an address to human beings, βασιλεῦ is completely absent from Homer and Sophocles. Its only use in Aristophanes is to address the δῆμος 'populace' (*Eq.* 1333); in Aeschylus it is used for Xerxes in the *Persae* (918, 929) and Agamemnon in the *Agamemnon* (782, 1489, 1513), and in Euripides it is occasionally used to important kings, Greek or otherwise (e.g. *IA* 43, *Rhes.* 379). The lack of comic examples is clearly due to the general scarcity of kings in comedy, and the small number of attestations in tragedy probably results from the difficulty of fitting this word into the iambic trimeter. It is perhaps significant that a number of the examples are used by people who are being particularly deferential (e.g. Eur. *IA* 43, 140), and also that Xerxes does receive βασιλεῦ.

In prose, the address βασιλεῦ generally stands alone but can occasionally be combined with the name of the addressee in the vocative.

A very different situation occurs when βασιλεῦ is followed by a genitive of the people or things ruled over. Βασιλεῦ alone implies that the addressee is king over the speaker and is therefore deferential; βασιλεῦ followed by a genitive implies that the addressee is king over

⁸⁸ Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 19 Keil; see also Bréhier (1906: 165, 170-3) and Dölger (1953: 986).

the things specified, a designation which can be insulting or flattering depending on the genitives used. The difference between βασιλεῦ alone and βασιλεῦ followed by a genitive is underscored by the fact that the latter is used more often to Greek than to oriental kings. The speaker is rarely a subject of the monarch and can be expressing any emotion from a desperate plea to an angry retort.

In Herodotus, the king of Persia is addressed as βασιλεῦ Μήδων 'king of the Medes' on three occasions, always by foreign envoys delivering a decidedly hostile speech (1. 206. 1, 7. 136. 2, 8. 114. 2). Since the Persian king was also the king of the Medes, this address is technically correct and not obviously insulting. Nevertheless, Herodotus was well aware of the Persians' pride in their nationality and their dislike of the Medes, for he discusses at some length the enmity between the two groups. It is therefore unlikely that he would have considered the address βασιλεῦ Μήδων equivalent to βασιλεῦ Περσῶν 'king of the Persians', which never occurs; on the contrary, he intended the address to be not entirely courteous, as is shown by the fact that in Herodotus all 66 examples of βασιλεῦ alone are in more or less respectful contexts, but all cases of βασιλεῦ Μήδων are embedded in demands or threats.

It is, however, also possible for βασιλεῦ and a genitive to be as deferential as βασιλεῦ alone or even more submissive, depending on the genitive used. Thus when gods are addressed as βασιλεῦ τῶν ὅλων 'king of all' (Joseph. *AJ* 14. 24) or βασιλεῦ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων 'king of gods and men' (Philo, *Flacc.* 170), the speeches are thoroughly polite.

3.3.2 Δέσποτα

The referential meaning of δεσπότης is a master or owner, particularly of slaves, or an absolute ruler. Δέσποτα in the vocative is fairly common in prose, although not as frequent as βασιλεῦ, and is found in a wide range of authors. It is, however, much commoner in Herodotus, Josephus, and the novelists than elsewhere.

There are three main ways in which the address is used: by mortals addressing gods, by slaves addressing their masters, and by subjects addressing rulers. The first usage, δέσποτα as an address from humans to gods, is not found in classical prose, but it is common in later prose and occurs in classical poetry, both comedy and tragedy.⁸⁹ It seems likely that this usage was indeed part of religious language in

⁸⁹ e.g. Eur. *IT* 271, *Bacch.* 582; Ar. *Vesp.* 389, *Nub.* 264, *Ach.* 247.

the classical period and that the lack of attestation in classical prose is due to chance.

The second type, *δέσποτα* as an address from servants to masters who are not also kings, is almost unattested in classical prose; there is only one example, in Herodotus (3. 85. 2). Like the first type, however, this usage is common in later prose and occurs in classical poetry, especially Aristophanes.⁹⁰ It is not found in tragedy, and both this omission and the scarcity of prose examples are probably due to the same cause: in tragedy and classical prose it is very rare for a slave to address a master who is not also a king. The type of the ordinary citizen with his slaves who talk to him freely is much more common in comedy than in other genres. Since in real life slaves must have spoken to their masters on occasion, it is very likely that this use of *δέσποτα* too was more frequent in conversational language than in our data. We might perhaps have expected to find some information on this usage from Homer, but the word *δεσπότης* is completely absent from Homer, perhaps because it is metrically impossible in all cases but the vocative.⁹¹

The third usage, *δέσποτα* as an address to rulers, is not found in Aristophanes and Menander, clearly because of the rarity of kings in comedy. It is, however, by far the most common usage in classical prose and in tragedy.⁹² When *δέσποτα* is used in this way the addressee is often someone who might have been addressed as *βασιλεῦ*, or even someone whom the same speaker elsewhere addresses as *βασιλεῦ*, and a careful look at the contexts is necessary to determine the difference between the two vocatives.

In Herodotus, the Median nobleman Artembares brings the boy Cyrus, who is thought to be a peasant's child, to king Astyages to complain about his behaviour. Artembares addresses Astyages as *βασιλεῦ* (1. 114. 5), but Cyrus uses *δέσποτα* (1. 115. 2). Later in Herodotus' history, Cyrus' successor Cambyses has a number of conversations with the nobleman Prexaspes. Once he asks him an entrapping question (3. 34. 2), once he has just shot Prexaspes' son to prove his marksmanship (3. 35. 4), and once he accuses him of having betrayed him (3. 62. 2); on all of these occasions Prexaspes replies

⁹⁰ e.g. Eur. *Cyc.* 250; Ar. *Vesp.* 142, *Pax* 875, *Plut.* 67; Men. *Dysk.* 589, *Mis.* A97, *Samia* 296.

⁹¹ But note that the vocatives of other words with the same pattern of syllables do sometimes occur: *τοξότα* (*Il.* 11. 385), *ἵππότητα* (*Il.* 2. 336, etc.).

⁹² e.g. Aeschylus, *Pers.* 1049, *Cho.* 157; Soph. *Aj.* 368, *OT* 1132, *Phil.* 135; Eur. *Hec.* 841, *Bacch.* 769.

using *δέσποτα*. On one occasion Cambyses praises Prexaspes and asks his advice, and then Prexaspes replies using *βασιλεῦ* (3. 63. 4).

In Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, when the Assyrian Gobryas first meets Cyrus he is a suppliant at his feet and consistently uses *δέσποτα* (4. 6. 2 ff.), but the next time his words are quoted, when he has become a trusted ally of Cyrus, he uses *Κῦρε* 'Cyrus' (5. 2. 7). Exactly the same thing happens with Croesus, who is reassured by Cyrus when a prisoner and at once switches from *δέσποτα* to *Κῦρε* (7. 2. 9 ff.).

From these examples it seems that *δέσποτα* is used by people of exceptionally low status, and also by people of higher rank who are trying hard to be especially deferential, while *βασιλεῦ* or FN is used in other circumstances. *Δέσποτα* thus seems to express a greater degree of deference than does *βασιλεῦ* when used to the same addressee.

The basic difference between the two addresses appears to be one of focus. *Βασιλεῦ*, as we have seen, implies that the addressee is a special kind of remote and supremely powerful king, but it says nothing about the speaker except that he is being very respectful. Speakers who use *βασιλεῦ* do not have to be subjects of the addressee, nor even less powerful than he. *Δέσποτα*, on the other hand, is used only by the addressee's own subjects or slaves. The lexical meaning of the term gives at least the implication that the person using it in address might be a slave, and this implication seems to colour the vocative meaning. *Δέσποτα* appears to denote not the nature of the addressee, but the direct power he has over the speaker, and to emphasize the helplessness and insignificance of the speaker as compared to the addressee, rather than the magnificence of the addressee as compared to the speaker.

It was also occasionally possible for *δέσποτα* to be used metaphorically, by a speaker who was not in fact the slave or subject of the addressee but who nevertheless wanted to indicate extraordinary deference. Such usage could occur as part of grovelling flattery of a rich man (Lucian, *Tim.* 48), obsequious service to the personified *δῆμος* 'populace' (Ar. *Eq.* 960), or (only in the novelists) by a lovesick woman to the object of her affections. This last usage is of course similar to English 'mistress'; it is notable that in English this meaning is only possible in the feminine, and 'master' does not normally designate a lover. In Greek the use of the feminine *δέσποινα* in the sense of 'lover' is well attested (see below), but it is uncertain how common this usage of *δέσποτα* was. *Δέσποτα* as an address to a lover

is found only twice in our sample, and on one of those occasions the woman feels the need to explain the address by saying *δεσπότης γὰρ εἰ ψυχῆς τῆς ἐμῆς* 'for you are the master of my soul' (Ach. 5. 26. 7).

All of these usages rely for their meaning on the fact that *δέσποτα* was normally used only in situations where the speaker had considerable direct power over the addressee. In the late antique period, however, it is sometimes possible to find examples of a 'weakened' usage of the term, where its use between equals is mere common courtesy, not gross flattery. Thus in one papyrus letter of the fourth century AD *δέσποτα* is used to an addressee who is clearly the writer's equal or inferior, not his superior (P. Herm. 11. 28), and in another of roughly the same date a father addresses his son as *δέσποτα* (P. Oxy. 123. 7). Much has been made of this weakened usage,⁹³ but it is important to note that it is rare even in papyrus letters. The vast majority of the occurrences of the vocative *δέσποτα* in papyri are used to people who are clearly the writer's superiors, such as officials to whom a petition is being made, and it is clear that the use of *δέσποτα* to friends and relatives was the exception rather than the rule.

Δέσποτα in the works surveyed is normally used alone, but it can occasionally be combined with the name of the addressee, and such usage is particularly common when *δέσποτα* is used to a god. This pattern is presumably due to the need to specify which god is being addressed, a need which arises much less often in conversation with kings and masters.

3.3.3 *Βασίλεια, βασίλισσα, and δέσποινα*

The feminine counterparts of *βασιλεῦ* and *δέσποτα*, *βασίλεια* 'queen', *βασίλισσα* 'queen', and *δέσποινα* 'mistress', are rarer than the masculine terms in our sample, due to a general scarcity of female addressees. Although no examples of any of these addresses are to be found in classical prose, there is some evidence for them in poetry. Important women in Homer are addressed as *βασίλεια*, *ἄνασσα* 'lady', or *πότνια* 'lady'; *δέσποινα* does not appear in the vocative in Homer, although cases other than the vocative do occur. In tragedy all four of these addresses are used and appear to be interchangeable (Wendel 1929: 88–90). In Aristophanes there are few important

⁹³ See Dihle (1952: 172) and Svennung (1958: 338). Preisigke (1924–7: s.v.) gives a more balanced view; Dinneen (1929: 56) finds that the force of *δεσπότης* is not at all weakened in 4th-cent. Christian epistolography.

women, but a number of goddesses are addressed as *δέσποινα*, and the term is also occasionally used by a slave to his owner's wife.⁹⁴ In Menander, *δέσποινα* is not very common and usually occurs in fragmentary contexts. One occurrence of its use to a goddess is certain (*Sik.* 144, see also *Kolax* 23), and it is probably used by slaves to their mistresses as well.⁹⁵

In prose as in comedy, the most common use of *δέσποινα* is in addresses to goddesses, but it is also used to queens and by servants to their mistresses. There are no examples in our data of this term being addressed to equals in flattery, but it is often used metaphorically between lovers in the novelists, a usage which may be derived from Latin *domina* (cf. Nisbet and Hubbard 1978 on *Odes* 2. 12. 13). In Achilles Tatius a young man advising a lovesick friend tells him to take the hand of the woman in question, and then *ἦν δὲ ταῦτά σου ποιούντος καρτερῇ καὶ προσίηται, σὸν ἔργον ἤδη δέσποινάν τε καλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν τράχηλον* 'if she allows you to do that and puts up with it, it is now your task to call her "mistress" and kiss her neck' (2. 4. 4). This usage was probably not identical to English 'mistress', for 'mistress' in the sense of 'lover' is not exactly a compliment in English and would probably not be used as part of a seduction attempt. The Greek term in the time of the novelists evidently retained a closer connection with the original lexical meaning than does 'mistress' today. Moreover, Greek *δέσποινα* could be applied by a man to his wife as well as to other women, at least in referential usage (Preisigke 1924-7: s.v.).

In later Greek, *δέσποινα* appears to have developed the same 'weakened' meaning as *δέσποτα*, with the result that in modern Greek the title *δεσποινίδα* is the equivalent of English 'Miss'. As with *δέσποτα*, however, the weakened meaning was by no means the predominant one in the late antique period; in fourth-century Christian epistolography *δέσποινα* was 'a title of great respect given to women of high station' (Dinneen 1929: 76).

Although the masculine *βασιλεῦ* was much more common than *δέσποτα*, the situation is reversed in the feminine: *βασίλεια* and *βασίλισσα* each occurs only once in our sample, while *δέσποινα* is fairly frequent. These proportions could be due to chance; only three queens are addressed by title in our corpus, so the fact that two receive *δέσποινα* and only one *βασίλεια* may not be significant. Nevertheless

⁹⁴ Goddesses: *Nub.* 266, 356, 429, *Av.* 877, *Thes.* 286, *Lys.* 203, 317; humans: *Plut.* 644, 738.

⁹⁵ *Heros* fr. 2, *Pap. Ghôran* 2, line 72.

these statistics lead one to wonder whether the feminine terms were used in exactly the same way as their masculine counterparts, or whether it sometimes happened that a woman was addressed as *δέσποινα* when a man in her position would have been called not *δέσποτα* but *βασιλεῦ*. This possibility is strengthened by a passage in Plutarch in which a eunuch addresses the Persian king Darius as *βασιλεῦ* and goes on to refer to Darius' dead wife as *ἡ δέσποινα Στατεῖρα* 'mistress Stateira' (*Alex.* 30. 4–5).

The situation regarding *βασιλίσσα* is more complicated. This term does not occur as a vocative in classical Greek, and even in referential usage it is not attested earlier than Xenophon.⁹⁶ Its one occurrence in our sample is addressed not to a queen but to the Pharaoh's daughter who found the infant Moses, in a helpful suggestion from Moses' sister Miriam (*Joseph. Aḡ* 2. 226). It is very difficult to tell whether *βασιλεῦ* could have been used to a man of the princess's status, but I am inclined to suspect that it could not have been.

3.3.4 Other Greek titles

Although *βασιλεῦ* and *δέσποτα* are by far the most frequent titles in the works surveyed, others do exist. One such is *κύριε*, a very common late address which is known mainly from the New Testament⁹⁷ and papyrus letters, where it is extremely common. In our data it occurs chiefly in Epictetus; the other late authors deliberately avoid it because of their classicizing tendencies. *Κύριε* is not a possible form of address in classical Attic and is virtually absent from classical poetry as well as prose, although it is perfectly acceptable in cases other than the vocative.⁹⁸ In our data *κύριε* is not infrequently combined with a name, another title, or an occupational term.

In the works surveyed, *κύριε* 'lord, master' is an address implying some deference, but not as much as *βασιλεῦ* and *δέσποτα*. It is found in addresses to gods, emperors,⁹⁹ and masters from their slaves, but in Epictetus it also occurs fairly frequently in speeches to ordinary citizens of equal status with the speaker. When so used it is always

⁹⁶ On the origin and referential use of *βασιλίσσα*, see Carney (1991: 156, 165 n. 11), Buck (1914), and Macurdy (1928).

⁹⁷ On this usage see Baudissin and Eissfeldt (1926–9).

⁹⁸ Svennung (1958: 337), Wendel (1929: 88), Zilliacus (1949: 20). But note Pind. *Pyth.* 2. 58 and Kambylis (1964: 155 n. 6).

⁹⁹ For the referential use of *κύριος* as an imperial title, see Hagedorn and Worp (1980), Bureth (1964), Bréhier (1906: 168), Dölger (1953: 986).

connected with obsequious flattery; in this respect it is no different from δέσποτα.

By a process paralleled in many languages, κύριε eventually became the modern Greek equivalent of 'Mr', in other words an almost completely neutral address which could easily be used reciprocally. In our texts κύριε certainly carries more force than in modern Greek, but there is evidence that within the period of this study the use of κύριε in the spoken language came very close to the modern Greek usage. In papyrus documents of the first century AD κύριε is found as a general polite address usable even between close relatives, and in the second century it seems often to be simply a standard neutral address, usable even between parents and children;¹⁰⁰ in some modern dialects this usage within the family was so prevalent that words derived from κύριος and its feminine κυρία became the normal terms for relatives such as fathers, grandmothers, and aunts (Zilliaccus 1943: 32; Shipp 1979: 347). This usage is certainly more common in papyri than the weakened use of δέσποτα, but nevertheless it is far from universal, and it would be a great mistake to think (as some scholars seem to imply) that in the Roman period κύριε had been so weakened that it was no longer a standard way of expressing deference to a superior (cf. Preisigke 1924-7: s.v., col. 853).

Κυρία 'mistress, lady' is also extremely common in papyri and appears to function in the same way as its masculine κύριε. It must have been current in spoken late Greek, given its dialect survival and its position in modern Greek as the standard equivalent of 'Mrs'. Because of the rarity of women in Epictetus, however, κυρία occurs only twice in our data, once from a servant to her mistress and once as part of the complex address ὦ καὶ ὑπάρχουσα καὶ πρὸς ἐμοῦ νομιζομένη κυρία 'you who both are and are considered by me to be my mistress' (Philo, *Congr.* 156; spoken by Abraham to Sarah as an allegory for higher learning). Epictetus says that women are called κυρία by men from the time they are 14 (*Ench.* 40; see below, p. 241); this statement is probably true, given the frequency of κυρία, but Simplicius in his commentary on this passage says that the address indicates not respect but flattery, in hopes of seducing the women (Dübner 1840: 127).

One of the rarer addresses in our data is ἄναξ 'lord', which in our corpus appears only in Herodotus and is addressed exclusively to

¹⁰⁰ See Svennung (1958: 337) and Zilliaccus (1943: 31-2, 1949: 34).

Apollo in his oracular function. It is sometimes apparently used to the Pythia, but in those cases the speaker is not addressing the priestess, but the god through her. The lexical meaning of *ἄναξ* is a lord or master, and in reference it is used primarily for gods, kings, and heroes.

In the vocative, this term appears in all major poets and is especially notable in Sophocles and Euripides, who use it for kings such as Oedipus, Creon, and Theseus (Wendel 1929: 88–9; Zilliacus 1949: 19). In Homer it is used to address both gods and men (Wendel 1929: 88); in Aristophanes the addressee is generally a god (e.g. *Plut.* 748, *Nub.* 264, *Vesp.* 875–6) but can also be human (*Pax* 90). In Linear B, for which we have no addresses, *ἄναξ* appears as *wa-na-ka*, a word which is usually taken to mean the highest official in the society, the king (Ventris and Chadwick 1973: 120–1); it has, however, also been claimed that *wa-na-ka* can refer to a god (Wathelet 1979: 26; Farmini 1983: 8–9). The question of the evolution of the meaning of *ἄναξ* and the relative importance of its divine and human usages is a difficult one and is more connected with the etymology and referential meaning of the word than with purely vocative usage. It has been much discussed already,¹⁰¹ and the explanation offered here is not intended to enter into this debate, but merely to suggest a synchronic explanation of the vocative usage in our data.

Although in prose *ἄναξ* is not employed to address humans, in tragedy it is often so used and generally seems to have the same function as *δέσποτα* (Wendel 1929: 88). There is one passage in Euripides (*Hipp.* 88) in which the relationship of these two words is commented upon, but unfortunately the meaning of that comment is not entirely clear. A servant addresses his master, saying *Ἄναξ, θεοὺς γὰρ δεσπότας καλεῖν χρεών . . .* This line can be translated as 'Lord—(I address you thus because) it is the gods whom one should call master . . .' (Barrett 1964: ad loc.) or as 'Lord—for we should call our masters gods . . .' (M. West 1965: 156) or as 'Lord, since it is essential to call the gods our masters . . .' (Diggle 1967: 134). In the first two interpretations the *γάρ*-clause is taken as an explanation of the address *ἄναξ*; in the third it is taken as referring to the request for attention in the next line.

The last view, although possible, seems to me to be a very forced interpretation of the Greek; a *γάρ*-clause discussing who ought to be called what, following a vocative, would surely be most naturally taken

¹⁰¹ See Ruijgh (1957: 112–14), Lejeune (1969: 179–92), Wathelet (1979: 25–40), Hooker (1979: 260), Cobet (1981: 14–16), Farmini (1983: 7–14).

as relevant to the vocative rather than to the following line. This is especially true when the next line is ἀρ' ἄν τί μου δέξαιτο βουλευσάντος εὖ; 'Would you take some good advice from me?', which does not have any obvious relevance to gods and masters. The difficulty with the other two possibilities is that Barrett's interpretation fits the context much better (the servant is approving his master's use of δέσποινα in lines 74 and 82), but, as West has pointed out (1965: 160), 'Outside poetry, ἀναξ survived only as an appellation of deities . . . to a fifth-century ear it suggested an address to a god.' The evidence for this statement is not given; Glucker in arguing against it (1966: 17) cites a large number of examples of ἀναξ used to humans, all of which West rejects (1966: 274) on the grounds that they are from poetry not prose. As far as I can tell, however, the actual situation in prose has never been investigated.

In the Attic prose works surveyed, ἀναξ as a vocative does not occur at all, to any addressee. In Herodotus it is used only to gods, but it is unjustified to draw from Herodotus any conclusions about the connotations this address would have had for an Athenian. It seems to me most likely that the vocative ἀναξ was completely absent from conversational Attic. In that case, the best interpretation of this passage is Barrett's ('it is the gods whom one should call master'), since it fits the context most easily, and the explanation is one of formality or register. If by the fifth century ἀναξ as a vocative was no longer current in spoken usage and familiar only as a Homeric address for gods and heroes, it would have been easily usable in tragedy because of its grand, Homeric sound. It would not, however, have been used in prose except in the most formal situations, that is, addresses to gods in the earliest and most formal of our prose authors. Thus to Euripides' audience ἀναξ sounded like a grand and poetic address for a god or a hero. Δέσποτα, which as noted before carried implications that the speaker was of very low status, reflected a level of subservience which was often given to human masters but which Hippolytus' servant preferred to reserve for the gods.

The original vocative form ἀνα (Wackernagel 1912: 24), found in poetry, is absent from prose, as is the feminine vocative ἀνασσα. There is no feminine vocative equivalent of ἀναξ in prose.

Another rare title is στρατηγέ, which in our corpus occurs in Polybius, Josephus, and Chariton. With this word we start to encounter problems in the definition of 'title', for the referential meaning of

στρατηγός is 'general', and it might seem inconsistent to classify it apart from addresses like ταξίαρχε 'squadron commander' and other addresses to military officers. For our purposes, 'title' will be defined as 'an address denoting rank or status used instead of a name in order to convey respect for the addressee'. The reasons for this definition will become apparent when we examine occupational terms which are not titles, such as ταξίαρχε (see pp. 182-3).

By this definition, the plural στρατηγοί is not a title where it appears in the works surveyed, since it is used for groups of generals (who could not be addressed by name in any case) by other generals and does not seem to indicate particular respect. In the singular, however, στρατηγέ does appear to be a title. In Polybius it is addressed to generals, and in Josephus it is used by humble foreigners apologizing profusely to Joseph in Egypt. The former usage derives from the classical referential meaning of στρατηγός, 'general', but the latter probably comes from the more general meaning of 'commander, governor' which this term acquired in Roman times (H. Mason 1974: 156-7).

The other Greek titles are all too rare to allow us to draw conclusions about their use. Προφήτα 'prophet' is used occasionally in Philo and Josephus to address prophets. Κεκτημένη 'mistress' is once addressed by a slave woman to her mistress (Lucian, *Dial. Meret.* 9. 1). This last address may well have been common, for it is found several times in Menander (*Pk.* 181, 187, 754), where it is always used by a maid to her mistress. As these passages in Menander are the only ones in which a serving woman addresses her mistress, and as there are very few such passages in prose, it is certainly possible that κεκτημένη was a common form of address in such dyads but that the lack of women in the works surveyed has made it a rare term.¹⁰²

Many titles found in poetry, such as βουληφόρε, ἥρωε, ὄρχαμε, κρείον, and κοίρανε (Wendel 1929: 88), are not represented at all in the works surveyed, but these forms were rare even in poetry and probably never used at all in non-literary language.

3.3.5 Roman titles

Most of the titles so far discussed could be used to Romans as well as Greeks, but there were also certain titles which had Latin origins and

¹⁰² Böhlig (1956: 214) considers κεκτημένη in Lucian to be an example of the Byzantine tendency towards using substantivized participles, but it seems more likely that Lucian was imitating comedy.

were used only in Roman contexts.¹⁰³ The most common of these was *αὐτοκράτορ*, which in the Roman period was used as a direct translation of the Latin *imperator* (Dölger 1953: 989; H. Mason 1974: 29, 117–20), although the Greek word had previously existed. In our sample, *αὐτοκράτορ* does not occur before the first century AD but is found in most authors from then onwards. The addressee is usually a Roman emperor, but some extremely important Republican Romans (all of them *imperatores* from a Latin point of view) also receive this term.

The speakers who use *αὐτοκράτορ* are usually very important people in their own right, and never of really low status. *Αὐτοκράτορ* is a respectful and polite address, but it is not slavish, as is shown by the fact that it is sometimes used in public disagreements with the addressee. The speaker can be male or female and is always directly subordinate to the addressee except when the term is used in jest. There are in fact several examples of *αὐτοκράτορ* used jokingly, either in a friendly way, as from Cleopatra to Antony (Plut. *Ant.* 29. 7), or with genuine hostility, as from the Galatian king to Crassus (Plut. *Crass.* 17. 2).

The address *Καῖσαρ* is difficult to evaluate as a title. It is the Latin *Caesar* transliterated into Greek, and the problems of the Greek address are very much connected with those created by the Latin form. *Caesar* was in origin the *cognomen* of Gaius Julius Caesar, but eventually it came to be used as a *gentilicium*,¹⁰⁴ while *imperator* acted as the *praenomen* and *Augustus* as the *cognomen* of the emperor, giving *Imperator Caesar Augustus*.¹⁰⁵ At this point the distinction between names and titles becomes hopelessly blurred, and though it can easily be argued that the early emperors used *Caesar* as a name and the later ones considered it a title (cf. Wifstrand 1939: 530–2), it would be difficult to find the point at which this change took place. If the titles *imperator* and *Augustus* can be described as *praenomen* and *cognomen* of the emperor, it is probably not constructive to attempt to distinguish between imperial titles and imperial names.

In Greek, *Καῖσαρ* was used as the equivalent of *Caesar* from the very beginning of the Empire and was an extremely common imperial title (Bureth 1964: *passim*). In the works surveyed it is not infrequent as a vocative; the addressee is generally Julius Caesar or Augustus, but later emperors occur as well. There are also two cases in which

¹⁰³ For the referential use of these titles, see H. Mason (1974) and Wifstrand (1939).

¹⁰⁴ For the Roman system of nomenclature, see Sect. 3.1.4.

¹⁰⁵ Syme (1958: 185); Bréhier (1906: 176); Dölger (1953: 989).

ὦ Καῖσαρ is used as a cry for help, in the complete absence of the emperor. One of these passages indicates that ὦ Καῖσαρ was the usual equivalent of the English 'Help!', for the hero of Lucian's *Asinus*, when captured by robbers, wanted to shout ὦ Καῖσαρ but could not do so because he had been changed into an ass (*Asin.* 16; cf. Millar 1981: 66). The other passage indicates how this usage may have arisen: Epictetus says that a man who is not a true Cynic, when beaten, will shout ὦ Καῖσαρ, ἐν τῇ σῇ εἰρήνῃ οἷα πάσχω; 'O Caesar, what sort of things am I suffering in your peaceful reign?' (3. 22. 55). It is possible that this use of Καῖσαρ grew out of the possibility of an actual appeal to Caesar (cf. the apostle Paul saying Καίσαρα ἐπικαλοῦμαι at Acts 25: 11).

The other Roman titles are rare, but even so their usage is fairly obvious. They are ὑπατε, the standard equivalent of *consul*, and δίκτατορ, equivalent to the Latin *dictator* (H. Mason 1974: 38, 165). Both are used by Roman speakers to addressees who did in fact hold the offices implied by the lexical meanings of these terms. Absent from the works surveyed, but common in documents, are a number of other Roman addresses, such as σεβαστέ 'Augustus' and αὐγουστε 'Augustus' for the emperor (H. Mason 1974: 28, 83; Dinneen 1929: 27, 34).

3.3.6 Conclusion

Ancient Greek had a wide range of titles available for use in addressing superiors, and titles were a very common type of address in our sample. It is not, however, justified to conclude on the basis of this evidence that titles were a very frequent form of address in most types of interaction. The literature which forms our sample, and indeed much of ancient literature in general, tends to be more concerned with kings and other important people than with ordinary citizens; hence it is likely that the addresses used to important people are disproportionately common in a sample based on literary sources. It will be argued (in Sect. 5.3) that the ancient Greek language in fact made fewer status distinctions among ordinary citizens than does modern English. At the same time, slaves probably did use titles (see Sect. 5.3.2), and it is probable that titles were as common as they are in our sample in actual interaction with rulers, when that occurred.

The evolution of κύριε and δέσποινα from 'lord' and 'mistress' to 'Mr' and 'Miss' is not an unusual phenomenon. English 'master', German *Herr*, French *monsieur*, and a host of similar terms in other

languages have undergone precisely the same change at different periods. This 'wearing out' is such a common process that it has been proposed as the main mechanism of address change and suggested as a universal phenomenon.¹⁰⁶ If this claim is justified, then the remarkable thing may be the stability of the Greek system of titles at an earlier period. *Δέσποτα* did not 'wear out' until the fourth century AD, having been in constant use from at least the fifth century BC. *Βασιλεὺς*, as far as one can tell, never 'wore out' at all. Until the Imperial period Greek had no neutral titles of the Mr/Mrs type.

The most surprising thing, from a linguistic point of view, is the relationship between *κύριε* and *δέσποτα*. The 'wearing out' phenomenon is usually connected with replacement, so that when an originally polite address has been weakened to a certain point, another address is introduced as a more deferential variant; at least in some categories of address it may be a universal phenomenon that a new variant is always more polite than the old one (Braun 1988: 57). Yet the vocative *κύριε* was not introduced as a politer alternative to *δέσποτα* when the latter began to 'wear out'; on the contrary, *κύριε* began to appear before *δέσποτα* showed any real signs of weakening and was never used as a more deferential alternative. The two terms have very similar lexical meanings, and in the papyri they are sometimes used interchangeably to the same addressee, but generally there is a difference between them: *κύριε* is the *less* deferential variant, the one which started to wear out sooner and which was more widely used in a weakened sense.¹⁰⁷

3.4 TERMS OF AFFECTION AND ESTEEM

In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates addresses his friend Glaucon 23 times as *φίλε* 'friend' or *φίλε Γλαύκων* 'dear Glaucon', but Glaucon never once uses these addresses to Socrates. Socrates also uses to Glaucon numerous other terms of affection or admiration, such as *ἐταίρε* 'comrade' and *ἄριστε* 'best', but Glaucon never uses any of these or any similar addresses to Socrates. Glaucon's apparent coldness cannot be excused by claiming that Plato did not let him speak as often

¹⁰⁶ Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak (1992: 95, 117–18); but note that Braun (1988: 57) does not say precisely what Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak (1992: 95) says she says: the claim of universality is made for 'what is new is polite', not for 'polite forms wearing out'.

¹⁰⁷ In formal epistolography as well, *δεσπότης* is more deferential than *κύριος* (Dinneen 1929: 56–7, 66–8, 78).

as Socrates spoke, for Glaucon speaks to Socrates frequently and addresses him 29 times, but he never uses any vocative other than Σώκρατες 'Socrates'. Searching for an explanation for this phenomenon, someone who did not know the *Republic* might reasonably assume that Socrates was much fonder of Glaucon than Glaucon was of Socrates.

Such an explanation, however, is inherently improbable, and as one examines a few more of Plato's dialogues one realizes that the problem at hand is a much larger one than simply that of Glaucon's feelings towards Socrates. Of the 147 examples of φίλε in Plato's genuine works¹⁰⁸ (excluding the *Laws*, in which Socrates does not appear), 133, or 90 per cent, are spoken by Socrates. Of the remaining fourteen, only six are spoken to Socrates, despite the fact that in Plato Socrates' interlocutors very rarely speak to anyone but Socrates. Comparable figures can be produced for ἑταῖρε, ἄριστε and similar addresses, for in fact Socrates' interlocutors greatly prefer address by name to any other vocatives.¹⁰⁹

Φίλε and ἄριστε belong to a group of addresses which have lexical meanings indicating respect or affection; for convenience they will here be referred to collectively as 'friendship terms' or 'FTs'. (A list of FTs occurring more than once in the works surveyed, as well as information on their frequency and distribution, can be found in Table 13, p. 136.) FTs are much more common in the singular than in the plural, and the usage in singular and plural is necessarily different, since in the singular FTs are always a marked address in contrast to the expected FN, which is not an available option in the plural. The following discussion thus applies only to singular usage. Since most of our evidence for FTs comes from Plato, we shall examine the Platonic usage before turning to other authors.

In those Platonic dialogues in which Socrates is a major character

¹⁰⁸ To conduct any statistical analysis of Plato it is necessary to decide on a corpus of genuine dialogues, however difficult such a decision may be. Here I have excluded all seriously disputed works, on the grounds that a genuine dialogue omitted will not jeopardize the value of results nearly as much as a spurious one included. The omission of a particular dialogue therefore says nothing about my own view of its authenticity, only my estimate of general scholarly opinion. My Platonic corpus consists of the following: *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Menexenus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*.

¹⁰⁹ The differences between Socrates' vocative usage and that of other characters in Plato has been independently noticed by Stephen Halliwell (1995), who has a different interpretation of the data. I am extremely grateful to him for allowing me to read his work before publication and for his comments on this chapter.

(that is, all the genuine dialogues but the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*), he produces 91 per cent of those vocatives with lexical meanings indicating affection or respect. Of course, as anyone with even a superficial acquaintance with Plato knows, Socrates talks more than all his interlocutors put together, but he does not use many more addresses than do the others: Socrates produces 56 per cent of all addresses, and only 46 per cent of addresses by name alone. The exact figures are shown in Table 11.

Table 11. *Singular vocatives in Plato's genuine dialogues, excluding the Sophist, Politicus, and Laws*

Speaker*	Terms indicating affection or respect (sing. only)	Name alone	Total
Socrates	396	902	1,298
Other speakers	39	1,058	1,097
TOTAL	435	1,960	2,395

* If an entire dialogue is narrated by one character, as the *Republic* is narrated by Socrates, the vocatives in the dialogue are assigned to the characters who actually speak them, not to the narrator. If, however, one character within a dialogue tells a relatively short story which includes a vocative attributed to someone else, that vocative is assigned to the teller of the story, not to the person who is described as having spoken it. The reasons for this policy are explained on p. 116; it is the same as that used by Halliwell (1995).

3.4.1 *The meaning of friendship terms in Plato*

Friendship terms ought, judging from their lexical meanings, to be particularly complimentary addresses. Yet we have already found many words with vocative meanings substantially different from their lexical meanings, and certainly there are passages where the interpretation of a FT as polite or affectionate is extremely difficult to reconcile with the context, causing translators of Plato to complain about the 'complimentary formulas . . . which in Plato's text are constantly making their appearance where they seem least wanted' (Cope 1864: xii-xiii). On the whole it seems more productive not to assume that these addresses must be complimentary because of their lexical meanings, and to look open-mindedly at the context in an attempt to discover their address meanings.

One of the first questions we might ask when analysing addresses in Plato is whether some terms express genuine affection while others, though perhaps similar in lexical meaning, do not. To test this question, one needs to look at the way Socrates addresses a number of different characters.

Of all Socrates' interlocutors, Crito is the one with the most indisputable claim to a long and close friendship with Socrates. The terms by which Socrates addresses him are *Κρίτων* 'Crito', *ἀγαθέ* 'good', *ἄριστε Κρίτων* 'best Crito', *βέλτιστε* 'best', *δαιμόνιε Κρίτων* 'marvellous Crito', *ἐταῖρε* 'comrade', *θαυμάσιε* 'wonderful', *μακάριε* 'blessed, happy', *μακάριε Κρίτων* 'blessed Crito', *φίλε Κρίτων* 'dear Crito', and *φίλε ἐταῖρε Κρίτων* 'dear comrade Crito'. On the other hand, Thrasymachus in the *Republic* is far from being any kind of friend to Socrates. He is hostile and insulting in his attacks on Socrates, and Socrates at least professes to be thoroughly afraid of him (*Rep.* 336b–e). Yet the list of addresses used to Thrasymachus is almost exactly the same as that used to Crito: *Θρασύμαχε* 'Thrasymachus', *ἀγαθέ* 'good', *ἄριστε* 'best', *βέλτιστε* 'best', *δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε* 'marvellous Thrasymachus', *ἐταῖρε* 'comrade', *θαυμάσιε* 'wonderful', *μακάριε* 'blessed, happy', *μακάριε Θρασύμαχε* 'blessed Thrasymachus', *σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε* 'wisest Thrasymachus', *φίλε* 'dear, friend', and *φίλε Θρασύμαχε* 'dear Thrasymachus'.

To add a third point of comparison, let us consider Meletus, who is Socrates' enemy if anyone is. The list of addresses used by Socrates to Meletus is shorter than those used to Crito and Thrasymachus, but this is not surprising, since the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus in the *Apology* is much shorter than the *Crito* or *Republic* I, but nevertheless it contains many of the same addresses: *Μέλητε* 'Meletus', *ἀγαθέ* 'good', *ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν* 'best of men', *βέλτιστε* 'best', *θαυμάσιε Μέλητε* 'wonderful Meletus', *τᾶν* (see 3.5.4), and *φίλε Μέλητε* 'dear Meletus'. An examination of all of Plato's works shows that most of the different addresses are used to a wide range of addressees, and that it is not possible to maintain any correlation between the speaker's affection for the addressee and the addresses he uses, except perhaps in a few rare cases.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Halliwell (1995: 92) would interpret this evidence differently, arguing that 'Socrates is shown as being able to address even his fiercest opponents as *φίλος*, and thereby to include them too within his aspiration . . . to co-operative, constructive and mutually amicable dialectic.' I do not feel that this explanation can be applied to the addresses to Meletus in the *Apology*.

The next question one may ask is whether Socrates uses different addresses in different contexts, and this is slightly more rewarding. Most FTs can be used in virtually any situation, as well as to almost all addressees; thus *φίλε* is found in contexts of praise (*Tht.* 154d, *Chrm.* 158b, *Phdr.* 230c, *Symp.* 199c) and of apology or self-denigration (*Rep.* 375d, *Phdr.* 257a), but also in objection or refutation (*Euth.* 14a, *Tht.* 171c, *Meno* 79c, *Rep.* 333e), as well as admonishment or rebuke (*Apol.* 26d, *Rep.* 336e, 599d). But with this line of inquiry a distinction emerges between *βέλτιστε* and *ἄριστε* on the one hand and *φίλε*, *ἀγαθέ* and the other terms on the other hand. *Βέλτιστε* and (to a lesser extent) *ἄριστε* are used primarily in moments of triumph for Socrates, when he is refuting his opponent or expressing pleasure at a refutation he sees to be coming.

If this is the way that *βέλτιστε* and *ἄριστε* are generally used, we can see why it is that Socrates uses them more often than do his interlocutors: Socrates is more often in a position of triumph. But we do not seem to be much closer to understanding the other FTs,¹¹¹ so a new line of inquiry must be tried. Having found no distinctions of addressee or context when Socrates is the speaker, we shall have to look at the cases where Socrates is not the speaker.

The best dialogue to examine is clearly the *Laws*, for it is long and full of addresses, and Socrates does not appear at all. Moreover, for a substantial part of the dialogue none of the three characters has a name, and one of them remains nameless all the way to the end. Not surprisingly, vocatives other than names are plentiful, but the distribution of FTs versus other addresses is peculiar. The two named characters, Cleinias and Megillus, prefer overwhelmingly to address the Athenian as *ξένε* 'stranger, guest', and they address each other as *ξένε* as well until they acquire names (and occasionally afterwards). The Athenian, although he too uses *ξένε* and eventually names, also uses the FTs normally used by Socrates.

What is the difference between the Athenian and the other characters? We do not need to ascertain the identity of the Athenian, who may represent Plato himself, in order to answer this question. In other dialogues, Socrates plays a distinctive role: he asks the leading questions, decides what is to be discussed when, and tends to end up

¹¹¹ Halliwell (1995) does find distinctions between the ways that some of the different FTs are used by Socrates. These distinctions are subtle; in my view, if they exist, they are subordinate to the more fundamental rules of usage which will be formulated in this chapter.

refuting the other speakers. Even when he is apparently no wiser than his interlocutors about the subject-matter under discussion, he still directs the course of the dialogue. This role is a distinctive one in Plato; Socrates virtually always plays it, but when he does not participate in a dialogue, as in the *Laws*, this part is given to another character. Friedländer (1975: 361) refers to this role as being the *Führer des Gesprächs*, 'leader of the conversation', and I shall call the person in that position the 'dominant character'.

In order to illustrate the validity of the concept of a dominant character, one need only consider any passage from the *Laws*, such as the opening of the seventh book given here:

ATHENIAN. Γενομένων δὲ παίδων ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν, τροφήν μὲν που καὶ παιδείαν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ὀρθότατ' ἂν γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν, . . . ἃ δὲ λέγω, δηλῶσαι πειρατέον οἷον δείγματα ἐξενεγκόντα εἰς φῶς· νῦν γὰρ λεγομένοις ἔοικε κατὰ τι σκότος.

CLEINIAS. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ATHENIAN. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς τὴν γε ὀρθὴν πάντως δεῖ τροφήν φαίνεσθαι δυναμένην ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται που.

CLEINIAS. Τί μήν;

ATHENIAN. Σώματα δὲ κάλλιστα, οἶομαι, τό γε ἀπλούστατον, ὡς ὀρθότατα δεῖ νέων ὄντων εὐθὺς φύεσθαι τῶν παίδων.

CLEINIAS. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. (*Laws* 788a-d)

ATHENIAN. Now that we have the children born, both the boys and the girls, the next subject to discuss would most reasonably be how to raise and educate them . . . but I really must try to make what I am saying a bit clearer and bring some examples to light, for at the moment things are pretty obscure.

CLEINIAS. How true.

ATHENIAN. Well, it is agreed, is it not, that a good education should show itself able to give the maximum possible beauty and goodness to both bodies and souls?

CLEINIAS. Certainly.

ATHENIAN. And, to start from the simplest point, the most beautiful bodies should, I imagine, develop as naturally as possible when the children are young.

CLEINIAS. Exactly.

In this passage it is perfectly possible to imagine Socrates speaking the words which are here assigned to the Athenian, and one of his interlocutors, say Glaucon, playing the part of Cleinias. It is, however, far more difficult for anyone familiar with Plato to substitute Glaucon for

the Athenian and Socrates for Cleinias, because the Athenian's role here is clearly that of the dominant character.

Thus the difference between the Athenian and the other characters in the *Laws* is that the Athenian is the dominant character. Could this be the reason that he uses FTs and the other two do not? This hypothesis sounds very likely, since in other dialogues Socrates is the dominant character, and in those dialogues he is the one who uses FTs. Fortunately we have some more evidence against which to test this idea: the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, the other two dialogues from which Socrates is essentially absent. In these dialogues Socrates speaks briefly at the beginning and then vanishes, leaving the dialogue to be dominated by a nameless Elean. The Elean, like the Athenian, is clearly the dominant character, and like the Athenian he is usually addressed as ξένη but addresses the other characters either by name or with FTs. Indeed the Elean's tendency to use FTs without receiving them himself is even more pronounced than the Athenian's. In the *Laws*, 80 per cent of the FTs are spoken by the Athenian, but in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, after the departure of Socrates, the figure is 100 per cent.

The strong implication of what has been observed so far is that the use of FTs in Plato is largely restricted to the one character who plays the dominant role in a given dialogue. This explanation would fit very well with the special uses of βέλτιστε and ἀριστε noted above, for these superlatives (meaning 'best') are in their lexical meaning much stronger than positives like ἀγαθὲ 'good' and φίλε 'dear'. It seems that mild FTs like ἀγαθὲ can be used at any time by the character dominating the argument, but at moments where this domination is particularly emphasized, a stronger FT is used.

In order to test this hypothesis further, we need to look more closely at individual dialogues and at addresses in their contexts. Examining dialogues where other characters use FTs to Socrates should be particularly rewarding, for according to our theory this should only happen when the dominance of the dialogue is contested by one of the other interlocutors, or when Socrates is speaking to someone for whom he has so much respect that he does not feel himself to be in a dominant position. It must be remembered, however, that these dialogues are exceptional, for usually Socrates speaks all or nearly all of the FTs in an interaction.

In book I of the *Republic* Socrates has three principal interlocutors.

First he converses with the elderly Cephalus, whom he treats much more respectfully than he does most characters. Significantly, Socrates does not use any FTs to Cephalus, although normally there would be at least one or two in an interaction of such length. Cephalus, who is also being polite, does not use FTs either. The first such term (332e) occurs after Cephalus has retired and the younger Polemarchus (a man for whom Socrates evidently has less respect) is conversing with Socrates. During this conversation Socrates uses both FN and FTs, but Polemarchus uses only FN as long as he is in the debate.

Then (336b) Thrasymachus breaks into the argument and proceeds to quarrel with Socrates, while Polemarchus falls silent. At first Socrates uses FN and mild FTs like *φίλε*, but as he gains confidence he switches to *βέλτιστε* (337e), *ἄριστε* (338d), and *σοφώτατε* 'wisest' (339e), the last in the context of a particularly strong refutation. During this time he also uses names, but no mild FTs. Thrasymachus uses only names until 338e, when he says *βέλτιστε* in laying down his ideas firmly and confidently, at a point in the dialogue where Socrates is also using strong FTs. There is then something of a lull until 342e, where Thrasymachus is refuted and responds angrily. Since no FTs are used at this stage, it seems that the connection between FTs and the feeling of the speaker that his position is a strong one may work in only one direction: although FTs are a sign of dominance, dominance is not always marked by FTs.

At 343d Thrasymachus insults Socrates, calling him *εὐηθέστατε* 'most simple-minded' as he rebukes him for idealism and *naïveté*. From 344d to 345b Socrates uses a large number of mild FTs as he urges Thrasymachus to explain himself; it seems from other dialogues that FTs are often used when Socrates is trying to get someone to answer him, perhaps because an opponent who will not answer is by definition far from being in control of the dialogue. The dialogue continues with Socrates using names or mild FTs and Thrasymachus using no addresses at all until 348c, when he calls Socrates *ἥδιστε*, in a context where he feels that Socrates has been being particularly obtuse. For the rest of the book Socrates uses names or FTs, while Thrasymachus only once uses an address, that being FN. The FTs used by Socrates include *φίλε*, *ἐταίρε*, and *ἄριστε*, with no obvious difference between their contexts, a fact which indicates that *ἄριστε* is not as consistently a strong FT as is *βέλτιστε*.

Another dialogue worth examining in detail is the *Phaedrus*, which

is particularly rich in FTs and where the characters have much more real affection for each other than do Socrates and Thrasymachus in the *Republic*. The dialogue begins with Socrates using mild FTs to ask neutral questions, while Phaedrus uses names in return. Then (227d) Phaedrus reproaches Socrates for having made a ridiculous statement, using *βέλτιστε*. Next (228d) Socrates uses the rare address *φιλότης* 'love' in forcing Phaedrus to produce the speech which he has been hiding.

There follows a thoroughly friendly and fairly trivial conversation, in which Socrates uses FN and mild FTs while Phaedrus uses FN. At 230c, however, Phaedrus is astounded at Socrates' ignorance of the world outside Athens and remarks upon it using *θαυμάσιε*.¹¹² Socrates apologizes but then defends himself, using *ἄριστε*.

After Lysias' speech on love, the dialogue continues with Socrates using FN and mild FTs, while Phaedrus uses only names until 235d, when he gets very excited and urges Socrates to speak. As mentioned earlier, Socrates often uses FTs when urging his interlocutors to speak, but it is rare for anyone to have to urge Socrates. It seems that Socrates, like any other character, loses control of the dialogue when he refuses to speak, for Phaedrus first uses *γενναιότατε*, then *φίλε* (236b), ordering Socrates firmly to speak. Socrates eventually capitulates, having first been reduced to uttering insults (236e) rather than FTs, although all rather in a joking spirit.

In the remainder of the dialogue Phaedrus uses two FTs: *θαυμάσιε* (257c) in making an assertion of fact which he knows for certain and Socrates does not, and *φίλε Σώκρατες* (259e) when Socrates says something with which Phaedrus feels obliged to disagree. For the rest, Socrates uses both names and FTs, while Phaedrus uses only names.

The *Gorgias* is too long to analyse in detail, but a few points are useful for our purposes. Socrates has three interlocutors in this dialogue, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. Of these Gorgias is by far the eldest and most famous, and Socrates treats him with far more respect than he does the other two. It is notable that during the entire conversation between Socrates and Gorgias no FTs are used at all. In the debate with Polus, however, Socrates uses FN and FTs, while Polus uses only FN. In the debate with Callicles, which is by far the fiercest, FTs are used on both sides. Callicles says *φίλε Σώκρατες* (486a) and *ἀγαθέ* (486c) in a highly patronizing speech urging Socrates to mend

¹¹² In this case and the next example of *θαυμάσιε* the address may be less of a FT than an exclamation of amazement; see p. 141.

his ways and grow up, and he uses *σοφώτατε σύ* (495d) to reply to what he finds to be a stupid question. Eventually Callicles becomes disgusted and refuses to argue any more, insisting that Socrates finish the debate by himself. He does this in a haughty rather than in a defeated way, and in consequence uses *ἀγαθέ* (506c, 507a) in telling Socrates to go on by himself.

The *Symposium* is a complicated and atypical work, but it has special interest because of the relatively large number of FTs which are spoken by people other than Socrates. The first, *φίλτατε*, is used by the narrator Apollodorus in an indignant reply to the unnamed companion who has criticized his devotion to Socrates (173e). The next, *ὦγαθέ . . . Ἀριστόφανες* (189a), occurs when the banquet is well under way, in a playful rebuke by Eryximachus to Aristophanes, and the one after that, *φίλε Ἀγάθων* (194d), is in a gentle but firm demand from Phaedrus to Agathon to stop arguing with Socrates and give his speech. All of these vocatives occur in exchanges in which Socrates does not participate, and they seem to reflect a situation similar to that in the *Laws*: in the absence of Socrates, another character may dominate a dialogue. The difference is that here the FTs show only momentary dominance, rather than the type of sustained control exerted by Socrates himself: no character uses FTs more than once in this section of the work.

Several more FTs occur in the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima, which is rather puzzling from the standpoint of addresses. Normally in Plato, if a dialogue is narrated by one character, the identity of the narrator does not affect the style of the different speakers in the dialogue. Thus the *Republic* is narrated by Socrates, but the characters in it do not talk like Socrates; and although the *Symposium* may be narrated by Apollodorus, the characters do not all speak as Apollodorus would. This is true even if we do not know much about how Apollodorus talked, for the characters in the *Symposium* have a number of distinct personal styles. So far, none of these observations is at all disconcerting, nor is the fact that when Socrates in the course of a dialogue invents a brief example which includes a dialogue, the characters in his imaginary dialogue do talk like Socrates, at least as far as their use of FTs is concerned. The question is, to which category does Socrates' speech in the *Symposium* belong?

Certainly Diotima is an imaginary character, and the normal address rules do not seem to apply to her at all. She is normally addressed by name, despite the prohibitions which existed on

addressing or even referring to women by name which existed in Athenian society (see 5.4.1). Moreover, it is unquestionably Diotima who has the upper hand in the dialogue. Either because of this dominance or because the dialogue is narrated by Socrates, Diotima uses a number of FTs (204b, 205e, 211d). Socrates, although he generally uses names, once addresses her as *ξένη* (204c), a term which elsewhere is used chiefly to the Elean and the Athenian, both dominant characters in their own dialogues. Surprisingly, Socrates also uses *σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα* (208b). Elsewhere in Plato the address *σοφώτατε* is clearly not to be taken as too much of a compliment, but here the praise seems completely genuine. This unusual address situation, with FTs used on both sides without any contest over the dominance of the debate, suggests that the FTs in this dialogue may be more a function of Socrates' narration than of Diotima's role.

The FTs which occur after Socrates' speech, however, are easy to explain. They are all spoken either by Socrates or by Alcibiades, who marches into the party and takes charge of it. Alcibiades is most definitely asserting his control of the situation and of the course of the conversation, so it is not surprising that he uses a few FTs in so doing.

These examinations of individual dialogues confirm our initial hypothesis. FTs are used by the person in a dominant position in a dialogue at any time, or by another person at a moment where he feels himself to have won the upper hand in the debate. One dialogue, however, is still perplexing: the *Parmenides*. In this dialogue the young Socrates appears inexperienced and humble in the face of the elderly Parmenides, who dominates the dialogue. In the first part of the dialogue (126–37), a number of different characters speak, all using only FN. That Socrates should not use FTs here is hardly surprising, given his position in the dialogue, but it is less easy to see why Parmenides does not use them. Moreover, the greater part of the dialogue (137c–166c) consists of a conversation between Parmenides and Aristotle, a rather characterless personage who is apparently younger than Socrates (137c). In this entire section there are no addresses at all, a situation unparalleled in Plato. The issue of the *Parmenides* is not one that we can answer at this point, but it will have to be kept in mind (see p. 126).

The findings that FTs in Plato, rather than being complimentary to the addressee, show the dominance of the speaker may seem surprising. Yet condescension can be expressed in English by addresses such

as 'my good man' or 'dear sir', and a recent study has shown that FTs in American English function in a way not dissimilar to those in Plato. 'Dear' and similar terms are generally used reciprocally to intimates, except that children never use them to adults, even their parents, while adults use them freely to all children. These terms can also be used to strangers, however, and in these circumstances are non-reciprocal and 'generally triggered by something in the interaction which shows the ... [addressee] to be somewhat less than totally competent' (Wolfson and Manes 1980: 89). The researchers note that 'along with any connotation of friendship involved in the use of terms of endearment in service encounters, goes the additional implication that the addressee is subordinate to the speaker in some way, just as a child is subordinate to an adult' (Wolfson and Manes 1980: 90).

The phenomenon of an overtly friendly or polite address having connotations of inferiority is not confined to English and Greek. The Polish address *przyjacielu* 'friend' is used by men to boys and 'by socially superior men to their male subordinates' (Jaworski 1986: 56-7). In Arabic, some words 'implying intelligence or capability ... were used sarcastically to imply the opposite of what they mean' (Parkinson 1985: 193). This usage is not precisely the same as that found in Greek, for Socrates is not simply being sarcastic when he uses FTs, and in fact closer Arabic parallels can be found in *siidi* 'mister', which is often used for contradicting the addressee, and in the use of prestigious titles to close friends of low rank, a usage which according to native speakers is simultaneously both respectful and disrespectful (Parkinson 1985: 161, 190). In Arabic polite forms can also be used between friends in argument 'implying that the addressee knows nothing at all' (Parkinson 1985: 26).

These comparisons with other languages show us that it is not only FTs which can be used in the way we have described. Indeed, examination of Plato's addresses suggests that Socrates also uses patronymics and ATs in this way. We have seen that patronymics outside Plato belong mostly to formal language and are used in genuine or ironic politeness, at least until a late period. In the classical period, the only major exceptions to this usage are some of the patronymics in Plato. Of the 22 singular patronymics in Plato's dialogues, 21 are spoken by Socrates, some in polite speeches but some in neutral contexts. The one example not spoken by Socrates (*Lach.* 180d) is a careful and formal address of the type that could easily contain a patronymic in another author as well. It thus seems likely that

patronymics were indeed used like FTs in Plato, although the body of evidence is not enormous.

ATs are still rarer, and conclusions regarding them must be even more tenuous, but they too are used chiefly by Socrates (or the Elean in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*). The most frequent AT is *παῖ* 'child', which, as we have seen, can be used even in other authors to show the dominance of the speaker as well as his friendliness. It is probable that ATs too indicated some superiority in Plato.

3.4.2 Socrates

Now that the usage of FTs in Plato has been established and a probable social meaning for them determined, the question that plainly arises is whether we have found the normal usage of Attic Greek or whether our findings merely represent Plato's style. No surviving classical author uses FTs nearly as often as does Plato, but a fair amount of evidence can be found by putting together all the other authors.

One of the richer sources for FTs is Aristophanes, who presents a usage significantly different from that of Plato. The most obvious difference lies in the repertoire of FTs in use, for *ἄριστε* 'best', *ἑταῖρε* 'comrade', *θαυμάσιε* 'wonderful', *γενναῖε* 'noble', and a number of other Platonic FTs are absent or virtually absent from Aristophanes. On the other hand, Aristophanes makes fairly generous use of *γλυκύτατε* 'sweetest', which occurs only once in Plato. *Βέλτιστε* 'best' is much more common in Plato than in Aristophanes, while *φίλτατε* 'dearest' shows precisely the opposite pattern.

There is also a substantial difference in the usage of FTs between the two authors, for Aristophanes makes distinctions among the different terms. *Φίλτατε* in Aristophanes tends to be used in genuinely affectionate or otherwise positive statements (*Nub.* 110, 1464), while *βέλτιστε* is found in positive or neutral contexts (*Eq.* 622, *Plut.* 1172). *Μακάριε* is not infrequently followed by a genitive of the cause of the addressee's good fortune and is more clearly connected to the lexical meaning of 'lucky' than is *μακάριε* in Plato (*Eq.* 157, 186). *Ἀγαθέ* seems to have no especially friendly or unfriendly connotations; sometimes, but not always, this FT seems to indicate the speaker's superiority as in Plato (*Lys.* 1166, *Av.* 91, 846, 1577, *Ran.* 1235, *Ach.* 305).

Menander's usage is more difficult to analyse, because of the

smaller amount of evidence, but it seems to lie between Plato and Aristophanes. *Γλυκύτατε* occurs several times in Menander, but then *γενναία* may be found as well, and although *φίλτατε* is the most common FT, *βέλτιστε* comes a very close second. Menander does make distinctions in meaning among the different FTs, but not always the same distinctions as Aristophanes. *Φίλτατε* again expresses genuine affection (*Mis.* 213, 308), but *βέλτιστε* in Menander often shows real respect (*Dysk.* 503, *Epitr.* 224). *Βέλτιστε* can alternate with *πάτερ* 'father' (*Epitr.* 308–70), which as we have seen is a very polite address.

A number of FTs seem to be used in Menander in much the same way as in Plato: *ἀγαθέ* 'good' is found in a complaint (*Aspis* 174) and a demand for unreasonable behaviour to be stopped (*Epitr.* 443), while *μακάριε* 'blessed, happy' occurs in a patient question to a slave whom the speaker considers to be mad (*Dysk.* 103) and a request by a calm speaker for an angry man to listen to him (Pap. Ghôran 2, line 151).¹¹³ On occasion *βέλτιστε* can also be used in this way, as from a reasonable brother to an unreasonable one (*Aspis* 251), in a patient explanation (*Dysk.* 342), or in making a good point (*Samia* 81).¹¹⁴

The FTs used in epic and tragedy are less varied than those found in prose and comedy. *Φέριστε* 'best' and *πέπον* 'gentle' are common in epic, *φίλτατε* is more frequent in tragedy, and *φίλε* is found in all genres. *Φίλε* generally indicates real affection in Homer, but its meaning is weakened later. *Φέριστε* seems to have little force even in epic, and the meaning of *φίλτατε* varies (Wendel 1929: 92–3, 105–6).

The Attic orators make only sparing use of FTs, but when these do occur, they seem to be in accordance with Plato's usage. *Βέλτιστε* occurs in Lysias and Demosthenes, *ἀγαθέ* in Isaeus (if the text at 3.70 is correct), *ἄριστε* in Dinarchus, and *χρηστέ* 'best' in Demosthenes (cf. Wankel 1976: on 318). In every case the orator is directing the address at his opponent, and doing so from a position of strength. He may be rebuking his opponent, asking him a biting question, or explaining something which he feels any idiot should know, but the speaker always feels himself to be in a strong position and is never being at all conciliatory. Given the content of the orators' works as a whole, most addresses to opponents are found in similar contexts, but nevertheless the orators show that FTs could be used in this way by a variety of classical Attic authors.

¹¹³ Cf. Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Dysk.* 103.

¹¹⁴ For *βέλτιστε* in Menander see Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Dysk.* 319.

We thus have a mass of conflicting evidence on usage of FTs outside Plato. Tragedy and epic can be disregarded, because they are very unlikely to reflect conversational Attic; the only conclusion we can draw from them is that Plato was not following tragic or epic usage. The orators seem to agree perfectly with Plato, but the weight of their evidence is not enormous. The comedians present another system, or rather two other systems, which follow more closely the lexical meanings of the individual FTs but which (especially in Menander) still allow for the Platonic usage of some terms. We must keep in mind that Menander wrote well after Aristophanes, but merely chronological criteria will not explain the way that Menander seems to lie between Plato and Aristophanes in his use of FTs.

The only satisfactory explanation is that FTs could be used in more than one way in conversational Attic. If Aristophanes' usage had not existed in the conversational language, some of the passages in Aristophanes and Menander would have made no sense to the audience. At the same time, if that usage had been the only one, Plato's audience (and to a lesser extent that of Menander and the orators) would have experienced the same difficulties as those modern translators who find Socrates' use of FTs incomprehensible. Such coexistence of different meanings for FTs is not uncommon: English 'dear' is sometimes used when the addressee appears incompetent or childlike, sometimes expresses real affection, and sometimes (as in letters) is purely conventional. Indeed, the Platonic usage is difficult to explain if the other had not existed concurrently: it is precisely because polite and friendly addresses *are* polite and friendly that they can demonstrate the speaker's control of the situation. Socrates in using FTs shows his moral superiority by remaining polite even when his adversary is angry and threatening, and his intellectual dominance by not being worried enough by his opponent's arguments to cease being friendly (cf. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 33, 108).

A passage in Plato which demonstrates this connection has been cited as Plato's description of 'the procedure for the expression of criticism' in a civilized Athenian context (Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 111 n.). It is a story told by Socrates in the form of a simile:

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ ἀρμονικῶ εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυγχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἶόν τε ὀξύτατην καὶ βαρυτάτην χορδὴν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἀγρίως εἶποι ἂν· "ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾷς," ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν πρῶτον ὅτι "ὦ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταύτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἀρμονικὸν ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀρμονίας ἐπαῖειν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἔξιν

ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἁρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἁρμονικά." (*Phdr.* 268d–e)

but just as a musician, if he came across a man who thought himself skilled in music because he happened to know how to get the highest and lowest notes, would not say rudely 'Wretch, you're crazy', but being a musician [he would say] more gently 'O best [of men], it is necessary for someone who is going to be skilled in music to know these things too, but nothing prevents someone who has as much knowledge as you do from understanding not even a little bit about music. You know the necessary preliminary lessons for music, but not music itself.'

The musician, *because* of his being the one who really knows what he is talking about (ἀτε μουσικὸς ὢν), would not address the ignorant man with the insult μοχθηρέ but would use the FT ἄριστε. Socrates is here saying that it is possible to recognize by his politeness the man who is a master of his subject, for those who know that they are right have no need for insults and can afford to be gentle and polite. Such a statement makes it clear why Plato depicted Socrates using FTs more than other characters, and it also indicates that these FTs were meant to be thought of as being polite as well as demonstrating the speaker's superiority.

With that background, let us turn to Xenophon. The works of Xenophon contain sixteen singular FTs, of which one (μακάριε σύ 'lucky you', *Cyr.* 8. 3. 39) is really an exclamation and should not be counted as a FT at all (see p. 140). Four more are examples of the formula Ζεῦ μέγιστε 'greatest Zeus', which does not occur in Plato and clearly does not function like other FTs (see p. 143). Of those remaining, three FTs¹¹⁵ are used in exclamations of praise, rather the way that one might expect all FTs to be used, given their lexical meanings. The other eight,¹¹⁶ however, are embedded in contexts very similar to those in which FTs occur in Plato, and it is notable that six of these come from Xenophon's Socratic works, all six being spoken by Socrates. Since the Socratic works contain only 39 per cent of all addresses in Xenophon, this distribution is very surprising.

These six addresses seem to be identical in function to those spoken by Socrates in Plato. Significantly, no character other than Socrates

¹¹⁵ ἀγαθὴ καὶ πιστὴ ψυχὴ: *Cyr.* 7. 3. 8; λῶστε σύ: *Hell.* 4. 1. 38; μέγα ἀγαθόν: *Cyr.* 5. 3. 20

¹¹⁶ ἀγαθέ: *Mem.* 1. 4. 17, 2. 3. 16, 3. 7. 9, *Cyr.* 3. 1. 30; ἄριστε: *Mem.* 3. 5. 28; φίλτατε: *Ap.* 28; λῶστε: *Symp.* 4. 1; θαυμασιώτατε: *Ap.* 3. 1. 27.

ever uses FTs in Xenophon's Socratic works, and the FTs used by Socrates in Xenophon are all ones that Plato's Socrates also uses. Although Xenophon's Socrates uses many fewer FTs than does Plato's, Xenophon's Socratic works are far shorter than Plato's and contain fewer addresses: the complete works of Plato contain 3,348 singular addresses, whereas Xenophon's Socratic works contain 413. Even taking into account this difference, however, Xenophon's Socrates uses FTs less often than does Plato's.

The evidence of Xenophon opens up some possibilities. By this time we know that the use of FTs to emphasize a speaker's superiority in an argument is not confined to Plato, but found to a lesser extent in many Attic authors. Yet none of these authors uses FTs as frequently as does Plato's Socrates. Moreover, Xenophon shows a tendency to assign these addresses to Socrates far more than to any other character, although in Xenophon's non-Socratic works there are many characters who play a dominant role in dialogues. Why should this be the case, and does it represent a real feature of the behaviour of the historical Socrates? This question is difficult to answer. Plato certainly portrays Socrates as using many more FTs than other characters, but when someone other than Socrates is dominant in a dialogue he generally uses FTs as well, so perhaps Plato's Socrates only uses so many FTs because he is typically the leading figure in a dialogue. Xenophon's evidence points more unambiguously to a particular connection between Socrates and FTs, but it is scantier than Plato's. At this point we need to consider what other evidence exists for the historical Socrates and the relative merits of different sources.¹¹⁷

The question of the historical Socrates is of course an old and very difficult one, and it would take far too long to relate all the different positions that have been taken, so only the bare minimum will be given here.¹¹⁸ The controversy focuses on the relative and absolute reliability of different sources for our knowledge of Socrates. Four major sources, Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle, all provide a large amount of evidence, whether or not it is accurate.

¹¹⁷ Halliwell (1995: 89) believes that the peculiarly Socratic vocative usage in Plato cannot be taken as belonging to the historical Socrates. I would not claim that the evidence presented here for a usage by the real Socrates is completely conclusive, but the evidence does exist, because of the difference between Xenophon's Socrates and Xenophon's other characters in address usage (a difference which Halliwell ignores).

¹¹⁸ For bibliography on Socrates, see Patzer (1985) and Navia and Katz (1988); works published since these bibliographies appeared include Rutherford (1995), Benson (1992), Brickhouse and Smith (1989), Gower and Stokes (1992), Patzer (1987), Vander Waerdt (1994), and Vlastos (1991).

Minor sources include fragments of works by other followers of Socrates, later sources which could be based on these lost works, and references and accusations by people who were not followers of Socrates. For our purposes, Aristotle and all of the minor sources are useless, for none of them contains vocatives in any significant quantity. This simplifies the issue greatly.

Aristophanes, however, does depict Socrates using addresses in the *Clouds*. There Socrates does not use any FTs at all, but then he rarely finds himself in a position to use them: Socrates rarely addresses individuals and never does so in situations where FTs would be appropriate. Indeed, Aristophanes' Socrates does not use FN as a form of address either and is fond only of insults. There is no reason to believe that Aristophanes' Socrates would not have used FTs just like Plato's Socrates if speaking under the same circumstances, but at the same time Aristophanes has clearly not gone out of his way to represent Socrates as using FTs more than other characters. Other characters in the *Clouds* do occasionally use FTs, but they follow the general usage of FTs in Aristophanes outlined above, not the Platonic usage.

Aristophanes thus does not confirm the hypothesis we have formed from Xenophon, but neither does he disprove it. Socrates' language could have had characteristics which Aristophanes did not choose to parody, either because they were not generally enough known or because for other literary reasons he preferred not to put Socrates in a position to display them. We shall thus have to examine Plato's and Xenophon's evidence on its own, to see if it justifies our tentative inference.

If a generous use of FTs was not a special characteristic of Socrates' speech, we must find some other way of explaining the evidence in Plato and Xenophon. Were they merely following the convention whereby the dominant person in a dialogue used more FTs than his opponents? If so, why does Xenophon assign more FTs to Socrates than to other dominant characters? Perhaps this distribution is simply a coincidence. And yet the *Cyropaedia* contains many speeches where Socratic FTs could easily be used, of which only one does contain a FT (3. 1. 30). The *Symposium* also contains a number of passages where people other than Socrates might well have used such terms, and there are some opportunities in the *Memorabilia* as well, notably the dialogue between Pericles and Alcibiades (1. 2. 41-6). It is also remarkable that in the *Oeconomicus*, for most of which Ischomachus

rather than Socrates is the dominant character (cf. Gera 1993: 46), there are no FTs at all.

It is true that we have a few FTs which are not spoken by Socrates, but that merely serves to confirm the existence of the convention of which we were already aware from Plato and the orators. The statistical facts are that all of the FTs in Xenophon's Socratic works are spoken by Socrates, and that FTs used in the sense that Plato uses them are extremely rare in Xenophon outside the Socratic works. The addresses spoken by Socrates by no means constitute a majority of Xenophon's vocatives—in fact, if one omits the *Oeconomicus*, where Socrates is not in a position of dominance for most of the dialogue, Socrates produces just under 16 per cent of all singular addresses in Xenophon. Such figures make it very improbable that Socrates' usage of FTs could be coincidental.

If Xenophon's use of addresses was not coincidental, perhaps he was imitating Plato in the type of addresses he assigned to Socrates. The question of how much Xenophon imitated Plato, or indeed other Socratic writers, has been debated at great length, but at least in the case of Xenophon imitating Plato discussion of the issue has focused more on content than on style. Xenophon's style is of course very different from Plato's, and most people consider it distinctly inferior. If Xenophon was trying to imitate Plato's style, the effort must on the whole be regarded as a failure. But in fact it is more probable that Xenophon made no attempt to imitate Plato's style in his Socratic works. Had he done so and been even slightly successful, there ought to be a perceptible difference in style between Xenophon's Socratic and non-Socratic works, but I at least can see no such difference. In the matter of addresses in particular, if Xenophon had simply been imitating Plato, Socrates ought to use many more FTs than he actually does in Xenophon's works.

Perhaps one might argue that Xenophon simply invented Socrates' address peculiarities. As far as I can see there is no concrete evidence either for or against this theory, but it is inherently improbable. Could Plato and Xenophon have independently invented the same minor peculiarities of Socratic speech? There is no visible motivation for the invention of such a peculiarity.

Thus, although the historical Socrates may not have had a tendency to use FTs more than other people, this possibility only arises if Xenophon did one of a number of things that seem very improbable. If on the other hand Socrates did have a tendency to use FTs, Aristophanes'

failure to record this fact can be explained without difficulty. This evidence does not of course constitute proof that Socrates certainly did act as Plato and Xenophon describe him acting, but it shows that it is more probable that he did than that he did not, which is more than one can say about most features of the historical Socrates.

It is easy to see how it could have come about that Socrates used more FTs than other Athenians. As we have observed, the use of FTs in a somewhat patronizing manner by someone who was in a stronger position in an argument seems to have been a real feature of Athenian speech. Socrates would thus not have had to distort normal usage in order to use FTs more than did other people, for he more than any other Athenian found himself in a position to use them. Eventually this natural usage would, at least in the eyes of those who knew him best (his disciples), have become a distinctive element of Socrates' behaviour.

It is notable that Plato, unlike Xenophon, represents other characters who fill Socrates' role in a debate as using FTs as often as Socrates does (in relation to the number of times that each speaker uses FN). Yet we found earlier that one Platonic dialogue, the *Parmenides*, has an apparently inexplicable address situation: no FTs are used at all, although Parmenides plays the dominant role in the dialogue. We cannot say that Parmenides does not use FTs because he is not Socrates, for the Elean and the Athenian use FTs. But perhaps the difference is that Parmenides was a real person, while the Elean and the Athenian were invented by Plato. If Plato knew that Socrates genuinely did use more FTs than other people, he might have felt reluctant to attribute to another real philosopher a manner of speech that that philosopher had not used. At the same time, Plato may have felt that Socrates was an ideal for philosophers, and therefore he assigned Socratic speech characteristics to imaginary characters whose position was meant to be analogous to that of Socrates.

These observations have some implications for the study of Plato, Xenophon, and Socrates. From the probability that Xenophon saw and reported a minor characteristic of Socrates' speech comes the likelihood that Xenophon knew Socrates well enough to pick up such niceties and remembered them when writing his works. The observation that Xenophon could faithfully report a characteristic of Socrates even when it required him to alter somewhat his usual style has implications for our views of Xenophon's general trustworthiness as a source for Socrates.

There is also another implication of the observations in this chapter. When Plato's Socrates professes ignorance and humility and appeals to his interlocutors' superior knowledge, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is being serious or not. But it seems from the usage of FTs in Plato that if Socrates uses FTs in his 'humble' utterances (e.g. *Euth.* 5a, 5c), they express only mock humility, for FTs are used only by someone who is conscious of dominating a dialogue.

3.4.3 Later Greek

The use of FTs at all periods was commoner in dialogues than in brief exchanges, and hence these terms are basically confined to those authors who wrote dialogues. In the works surveyed, the first authors after Plato to write surviving dialogues were Plutarch and Dio. Plutarch of course wrote many different works, only a few of which were properly dialogues.¹¹⁹ Although they are a small proportion of Plutarch's total output in terms of volume, the dialogues provide nearly half of the singular addresses in the genuine works of Plutarch: 27 per cent of all addresses in the dialogues use FTs, as opposed to 4 per cent in the *Lives* and 12 per cent in the rest of the *Moralia*. This figure of 27 per cent is very close to that found in many of Plato's works.

To this extent Plutarch agrees with the classical authors, but on other points of usage he differs sharply. Whether in dialogues or elsewhere, FTs are not used exclusively or even primarily in situations where the speaker feels superior to the addressee. Indeed if we consider the usage of FTs as a group, there is no reason to believe that the context has any effect at all on the choice of FTs versus other types of address. *Γενναῖε* 'noble', for example, is used both in an annoyed rebuke by Cato to his son (*Cato* 68. 6) and in an appeal by the suppliant Coriolanus to a former enemy (*Cor.* 23. 7). FTs are also used in perfectly neutral statements, especially in the dialogues.

As regards distinctions by speaker, Plutarch's dialogues differ from Plato's in several important respects. Platonic dialogues usually consist either of long speeches by the dominant character (mostly in the later dialogues) or of interchanges between two people only. Of course many Platonic dialogues have more than two characters, but usually

¹¹⁹ For the purposes of this survey, the following works in the *Moralia* are considered to be dialogues: numbers 11, 13, 24, 25, 26, 29, 41, 43, 46, 47, 60, 63, 64, 72. The following are considered spurious: 1, 10, 15, 16, 19, 42, 48, 55, 58, 62, 76, 77, 78.

the characters in such dialogues take it in turn to talk to Socrates or his equivalent, and it is uncommon for them to address each other. Plutarch's dialogues, however, have many more characters, who interact freely with one another in a way that is paralleled in Plato only in the *Symposium*. Sometimes it is impossible to single out one of Plutarch's characters as 'dominant'; the interlocutors can be equal in their intellectual status and their control of the conversation. It is thus not surprising to find that no one character uses most of the FTs in Plutarch's dialogues, for there is not always a role in those dialogues analogous to the one played by Socrates in Plato. What is surprising is that the FTs are not used only at points where one character feels dominant, but at apparently random points throughout the dialogue, although they almost never occur when the addressee seems to be in a stronger position than the speaker.

Perhaps, one might argue, FTs in address had regained their lexical meaning by the time of Plutarch and were used to friends or in expressions of friendship or admiration. But there is no evidence from Plutarch that such is the case, and some evidence against it. In the *Septem Sapientum Convivium* (*Mor.* 146b–164d), most of the characters do not know each other well, yet they use FTs, both in contexts where the addresses might be polite and in contexts where they could not be. Solon and Mnesiphilus, who are genuinely close friends, nevertheless address each other by name (154d).

Perhaps Plutarch, like Menander and Aristophanes, made more of a distinction than did Plato between the different FTs, using some in positive contexts and others in negative ones, or some for speakers in a superior position and others for speakers in an inferior position. Unfortunately, this hypothesis does not seem to work either. The disparate uses of *γενναίε* have been remarked upon already, and a similar phenomenon can be seen with *ἐταίρε* 'comrade' and other terms. The only common FT which could be an exception is *βέλτιστε*, which in the majority of its uses does seem to occur when the speaker feels superior to the addressee, but even with this vocative there are a few passages where the context has to be interpreted rather generously to give an indication of superiority. As far as I can see, there is little difference between one FT and another in Plutarch, except for some rare terms like *φίλτατε* which are always taken in their affectionate lexical meaning and a few other rare ones like *λῶστε* which are always ironic and negative.

Clearly Plutarch does not adhere to the classical usage of addresses

in philosophical dialogues, nor does he have a different but equally structured system of his own. Plutarch's usage rather seems to be random, a situation which is relatively rare with major groups of addresses. Perhaps Plutarch was merely following the spoken usage of his own day, and FTs, having lost the special connotations they carried in Plato's Athens, had become more random in distribution. The problem with this theory is that random usage of addresses is not at all common in the Greek we know, nor is it in other languages.

It seems more probable that Plutarch was not attempting to follow normal spoken usage of his period, but was imitating classical prose. In favour of this theory is the fact that Plutarch and other authors of his date did rely heavily on classical authors (particularly Plato in the case of dialogues) as an example of style, and that by the time of Plutarch the gap between spoken and formal written Greek was substantial (cf. Russell 1973: 20-1; Hirzel 1895: ii. 83-4). Plutarch might have used more FTs in his dialogues than elsewhere in his works because in dialogues, as a genre, the influence of Plato (and to a lesser extent Xenophon) was more pervasive than in other genres where other classical models might be more pertinent. Plutarch imitated Plato relatively well, in that he used FTs about as often as Plato did and made little distinction between one FT and another, but he failed to catch the crucial distinction of speakers which made sense of Plato's usage. Thinking that Plato had distributed FTs randomly, Plutarch did so himself.

Such a mistake tells us that the usage of FTs in Plutarch's day was no longer what it had been in the classical period, but it does not tell us what that usage was. From the great scarcity of any FTs in other authors of Plutarch's period, however, and in particular from the absence or near absence of FTs in the more informal or colloquial writers, we are entitled to suspect that FTs could have disappeared from ordinary speech altogether by the time of Plutarch.

Only one contemporary of Plutarch's provides enough FTs to give us some idea of his patterns of usage. That author is Dio Chrysostom, a rhetorician whose use of Greek was so respected that it won him the nickname 'golden-mouthed'. Because of the nature of his profession, most of the addresses in Dio's surviving works are plural and spoken to an audience. Nevertheless some of Dio's pieces contain, or consist of, dialogues, and a number of these dialogues clearly follow a Platonic model; indeed, a few even have Socrates as a participant. Unfortunately, Dio's dialogues have very few addresses of any type,

but the ones they do have are particularly useful. In the third oration, for example, Socrates speaks to various interlocutors. The interlocutors between them produce three addresses, all of which are FN addressed to Socrates, but the one address spoken by Socrates is *ἀριστε*, in making a point (3. 39).

Another type of dialogue altogether is that in which the speakers are Dio himself and an unnamed student or other fairly humble interlocutor (e.g. 21, 55, 56, 67). Since the students are nameless, they are never addressed with FN; on the rare occasions where they receive an address, it is usually a FT. Only once does one of these interlocutors use an address to Dio, and this address, contrary to all expectation, is *ἀριστε* (67. 2). Elsewhere, however, Dio generally uses FTs in a manner thoroughly consistent with Platonic usage, except that they, like all addresses, are rarer than they would have been in Plato.

Dialogue 15 takes place between a speaker who is always perfectly calm and self-controlled and one who is angry and abusive. The abusive speaker uses no addresses at all, but the calm one produces three, all of them FTs. We shall see this pattern of a calm and an abusive interlocutor recurring in Lucian, and there as here it is clear that anger is a sign of not being in control of the argument. Indeed the same phenomenon can be seen to some extent in Plato—it is only Socrates' opponents who get angry, never Socrates himself. In Plato an angry interlocutor may think himself to be superior, and thus he can use FTs. In later authors the angry interlocutor does not use FTs, as here.

Thus the evidence from Dio, slim as it is, suggests that his usage of FTs was to a large extent, although not completely, the same as the classical usage. Since we have observed from Plutarch that the spoken practice regarding FTs in the late first century AD was almost certainly not the same as the classical usage, it appears that Dio was probably imitating Plato. This is in any case highly probable, given the extent to which Dio followed Plato in other respects (cf. Russell 1992: 2). Unlike Plutarch, Dio seems to have grasped the principle behind Plato's usage of FTs, a fact that is not terribly surprising when we remember that Dio was more of a purist in his adherence to classical usage than was Plutarch.

The only other author of this period in the works surveyed who wrote any kind of dialogue was Epictetus, or rather Arrian recording Epictetus. Epictetus' dialogues are hardly worthy of the name, for Epictetus does nearly all the talking, and his opponents are both

nameless and characterless. Epictetus produces nearly all of the addresses, and although he does use a few FTs, the majority are insults. Epictetus made much less attempt to imitate classical writers than did the other late authors in our corpus, and the lack of FTs in his works is evidence for their disappearance from the colloquial speech of his day.

The last writer of dialogues in our corpus is Lucian. Because Lucian wrote a great many surviving dialogues, he produced more than twice as many singular addresses as Plutarch and was surpassed in volume of addresses only by Plato. Unfortunately the great variety of the dialogues makes generalizations about usage exceedingly difficult, and thus it will be easier to begin by considering a few individual dialogues.

The *Hermotimus* is, of all of Lucian's works, the closest to a Platonic dialogue. In it Hermotimus, a committed student of philosophy, converses with the doubter Lycinus. At first Lycinus is very humble and asks questions assuming that Hermotimus is correct in his actions, but eventually his questions show that Hermotimus' teacher is a fraud and convince Hermotimus to abandon his studies. Except for the ending, this plan is strongly reminiscent of Plato's *Euthyphro*, and indeed Lycinus' whole technique is similar to that of Socrates.

The dialogue begins with both characters using FN, and continues in this way for some time. Then when Hermotimus gets annoyed he begins to use FTs (7), and soon Lycinus follows suit (8). Shortly afterwards Hermotimus stops using FTs, and Lycinus continues, although he also uses names. For the rest of the dialogue, which is fairly long, Hermotimus uses only names, while Lycinus uses both names and FTs. The shift in the two characters' address usage thus exactly mirrors the change in their positions in the dialogue. A number of FTs also recur in stories told by Lycinus, spoken by one character to another within the story, and in every case the speaker appears to be in a stronger position than the addressee. The FTs used in this dialogue are ἀγαθέ 'good', βέλτιστε 'best', ἑταῖρε 'comrade', γενναῖε 'noble', θαυμάσιε 'wonderful', καλέ 'beautiful, good', μακάριε 'blessed, happy', φιλότης 'love', and χρηστέ 'best', of which all but χρηστέ appear in Plato.

From this evidence it seems clear that Lucian in the *Hermotimus* is following the classical usage of FTs: they are used only by the character in a superior position in the argument. The only significant

difference is that Lycinus at the beginning of the dialogue does not use FTs, whereas Socrates in an analogous situation at the beginning of the *Euthyphro* does use them. This difference could be explained by saying that Lycinus was sincere in his protestations of ignorance while Socrates was not, which is possible. It is also possible that Lucian thought that the use of FTs would make Lycinus' humble attitude seem unconvincing, perhaps because in his day, being no longer a part of conversational speech, they evoked Plato's Socrates.

In any case, it seems very likely that Lucian was copying Plato's usage. As we have seen, it is probable that the classical usage of FTs, and possibly the use of FTs at all, had been lost by the time of Plutarch, and it is highly unlikely that this usage could have come back into fashion by Lucian's era. Lucian cannot have been following the tradition embodied by Plutarch, who did not adhere to the classical usage, nor that of Dio, who used too few addresses to make a convincing pattern, and thus he is most likely to have been imitating the classical usage directly. This is especially likely in a dialogue like the *Hermotimus* which is also reminiscent of Plato in many other ways.¹²⁰

Another dialogue worth examining is the *Iuppiter Tragoedus*. This dialogue is far more complex than the *Hermotimus*, for it consists mainly of a discussion among the gods, but for part of the time the gods are also watching and commenting upon a debate between two mortal philosophers, Timocles and Damis. In this debate Timocles is angry and insulting and gets very much the worst of the argument, while Damis remains perfectly calm and in control both of himself and of the argument. He produces seventeen addresses in the course of the dialogue, of which eleven are names and six FTs, while Timocles uses eleven addresses: two names, nine insults, and no FTs (cf. Coenen 1977: 112, 127). Lucian here is again employing the classical usage of FTs.

In the dialogue among the gods, however, the situation is very different, for here there are only four FTs out of sixty-three addresses. Since the two dialogues are intertwined and part of the same work, differences in date or purpose cannot be invoked, and it seems that Lucian for some reason avoided using FTs among the gods. This tendency is amply attested elsewhere, such as in the *Dialogi Deorum*, *Dialogi Marini*, *Iuppiter Confutatus*, *Bis Accusatus*, etc. Moreover, in many dialogues between mortals FTs are rare or completely absent.

¹²⁰ For Lucian's imitation of Plato and classical authors in general, see Bompaigne (1958) and Hirzel (1895: ii. 273).

This fact makes it even more likely that Lucian was consciously imitating Plato in those dialogues which do contain FTs, rather than coincidentally sharing Plato's rules of usage. The dialogues with FTs are often more philosophical than the others; for example in the *Dialogi Mortuorum* most dialogues do not contain any FTs at all, but the five involving Diogenes all include FTs, and all the FTs in those dialogues are spoken by Diogenes.

In general Lucian does seem to assign FTs to the dominant character in an interaction, especially if he is a philosopher, but there are more exceptions to this rule in Lucian than in Plato. On occasion FTs are used simply because the addressee does not have a name, as in the *Nigrinus*, where all the addresses are by FT (although several are spoken by the subordinate rather than the dominant character), and in the *Icaromenippus* and *Necyomantia*. In Plato nameless characters are addressed as ξένη 'stranger, guest' rather than with FTs, but a tendency to use FTs to nameless interlocutors is found already in pseudo-Platonic dialogues such as the *Hipparchus*, *Erastai*, and *Minos*.

In Lucian and in other late authors it was also possible for certain FTs to be used in a very un-Platonic way, to express very strong positive or negative emotions. These uses are best discussed separately for the individual FTs.

3.4.4 Conclusion

In classical Attic, FTs could be used either in the sense of their lexical meanings to convey respect and affection, or with slightly patronizing connotations by people who felt themselves to be superior in a debate. Because of Socrates' tendency to play a dominant role in arguments, he used FTs more often than did other Athenians, and there is evidence that a frequent use of FTs was recognized as a peculiar characteristic of the historical Socrates' speech. In a later period this usage of FTs seems to have disappeared from spoken Greek, and it is possible that FTs themselves disappeared as well, though late Greek authors trying to imitate Plato or general Attic usage did use FTs. Sometimes these later authors succeeded in using FTs almost exactly as Plato would have done, but often they were very far from classical usage.

3.4.5 *Uses of individual terms*

We found at the beginning of this section that there is little difference between one FT and another in Plato, but it then transpired that some distinctions do exist in comedy. In this subsection we shall examine the use of individual FTs in various prose authors. Our sample is very much biased towards Platonic usage, because Plato used many more FTs than did other authors: the most common FT, $\phi\iota\lambda\epsilon$, had 76 per cent of its occurrences in Plato and a further 21 per cent divided between Plutarch and Lucian, leaving only 3 per cent for all the other authors. Although this distribution is a bit more extreme than that of some other FTs, it is by no means atypical. It is caused less by Plato's predilection for assigning FTs to Socrates than by the general distribution of addresses in the works surveyed, as is shown in Table 12.

Table 12. *Distribution of friendship terms*

Author*	Sing. addr. by FT	Total sing. addr.	% of sing. addr. by FT
Plato	577	3,348	17
Plutarch	137	863	16
Lucian	276	1,931	14
Others	122	2,371	5
TOTAL	1,118	8,513	13

* In this and the following table, for the sake of completeness, all doubtful and spurious works of each author are included in the figures for that author.

The following discussion will take the terms in order of frequency, including feminines and forms in combination with other vocatives but ignoring plurals, which are often used very differently from the singular forms.

The most frequent FT is $\phi\iota\lambda\epsilon$, which is also one of the most common of all singular addresses in the works surveyed and which has a lexical meaning of 'dear' or 'friend'.¹²¹ This address is less common in poetry, although the plural $\phi\iota\lambdaοι$ is frequent in epic and tragedy; in

¹²¹ $\phi\iota\lambda\epsilon$ has the peculiarity that the nominative $\phi\iota\lambdaος$ is very often used instead of the vocative, especially in the *Iliad*. This issue has been discussed by a number of scholars, none of whom has produced a completely satisfactory explanation: see Wendel (1929: 92), Svennung (1958: 200-3), and Hedberg (1935: 74).

Homer and Sophocles *φίλε* seems to express genuine affection, but this usage is weakened in Euripides and comedy, and in late Greek *φίλε* often carries very little meaning of any sort.¹²²

Φίλε is unusual among FTs in that it is more often found in combination with other vocatives than alone. In the works surveyed, *φίλε* expresses genuine, indisputable affection only in combination.¹²³ It can be combined for this purpose with KT's or the names of people or things dear to the speaker. Thus in Longus a happy wife addresses her husband as *φίλε ἄνερ* 'dear husband' (4. 21. 3), and Cleopatra uses *φίλ' Ἀντώνιε* 'dear Antony' to address the dead Antony (Plut. *Ant.* 84. 4). In our sample there is no instance of *φίλε* alone clearly having such a meaning. Nevertheless, not all instances of *φίλε* in combination express genuine affection or politeness; Plato and Plutarch in particular contain many passages where its meaning does not appear to be any stronger than that of *φίλε* alone.

A variation of *φίλε* is *φίλη κεφαλή* 'dear head', which is found only in Plato. A number of different theories have been suggested to explain the use of words meaning 'head' in this and similar Greek expressions;¹²⁴ the best of these seems to be that of Van Hook, who argues (1949: 414) that there is a difference between periphrases using *κάρα* 'head' and those using *κεφαλή* 'head': the former are found only in Attic tragedy and always imply respect, affection, or both, while the latter are complimentary where they occur in Homer but in later Greek prose and poetry can express either affection or hatred. In our data there are no examples of *κάρα* (which is only to be expected, as it is not a prose word), but *κεφαλή* occurs both in *φίλη κεφαλή* and as part of the insults *κακὴ κεφαλή* 'bad head' and *μιαρὰ κεφαλή* 'foul head'. From the evidence of the works surveyed it does not seem that *κεφαλή* in these phrases significantly alters the meaning of either *φίλε* or *κακέ*.

The superlative *φίλτατε* 'dearest' occurs in our data chiefly in late authors. Like *φίλε*, *φίλτατε* is often combined with other vocatives; it is notable that these vocatives are usually names (as with *φίλε*) and never the partitive genitives which follow many other superlatives. Unlike *φίλε*, however, *φίλτατε* does not show a difference in meaning between combined and uncombined forms. Lexically speaking,

¹²² Wendel (1929: 92-3); Zilliacus (1949: 14, 20); Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 57).

¹²³ The phenomenon of an address which has one meaning when used alone and a different one in combination is not unusual; cf. Mehrotra (1981: 124-5).

¹²⁴ Jebb (1900b: on 1); Zilliacus (1949: 16); cf. Dinneen (1929: 65).

Table 13. Friendship terms

Term	In Plato		In Plut.	In Luc.	Other authors	Total sing.	Plural
	Spoken by Socrates or equivalent	Spoken by others					
φίλε 'dear, friend'	163	14	44	5	6	232	68
φίλη κεφαλή 'dear head'	2	—	—	—	—	2	1
φίλτατε 'dearest'	1	2	6	17	24	50	2
φιλότης 'love'	1	—	—	17	—	18	—
φιλούμενε 'beloved'	1	—	—	—	—	1	—
ἑταίρε 'comrade'	80	—	26	46	—	152	10
φίλε ἑταίρε 'dear comrade'	10	—	—	—	—	10	1
βέλτιστε 'best'	36	6	15	40	18	115	5
ἀγαθέ 'good'	42	11	6	27	10	96	9
ἄριστε 'best'	51	1	3	23	7	85	10
μακάριε 'blessed, happy'	48	3	15	12	4	82	11
γενναίε 'noble'	9	1	6	23	18	57	15
γενναϊότατε 'most noble'	1	1	—	10	1	13	—
γεννάδα 'noble'	1	—	—	1	—	2	1
θαυμάσιε 'wonderful, admirable, strange'	32	8	—	16	1	57	5
θαυμασιώτατε 'most wonderful'	—	—	—	1	4	5	—
θαυμαστόν 'wonderful'	1	—	—	1	1	3	—

θαυμαστότατοι 'most wonderful'	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
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Note: See Appendix B, pp. 274-83, for greater detail.

φίλτατε means 'dearest', and the referential meaning is more present in the address usage than is the case with most FTs. Except for the examples in Plato, *φίλτατε* almost always expresses genuine, often deep, affection. Like *φίλε* in combination, it is far more likely to be used between family members or lovers than are other FTs. In Plato, however, *φίλτατε* whether combined or not seems to be used no differently from *φίλε* or *ἀγαθέ*. In Menander, *φίλτατε* is one of the most common FTs and expresses very strong and genuine affection. In other poetry, too, *φίλτατε* is generally affectionate and often combined with other vocatives (Wendel 1929: 106; Gregor 1957: 14–15). In Aristophanes *φίλε* and *φίλτατε* are frequently (by no means always) used by women, and it has been suggested that women may have used these vocatives more than men in classical Attic (Sommerstein 1995: 72), but in Attic literature other than Aristophanes these terms are normally used by men.

A rarer term is *φιλότης*, which in our data occurs once in Plato and otherwise only in Lucian. It is never combined. The lexical meaning of *φιλότης* is 'friendship', 'love', or 'affection', and it is surprising to find such an abstract noun used as an address, but *φιλότης* as an address occurs elsewhere as well (Svennung 1958: 61–2).¹²⁵ In the works surveyed it seems to be used no differently from *φίλε*, except that in Lucian it is more likely than other FTs to be used in addressing the person to whom a given work is dedicated.

Almost as common as *φίλε* is *ἐταῖρε*, which has a lexical meaning of 'comrade' or 'companion'.¹²⁶ It is very rarely found in combination; this major difference from *φίλε* must be due at least in part to the fact that *φίλε* is an adjective and *ἐταῖρε* a noun. Nevertheless addresses such as *Μένων ἐταῖρε* (Plato, *Meno* 98a) do occasionally occur. *Ἐταῖρε* can occasionally be followed by a genitive, as in *σωμάτων καὶ χρωμάτων ἐταῖρε Λάβαν* 'Laban, companion of bodies and of colours' (Philo, *LA* 3. 22) or *μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἐταῖρε* 'companion of dark night'.¹²⁷ In such passages it is not a FT, for it does not even nominally express comradeship with respect to the speaker (cf. pp. 62, 90).

In meaning there is no discernible difference between *ἐταῖρε* and

¹²⁵ Hedberg (1935: 77) and de Vries (1969: on 228d) point out that this use of an abstract noun for the more concrete *φίλε* is a peculiarly Attic usage.

¹²⁶ Miller (1953: 47) suggests that *ἐταῖρος* was originally a KT meaning 'paternal kinsman', but this meaning is not evident in the vocative usage.

¹²⁷ Homeric Hymn to Hermes 290, cf. also 436 *δαιτὸς ἐταῖρε* 'companion of the feast'. For the construction compare *πληρώσεων τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἐταῖρον* 'companion of indulgences and pleasures' (Plato, *Rep.* 439d).

φίλε when both are used alone. *Ἐταῖρε*, however, is rare in poetry, unlike *φίλε* (Wendel 1929: 93). The other difference is that *φίλε* and most other frequently occurring FTs are occasionally found in the feminine, but the vocative *ἑταῖρα* never occurs. This omission is probably due to the lexical meaning of *ἑταῖρα*, which is 'courtesan'. A similar situation exists in Polish, where the masculine *przyjacielu* 'friend' is a common address but the feminine *przyjaciółko* means 'lover' and in consequence is not used as an address (Jaworski 1986: 57).

A FT found exclusively in Plato is *φίλε ἑταῖρε* 'dear comrade', which is once combined with a name but otherwise stands alone. It is spoken only by Socrates and is used only in fairly neutral statements.

Another common FT is *βέλτιστε*, which has a lexical meaning of 'best'. This term is more widely distributed among prose authors than are most FTs and is frequent in Menander as well. *Βέλτιστε* can be used in combination with names or with essentially meaningless genitives like *ἀνδρῶν* 'of men'. This latter construction is not infrequent with superlative adjectives used as addresses, whether positive or negative, and it appears to strengthen the address slightly without altering its meaning.

In Plato, *βέλτιστε* has a usage distinct from that of most other FTs. It is normally used when the speaker is delivering a particularly crushing blow to his opponent's argument and so indicates not only the general superiority of the speaker but also his triumph at that particular moment. Other authors do not make a similar distinction between *βέλτιστε* and other FTs, and in Plutarch and Lucian it is often used to unknown addressees. When found outside Plato, Plutarch, and Lucian, *βέλτιστε* is often ironic and can be used in a heavily sarcastic way. In Menander this term is usually polite and respectful, but it can also be used in the Platonic sense on occasion (see p. 120).

Another common FT is *ἀγαθέ* 'good'. This term is only occasionally combined, usually with a name in the vocative. Outside Plato, *ἀγαθέ* in combination is likely to be genuinely friendly or heavily sarcastic, while *ἀγαθέ* alone is more neutral, as was the case with *φίλε*. There does not appear to be any difference in meaning between *ἀγαθέ* alone and *φίλε* used alone. In Menander, however, *ἀγαθέ* always occurs in contexts where the speaker is in a position of dominance, in contrast to *βέλτιστε*. In the poetic works surveyed by Wendel, *ἀγαθέ* occurs only in comedy and can be used in almost any interaction (Wendel 1929: 106).

Close to ἀγαθέ in frequency is the superlative ἄριστε 'best'. This term is often combined with a name or with a genitive plural like ἀνδρῶν. In this its usage resembles that of βέλτιστε, and in Plato its meaning seems to be similar to βέλτιστε but somewhat less strong. In Lucian ἄριστε is if anything stronger than βέλτιστε and is used both to express scorn and in genuine politeness. Other authors seem to use it as a more neutral FT than βέλτιστε, but the evidence is scanty.

Μακάριε 'blessed, happy'¹²⁸ is sometimes combined with other vocatives, but there is no evident difference between the combined and uncombined meanings. Nor is there a difference between the meanings of μακάριε and φίλε or ἀγαθέ, a fact which may tell us something about Greek (and Roman, given the similarity of Latin *beate* to Greek μακάριε) culture. What the FTs have in common is that their lexical meanings are complimentary. In English most people would be far more complimented to be told that they were good or dear to the speaker than to be told that they were lucky or happy, but it seems that in Greece there was no such distinction. In Menander as well, μακάριε is used in the same way as ἀγαθέ.

There is also a special, uncommon usage of μακάριε which is essentially separate from its use as a FT. This usage occurs when the speaker is commenting on the good fortune of the addressee in respect of one particular point of which he has just been informed. Thus we have μακάριε Ζέφυρε τῆς θεᾶς (Lucian, *Dial. Mar.* 15. 4; cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 8. 3. 39) spoken by a companion who has just heard what amazing things Zephyrus saw. This use of μακάριε might best be translated as, 'Zephyr, you were lucky to see it'; it is virtually impossible to decide whether it properly constitutes an address or an exclamation.

Γενναίε is unusual in that it is not common in Plato but relatively frequent in Philo, who rarely uses other FTs. The lexical meaning of γενναῖος is 'noble', but by the time of Plato it had lost most of its reference to lineage and become a general complimentary term (Dover 1974: 95). Its address usage in Plato and Lucian is basically the same as that of other FTs such as φίλε; in other authors γενναίε is used more often than other FTs in completely negative contexts but can also be genuinely polite.

Γενναιότατε 'most noble' is found mainly in Lucian. It is combined much more frequently than γενναίε, always with a genitive plural. Γενναιότατε is almost always used in very positive or very negative

¹²⁸ For a more thorough discussion of the referential meaning of μακάριος, see de Heer (1969: 56-7, 83-7).

contexts. In Lucian the negative meaning certainly predominates, but the reverse is true in the few examples in Herodotus and Plato. In late Greek, it is used as a commendatory epithet for extremely important people (Zehetmair 1912: 9; Hornickel 1930: 3-4).

Γεννάδα, which appears to be a neutral FT, is related to *γενναῖε* and has the same lexical meaning but occurs much less frequently.¹²⁹

The address *θαυμάσιε* is primarily Platonic. The lexical meaning of *θαυμάσιος* is 'wonderful', 'admirable', or 'extraordinary'; in the works surveyed there is generally no distinction in usage between *θαυμάσιε* and *φίλε* or *ἀγαθέ*, and thus it was probably the sense of 'admirable' rather than 'extraordinary' which underlay the use of this term as an address. In a few passages, however, *θαυμάσιε* is used when the speaker expresses surprise at the addressee (e.g. *Phdr.* 230c); in these cases it seems to regain the sense of the lexical meaning 'extraordinary'.

The superlative of *θαυμάσιε*, *θαυμασιώτατε*, is perhaps more often ironic than most FTs and is entirely absent from Plato. *Θαυμασιώτατος* as a title or epithet is common in late Greek, where it is the equivalent of the (rarer) Latin *(ad)mirandissimus*.¹³⁰ There is also a variant of *θαυμάσιε*, *θαυμαστέ*, which occurs in positive, negative, and neutral contexts.

The exact meaning of the vocative *δαιμόνιε* is disputed; although the lexical meaning of *δαιμόνιος* is 'miraculous' or 'marvellous', the address usage pre-dates this lexical meaning considerably—Homer uses only the vocative, and the other cases first appear in Pindar (Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 5, 139). Some scholars connect the meaning of *δαιμόνιε* with that of its etymological relative *δαίμων* 'divinity' and hold that it expresses astonishment at and criticism of the addressee (Verdenius 1959: 147-8). Others, following the exhaustive work of Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 140, 142; Rose 1956: 149), maintain that *δαιμόνιε* is an address which creates intimacy between speaker and addressee and urges compliance with the speaker's requests. Both of these views are based primarily on poetic usage, and neither fits the usage in our prose sample, *pace* Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 97-114). Sommerstein (1977: 272) argues that in Aristophanes *δαιμόνιε* is normally used to superiors and always has an element of deference. In Plato, the only author in our corpus to provide a substantial number of examples

¹²⁹ The form and referential usage of *γεννάδας* are discussed by Björk (1950: 51-4); cf. Halliwell (1995: 118).

¹³⁰ Zehetmair (1912: 39-42); Hornickel (1930: 15-16); Dinneen (1929: 44).

of δαίμονιε, there is no visible distinction in usage between it and other FTs.

From the evidence on poetry assembled by proponents of the different views, it appears that Brunius-Nilsson is correct to separate δαίμονιε from δαίμων but that her determination to find one meaning for δαίμονιε which applies in all contexts and all genres (1955: 113, 140) has led to some very unconvincing interpretations of individual passages. Most of the vocatives we have so far examined have had variations in meaning; in particular, FTs in comedy often seem to have specific individual meanings that are not present in Plato. Μακάριε, which is very similar to δαίμονιε in lexical meaning, is sometimes used in ways which stress this meaning and sometimes in ways totally divorced from it. The meaning Brunius-Nilsson finds for δαίμονιε fits very well in some of her examples, but in others the traditional view seems preferable; for Aristophanes Sommerstein's explanation seems to be the best, and it would fit better than the others with the fact that δαίμονιε is a FT in Plato.¹³¹ In our data this term is not infrequently combined, either with a name or with ἀνδρῶν like a superlative. In poetry, however, such combinations are extremely rare (Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 80).

Καλέ, an address found chiefly in Lucian, is almost always combined, usually with a name (in Lucian) or with παῖ (in Plato). The lexical meaning of καλός is 'beautiful', 'good', or 'noble', but in Plato the sense of 'beautiful' is the primary one (Smothers 1947: 6, 52-3). In Plato παῖ 'child' is not infrequently combined with καλέ in contexts where beauty is an issue.¹³² Apart from these combinations, καλέ is used no differently from other FTs.

Καλή and καλοί can also occur in the vocative as part of the phrase καλὸς καγαθός 'gentleman'. This address may well be different in usage from καλέ in other combinations, since καλὸς καγαθός is a set formula, but there is not enough evidence to determine its vocative meaning. Κάλλιστε 'most beautiful' occurs only in Plato, combined with names. It is used between adult men like other FTs, never to boys like καλέ.

¹³¹ Brunius-Nilsson does note that δαίμονιε can be used by a 'restrained and superior' speaker in Homer (1955: 143), and by Plato's Socrates 'just where he puts his finger on the weak point in his opponent's argument' (1955: 103); it seems to me that this usage calls into question her classification of δαίμονιε in these passages as a 'vocative of appeal' (1955: 103), but this problem does not seem to worry her.

¹³² In its referential usage καλός often appears in praise of boys; see Smothers (1947) and Wachter (1989).

Λῶστε is the superlative corresponding to the comparative *λῶϊων* 'better', and thus it is close to *ἄριστε* and *βέλτιστε* in lexical meaning. The address meaning of *λῶστε* in Plato does not seem to be as strong as that of these two superlatives, although with so few examples it is difficult to be certain. Outside Plato *λῶστε* might be as strong as *ἄριστε* or *βέλτιστε*. Plutarch always uses it in negative contexts.

Σοφώτατε too is found in a variety of authors.¹³³ It is always combined, sometimes in rather complicated and lengthy addresses, and is usually ironic. *Σοφώτατε* is the superlative of *σοφέ* 'wise', which occurs as an address only once in the works surveyed. It is rare among Greek FTs for a superlative to be more common as an address than the positive. A variant *πάνσοφε* 'omniscient' occurs only in Philo, who uses it to address the writer of the biblical passages he is commenting on.

Μέγιστε is fundamentally different in usage from the other FTs and is found in neither Plato nor Lucian. Since *μέγιστος* is the superlative of *μέγας* and therefore means 'greatest', one might expect it to function like other complimentary adjectives, but to all intents and purposes *μέγιστε* is a title, not a FT. Xenophon uses it only in combination with *Ζεῦ* 'Zeus', and Philo as well employs it as part of an address to a god. Other authors in our corpus apply *μέγιστε* only to Roman emperors, always in combination with names or other titles (cf. Dinneen 1929: 34).

A more normal FT is *χρηστέ*, which does not occur in Plato and is never combined. The lexical meanings of *χρηστός* are 'useful', 'good', and sometimes 'silly', but there is no evidence that this last meaning is present in the vocative usage. *Χρηστέ* seems to be one of the FTs which can be particularly negative, like *ἄριστε* or *βέλτιστε*, but its negative sense could come from its use as a FT as much as from a meaning of 'silly'. Often, when it is used, a FT would be expected but an outright insult or negative term would not.

Κράτιστε 'strongest, mightiest' is always followed by *ἀνδρῶν* 'of men' or *γυναικῶν* 'of women' as part of a more complex address. Although *κράτιστος* sometimes functioned as a specific title (= Lat. *egregius*) in late Greek (Zehetmair 1912: 13; Hornickel 1930: 19–22), the occurrences in the works surveyed do not seem to be titles, but rather straightforward expressions of affection or esteem. *Κράτιστε* is always thoroughly positive in the works surveyed.

¹³³ For the use of *σοφός* and *σοφώτατος* in late Greek, see Hornickel (1930: 32) and Dinneen (1929: 70).

Somewhat rarer is *προθυμότετε* 'most willing', 'most eager', which is always followed by a name. As far as one can tell from the works surveyed *προθυμότετε* is used like any other FT.

The address *ἀνδρειότετε* is found only in Plato and is always combined with *πάντων* 'of all'. The lexical meanings of *ἀνδρειότητος* are 'bravest' and 'most stubborn', but it is probable that the meaning 'bravest' prevails in the vocative, since *ἀνδρειότετε* is not used in situations where an overtly negative term would be appropriate.

Although *θεῖε* 'holy, divine' occurs only once in our data (Plato, *Laws* 626c), it is of special interest because the scholiast remarks that this (in the Laconian form *σεῖε*) is a typically Spartan form of address (cf. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 112). The speaker is indeed the Spartan Megillus, and the address does not occur elsewhere in classical Attic prose or poetry; it is, however, found in Theocritus (7. 89). Confirmation of the scholiast's assertion is given at *Meno* 99d, where it is stated that women and Spartans used the phrase *θεῖος ἀνὴρ* 'divine man' as an expression of praise (cf. also *Aret.* 379d, Arist. *EN* 1145^a). In the *Laws*, this address occurs at the first point where Megillus says anything longer than a simple *ναί* 'yes', and it is probably intended to characterize him as Spartan. A number of related vocatives also occur in the works surveyed, but they do not seem to be particularly Spartan: *θειότετε* 'most holy', 'most divine', *θεοφιλεῖς* 'dear to the gods', *θεοφιλέστατε* 'most dear to the gods', *εὐδαιμον* 'blessed',¹³⁴ and *εὐδαιμονεστάτη* 'most blessed'. All of these addresses are very rare in the works surveyed, but some occur more often in later Greek (Dinneen 1929: 51–3, 98; Hornickel 1930: 16–17).

Other FTs, or terms which might be considered FTs, occur so rarely in the works surveyed that nothing useful can be said about their meanings.

3.4.6 Plurals

The plural of FTs is generally much less common than the singular (see Table 13). The use of the plural can be divided into two categories: addresses to two people and addresses to more than two people. In the former situation names can be used in address (e.g. Plato, *Laws* 683b, 693a, 702b, etc.), and thus the use of FTs is a noticeable and meaningful deviation from FN address, as in the singular. In these situations the meaning of plural FTs appears to be the same as

¹³⁴ For the referential meaning of this word, see de Heer (1969: 24–6, 38–44, 54, 59–67).

that of singular ones, and in Plato they are generally used by the dominant character in a dialogue.

When there are more than three addressees, however, names are virtually never used in the works surveyed, and none of the usual group addresses (see 3.9) is so standard that a deviation from it is necessarily marked. Plural FTs, especially *φίλοι*, seem to be neutral addresses when used to groups of more than two. The same is true in poetry (Wendel 1929: 93).

One might wonder whether this distinction in meaning between FTs addressed to groups of different sizes was connected with the archaic grammatical distinction of singular, dual, and plural which was still current in Plato's day.

3.5 INDEFINITE ADDRESSES AND *ΞΕΝΕ*

Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; (Plato, *Grg.* 452b)

Who are you, O man, and what is your work?

Ὁνθρωπε, τίς τε ἐὼν καὶ κόθεν τῆς Φρυγίης ἦκων ἐπίστιός μοι ἐγένεο;
(Hdt. 1. 35. 3)

O man, who are you, and from what part of Phrygia have you come to be a suppliant before me?

The addresses discussed so far all have relatively clear lexical meanings which either define the addressee absolutely (names, etc.) or state something about his relationship to the speaker (KTs, etc.). Most of the terms to be discussed in this chapter, however, are less precise in their lexical meanings; indeed several have no lexical meaning at all. In this section we shall try to see what use the Greek address system made of such terms.

Table 14. *Indefinite addresses*

Term	Sing.	Plural	Total
ξένε/ξεῖνε 'stranger, guest'	221	16	237
ἄνθρωπε 'human being'	137	30	167
οὗτος/οὗτοι/αὗται 'this one'	51	6	57
τᾶν (?)	22	—	22
μέλε (?)	1	—	1

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 283–6, for greater detail.

3.5.1 *Ξένη*

Of these addresses by far the most precise in lexical meaning is *Ξένη*, which is also found in the Ionic form *Ξείνη*. The referential meanings of *Ξένος* are 'stranger', 'foreigner', and 'guest-friend'. Because of the latter meaning, *Ξένη* could be a FT, but it does not appear to be used as such. It is one of the most common of all singular addresses in the works surveyed, but this is mostly due to Plato, who provides nearly three-quarters of the examples, mostly from the *Laws*. Nevertheless, a number of other authors also employ this term.

Despite the large number of examples, *Ξένη* in Plato is restricted to a relatively small number of addressees. As we would expect from the lexical meaning of the term, these addressees are never of the same nationality as the speaker, and closer examination reveals other restrictions as well on the use of *Ξένη*. The Elean in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* is a visitor in Athens and is addressed only as *Ξένη* by his Athenian interlocutors; he, on the other hand, never uses *Ξένη* to address them. This distinction indicates that *Ξένη* functions very differently from FTs, which in these same two dialogues are used by the Elean but never to him. It also illustrates a general rule for the use of *Ξένη* in virtually all authors: *Ξένη* is used by natives of the place in which it is spoken, to addressees who come from somewhere else. Such a rule is not surprising, and indeed it is similar to the referential use of the English term 'foreigner'. When an Englishman is in England, any German he meets is a foreigner, but when he is in Germany, the Englishman is the foreigner. Nevertheless, it did occasionally happen in Greek that *Ξένη* was used between two people both of whom were abroad, or by a traveller to a native;¹³⁵ this is because Greek *Ξένη* does not exactly correspond to English 'foreigner', as we shall see.

Many characters in Plato, such as Hippias, Gorgias, Meno, Parmenides, Ion, and Simmias, to name but a few, are indisputably foreigners in Athens, and yet they are addressed by name, not with *Ξένη*. What is the difference between them and the Elean? Probably it is that these characters had names which were known to their interlocutors and Plato's audience alike, and it was not generally appropriate to address someone as *Ξένη* once his name was known.

This suggestion is supported by the few passages in which these named characters do receive the address *Ξένη*. In the *Meno*, Socrates invents an imaginary opponent in the debate, and although Socrates

¹³⁵ e.g. Hdt. 9. 16. 4; Plato, *Symp.* 204c, *Plut. Mor.* 150c, 220c, etc.

himself uses FN to Meno, this imaginary opponent uses ξέvre (71a). Exactly the same thing happens in the *Hippias Major*, where Socrates' imaginary interlocutors twice address Hippias as ξέvre (287c, d), although Socrates himself uses Ἱππία 'Hippias'. In both these cases the invented characters are thought of as being Athenians who did not know Hippias and Meno, and they use the addresses appropriate to that situation. In the *Euthydemus*, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are addressed by name for most of the dialogue, but at one point the Athenian Ktesippus calls Dionysodorus ξέvre Θούριε (283e). This address is used in a moment of irritation and is perhaps intended as a derogatory reminder of the addressee's lower status as a metic or foreigner.

In the addresses to the Elean, however, as well as in most other occurrences of ξέvre in Plato, no specific contextual motivation for the address can be found. Ξέvre seems rather to be used as a substitute for FN in addressing foreigners, and indeed this usage is also normal outside Plato. The contexts in which ξέvre is used range from Lysander's veiled threats to a Megarian (Plut. *Lys.* 22. 3), Leonidas' rebuke to a counsellor (Plut. *Lyc.* 20. 1), and Theopompus' retort to a stranger (Plut. *Lyc.* 20. 7) through many neutral statements to a friendly offer to a traveller (Lucian, *Herc.* 4) and Philoctetes' commiseration with the disguised Odysseus (Dio Chrys. 59. 11). The term is clearly a neutral one in most uses.

More than half the examples of ξέvre come from Plato's *Laws*, a dialogue which exemplifies several different rules of address usage. The three characters are all nameless at the beginning, but they are not complete strangers to one another. They come from three different city-states, Athens, Sparta, and Crete, and since the dialogue is set in Crete, Cleinias is a native and the other two are visitors. At first they all address each other as ξέvre, and the Athenian uses FTs as well. Eventually Cleinias and Megillus acquire names, and once they have been addressed by name they rarely receive ξέvre again. The Athenian, however, never acquires a name and continues to be addressed as ξέvre throughout the *Laws*.

The indisputable fact is that most of the occurrences of ξέvre in the *Laws* are spoken by Cleinias, but there are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. It could be a result of the tendency, strong elsewhere in Plato, for ξέvre to be used only by a native to a foreigner, although the *Laws* also contains a number of examples of ξέvre used by the other characters to Cleinias and to each other. On the other hand, Cleinias and the Athenian do most of the talking, and although

Cleinias can be addressed by name, the Athenian cannot. This inevitably means that Cleinias uses *ξένε* most often, but it does not prove anything about what the Spartan Megillus would have used if he had spoken more.

Perhaps indeed these two explanations are related. If Plato felt uncomfortable about the use of *ξένε* by someone who was not a native of the land in which it was spoken, this might be part of the reason why he had Cleinias address the Athenian (who could not easily be addressed except with *ξένε*) more often than Megillus did.¹³⁶ This might also explain why Cleinias is the first of the characters to acquire a name: because of a reluctance to call him *ξένε* in his own land.

The use of *ξένε* in other authors is not dissimilar to that in Plato, but in some cases it provides us with additional information. *Ξένε* is never used in any work whose primary subjects or setting are not Greek. Thus this address is entirely absent from Dionysius, Philo, Josephus, the Roman lives of Plutarch (but not the Greek), and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (but not the Socratic works). In those works where it is used, *ξένε* is usually spoken between two Greeks, but the term is also found between a Greek and a barbarian, or between two non-Greeks. Thus *ξένε* is used by a Persian to a Greek in Herodotus (9. 16. 4) and in Plutarch (*Lys.* 6. 6, *Them.* 27. 3); by Greeks to Persians, Egyptians, and Scythians in Plutarch (*Mor.* 220c, 151d, 150e); and between two non-Greeks in Herodotus (1. 45. 2, 7. 29. 1). It seems that the address *ξένε* expresses an essentially Greek idea which was not appropriate in a Roman or Jewish context. Authors like Dionysius and Plutarch thus could not use it for their Roman works, because it simply did not fit. In a Greek work like that of Herodotus, however, no distinctions were made between Greeks and barbarians in the use of *ξένε*.

Another factor influencing the use of *ξένε* was how well the speaker knew the addressee. *Ξένε* is very rarely used to a completely unknown person; usually the speaker knows something about him, if not his name, and often they have been conversing for a while. At the same time, however, *ξένε* is almost never used to people with whom the speaker is well acquainted, and not often to ones whose names he knows.

Although we have seen that *ξένε* is generally a neutral address, there are occasions on which it seems that the meaning 'guest-friend'

¹³⁶ It is also likely that Megillus speaks less than the other characters because he is a typically laconic Spartan. See Ritter (1896: on 626c).

predominates, making the address a friendly one. These situations are easy to identify, for in them the normal rules for the use of *ξένε* are often broken. Thus in Herodotus Croesus uses *ξείνε* to the refugee Adrastus when he forgives him for accidentally killing his son (1. 45. 2), although he has previously addressed him by name (1. 41. 1). In Dio's version of the Philoctetes story, Philoctetes has been talking to the disguised Odysseus for some time when he invites him to come in, and only then does he use the address *ξένε* (42. 11). Perhaps the most striking example of such violation of the normal rules occurs in Lucian's *Scytha* (4), where the Scythian Anacharsis, newly arrived in Athens and utterly bewildered by the strange environment, is surprised and delighted to meet Toxaris, another Scythian. Anacharsis addresses him as *ξένε*, which here clearly denotes some bond between the two Scythians rather than any difference of nationality.

In addition to being used alone, *ξένε* can be combined with an ethnic, particularly in Herodotus. It is also once used in the feminine, to Diotima (Plato, *Symp.* 204c). There is one occurrence of a diminutive of *ξένε*, *ξενύλλιον*. This address is probably derogatory and is used in an angry speech, but it is impossible to pinpoint the circumstances exactly since the addressee is unspecified (Plut. *Mor.* 229e).

The plural *ξένοι* is much less common than the singular. It is found primarily in Plato's *Laws*, addressed by the Athenian to the other two characters (both before and after their names are known). In Plutarch, Spartans use *ξένοι* to groups of strangers; both these uses are to be expected from the singular. *Ξένοι*, however, is never combined with an ethnic, for the ethnic alone or with *ἄνδρες* 'men', not *ξένοι*, is the usual way of addressing groups of foreigners.

The use of *ξένε* and *ξένοι* in poetry is similar to that in prose. There too the singular is much more common than the plural, and the address is used primarily to strangers whose names are not known; when used otherwise, it has the sense of 'guest-friend' (Wendel 1929: 94). According to Wendel, Odysseus is addressed as *ξείνε* by Eumaeus, Alcinous, Arete, and Nausicaa but does not use the term in return, a fact which indicates that in poetry, as in prose, *ξένε* is rarely used by a traveller to a native of the land in which he finds himself. Although *ξείνε*/*ξένε* is common in the *Odyssey* and tragedy, it is absent from the *Iliad* and very rare in comedy (Wendel 1929: 93-5). In poetic inscriptions on tombstones *ξένε* can be used (like *ὁδῖτα* or *παριών* 'traveller') as an address to an unknown reader (Peek 1955: Nos. 1214, 1232, 1236, etc.).

3.5.2 Ἄνθρωπε

A much more indefinite address than ξένε is ἄνθρωπε, which is also one of the most common singular addresses in our corpus. The term occurs in a very wide range of authors, but its status as one of the most frequent terms is due chiefly to Epictetus, who provides half of the examples. The referential meaning of ἄνθρωπος is 'man', 'human', but the conventional wisdom is that the vocative ἄνθρωπε is used 'frequently in a contemptuous sense, as when addressed to slaves' (LSJ, s.v. ἄνθρωπος; cf. Wackernagel 1912: 24). In the works surveyed, however, it cannot be inherently derogatory, for not only is it often used in neutral statements, but on some occasions the speeches in which it is found are definitely positive.

The primary use of ἄνθρωπε in these data is as a general term for vague, imaginary, or unspecified addressees. Thus it is not infrequently used in Plato for the interlocutors that Socrates invents, as ἀλλ' ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὅτι . . . εἵπομεν ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι σύ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε . . . (Plato, *Symp.* 200c) 'But whenever anyone says that . . . we can reply to him: "You, O man . . ."'. It is also used in relating anecdotes where the identity of one of the parties is irrelevant, particularly in Plutarch, as ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄγις ἐπὶ τὴν στραγγάλην πορευόμενος, ὡς εἶδέ τινα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν δακρύοντα καὶ περιπαθοῦντα, "Παῦσαί με," εἶπεν, "ὦ ἄνθρωπε, κλαίων . . ." (Plut. *Ag. & Cl.* 20. 1) 'Agis, on his way to his execution, saw one of the attendants weeping and being greatly distressed and said, "O man, cease weeping for me . . ."'. A similar usage is found in proverbs and inscriptions addressing whoever may happen to read them, as Cyrus' tombstone: 'ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ὅστις εἴ καὶ ὀπόθεν ἦκεις, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἤξεις οἶδα, ἐγὼ Κῦρός εἰμι ὁ Πέρσαις κτησάμενος τὴν ἀρχήν . . . (Plut. *Alex.* 69. 4) 'O man, whoever you are and wherever you come from—for I know that you will come—I am Cyrus who founded the Persian empire . . .'.
 This usage to unspecified addressees explains the high proportion of uses of ἄνθρωπε in Epictetus, for nearly all of the people whom Epictetus addresses are unspecified or imaginary. Thus one finds ἄνθρωπε not only in passages such as πάλιν ἂν τις παρελθὼν λέγῃ . . . ἢ πάλιν ἄλλος "μάθε παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἄνθρωπε, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται μαθεῖν . . ." (Epict. 2. 20. 4) 'Again, if someone coming says . . . or again if another [says] "Learn from me, O man, that nothing can be learned . . ."', but also in ordinary exchanges between Epictetus and his interlocutors, who are nameless. Indeed Epictetus uses ἄνθρωπε as Plato

might use a name. It is by no means the only address that can be used under these circumstances, as we shall see, but it is certainly the most common one.

When used in this way, *ἄνθρωπε* appears to be a neutral address in classical authors. In Plato two-thirds of the uses of *ἄνθρωπε* to an imaginary or unspecified addressee are neutral, and no classical prose authors except Plato ever use *ἄνθρωπε* in a negative statement to an unspecified addressee. Later authors such as Epictetus and Lucian, however, do use *ἄνθρωπε* negatively in such situations.

Although the cases discussed above comprise 70 per cent of the occurrences of *ἄνθρωπε*, there are still a substantial number of cases where *ἄνθρωπε* is used between definite characters who have names and an independent existence. Of these characters, however, nearly half do not know each other. This is a far higher per centage than that of unknown addressees in general in our sample, so it seems that *ἄνθρωπε* is particularly suited to addressing unknown people.

Addresses with *ἄνθρωπε* between people who do not know each other are generally neutral, as for example Croesus asking the refugee Adrastus what his name is (Hdt. 1. 35. 3) or Ganymede asking an unknown Zeus why he has changed his shape (Lucian, *Dial. D.* 10. 1). Some, however, are certainly negative, such as Marius' rebuke to the man sent to kill him (Plut. *Mar.* 39. 3), and some are very positive, such as Darius' dying thanks to the man who gave him water as he lay wounded (Plut. *Alex.* 43. 4). It thus seems probable that *ἄνθρωπε* when addressed to an unknown addressee is a neutral term of address.

This usage of *ἄνθρωπε* brings us to one of the most fundamental rules of the Greek address system, that of address by distinguishing characteristics. As we shall see (in Sect. 4.1), there is substantial evidence that in Greek it was virtually obligatory to use an address in some situations. We have observed that if the addressee's name is known to the speaker, he generally uses it in address, unless the addressee belongs to one of the categories of people whose names are avoided. If, however, the addressee's name is unknown, the address used as a neutral equivalent of FN is virtually always a reference to the addressee's single most distinguishing feature. The state of being an adult male native of the place in which the conversation takes place is considered to be unremarkable, but any deviations from that state are usable as addresses. Thus it is natural to call a woman *γύναι* 'woman', a child *παῖ* 'child', and a foreigner *ξένε*. If none of these distinctions

applies, an unknown man can sometimes be addressed by his occupation (see pp. 182-4). There remain, however, some addressees for whom none of these forms of address is available, because they have no distinguishing features of which the speaker is aware, and it is to these addressees that *ἄνθρωπε* is used. Failing all else, an addressee can be distinguished as a human being. The fact that *ἄνθρωπε*, which in its referential meaning applies to women and children as well as to men, is restricted in the vocative to adult men *when the addressee is specified* shows that it is a term which is used only in the absence of any distinguishing characteristic.

When *ἄνθρωπε* is used between people who know each other, however, the position is different. Here the context of *ἄνθρωπε* is usually negative, and often strongly negative. When it is not negative, there is often a special reason why we are not dealing with a normal interaction. Thus in Plato the one case of *ἄνθρωπε* used between real interlocutors is not part of a direct interaction between them but occurs in a hypothetical 'if I should say to you' situation: *ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεις, εἰ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε . . .* 'You would probably be vexed if I said to you: "O man . . ."' (Plato, *Grg.* 518c). Similarly Demosthenes uses *ἄνθρωπε* as an address to himself, but in a situation where he is pretending to be another person and questioning himself strictly (57. 67).

It also happens, although rarely, that *ἄνθρωπε* is used between people who know each other as an expression of amazement and surprise at the conduct of the addressee. It could be that the speaker is so surprised at the behaviour of the addressee that he addresses him as if he were a stranger, since he is acting like one. It could also be that the address is really an exclamation like German *Mensch!*, which has the same referential meaning.

The different uses of *ἄνθρωπε* can be explained as follows. Originally the term was one used in neutral addresses to completely unknown men with no obvious distinguishing features, a usage which arose from the referential meaning 'man, human'. As soon as *ἄνθρωπε* became established as an address for unknown people, it became possible to use it as an insult when speaking to known addressees. A term which implies that the addressee is unknown to the speaker can easily be insulting when applied to someone who is known, even if it is a neutral address in its proper context. In several of the examples of *ἄνθρωπε* used to a known person, the addressee has a very close connection to the speaker, such as being a close relative or a lover; this

may indicate that *ἄνθρωπε* was particularly useful as a way of wounding people for whom its implications of distance were especially inappropriate.

The usage of *ἄνθρωπε* as a neutral term to unspecified addressees could have arisen directly from the referential meaning of the word, but it is more likely to have come from the use to unknown addressees. Many of the situations in which it occurs, such as the conversations between Epictetus and his nameless, faceless interlocutors, would never have been possible in real life, and the usage is thus an essentially literary one. It is therefore likely to have been preceded by the use of *ἄνθρωπε* to a definite but unknown addressee, both in the history of the language and in the experience of each individual author. Once a term meaning 'human' was established as an address for people with no known distinguishing features, it would have been easy to transfer it to people who had no distinguishing features because they did not exist.

In some of the late authors surveyed *ἄνθρωπε* seems to have negative connotations even when used to unspecified addressees. It seems likely that this difference reflects a change in meaning which arose because in most contexts the usage as a negative address for known interlocutors was more common than the other uses.

In our corpus *ἄνθρωπε* is sometimes combined with adjectives, almost always insulting ones. These combinations are generally directed to specified, known addressees.

The usages of *ἄνθρωποι* 'humans' are similar to those of *ἄνθρωπε*, but the plural seems on occasion to have a closer connection to the referential meaning 'humans'. *Ἀνθρωποι* can be used to the human race in general by a philosopher. It can also be used to an unspecified group of addressees, like *ἄνθρωπε* to a single indefinite addressee, or to a group of imaginary addressees, particularly in Plato. On at least one occasion it is also used to a group of specified but unknown people. Unlike *ἄνθρωπε*, however, *ἄνθρωποι* can never be used to specified, known addressees, no matter how negative the context. The standard address for a group of known addressees is *ἄνδρες* 'men', not *ἄνθρωποι*, and if the speaker wishes to be insulting he must use an insult.

The usage of *ἄνθρωπε* and *ἄνθρωποι* in poetry is very similar to that in prose, except that unspecified addressees are rare in epic and drama. *Ἀνθρωπε* belongs primarily to comedy and does not seem to be a very elevated form of address. Aristophanes uses it in negative

statements to known people (*Pax* 474, *Ach.* 464, 1107, etc.), in polite or at least clearly non-negative addresses to unknown people (*Eq.* 786, *Ran.* 172, etc.), and in the meaning 'human' in addresses from gods or animals to men (*Pax* 719, *Av.* 540). In Menander usage is more restricted, so that *ἄνθρωπε* is almost always negative and directed towards known addressees.

3.5.3 *Οὗτος*

The address *οὗτος* 'this one'¹³⁷ is much less common than *ἄνθρωπε* in our data and almost never occurs in classical prose. As with *ἄνθρωπε*, the conventional wisdom is that *οὗτος* is somewhat negative or peremptory (Wackernagel 1912: 10 n.; Moorhouse 1982: 31), but it would be unwise of us to accept this judgement without further investigation. Given the lateness of most of our data for this word, however, a proper examination of the evidence will have to start with works outside the corpus, chiefly Aristophanes.

In Aristophanes, *οὗτος* is almost always used at the beginning of a short question or command, most commonly *τί ποιεῖς*; 'what are you doing?' (*Nub.* 723, *Ran.* 198, *Av.* 1164, *Pax* 682, *Eccl.* 372), *ποῖ θεῖς*; 'where are you rushing off to?' (*Vesp.* 854, *Thes.* 224, *Lys.* 728), *οὐ μὲν εἰς*; 'won't you wait?' (*Av.* 354, 1055, *Thes.* 689), or similar expressions. In most of these cases the speaker is trying to get the addressee's attention, and indeed *οὗτος* can also be used in Aristophanes as an attention-getting vocative standing entirely on its own. In such situations one character says *οὗτος*, to which the other replies *τί ἐστίν*; 'what is it?' to indicate that he is listening, and the first then proceeds with what he has to say (*Av.* 49, 225, *Pax* 268, *Ran.* 312). It is notable that *οὗτος* is almost always the first word in its sentence and that, in contrast to other vocatives in Aristophanes, it is virtually never accompanied by *ὦ*; this abruptness is another indication that the word was used primarily to get the addressee to turn around, rather like English 'hey!'

In English, 'hey' is not a very polite form of address, but at the same time it does not imply any ill will on the part of the speaker. A boy may

¹³⁷ It is generally agreed (cf. Wackernagel 1926-8: i. 306) that *οὗτος* is a nominative not a vocative. None the less, as stated in the Introduction, nominatives used as vocatives are included in this survey when they are indisputably used as vocatives; there is no separate vocative form for *οὗτος*, and if all words which did not have a separate vocative form were omitted, we would have to exclude *ἄνδρες*, which is the most common address in Greek prose.

say to his father, 'Hey Dad, can I have an ice-cream cone?' in a genuine attempt to get the thing requested; if his father objects, it will not be because he feels that his son has expressed any negative feelings towards him, but because he wishes that his son would not use the word 'hey' at all. If a teacher objects to her students saying 'hey' to her, she is unlikely to use the word to them either. To the extent that 'hey' is disrespectful, it is so not because it indicates that the addressee is the speaker's inferior, nor because it indicates any kind of negative emotions, but simply because it is so informal; it belongs to a low register of speech.

There is strong evidence that Greek οὗτος was in this respect very similar to 'hey'. It is one of the most common addresses in Aristophanes, who provides fifty-seven examples of its use, but other classical authors use οὗτος much more sparingly. It does not appear as an address at all in epic and is rare in tragedy, prose, and Menander (Wendel 1929: 115–16). This distribution suggests that οὗτος belonged to a low register of language. Within that register, however, it does not seem to have had any negative connotations: οὗτος does often occur in passages where the speaker is insulting the addressee or making fun of him, but as such passages are extremely common in Aristophanes this fact has very little significance. It is more noteworthy that the address is used just as often in situations where genuine ill will is very unlikely. Indeed, in some cases the attitude of the speaker towards the addressee is one of respect and/or affection (e.g. *Pax* 682, *Eq.* 240, 1354). Given these facts, it is difficult to accept the standard view that 'this phrase mostly implies anger, impatience, or scorn' (LSJ: s.v. οὗτος); it seems more likely that οὗτος, like 'hey', does not imply any negative emotions and is disrespectful only in that it is extremely informal.

Οὗτος in Aristophanes is not always used simply to get someone's attention; it can also be found in replies, such as ἀληθες οὗτος; 'is that so?' (*Vesp.* 1412, *Eq.* 89, *Av.* 1048). In these passages it could not be translated with English 'hey', but its meaning does not seem to differ from that in the passages we have already discussed.

The few Menandrian examples appear to follow the same pattern as the Aristophanic ones (*Dysk.* 750, *Samia* 312, 657, 675), but the most famous example of οὗτος as an address requires a bit more explanation. This occurs at the end of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, where the god says to Oedipus, ὦ οὗτος οὗτος, Οἰδίπους, τί μέλλομεν χωρεῖν; (1627–8) 'O this, this, Oedipus, why are we waiting to go?'

Interpretations of this passage vary,¹³⁸ but given the inclusion of the speaker in the verb μέλλομεν, it can hardly be harsh or censorious, though it may be impatient. It seems more likely that the informality of using οὗτος to get Oedipus' attention, in combination with the first-person verb, signals a certain lack of distance between speaker and addressee, and this is something which can only be complimentary in an address from a god to a mortal.

Having now established the meaning of the word in classical poetry, let us look at our data on prose usage. In classical prose there is only one example of οὗτος used as an address, which occurs at the beginning of Plato's *Symposium*: ὦ Φαληρεὺς . . . οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος (172a) 'O man from Phaleron . . . this Apollodorus'. Unfortunately interpretation of this passage depends on an understanding of Φαληρεὺς as well as οὗτος, and thus it will have to be discussed later (see pp. 176–7). In the works surveyed οὗτος is most frequently found in Lucian and Philo, who between them provide 90 per cent of the examples, and it is immediately clear that their usage is not the same as that of Aristophanes.

The first thing which strikes one about οὗτος in Lucian and Philo is that it rarely appears as the first word in a sentence and is almost always accompanied by ὦ, a situation precisely the opposite of that in Aristophanes. Οὗτος in prose is occasionally used in the type of short, attention-getting question we saw in Aristophanes (Lucian, *Cat.* 18, *VA* 27), but this usage is not the predominant one in Lucian and is not found at all in Philo; in both authors the address is much more likely to be embedded in longer statements.

In Philo, 90 per cent of the examples of οὗτος are used to imaginary or indefinite addressees, or (far less frequently) to the author or someone else by an unspecified speaker. This fact may have less to do with the meaning of οὗτος than with the nature of Philo's writings. His works are characterized by a large number of extremely indefinite vocatives, so that it is frequently difficult or impossible to work out whether he is addressing himself, the reader, or his characters. Indeed, Philo's addresses are often so vague, and his range of personifications so impressive, that it is not clear that the addressee is human at all. On some occasions it is certainly not human. Greek has relatively few

¹³⁸ See Stevens (1976: 37–8), Schöne (1909: on *Symp.* 172a), Jebb (1900a: ad loc.), Kirkwood (1958: 219), Wackernagel (1912: 10 n.).

addresses for unspecified addressees, and the most common of those, *ἄνθρωπε*, has a lexical meaning which makes it virtually unusable for non-human characters. Thus if Philo was to use addresses at all, *οὗτος* was probably the obvious choice.

Philo's usage presupposes significant changes in the meaning of *οὗτος* since the classical period. Although Philo's writing may not be the most elevated form of Greek known, it certainly does not belong to a register as low as that of Aristophanes, and the speeches in which *οὗτος* appears are no more informal than the rest of Philo's work. The large number of occurrences of *οὗτος* in Philo make it clear that the word no longer belonged to the exceptionally low register which it had occupied in the classical period. It seems to be essentially a neutral form of address with neither positive nor negative emotional overtones.

The situation in Lucian is naturally different from that in Philo, for unspecified addressees are rare in Lucian's works. There are a few occurrences of *οὗτος* between imaginary or unspecified people, but most of the examples are between more definite interlocutors. Lucian seems to use *οὗτος* in the same way as *ἄνθρωπε*, except that *οὗτος* is more flexible and admits of being used to groups and non-humans. We noted that *ἄνθρωπε* in Lucian seemed to have negative connotations even when used to unknown addressees, and the same is true of *οὗτος*, which appears to be slightly scornful. Like *ἄνθρωπε*, *οὗτος* can also be used to express astonishment at the addressee. As we have noted, however, Lucian does sometimes use *οὗτος* in a way very reminiscent of Aristophanes: *οὗτος, ποῖ φέρῃ;* (*Cat.* 18) 'Hey, where are you going?' Lucian's language does not on the whole belong to a low register, but it does contain a large element of imitation of classical authors, and it seems likely that his use of *οὗτος* is in some places borrowed directly from comedy.

The usage of *οὗτος* in prose authors other than Philo and Lucian, although much less frequent, tends to confirm the idea that *οὗτος* in later Greek functioned like *ἄνθρωπε*. All the examples are spoken to (or, in one case, by) unspecified or at least unnamed characters, and the term does not seem to be especially informal.

Οὗτος virtually always stands by itself as an address, both in prose and in Aristophanes; it is pure chance that the two most famous occurrences, the *Symposium* passage and that from the *Oedipus at Colonus*, are both atypical in having *οὗτος* modify a noun.

Οὗτος can in theory assume any of four forms: *οὗτος* (masculine

singular), αὐτῇ (feminine singular), οὗτοι (masculine plural), or αὐταί (feminine plural). All appear to function in the same way, except that αὐτῇ does not occur in prose; this is connected with the fact that οὗτος in prose seems to be very similar to ἄνθρωπε, which is not used to women. In Aristophanes, where οὗτος and ἄνθρωπε are clearly different, there are no such restrictions on the feminine, but the plural is very rare, probably because Aristophanes' plays contain relatively few passages in which one character tries to gain the attention of several people at once.

The problem of how a deictic pronoun like οὗτος became an address with the meaning it has is a difficult one. The question has been examined in detail by Svennung (1958: 208–12), who argues that the address arose through apposition. Our data do not shed any new light on this issue.

3.5.4 *Tān and μέλε*

A particularly obscure and problematic address is τᾶν, which occurs in Plato, Demosthenes, Plutarch, and Lucian. This term is always accompanied by ὦ, but for the sake of consistency within this work we shall refer to it as τᾶν rather than the ὦ τᾶν preferred by a number of other scholars. Τᾶν is only once combined, with a name. It has no lexical meaning, for it never occurs except in address, and its etymology is obscure. In prose the usage of τᾶν varies by author.¹³⁹

Demosthenes uses τᾶν only for situations in which the orator imagines what an opponent might be able to say against him (cf. Stevens 1976: 43). Thus in the third *Olynthiac* Demosthenes says in the midst of his criticisms of his opponent, ἀλλ', ὦ τᾶν, εἰ ταῦτα φαύλως, τά γ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει νῦν ἄμεινον ἔχει (29). Most translators feel it necessary to add the explanation of change of speaker which in the Greek is absent: "But, my good Sir," you say, "if we are badly off in these respects, we are at any rate better off at home" (Pickard-Cambridge 1906: 117). This addition is certainly correct.

In the Demosthenic corpus (including spuria) there are five passages like this one where the orator imagines an opponent using an address to him, and four of those addresses are τᾶν. The fifth (19.94) is ἄνθρωπε, a vocative which is often used in Demosthenes when one fictitious character addresses another. It is striking that none of these

¹³⁹ For the possibility that τᾶν may have been an address used by men more than women, see McClure (1995: 55) and Sommerstein (1995: 76 n. 45).

addresses is by FN, since that is the commonest type of singular address in Demosthenes and since, in Plato, Socrates' imaginary opponents often use FN to address him or other characters.¹⁴⁰ All we can conclude is that *τάν* had some force which made it more appropriate than FN for address by a hypothetical opponent to the orator.

The remaining Attic orators never use *τάν*, but they do not have any address situations parallel to those in which Demosthenes uses it. Andocides on three occasions describes someone as addressing him as *Ἀνδοκίδῃ* 'Andocides' (I. 49, I. 63, I. 101), but he is relating conversations which actually took place between specific people, rather than speculating about what an undefined 'someone' might say, and this difference is crucial in determining the address used. The other orators do not describe themselves as being addressed by anyone.

Plato's Socrates uses *τάν* only once, to Meletus in the *Apology* (25c). In this context *τάν* appears to be a FT, but the evidence is very limited. Elsewhere in Plato Socrates often imagines what a fictitious character might say to him, but he always uses names or FTs rather than *τάν* in those passages. *Τάν* also occurs in one of Plato's (spurious) letters to Dionysius of Syracuse, in the context of a firm rebuke (*Epist.* 3. 319e); it is notable that this is the only Platonic letter in which a FT occurs (*θαυμάσιε*, 318b).

Plutarch, who provides more than half the examples, definitely seems to use *τάν* as a FT. It almost always occurs between specified, existing interlocutors, and the context can range from friendly to negative. The usage in Lucian seems to be similar, although there are many fewer examples.

Thus, except in Demosthenes, *τάν* appears to function as a FT in the works surveyed. In poetry, *τάν* belongs primarily to comedy and is never found in Homer or Aeschylus; its meaning is disputed. Wendel says that it is usually friendly and can be used to addressees of higher status (1929: 116), and Dodds calls it 'polite and respectful' (1960: on 802), but other scholars maintain that it usually has 'some sense of superiority [of the speaker]'.¹⁴¹ Stevens sensibly acknowledges the existence of both possibilities: 'Ostensibly a polite form of address . . . but very often with a note of condescension or impatience' (1976: 42). This combination of meanings is the same we saw for FTs, and thus *τάν* probably functions as a FT.

Since all FTs have lexical meanings which are clearly positive, the

¹⁴⁰ *Crito* 44b, 50a ff., *Phd.* 60e, *Tht.* 158e, 203a, etc.

¹⁴¹ De Vries (1966: 226); cf. Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Dysk.* 247.

address usage of $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$ could shed some light on its etymology: it could well be derived from some word implying affection or admiration. Indeed, this view fits well with current opinion on the etymology of $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$. A recent article by Szemerényi suggests that $\acute{\omega} \tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$ came from the Doric vocative ($\acute{\omega} \epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$) of $\epsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ 'kinsman' and compares it with $\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon$.¹⁴² There are other possible derivations of $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$ as well,¹⁴³ but Szemerényi's is more convincing and fits the meaning of the address better than do the others.

The address $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon$ is common in Aristophanes but occurs only once in our data, in a context which tells us very little about its meaning (Plato, *Tht.* 178e). Like $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon$ has no lexical meaning and no secure etymology.¹⁴⁴ No meaningful evidence about its usage can be drawn from our survey.

3.5.5 Conclusion

The addresses in this chapter lack common parallels in modern English, but equivalents can be found in other languages. In terms of the forms used, $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\epsilon$ is paralleled in the Turkish *adam* 'human' (a Hebrew borrowing), which has a pejorative sense when used in address (Başoğlu 1987: 179, 183), and the Arabic address *bani aadam* 'human' (originally a plural), which is used for finding fault with someone 'to remind the addressee that he is not acting as a human being should' (Parkinson 1985: 197). $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ too finds a formal parallel in the Italian address *quello* and the Spanish *este* (Svennung 1958: 212).

One of the functions performed by $\xi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon$, $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\epsilon$, $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and to a certain extent $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$ was to provide an address for situations in which names were unknown or could not be used. These situations arise in many languages, and the terms used for them are varied. A study of these terms in European languages has defined them as

Die substantivische (d.h. nichtpronominale), höfliche, möglichst wenig charakterisierende, affektneutrale Anrede an erwachsene Personen, deren Namen, Beruf, genauere soziale Stellung usw. man nicht kennt, oder von

¹⁴² Szemerényi (1987: 576). Cf. scholia to Plato, *Apol.* 25c and Ar. *Plut.* 66. On $\epsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ see Gates (1971: 28–31).

¹⁴³ See Szemerényi (1987: 569–70), De Vries (1966: 225), Kretschmer (1909: 58), Björk (1950: 55, 275–7).

¹⁴⁴ For the one most often accepted, see Kretschmer (1915: 297) and scholia to Plato, *Tht.* 178e, Ar. *Eq.* 671.

deren Kenntnis man in der Anrede zumindest nichts erscheinen lassen will.¹⁴⁵ (Albrecht 1971: 362)

With the exception of one word, this definition could easily be applied to the addresses in this chapter. That word is *höfliche* 'polite', for although in European languages the addresses in this category are those like English 'sir' and French *monsieur*, both distinctly polite in other vocative uses and in referential meaning, in Greek *ἄνθρωπε* and *οὗτος* are not especially polite in any of their senses, and *ξένε* and *τάν* are much less strongly and consistently polite than 'sir' and *monsieur*. Why is it that in so many languages strangers are addressed with words which are polite when used to known people, while in Greek they are addressed with words which are often rude when used to known addressees? We have no answer to this question, but the issue will be raised again in the Conclusion (6.4).

3.6 TERMS OF PITY

καὶ ὡς πυρέσσοντί μοι συνάχθονται. "τάλας, ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου οὐ διέλειπες πυρέσσων." (Epict. 4. 6. 21)

and they condole with me as if I had a fever: 'Poor man, you have had a fever for such a long time.'

"ἐγὼ θέλω γινῶναι, τί λέγει Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Ψευδομένου." οὐκ ἀπάγξῃ μετὰ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ταύτης, τάλας; (Epict. 2. 17. 34)

'I want to know what Chrysippus says in his book *The Liar*.' Will you not go hang yourself if that is your goal, you wretch?

In both these passages from Epictetus the address *τάλας* is used, but in the first case it expresses sympathy and in the second scorn. This dual meaning is common among terms of pity in Greek.

Τάλας, which has a referential meaning of 'wretched' or 'miserable', is found only in Epictetus in the works surveyed. Half the time it is used in expressions of genuine or ironic sympathy or encouragement, as in the first quotation above, and half the time in scornful rebukes, as in the second quotation. The connection between the various usages seems to be as follows: *τάλας* is used to show pity or sympathy, and by extension to affect sympathy by way of mocking someone who Epictetus thinks does not really deserve sympathy,

¹⁴⁵ 'The substantival (i.e. not pronominal), polite, unemotional addresses which characterize the addressee as little as possible and are used for adults whose names, occupations, precise social standing, etc. one does not know, or at least does not wish to appear from one's address usage to know.'

Table 15. *Terms of pity*

Term	Sing.	Plural	Total
τάλας 'wretched, miserable'	10	—	10
τάλαινα 'wretched, miserable'	2	—	2
ταλαίπωρε 'suffering, miserable'	10	3	13
ἄθλιε 'unhappy, pitiful'	8	—	8
δύστηνε 'wretched, unfortunate'	4	—	4
σκέτλιε 'merciless, miserable'	2	4	6
σχετλιώτατε 'most merciless, most miserable'	3	—	3
τλήμον 'suffering, enduring, bold'	3	—	3
τλημονέστατε (superl. of above)	1	1	2
δυστυχές 'unfortunate'	1	1	2
δυστυχέστατε 'most unfortunate'	1	—	1
δείλαιε 'wretched'	1	—	1
TOTAL	46	9	55

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 286–7, for greater detail.

either because the woes he complains of are not very significant or because his problems are all his own fault. It then becomes possible to use *τάλας* to people who are not miserable because they do not know that they should be so, at which point it is hard to distinguish *τάλας* from ordinary insults. Nevertheless, the contexts suggest that *τάλας* does always carry with it the idea, whether sincere or ironic, that the addressee ought to be pitied, an idea which is by no means common to all insults. The feminine of *τάλας*, *τάλαινα*, is found in Plutarch and Lucian. In all occurrences the sympathy expressed is clearly genuine, but our sample is too small to be conclusive.

Τάλας and *τάλαινα* are not uncommon in poetry, where, however, the most common vocative from this stem is *τάλαν* (used to both men and women). In Homer these terms apparently mean 'insolent', but in tragedy *τάλαν* 'usually implies compassion or self-pity', as well as being usable in rebukes.¹⁴⁶ Aristophanes uses *τάλαν*, *τάλαινα*, and the superlative *ταλάντατε* more often than any other pity terms; they usually function as mild rebukes but are occasionally used in praise or agreement (*Eccl.* 242, *Lys.* 102). Menander employs *τάλαν* to express both genuine sympathy (*Epitr.* 466) and criticism (*Epitr.* 546). In

¹⁴⁶ Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 59); Wilson (1971: 294–300); Wendel (1929: 107–8).

Aristophanes, Menander, and some other poets *τάλαν* seems to be 'women's language'; that is, it is used primarily or exclusively by women (see 5.4.2).¹⁴⁷ In our data the masculine *τάλας* is often used by men, but both examples of *τάλαινα* are spoken by women.

Ταλαίπωρε is the most common vocative of pity in the works surveyed. Its referential meaning is 'suffering, distressed, miserable', but only once is it used as a genuine expression of sympathy. It is, however, sometimes used in an ironic mockery of sympathy to someone who really is in an indubitably pitiable state. In Plutarch *ταλαίπωρε* is often used, like *τάλας* in Epictetus, in a pitying rebuke to someone who does not know that his vices make him contemptible, but it can also be used in a straightforward rebuke to someone in a miserable condition. The occurrence in Demosthenes (18. 121) is addressed to an opponent who, it is implied, is using such flimsy arguments that he is to be despised and pitied for his incompetence. The plural *ταλαίπωροι* occurs only in Epictetus. It is used like *ταλαίπωρε* when the speaker is rebuking the addressees and showing that they should be pitied for their faults. The use of this term in poetry appears to be similar to that of *τάλαν*, except that there is no possibility of its being restricted to women speakers (Wendel 1929: 107). It does not appear in Aristophanes or Menander.

ἄθλιε has a referential meaning of 'struggling, unhappy, wretched, miserable, pitiful', and on a number of occasions the prose vocative usage is genuinely sympathetic. In those situations it is often combined with another word, as *τέκνον ἄθλιον* 'wretched child' (Lucian, *Luct.* 17; *Char.* 5. 10. 2). It is also possible, however, for *ἄθλιε* to imply the same combination of pity and scorn seen in *τάλας* and *ταλαίπωρε*; it may or may not be a coincidence that in our data it is never combined when so used. The similarity between *ἄθλιε* and *ταλαίπωρε* is demonstrated by Plutarch, who reports the same anecdote once with the address *ταλαίπωρε* (*Mor.* 525d), and once with *ἄθλιε* (*Mor.* 235e, possibly spurious), the context remaining basically unchanged. In Menander, *ἄθλιε* is common and is generally used as a simple insult (*Pk.* 390, etc.); in other poetry it is very rare as a form of address.

A less common address is *δύστηνε*. Its referential meaning is 'wretched, unhappy, unfortunate', but in our data it is only once used as a term of sympathy. On the other three occasions the address

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Sommerstein (1995: 68–70), McClure (1995: 45–8), Bain (1984: 33–5), Gomme and Sandbach (1973: on *Epitr.* 434), Wilson (1971: 295), Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 94), scholia to Plato, *Apol.* 25c and *Thet.* 178e.

expresses scorn, and an ordinary insult could be substituted for it without changing the sense. In Aristophanes *δύστηνε* is normally contemptuous, but on one occasion (*Lys.* 959) it expresses pity. In most cases, however, it is probable that the negative usage at least arose from an implication that the addressee was pitiable, and in epic and tragedy *δύστηνε* generally indicates real sympathy (Wendel 1929: 107; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 46).

The term *σχέτλιε* is difficult to evaluate, for it is unclear whether it belongs with the terms of pity at all or whether it should be classified as an insult.¹⁴⁸ *Σχέτλιε* itself occurs only twice in our data, but there are also examples of *σχετλιώτατε* and *σχέτλιοι*. In referential usage *σχέτλιος* has a wide range of meanings, including 'unflinching', 'merciless', and 'miserable', and in the vocative it is not always easy to see which meanings apply. It is also possible that there is some evolution over time in the usage of this term, for it has been claimed that in referential usage *σχέτλιος* developed the meaning 'miserable' relatively late in its history (Wilson 1971: 293-4; cf. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 46-8, 76).

The clearest evidence in our data for a meaning 'miserable' comes from Dionysius, where *σχέτλιοι* is used several times in urging a mob to remember how it has been wronged; although there are some overtones of a rebuke to the addressees for not having acted sooner in their own defence, the primary sense is a recognition of their wrongs. The opposite extreme is found in Plutarch, where *σχετλιώτατε* (superlative) functions as a pure insult without any discernible trace of pity, and in Lysias, where *σχετλιώτατε πάντων* could be translated as either 'merciless' or 'stubborn', but certainly not 'miserable'. The address is negative in Aristophanes (*Ran.* 116, 1476, *Ach.* 360), but the exact connotations are difficult to determine.

The address *τλήμον* and its superlative *τλημονέστατε* are also ambiguous in meaning. In Homer the referential meaning of these terms is 'stalwart, daring', but from the fifth century the dominant meaning was 'miserable, wretched' (Wilson 1971: 292). In our data *τλήμον* occurs only in Xenophon and Chariton and is used negatively; *τλημονέστατε* occurs only in Josephus and is used positively.

Δυστυχές 'unfortunate', *δυστυχέστατε* 'most unfortunate', and *δείλαιε* 'wretched' occur in our data only in the novelists Achilles Tatius and Chariton. All three of these words are used to express pity rather than scorn, but this fact may not tell us much about their

¹⁴⁸ Wendel (1929: 107) classifies it as a term of pity.

meaning outside these authors, since all the terms of pity found in the novelists are used in positive rather than negative contexts.

Thus virtually all the Greek addresses which are used to express pity and sympathy can also be used as reproaches. Although English 'wretched' has two meanings very similar to those of the Greek terms under discussion, there are terms in English which are clearly sympathetic. The address 'Poor Jane' can be used sarcastically, but it cannot be a straightforward rebuke. Does the absence of such addresses in Greek imply that in the culture which produced these addresses someone who deserved pity also inevitably deserved scorn and contempt?¹⁴⁹

3.7 INSULTS

ὦ χρηστέ, ἵνα μηδὲν ἄλλ' εἶπω . . . (Dem. 18. 318)

My good man, to call you nothing worse . . .

ὦ—τί ἂν εἰπὼν σέ τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι; (Dem. 18. 22)

O—how could one address you rightly?

In these passages from Demosthenes' *De Corona*, the orator makes a point of avoiding the use of insults. Many speakers were not so careful, however, and insults and derogatory terms were a fairly common type of address in the works surveyed. This is fortunate for us, because insults appear to be a segment of language particularly subject to social variation. In English, for example, there are insults which some people use freely and others would never utter under any circumstances. In between are people who use these words only when seriously angry; this is clearly an example of register variation.

The topic of Greek insults is not, however, one ideally suited to being treated as part of a larger study of forms of address. Insults often occur in cases other than the vocative, and in non-literary contexts such as graffiti; at least for late Greek, such evidence undoubtedly gives a much better picture of insults in conversational usage than does our data. Nevertheless it is not possible to conduct a full study of Greek insults within the confines of the present work, because such a study would rapidly become a book in itself. As a

¹⁴⁹ It must be admitted that Aristotle does not mention any such connection between scorn and pity in his discussion of pity (*Rh.* 1385^b), but this omission could simply be due to the fact that the connection is irrelevant to the point Aristotle was making.

result, we shall discuss only the contributions our data can make to the understanding of Greek insults, in the hope that this information will be useful until a more complete work on the subject appears.¹⁵⁰

The classification of insults is a complex question and not one confined exclusively to register issues. Insults are often classified by their lexical meanings, and such a method can produce interesting results, but it is not one which will be particularly useful to an inquiry like ours concerned primarily with social meaning. The social meaning of an insult, like that of any other form of address, is not determined by its lexical meaning; this is evident both from the fact that some words with offensive lexical meanings are not insults when used as terms of address (e.g. Icelandic *rassgat* (Braun 1988: 254), which means 'anus' but functions as a term of endearment) and from the fact that the same address can have different social meanings in different cultures which share the same language (e.g. the difference in the offensiveness of calling someone a 'bloody fool' in Britain and America). It is very often the case that words with certain types of lexical meaning are more likely to become insults, or more likely to become particularly offensive insults, than are other words, but such rules are not absolute and cannot be relied upon by themselves when we are trying to determine the social meaning of a particular word.

Lexical meaning is also completely unconnected with register, for one of the most obvious examples of register differences is the use of different words in different registers to designate the same things, such as parts of the body.

Social meaning and register are certainly connected, for the register to which a word belongs forms part of its social meaning. Nevertheless there are other aspects to social meaning as well, such as offensiveness. An insult from a low register may always be particularly offensive when used in a context where a higher register of language is expected, but that does not mean that it is not possible to be extremely offensive while remaining entirely in a high register. Indeed, there exist a number of books with titles like *Shakespeare's Insults: Educating your Wit* (Hill and Ötchen 1991) or *Honourable Insults: A Century of Political Invective* (Knight 1990) which provide examples of particularly crushing high-register insults and often argue that such terms can be far more effective than anything from a low register. In dealing with

¹⁵⁰ For linguistic work on insults in other languages, see Hughes (1991), Delumeau (1989), Kiener (1983), Ruwet (1982), Huston (1980), Milner (1978).

Greek insults, therefore, we shall not be able to assume that offensiveness and register are necessarily linked.

Nor is it possible to assume that the social meaning of an insult remains permanently fixed, either with respect to offensiveness or with respect to register. Shakespeare's insults all belong to a high register today, because they are Shakespearian, but in Shakespeare's own time there were significant differences among the different terms.

3.7.1 Classical insults

The most common insult in the works surveyed is *μιαρέ/μιαρώτατε* 'foul, defiled', which occurs in authors of all periods. This word is also the most common insult in Aristophanes, where it occurs thirty-three times, but is never found in Menander and only once in tragedy. This distribution suggests strongly that *μιαρέ* in the classical period belonged to a low register of speech. It also seems to have been one of the more offensive terms, for forms of *μιαρέ* can be the climax of a series of insults in Aristophanes, as *Ran.* 465-6 ὦ βδελυρὲ κἀναίσχυντε καὶ τολμηρὲ σὺ καὶ μιαρὲ καὶ παμμίαρε καὶ μιαρώτατε 'O disgusting and shameless and foul and entirely foul and foulest' (cf. *Pax* 182-3). In classical prose *μιαρέ* is found in Plato and the orators; in the orators it is a serious insult, but in Plato it is used only by Socrates in an ironic, joking way to people whom he does not actually want to offend. This evidence fits with the conclusion that *μιαρέ* was a low-register insult in classical Attic: the orators used it when they were willing to descend to a lower register for effect, Plato used it only as a joke but never in earnest, and no other classical prose author was willing to use it at all.

Another common prose insult is *κακέ* 'bad', which virtually always appears in the superlative form *κάκιστε*. This term is much rarer than *μιαρέ* in Aristophanes, where it is only used in combination with other words, but it does occur in Menander (*Samia* 492), and there the character who speaks it would be expected to use high-register language. It is the most common insult in tragedy (Wendel 1929: 22). This evidence suggests strongly that *κάκιστε* belonged to a higher register of language than did *μιαρέ*. In prose it is used by Herodotus, Xenophon, and Demosthenes; it is certainly a strong insult and tends to be used by characters who are furiously angry, but all the speakers are of fairly high status, and there is no suggestion that they might be descending to a lower register.

Another common insult, *κακόδαιμον* 'possessed by an evil genius', appears to belong to a middle register. It is frequent in Menander, where it is used both by characters who ought to use high-register language and by those who could be expected to use lower registers. In Aristophanes this word is one of the most common insults and is used by every type of character, from slaves to Aeschylus in the *Frogs* (1058). *Κακόδαιμον* is not a particularly offensive insult; in poetry it is sometimes used as a term of pity (e.g. Ar. *Pax* 113), and it often occurs in milder contexts than those in which *μιαρέ* and *κάκιστε* are found.

Another term which is not very offensive is *πόνηρε* 'bad, worthless'. This term is often used where no real ill will is apparent (e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 731), and it has been argued that it is used only between social equals in conversation.¹⁵¹ *Πόνηρε* seems to belong to a low register, because it is very common in Aristophanes but completely absent from classical prose and tragedy and because almost all of the characters in Menander who use it are of low social status.

On the basis of considerations like these it is possible to divide most of the classical insults occurring in our corpus according to register. Of course a simple opposition of 'high' and 'low' registers is a very crude distinction, and more subtle gradations undoubtedly existed, but our evidence is not sufficient to reconstruct them. The results of these divisions are presented in Tables 16, 17, and 18, with the number of occurrences in different authors. It should, however, be remembered that the figures by themselves provide only part of the evidence for classification; the contexts in which an insult occurs are also very important. Thus *μῶρε* and *μοχθηρέ*, low-register insults, both occur in Plato, but only as examples of what a slave might say or of what a true musician would *not* say (*Laws* 857d, *Phdr.* 268e). *Νήπιε*, a high-register insult, does occur in Aristophanes, but only in a parody of elevated, religious language (*Pax* 1063).

In the tables that follow, the statistics on prose and comedy come from my own research, but those on tragedy are taken from Wendel. If the only occurrence of a term in a particular author or genre is in a different form from that given in the table (e.g. *κατάρατε* in Menander only appears as *τρισκατάρατε*), this is indicated by parentheses.

¹⁵¹ Griffith (1968); his conclusions are meant to apply not to the word *πόνηρε* *per se*, but to 'expressions of the type (ὦ) πονηρὲ σύ' (1968: 8). It is, however, difficult to know exactly what this group includes, since it is never clearly defined (it cannot include all insults, since Griffith finds only 25 examples in Aristophanes and Menander together). In my view the results are in any case suspect because some of his criteria are dubious (e.g. counting gods as the social equals of humans).

Insults which do not occur at all in classical prose but were none the less in use in the classical period are included in these tables if they occur in later prose, but all terms which occur only once are omitted.

These figures reveal certain tendencies of individual authors. Herodotus and Thucydides use only terms belonging to the higher register, and the same is true of Xenophon, except for one quotation of Socrates using an insult as a joke (*Mem.* 1. 3. 13). In Plato Socrates' joking insults are all drawn from the lower register. Demosthenes uses both registers freely, but the other orators provide too few insults for us to know what their tendencies were. Menander tends to have characters of higher social level use higher-register insults and those of lower level use lower insults, although there are exceptions to this rule; Aristophanes generally uses the lower register but can also employ other levels for comic effect. Of the tragedians only Sophocles uses insults from the low register.

At a later period, the difference in register among the classical insults seems to have disappeared.¹⁵² Most of the late authors use insults from both high and low registers freely and intermingle them without difficulty, even in works which were probably not intended to sound low or vulgar. Thus for example in Lucian's *Iuppiter Tragoedus*, the characters Timocles and Damis have a fierce argument in which Timocles loses his self-control and utters a large number of insults. These include *ιερόσυλε* 'sacrilegious' (35) and *θεοῖς ἐχθρέ* 'enemy to the gods' (43), both originally high register, and *μιαρέ* 'foul' (35, 52) and *ἀναισχυντότατε* 'most shameless' (52), both originally low register, as well as several terms which are more difficult to classify. It is unlikely that these insults were still in normal use in Lucian's day; some of the words used by Timocles, such as *ἀλιτήριε* (44), were probably obsolete in all cases, not merely the vocative.

The attitude of Lucian's contemporaries to classical insults can be seen from the fact that Suetonius compiled a glossary of obsolete insults, *Περὶ βλασφημιῶν καὶ πόθεν ἐκάστη* 'Concerning Insults, and the Origins of each one' (Taillardat 1967: 48–63). Although in its present form this work does not contain many of the insults used in our data, the existence of the treatise does show how much Lucian's attitude towards classical Greek insults may have resembled the modern attitude to Shakespearian words. In both cases distinctions of register between one insult and another have been lost as all the

¹⁵² On the use of classical insults in late Greek see also Schwartz (1967: 546–8).

Table 16. *High-register insults*

Term	Classical prose				Later prose	Classical poetry*		
	Hdt. and Thuc.	Plato	Xen.	Orators	Total	Ar.	Men.	Tragedy
ἀνόσιε, -ώτατε 'unholy'	1	—	—	—	1	3	—	—
βάρβαρε 'barbarous'	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1
θεοὺς ἐχθρὲ 'enemy to the gods'	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	(1)
ἱερόσυλε 'sacrilegious'	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
κάθαρμα 'refuse, offscourings'	—	—	—	1	1	7	1	—
κακέ, -ιστε 'bad'	3	—	1	1	5	19	1	22
κακὴ κεφαλὴ 'bad head'	1	—	—	1	2	7	—	—
κίναδος 'fox, rogue'	—	—	—	3	3	1	—	—
μάταιε 'empty, in vain'	1	—	—	1	2	12	1	6
νήπιε 'foolish'	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—†

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 287–92, for references for prose insults.

* References: ἀνόσιε: Men. *Dysk.* 108, 469, 595; βάρβαρε: Eur. *Andr.* 261, Men. *Samia* 519; θεοὺς ἐχθρὲ: Soph. *Phil.* 1031, Ar. *Lys.* 371, *Ran.* 936; ἱερόσυλε: Men. *Aspis* 227, *Dysk.* 640, *Epir.* 935, 952, 1064, 1100, 1122, *Pk.* 366, *Samia* 678; κάθαρμα: Men. *Samia* 481, Ar. *Plut.* 454; κακίστε: Soph. *OC* 866, 1354, Eur. *Andr.* 719, *Hec.* 577, etc., Men. *Samia* 492, Ar. *Av.* 366, *Vesp.* 448; μάταιε: Aesch. *PV* 999, Eur. *Med.* 152, 333, etc., Ar. *Vesp.* 338; νήπιε: Ar. *Pax* 1063.

† Although it does not occur in tragedy, νήπιε is not uncommon in Homer: *Il.* 16. 833, 18. 295, 21. 99, etc.

Table 17. *Low-register insults*

Term	Classical prose			Later prose	Classical poetry*		
	Hdt. and Thuc.	Plato	Xen. Orators		Ar.	Men.	Tragedy
ἀναίσχυντε, -ότατε 'shameless'	—	—	—	1	5	—	—
ἀνόητε 'fool, silly'	—	—	—	6	3	—	—
βδελυρέ 'disgusting'	—	—	1	—	4	—	—
δειλέ, -ότατε 'coward'	—	—	—	1	4	—	—†
ἐμβρόντητε 'stupefied'	—	—	1	1	1	1	—
ἐπίτριπτε 'damned'	—	—	1	1	2	—	—
θηρίον 'beast'	—	—	2	1	2	1	—
καταγέλαστε 'ridiculous'	—	2	—	4	3	—	—
κατάπυγον 'lewd'	—	—	—	1	2	—	—
μιαρέ, -ώτατε 'foul, defiled'	—	4	5	19	33	—	1
μοχθηρέ 'bad, wretched'	—	1	—	4	3	—	—
μῶρε/μωρέ 'dull, stupid'	—	1	1	7	5	—	2
πόνηρε/πονηρέ 'bad, worthless'	—	—	—	6	22	5	—
τολμηρέ 'audacious'	—	—	—	4	3	—	—

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 287–92, for references for prose insults.

* References: ἀναίσχυντε: Ar. *Thes.* 638, 744, *Pax* 182, *Ran.* 465, *Nub.* 1380; ἀνόητε: Ar. *Ran.* 734, *Nub.* 858, *Vesp.* 252; βδελυρέ: Ar. *Eccl.* 1043, *Plut.* 1069, *Ran.* 465, *Eq.* 303; δειλέ: Ar. *Plut.* 123, 439, *Av.* 87, *Ran.* 486; ἐμβρόντητε: Men. *Dysk.* 441, Ar. *Eccl.* 793; ἐπίτριπτε: Ar. *Pax* 1236, *Ach.* 557, *Therion*: Men. *Pk.* 366, Ar. *Av.* 87, *Vesp.* 448; καταγέλαστε: Ar. *Lys.* 751, 907, *Ran.* 480; κατάπυγον: Ar. *Lys.* 137, *Thes.* 200; μιαρέ: Soph. *Ant.* 746 (NB also *Ichn.* 191), Ar. *Pax* 182, *Av.* 1209, *Ran.* 465, etc.; μοχθηρέ: Ar. *Plut.* 391, *Ran.* 1175, *Ach.* 165; μῶρε: Soph. *El.* 1326, OC 592, Ar. *Av.* 1238 (*bis*), *Eq.* 162, 350, *Nub.* 398; πόνηρε: Men. *Dysk.* 587, *Epir.* 373, *Herod.* 6, *Pk.* 390, *Sik.* 150, Ar. *Pax* 384, *Av.* 3, 1648, etc. (NB also Soph. *Ichn.* 374, 392); τολμηρέ: Ar. *Pax* 182, 362, *Ran.* 465.

† The phrase ἀ δειλέ occurs several times in Homer (*Od.* 14. 361, 21. 288, etc.), but there the usage is very different from in prose; the term is not necessarily insulting at all.

Table 18. *Insults not obviously belonging to either the high or the low register*

Term	Classical prose			Later prose	Classical poetry*	
	Hdt. and Thuc.	Plato	Xen. Orators Total		Ar.	Men. Tragedy
ἀδικοι, -ώτατε 'unjust'	—	—	1	3	—	—
ἀβέλτεροι 'silly'	—	—	—	1	—	1
ἀλιτῆριε 'guilty'	—	—	1	3	—	—
ἀνδρόγυνε 'androgynous'	—	—	—	2	—	1
γελοῖε 'absurd'	—	—	—	2	—	1
εὐηθέστατε 'most simple-minded'	—	1	—	1	—	—
κακόδαιμον 'possessed by an evil genius'	—	1	—	12	23	6
κατάρατε 'accursed'	—	—	5	10	3	(1)
μαστιγία 'whipped'	—	—	—	1	2	5
συκοφάντα 'informers'	—	—	2	2	—	—
φauλότητα 'cheapest, worst'	—	—	2	1	—	—

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 287–92, for references for prose insults.

* References: ἀβέλτεροι: Men. *Epir.* 450; ἀνδρόγυνε: Men. *Samia* 69; γελοῖε: Men. *Georg.* fr. 4; κακόδαιμον: Men. *Aspis* 410, 505, *Kolax* 8, *Mis.* A88, 312, *Pk.* 373, Ar. *Pax* 364, Ar. *Pax* 364, Ar. 672, *Ran.* 1058, etc.; κατάρατε: Eur. *Hec.* 716, 1064, Men. *Epir.* 1080, Ar. *Lys.* 530, 588, *Pax* 1076b; μαστιγία Men. *Dysk.* 473, *Kolax* 125, *Pk.* 324, *Samia* 324, *Epir.* 1113, Ar. *Lys.* 1240, *Eq.* 1228.

insults concerned vanished from the language spoken by less educated members of society; an archaic and purely literary form always belongs to a high register.

Not all late Greek authors, however, felt the need to display their erudition by using archaic insults. One who did not is Epictetus, in whose works classical insults rarely occur, although post-classical abusive language is common. It is thus notable that one classical insult, *μῶρε* 'stupid', occurs five times in Epictetus. Sometimes Epictetus uses classical addresses when putting words into the mouth of a historical or literary character; thus he has Diogenes say *κακαὶ κεφαλαί* 'bad heads' (3. 22. 58), which is a very high-register classical insult (and thus one which Diogenes himself would almost certainly not have used). But all five examples of *μῶρε* are spoken by Epictetus himself, rather than put into someone else's mouth, and it seems from this that *μῶρε* may be an insult which was still part of current non-literary language in Epictetus' day. This hypothesis is the more likely as the address *μῶρε* survives into modern Greek, although it is no longer an insult (Shipp 1979: 398).

3.7.2 Post-classical insults

Many of the insults which appear in later prose were not in use in the classical period at all. This is inevitably the case with unique insults,

Table 19. *Post-classical insults*

Term	Occurrences
<i>ἀνδράποδον</i> 'captive, slave'	21
<i>ἄπιστε</i> 'untrustworthy'	3
<i>ἀσεβέστατε</i> 'most impious'	5
<i>ἀχάριστε</i> 'ungracious'	3
<i>βάσκανε</i> 'sorcerer, slanderer'	3
<i>ἐπίβουλον</i> 'treacherous'	2
<i>κενοὶ φρενῶν</i> 'empty of mind'	3
<i>σιδήρειε</i> 'made of iron'	2

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 287–92, for greater detail.

* This term does occur in Homer, *Il.* 24. 63.

† The term *σιδηροί* does occur once in classical prose, in Aeschines (*Ktes.* 166), but there it does not function as an insult.

those invented to suit a specific situation, but there are also some terms which occur repeatedly in later authors. Most of these are not very common, and a few are confined to one author, as *κενοὶ φρενῶν* to Philo; they may thus reflect the idiosyncrasies of a writer rather than the state of the Greek language in his time. The more common post-classical insults are listed in Table 19, and terms which occur only once may be found in Appendix B.

There is one post-classical insult which is markedly more common than the others, *ἀνδράποδον* 'captive, slave'. This term is frequently employed by Epictetus, whose language is certainly not elevated, and is not uncommon in Plutarch. It is a very strong insult. It is notable that those late authors in our corpus who wrote particularly classicizing Greek do not ever use the insult *ἀνδράποδον*, although Lucian once employs a variant of it, *ἀνδραποδωδέστατε* 'most slavish'. This avoidance suggests that *ἀνδράποδον* was probably neither elegant nor literary in the first and second centuries AD.

3.8 ETHNICS

ἐνθα δὴ ὁ Τιγράνης ἐπήρετο τὴν γυναῖκα· Ἡ καὶ σοί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρμενία, καλὸς ἐδόκει ὁ Κύρος εἶναι; Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἐκείνον ἐθεώμην. Ἀλλὰ τίνα μήν; ἔφη ὁ Τιγράνης. Τὸν εἰπόντα νῆ Δία ὡς τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἂν πρίατο ὥστε μὴ με δουλεύειν. (Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 41)

Then Tigranes asked his wife, 'O Armenian', he said, 'did Cyrus seem handsome to you as he does to others?' 'By Zeus', she said, 'I was not looking at him.' 'Then who were you looking at?' said Tigranes. 'By Zeus, the one who said that he would save me from slavery even at the price of his own life.'

In Xenophon's description of the reunion between the Armenian prince Tigranes and his beloved wife whom Cyrus had captured, the prince addresses his wife with the ethnic *Ἀρμενία* 'Armenian'. This is clearly an affectionate interchange, and yet in Attic singular ethnics used as vocatives could characterize the addressees as slaves (Schulze 1896: 242; cf. Hirzel 1918: 62). What then is the meaning of this address?

In order to examine the usage of the singular ethnic we must separate it from the plural ethnic (discussed in Sect. 3.9), which is much more common and is a standard neutral address for groups of men of any nationality. A singular ethnic can occur in the vocative either as a substantive or as an adjective modifying *ξένη/ξείνη*

'stranger'. In the latter case it does not seem to alter the usage of the address *ξένη* and has no perceptible significance of its own. In the former case, however, the ethnic does have a meaning, even if it is not obvious exactly what that meaning is.

Table 20. *Singular ethnics, omitting those with ξένη*

Author	Used to general or ruler	Used to ordinary citizen	Used to slave or servant	Other	Total
Herodotus	2	—	—	—	2
Plato	—	1	—	—	1
Xenophon	12	5	4	1	22
Plutarch	1	7	—	—	8
Lucian	2	4	1	2	9
TOTAL	17	17	5	3	42

Note: See Appendix B, p. 293, for greater detail.

In the classical works surveyed, more than half of the substantial singular ethnics are addressed to rulers. These addresses are often used in hostile or threatening contexts, as by an enemy king to Darius (Hdt. 4. 127. 1) or by a hostile apparition to Xerxes (Hdt. 7. 12. 2).¹⁵³ They are also used by more powerful to less powerful monarchs, as neutral or even friendly addresses. Thus Xenophon's Cyrus uses a singular ethnic both to praise his trusted follower the Hyrcanian king (Cyr. 4. 5. 23) and to question the Armenian king at his trial (Cyr. 3. 1. 9, etc.). Kings certainly do not constitute a majority of all addressees in classical authors, and the preponderance of ethnics addressed to them cannot be accidental. It may be connected with the fact that insults are almost never used to rulers.

In classical prose, ethnics could also be used to servants, as the entertainer in Xenophon's *Symposium* (Συρακόσιε 'Syracusan', 2. 16, etc.) or Astyages' cupbearer (Σάκα 'Sacian', Cyr. 1. 3. 9). This usage was, however, much less common than that to kings. Outside the works surveyed, it is possible to see that the ethnics used to slaves often functioned as their names, in both referential and vocative usage:

¹⁵³ This usage has been paralleled in modern times by the referential use of 'the Corsican' for Napoleon in places where he was hated—see Hirzel (1918: 61–2).

these ethnics appear as their names even on inscriptions, making it likely that they had no other names.¹⁵⁴ There was no necessary connection between a slave's nationality and the ethnic used as his name, for ethnics like Θραξ 'Thracian' and Δάος 'Dacian' became standard slave names (Lambertz 1907: 10).

In classical authors few addressees of a status between that of kings and servants received ethnics. In later authors, however, such usage is more frequent. In Plutarch singular ethnics are never used to monarchs, and rarely addressed to people whose status is obviously lower than the speaker's. Instead ethnics are used for insulting or rebuking people of ordinary status. In Lucian ethnics can be used to servants (*Lex.* 3) or in negative statements to people of ordinary or even high rank.

What is the connection between these different uses? Probably the singular ethnic indicates relative status: the speaker implies that he is socially superior to the addressee. When used by a social superior, then, the address is not at all insulting and can be used even in praise. When used to equals, however, an ethnic is rude.

The usage in poetry generally supports this interpretation. Singular ethnics are common only in comedy, where they are generally used for slaves and function as names. In Homer it is noteworthy that Polyphemus is regularly addressed as Κύκλωψ 'Cyclops' but that no one is ever addressed as Ἀχαιέ 'Achaean', Ἀργεῖε 'Argive', Δαναέ 'Danaan', Τρώς 'Trojan', or Δάρδανε 'Dardanian' (Wendel 1929: 71-2; Wackernagel 1912: 24).

We are now in a position to consider the address ὦ Φαληρεὺς . . . οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος 'O Phalerian . . . this Apollodorus' (Plato, *Symp.* 172a). The narrator Apollodorus comments on it, saying that the speaker was being playful (παίζων), but the exact nature of the joke is not clear to modern ears. Dover thinks it may consist in feigned urgency shown by οὗτος (1980: ad loc.), Schöne suspects it consists in feigned solemnity carried by Φαληρεὺς (1909: ad loc.), and Bury would prefer to emend away the name, to give an address where the speaker pretended not to know the addressee (1909: ad loc.). Since ethnics spoken by people of ordinary status are generally directed towards servants and/or attached to hostile statements, it seems to me that the joking effect of this address probably lies in the apparent rudeness of Φαληρεὺς. Οὗτος is not in itself rude, but it belongs to a

¹⁵⁴ See Strabo 7. 3. 12, Garlan (1988: 23), Masson (1972: 13, 19), and Lambertz (1907: 10-18).

low register, the use of which is unexpected in Plato, and thus it probably provided something of an additional shock to accompany the rudeness of the ethnic. The unusual form of this address (in prose, neither οὗτος nor ethnics are elsewhere used in combination with names) is probably due to the need to include a name to show who is being addressed. The passage should thus be translated, 'Hey you! Phalerian! Apollodorus!'

Against this interpretation it could be argued that 'Phalerian' was not an ethnic but a demotic (Phaleron was a subdivision of one of the Athenian demes), and that demotics were used to identify Athenians in formal contexts. Yet I know of no occasion on which demotics were used in *address*, and even in reference they did not normally stand alone, with the name of the individual concerned attached almost incidentally several words later. In this passage Φαληρεύς, although technically a demotic, is functioning like an ethnic, and its connotations are insulting.

So why does Tigranes address his wife as Ἀρμενία? This address cannot be an insult, and moreover, the use in address of an ethnic which could also be applied to the speaker is otherwise unparalleled. Two possibilities exist. Perhaps Ἀρμενία is actually the princess's name, for no other name for her is given, and the name Ἀρμένιος is attested in Plato (*Rep.* 614b). Alternatively, this passage too might contain a joke; if so, it is unlikely to be a feigned insult, since that would not fit very well with a reunion between a devoted couple. But since Tigranes is virtually a monarch himself, he could be following the regal practice of using ethnics to address subordinate rulers. In that case, since his wife had just passed from the status of a prisoner to that of a princess, Tigranes could be affectionately reminding her of the rank to which she had just been restored. The affectionate and joking tone of his address could be distinguished from the derogatory usage of the term to servants because he too was an Armenian.

3.9 OCCUPATIONAL AND GROUP ADDRESSES

ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὕμᾱς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—
θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. (Plato, *Apol.* 40a)

For to me, jurymen—for in calling *you* jurymen I may address you rightly—an amazing thing has happened.

In addressing the jury, Socrates in Plato's *Apology* uses three different vocatives: *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* 'Athenian men', *ἄνδρες* 'men', and *ἄνδρες δικάσται* 'jurymen'.¹⁵⁵ The first two are used throughout the speech, but the last occurs only at the end, when Socrates turns to those who voted for his acquittal and justifies his address by saying that they are worthy of the title *δικάσται*. The implication of this statement is clearly that the other jurors are not worthy of this title, and as early as the middle of the last century commentators began to assert the view, still common today, that the address *ἄνδρες δικάσται* was more polite, more of an 'Ehrenname' than *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* (Steinhart 1850: ii. 288), or that it was the proper form of address to a jury.¹⁵⁶ As one proponent of this view put it, 'Socrates refuses to the jury the honourable title of "judges", with which the orators were accustomed to flatter them' (Maas 1939: 59).

In order to interpret this passage, some knowledge of actual practice in Athenian lawcourts is essential. If indeed juries were generally addressed as *ἄνδρες δικάσται* and considered this an honourable title, then Socrates in using other vocatives was deliberately annoying them from the very beginning of his speech, a fact which would have important consequences for our understanding of Socrates' purpose in making his defence. It has been suggested that 'any claim as to what the usual practice was is prohibitively speculative' (Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 212 n. 4), but this is untrue. A large corpus of speeches to Athenian juries exists, and it is simply a matter of examining their vocatives. As soon as any such study is undertaken it is clear that the addresses *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* and *ἄνδρες δικάσται* were interchangeable when speaking to a jury. In Demosthenes' *De Corona* and *De Falsa Legatione*, both of which were delivered to juries, there are a total of 13 cases of *ἄνδρες δικάσται*, as against 106 of *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*. Many of Demosthenes' private orations contain a higher per centage of *ἄνδρες δικάσται*, but then most of the other orators also use *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* and *ἄνδρες δικάσται* interchangeably. Lysias, who is closer in time to Socrates than is Demosthenes, provides fewer addresses; although in general he uses *ἄνδρες δικάσται* more often than *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*, a number of speeches (6, 12, 13, 27) contain both vocatives addressed to the same audience.

¹⁵⁵ Group addresses in Attic orators, and the individual tendencies of the different writers, are treated more fully by Rockel (1884) and Eibel (1893), who examine issues different from those which concern us here.

¹⁵⁶ Williamson (1908: 49); for later expressions of the same view see Phillipson (1928: 356) and T. West (1979: 66).

Table 21. Occupational and group addresses

Term	Sing.	Plural	Total
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι 'Athenian men'	—	1,038	1,038
ἄνδρες 'men' with another ethnic	—	147	147
Ἀθηναῖοι 'Athenians' alone	—	104	104
Other ethnics alone	See Sect. 3.8	118	118
ἄνδρες δικάσται 'jurymen'	—	801	801
Other terms identifying addressees			
by civil status	4	223	227
Terms identifying addressees			
by military position	2	82	84
Other occupational terms	69	11	79
ἄνδρες 'men' alone	See Sect. 3.2	524	524
γυναῖκες 'women' alone	See Sect. 3.2	7	7
Other descriptive addresses	—	42	42

Note: See Appendix B, pp. 293–305, for greater detail.

Thus there was nothing unusual in addressing a jury as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, and there can have been nothing impolite about it either. If ἄνδρες δικάσται had been a more honourable term, other orators (who certainly wanted to win their cases) would have used it to the exclusion of ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, even if Socrates did not. The same is true of the other address used by Socrates, ἄνδρες 'men'.¹⁵⁷ It seems unlikely that Socrates' audience (or Plato's readers) would have seen anything unusual in the addresses in the first two parts of the *Apology*.

Nevertheless, Socrates is clearly making a point when he says that only those who acquitted him can rightly be called δικάσται, and he certainly implies a contrast with his earlier forms of address to the jury as a whole. It is this implication which has caused so many scholars to feel that ἄνδρες δικάσται must be the only proper address to a jury, because it is polite and/or because it is customary, even in the face of strong evidence to the contrary.

The answer, it seems to me, lies in Socrates' idiosyncratic character. He was giving the literal meaning of the term δικάσται an emphasis which it did not normally carry in vocative usage, and thus making the

¹⁵⁷ For reasons not entirely clear to me, this term is usually left out of discussions of the *Apology* vocatives. Burnet (1924: on *Apol.* 40a3) even remarks, 'Hitherto he has said only ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι', although in fact Socrates has used ἄνδρες alone 17 times by 40a.

address more of an honour than it would otherwise have been. We have seen before that Socrates could use vocatives idiosyncratically, and the Platonic dialogues are full of examples of his attempts to bring out the 'real' or underlying meaning of words and phrases. It is thus entirely in character for him to make *ἄνδρες δικάσται* a more honourable term than *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* by emphasizing its literal meaning. As he does not bring out this point until after the trial, however, Socrates cannot be said to be provoking the jury by his use of vocatives.

The three addresses in the *Apology*, *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*, *ἄνδρες δικάσται*, and *ἄνδρες*, are by far the most common addresses to groups in the works surveyed. There are, however, other group addresses, which fall naturally into three categories: ethnic (as *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*), occupational (as *ἄνδρες δικάσται*), and other descriptive terms (as *ἄνδρες*). The ethnics form the largest group and can occur with or without *ἄνδρες* 'men'.¹⁵⁸ In the case of *Ἀθηναῖοι* 'Athenians', addresses with *ἄνδρες* are far more common than those without (see Table 21); indeed *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* is the most common address in our corpus. Other ethnics are much less common, and they do not show the same preference for *ἄνδρες* as does *Ἀθηναῖοι*; indeed some terms such as *Λακεδαιμόνιοι* 'Spartans' occur more often without *ἄνδρες* than with it. This difference is due to the fact that most of the group addresses to Athenians in our corpus come from the Attic orators, while those to people of other nationalities come from other genres, such as history. The other authors were clearly much less concerned than the orators about the use of *ἄνδρες* with ethnics; in the case of *Ἀθηναῖοι* as well, both Herodotus and Thucydides use the ethnic alone more often than they use it with *ἄνδρες*.

When an orator addressed the Athenian *ἐκκλησία* 'popular assembly' or a comparable group in another state, ethnics and *ἄνδρες* were virtually the only descriptive terms available to him, for the addressees had little else in common. If, however, the speaker was before the Athenian *βουλή* 'council', a jury, or another group which could be defined by function, he could address the members of the audience by their function or occupation—although, as we have seen in the *Apology*, ethnics could still be used freely. Because so many of our preserved speeches were delivered before juries, by far the most common address in this group is *ἄνδρες δικάσται*. Nevertheless

¹⁵⁸ See Rockel (1884) and Eibel (1893) for a more detailed discussion of factors affecting the use of *ἄνδρες* with plural addresses.

others are found as well, such as βουλή 'council, senate'¹⁵⁹ or (ἄνδρες) βουλευταί 'councillors, senators', (ἄνδρες) πολῖται 'citizens',¹⁶⁰ and (particularly in Roman contexts) (ἄνδρες) δημόται 'plebeians',¹⁶¹ (ἄνδρες) πατέρες 'senators' (see H. Mason 1974: 74), and δῆμαρχοι 'tribunes of the plebs' (see H. Mason 1974: 34). Addresses by military position include (ἄνδρες) σύμμαχοι 'allies', (ἄνδρες) στρατιῶται 'soldiers', and ἱππεῖς 'cavalry'.

When neither ethnics nor occupational terms could be used to a given group, other descriptive terms had to be found, and often these terms were used even where ethnics or occupational terms could have been employed. By far the most common such term was ἄνδρες 'men', which could safely be used to describe almost any group of addressees in our corpus. Ἄνδρες alone was a less formal address than when combined with ethnics or occupational terms, or than those terms used alone. It is virtually the only group address used in informal settings such as symposia, and although it does occur in some orators, ἄνδρες alone is not used by Demosthenes.

Other descriptive addresses could be formed according to the circumstances, with or without ἄνδρες. Some in Lucian are clearly parodies of the standard forms of group address, such as ἄνδρες θεοί 'gentlemen gods' in a speech to the assembly of gods (*Iupp. Trag.* 15) and φωνήεντα δικάσται 'vowels of the jury' to a jury of vowels (*Lis* 2, 10). Others describe a group of addressees by an important distinguishing feature, often one relevant to the purpose of the speech, as πάντες οἱ παρόντες 'all who are present' or παρόντες ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ τάφῳ 'those who are present at this tomb' (*Lys.* 2. 1). Still others are necessary to indicate a particular subgroup of a larger audience to which the speaker is addressing himself, as ἄνδρες οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε 'men who caused my death' and καταψηφισάμενοί μου 'those who condemned me' in Plato (*Apol.* 39c).

Only very rarely is a group addressed for which ἄνδρες cannot be used at all. In those situations, the fact that the addressees are not men is an important distinguishing characteristic which will usually form the basis of the address. We have seen a few examples of παῖδες

¹⁵⁹ This address is unusual in being a collective noun used as a vocative in the classical period; see Wackernagel (1912: 13–15). It is commonly used by Dionysius for the Roman senate, although this may not have been the normal practice; see H. Mason (1974: 123).

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 855; for the referential meaning of πολίτης, see Lauffer (1981).

¹⁶¹ See H. Mason (1974: 35); in Greek settings, note Xen. *Cyr.* 2. 3. 15, Ar. *Ach.* 319, 328, *Plut.* 322.

'children' used to children in this way even when the speaker is himself a child (see p. 69), and similarly γυναῖκες 'women' is used by both men and women to address groups of women. In the plural γυναῖκες as a vocative always means 'women', not 'wives'; it is not a common address in the works surveyed, owing to the scarcity of groups of women to be addressed. It appears to be neutral in sense and is not uncommon in poetry.¹⁶² Addresses to non-humans, as we shall see in the next section, generally employ such generic terms as well.

A general rule of formation of group addresses, although not a universal one, is that ἄνδρες will not be added to the descriptive word if it comes after another vocative. Thus all nineteen cases of ἄνδρες σύμμαχοι 'allied men' occur alone, whereas the thirteen cases of σύμμαχοι 'allies' all appear as parts of phrases such as ἄνδρες φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι 'friends and allies'. Within the prescriptions of this rule, military addresses will almost always take ἄνδρες if possible, while ethnics and many addresses referring to civil status (although not δικάσται) can be used freely without ἄνδρες as well as with it.

Two considerations would make a lengthier discussion of group addresses unprofitable. As noted in the Introduction (pp. 26–7), plural addresses give much less information about the relationship of speaker and addressee than do singular ones, and an extensive study of their usage would be unlikely to justify itself. Moreover, certain group addresses appear to be more subject to textual corruption and editorial caprice than the other types of address which we have seen so far. This is due to the abbreviations used in the manuscripts, which are easily confused and which have resulted in serious and irresolvable discrepancies among the different manuscripts.¹⁶³

Occupational terms can be used to individuals as well, though less often than to groups. It is very difficult to separate singular occupational terms from titles, in modern languages as well as ancient ones (Braun 1988: 10), and it might seem perverse to distinguish terms like στρατηγέ 'general' from ταξίαρχε 'squadron-commander'. But one means of distinction does exist in Greek, even if it may not apply to other languages. In the works surveyed, occupational terms are not generally used to named addressees unless those addressees are

¹⁶² Wendel (1929: 83); Men. *Dysk.* 660; Ar. *Thes.* 384, 455, 466, 533, etc.

¹⁶³ Cf. Wyse (1904) on Isaeus 1. 47.

extremely distinguished.¹⁶⁴ The exceptions to this rule are mostly found in Lucian and seem to be used for comic effect. It is thus fair to call 'titles' those Greek occupational terms which are generally addressed to named people, as well as those indicating such high status that we can reasonably believe that they would generally have been so used if we had enough examples of them in our corpus. Thus among the addresses referring to civil status, most of the high ranks such as βασιλεῦ and ἄναξ are clearly titles; those indicating rank too low to be clearly honorific are almost always plural (99.8 per cent of the time), and when used in the singular they are spoken only to nameless addressees (e.g. πρύτανι 'chairman',¹⁶⁵ Thuc. 6. 14. 1; συγκλητικέ 'senator',¹⁶⁶ Epict. 4. 1. 9). Occupational addresses seem to be used most often as addresses by the best distinguishing feature when names cannot be employed (cf. p. 151), and it is rare that someone's civil status is known when his name is not. Singular addresses indicating the addressee's military rank are also rare (see Table 21).

Occupational terms referring to the addressee's profession are more common in the singular than those indicating civil or military status, probably because the followers of many trades are immediately identifiable as such even when their names are unknown. These terms are, however, less common in the plural, probably because ancient Greeks did not usually have occasion to address a group of people all of whom shared the same non-military profession, at least in our corpus. Occupational terms are very diverse, including φιλόσοφε 'philosopher', βουκόλε 'cowherd', διδάσκαλε 'teacher', κεραμεῦ 'potter', γραμματεῦ 'clerk, scribe', ἄγγελε 'messenger', and πορθμεῦ 'ferryman'. Although not common, they are found in almost all authors, and usage does not seem to differ greatly from one author to another with the exception of Lucian. In Lucian occupational terms can be used freely to named addressees of all ranks, without any perceptible difference in meaning from names. In Lucian and in other authors, of course, terms indicating a particularly degrading occupation may be used as insults to named or unnamed addressees, as

¹⁶⁴ The same situation seems to exist in modern Greek, where occupational titles are used to address people of high status and to get the attention of people of lower rank whose names are not known (Sifianou 1992: 65, 68).

¹⁶⁵ This vocative also occurs at Pind. *Pyth.* 2. 58 (and probably *Paeon* 6. 68), where it does function as a title and has a completely different meaning. In Aristophanes the term is once used in the singular and is then addressed to a nameless official (*Thes.* 936); it also occurs several times in the plural (*Ach.* 56, *Pax* 887, 905).

¹⁶⁶ Although rare in our data compared to βουλευή and its derivatives, this was in fact the standard Greek word for 'senator' in the Roman period; see H. Mason (1974: 122).

κεραμεύ 'potter' is used to Agathocles in Plutarch (*Mor.* 458e). There is some evidence from outside the works surveyed that occupational titles could be used instead of names for slaves (Masson 1972: 15).

In poetry, address by occupation is not uncommon in Aristophanes and the *Odyssey* but rare elsewhere. In Aristophanes these addresses are very often used to nameless characters, as in prose, but in Homer Eumaeus is also so addressed (Wendel 1929: 91).

In English, occupational terms are sometimes used as addresses, but English speakers usually cannot invent an address by occupation to summon an unknown practitioner of that occupation, as Greeks seem to have been able to do. Some occupational terms, such as 'doctor', are perfectly acceptable as addresses in English, while others, such as 'gas-station attendant', are simply impossible (cf. Ervin-Tripp 1969: 228). One characteristic that Greek and English share, however, is that these addresses do not constitute a very major part of the address system. In many other languages the range of occupational terms which can be used as addresses is much wider than in modern English, and this type of address is used more often.¹⁶⁷ Indeed the substantial number of occupational addresses found in Shakespeare (Salmon 1967: 51) shows that this type of address used to be much more common in English than it now is.

3.10 GENERIC TERMS FOR NON-HUMANS

MICYLLUS. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πυθαγόρα—καίτοι τί μάλιστα χαίρεις καλούμενος, ὡς μὴ ἐπιταράττοιμι τὸν λόγον ἄλλοτε ἄλλον καλῶν;

COCK. Διοίσει μὲν οὐδὲν ἦν τε Εὐφορβὸν ἦν τε Πυθαγόραν ἦν τε Ἀσπασίαν καλῆς ἢ Κράτητα· πάντα γὰρ ἐγὼ ταῦτά εἰμι. πλὴν τὸ νῦν ὀρώμενον τοῦτο ἀλεκτρυόνα ὀνομάζων ἄμεινον ἂν ποιοῖς, ὡς μὴ ἀτιμάζοις εὐτελὲς εἶναι δοκοῦν τὸ ὄρνεον, καὶ ταῦτα τοσαύτας ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὰς ἔχον.

MICYLLUS. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἀλεκτρυόν . . .

MICYLLUS. Therefore, Pythagoras—but what do you most like to be called? Let me not disrupt the conversation any more by calling you different things at different times.

COCK. It will make no difference whether you call me Euphorbus, Pythagoras, Aspasia, or Crates, for I am all these. But you would do better to call me that which I now appear, a cock, so as not to dishonour the bird which seems to be so insignificant but which has all these souls in it.

MICYLLUS. Therefore, O cock . . .

¹⁶⁷ e.g. Hindi (Mehrotra 1981: 127–8), Turkish (Başoğlu 1987: 131), Chinese (Chao 1956: 226–7).

In this passage from Lucian's *Gallus* (20), the cobbler Micyllus wonders how to address his cock, who turns out to be a reincarnation of Pythagoras and many other people. The cock, who clearly does not have a name in his present incarnation, asks to be addressed as ἀλεκτρούων 'cock'. This choice is typical of addresses to animals and other non-human entities in the works surveyed, for (with the exception of cities) such addressees almost always receive a generic descriptive term.

Table 22. *Generic terms for non-humans*

Type of term	Sing.	Plural	Total
Terms for animals	21	6	27
Terms for inanimate objects	31	4	35
Terms for abstract concepts	58	—	58
Terms for superhuman beings	13	45	58
TOTAL	123	55	178

Note: The figures in this table are tentative, owing to the necessity of deciding subjectively which terms to include. See Appendix B, pp. 306–9, for greater detail.

In our data animals are always addressed with terms indicating their species. Almost all of these addresses occur in Lucian, because animals are very rarely addressed in other authors. As shown by the passage just quoted, species terms are in no way derogatory when addressed to animals; they are the equivalent of FN or ἄνδρες addressed to humans. The same is true in Aristophanes, whose animal characters are addressed with species terms just as in prose (e.g. *Av.* 406, 835, 1118). Animals in Aristophanes do occasionally receive addresses by name as well; these names are not simply the animals' names but rather mythological allusions brought in for humorous purposes (e.g. Πήγασε 'Pegasus' to the dung-beetle at *Pax* 154). The basic agreement between prose and comedy on this point suggests strongly that in classical Athens animals did not have names, although Homer does portray named horses and dogs, and although some of the sheep and goats in Theocritus are addressed by name (5. 102; but no name at 5. 147). Animals are not addressed in tragedy (Wendel 1929: 62). In fables involving animals, such as those of Babrius and Aesop, the animals are generally treated as humans and so receive KT, FTs,

insults, etc. Even these animals, however, do not normally have names, and they may be addressed with species terms on occasion (Babrius 3. 6, 13. 9, 77. 4, 115. 5, 122. 3).

Species terms can be used to address humans as well and when so used are invariably derogatory. Thus in Lucian's *Piscator* a philosopher who has been caught with a fishing-rod because of his greed is mockingly addressed as βέλτιστε ἰχθύων 'best of fish' (48), and θηρίον 'beast' and κάνθαρε 'beetle' are both used as insults. Such addresses, however, are extremely rare outside comedy.

Addresses to inanimate objects usually follow the same pattern as addresses to animals and use the generic name for the object (cf. Moorhouse 1982: 32). These addresses are not common, for the need to use them rarely arises, and they are often combined with other terms. Thus the Hellespont is rebuked as πικρὸν ὕδωρ 'bitter water' (Hdt. 7. 35. 2), and Phocion's hearth is addressed as φίλη ἐστία 'dear hearth' (Plut. *Phoc.* 37. 5). Cities of course do have names, and thus they can be addressed by name or with a generic term. We find in Josephus both Νινύα 'Nineveh' (*AJ* 9. 241) and τλημονεστάτη πόλις 'long-suffering city' (*BJ* 5. 19), and Aristophanes too uses both forms of address to cities.¹⁶⁸

In the case of abstract concepts there is some difficulty in deciding whether a given address is a generic term or a name. Lucian and Philo, and to a lesser extent other authors, tend to personify abstract ideas. Thus in Lucian Philosophy appears to be a woman named Φιλοσοφία 'Philosophy': she complains, calls Zeus πάτερ 'father', and is addressed by him as θύγατερ 'daughter' (*Fug.* 3). Since Lucian did not have the option of indicating his personifications with capital letters, however, it is not always certain whether a given addressee is a personification, an abstraction, or simply an inanimate object.

Terms meaning 'soul' have a dual usage in Greek. Like 'head' in φίλη κεφαλή 'dear head' and κακή κεφαλή 'bad head' (see p. 135), 'soul' can stand for a person. Thus Xenophon's Cyrus addresses a dead friend as ἀγαθὴ καὶ πιστὴ ψυχὴ 'good and faithful soul' (*Cyr.* 7. 3. 8), and Plutarch says ψυχὴν καὶ κεφαλὴν τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰώθαμεν ἀπὸ τῶν κυριωτάτων ὑποκορίζεσθαι 'we are accustomed to call a person affectionately "soul" or "head" from the most important parts of him' (*Mor.* 692d). A late survival of this custom can be seen in the use of ψυχὴ with a modifier as a title in Christian epistolography

¹⁶⁸ *Eq.* 813, 1329, *Ach.* 75, 971, *Pax* 246, etc. See also Pind. *Pyth.* 2. 1 and Soph. *Phil.* 1213.

(Dinneen 1929: 92), and an interesting variant occurs in Theocritus, where a mother addresses her two babies as ἐμὰ ψυχὰ 'my soul' (24. 8; cf. Gow 1952: ad loc.).¹⁶⁹

It is, however, also possible for both ψυχὴ and θυμέ to be used literally, as addresses to the speaker's own soul. In this sense θυμέ is more common than ψυχὴ and is found as early as Archilochus (66. 1 Bergk). Whereas ψυχὴ and κεφαλὴ when standing for a person are almost always qualified by adjectives, addresses actually directed to a soul are generally unmodified. This form of address is not by any means frequent, but it is not exceptional: examples occur in Pindar (*Nem.* 3. 26, *Ol.* 2. 89), Euripides (*Med.* 1056, *Ion* 859), paratragic passages in Aristophanes (*Ach.* 450, 480, 483, *Eq.* 1194, *Vesp.* 757), and other poetry.¹⁷⁰ In our data addresses to souls are very common in Philo and can use either ψυχὴ 'soul, spirit' or διάνοια 'thought, intelligence, understanding'; θυμέ does not occur. The context of these addresses in Philo is always a comment made by the author to himself, the reader, or some unspecified other person. In most cases it is impossible to determine who the addressee is, and indeed it is by no means certain that Philo had a specific addressee in mind. The only other author in our corpus to address a soul is Chariton, who twice portrays characters using ψυχὴ to address their own souls; this usage is closer to that of classical poetry than is Philo's.

Other parts of the body may also be addressed. Our corpus contains several addresses to eyes (Plato, *Rep.* 440a; *Ach.* 5. 1. 5; *Char.* 6. 1. 9), and in poetry characters address their own hearts as early as Homer (κραδίη *Od.* 20. 18) and continue to do so in drama (e.g. Eur. *IT* 344; Ar. *Ach.* 485). Addresses to other body parts are less common but still possible in poetry, and it has been suggested that such addresses may have been used more by women than by men (McClure 1995: 52-4).

Superhuman beings can also be addressed with generic terms, as μοῖρα 'fate', τύχη 'fortune', νύμφαι 'nymphs', Τιτάν 'Titan', δαῖμον 'divinity', or θεοί 'gods'. This type of address is fairly frequent and found in a wide range of authors, and it is often used to beings who can also be addressed by name. In Lucian's *Cataphus*, for example, Clotho is addressed by the same speakers both as Κλωθοῖ 'Clotho' and Μοῖρα (8 etc.) without any perceptible difference in meaning. The same is true on most other occasions that these addresses are used in

¹⁶⁹ The use of ζωή 'life' and ψυχὴ as terms of endearment between lovers is attested in Juvenal (6. 195; cf. Courtney 1980: ad loc.).

¹⁷⁰ See Giangrande (1968: 59) and Page (1938: on 1056) for more references.

Lucian, but in other authors such terms are only used in the singular when the addressee's name is unknown or non-existent.

Also included in this category is the address 'god', which appears once as *θεός* (*κύριε ὁ θεός* 'lord god', Epict. 2. 16. 13),¹⁷¹ once as *θεέ* (*θεέ βασιλεῦ τῶν ὅλων* 'god, king of all', Joseph. *AJ* 14. 24), and once as *δαίμον* 'divinity' (Plut. *Mor.* 105a). This address has been the subject of extensive discussion.¹⁷² Wackernagel points out that in classical Greek neither *θεός* (nominative) nor *θεέ* (vocative) is used in address; both were introduced in Judaeo-Christian literature, where *ὁ θεός* was the usual form. It is, he argues, unrelated to other Greek nominative-for-vocative constructions, but rather a direct translation of the Hebrew nominative *אלהים* 'god', and the rarer *θεέ* is a remodelling of this form on more Greek lines (1912: 5–7, 11; cf. 1926–8: i. 307). In classical Greek the necessity of indicating which god one was praying to meant that individual gods were addressed by name rather than with a form of *θεός*, although the plural *θεοί* is common and examples can certainly be found of *δαίμον* and of the feminine *θεά* (1912: 20–1). Wackernagel argues that the use of *θεά* is essentially a Homericism and connects it with the use of *γύναι* 'woman' rather than FN in addressing mortal women, concluding that male gods had to be treated as individuals but that such treatment was not always accorded to females, even goddesses (1912: 23, 26).

A different interpretation has been suggested by Svennung,¹⁷³ who argues that if a god can be addressed with *δαίμον* and not with *θεός* or *θεέ*, the difference must lie in the word *θεός* itself. He points out that *νέος* 'young, young man' does not have a vocative either, and argues that in these two words a vocative *θεέ* or *νέε* would have contracted to **θεί* or **νεί*, thus giving a monosyllabic vocative in an otherwise dissyllabic paradigm, a situation which Greek would have avoided (1958: 229–34).¹⁷⁴ He claims that the use of *ὁ θεός* in the Septuagint and Christian literature is not a Hebraism, but rather that the need for a vocative of *θεός* first arose at this time, and since *θεέ* did not exist, early translators were obliged to use *ὁ θεός* (1958: 234–6).

¹⁷¹ Wackernagel (1912: 19–20) suggests that this address may be an interpolation; this is possible, but there is no real evidence.

¹⁷² In addition to the works mentioned here, see Baudissin and Eissfeldt (1926–9: i. 51, 56).

¹⁷³ The basic outlines of Svennung's argument are to be seen already in Kretschmer's review of Wackernagel's monograph (1915), but it was Svennung who developed them into a positive theory rather than merely a criticism of Wackernagel.

¹⁷⁴ Wackernagel (1912: 6) says that there are formal parallels for *θεέ*, but the examples he gives are all di- or trisyllabic.

Svennung is probably right in his phonetic explanation of the lack of a vocative of *θεός*, but it is also true that if a need had been felt to address gods other than by their individual names, the nominative *θεός* could have been used in the classical period. Its absence, and the rarity of *δαίμων*, suggests that this type of address was avoided for other reasons as well.

The plural *θεοί* is much more common, but in many cases it is used as an interjection rather than a proper address and so was not counted for the purposes of this study. *Δαίμονες* is less common and generally used in true addresses; it is almost always joined with *θεοί* in *θεοί τε καὶ δαίμονες* 'gods and divinities' or some variation thereof. These addresses are unremarkable, for there is no other simple way of addressing a group of gods. It is very rare that such terms are used to mortal addressees, and then either the addressee is believed to be dead (Char. 5. 1. 7) or the address is acknowledged to be a revoltingly abject one (Polyb. 30. 18. 5; Diod. Sic. 31. 15. 3).

Other Aspects of Address Usage

The preceding chapter has discussed the meaning of the different words used as addresses in Greek. Meaning is, in my opinion, the most important aspect of an address system, but there are also many other elements which go to make up a language's pattern or patterns of address usage. In this chapter a brief overview of the most significant such factors will be given.

4.1 ADDRESS FREQUENCY

The frequency with which free addresses occur and the circumstances in which they are used or avoided vary from language to language. It has been observed that Arabic speakers use direct address more often than do English speakers, and Finnish and Korean speakers are said to do so less often.¹ Several studies of Elizabethan English have noted the number and variety of vocatives at that period, as contrasted with modern English (Salmon 1967: 50; Replogle 1973: 175-6). Sometimes the frequency of vocative usage varies noticeably even between different social groups within one language (Parkinson 1985: 39). I know of no quantitative studies devoted to this phenomenon, however, and such a study would be very difficult to conduct.

It has been suggested that vocatives were more common in ancient Greek than in modern languages like French or English (Anon. 1930: 59). Such judgements are difficult to substantiate given the difficulty of ascertaining exactly how frequent vocatives in French or English actually are; moreover, the number of addresses per page of dialogue in Greek varies enormously from one author to another and even from one Platonic dialogue to another. Instinctively, many English speakers will feel when reading early Plato that Greek addresses were far more frequent than English ones, and such instinctive judgements are not

¹ Braun (1988: 184-5); Zwicky (1974: 797); Hwang (1975: 21).

without validity. Nevertheless, frequency of address usage in English varies from speaker to speaker, and it seems wiser not to make pronouncements about relative address frequency before satisfactory methods of measuring it have been developed.

Although linguists have not worked extensively on the difference in address frequency between languages, they have looked more closely at factors which cause variations in frequency within a language. Such studies have revealed that the presence or absence of vocatives can carry great sociolinguistic significance: 'It is a fact that avoiding the use of terms at all . . . is as fraught with relationship related meaning as using any particular term would be' (Parkinson 1985: 39). In Nahuatl, speakers use a higher percentage of vocatives when being especially polite (Hill and Hill 1978: 134). The same was true of Elizabethan English (Replogle 1973: 175), but in some types of modern English frequent use of addresses seems to be a sign of aggression (Kramer 1975: 200, 206). In Egyptian Arabic, the number of addresses in a speech indicates the social class of the speaker: the lower the social class, the more addresses used (Parkinson 1985: 39). These differences in vocative usage are to be distinguished from address avoidance, a phenomenon which occurs when the speaker feels that he or she ought to use an address but cannot decide which one to use and so avoids using any at all (cf. McIntire 1972: 286, 290).

There is thus a very wide range of factors affecting the use or omission of addresses in modern languages, and we should not be surprised to find many of these factors at work in Greek as well. Before examining the situation in Greek, however, it is worth making a distinction in terminology. In this chapter, the word 'speech' is used to refer to anything spoken, regardless of length or style, and 'oration' is used for a long, formal speech delivered to a group. Where there is a risk of confusion, those speeches which are not orations will be referred to as 'short speeches'. A speech is considered to end at the place where it would be appropriate to place quotation marks; that is, when other words intervene in the text which are not part of that speech.

The possible locations for an address can be divided into four categories: at the beginning of the first speech made between two characters, at the beginning of the second speech (in which the speaker will be addressing his partner for the first time but will himself already have been addressed once), at the beginning of subsequent speeches in an interaction, and in the midst of a speech. Addresses

have been counted as occurring at the beginning of a speech if they fall within the first two lines of printed text in that speech; in practice, most addresses occur as one of the first three or four words of a speech or else several sentences into it, so the definition of 'beginning' does not really pose a problem.

As a general rule, the order in which these locations have just been given is one of declining frequency of addresses in short speeches in Greek. It is probably for this reason that in Herodotus, where most interactions consist of only a few speeches, 69 per cent of the speeches have addresses, while in book IV of Plato's *Republic*, which is a continuous dialogue, only 5 per cent of the speeches use addresses.

One might argue that addresses at the beginnings of speeches were literary devices for indicating a change of speaker in written dialogues, a practice which was necessitated by the lack of aids to the reader in Greek papyri and says nothing about spoken usage. If this argument were valid, however, it would require vocatives at the beginning of virtually every speech in a dialogue, which is certainly not the case in Plato, and it would prohibit vocatives in the midst of speeches, which do occur. In fact Greek dialogues often indicate change of speaker by phrases such as *ἔφη/ῆ δ' ὅς* 'he said' or *ἔφην/ῆν δ' ἐγώ* 'I said', whether or not there are vocatives present; conversely they often give no textual indication, by vocatives or any other means, in cases where the context should make the situation clear. Passages where a new interlocutor enters the debate are usually marked with vocatives, but these vocatives are rarely necessary for comprehension of the change of interlocutors, which is indicated by narrative devices such as *εὐθὺς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν* 'when he saw me Cephalus greeted me at once and said' (Plato, *Rep.* 328c), *ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων* 'Glaucón said' (*Rep.* 337d), or *ἔφη . . . ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος* 'Polemarchus replying said' (*Rep.* 331d). Indeed in *Republic* I, where changes of interlocutors are especially frequent compared to the rest of Plato's works, there are only four passages (337d, 340a, 340c, 348b) where the identity of the addressee might have been in doubt without the address. These cases form a very small percentage of the 93 addresses in the book, and even in them the author was not really obliged to use an address, as he could always have clarified the point with the narrative devices used elsewhere.²

² In drama, on the other hand, the narrator's voice is absent and technical constraints do affect address usage to some extent (cf. p. 41).

There is thus no reason to believe that the high percentage of addresses at the beginnings of conversations and at changes of interlocutors was not a feature of natural dialogue in classical Greek. It is not at all surprising that two characters should address each other when they begin to speak, nor that repetition of addresses throughout a long dialogue should be omitted as tedious and unnecessary. Such practices are not firm rules, and it is always possible to find exceptions which do not seem to carry any evident meaning, but in general the absence of an address at the beginning of an interaction or the presence of an address in the midst of a dialogue or long speech is noteworthy. In the second speech in an interaction there may or may not be an address, and no particular emphasis seems to be attached to its presence or absence. In late Greek addresses are sometimes (by no means always) much rarer than in classical authors; it is possible that the rules governing address frequency changed over time. Since many late Greek authors were not writing in their own conversational language, however, other factors may have been at work.

The address rules we have found for classical Greek are similar to those which exist in other languages. In Arabic, vocatives are most likely to be found at the beginning of a speech, either initially or post-positively after the first word or phrase, or (less commonly) at the ends of sentences (Parkinson 1985: 32). The Elizabethans used vocatives more often at the beginnings of speeches than within them and indeed were under a strong compulsion to begin all speeches with vocatives, at least at the beginnings of interactions (Replogle 1973: 175-6, 184). In Cicero's letters, vocatives were expected, and their omission, when it occurs, often shows hostility (Adams 1978: 163-4).

In classical Greek prose, the absence of an address at the beginning of an interaction often occurs when the speaker is of higher status than the addressee, is angry, or is being insulting. Such omission of address can also occur without derogatory connotations when the communication being made is particularly brief or urgent, or when the speaker is an envoy or herald delivering a formal message which begins with the name of the sender.

A very similar situation exists in Homer. There, about 80 per cent of all speeches have vocatives (Bassett 1934: 140; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 40), and while the first speech in an interaction requires the vocative, later speeches in the same conversation are very likely to omit it (Bassett 1934: 142). Other circumstances in which the vocative can be omitted include those in which an urgent communication is being

made, the identity of the addressee is unknown or unspecified, the speech is very short, or the addressee is greatly inferior to the speaker in rank (Bassett 1934: 141–5). This agreement between prose and poetry strengthens our claim that the rules of vocative usage applied in conversational Greek as well as in literary prose.

The tendencies governing address usage are evident in book 1 of Herodotus,³ which contains a total of 88 speeches, 42 of which are the first in an interaction or at a change of interlocutors. Of these 42, twelve have no vocatives: six clearly derogatory (angry, condescending, or spoken to inferiors: 91. 1, 110. 3, 115. 2, 141. 2, 153. 1, 214. 5), three very short (86. 3, 86. 4, 109. 2), two messages (53. 2, 69. 2), and a speech reporting something the Medes said to each other which has neither speaker nor addressee (97. 2).

Within a longer dialogue, as well as being used to mark a change of interlocutors, addresses are used to set off key points in the dialogue, such as the climax of an argument or a moment of emotional intensity. A good example of the use of addresses to mark a climax is the Melian dialogue in Thucydides (5. 85 ff.), which consists of 29 consecutive speeches. None of these speeches contains an address except the Melians' last statement, in which they report their final decision to the Athenians. A similar situation exists in English:

Terms of address are often . . . coupled with exclamation points or question marks. We are more likely to see or hear sentences such as 'Goddamit Jane!' and 'What do you want to do tonight, Ted?' . . . than we are to hear something like a calm 'The snow is pretty, Jane.' (Kramer 1975: 207)

Nevertheless, in Greek as in English, addresses can also occur for no apparent reason; in Greek, they are far more likely to do so if the individual speeches of the interlocutors are fairly long (e.g. Hdt. 7. 46–52). In such circumstances the addresses may be a way of keeping the context alive and reminding the reader of the larger picture in which that speech is embedded.

The pattern of use and omission of addresses is particularly clear in the trial of the Armenian king by Cyrus in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (3. 1. 9 ff.).⁴ The first two speeches of this trial have addresses, one by Cyrus to the king and one in reply by the king to Cyrus. After these speeches there is a dialogue of fourteen more speeches between the king and

³ The factors influencing address use and omission in Herodotus are also discussed by Heni (1976: 29 n. 31), who reaches different conclusions.

⁴ This dialogue is treated in more detail by Gera (1993: 78–98).

Cyrus, none of which has an address. At the end of this section there is an outcry from the Armenians and a pause, after which Cyrus asks the final and key question of his interrogation, using an address to emphasize its importance (1. 13).

At this point, since the king cannot answer the question, his son Tigranes enters the conversation, using an address as it is the first time he has spoken to Cyrus in the trial. Tigranes and Cyrus then have a dialogue of 31 speeches, in which Cyrus uses no addresses, whereas Tigranes uses six. Whether or not these six addresses (1. 15, 1. 16, 1. 18, 1. 27, 1. 29, 1. 30) mark the six most important points made by Tigranes is debatable, but all of the points so marked are fairly major, and the last two are clearly part of the climax of Tigranes' argument.

At the end of this dialogue Cyrus turns back to the king, using an address and receiving one in return. The two then have a dialogue of nine speeches, in which the only address is made by the king at a moment of very high emotional strain: *Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Κύρε, μὴ οὕτω λέγε . . .* 'By the gods, Cyrus, he said, do not speak thus . . .' (1. 35). At its end Cyrus turns back to Tigranes, using an address, receiving one in return, and producing one more speech without an address before speaking again to the king, to whom he uses an address in making the concluding speech of the trial. In this passage, then, all changes of speaker or addressee are marked by at least one and often two addresses, and all other points at which addresses are used are exceptionally important speeches, although not all such speeches are marked by addresses. The use of addresses in *Republic IV* is similar to that in Xenophon, except that the speeches marked by addresses are not always so clearly important.

The factors affecting the position and use of vocatives in orations are not identical to those affecting short speeches.⁵ Since most speeches other than orations are only a few sentences long, if a vocative has been used at the beginning, it will often be difficult to repeat that vocative within the speech or even to use another one. In orations, however, the very length of the individual speeches means that most vocatives come in the midst, rather than at the beginning, of a speech. Moreover, changes of addressees within an oration cannot be marked with the narrative devices used in dialogue. Orators generally use

⁵ Rockel (1884) and Eibel (1893) discuss some factors which may affect the position of vocatives in orations but which are beyond the scope of this study.

addresses to indicate a switch from one addressee to another, as from the jury to their opponents, just as speakers in a dialogue use addresses to mark changes of interlocutors. The addresses in orations, however, are more necessary for the comprehension of a change of addressee than are those in dialogues, and thus they cannot tell us much about conventions for address usage in conversational Greek. Since the vocatives were no less necessary in the actual delivery of the orations than in the written versions, however, we can be reasonably certain that they represent the actual practice of Athenian orators.

The beginning of an oration is even more likely to contain an address than the beginning of a short speech: 57 of the 60 orations in the Demosthenic corpus begin with vocatives, as do 28 of the 33 speeches of Lysias which have intact beginnings. Again, this tendency is found in other languages as well, for in Egyptian Arabic direct addresses are obligatory at the beginnings of public speeches (Parkinson 1985: 183), and the English 'Ladies and Gentlemen', if not strictly obligatory, is certainly customary.

Within orations, Greek addresses (except when used to signal a change of addressees) tend to mark key points, divisions, or emotional moments in the speech (cf. Wohlrab 1877: 49). Pseudo-Dionysius (*Ars Rhetorica* 9.1) claims,

τὸ προσαγορεύειν ἄνευ σχήματος οὐ γίνεται· ὁ μὲν φιλοφρόνως προσαγορεύει, ὁ δὲ αἰδημόνως, ὁ δὲ σκώπτων, ὁ δὲ ἰλαρῶς, ὁ δὲ ὡς θαυμάζων.

An address invariably involves a figure: it may be friendly, or modest, or joking, or cheerful, or giving the impression of admiration.

Another place in which addresses can be used is in written communication. A few letters are preserved within the works surveyed (particularly in the historians), and a large number exist on papyrus. Letters do not generally have initial vocatives, since they start with a formulaic salutation containing the name of the addressee in the dative. A long letter, however, may contain vocatives in other positions. In contrast to letters, works dedicated to specific people do tend to start with vocatives. The standard way of indicating a dedication is to begin the work with a (postpositive) address, and sometimes vocatives addressed to the dedicatee are found within the work as well. The first vocative is usually the name of the dedicatee, since his or her identity must be indicated unambiguously if the dedication is to be an honour, but the others can be any type of term.

4.2 POSITION OF ADDRESSES WITHIN THE SENTENCE

The position of addresses within a sentence is a separate problem from that of their position within a speech. This issue has been treated at length by Eduard Fraenkel, who observed that vocatives within a sentence often come between two clauses or other distinct elements of the sentence and serve to separate them; when a vocative is found within a clause, it is usually positioned next to an emphatic word or phrase (1965: 30). The present study has nothing to add to Fraenkel's extremely thorough work, except with respect to one problem not treated by Fraenkel, that of vocatives which stand at the very beginning of a sentence.

In Attic prose addresses are normally postpositive; that is, they are unlikely to occur as the first word in a sentence. The Attic author who begins sentences with vocatives most often is Thucydides, who does so 13 per cent of the time; other authors often show figures closer to those of Demosthenes, less than one per cent of whose vocatives come at the beginnings of sentences. This tendency, however, belongs to Attic rather than to Greek in general, for 73 per cent of the vocatives in Herodotus occur at the beginnings of sentences, and in Homer as well addresses are not normally postpositive (Kieckers 1908: 357-8).

In Attic, when a vocative does occur as the first word in a sentence, that sentence is virtually always the first sentence of a speech. Even in Herodotus, addresses within the body of a speech are very unlikely to begin a sentence. Thus a long piece of advice from Croesus to Cyrus (Hdt. 1. 155. 3-4) begins, *ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν οἰκότα εἶρηκας, σὺ μέντοι . . .* 'O king, what you have said is right, but . . .' and ends several sentences later with, *καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὦ βασιλεῦ, γυναῖκας ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν ὄψεαι γεγονότας, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινοί τοι ἔσονται μὴ ἀποστέωσι* 'and soon, O king, you will see that they have turned into women instead of men, so that they will neither be a threat to you nor revolt'. This tendency is much more conspicuous in Herodotus than in other authors, because so many of Herodotus' addresses come at the beginnings of sentences, but it seems to apply to virtually all prose authors.⁶

This rule is connected with the tendencies which govern those vocatives which do begin sentences in Attic prose. Very often such addresses come not in the midst of a continuous dialogue between two

⁶ Exceptions (vocatives at the start of sentences which do not begin a speech) include Xen. *An.* 6. 5. 21; Dion. Hal. 6. 72. 5, 10. 29. 2.

speakers, but in a situation in which the speaker needs to use an address to get the attention of the addressee or to single him out of a group. Thus in the *Protagoras* Socrates describes the following scene:

Τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἴπποκράτης, ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέωξέ τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω ἦι ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, “ὦ Σώκρατες,” ἔφη, “ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις;” (310a–b)

Last night, just before dawn, Hippocrates the son of Apollodorus, the brother of Phason, banged violently on my door with his staff, and when someone opened it for him he hurried inside at once and shouted loudly, ‘Socrates! Are you awake or asleep?’

Here the speaker is calling out to someone he cannot see and needs to identify him at once with an address. Similarly in another passage from the *Protagoras*, Socrates switches interlocutors suddenly in confusion and begins his first sentence with a vocative in order to make it clear whom he is addressing:

ἔπειτα—ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσθαι τὰληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής—τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, “ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης . . .” (339e)

Then, to tell the truth, in order to get some time to consider what the poet meant I turned to Prodicus, and calling him I said, ‘Prodicus, you and Simonides are compatriots . . .’

In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates is talking to Theodorus when they decide to bring Theaetetus into the conversation as well. The sentence in which Theodorus calls the young man over begins with a vocative, in order to let Theaetetus know that he is being addressed:

SOCRATES. καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

THEODORUS. ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη. (144d)

SOCRATES. Call him for me, to come and sit with us here.

THEODORUS. Very well. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

Although vocatives coming at the beginning of a sentence in Plato very often occur in such contexts, they can appear in other situations as well, most often in addresses to or from imaginary interlocutors. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to get the attention of someone who is imaginary, nor does a speaker need to use an address when imagining what someone might say to him. Nevertheless, the imaginary interlocutors are portrayed vividly, as if they were really

present, and in consequence they often use or receive vocatives at the beginnings of sentences where such would have been expected if the interlocutors had been real. Thus for example when the laws of Athens address Socrates in the *Crito*, they tend to begin their admonishments with vocatives (50c, 52b).

These tendencies are observable not merely in Plato, but in Thucydides, Xenophon, and the orators as well.⁷ In all Attic prose authors those vocatives which begin a sentence very often occur at points where, in real life, the speaker would have needed to get someone's attention or indicate whom he was addressing. We have already seen a similar phenomenon in Aristophanes, where οὐτός is often used to get a character's attention and when so used tends to be the first word in an interaction (cf. p. 154). Nevertheless this tendency is far from being an absolute rule; in Plato and in other authors, vocatives can also be used postpositively when they are needed to indicate a change of addressee, and a number of vocatives occur at the beginnings of sentences for no apparent reason.⁸

It could be argued that the placement of addresses is dictated by technical constraints, for the readers need to be alerted to what is going on. In fact, however, the readers are normally notified in other ways, and it is the addressee who needs the vocative. In all three of the passages quoted above Plato has made clear who is being addressed by other means, and the passages would have been perfectly intelligible to a reader if the vocative had been postpositive. This fact suggests strongly that the tendencies for vocative placement we have observed in Plato and other Attic authors were a feature of conversational as well as literary Greek.

In later authors as well addresses tend to be postpositive (e.g. 95 per cent of the time in Lucian), although in some writers such as Plutarch vocatives at the beginnings of sentences are not uncommon.

4.3 THE USE OF ὦ WITH VOCATIVES

In sharp contrast to all other aspects of Greek address usage, the use of ὦ is a topic which has received more attention than it deserves.

⁷ e.g. Thuc. 2. 71. 2, 2. 74. 2; Xen. Cyr. 7. 1. 19, Symp. 6. 3, 7. 2; Dem. 53. 12, 55. 5.

⁸ It is sometimes suggested that vocatives at the beginnings of sentences indicate emotion in Greek, but such a view is untenable. Consider for example *Laws* 629b, 631b, 634c, 662e: if these passages are emotional, then so is practically every sentence in Plato.

More has been written on this one point than on all other aspects of Greek vocative usage put together, and the results of all this activity are not terribly satisfactory.⁹

Probably the most famous treatment of the use of ω is that of John Adams Scott (1903–5). Scott argued that in Homer, Hesiod, and lyric poetry ω is normally omitted, especially in elevated speech, and that its use ‘denotes a throwing off of reserve . . . [and gives the vocative] a familiar tone, which often becomes angry, coarse, or impatient’ (1903: 195–6). In Aeschylus and Sophocles, however, ω is more common and less obviously meaningful; its presence is governed by a complicated set of rules based largely on the form of the address and metrical considerations (1904). In Euripides, although there are a number of factors affecting the use of ω , it tends to indicate familiarity or passion, whereas its absence ‘gives a tone of calmness, distance, or reserve’ (1905: 39). In Aristophanes ω is normally used but can be omitted when elevation, reserve, or dignity is indicated (1905: 39–41).

Noting that Herodotus seems largely to follow the same rules as Aeschylus and Sophocles but that Plato virtually always uses ω with vocatives, Scott concluded that the meaning of ω did not change among the different authors in his study. Its presence always indicated familiarity and informality, but as time went on the literary language became more and more informal, resulting in a greater and greater use of ω (1905: 42).

Later works on the subject have argued both for and against Scott. Gildersleeve and Miller (1903) and Giangrande (1968) applied Scott’s Homeric rules to ω in the Homeric Hymns, Callimachus, and Apollonius Rhodius and found that the usage in these later works was the same as that in Homer. Kieckers (1908: 358–62), however, doubted that Scott’s theories were applicable even to Homer. He suggested that metrical factors were more significant: since vocatives in Homer tend to come at the beginnings of lines and many of the names and other words used as addresses begin with a short syllable, ω is needed to provide an initial long syllable. Kieckers also found a number of passages in Homer where the meaning of the address clearly does not accord with Scott’s theories. Macurdy examined the use of ω in Homer and Herodotus and concluded that in both authors the absence of this particle shows ‘familiarity or condescension on the

⁹ On this topic see Lepre (1979), Brioso Sánchez (1971), Giangrande (1968), Loewe (1925), Macurdy (1912), Kieckers (1908), Scott (1903, 1904, 1905), Gildersleeve and Miller (1903), Eibel (1893), Rockel (1884).

part of the speaker' (1912: 77), findings precisely opposite to Scott's theory that the *presence* of ω indicates familiarity. McClure (1995: 50) also contradicted Scott, suggesting that in Euripides ω with the vocative belongs to 'solemn language'. Loewe (1925) reworked and refined Scott's theories and applied them more exhaustively to prose, but his conclusions are not entirely convincing. Brioso Sánchez (1971) devoted most of his article to a detailed refutation of Scott, while Lepre (1979) tried to reconcile Scott and Kieckers by arguing that both Scott's rules regarding the meaning of ω and Kieckers's metrical principles affected the use of ω in Homer.

Another group of scholars, concerning themselves primarily or exclusively with Attic prose, has a slightly different view of the situation. Wackernagel (1926-8: i. 311-12) claims that Herodotean and poetic usage is fundamentally different from the Attic practice, which can be seen in Plato and the orators: in Attic, ω is virtually always used, and its absence often indicates disrespect. This generalized use of ω is an innovation of the Attic dialect and distinguishes it both from other Greek dialects and from other Indo-European languages such as Latin and Germanic, in which the equivalents of ω are much rarer. Kühner-Gerth (i. 48) and Schwyzer (Schwyzer-Debrunner i. 60-1) agree that the absence of ω in prose is meaningful and that the meaning concerned is usually negative, but they differ in their ideas of what the range of possible meanings is, as well as in their explanation of particular passages. Gomme and Sandbach (1973: on *Dysk.* 823) suggest that, since in Menander the absence of ω is the norm, its presence must be meaningful and can indicate appeals, remonstrance, gnomic speeches, or solemnity.

The facts of the question are as follows. About 10 per cent of the vocatives in Homer have ω , but the particle is much more common in the tragedians and figures rise to 80 per cent in Aristophanes before dropping again to 12 per cent in Menander. In prose, Herodotus uses ω 59 per cent of the time, Thucydides 85 per cent, Xenophon 93 per cent, Plato 98 per cent, and most of the Attic orators 90 per cent or more.

It seems that in the late fifth and fourth century ω tended to be used before most vocatives in Attic, but it is possible that usage of ω decreased during the fourth century and particularly at the end of that century. The earliest of the orators, Antiphon, always uses ω with vocatives, and Lysias, Andocides, Isocrates, and Isaeus, all of whom grew up in the fifth century, each use ω with 95 per cent or more of

their addresses. Lysurgus, Demosthenes, and Aeschines, all products of the early fourth century, use ω 92 per cent, 90 per cent, and 78 per cent of the time respectively, and Dinarchus, the latest of them all, uses ω with only 79 per cent of his addresses. Menander, born later still, is down to 12 per cent, and this pattern of decline may well represent the actual evolution of Athenian speech in this period.

A few positive statements can be made about the contexts in which ω occurs. In prose and comedy it is generally the case that ω is not used with $\pi\alpha\iota$ addressed to slaves, but that $\omega \pi\alpha\iota$ is used to free addressees. This rule is valid over 90 per cent of the time (out of almost 200 examples), but there are a number of exceptions: Menander sometimes uses $\pi\alpha\iota$ without ω when addressed to a child, and Plato, Aristophanes, and Menander all use $\omega \pi\alpha\iota$ to slaves on occasion.¹⁰ A variety of explanations for the exceptions has been given (Scott 1905: 42; Loewe 1925: 140), but they remain puzzling. Nevertheless, the tendency to drop ω before $\pi\alpha\iota$ used to slaves is too pronounced to be accidental, and the peculiarity is not confined to $\pi\alpha\iota$. Euripides normally omits ω before addresses to servants using $\pi\rho\acute{o}\sigma\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\iota$, $\delta\mu\omega\epsilon\varsigma$, etc. (Scott 1905: 37–8), and in the orators ω is not used with $\mu\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\epsilon\varsigma$ 'witnesses' and $\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\tau\epsilon\upsilon$ 'clerk'.

Another tendency involves the word $\alpha\upsilon\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$. In Herodotus, only one out of the 38 addresses containing the word $\alpha\upsilon\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$ has ω , although ω is used freely in addresses like $\omega \text{ Ἀθηναῖοι}$. In the orators, on the other hand, over a thousand examples attest that ω was not normally omitted before $\alpha\upsilon\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$. In Thucydides and Xenophon ω is normally used with $\alpha\upsilon\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$ when the vocative is postpositive, but when an address containing $\alpha\upsilon\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$ stands first in the sentence it does not usually have ω . Most of the 78 vocatives without ω in Xenophon and nine such in Thucydides are instances of this rule, and it applies to some of the orators as well, although in their works a vocative very rarely begins a sentence.

In Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides ω is not normally used with unmodified personal names (Scott 1905: 38), and this rule seems to apply to Herodotus and Thucydides as well (Loewe 1925: 115, 129). It is difficult, however, to know how to interpret this fact given that thousands of examples in Plato and Xenophon show that ω is almost always used with names in those authors.

In most writers ω tends to be used with addresses consisting of

¹⁰ Men. *Dysk.* 741, *Samia* 148, *Dis* 52, *Kolax* fr. 1. 2; Ar. *Pax* 1153, *Ran.* 437, *Ach.* 432, 1136, 1137, 1140, *Vesp.* 1297; Plato, *Meno* 82b, 83c, 85b, *Symp.* 175b.

participles or substantive adjectives, and with addresses to inanimate objects. This rule, as Loewe has remarked (1925: 128), is caused by the need to make it clear that the word following ω is an address. It is, however, not without exceptions, and in any case it explains a very small percentage of the total number of vocatives.

Another factor which seems to make a difference to the use of ω is avoidance of hiatus. The only classical prose author in whose works this factor is certainly relevant is Demosthenes; in his works most of the cases of omission of ω occur before words beginning with a vowel.¹¹ This tendency does not, however, apply to $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$, which is usually (not always) preceded by ω . With words other than $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$, ω is used 82 per cent of the time with words beginning with a consonant but only 6 per cent of the time with words beginning with a vowel.¹² The fact that Demosthenes never uses ω in addressing Aeschines, which is often cited as a prime example of the contemptuous tone of addresses without ω , is more likely to be due to these phonetic factors: Demosthenes' opponents in other speeches are far more likely to be addressed without ω if their names begin with vowels than if they start with a consonant. It is also notable that Demosthenes uses addresses other than FN (primarily insults) to Aeschines 13 times in *De Corona*, and the 12 of those which begin with consonants all have ω , while the one beginning with a vowel does not.¹³ Another peculiarity of Demosthenes is that with all addresses, including those to the audience, he uses ω much less often in *De Corona* (39 per cent of vocatives) than in other speeches (94 per cent).

Although most authors believe firmly that the presence or absence of ω is in some way connected to the tone of the address, it is very difficult to make such theories work in practice. The very fact that Scott could talk about the 'familiar tone' of ω with the vocative (1905: 33) while Macurdy, using the same data, drew conclusions about the 'intimate dropping of the formal ω ' (1912: 78) indicates that the evidence is not entirely clear in either direction. Moreover the logical

¹¹ Cf. Brioso Sánchez (1971: 44-5); Gildersleeve and Miller have suggested (1903: (197) that this factor may apply to epic poetry as well, and Scott (1905: 40) maintains that in Aristophanes ω may be omitted after words ending in $-\omega$.

¹² Consonants: 96 examples, of which 79 with ω ; vowels: 62 examples, of which four with ω (all four from orations 48 and 57, both of which could be spurious). These statistics include all vocatives, whether names or not, since the percentages of ω for FN and non-FN address are more or less the same.

¹³ Consonants: 70, 82, 113, 121, 128, 162, 209 (*bis*), 244, 290, 312, 318; vowel: 243.

result of attempts to reconcile all evident exceptions with one theory or another leads to very dubious assertions. Thus Loewe was forced to argue that the absence of ω before certain types of words indicated respect and formality, whereas before other types of words it indicated lack of respect, and in still other circumstances it had no meaning at all (1925: 146, 148). Those scholars who simply claim that ω indicates emotion have an easier time of it, because a very high percentage of the addresses in literature contain emotion of one kind or another. In many authors words are not quoted in direct speech at all unless they are unusually important, and with a little ingenuity it is possible to find emotion in the majority of addresses to individuals outside Plato. Despite this fact, some counter-examples to the emotion hypothesis do exist (see below).

The difficulties with the meanings proposed for ω can be illustrated from virtually any author, but let us do so from Xenophon, as he has so far been cited in this context less often than Plato or Demosthenes. Twice in Xenophon (*Cyr.* 5. 3. 18, 6. 3. 35) Cyrus the Great is addressed as *Kύρε* 'Cyrus', without ω . In the first case he is being greeted formally and deferentially by his new ally Gadatas, and in the second the king of Susa is volunteering for a dangerous post in battle to show his gratitude to Cyrus. Both of these passages can be explained very well by the theory that the absence of ω is formal and reverential; they might also fit the argument that it is emotional. But they make it unlikely that omission of ω in Xenophon is familiar, or that it is peremptory or connected with censure or contempt. In a number of other passages where ω is not used the address could be argued to be either familiar or formal, but it is certainly not negative: Abradatas' farewell to his beloved wife Panthea (6. 4. 11), Cyrus' final prayer to Zeus (8. 7. 3), and the dying Cyrus' last instructions to his children and friends (8. 7. 6).

On the other hand, there are some addresses without ω which are neither formal nor reverential. These include an army officer saying *ἄνθρωπε, τί ποιεῖς*; 'man, what are you doing?' to a young recruit who has stepped out of line (2. 2. 7) and Cyrus giving orders to two of his officers before a battle (5. 3. 36, 5. 3. 42). It is equally unlikely that these addresses represent unusual familiarity, and the second two examples are difficult to construe as emotional, although the first might indicate surprise. On the other hand, all three could very well be described as peremptory, and the first has an element of censure to it as well. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that between the two orders without ω

comes an order to a third officer, in precisely the same context, and this address does have ω (5. 3. 42).

Xenophon's Socratic works provide calmer scenes and less emotional addresses, yet here too ω can be omitted. Such omission occurs twice in the *Memorabilia*, once when Socrates asks a friend where he has been (2. 8. 1) and again shortly afterwards when he gives the friend some advice (2. 8. 5). The first omission might possibly be due to surprise, but any emotion in the second is so slight that if this vocative is emotional, so is every address in the works of Xenophon.

Xenophon's evidence for the omission of ω is very slight, since almost all of his vocatives do take ω except those where $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$ begins a sentence. Nevertheless even such a tiny pool of evidence can provide counter-examples to every proposed meaning for the omission of ω . True, these counter-examples can be explained away; indeed many of them have been so explained. But dozens of other examples like them can be found in Plato and Demosthenes, not to mention Menander, and with every theory the exceptions come close to outnumbering the 'regular' cases.

Of course, there is also the problem of textual corruption. In many of the passages from Xenophon just cited, some manuscripts do indeed have ω before the vocative. The same is true for some of the Platonic exceptions, and it has been suggested (E. Thompson 1901: on 98a) that since ω could easily be lost it should simply be restored where missing in Plato. On the other hand, it is possible that scribes who were used to seeing ω before most prose vocatives could have added the particle to addresses where it did not originally belong, either out of habit or in a belief that it had fallen out earlier and needed to be restored. It is virtually certain that textual corruption is responsible for the presence or absence of ω in some passages in Greek prose, but it is not possible to say which passages those are, nor does the evidence justify emendation in either direction.

The search for a meaning for ω is probably futile. None of the meanings which have been proposed apply even to all the relevant passages within one author, let alone across authors. In Latin the addition of *o* to a vocative is significant, but it does not follow from that that Greek ω , which is far more common than Latin *o*, had the same or indeed any meaning. Given the widely varying practices of different authors, the only sensible explanation is that there was no 'rule' for the use of ω ; usage was in flux, and each speaker or writer had a slightly different system. We have seen that some authors had a

fairly consistent practice regarding the combination of ω with $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$, names, or words beginning with vowels, but such 'rules' apply only within certain authors, and others may have precisely the opposite practice. This variation indicates that such tendencies are not based on any deeper or more general meaning of ω and makes it virtually certain that no such meaning existed.

In the post-classical period the picture is somewhat clearer. The particle ω has vanished from modern Greek, and the evidence of papyri, inscriptions, the Septuagint, and the New Testament all indicate that it had already gone out of use even in the Hellenistic period (Mayser 1926-38: ii. i. 55). Epictetus uses ω with only 13 per cent of his vocatives, and many of those are addressed to literary characters from another age, such as ω Ἀχιλλεύ 'O Achilles' (1. 22. 6). Most of the other late authors in our corpus use ω more often, doubtless in imitation of classical writers. In many cases there does not seem to be a rule governing which addresses take ω and which do not, but some writers adhere to particular principles. Thus ω is never found with $\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$ in Philo or Josephus,¹⁴ and it is almost never used before words beginning with a vowel in Dionysius.¹⁵ In none of our late authors does it seem that emotional factors governed the use or omission of ω , but it has been argued that such factors do apply in other late works (Mayser 1926-38: ii. i. 55).

¹⁴ Twelve examples. Otherwise Philo uses ω 86% of the time and Josephus 81%.

¹⁵ Thirty-seven examples and four exceptions, assuming that Greek $\omicron\upsilon$ is not a vowel when it stands for Latin *v* (e.g. Οὐαλερία 'Valeria', 8. 41. 1). Otherwise ω is used 88% of the time.

5

Social Distinctions

In the preceding chapters we have discussed all the major types of address which occur in the works surveyed. Some facets of the way the Greek address system worked, however, cannot easily be seen from a discussion of the individual terms, since they concern certain types of speakers or addressees who use or receive a number of different kinds of address. In this chapter we shall examine selected groups of speakers and addressees to determine their usage of various terms.

This examination will be based on the address rules developed in the preceding chapters, which may be summarized as follows: in Greece the use of addresses was virtually obligatory in certain situations, such as the beginnings of conversations or orations (4.1). If the speaker was addressing a group, he could not use names, and therefore he normally employed a term which described the addressees, whether by their nationality or by some other characteristic which they shared (3.9). Other vocatives such as insults could be used to groups as well, but these often conveyed some emotion on the part of the speaker, whereas the descriptive addresses were neutral and much more common.

If the addressee was an individual, a more complicated set of rules determined which addresses were normal and which expressed some particular sentiment. For some types of addressee names were not appropriate (5.1-5.4), and other addresses could serve as neutral equivalents of FN. For most of the characters addressed in the works surveyed, however, the standard address was by name alone (3.1.1), and any other form of address could carry a special meaning. When speakers did not know an addressee's name, they used his or her most obvious distinguishing feature as an address: any deviation from the state of being an adult male native of the place where the conversation took place could distinguish an addressee, and failing such characteristics other features could be used in address (3.5.2). Such descriptive addresses were neutral when used to unknown addressees, although

they might have positive or negative connotations when used to named people. Indefinite addresses were used to people who had no obvious distinguishing features, and also to hypothetical or unspecified addressees (3.5.2).

5.1 DISTINCTIONS OF AGE

Of pronominal address usage in modern Greek it has recently been said, 'In general it is age more than any other social distinction that motivates paradigmatic choice in the Greek system, the formal expressions being typically used to address those much older than oneself' (Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990: 142). Yet in the ancient Greek address system age seems to have been a very minor factor. This section will not be able to provide an explanation for the different importance placed upon age in ancient and modern Greek, but we may at least be able to find what role age differences played in the ancient Greek address system.

In order to get an accurate picture of the effect of age on Greek address usage, we shall have to consider only those dyads in which more important factors are absent. The following discussion will therefore exclude most addresses to or from women, close relatives, and dead or non-human characters. The omission of dead men, which may seem surprising, is essential: if a man dies at age 50, and his favourite pupil (who is at that time only 20) lives to be 70, who is the elder when they meet in the underworld? We must avoid getting entangled in this type of situation.

These restrictions still leave us with a very large number of addressees, but the field is greatly reduced by the usual difficulty that the ages of most characters are not specified. Nevertheless, there are around 200 instances within the restrictions we have set where a significant difference in age clearly exists between speaker and addressee. It is to be remembered (cf. p. 64) that we are relying on the general context to determine ages, which are virtually never given in terms of years.

5.1.1 *Addresses to or from the young*

We have relatively few vocatives which are indubitably addressed to children¹ by people other than their parents, and most of these come

¹ For the general issue of youth in Greece, see Golden (1990) and Kleijwegt (1991).

from Plato, who in the *Lysis* provides twenty-nine addresses to the boys Lysis and Menexenus and who elsewhere has addresses to occasional real or imaginary children.² A few addresses to children are also found in a variety of other authors.³ In the *Lysis*, Socrates in addressing the boys singly or collectively uses names 55 per cent of the time, *παῖ* 'child' or *παῖδες* 'children' 17 per cent of the time, and other terms 28 per cent of the time. In the rest of Plato, children spoken to by people other than parents are nameless, and in consequence they almost always receive *παῖ* or *παῖδες*. In the other authors, unnamed boys receive *παῖ* (e.g. Lucian, *Demon.* 17) and named ones are most likely to be addressed by name (e.g. Joseph. *AJ* 5. 349) but can also receive *παῖ* or other terms such as insults.

ATs generally used for youths are occasionally applied to children as well (see 3.2.1.3). The use of other terms such as insults and FTs does not seem to vary with age; even *ἑταῖρε*, a word which one might expect to refer to companions of the speaker's own age or at least to adults, can be used by middle-aged men to boys (e.g. Socrates to Lysis: Plato, *Lys.* 216a).

When more than one child is addressed, the tendency to use *παῖδες* increases. If more than two children, or any number of unnamed children, are addressed, *παῖδες* is always used. If there are only two addressees, the use of both names is a common option, but less common than in the singular. In the *Lysis*, the boys addressed individually in the singular receive *παῖ* only once; when addressed together, they are called *παῖδες* four times and *Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξευε* 'Lysis and Menexenus' *vel sim.* five times. The difference is clearly due to the unwieldiness of using two or more names.

Thus the general rule seems to be that individual children whose names are known to the reader are more often addressed by name than with *παῖ* or other terms, but that unknown children receive *παῖ* as an address by primary distinguishing characteristic. Since being a child is an important distinguishing feature, children never receive indefinite addresses such as *ἄνθρωπε* 'human being' or *οὗτος* 'this one'.

I can find no evidence for addresses from one child to another, but it is highly probable that names would have been used. There are two instances of a child addressing a group of children, both using *παῖδες* (see p. 69).

² *Grg.* 521e, 522a; *Phdr.* 237b, 238d, 241c, 243e, 252b, 256e; *Laws* 772 e.

³ Plutarch, e.g. *Them.* 2. 2, *Cato* 2. 3, 3. 6; Lucian, e.g. *Dial. D.* 6. 1, 10. 1; Xen. *Symp.* 3. 13; Joseph. *AJ* 5. 349; Dio Chrys. 58. 5.

For addresses to youths and young men far more evidence exists than for children, and again much of it comes from Plato. Young characters in Plato include Theaetetus (*Theaetetus*, *Sophist*), the younger Socrates (*Politicus*), Hippothales (*Lysis*), Hippocrates (*Protagoras*), Cleinias (*Euthydemus*), Protarchus (*Philebus*), and even Socrates himself in the *Parmenides*. Other authors, especially Plutarch, are also informative.

The normal way of addressing young men is clearly by name, but most terms usable for adults are possible as well, as are the ATs *νεανία*, *νεανίσκος*, and *μειράκιον* 'young man'. Since young men's age is an important feature, they, like children, do not receive indefinite addresses. None the less, while age in children is an overriding distinguishing feature, in young men it is less so and may have to compete with other features when names are not used. For example, in Plutarch's dialogue *De Pythiae Oraculis* (*Mor.* 394d–409d), the character Diogenianus is both young and a foreign visitor; he is addressed four times as *παῖ*, twice as *ξένη* 'stranger', and three times with FTs.⁴

Addresses from one youth to another generally employ names but can also make use of ATs like *νεανίσκος*.⁵

When the addressee is too old to be considered a young man, an age difference is not normally taken into account in addressing him, no matter how much older the speaker is. If an AT is used, it is insulting, not neutral as when applied to young people.

When children or youths address unrelated adults, they use the same terms as adults use to each other. Usually, of course, this would be FN, which is amply attested: *Lysis* and Menexenus to Socrates, Socrates (aged *c.* 20) to Parmenides (aged *c.* 65), etc.⁶ Any other address used among adults can also come from boys or youths.⁷

Wendel's statistics do not tell us much about how young people use or receive addresses in poetry, but such evidence as there is suggests that poetry is no different from prose, except for the general rule that in poetry names are less frequent to addressees of all ages and ATs somewhat more frequent. The use of FN by children to their elders is shown particularly well in Herodas, where a boy uses FN to plead

⁴ *Παῖ*: 395e (*bis*), 397d, 404b; *ξένη*: 396b, 405f; FTs: 398e, 401a, 405a.

⁵ Names: Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 27, 5. 4. 33, etc.; ATs: Lucian, *DI* 7, *Ach.* 2. 33. 2.

⁶ Plato, *Lys.* 207e, 213b, etc.; *Parm.* 128a, etc.; Epict. 1. 9. 12; Plut. *Ant.* 28. 9; Polyb. 31. 23. 9, etc.

⁷ *Βασιλεῦ*: Joseph. *AJ* 6. 179, 12. 178; *δέσποτα*: Hdt. 1. 115. 2; *βέλτιστε*: Lucian, *Dial.* D. 10. 2; *ξένη*: Dio Chrys. 7. 71, 36. 14; *ἄνθρωπε*: Hdt. 1. 85. 4, Lucian, *Dial.* D. 10. 1; ethnics to servants: Σάκα: Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 3. 9.

with the schoolmaster who is beating him (3. 71, 77, 81). Menander's usage is, on the whole, very similar to that of prose; he does not portray any children, but his young men can both give and receive FN freely with their elders. They also receive *μειράκιον* 'young man' and *τρόφιμε* 'nursling' (from older servants).⁸ *Μειράκιον* can also be used between two young men of the same age.⁹ Menander also provides a number of addresses to babies by women who are not their mothers; in these names never occur, but terms of pity or endearment are used, sometimes combined with *τέκνον* 'child'.¹⁰

5.1.2 Addresses to or from the old

Addresses by and to old men are also relatively straightforward.¹¹ Old men are usually addressed by name, and our data include only one example of an AT used to an old man (*γέρον* 'old man', Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 22. 9). When KT's are used to unrelated old men, they are of course KT's showing the addressee's greater age, but KT's are no more frequent to old than to young non-relatives. There is no limit on how old a man can be addressed by name, nor on how young a person may address him. Thus Socrates addresses both the aged Cephalus (*Plato, Rep.* 328d, etc.) and the elderly Gorgias (*Grg.* 448d, etc.) by name on many occasions, and Socrates' disciple Chairephon also uses FN to Gorgias (*Grg.* 447d, etc.). This usage is by no means confined to Plato, and in Plutarch's dialogue *De Genio Socratis* many characters address the aged Simmias by name (*Mor.* 582e, etc.). Most other types of address are also possible to old men, including FT's and *ἄνθρωπε*.¹²

When addressing younger people, the elderly appear to use the same addresses that anyone else would use. In addition to FN, these include indefinite addresses, AT's, and titles.¹³ There is no evidence that advanced age gave a Greek the right to address superiors more familiarly or inferiors more condescendingly than would a younger man.¹⁴

Wendel's work does not tell us much about addresses involving old

⁸ *Μειράκιον*: *Dysk.* 729, *Samia* 718, *Sik.* 274; *τρόφιμε*: *Pk.* 292, *Aspis* 2, *Phasma* 41.

⁹ *Dysk.* 269, 299, 311, 342, 539.

¹⁰ *Samia* 242, 243, *Epitr.* 466, 856.

¹¹ For the larger issue of old age in antiquity see Falkner and de Luce (1989).

¹² *Φίλε Σιμμία*: *Plut. Mor.* 585d; *ἄνθρωπε*: *Plut. M. Cato* 9. 10; *Epict.* 1. 22. 20.

¹³ e.g. *Plut. Mor.* 222a; *Dio Chrys.* 36. 24; *Plato, Rep.* 329c; *Diod. Sic.* 17. 51. 1.

¹⁴ Plutarch's explanation of the name 'Hecaline' (*Thes.* 14. 2) could be taken as a statement that old people were more likely to use diminutive addresses in Greek, but such an interpretation of the passage is uncertain (the suffix *-ινος* is not necessarily a diminutive, and *ὑποκορίζομαι* does not necessarily mean 'use diminutives').

people in poetry, but comedy shows a system somewhat different from that of prose. In Menander old women servants are often addressed as *γραιῦ* 'old woman' or *γραιδιον* 'little old woman', but the same women can also be addressed by name, and older women who appear to be free are always addressed by name or with FTs.¹⁵ In Aristophanes free women too may be addressed as 'old woman', often in fairly impolite speeches.¹⁶ It is possible that these addresses were used to old women in conversational Greek, although they are not found in prose (see p. 84). There are no extremely old men in Menander, but men the age of the young men's fathers are addressed freely by name. They are also addressed as *πάτερ* 'father' by strangers trying to be polite; sometimes the speaker is younger than the addressee, but often the speaker's age is unknown.¹⁷ In Aristophanes old men may be addressed with terms meaning 'old man' as well as by name, but as we have noted (p. 84) the scarcity of such addresses in prose and Menander suggests that they may not have been current in conversational language.

5.1.3 Conclusion

Thus the only effects of age on the Greek address system are to introduce ATs as a possible alternative to names when the addressee is conspicuously young or old and to provide a distinguishing feature for addressing nameless people, thus eliminating the use of indefinite addresses in the case of children, young men, and some old people. In most cases, however, names are used as if the age factor did not exist. This situation is very unusual among address systems studied by sociolinguists. In modern Greek it is considered rude to call an older person by FN.¹⁸ In English it is not normal to address by his or her first name someone substantially older than oneself, and this is the more true the younger the speaker. A child who addressed a middle-aged man whom he did not know by his first name instead of TLN would usually be considered rude even today, and it is not so very long ago that the child might have been expected to say 'sir'. This difference cannot be explained simply by the absence of the FN/TLN distinction from Greek, for in many languages elders are addressed with terms such as KT or 'sir' which fall outside such divisions;

¹⁵ Slaves: *Dysk.* 636, 926, *Epitr.* 1062, 1119; free: *Georg.* 22, 28, 87 (FT).

¹⁶ e.g. *Lys.* 506, 637, 797, *Eccl.* 904, 1000.

¹⁷ Younger: *Sik.* 379, 381, *Dysk.* 171; age unknown: *Dysk.* 107, *Epitr.* 231, 296, etc.

¹⁸ Information from native speakers.

although a distinction by age in address is common to many languages, the term used to express it may vary.

Thus in Kannada respected elders are much less likely to be addressed by name than are people of the speaker's own age (Bean 1978: 101), and in some types of Turkish elders normally receive KTs in address (Laude-Cirtautas 1981: 246). In Korean, age is one of the most important factors in address, and an age difference of three years or more will usually produce non-reciprocal addresses, even among children (Hwang 1975: 44-6, 60). Age is also a crucial factor in address usage in Icelandic, Canadian French, Turkish, Slovene, Portuguese, Italian, and many other languages.¹⁹ In many languages age is at least partially equated with rank, and one uses the same addresses to elders as to superiors. Such a situation exists to some extent in English with TLN, as well as in many languages that have a T/V pronoun distinction.²⁰

In some languages this equation of age and rank is more pronounced than in English (Kridalaksana 1974: 18), and in Greek it can also be seen, although not as extensively as in some other languages. The use of *παῖ* 'boy' as an address for slaves is such a phenomenon, as is the use of *νεανία*, *νεανίσκος*, and *μειράκιον* 'young man' as derogatory terms for adults. This connection of age and rank seems to occur only with ATs referring to youth in Greek; there is no similarity between *γέρον* 'old man' or *γραιῦ* 'old woman' and the titles used to rulers.

In some languages studies of the ages of speakers and addressees using various terms have enabled researchers to draw conclusions about the age at which children became adults in the society concerned. Although the lack of evidence in our texts about characters' precise ages makes it impossible to draw such conclusions about Greek, our survey does enable us to say that Greek does not make a binary distinction between 'child' and 'adult' as in English. Analyses of English address systems divide speakers and addressees simply into children and adults (e.g. Ervin-Tripp 1969: 227). Although there may be difficulties in knowing exactly where to draw the line, since there are essentially two address possibilities (FN or TLN), people do in fact have to belong to one or the other of two systems at the moment of any given address, even if they may be classified differently in different dyads.

¹⁹ Schubert (1984: 64); Lambert and Tucker (1976: 145-6); Başoğlu (1987: 298); Kess and Juričić (1978: 309); Kilbury-Meissner (1982: 141); Bates and Benigni (1975: 283).

²⁰ For the English equation see Webster (1988: 91).

In Greek this is not the case. There is one class of people who are referred to as *παῖς* 'child' and addressed as *παῖ* or by name, another which is referred to as *νεανίας*, *νεανίσκος*, or *μειράκιον* 'young man' and addressed with these terms, *παῖ*, or names, and a third which is fully adult and does not receive ATs except in a derogatory sense. These categories can be clearly seen in Menander when the characters address the audience at the end of the plays, for they do not divide their listeners into adults and children, but into *μειράκια*, *παῖδες*, *ἄνδρες* 'youths, boys, and men' (*Dysk.* 967) or *παῖδες καλοί*, *μειράκια*, *γέροντες*, *ἄνδρες* 'handsome boys, youths, elders, and men' (*Samia* 733).²¹

5.2 DISTINCTIONS OF KINSHIP

PAN. Χαίρε, ὦ πάτερ Ἑρμῆ.

HERMES. Νῆ καὶ σύ γε. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐγὼ σὸς πατήρ; . . .

PAN. Ὅσα ἂν ἀποσκώψῃς εἰς ἐμέ, τὸν σεαυτοῦ υἱόν, ὦ πάτερ, ἐπονείδιστον ἀποφαίνεις, μᾶλλον δὲ σεαυτόν . . .

PAN. Καὶ μὴν οὐ καταισχυνῶ σε, ὦ πάτερ . . . ἦν γοῦν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἔλθῃς, εἴσῃ ὅσον ἐκεῖ τοῦ Πανὸς τὸ ὄνομα.

HERMES. Εἰπέ δέ μοι, γεγάμηκας, ὦ Πάν, ἤδη; τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, καλοῦσίν σε.

PAN. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ πάτερ . . .

HERMES. Οἶσθα οὖν, ὦ τέκνον, ὅ τι χάριση τὸ πρῶτον αἰτοῦντί μοι;

PAN. Πρόσταττε, ὦ πάτερ· ἡμεῖς μὲν εἰδῶμεν ταῦτα.

HERMES. Καὶ πρόσσιθί μοι καὶ φιλοφρονοῦ· πατέρα δὲ ὄρα μὴ καλέσῃς με ἄλλου ἀκούοντος.

PAN. Greetings, Hermes my father.

HERMES. Greetings to you too. But how am I your father? . . .

PAN. With every joke you make against me, father, you bring disrepute upon your own son, or rather on yourself . . .

PAN. But indeed I will not disgrace you, father . . . At any rate, if you go to Athens you will find out how great the name of Pan is there.

HERMES. But tell me, are you married yet, Pan? For that's what they call you, I think.

PAN. Certainly not, father . . .

HERMES. Do you know, son, how you could make me very happy? I've never asked you a favour before.

PAN. Just give the order, father; let me know it [and I shall do it at once].

²¹ Cf. also Xen. *Symp.* 4. 17.

HERMES. You may come to me and greet me, but see that you don't call me 'father' when anyone else is listening.

When Hermes first meets his son Pan in Lucian (*Dial. D.* 2), the different possible addresses between father and son are manipulated by both characters to further their own ends. Pan consistently uses *πάτερ* 'father' in his attempt to make Hermes admit the relationship, and Hermes at first uses no addresses, then names, in order to distance himself from Pan; later, however, when his desire to get Pan to co-operate with him in concealing the relationship overcomes his antipathy to the kinship, he uses the KT *τέκνον* 'child' to cajole Pan into agreeing. Such manipulation of address usage was only effective because there were rules about addresses between kinsmen which were known to Lucian's readers.

In discussing addresses between kinsmen, we shall have to set aside some of the evidence, as we did for the examination of age differences. For the present, we shall ignore those situations in which both members of the dyad are dead or in which one or both are not human.

5.2.1 *Dyads in which the addressee belongs to a younger generation than the speaker*

The largest group of addresses to younger relatives comprises that of fathers to sons, which alone contains over 100 addresses from nearly all of the authors surveyed. Sons who are definitely children are never addressed by name, although their names may be perfectly well known to both author and reader.²² They always receive a KT, whether the context is a rebuke (Philo, *Jos.* 9), enthusiastic praise (Plut. *Alex.* 6. 8), or anything in between. This usage is notably different from the way that children are addressed by unrelated adults, who tend to use FN (see 5.1.1); thus in Xenophon's *Symposium* the boy Autolycus is addressed as *υιέ* 'son' by his father (2. 5) but as *Αὐτόλυκε* 'Autolycus' by the other guests (3. 13). No special KT is reserved for children; in addition to *υιέ* there are several examples of *τέκνον* 'child' and even more of *παῖ* 'child'.

Sons who are young men can sometimes be addressed by name (Long. 4. 24. 3; Plut. *Publ.* 6. 2, etc.), but this usage is rarer than that of KTs. The youngest son to be addressed by name by his father is described as a *μειράκιον* 'young man' (Dio Chrys. 2. 8, etc., cf. 2. 1

²² e.g. Xen. *Symp.* 2. 5; Philo, *Abr.* 175; Plut. *Alex.* 6. 8; Joseph. *AJ* 7. 374.

μειράκιον ὄντα), but few sons addressed by name are less than fully adult in terms of their role in society. The vast majority of addresses to youthful sons use *παῖ*, but *υἱέ* occurs once (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 26), and *τέκνον* is not uncommon, although when it is addressed to sons of this age, they are almost always dead or dying.²³ When the addressee is a child the connection of *τέκνον* with emotional crises is much weaker, but for youths the function of *τέκνον* as an address which emphasizes kinship is very obvious. Addresses other than KT's or names are extremely rare and are confined to laments for the dead and rebukes addressed to older sons.²⁴

Sons who are unquestionably adults are more frequently addressed by name than those who are young, but *παῖ* is still a common form of address. Thus *παῖ* is used both to a consul (Plut. *Mor.* 196a) and to a general (Plut. *Fab.* 24. 4). The only other KT which occurs in this context is *παιδίον* 'little child', which is used only once, between a father and son who are represented as being especially close (Plut. *Demetr.* 19. 8). No addresses other than names and KT's are used to sons who are definitely adults, but insults are sometimes used to sons who are probably adults.

Thus there appears to be a progression from children, who always receive KT's, through young men, who usually receive KT's but can sometimes be addressed by name, to adult sons, who are often addressed by name but often receive KT's as well. In one case we have a chance to observe this progression within one relationship, that of Cyrus and his father in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. When Cyrus' father instructs him in generalship at the beginning of the *Cyropaedia*, he uses *παῖ* 'child' frequently and no other addresses (*Cyr.* 1. 6. 2 ff.). At this time Cyrus has completed the boyhood training of the Persians and is therefore at least 27 years old (*Cyr.* 1. 2. 8-9, 1. 5. 4). Cyrus then embarks on his career of conquest and is not addressed by his father again until he returns to Persia at the end of it, at which point he consistently receives *Κῦρε* 'Cyrus' (*Cyr.* 8. 5. 22 ff.). By modern standards, and according to Xenophon by Persian ones, Cyrus at 27 is certainly an adult, and no one but his father addresses him as *παῖ*. Clearly the boundary between a son who could be addressed as *παῖ* and one who would more naturally receive FN is set at a fairly advanced age in Greek.

²³ e.g. Philo, *Jos.* 23; Joseph. *AJ* 7. 252; Lucian, *Tyr.* 20, *Luct.* 13 ff.; counter-example Lucian, *Abd.* 22.

²⁴ Plut. *Cato* 68. 7; Philo, *LA* 3. 179; Joseph. *BJ* 1. 618; Ach. 1. 13. 5.

The above is not meant to suggest that once a son is addressed by name he can not be called *παῖ* again, for sometimes there is considerable fluctuation in address. Thus when Dio describes Philip talking to the young Alexander (Dio Chrys. 2, *passim*), Alexander is addressed six times as *Ἀλέξανδρε* 'Alexander' and three times as *παῖ*, all in one conversation. In Cyrus' case, however, there are a large number of addresses and no fluctuation at all.

In the plural, sons of any age are addressed only with KT's. The usual address is *παῖδες* 'children', and the only alternative is *τέκνα* 'children'.

Addresses by mothers to sons, although less common than those by fathers, are still fairly frequent in our data and seem to follow a similar pattern. Mothers, like fathers, use only KT's when addressing sons who are clearly children, and either *παῖ* or *τέκνον* can be used, with *παῖ* being more common.²⁵ Addresses by mothers to young men are also usually by KT. Unlike fathers, mothers use *τέκνον* freely to living as well as dead sons who are out of childhood (indeed *παῖ* is no more common than *τέκνον* in this category),²⁶ and they very rarely use FN to sons who are less than fully adult. Like fathers, however, mothers do not tend to use other terms to sons in this category, except insults directed to relatively mature sons (Plut. *Mor.* 241b).

Mothers address fully adult sons more often than do fathers in our corpus, but this is due mainly to the story of Coriolanus' mother, which is told by both Plutarch and Dionysius and makes lavish use of addresses. When addressing adult sons, mothers do sometimes use names (e.g. Dion. Hal. 8. 49. 6), but KT's or a combination of names and KT's are more common (e.g. Dion. Hal. 8. 46. 2). The KT used can be either *παῖ* or *τέκνον*, and the two are again about equally frequent. Mothers of monarchs can also use titles to their sons.

Mothers address sons in the plural very rarely in our data; in the one example we have the address used is *τέκνα* (Plut. *Ag. & Cl.* 59. 9).

The difference between the ways that mothers and fathers address their sons, then, seems to be that mothers treat sons as younger than fathers do. Both parents address young children in the same way, but fathers usually stop using *τέκνον* as soon as the son is a *μειράκιον* 'young man', except for emotional crises, while mothers continue using it freely even to adult sons. Likewise, fathers begin using FN to sons earlier than do mothers and use it more freely to adult sons.

²⁵ e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 3. 11 ff.; Joseph. *Ag.* 8. 7; Plut. *Mor.* 252d.

²⁶ e.g. *παῖ*: Hdt. 6. 69. 1 ff.; *τέκνον*: Plut. *Mor.* 241c ff.

For daughters, who are addressed much less often than sons in our sample, fathers always use a KT, usually *θύγατερ* 'daughter', which can be used equally well to small children (Plut. *Aem.* 10. 8) and married women (Hdt. 3. 69. 2). Other possibilities are *θυγάτριον* 'little daughter' and *τέκνον* 'child'. Of all of these the passages involving *τέκνον* are by far the most emotional, so for daughters as well as sons it seems that *τέκνον* is an address which emphasizes the closeness of parent and child (cf. 3.2.1.2).

All of the evidence in our corpus for addresses from mothers to daughters concerns young women, and thus we have no information on variation in age. Within this evidence, the pattern is one of free alternation between *θύγατερ* and names, with names being more common but *θύγατερ* not infrequent. *Τέκνον* is once used to a dead daughter, and insults also occur.²⁷

It is thus possible that in Greek offspring were more likely to be addressed by name by the parent of their own sex, but our evidence is not conclusive. Apart from this difference, there is nothing in the information we have on addresses to daughters which contradicts the idea that they were addressed basically the same way as sons, with *θύγατερ* replacing *παῖ* and, to some extent, *τέκνον*.

Other relationships are less well documented than those between parents and children. In the case of uncles addressing their nephews there are a total of twenty-eight addresses, but these come from only five different dyads. Two of the nephews are young; one of these is referred to as a *μειράκιον* 'young man' and addressed as *παῖ* (Plut. *Oth.* 16. 2-4) and the other receives *τέκνον* (Ach. 8. 4. 3). Xenophon's Cyrus is first addressed by his uncle Cyaxares when he is aged at least 27 and is in full command of the Persian army (*Cyr.* 2. 1. 8), and both at that time and in all the later conversations he is called *Κῦρε* 'Cyrus'. In Dionysius, the decemvir Appius Claudius is addressed repeatedly by his uncle as *Ἀππιε* 'Appius', but also once as *Ἀππιε τέκνον* (Dion. Hal. 11. 9. 1 ff., 11. 13. 5). In Herodotus, Xerxes has recently succeeded to the throne and is contemplating the conquest of Greece while being advised by his uncle Artabanus, who usually addresses him as *βασιλεῦ* 'king' but once uses *παῖ* (7. 10 ff., 7. 16b2).

The term for 'nephew' in referential usage is *ἀδελφιδούς*, but this word is not used as an address in Greek. It is a common linguistic phenomenon for some KTs to be usable only in reference and to be replaced in vocative usage by KTs with a different lexical meaning,

²⁷ Lucian, *Dial. Meret.* 2, 3, 6, 7; Ach. 2. 24. 1-3; Char. 3. 4. 2.

and it is often the rarer KT's that are so replaced in address with more common ones, as here. Thus for example in Turkish one's mother's brother's son is referred to with the KT *dayioğlu* but addressed as *kardeş*, 'younger brother' or *ağabey* 'older brother', depending on whether he is older or younger than the speaker (Başoğlu 1987: 89).

It thus seems that in Greek young nephews were probably addressed by KT, but adult ones certainly received names most of the time. When KT's are used, *παῖ* is preferred to *τέκνον*, and KT's to adult nephews are used only occasionally to emphasize the position of an uncle who usually uses other terms. Uncles thus fall between parents, who often use *παῖ* and *τέκνον* to adult sons, and unrelated elders, who virtually never do so.

Information on addresses involving aunts, nieces, grandmothers, and granddaughters is non-existent, so the only remaining category of younger kin is grandsons addressed by grandfathers. This group is represented by seventeen addresses from four different dyads, and all but one of the addresses are *παῖ* or *παῖδες*. Most of them come from the boy Cyrus' conversations with his grandfather Astyages in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (1. 3. 4 ff.). At the beginning of these conversations Cyrus is about 12 years old, and at the end he is 15 or 16, but the address used to him is always *παῖ*, except for one occurrence of *Κῦρε* near the beginning (1. 3. 10). In Herodotus' version of the same story (1. 121), Cyrus is a child, and the address used is likewise *παῖ*. Elsewhere grandsons are children or youths and are always addressed as *παῖ* or *παῖδες* (Hdt. 3. 50. 3; Plut. *Cic.* 49. 5). Like uncles, grandfathers are using a KT which would not be appropriate in referential usage, for the word for 'grandson' is *υἱοῦς* or *υἱεύς*, which is not found as a vocative in our data.

It seems that grandsons receive many more KT's than do nephews, but this difference is probably due to addressee age, for the grandsons addressed in our data are much younger than the nephews. The example of Cyrus and Astyages suggests that grandfathers may use KT's less consistently than do fathers, for the use of FN to a boy as young as 12 is not paralleled among the addresses by parents, but clearly they can use KT's much more than would unrelated elders.

It thus seems that, in prose, parents have a very strong tendency to use KT's to their offspring, while uncles and grandfathers have a less strong but still noticeable tendency in the same direction. Wendel's evidence does not allow us to draw conclusions about tragic usage, but the practice in Menander is clearly much the same as that in prose.

There are no children in Menander, nor any fully adult offspring, only young men and women. The young men are most often addressed by name by their fathers, but *παῖ* is also frequent, and insults or derogatory terms occasionally occur.²⁸ There are no certain examples of address by a mother; in the cases where a mother could be the speaker, *παῖ* is used (*Sik.* 286, 296). Fathers addressing daughters almost always use KT's, but they can occasionally employ names or, once, *φιλτάτη* 'dearest'.²⁹ There is one possible example of an address by a mother to a daughter; the address is by name, but the addressee may be a maid, so we cannot draw too many conclusions from it (*Dysk.* 430).³⁰

Addresses to younger relatives in Aristophanes are much more varied than in prose or Menander, but the outlines of the prose address system can still be seen. Boys in Aristophanes are normally addressed as *παῖ* or *παιδίον* by their fathers (*Vesp.* 290, 293, 296), and young men can receive FN (*Nub.* 80, 827) or KT's (*Nub.* 87, 1170), but other terms such as insults are very common to young men and can also be used to boys (*Nub.* 1325, etc., *Vesp.* 252). The one fully adult son who is addressed by his father in Aristophanes, Bdelycleon in the *Wasps*, never receives FN or KT's, but only other addresses (*Vesp.* 829, 854, 920). Parents generally use KT's or AT's to daughters (*Ach.* 244, 253, *Pax* 119), but other terms can be used as well (*Pax* 137, *Ach.* 778). It seems from these addresses that Aristophanes was working from basically the same address system as that in prose, including the tendency for KT's to be used more often to younger than to older children, but that he often included abnormal addresses as well to add comic colour to the monotony of the standard address pattern.

5.2.2 *Dyads in which the addressee belongs to an older generation than the speaker*

The most common addresses to relatives of an older generation, not surprisingly, are those from sons to fathers, which number seventy-nine, with examples from nearly all of the works surveyed. All of these use the same address, *πάτερ* 'father'. There are no examples of a father addressed by a son who is definitely a child, but it is virtually certain

²⁸ FN: e.g. *Samia* 452, 465, *Dysk.* 779, 813; *παῖ*: e.g. *Samia* 129, 148, *Dis* 52; *κάθαρμα* *σύ*: *Samia* 481.

²⁹ *Θύγατερ*: *Dysk.* 740, *Pap. Ghôran* 2, line 101, etc.; *θυγάτριον*: *Mis.* 438, *Dysk.* 700; *τέκνον*: *Pk.* 804, *Mis.* 214; *παιδίον*: *Pk.* 802, *Mis.* 212; FN: *Mis.* 252, *Epitr.* 717; *φιλτάτη*: *Pk.* 824.

³⁰ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973: ad loc.) and Handley (1965: ad loc.).

that the address used there would be *πάτερ* as well. Young men and adults are well represented, and there does not seem to be any upper age limit on the use of *πάτερ*. Examples of adult sons who use it include the successful general Antigonos (Plut. *Demetr.* 40. 3) and the long-independent Antipater, son of Herod (Joseph. *Bf* 1. 621), as well as Cyrus aged at least 27 (Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 6. 3 ff.).

Addresses from daughters to fathers are far less frequent, with only twelve examples in our data, but it is clear that they behave in the same way as those from sons to fathers: only *πάτερ* is used. Despite the small sample there is a greater range of ages among the daughters, with three addresses indubitably coming from children and several more from fully adult women.³¹ It is thus unlikely that there is any age limit for the use of *πάτερ* among daughters.

Addresses from sons to mothers are more common, with twenty-three examples. A wide variety of authors is represented, and in all of them the usual address is *μήτερ* 'mother', which is used in all but one example. The only other address, *ταλαίπωρε* 'miserable', is an expression of pity from an adult son to his mother (Dion. Hal. 8. 47. 4). Adult sons are well represented in the data, as are children,³² so there were probably no age limits on the use of *μήτερ*.

The works surveyed contain only twelve examples of addresses from daughters to mothers, and as in the case of addresses from mothers to daughters all of the daughters are young women. Nine of these addresses use *μήτερ*, and the others use diminutives of *μήτερ*. It thus seems that daughters, like sons, always used KTs to their mothers, but that they also had the option of using diminutives. It is worth noting in this context that in Homer, despite the overwhelming preponderance of addresses from sons to parents over addresses from daughters to parents, the only variation of a KT used to a parent comes from a girl: *πάππα* 'papa' from Nausicaa, *Od.* 6. 57. In some languages the use of diminutives is typical of women's speech (Başoğlu 1987: 81), and it is possible that we have here traces of a similar phenomenon in Greek.³³

Addresses from nephews to uncles are numerous, but most of the

³¹ Children: Hdt. 5. 51. 2, Plut. *Aem.* 10. 7, *Mor.* 240d; women: Dion. Hal. 4. 66. 2, 4. 66. 3, Plut. *Ag. & Cl.* 17. 5.

³² Adults: Dion. Hal. 8. 41. 3 ff., Plut. *Cor.* 36. 5, *Caes.* 7. 3; children: Hdt. 3. 3. 3, Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 3. 2, 1. 3. 15 ff.

³³ Gilleland (1980: 181) gives evidence for the use of diminutives as characteristic of female speech in ancient Greece, and Bain (1984: 37–8) suggests that *πάππα* may indeed be women's language. On the other hand, Sommerstein (1995: 76–7) thinks that diminutives may have been characteristic of male speech.

examples come from two dyads, Xerxes and Artabanus in Herodotus and Cyrus and Cyaxares in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. In only one case is the nephew a child: the 14-year-old Cyrus, who uses *θεῖε* 'uncle' (1. 4. 9). When Cyrus next meets his uncle he is aged over 27 and consistently uses *Κυαξάρη* 'Cyaxares' (2. 4. 6, etc.) except in one very emotional scene where he is trying to soothe his distraught uncle and reconcile him to himself (5. 5. 8, 5. 5. 35), where he again uses *θεῖε*. Xerxes too addresses his uncle consistently by name (Hdt. 7. 11. 1 ff., 7. 47. 1 ff.), except for one FT (7. 48). The usage lying behind this is probably that children addressed their uncles as *θεῖε*, but adults used FN except in very special situations. A young man in Achilles Tatius consistently addresses his uncle as *πάτερ* (8. 5. 5-7, 8. 17. 2), but this appears to be a post-classical usage.

For addresses from grandsons to grandfathers there are fifteen examples, all of which come from Cyrus' conversations with Astyages in Xenophon. The address used is always *πάππε* 'grandfather'. It would be unsafe to make generalizations from this usage about the age, if any, at which grandsons stopped using *πάππε* and began to use names.

Thus the rules for addressing older relatives are different from those for addressing younger ones. Whereas grandsons and nephews did not receive in the vocative the KT's that stood for their specific relationship in referential usage, but were addressed with *παῖ* 'child' like sons, uncles and grandfathers received the KT's appropriate to their particular position in classical Greek. This situation is paralleled in modern English, where a child may well address his older relatives as 'Grandfather' and 'Uncle John' but is less likely to be addressed as 'Grandson' or 'Nephew' in return. Another difference between the generations is that sons and daughters are addressed by name more and more the older they get, while parents always receive KT's regardless of the age of the speaker. Uncles, however, do seem to be addressed with FN more often as their nephews grow up.

In Menander there are no addresses to grandfathers and only one to an uncle; the term used is *θεῖε* 'uncle', but as the nephew believes his uncle to be dead this is a highly emotional address and would call for a KT regardless of the age of the speaker (*Aspis* 504). In addresses to parents names are never used, but diminutive and endearing expressions are more common in Menander than in prose. As in prose, these expressions are used primarily by daughters rather than by sons, but here the addressee is the father not the mother, for mothers in

Menander are very rarely addressed. In addressing fathers, sons generally use *πάτερ* 'father', with one example of *παππία* 'papa', while daughters use *πάππα* 'papa', *πάτερ*, and, once, *φίλτατε* 'dearest'.³⁴

A very different picture emerges from Aristophanes. There *πάτερ* and its variants *παππία*, *παππίδιον*, and *πατρίδιον* are fairly common and used by sons ranging in age from children to full adults (*Vesp.* 248 ff., 975 ff., *Nub.* 35 etc.), but nevertheless they account for only slightly more than half of the addresses from sons to fathers. Other terms such as FTs and insults occur frequently (e.g. *Nub.* 816, 858, *Vesp.* 751, 1145). All addresses from daughters to fathers use *πάτερ* or *παππία* (*Pax* 114, 118, 128, 131); the daughter involved is clearly a child, and sons who are children likewise use only KT's (*Vesp.* 248, 292, 297, 303). This might suggest that Aristophanes was following a system whereby children always used KT's to their parents and older offspring could employ a wider range of addresses, but it is more likely that the difference is due to other factors. The children who use only KT's to their parents are nameless characters introduced briefly for the sake of a domestic scene; the whole point of their presence is their status as their parents' children, and in consequence they use the address forms appropriate to that role. The only characters who use other terms to address their fathers are Pheidippides in the *Clouds* and Bdelycleon in the *Wasps*. Both of these sons are major characters in their own right, and as their relationship is not the only point of their existence, they can be made to use any type of address form which suits the point the poet is making at the moment. Unlike the nameless children, Pheidippides and Bdelycleon often interact with their fathers in improbable, comic ways, and thus it is only to be expected that they will use improbable forms of address as well.

5.2.3 *Dyads in which speaker and addressee belong to the same generation*

Among addresses to relatives of the speaker's own generation the most common are those from husband to wife, which are found in a wide variety of authors. Most of these use the address *γύναι* 'wife, woman', but there are also a number of instances of FN.³⁵ Other addresses are

³⁴ Sons: *πάτερ*: *Dysk.* 754, 784, etc., *Samia* 128, 452, etc.; *παππία*: *Dysk.* 856. Daughters: *πάππα*: *Mis.* 213, 248, 439; *πάτερ*: *Mis.* 254, *Pap.* Didot 1; *φίλτατε*: *Mis.* 213.

³⁵ Mostly in the novelists: *Char.* 5. 10. 8, 8. 1. 8, etc.; in other authors only seven: *Xen. Cyr.* 6. 1. 47, 6. 4. 11; *Dion. Hal.* 8. 41. 4, 8. 45. 2; *Joseph. AJ* 17. 352; *Plut. Grac.* 4. 3, *Pomp.* 75. 1.

occasionally found, particularly reproaches and FTs.³⁶ The difference between FN and *γύναι* is not easy to find. *Γύναι* occurs in a wide variety of authors, and almost all the authors who use FN for wives also use *γύναι*, and use *γύναι* more often. *Γύναι* can be used in all situations, from rebukes and anger³⁷ to praise, kindness, or agreement.³⁸ Names too are used in situations ranging from rebukes (Joseph. *AJ* 17. 352) to love and comfort.³⁹ Thus the difference between the two is not one of author preference, nor is it one of positive or negative contexts.

A clue as to the difference can be gained by looking at one couple which uses both modes of address, Panthea and Abradatas in Xenophon. Abradatas uses *Πάνθηα* 'Panthea' twice to his wife, once when he is first reunited with her after she had been captured and once when he bids farewell to her before going off to the battle in which he is killed (*Cyr.* 6. 1. 47, 6. 4. 11). He also uses *γύναι* once, in a question about his armour (6. 4. 3). The difference here is one of emotional intensity, and this factor may well provide the key to the two forms of address. All of the uses of FN to wives are in situations of at least some emotional intensity, and often a great deal, such as Coriolanus' farewell to his wife as he goes into exile. Many of the uses of *γύναι* occur in less emotional contexts, such as Ischomachus' instructions to his wife (*Xen. Oec.* 7. 10 ff.), although a few do not (e.g. Long. 4. 18. 3). It is true that Plutarch consistently uses *γύναι* to his wife in consoling her upon the death of their daughter, but the address forms used here may reflect the fact that Plutarch is urging his wife to moderate her grief and trying to display self-control (*Mor.* 608c).

Addresses from men to women with whom they have a close relationship but to whom they are not actually married are much rarer than addresses to wives; in those that do occur *γύναι* is never used, and names are the usual mode of address.⁴⁰

Addresses from wives to husbands are equally varied. *ἄνερ* 'husband' occurs nine times alone or with modifiers, and FN alone occurs frequently.⁴¹ Titles, insults, and FTs are also possible, particularly

³⁶ Xen. *Cyr.* 3. 1. 41; Dion. Hal. 8. 41. 3; Philo, *LA* 2. 46, *Congr.* 156; Joseph. *BJ* 2. 116; Ach. 5. 16. 8, 5. 21. 6.

³⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 20. 5; Hdt. 2. 181. 3.

³⁸ Hdt. 3. 134. 4, 3. 134. 6; Plut. *Mor.* 608b ff.

³⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 75. 1; Dion. Hal. 8. 41. 4, 8. 45. 2.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Ant.* 76. 6; Lucian, *Asin.* 6, 10, 11, 12.

⁴¹ For *ἄνερ* see Appendix B; FN: Plato, *Phd.* 60a, Xen. *Cyr.* 6. 4. 5, Joseph. *AJ* 18. 243, Plut. *Brut.* 13. 6, 13. 9, *Gracc.* 36. 3, Ach. 2. 24. 2, etc., Char. 1. 14. 9, etc.

φίλτατε 'dearest'.⁴² Nearly all of the addresses are at moments of fairly high emotion, so emotional level does not determine whether *ἄνερ* or names are used, nor does author preference, since on the whole the same authors use both types of address. It appears that the variation between FN and *ἄνερ* is either random or dependent on factors which we have been unable to identify.⁴³

Few examples exist of addresses by a mistress or concubine, and in these *ἄνερ* does not occur.⁴⁴

It thus appears that both husbands and wives can use names, KT's, or other terms, but that husbands are substantially more likely than wives to use KT's in addressing their spouses.

In poetry, according to Wendel (1929: 97), the most common term for wives is *γύναι*, but there are also other KT's such as *ἄλοχος* 'wife' and *δάμαρ* 'wife'. Husbands receive KT's much less often; *ἄνερ* is common only in Aristophanes, and the older word for 'husband', *πόσι*, is frequent only in Euripides. There is a clear tendency for husbands to use KT's more than wives; thus in Euripides' *Medea* Jason consistently uses *γύναι* to Medea while she addresses him by name.⁴⁵ In Menander, husbands are rarely addressed and seem to receive *ἄνερ* (*Phasma* 103), and wives usually receive *γύναι* (*Epitr.* 303, 376) but can also get FN (*Πόδη*, fr. 592) or FT's (*γλυκυτάτη*, *Epitr.* 888). Mistresses not married to the speaker receive FN (*Samia* 378, 385, etc.). In Aristophanes husbands are never addressed by name; they are usually called *ἄνερ* but can also receive insults or FT's.⁴⁶ Men, on the other hand, do occasionally address their wives by name but are more likely to use *γύναι*, FT's, or insults.⁴⁷ Once again Aristophanes appears to be using a different system of address from prose, in that he has husbands receive more KT's than wives in address, and this time the evidence from Menander is too slight to be of use to us. Nevertheless it seems likely that Aristophanes' addresses are due more to dramatic convenience than to a genuinely different system, for more than half of the addresses using *ἄνερ* occur in imaginings of what a wife might say to a

⁴² Hdt. 3. 134. 1; Plut. *Mor.* 768d; Lucian, *Asin.* 39; Long. 4. 21. 3; Ach. 5. 15. 6, etc.; Char. 8. 5. 9, etc.

⁴³ It has sometimes been argued (Hirzel 1918: 27) that women avoided using their husbands' names, but the passage in Herodotus cited in favour of this theory (1. 146) describes this as an *exceptional* custom among the Carians. Cf. Gilleland (1980: 181).

⁴⁴ Hdt. 3. 1. 4; Plut. *Ant.* 29. 7, 84. 4. ⁴⁵ *Med.* 460, 525, 868, 869, 908, 1310.

⁴⁶ *Lys.* 518, 907, 910, 914, 950, *Thes.* 484, 508, *Eccl.* 520, 531, 542.

⁴⁷ Names: *Lys.* 874, *Eccl.* 520; *γύναι*: Ach. 262, *Nub.* 55, *Pax* 1329; other: *Lys.* 891, 930, 945, *Eccl.* 520.

husband and need the address *ἀνερ* to make the context clear (*Lys.* 518, *Thes.* 484, 508).

The use of KT to spouses is uncommon in modern English, where FN, FT, or nicknames are more usual. Nevertheless there are many languages in which spouses cannot be addressed by name at all or in which FN address is avoided.⁴⁸ In some languages the name of a spouse cannot even be mentioned in any context, let alone used in address.⁴⁹ Even in Shakespeare's English, wives and husbands rarely addressed each other by name and preferred to use 'husband' and 'wife', sometimes modified by FTs like 'honey-sweet' (Salmon 1967: 56), while in Victorian English the usual working-class form of address from husband to wife was 'missis' (Phillipps 1984: 163-4).

The other addresses which occur between relatives of the same generation are those between siblings. Of these the most common are addresses between two brothers, but even these are not very frequent, occurring only eighteen times in the works surveyed. All of the addressees are adults, as are all but one of the speakers. The most common address is FN,⁵⁰ but other terms such as insults are also possible (e.g. *Hdt.* 3. 145. 2). *Ἀδελφε* 'brother' occurs three times, twice where the name of the brother is unknown to the reader⁵¹ and once in a particularly affectionate speech: *φίλτατ' ἀδελφε* 'dearest brother' (*Plut. Ag. & Cl.* 49. 6). It seems that brothers were usually addressed like non-relatives, with FN or other terms as appropriate, but that to express closeness and affection one could use a KT. When the addressee's name, although presumably known to the brother who addresses him, is unknown to the reader, brothers are addressed by the distinguishing feature of kinship, resulting in the other two instances of *ἀδελφε*. Since these addresses were caused by a literary necessity with no counterpart in reality, Greek brothers may have been addressed by KT more in literature than in normal conversation.

Addresses from sisters to brothers occur only six times, all between adults. They can be by name, insults, or KT such as *ἀδελφε* and *παῖ*.⁵² *Ἀδελφε* is used by David's daughter Tamar urging her half-brother not to rape her (*Joseph. Aḡ* 7. 168), while the case of *παῖ*, which is exceptional (see p. 69), is also clearly emotional. It appears

⁴⁸ Turkish (Başoğlu 1987: 299), Kannada (Bean 1978: 101), Chinese (only husbands) (Fang and Heng 1983: 504), Bengali (Das 1968: 24).

⁴⁹ Penan (Needham 1971: 211), Bengali (only husbands) (Das 1968: 24).

⁵⁰ e.g. *Hdt.* 7. 237. 1; *Plut. Gracc.* 22. 7; *Joseph. Bḡ* 1. 557.

⁵¹ *Plut. Caes.* 66. 9; *Epict.* 1. 2. 25.

⁵² *Plut. Dion* 21. 8, 51. 3; *Dion. Hal.* 3. 21. 5; *Joseph. Aḡ* 7. 168; *Hdt.* 3. 53. 3.

from this evidence that women, like men, usually address their brothers by name, but that they can use KT's at emotional moments.

Sisters are very rarely addressed in the works surveyed. There are two addresses from a brother, the triumphant Horatius arguing with his sister, both of which are insults (Dion. Hal. 3. 21. 6). The one address between two sisters is *φιλτάτη* 'dearest', which occurs in a moment of great distress when the sisters are discussing who is to kill herself first (Plut. *Mor.* 253d). It is therefore impossible to draw conclusions about the normal mode of address to sisters.

The general rule for addressing siblings thus seems to be that they are usually treated as non-relatives, but that KT's can be used to emphasize the relationship or when the reader does not know the addressee's name. In poetry, exactly the same rules seem to apply, for Wendel asserts (1929: 97) that siblings are usually addressed by name but that KT's can be used to emphasize kinship, and in Menander brothers are addressed by FN or FT, never KT (*Aspis* 250, 251, 256, 261). It is, however, possible that siblings who were children might not have used FN, since in other relationships FN was less common to or from children. Our data provide no evidence on this point.

5.2.4 *Addresses among more distant relatives*

The data also include a number of addresses between relatives whose connections are more distant than those investigated above. There are eight classical addresses to cousins, from two different dyads: Charmides and Andocides (*Andoc. Myst.* 49) and Xerxes and Mardonius (*Hdt.* 7. 5. 1, 7. 9. 1, etc.). These cousins are all adults and all use FN or titles as appropriate. The novelist Achilles Tatius also provides a large number of addresses between younger cousins, but since most of these involve cousins who fall in love and marry each other, other factors are more important than kinship in determining their relationship. Achilles Tatius' cousins normally use FN in address, but the lovers can also use FT's or other addresses.⁵³ There is also one address to a grand-nephew, from the emperor Tiberius to Gaius as a young man, and there *παῖ* 'child' is used (*Joseph. AJ* 18. 219). Pericles and Alcibiades were distant kinsmen, and Pericles was in addition Alcibiades' guardian, but the two address each other consistently by name in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1. 2. 41 ff.). Xenophon's young Cyrus uses *σύγγενες*

⁵³ Non-lovers: 1. 7. 3, 1. 9. 1, etc.; lovers: 2. 7. 4, 3. 10. 4, 3. 11. 2, etc.

'kinsman' to a man claiming to be his kinsman (*Cyr.* 1. 4. 28), but since he does not know the man's name the address is an example of address to a nameless person by the best distinguishing feature, not a normal KT.

There are also a number of addresses to in-laws, including sons-in-law, fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law, and one sister-in-law. Almost all of these addresses are by name, and the remainder use insults, titles, or occasionally KTs.⁵⁴ An insult is also addressed by the young Alexander to his stepmother's uncle (*Plut. Alex.* 9. 8).

It thus appears that in-laws, cousins, and other relatives outside the nuclear family do not count as relatives for the purpose of address usage,⁵⁵ for none of them receives addresses which could not have been used to unrelated addressees, with the exception of the unusual *σύγγενες*. In Menander, likewise, distant relatives are addressed by name (e.g. *Dysk.* 847).

5.2.5 Conclusion

The general tendencies of address usage among relatives close enough to be addressed as relatives are the following: the more closely related two people are, the more unequal they are in age and/or gender, and the younger the younger one is in absolute terms, the more likely they are to use KTs rather than FN to each other; and KTs are more likely to be used when the addressee is older than the speaker.

At this point we can look at the addresses involving dead or non-human characters which have so far been excluded, and see how they differ from the ones already examined. The excluded addresses, most of which come from Lucian, consist mainly of addresses between gods who are genetically related, like the dialogue between Hermes and Pan quoted at the beginning of this chapter. That dialogue contains no addresses which could not have been used had the characters been human, as we have seen, and when Lucian's gods elsewhere use KTs to relatives, they nearly always use the KT that would have been appropriate in a human relationship.⁵⁶ The only point of difference is

⁵⁴ *Dion. Hal.* 4. 4. 4 ff., 4. 29. 1 ff.; *Diod. Sic.* 10. 1, 33. 7. 4; *Plut. Phoc.* 22. 4, *Mor.* 553d; *Joseph. AJ* 18. 186, *BJ* 1. 595; *Char.* 8. 7. 4; *Ach.* 8. 17. 2.

⁵⁵ There were, however, separate KTs for these relatives in referential usage: see W. Thompson (1971: 111).

⁵⁶ e.g. *μητέρα*: *Dial. D.* 4. 1, 20. 2; *πάτερ*: *Iupp. Trag.* 5, 30, *Tim.* 7, *Fug.* 3; *παῖ* and *τέκνον*: *Iupp. Trag.* 14, 30, 33, *Dial. D.* 2. 2, 4. 2, 23. 2; *θύγατερ*: *DI* 2, *Fug.* 3; *ἄνερ*: *Dial. Mort.* 28. 3; *ἀδελφή*: *Dial. Mar.* 12. 1.

that τέκνον from fathers to sons is considerably more frequent than παῖ among the gods, although among men it is normally used only to very young or dead sons.

The problem with the gods is not how KT's are used, but whether they are used. Among mortals, parents are always addressed with KT's rather than FN, and wives rarely receive FN from their husbands, but this is not the case among the gods. Often gods simply address their fathers by name (*Iupp. Trag.* 13, 14), and at other times they alternate between FN and KT's in the course of a single conversation (*Iupp. Trag.* 32). Hera, who is often addressed by Zeus, always receives FN rather than γύναι (*Dial. D.* 8, 9, 22, etc.).

In these circumstances one must remember that it is not addresses between gods that we are examining, but Lucian's depiction of addresses between gods. Humans in all authors tend to address gods by name, and thus vocatives like Ζεῦ 'Zeus' become the standard, unmarked form of address. If Lucian has Hermes use Ζεῦ, it is not immediately obvious as a violation of the rules of kin address, because one would not think of Hermes primarily as the child of Zeus. When for one reason or another Lucian wishes to emphasize the kinship between the gods or make them appear more human, however, he can use KT's.⁵⁷

This explanation, that KT's are used to bring out the kinship between the gods, may also account for the preference for τέκνον over παῖ, for τέκνον, as we have seen (3.2.1.2), emphasizes kinship more than does παῖ. Also in favour of this theory is the fact that KT's are used very heavily in those dialogues where the kinship of the participants is important,⁵⁸ but in other dialogues where kinship is less relevant, FN is the primary or only form of address between related gods.

Although Lucian's gods do not always address each other in the same way that humans do, addresses between dead characters are similar to those between living ones. In Lucian's underworld distinctions of rank vanish completely from the address system, but distinctions of kinship do not. Thus in *Dialogi Mortuorum* 12, where the dead Alexander meets his father Philip, Alexander consistently uses πάτερ 'father' (12. 1, 12. 3, 12. 5), while Philip always uses Ἀλέξανδρε 'Alexander' (12. 1, 12. 5, 12. 6).

⁵⁷ In some passages, however, the KT's may be used as Homeric echoes. See Coenen (1977: 40, 65).

⁵⁸ e.g. *Dial. Mar.* 2 (Poseidon and Polyphemus, 4 KT's and 2 FN), *Dial. D.* 2 (Hermes and Pan, 7 KT's and 1 FN), *Dial. D.* 4 (Hermes and Maia, 2 KT's and 1 FN), *Dial. D.* 20 (Aphrodite and Eros, 3 KT's and 0 FN), *Dial. D.* 23 (Aphrodite and Eros, 4 KT's and 1 FN).

Many of the customs of address to relatives in Greek have parallels in other cultures. The tendency to use KT's more to relatives older than the speaker is echoed in our own culture, where parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles frequently receive KT's from younger relatives whom they address with FN. Other languages with this tendency include Arabic, Korean, Indonesian, and Kannada.⁵⁹ Greek, however, differs from modern English in that relatives of younger generations do often receive KT's in address from parents, uncles, and grandfathers.

Another point on which Greek resembles other languages is the stability of addresses between kin. Between two unrelated Athenians a wide variety of addresses was possible according to the circumstances: FN in any event, FT's, AT's, insults, and sometimes indefinite terms. Between relatives who used KT's, however, other terms very rarely appear. Occasional insults or expressions of pity or affection can be found, but these are rare among relatives, particularly in addresses to parents. Thus in all ninety-one addresses to fathers, no address other than *πάτερ* is used. This situation is not really paralleled in English, where addresses other than FN or KT's are rare among friends and relatives alike. It is, however, echoed in Indonesian, about which it has been said, 'In all situations, I will address my mother as *ibu*. Other interrelationships may change at any time . . .' (Kridalaksana 1974: 19).

We have seen that in Greek addresses to relatives change as the younger member of the dyad grows from child to adult, with FN replacing KT's sooner or later in almost all directions except addresses to parents. In my own dialect of English, at least, this situation is not paralleled in addresses to relatives, for the patterns of address to and from specific individuals which are developed in childhood continue throughout one's life, with the occasional exception of the dropping of diminutives when a child becomes adult.

This phenomenon does, however, find its parallels in addresses outside the family in English. Children are generally addressed by adults with FN and must use TLN in return, but as they grow older they receive TLN more often themselves and often have to switch from TLN to FN with certain adult friends. In Greek, the age at which KT's give way to FN seems to be higher the closer the genetic relationship of speaker and addressee, so that someone who is enough of an adult to be addressed by name by his uncle is still young enough to be called *παί* by his father. Although English does not seem to share this

⁵⁹ Parkinson (1985: 75-6); Yassin (1978: 56); Hwang (1975: 41); Kridalaksana (1974: 19); Bean (1978: 66, 76).

distinction, it is found in the equivalent of the FN/TLN distinction in languages such as Korean (Hwang 1975: 30).

5.3 DISTINCTIONS OF RANK

Λύσας δὲ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Πύρρος εὐθὺς τὸ ῥαδιούργημα τοῦ Λυσιμάχου συνείδεν· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἡ συνήθης γεγραμμένη προσαγόρευσις “ὁ πατὴρ τῷ υἱῷ χαίρειν”, ἀλλὰ “βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος βασιλεῖ Πύρρῳ χαίρειν”. (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6. 7)

But on opening the letter Pyrrhus at once realized Lysimachus' forgery, for it did not have the usual salutation, 'The father to the son, greetings', but 'King Ptolemy to King Pyrrhus, greetings'.

Addressing monarchs in ancient Greece was a more complicated affair than merely knowing the correct title for one's addressee. Titles were a common way of addressing people of high rank, but many other options existed as well, including KT's and names. In this section we shall examine the various ways that status could be reflected or ignored in the Greek address system.⁶⁰ Differences in status are most notable at the extremes of the social hierarchy, that is to say in dyads where one member is a servant or a monarch, and thus it is easiest to begin our examination with a common feature of daily life in Greece, addresses to servants by people other than kings.

5.3.1 *Addresses to servants*

In discussing addresses to servants we face the usual difficulty of insufficient contextual evidence about the factor being studied. In the ancient world the difference between a slave and a free man was very important, and we might expect that slaves would be addressed differently from attendants who were free, but it is not always possible to tell whether or not a given addressee was actually a slave. Many of the servants in the works surveyed are certainly slaves, and a few are probably free, but in the majority of cases their status is unclear.

This problem, however, is not as serious as it might seem at first glance. The chances are excellent that most of the servant characters addressed in our corpus were in fact intended to represent slaves, even if we cannot be certain. Moreover, such evidence as we do have

⁶⁰ The terminology used to reflect distinctions of status in referential usage is a fascinating but separate study; on this see Garland (1988: 20–2), Kästner (1981), Spicq (1978), Klees (1975: 14–36), and Gschnitzer (1964, 1976).

suggests that there were similarities between the addresses used to slaves and those used to free men acting in the role of servants. Thus one address for slaves was the singular ethnic (see 3.8), and yet the term *Συρακόσιε* 'Syracusan' is consistently used to address the hired entertainer in Xenophon's *Symposium*, who is probably not a slave.

Addresses to servants are less frequent than we might expect, for addresses were not as common in speech to servants as in interactions with free characters. This difference is probably not coincidental; Plato's Athenian says, *τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσρησιν χρὴ σχεδὸν ἐπίταξιν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι* 'an address to a servant should be just a command' (*Laws* 777e), and in many of the works in our corpus servants are rarely spoken to except to be given abrupt orders. This practice is part of the larger tendency for addresses to be omitted when the addressee is of significantly lower status than the speaker (see 4.1). In comedy, on the other hand, servants are much more frequently addressed and can be major characters in their own right rather than the nameless, shadowy figures which often appear in other genres. As a result, the best evidence for addresses to servants comes from Aristophanes and Menander.

In both these authors slaves can be addressed either with *παῖ* 'boy' (or a variant such as *παιδίον* or *παιδάριον* 'little boy') or by name; since most of the slaves have names formed from ethnics (see 3.8), it would be just as accurate to say that they can be addressed either with *παῖ* or with an ethnic. Many of the addresses to servants are not directed to a specific person but are rather general calls, such as the *παῖ*, *παῖ* of someone knocking on a door; these addresses almost always use *παῖ* or a variant thereof.⁶¹ When the addressee is a specified, known character names are often used, but *παῖ* is still common, especially in Aristophanes. Female servants do not receive *παῖ*; in Menander they are called *γραῦ* 'old woman' (or a variant thereof) or addressed by name,⁶² and in Aristophanes the problem does not arise. Neither *παῖ* nor *γραῦ* implies an age difference between speaker and addressee; *παῖ* can be used by speakers who are almost certainly younger than the addressees (Men. *Dysk.* 551) and *γραῦ* by fairly old men (*Dysk.* 427). Insults, FTs, and similar forms of address are also used to servants as to free addressees.⁶³

Cooks in Menander form a subclass of servants; they are often hired from outside for a given event and do not belong to the household of

⁶¹ e.g. Men. *Dysk.* 459 ff., *Epitr.* 1076 f., *Mis.* 206; Ar. *Nub.* 132, 1145, *Ach.* 395.

⁶² e.g. *γραῦ*: *Dysk.* 427, 587, *Epitr.* 1064; names: *Pk.* 398, *Dysk.* 636, *Epitr.* 1062.

⁶³ e.g. Men. *Dysk.* 103, 469, 595; Ar. *Ran.* 35, *Vesp.* 214, 395.

the main characters. They are usually addressed as μάγειρε 'cook' by everyone, both masters and slaves.⁶⁴

We might expect to find a difference between addresses from a master to his own slaves and those to other people's servants, but it is clear that there was no such distinction. Both παῖ and γραῦ are used freely by characters other than a slave's own master or mistress, although these characters may use names as well.⁶⁵ Παῖ can even be used from one servant to another, although the usual form of address in these circumstances is FN.⁶⁶ Such usage suggests strongly that παῖ indicates the absolute status of the addressee rather than the relationship between addressee and speaker. While neither παῖ nor γραῦ is an insulting address, these terms tend to be used more often in calling servants and in giving orders, whereas at least in Menander names are more likely to appear in conversations or questions. This distinction in address may correspond to a difference in these two types of interaction: orders are given only to servants, but one can ask a question or hold a conversation with anyone, free or slave.

In Theocritus and Herodas servants are very often addressed by name or with FTs or insults; παῖ is never used, but female slaves are sometimes called δούλη 'slave'.⁶⁷ Slaves can address each other by name (Theocritus 5. 9, 79, 136) or with other terms, including insults based on the fact that the addressee is a slave (δῶλε Σιβύρτα 'slave Siburtas' 5. 5, ὠλεύθερε 'O free man' 5. 8). In tragedy and epic, as in prose, there is a tendency for servants not to be addressed at all (Bassett 1934: 145; Wendel 1929: 90). When addresses do occur, the use of names is acceptable in epic but not in tragedy (Wendel 1929: 62; cf. Olson 1992: 309). The term used instead of a name in such poetry is not παῖ but rather one of a selection of literary addresses not normally found in comedy or prose, such as δμῶες, ἀμφίπολοι, or δμωαί 'servants' (Wendel 1929: 90–1). It is conspicuous that the only term for slaves which is regularly used as an insult to free men, ἀνδράποδον 'slave', is never used to address slaves.

When servants are addressed in prose, the address system in operation seems to be largely similar to that in comedy. Names are occasionally used, but παῖ is more common, and ethnics and insults also occur. It is clear that in prose, as in comedy, there is no distinction

⁶⁴ e.g. *Mis.* 270, 275, *Dysk.* 888, *Aspis* 221.

⁶⁵ *Men. Aspis* 19, 305, *Samia* 362, *Dysk.* 587, *Mis.* 222, 228; *Ar. Ran.* 37, 464.

⁶⁶ e.g. FN: *Men. Heros* 1, 13, *Ar. Vesp.* 1; παῖ: *Men. Dysk.* 459 ff., 959, *Samia* 362.

⁶⁷ Theocritus 2. 1 ff., 15. 2 ff.; Herodas 1. 1 ff., 5. 1 ff., 7. 6 ff., 8. 1 ff.

between addresses from a servant's own master and those from other people; thus in Plato's *Meno* Socrates addresses Meno's servant as *παῖ* (82b, 83c) and *παῖ Μένωνος* 'Meno's boy' (85b), while in the *Symposium* Alcibiades orders one of Agathon's servants with *παῖ* (213e). It is true that in these encounters the servants are not named, and thus *παῖ* could be an address by primary distinguishing feature, but the lack of names may be significant in itself. Meno's slave in particular talks to Socrates for some time, and if he had not been a slave, his name surely would have been used.

In Josephus (*AJ* 18. 193), Agrippa uses *παῖ* to address Gaius' slave Thaumastus. Not only do the readers know 'Thaumastus' name, but Agrippa probably knew it too, for Thaumastus had served him before. Agrippa is at that moment a prisoner, with somewhat less power than a slave would have, and is expressing gratitude to Thaumastus for helping him. Thus in prose, as in comedy, *παῖ* is a neutral address which is tied to the absolute status of the addressee and not to the difference between the speaker's rank and that of the addressee.

Names are rarely used to servants in prose except in Lucian and the novelists. When names do occur in earlier authors, they are spoken by masters being especially friendly to their servants, either out of kindness or intimacy or because they are asking a favour. Thus Darius uses FN to his groom when asking him to arrange a trick so that he can become king (*Hdt.* 3. 85. 1), Antony does so in praising a slave (*Plut. Ant.* 76. 9), and a nobleman in Polybius does the same when telling a sad secret to his old servant (8. 12. 5). In Achilles Tatius and Chariton, on the other hand, servants are addressed by name exactly like the other characters, and *παῖ* is never used at all. It is notable that the servants in these novels, unlike most of those elsewhere in our corpus, are often major characters in their own right, with distinctive personalities and complex relationships with their masters and mistresses.

In Lucian there is a difference between *Lexiphanes* and *Piscator*, where *παῖ* and similar addresses are used to servants, and the *Dialogi Meretricii*, where FN is the normal address and *παῖ* is not used. The difference seems to lie in the nature of the relationship being depicted; characters in the *Dialogi Meretricii* confide in their servants and ask their advice, while those in other works simply give brief orders.

It thus seems that in both prose and comedy there was a certain tendency to use names to servants when treating them as individuals and *παῖ* or similar terms when treating them simply as 'a slave', even if

a certain individual was intended to be the addressee. This distinction, however, is not absolute in any genre.

5.3.2 *Addresses from servants*

Since *παῖ* used to servants indicates the status of the addressee in absolute terms, not his relationship to the speaker, we might expect that the same basic principle would hold for addresses from servants to free men and women. This is not the case, however; servants addressing free people use both FN and titles, but the titles are used only to the speaker's own master or mistress. Other addressees generally receive FN, as from Meno's slave to Socrates (Plato, *Meno* 84a ff.), but insults or other terms can be used as well. Neither in prose nor in comedy do servants normally use any type of deferential address to citizens other than their own masters and mistresses.

Masters and mistresses, however, very often receive such addresses. The most common titles used by servants are *δέσποτα* 'master' and *δέσποινα* 'mistress', but *κύριε* 'lord', *κυρία* 'lady', and *κεκτημένη* 'mistress' also occur. Masters and mistresses can also be addressed by name, but this is a usage which varies from author to author. In Menander names (or *τρόφιμε* 'nursling' to younger characters) are common in addresses from servants, but in Aristophanes *δέσποτα* is more usual. Classical prose contains virtually no addresses from servants to masters who are not also monarchs; in later prose names may be used,⁶⁸ but titles are more common, especially in the novelists. It is notable that there is no correlation between servants who address their masters by name and those whose masters address them by name; if anything, there appears to be an inverse relationship between these two categories in prose. In the novelists and Lucian's *Dialogi Meretricii*, where servants are usually addressed by name, they virtually always use titles to their masters and mistresses.

5.3.3 *Addresses to rulers*

In the case of addresses involving servants it seems very likely that our data do reflect actual conversational usage, given the high level of agreement between prose and comedy. With addresses involving rulers, however, the situation is different. Many of the authors in our corpus probably had no idea how to address a Persian king, still less

⁶⁸ e.g. Plut. *Ant.* 79. 3; Dion. Hal. 4. 39. 4.

how a Persian king would be addressed by his wife or son. The next two subsections will thus be concerned with the literary Greek conception of addresses to or from rulers, rather than with actual practice.

The addresses used to rulers depend on their nationality: Greek and Roman kings, Macedonian and Hellenistic kings, oriental rulers, and Roman emperors form four distinct groups. Greek and Roman kings are generally addressed by name,⁶⁹ but they receive other terms as well, including patronymics and, rarely, βασιλεῦ 'king'. Macedonian and Hellenistic monarchs are often addressed as βασιλεῦ, by anyone from close friends to servants and captives, but names can also be used, as can a few other addresses. The addresses by name tend to occur in less respectful contexts than those in which βασιλεῦ is used. Neither of these two groups of monarchs is ever addressed as δέσποτα 'master' except by a servant or captive.

Oriental monarchs are addressed more frequently than the other groups of rulers; except in Xenophon, the usual way of addressing them is with βασιλεῦ or δέσποτα (see 3.3). In Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, FN is the usual way of addressing both Cyaxares, the actual king, and Cyrus, the conqueror and hero of the story. In the case of Cyaxares, the speaker is nearly always Cyrus; on the one occasion when Cyrus is not the speaker, δέσποτα is used (4. 5. 11). When Cyrus is the addressee, the status of the speaker does not matter, for names are used even by captives on trial for their lives (e.g. 3. 1. 9 ff.). Cyrus does also receive δέσποτα, and occasionally βασιλεῦ, but FN is far more common. This tendency can be explained by the factors discussed in 3.3, that βασιλεῦ as an address indicated the great power and remoteness of the addressee while δέσποτα emphasized the humility of the speaker. Cyrus, although certainly an oriental monarch, is portrayed in Xenophon as acting rather like a Greek general in terms of his familiarity with his men and his constant presence at the scene of action. In Herodotus' works, Cyrus is much more remote and does often receive βασιλεῦ, but these two authors do not differ in their use of δέσποτα.

Outside Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, address by FN to oriental monarchs is rare and often seems to contrast with the expected title. Thus in Polybius a young Roman envoy is described as being insufficiently respectful to the Illyrian queen, and one of the things he does is to address her by name (2. 8. 10). Similarly Croesus in

⁶⁹ e.g. Dion. Hal. 3. 17. 1; Hdt. 5. 49. 2; Xen. *Hier.* 1. 1 ff.

Herodotus is addressed as *Κροῖσε* 'Croesus' by the free-thinking Solon (I. 32. 1, I. 32. 4).

Roman emperors resemble oriental rulers in that they are virtually never addressed by name alone, but in our data they do not receive *βασιλεῦ* either. The most common titles for emperors in our corpus are *Καῖσαρ* 'Caesar', *αὐτοκράτορ* 'emperor', and *δέσποτα*, but others occur as well, such as *κύριε* 'lord' or long combinations of titles.

When the speaker is a member of the monarch's immediate family, the rules of address are somewhat different. Greek and Roman kings are addressed by members of their families just as are ordinary people (5.2);⁷⁰ this is what we would expect from the general tendency for Greek and Roman kings to be addressed like other citizens. A title is once used to a Greek king by his mother, but this address, *βασιλεῦ Λακεδαιμονίων* 'king of the Lacedaemonians' (Plut. *Ag. & Cl.* 43. 7), occurs in a context of exhortation and comfort and is clearly intended to remind the king of his position and responsibilities and to cheer him up, rather than being the usual address for that dyad.

For Macedonian and Hellenistic kings and for Roman emperors most of our addresses from family members are from sons to fathers, all using *πάτερ* 'father';⁷¹ again this is the term which would have been used if the addressee had not been a king.

The most complicated category is that of the oriental monarchs, where a difference between younger and older relatives is apparent. Younger relatives never use titles in addressing an oriental ruler, in any author. The usual mode of address is a KT,⁷² but in Xenophon (e.g. *Cyr.* 2. 4. 6 etc.) FN can be used to an older relative who would receive FN if not a king (see 5.2.2); there is no evidence for the practice of other writers on this point. When the relative is older than the monarch, the usual form of address is *βασιλεῦ* 'king'.⁷³ No other titles occur, but twice a young ruler is addressed with *παῖ* 'child' by his mother;⁷⁴ as these are the only addresses we have for those dyads, it could well be that mothers normally addressed young rulers with *παῖ*. Xerxes is also once (Hdt. 7. 16b2) addressed as *παῖ* by his uncle, who

⁷⁰ e.g. *πάτερ* by sons or daughters (Hdt. 5. 51. 2; Plut. *Ag. & Cl.* 17. 5), FN from siblings (Plut. *Dion* 21. 8).

⁷¹ Hdt. 5. 19. 1; Plut. *Demetr.* 40. 3, *Mor.* 331b; Dio Chrys. 2. 3 ff.; Joseph. *Bj* 4. 628.

⁷² e.g. *πάτερ*: Hdt. 1. 39. 1, Joseph. *Aj* 6. 126, etc.; *πάππς*: Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 3. 4 ff.; *θεῖς*: Xen. *Cyr.* 5. 5. 8, 5. 5. 35.

⁷³ e.g. Hdt. 7. 10a ff. (Xerxes from his uncle), Plut. *Art.* 14. 9 (Artaxerxes from his mother).

⁷⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 488f; Joseph. *Aj* 8. 7.

normally uses βασιλεῦ. When an oriental ruler is addressed by a relative of his own generation, such as a brother or wife, titles (either βασιλεῦ or δέσποτα) are always used.⁷⁵ The universal use of titles and the fact that the very subservient term δέσποτα can be used indicate that these relatives rank lower than those older than the monarch.

Thus in dyads where the addressee is a ruler the use of titles can never supplant that of KT's, but FN between relatives can be replaced by titles in certain circumstances. It seems that for younger relatives the relationship is the factor determining the address, not the status of the ruler; for relatives of the monarch's own generation the factor of status completely outweighs that of relationship, which was never as strongly present in address as that between relatives of different generations in any case (see 5.2.5). Relatives older than the ruler are a privileged group; they generally use titles or names like non-relatives, but they do not use the self-abasing δέσποτα employed by wives and brothers. Occasionally they can make use of KT's emphasizing their own age and wisdom. No class of relatives, however, may address by name a ruler who normally receives titles from non-relatives.

The use of titles by a close relative of a monarch may sound strange to speakers of modern English, who would probably not expect Prince Philip to address the Queen as 'Your Majesty'. Yet a close parallel exists in Tudor English, where the future Queen Elizabeth addressed her older sister Mary as 'Good Sister' until Mary became Queen, at which point Elizabeth began to call her 'Your Majesty' (Replogle 1973: 177). In Shakespeare, titles are regularly used between close friends and from children to parents (Replogle 1973: 180-1). Even in Victorian England it is noted that 'the higher the rank, the more formal were the terms of address' from children to parents (Phillipps 1984: 162). A similar situation has been noted in contemporary Arabic, where high officials receive their titles even from close relatives (Parkinson 1985: 184).

Rulers can sometimes be addressed by other kings or by gods or spirits, and in those situations the address used is much less predictable. Titles can still be employed,⁷⁶ but they are less likely, particularly if the speaker is hostile. Names are possible (e.g. Polyb. 18. 7. 6, 18. 38. 3), although rarely to oriental monarchs, and insults, ethnics, and other terms also occur.

⁷⁵ Βασιλεῦ: Hdt. 7. 236. 1, 9. 111. 4 (brothers), 3. 134. 1 (wife), 3. 1. 4 (concubine); Joseph. BJ 1. 595 (brother's wife); Char. 8. 5. 9 (wife); δέσποτα: Hdt. 9. 111. 3, 9. 111. 5 (brother), Joseph. AJ 11. 240 (wife). Note also κύριε from Esther to her husband in the Septuagint (Esther 5: 2a).

⁷⁶ e.g. Plato, Phdr. 274e; Joseph. AJ 20. 59; Char. 5. 7. 1, 5. 7. 5.

5.3.4 *Addresses from rulers*

The way in which monarchs addressed their subjects did not differ greatly from the way that people of equal status spoke to each other. The usual address was by name, regardless of the grandeur of the monarch, but other terms such as KT's, insults, and addresses for unspecified addressees could be used if appropriate. The one way in which rulers' addresses differed from those of ordinary people was that a monarch could use a singular ethnic to captive or subordinate kings, provided that they were not of his own nationality. When the addressee was of the same country as the ruler, there was no available address to emphasize the speaker's rank, and so FN was used even in situations where the speaker might have wished for an alternative. Thus in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* when the Assyrian king is extremely angry with Gobryas, one of his subjects who has gone over to Cyrus, he addresses him saying Δεσπότης ὁ σὸς λέγει, ὦ Γωβρύα 'your master is speaking, Gobryas' (5. 3. 6). In Herodotus the mad king Cambyses addresses his courtiers by name even when furious with them (3. 35. 4, 3. 62. 2). In this respect there is no distinction between Greek, Roman, and oriental rulers in our data.

When addressing members of their immediate family, as well, monarchs used addresses in the same way as ordinary people. In speaking to relatives of their own generation or below, rulers used FN or KT's as appropriate. There is little evidence for addresses to older relatives, since kings were almost always adults and did not often have living fathers; the only example is Xerxes using FN to his uncle Artabanus (Hdt. 7. 11. 1, 7. 15. 1, etc.), and this is the address we would have expected if Xerxes had not been a king.

5.3.5 *Other differences in rank*

Although most, indeed nearly all, of the addresses which recognized a power or status difference involved servants or monarchs, other distinctions of rank did exist in ancient society. Democratic Athens and Republican Rome did not have kings, and the elected officials who governed these states were generally addressed by name. On occasion, however, titles could be used to these officials as well: δῖκτα-τορ 'dictator' (Plut. *Fab.* 13. 7), ὕπατε 'consul' (Plut. *Publ.* 14. 6), στρατηγέ 'general' (Polyb. 10. 18. 12, 20. 10. 6), αὐτοκράτορ *imperator* (Plut. *Sull.* 35. 8). It is possible that such titles were sometimes used

because the addressee's name was unknown, for rank would certainly be a distinguishing characteristic usable in address to an unknown addressee, but they are also used when the addressee's name is well known to both speaker and reader.

There are also occasional cases of the use of titles to petty officials, prophets, and even ordinary citizens (see 3.3.4), but it is clear that this usage was unusual for most of the period covered by our data. Even subordinates being particularly deferential tended to address by name high officials other than actual rulers.⁷⁷

5.3.6 Conclusion

Distinctions of rank thus are rarely marked in the Greek address system unless the dyad includes someone of extremely high or extremely low status, and even then rank is not always reflected. The works surveyed suggest that an ordinary Spartan or Athenian citizen would use the same form of address, FN, to everyone he met except servants (and children and relatives as noted in 5.1 and 5.2), and that even slaves would use this same form to everyone except their own masters and mistresses. Such a widespread use of the same name is certainly not paralleled in English, although our address system is currently in transition; studies have found that, in corporate hierarchies, FN (as opposed to TLN) is used more often to an employee's immediate superior than to that superior's superior. The higher the level within the management structure, the less likely a person is to use FN even to his immediate superior, although FN can be used freely to subordinates (Slobin, Miller, and Porter 1968: 292). Yet English has often been called 'democratic' and 'classless' in its address system (e.g. Adler 1978: 179), and such a label is not absurd when English is compared to some non-European languages. The lack of emphasis on status in the Greek address system is thus exceptional.

From comparison of the different ways that rank can be reflected in address in Greek, enlightening results emerge. Among addresses directed to a superior there is some similarity between the usage from servants to their masters and that from subjects to rulers, in that *δέσποτα* can be used in both cases. In other respects, however, the two types of address are very different, for a variety of other titles can also be used to rulers, and the use of individual titles or of any title at all

⁷⁷ e.g. Hdt. 9. 12. 2; Philo, *Leg.* 230, etc.; Joseph. *AJ* 18. 266, *BJ* 3. 400.

depends very much on the nationality of the ruler, a factor which is irrelevant in the case of slaves. Moreover, rulers are addressed deferentially by people other than their own subjects, for most of the titles used to them reflect their absolute status, while servants use titles only to their own masters or mistresses.

In addresses to people of lower rank than the speaker, the situation is reversed. Servants are commonly addressed with *παῖ* or other words which imply servile status, and these addresses are clearly dependent upon the absolute status of the addressee, not his relationship to the speaker; rulers, however, address their subjects and others almost exactly as they would if they were not rulers. No matter how exalted a monarch is, he can never address an adult subject as *παῖ* unless that person is actually a slave.

There is, however, one address which can be used both by rulers and to slaves, namely the singular ethnic. This form of address is not derogatory, for Cyrus uses it to address his trusted follower the Hyrcanian king even when praising him (Xen. *Cyr.* 4. 5. 23), but at the same time people other than Cyrus would not presume to address the Hyrcanian king in this way. It seems likely that this address reflects not absolute status like *παῖ*, but relative status. It can thus be used by and to people of virtually any rank, provided that the status difference between them is of the right type. If this conclusion is correct, ethnics would be the only addresses in the Greek system to reflect rank in this way.

5.4 DISTINCTIONS OF GENDER

Αἱ γυναῖκες εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν κυρίαὶ καλοῦνται. (Epict. *Ench.* 40)

Women are called 'ladies' by men from the time they are 14 years old.

The vast majority of the addresses in the works surveyed are spoken by one man to another, and as a result most of the conclusions drawn so far have been about addresses between men. To what extent do these conclusions apply to women as well?⁷⁸

We might think that, at least in modern English, there are no

⁷⁸ Much work has recently been done on women and gender issues in antiquity; most of this is not concerned with address and so cannot be discussed here. For bibliography in this area see Cameron and Kuhrt (1983), Just (1989), Pomeroy (1990), Clark (1993).

significant gender differences in address, but recent studies have shown that this assumption is not completely valid.⁷⁹ More pronounced differences can be found in Victorian English, where FN was not generally usable between men and women (Phillipps 1984: 146). In many other languages the difference between addresses to men and those to women are far greater. In Korean women cannot be addressed by name at all (Hwang 1975: 51), and in Bengali there are virtually no addresses of any type for women not related to the speaker (Das 1968: 23). In Turkish, men and women of the same generation avoid addressing each other whenever possible (Başoğlu 1987: 299). In Arabic, women use names more freely to each other than to men (Yassin 1978: 57), and women in high positions receive certain polite addresses notably less often than men of the same rank (Parkinson 1985: 19).

Given this situation in other languages, it would be unwise to assume that addresses to women in Greek were the same as those to men. But what were the differences? In looking at addresses involving women we are hindered by the fact that we have much less evidence for them than for addresses between men. Our corpus contains no works actually written by women, and words assigned to female characters by a male author may not reflect women's speech accurately. Moreover, women are very much a minority in our data, both as speakers and as addressees. This small pool of data must then be reduced even further by excluding from consideration all plural addresses and all addresses to or from non-humans, a restriction which mainly affects goddesses. We found in a previous section that Lucian's gods do not always use addresses as humans do, and the same is true of the addresses in this section. Lucian and other authors apply the same addresses to goddesses as to male gods.

Addresses by and to kindred women have already been discussed, and some differences between males and females were found. Children of either sex may be more often addressed by name by a parent of the same sex than by a parent of the opposite one. There is also some evidence, both from prose and from poetry, that daughters are more likely than sons to use diminutives or pet names in addressing their parents. The most pronounced gender difference occurs between spouses, for husbands generally address their wives as γυναίκα 'wife, woman' and use FN only in moments of high emotion, while wives use names freely to their husbands.

⁷⁹ Kramer (1975: 198–210); Wolfson and Manes (1980: 79–92); Lakoff (1973: 45–80).

What are the address differences between men and women in interactions between unrelated people?

5.4.1 *Addresses from men to women*

It has been observed that Attic orators deliberately avoided referring to women by name in their speeches, substituting instead elaborate periphrases from the names of their fathers, husbands, and brothers as a means of identification (Schaps 1977: 323–8). Those women whose names were used generally were dead, belonged to the opposing side, or were women of ill repute. These restrictions are evident only in referential usage, for the Attic orators did not have occasion to address women in their speeches, but it is not impossible that they could apply to vocative usage as well. With a few modifications, this prohibition against naming respectable women applies to both referential and vocative usage in comedy (Sommerstein 1980: 406–7). In Homer, women are almost never addressed by name, and in tragedy such address is rare, for the usual way of addressing unrelated women is *γυναῖ* (Wendel 1929: 60–1).

At first glance, addresses to women in our prose data do not seem to be any different from those to men, for men addressing unrelated women use names not infrequently. Many of the FN addresses are to prostitutes, however, and a number of others are used to Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*. Diotima is not portrayed as a normal woman; she has no feminine characteristics and plays the thoroughly masculine role of an instructor in philosophy. All instances of FN address to unrelated women in classical authors fall into one of these two categories. It thus seems that the restricted use of women's names found in the orators may have extended to contemporary address usage, at least outside the family. (It should be remembered that under certain circumstances names can be used to wives in classical authors.)

At a later period, however, the situation seems to be different. Many of the FN addresses to women in late authors are applied to prostitutes, servants, or captives, but by no means all. Respectable women in later prose authors can certainly be addressed by name, and the same is true in Theocritus and Herodas.⁸⁰ In addition, Plutarch uses a number of addresses by name to women to whom he is dedicating or

⁸⁰ e.g. Plut. *Cim.* 14. 5, *Cato* 9. 1; Dion. Hal. 4. 39. 4; Lucian, *Symp.* 16; *Char.* 2. 5. 8; Theocritus 2. 114; Herodas 3. 58, 7. 3 ff.

addressing a work.⁸¹ The standard way of indicating a dedication in Greek prose is to include a vocative addressing the dedicatee at the beginning of the work (see p. 196). This practice of course puts some pressure on the author to use FN in addressing a female dedicatee, for the obvious alternative, *γύναι* 'woman', would not serve to identify her. Nevertheless periphrases of the type employed by the Attic orators could have been used; addresses such as *γύναι Ἰεροβοάμου* 'wife of Jeroboam' (Joseph. *Ag* 8.269) do occur elsewhere. The dedicatees were living, respectable women, precisely the type that the Attic orators avoided mentioning by name, and the dedication was supposed to be an honour. Under these circumstances it seems impossible that FN address to women can have been very improper in Plutarch's time.

It thus seems that respectable women may not have been addressed by name in the classical period, but that such addresses were perfectly acceptable later. How then were women addressed when FN was avoided? The most frequent address is *γύναι*, which in the classical works surveyed is the only way of addressing a respectable unrelated woman and in later authors is often the preferred term for such addressees. *Γύναι* is also the normal form of address, from any speaker, for unknown or nameless women. Lucian and Longus never use *γύναι* but do employ the ATs *παρθένε* 'maiden' and *κόρη* 'maiden' in a similar function. *Γύναι* can also be used by a man addressing a woman of much higher rank, particularly in Homer and tragedy (Wackernagel 1912: 25–6) but also once in prose (Plut. *Mor.* 112a). Titles such as *δέσποινα* 'mistress', *βασίλεια* 'queen', *βασίλισσα* 'queen', or *κυρία* 'lady', however, are a more common form of address to high-ranking women or from servants of either sex to their mistresses (cf. Wendel 1929: 88–90).

In the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Epictetus tells us that women were called *κυρία* from the time they were 14, but no trace of this usage can be found in our corpus of vocatives. Since Epictetus' interlocutors do not include women, however, we cannot say that he did not himself follow this convention, and it is important to bear in mind that Epictetus' Greek is much less literary than that of the other late authors in our corpus. It seems likely that the general use of *κυρία* to women was indeed current in Epictetus' day, but that it was avoided in literary works as being a strictly post-classical usage.

Women can also be addressed in a number of other ways. *Μῆτερ*

⁸¹ *Mor.* 145a, 145e, 242e, 351c, 352c, 364e.

occurs three times as an address to unrelated women, and in Menander it is recommended that this term be used as a general flattering address to old women. In the same passage (*Dysk.* 495–6; see p. 61) it is advised that *ἱερέα* ‘priestess’ be used to address middle-aged women politely, but there are no examples of this usage in Menander or in our corpus. A few instances of insults and FTs are also to be found, but indefinite addresses are not used to women in our data.⁸² Such avoidance is not surprising, for feminine gender is a distinguishing characteristic, and thus an unknown or imaginary woman will always be addressed as *γύναι* (or *παρθένη* or *κόρη*) rather than with an indefinite address.

For some women, however, none of these addresses was adequate, and classical authors found themselves in difficulties. One example is Artemisia, whom Herodotus describes as being in full command of a fleet, controlling her own ship bravely and intelligently in major battles, and being one of Xerxes’ best advisers. Men in her position are addressed by name by Xerxes, as *Δημάρατε* (7. 101. 1 etc.), *Ἀρτάβανε* (7. 11. 1 etc.), and *Μαρδόνιε* (8. 26. 3 etc.); in Herodotus, as in most authors, the first speech in any conversation usually contains an address (see 4.1). At 8. 101. 2, however, Xerxes is pleased with Artemisia and asks her advice, and yet fails to use any term of address at all to her. It seems to me that this avoidance of address reflects the problem that names could not be used to women, but at the same time it was totally inappropriate for the king to address such a valuable counsellor as *γύναι*. This argument does not imply that Herodotus was trying to portray Xerxes as having difficulty figuring out what to call Artemisia; rather it seems likely that Herodotus himself did not know how she should be addressed and so resorted to address avoidance.⁸³

5.4.2 *Addresses spoken by women*

The situation in other languages might lead us to expect that women would not use exactly the same system of address as men, but the

⁸² *Ξένη* addressed to Diotima at Plato, *Symp.* 204c, is not an exception to this statement, for *ξένη* is not an indefinite address when used to known individuals. In Aristophanes, however, indefinite addresses are sometimes used to women (e.g. *Lys.* 728, *Thes.* 610, *Ecll.* 1049).

⁸³ Address avoidance in cases of doubt about the term to be used is not uncommon in real life; see McIntire (1972: 290) and Mehrotra (1981: 134–5).

nature of our evidence makes the differences very difficult to recover.⁸⁴ One thing which we can say, however, is that addresses from one woman to another have no restrictions on use of names. Although examples are scarce in classical prose and Menander, Aristophanes' women certainly have no inhibitions about addressing each other by name, nor do those in Theocritus, Herodas, or later prose.⁸⁵ Women can also use most other kinds of addresses to one another, including γύναι 'woman' and FTs. That women did not always address each other in the same way as they were addressed by men is implied by the quotation from Epictetus with which this chapter began: women are called κυρία *by men*, implying that they may not have been called κυρία by other women.

Women addressing men use names freely, in classical prose as well as in later authors,⁸⁶ and can also use titles, ATs, insults, and FTs just as men do. There does not appear to be any type of restriction on the addresses used by women, although it is certainly possible that such existed and is not reflected in our evidence.

The most difficult question is whether our data contain examples of addresses used by women significantly more often than by men, so that they can be considered elements of 'women's language'.⁸⁷ Unfortunately our results provide little evidence on this point. We have suggested that females may have used diminutive and other variant forms of KT's (see p. 221), τάλαν/τάλαινα (p. 163), and τέκνον (p. 65) more often than males, but in all these cases our evidence is slim.

⁸⁴ See Bain (1984: 25) on the difficulties of reconstructing female speech in Greek.

⁸⁵ Ar. *Lys.* 6, 9, 69, 70, 78, 135, etc.; Theocritus 15. 1 ff.; Herodas 1. 9 ff., 4. 19 ff., 6. 1 ff.; Dion. Hal. 8. 40. 2-41. 6; Plut. *Cor.* 33. 5.

⁸⁶ e.g. Hdt. 1. 11. 2, Xen. *Cyr.* 7. 3. 10, Plato, *Symp.* 202b, etc. Sommerstein (1995: 77) argues that women do not address men by name, but his evidence comes only from Aristophanes, where FN address is not very common under any circumstances (see p. 47). In Menander and prose no such restrictions apply, suggesting that the figures for Aristophanes may be coincidental.

⁸⁷ On women's language in Greek see Sommerstein (1980, 1995), McClure (1995), Bain (1984), Gilleland (1980).

6

Conclusion

Our examination of Greek forms of address had three goals: to aid the interpretation of literature by discovering the connotations of specific addresses in Greek, to shed light on Greek social structure, and to test sociolinguistic assumptions based on modern languages (see p. 2). In addition, we promised to examine the question of how close the language of our texts is to any type of conversational language.

6.1 THE GREEK ADDRESS SYSTEM

The first and primary goal of this study has certainly been fulfilled, for we have succeeded in drawing conclusions about the basic rules of address in the Greek system and the meaning carried by various deviations from that system. It should now be possible for readers to know what is meant by most of the vocatives in their texts, rather than relying on the meaning that a vocative with the same referential usage would have in the English system. In brief, the classical Greek system was as follows.

Addresses were generally expected at the beginnings of conversations and orations, and the absence of an address in such a situation usually meant that the communication was very urgent, that the addressee was greatly inferior to the speaker in status, or that the speaker was having trouble deciding what to call the addressee (4.1, 5.4.1). Between close relatives, KT's were often the standard form of address, but names could also be used in many types of relationship (5.2). In some situations, such as children addressing their parents, KT's were virtually obligatory, and the use of names would have been conspicuous and meaningful (5.2.2). Outside the family, names were used more freely; in later authors there were no restrictions on the use of names between men and women, but in classical works men addressing respectable women not related to them generally used

γύναι 'woman' or other terms rather than names (5.4.1). The use of FN to one's wife indicated emotional strain (5.2.3); its use to another woman in classical authors seems to have implied that the woman was less than perfectly respectable (5.4.1).

If the addressee was a child or young person unrelated to the speaker, both ATs and FN could be used freely (5.1.1), but otherwise the ages of unrelated interlocutors had little or no effect on the Greek address system. Power differences were more completely reflected in address; in many dyads where the addressee had a great deal of direct power over the speaker, as in addresses from slaves to masters or subjects to absolute monarchs, titles were the standard form of address, and names would have been remarkable and disrespectful (5.3.2, 5.3.3). In dyads where the speaker was more powerful than the addressee, this power difference was not usually reflected in address unless the addressee was a slave or servant, regardless of the status of the speaker (5.3.1, 5.3.4). Slaves would normally be addressed with παῖ 'boy' or with ethnics if being treated as 'a slave', whether by their own masters or mistresses or by others; they could, however, also be addressed by name when treated more as individuals (5.3.1).

In all other dyads FN was the standard way of addressing an individual whose name was known, and any deviation from that form could be meaningful. In general, patronymics and titles conveyed formality and respect (3.1.3, 3.3), KT's conveyed affection and/or respect (3.2), insults and ethnics conveyed contempt, anger and/or hatred (3.7, 3.8), expressions of pity conveyed sympathy and/or contempt (3.6), and friendship terms indicated friendly feelings or a sense of superiority on the part of the speaker (3.4).

If the addressee's name was unknown, or if a speech was addressed to an imaginary, nameless figure, an address was formed from the addressee's primary distinguishing feature (3.5.2). Women were thus addressed as γύναι 'woman' (5.4.1), young people with ATs (5.1.1), and strangers as ξένοι (3.5.1). In the absence of such features men could be addressed by any other notable feature or by indefinite addresses such as ἄνθρωπε 'human being' (3.5.2) or οὗτος 'this one' (3.5.3). When used to nameless people in classical authors, all of these addresses by distinguishing characteristic were neutral and carried no positive or negative meaning, whatever their implications when used to a named person.

Speakers addressing groups could not normally use names, so groups were generally addressed by some shared feature, such as ethnics, occupational terms, or descriptive addresses (3.9).

6.2 VARIATION AND THE LANGUAGE OF OUR TEXTS

The above description is of course a simplified overview, omitting the numerous small variations found in different authors and the fine points of the address rules, which have been discussed already. It is not claimed that the Greek address system is entirely uniform and consistent across all the authors surveyed; like the address systems of all other known languages, it is subject to variation. The surprising thing is that the variation found in Greek is different from that which sociolinguistic research would lead us to expect. Modern languages tend to have several slightly different systems of address which are used by people of different social classes, regions, and chronological periods (1.2.3). Yet very little such variation is detectable within any one of the authors surveyed. There is no noticeable difference between the address systems in Plutarch's lives of prehistoric Greeks and in those of Hellenistic kings, nor between Xenophon's Athenians and Spartans, nor between kings and humble figures in Herodotus.

The only such variation which appeared was one probable instance of a dialectal address ($\theta\epsilon\iota\epsilon$, see p. 144) and a few traces of women's speech (pp. 65, 163, 221). Other scholars have occasionally claimed to find social variation in poetic addresses; thus it is maintained that $\delta\epsilon\sigma\pi\omicron\iota\nu$ 'Aθηνά in Menander is a citizen's way of addressing the goddess, not a slave's (Gomme and Sandbach 1973: on *Kolax* 23), and certain elegant addresses in Homer may be reserved for noble speakers (Zilliacus 1949: 14). These observations are made in passing, however, and no evidence for them is given.

Greek is unlikely to have been a language genuinely having so little regional, social, or chronological variation in address systems; such languages are rare, and in any case it is well established that the Greek language did display a great deal of regional and chronological variation in aspects other than address usage. It is virtually certain that more variation existed than was reflected by our authors. This means that the texts used have not been completely accurate in representing conversational language, but from that it does not follow that they have been completely inaccurate. Clearly our authors have not taken care to represent accurately the speech habits of people of different centuries, regions, or social classes, but it may be that they were nevertheless giving an accurate picture of one system, most probably their own. Indeed there is some evidence that certain authors were concerned to represent variation within the speech of educated men of

their own time and place, since Socrates' individual peculiarities of address usage seem to have been reflected in Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues (3.4.2).

If each of our authors was accurately representing his own address system in his works, we should find the regional, social, and chronological variation between one author and the next rather than within individual authors. Indeed there is considerable variation among the authors included in our sample, but it does not seem to conform to a consistent pattern. Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides, and the Attic orators might be expected to share the same address system, and they do, but this system is virtually identical to that of Dio Chrysostom, who lived well over 400 years later. On the other hand, Dio and Epictetus, who were almost exactly contemporary, have distinctly different address systems.

It is a known fact that certain of our later authors made a conscious effort to imitate the classical ones (3.4.3), and we have clear proof of their ability to do so accurately in the case of addresses. The proof is provided by Lucian's *De Syria Dea*, which is a parody of Herodotus. Whether or not this work, whose authorship is disputed, was actually written by Lucian is not important; it is certainly a late imitation, rather than the work of Herodotus or a contemporary. Herodotus' own addresses are distinguished from Lucian's in several ways: they are far more likely to come first in a sentence, they are far more likely to include titles such as βασιλεῦ or δέσποτα, and they are less frequent. In the *Syria Dea*, however, vocatives are much less frequent than usual in Lucian, and despite the small size of the sample both βασιλεῦ and δέσποτα occur. Seventy-one per cent of vocatives are placed at the start of a sentence (the figure in Herodotus' own work is 73 per cent, and in Lucian as a whole only 5 per cent). From this evidence of the ability of late authors to imitate accurately the vocative usage of earlier ones, as well as from the similarities between certain late authors and classical ones, we may reasonably conclude that the address systems found in Dio, Plutarch, and Lucian are largely imitations of the classical one.

This conclusion does not mean that we have learned nothing about conversational address usage in the first and second centuries AD. Just as the sound changes of spoken Greek can be traced through spelling mistakes in papyri, so it is possible to learn something about Plutarch's and Lucian's own address systems from the 'mistakes' they made in imitating the classical system. In addition, certain late authors

such as Epictetus were much less concerned to imitate Attic usage, and they may well give accurate or partially accurate representations of their own conversational address systems as a result. In some cases there is also information available from sources outside our corpus, such as documentary papyri. Often these different sources of evidence conflict, and it is not possible to say with any certainty what the conversational usage of a given term was. In some cases, however, the papyrological evidence and/or the system of Epictetus coincides with that inferable from the mistakes of other late authors so that only one hypothesis about the underlying conversational usage will adequately explain all the facts. In those cases we can draw conclusions about conversational address usage in late Greek: that FTs and many of the classical insults were no longer common in non-literary language of the first and second centuries AD (3.4.3, 3.7), that several indefinite addresses had probably taken on negative connotations even when used indefinitely (3.5.2, 3.5.3), that unrelated men could be called 'brother' (3.2.3.3), that ω was no longer prefixed to vocatives (4.3), and that some titles had been weakened in force (3.3.4).

The classical prose texts must be treated somewhat differently; they can only be compared with each other and with the poetic genres. In general, Plato and Xenophon have the same system of address, and the evidence of Thucydides and the orators (slim though this is for anything except addresses to groups) does not diverge from that system. Herodotus' addresses are somewhat different, not only in the terms used but also in the position of the vocative in the sentence and the use of ω . Given that the other classical authors were all Athenian and roughly contemporary, while Herodotus was Ionic and rather earlier, this evidence might suggest that the classical authors were in fact reflecting the conversational language of their own times in their writings. Certainly the Attic writers were not imitating Herodotus.

The Attic prose authors can also be compared with tragedy and comedy. Epic is not really relevant at this point, for the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* come from a period for which we have no prose material for comparison of address usage,¹ and other epic (unless also too early to be comparable) is both heavily imitative of Homer and rather short on addresses. It is beyond dispute that the language of tragedy was

¹ It is so difficult to find a coherent system of address in Homer that Weise (1965) devoted an entire dissertation to an attempt to prove that the vocatives in the *Iliad* had some relevance to their contexts.

specifically intended to be elevated, elegant, and removed from ordinary diction; we proposed earlier that if the prose system of address was found to be closer to that of tragedy than to that of comedy, it would be an indication that our texts were not representing conversational language, while a similarity to comedy might indicate the reverse. In fact, the agreement was not total in either direction. On some points tragedy, comedy, and prose all present basically the same usage, and on others the language of prose is distinct from that of both tragedy and comedy. In a number of areas, however, the address system of prose does seem to be much closer to that of comedy than to that of tragedy (e.g. use of *παῖ* and of *ἀναξ*).

We must judge each question on its own merits, but it appears that in most cases the language of our texts is at least as close to conversational speech as is any other literary genre. The exceptions often arise from the difference between the types of scene depicted in literature and those occurring in real life: we noted that addresses to unspecified addressees were probably much more common in Greek literature than in Greek society and that certain types of addressee, such as nameless brothers, probably never occurred at all in real life. It is also true that authors are likely to represent in direct speech the most dramatic and emotional of a character's words, rather than his daily complaints to the cook about the soup, and that therefore addresses which are connected with moments of great emotion will be proportionally more frequent in our data than in real life. If we make due allowance for these exceptions, however, we are in a good position to reconstruct the address system of conversational Greek.

In many passages where the prose system of address is violated in poetry, it is possible to show that there were special reasons for that individual violation: metrical considerations, the dramatic necessity of identifying entering characters, or humorous purpose. Rarely are the basic outlines of the classical prose address rules actually broken in poetry (e.g. names used to characters who should not receive them) without such a reason. It thus seems that the dramatists were probably aware of the address system found in prose and adapting that system to their own purposes, rather than creating a totally different one; if so, the prose system was probably their own conversational one.

The most striking differences between the genres, however, lie not in the rules for the use of specific addresses, but in the general character of the addresses used.² This criterion divides the genres not

² This point is treated more fully in Dickey (1995).

into tragedy, comedy, and prose, but into tragedy and Aristophanes versus Menander and prose. (The three major tragedians are of course not identical in their use of addresses, but the differences between them are minor compared to those between Aristophanes and Menander.) In prose and Menander most addresses consist of a single word (or a single word preceded by ω), while in tragedy and Aristophanes longer, more complex addresses are more common. Simple FN addresses in particular form a much higher percentage of the total in prose than in tragedy or Aristophanes, and Menander's practice is closer to that of prose than to that of Aristophanes (3.1.1).

Addresses in prose and Menander also tend to be consistent and repetitive; in a dialogue between two people it is by no means rare for one character to use the same address several times in a row to his interlocutor, while in poetry other than Menander this type of repetition is rare. Moreover, most non-FN addresses in prose and Menander use one of a limited number of terms which are also found, in a predictable distribution, in other dyads. These words tend to be common ones; thus $\pi\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho$ 'father', $\mu\eta\tau\epsilon\rho$ 'mother', and their diminutives are the only KT's available for addressing parents in classical prose and Menander, while $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\upsilon$ 'king' and $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\pi\omicron\tau\alpha$ 'master' are the only titles usable for a king. It is precisely this repetition and predictability which has made it possible for us to formulate rules of usage for the prose address system. Yet in tragedy and Aristophanes the situation is very different, for a much wider range of titles, KT's, and other terms is available, including rare words and vocatives that seem to have been invented especially for the occasion, and the usage of one term rather than another is difficult to predict. It is this huge variety and unpredictability, together with the relative rarity of each individual term, that has caused so many problems for previous studies of Greek addresses which concentrated on poetic usage.

Languages that display such variety and unpredictability in the address system of conversational speech do exist (Braun 1988: 184), but they seem to be a minority among those studied by sociolinguists. I know of no language in which addresses as long and complex as those found in Greek tragedy are regularly employed in conversational usage. It is theoretically possible that conversational Greek did employ such complex, varied, and unpredictable addresses, but it is far more likely that the simpler system of prose was used in daily interactions.

These observations about vocatives in Aristophanes, Menander,

and prose are not inconsistent with other aspects of comic language. Bremer (1993: 144–60) has shown that Aristophanes' language can be consciously literary, and that at times he echoes tragedy for the sake of elegance, not for parody. Dover (1976) has concluded that Aristophanes did not consistently characterize his characters by their language, because the advantages of having his characters speak consistently were outweighed by the advantage of doing other, more humorous, things with language. Menander, on the other hand, has been found to make his characters' language fit their personalities in a much more consistent way (Sandbach 1970), and in addition to these individual differences he also preserves traces of sociolinguistic variations such as women's language (Bain 1984). These findings are not unique to modern scholars, although more interest has been shown on this point in recent years than for some time. Plutarch in his essay on Aristophanes and Menander complains about the way Aristophanes mixes at random the language appropriate to men and women, kings and ordinary men, so that it is impossible to tell from the language the social role of each character (*Mor.* 853d), while he praises Menander's ability to adapt his language to each kind of character (853e). The fact that vocatives in prose have turned out to be much closer to those in Menander than to those in Aristophanes is therefore a sign that they are closer to ordinary speech.

Moreover, the classical prose authors surveyed were some of the earliest Greek prose writers, pioneers in their genre. Their address system is not the same as that of contemporary or earlier poetry. If they did not derive it from non-literary language, where did it come from? Could Plato and Xenophon independently have developed simple, consistent systems of address which differed both from that used in their daily speech and from the address systems of all previous literature? Could they have got together and worked such a system out? What would have been their motive for doing this? It cannot have been literary elegance; the unrelenting repetition of FN address in many prose works is far less attractive than the varied vocatives of poetry. And why would Menander then have imitated the language of literary prose rather than that of earlier comedy in developing his own address system?

By far the best explanation for the evidence we have is that the Attic prose authors were in fact reflecting their own conversational address systems in their works, and that Menander was following not their creation but his own non-literary system. In departing from the metres

of poetry the first prose authors were certainly moving in the direction of greater conformity to conversational speech, and such a movement could hardly fail to be connected with a closer adherence to conversational language in usage as well as in rhythm.

In the case of Herodotus it is more difficult to be sure of our position, for there are fewer comparanda. Since ancient times it has been believed that Herodotus' language imitated that of Homer (Palmer 1980: 148), and this is probably true on some points. But in the matter of addresses Herodotus' system is certainly closer to that of Plato than to that of Homer. Nothing in our data is inconsistent with the idea that Herodotus was reflecting his own conversational address system in his works, but it is also possible that in writing he modified his own system somewhat to bring it slightly closer to Homer's. Herodotus provides many fewer addresses than either Plato or Xenophon, so his internal consistency is harder to verify, and there are no other prose authors of the same date and region with which he may be compared.

It thus seems probable that we have succeeded in gathering from our texts a system very close to that actually in use in certain circles in fourth-century Athens. We will not claim to have exactly reproduced the system in every detail, especially given the scarcity of evidence for certain types of interactions. But remembering the reservations expressed earlier about the success of other methodologies (2.3), we may reasonably assume that we have reached at least as close an approximation of the upper-class Athenian system as sociolinguists normally reach for modern languages. It is to be regretted, however, that we have not been able to recover the address systems of any other regions or social groups.

6.3 FINDINGS ABOUT GREEK SOCIAL RELATIONS

The relationship between address usage and social structure is only partial: if a distinction is made in address, that distinction must have existed in the society which produced that address system, but distinctions may exist in a culture which are not reflected in the address system, and thus the absence of a distinction from the address system is uninformative. Distinctions are of course not the only source of information that address usage offers us; we can also learn about relative values from the words which are used as addresses.

Nevertheless, as we have said (1.2.9), such evidence must be used with extreme caution.

In the course of this work a number of suggestions have been made about the ways in which the Greek address system might tell us something about Greek culture. In many cases this study merely points to features of Greek culture which are already obvious from other evidence: men are distinguished from women, children from adults, slaves from their masters, and absolute rulers from their subjects. Other points may be somewhat more interesting, such as the findings that it was probably flattering to address a small child as 'young man', but certainly derogatory to so address an adult, although 'child' was a friendly address when applied to young men; that the Greeks divided males for the purposes of address not into children and adults but into boys, young men, and adults; that it was flattering to address an older, unrelated person as 'father' or 'mother'; that there was a major distinction between oriental (absolute) monarchs and Greek kings, with Hellenistic and Macedonian kings falling in the middle; that to tell someone he was fortunate was as much of a compliment as to tell him that he was good or noble; and that there may have been a close connection between pity and contempt.

Perhaps the most interesting inference which can be drawn from the Greek address system arises from the fact that addresses to unknown people by distinguishing characteristics were based on the assumption that the state of being an adult male native of the place in which the conversation occurred was unremarkable. It has been claimed that 'it was the division between active male citizens and everyone else which really mattered in Athens' (Golden 1985: 101), and this theory seems to be confirmed by the structure of the Greek address system.

6.4 GREEK AND SOCIOLINGUISTICS

The basic elements of the sociolinguistic theory of address were developed from the evidence of a few European languages. Although studies now exist of addresses in a huge variety of languages, claims about the universality of various features still seem to be based primarily on a Euro-centred approach. In addition, historical studies of address usage, where they exist, are rarely taken into account, and the chance of tracing the evolution of individual features is often lost.

The present work cannot alter this situation, but it may be useful to point out that some of the claims made on the basis of this incomplete evidence are inapplicable to Greek and are thus wrong to the extent that they claim to be universal.³

We have already noted that the introduction of the title *κύριε* as an alternative, but not a more polite alternative, to *δέσποτα* cast doubt on some alleged 'universals' (p. 107). In addition, some incautious linguists make claims such as the following:

It is apparently a sociolinguistic universal that the address terms exchanged between intimates ('familiar pronoun', first name, etc.) is the same term used in addressing social inferiors, and that the term exchanged between non-intimates ('polite pronoun', title and last name, etc.) is also used to address social superiors.⁴

Differences in power exist among people of all societies. If those differences cannot be reflected in a set of pronouns or some other grammatical category, they will find their expression by other linguistic means. Since English cannot any longer distinguish solidarity and power by means of pronouns, it relies on the use of first names and titles to accomplish the same goal. (Hook 1984: 184)

The change from the formal to the informal address [between people who meet as adults and later marry] seems to be a phenomenon which is shown by every language, whatever means may be used to express these differences. (Adler 1978: 170)

More prudent linguists do not make such claims (cf. Braun 1988: 66), and indeed a number of languages have already been found which do not entirely conform to these patterns.⁵ Nevertheless, in the face of such statements it is worth pointing out that these 'universals' are completely absent from Greek. Not only did ancient Greek lack a T/V distinction in second-person pronouns, but no equivalent of this distinction, no recognition of a division into formal and familiar, is to be found anywhere else in the address system. In Plato's Athens, FN was the standard address between adult men, whether they were the oldest of friends or had only just met, and regardless of power or status unless one member of the dyad was a servant.

³ Comrie (1989: 19 ff.) points out that it is possible for something to be a universal *tendency* but still to have exceptions. Unfortunately not all researchers into address theory recognize this distinction between 'absolute universals' and 'tendencies' when making their claims.

⁴ Slobin, Miller, and Porter (1968: 289). For similar views more recently expressed, see Head (1978: 194) and Kroger and Wood (1992).

⁵ Kretzenbacher and Segebrecht (1991: 27-8); Hwang (1975: 64); Braun (1988: 22).

The rare occasions on which a Greek would have used an address other than FN cause even more trouble for these linguistic 'universals'. The addresses for strangers (*ἄνθρωπε*, *ξένε*, etc.) were never used to show respect to people who were not strangers, nor were those for superiors (*βασιλεῦ*, *δέσποτα*, etc.) ever used to equals to express distance. The only point at which the Greek address system might be said to approximate a T/V system is the use of *παῖ* 'child/boy' both to address slaves and for the speaker's own children. But as we have seen (3.2.1.2), the usage of *παῖ* for slaves probably arose from its function as an AT, not from the KT meaning in which it was applied to one's own children. Thus although there was certainly a connection between the position of slaves and that of children who were not intimate with the speaker, there was no real connection in the classical period between addresses to slaves and to one's own offspring.

In fact, the classical Greek address system had at least one term which worked in a way directly opposite to a T/V distinction. This was *ἄνθρωπε* 'human being', which was a term for strangers but which functioned as an insult when addressed to someone the speaker knew. The very existence of a term which was commonly used for strangers but was the opposite of polite when used to intimates cannot be reconciled with these alleged 'universals'.⁶

⁶ The implications of this study for sociolinguistics are discussed in more detail in Dickey (forthcoming).

APPENDIX A

Ancient Authors and Corpus of Works Surveyed

Dates are listed only to give an impression of chronological range, and no claim is made for their absolute accuracy. For the sake of consistency, they have all been taken from Howatson (1989), *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, 2nd. edn. (Oxford).

ACHILLES TATIUS (2nd cent.? AD): *Leucippe and Clitophon*

128 addresses (124 sing., 4 pl.)

Garnaud, J.-P. (1991), *Achille Tatius d'Alexandrie: Le Roman de Leucippé et Clitophon* (Paris).

AESCHINES (c.390–c.322 BC): All speeches, letters, no fragments

145 addresses (30 sing., 115 pl.)

Blass, F., and Schindel, U. (1978), *Aeschines: Orationes*, 3rd. edn. (Leipzig).

ANDOCIDES (c.440–c.390 BC): All speeches, no fragments

91 addresses (9 sing., 82 pl.)

Dalmeyda, G. (1930), *Andocide: Discours* (Paris).

ANTIPHON (c.480–411 BC): All speeches, no fragments

36 addresses (all pl.)

Gernet, L. (1954), *Antiphon: Discours* (Paris).

CHARITON (2nd cent.? AD): *Chaireas and Callirhoe*

201 addresses (190 sing., 11 pl.)

Molinié, G. (1979), *Chariton: Le Roman de Chairéas et Callirhoé* (Paris).

DEMOSTHENES (384–322 BC): All speeches, letters

1,509 addresses (147 sing., 1,362 pl.)

Butcher, S. H. (1903–7), *Demosthenis Orationes* (Oxford), Or. 1–26.

Rennie, W. (1921–31), *Demosthenis Orationes* (Oxford), Or. 27–61, prooemia, letters.

DINARCHUS (c.360–c.290 BC): All speeches, no fragments

84 addresses (14 sing., 70 pl.)

Conomis, N. C. (1975), *Dinarchi Orationes cum Fragmentis* (Leipzig).

DIO CHRYSOSTOM (AD c.40–after 111): All works, no fragments

138 addresses (83 sing., 55 pl.)

Von Arnim, J. (1893–6), *Dionis Prusaensis quem vocant Chrysostomum quae exstant omnia* (Berlin).

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- DIODORUS SICULUS (fl. c.60–30 BC): *Bibliotheca Historica*, incl. fragments
 36 addresses (17 sing., 19 pl.)
 Vogel, F. (1888–93), *Diodori Bibliotheca Historica* (Leipzig), books 1–15.
 Fischer, C. T. (1906), *Diodori Bibliotheca Historica* (Leipzig), books 16–20.
 Walton, F. R. (1957–67), *Diodorus of Sicily* (Cambridge, Mass.), books 21–40.
- DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS (fl. from 30 BC): *Antiquitates Romanae*,
 incl. fragments
 336 addresses (157 sing., 179 pl.)
 Jacoby, C. (1885–1905), *Dionysi Halicarnassensis Antiquitatum Romanarum quae
 supersunt* (Leipzig).
- EPICTETUS (AD c.50–c.120): *Diatribes*, *Enchiridion*, no fragments
 185 addresses (168 sing., 17 pl.)
 Schenkl, H. (1916), *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae*, Editio minor
 (Leipzig).
- HERODOTUS (c.490–c.425 BC): *Historiae*
 291 addresses (219 sing., 72 pl.)
 Hude, C. (1927), *Herodoti Historiae*, 3rd edn. (Oxford).
- ISAEUS (c.420–after 353 BC): All speeches, no fragments
 173 addresses (10 sing., 163 pl.)
 Roussel, P. (1922), *Isée: Discours* (Paris).
- ISOCRATES (436–338 BC): All speeches, letters, no fragments
 41 addresses (7 sing., 34 pl.)
 Mathieu, G., and Brémond, É. (1928–62), *Isocrate: Discours* (Paris).
- JOSEPHUS, FLAVIUS (AD 37–after 93): All works
 195 addresses (148 sing., 47 pl.)
 Niese, B. (1885–94), *Flavii Iosephi Opera* (Berlin).
- LONGUS (2nd cent.? AD): *Daphnis and Chloe*
 44 addresses (38 sing., 6 pl.)
 Reeve, M. D. (1982), *Longus: Daphnis et Chloe* (Leipzig).
- LUCIAN (AD c.115–after 180): All works in OCT, incl. spuria, except *Timarion*
 and poetic works
 2,041 addresses (1,931 sing., 110 pl.)
 Macleod, M. D. (1972–87), *Luciani Opera* (Oxford).
- LYCURGUS (c.390–c.325 BC): *Κατὰ Λεωκράτους*, no fragments
 71 addresses (5 sing., 66 pl.)
 Conomis, N. C. (1970), *Lycurgi Oratio in Leocratem* (Leipzig).
- LYSIAS (c.458–c.380 BC): All speeches, no fragments
 303 addresses (13 sing., 290 pl.)
 Hude, C. (1912), *Lysiae Orationes* (Oxford).
- PHILO JUDAEUS (c.30 BC–AD c.45): All works included in Cohn and
 Wendland
 168 addresses (136 sing., 32 pl.)
 Cohn, L. (1896–1906), *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt* (Berlin), vols.
 1, 4, 5.

Ancient Authors and Works Surveyed

- Wendland, P. (1897-8), *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt* (Berlin), vols. 2, 3.
 Cohn, L., and Reiter, S. (1915), *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt* (Berlin), vol. 6.
- PLATO (427-347 BC): All works included in OCT, incl. spuria
 3,487 addresses (3,348 sing., 139 pl.)
 Burnet, J. (1900-7), *Platonis Opera* (Oxford).
- PLUTARCH (AD c.46-c.120): *Lives, Moralia*, incl. spuria, no fragments
 988 addresses (863 sing., 125 pl.)
 Ziegler, K. (1964-73), *Plutarchi Vitae Parallelae* (Leipzig), *Lives*.
 Paton, W. R., Wegehaupt, I., and Pohlenz, M. (1974), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 1-14, vol. 1.
 Nachstädt, W., Sieveking, W., and Titchener, J. B. (1925), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 15-23, vol. 2.
 Pohlenz, M., and Sieveking, W. (1922), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 24-45, vol. 3.
 Hubert, C. (1957), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 46-8, vol. 4.
 Hubert, C., and Pohlenz, M. (1957), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 49-54, vol. 5.1.
 Mau, J. (1971), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 55, 58, vol. 5.2.1.
 Häslér, B. (1978), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 56, 57, vol. 5.2.2.
 Hubert, C., and Pohlenz, M. (1955), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 59-61, vol. 5.3.
 Hubert, C. (1954), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 62-9, vol. 6.1.
 Pohlenz, M. (1952), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 70-5, vol. 6.2.
 Ziegler, K., and Pohlenz, M. (1966), *Plutarchi Moralia* (Leipzig), *Mor.* Nos. 76-8, vol. 6.3.
- POLYBIUS (c.200-after 118 BC): *Historiae*, incl. fragments assigned to definite books
 44 addresses (21 sing., 23 pl.)
 Büttner-Wobst, T. (1889-1904), *Polybii Historiae* (Leipzig).
- THUCYDIDES (b. 460-455, d. c.399 BC): *Historiae*
 60 addresses (2 sing., 58 pl.)
 Jones, H. S., and Powell, J. E. (1942), *Thucydidis Historiae* (Oxford).
- XENOPHON (c.428-c.354 BC): All works included in OCT
 1,092 addresses (834 sing., 258 pl.)
 Marchant, E. C. (1900-21), *Xenophontis Opera Omnia* (Oxford).

COMPARATIVE DATA

Homer, tragedy, Pindar, and Theocritus are cited following the Oxford Classical Texts.

Appendix A

Aristophanes: all complete plays, no fragments

Dover, K. J. (1968), *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford).

MacDowell, D. M. (1971), *Aristophanes: Wasps* (Oxford).

Ussher, R. G. (1973), *Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae* (Oxford).

Henderson, J. (1987), *Aristophanes: Lysistrata* (Oxford).

Dover, K. J. (1993), *Aristophanes: Frogs* (Oxford).

Other plays are cited following the Budé edition: Coulon, V. (1946-54), *Aristophane* (Paris).

Menander: All fragments assigned to known plays, no other fragments

Sandbach, F. H. (1972), *Menandri Reliquiae Selectae* (Oxford).

Turner, E. G. (1977), *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 63: 315-31.

APPENDIX B

Listing of Addresses

Notes: The purpose of this listing is to make the assertions in the text checkable by providing references for the vocatives in question. Different information is therefore given for each type of term, according to what has been said about it in the text. The terms are given in the order in which they are discussed in the text, and thus the same principles have not been used for the ordering of every section. Those who wish to use this listing without the text should use the alphabetical index of vocatives to find specific terms. Authors' names are in parentheses if all of the uses of the term cited come from doubtful or spurious works.

Greek words in parentheses give the form of the vocative in question if different from that of the main entry, and other words in the same address, if any. References without words in parentheses are to vocatives which stand alone and are in the form given (normally the masculine singular).

(?) indicates that the classification is uncertain.

> indicates speaker and addressee: the speaker is to be found to the left of this sign and the addressee to the right.

Translations are of the referential meaning of the words only and are intended simply as a rough guide for non-classicists; for a fuller discussion of the referential and vocative meaning of individual terms, see the text.

NAMES (See text, pp. 43-61)

First names (See text, pp. 46-50)

It is not possible to list all the addresses by FN found in the works surveyed. See Table 2 for numbers of addresses by FN alone in individual authors.

Variations of FN (25) (See text, pp. 50-1)

Diminutives, spoken to prostitutes:

Ἀμπελίδιον, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 8. 2

Γλυκέριον, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 1. 1 (*bis*), 1. 2

Κλωνάριον, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 5. 1, 5. 3 (*bis*), 5. 4

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- Μουσάριον*, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 7. 1, 7. 2, 7. 4 (*bis*)
Μύρτιον, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 2. 2 (*bis*), 2. 3
Χελιδόνιον, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 10. 1, 10. 2 (*bis*), 10. 4 (*bis*)
 Diminutives, other: **Plut.** *Mor.* 1112d (*φίλον Κωλωτάριον*); **Lucian**, *Cont.* 1
 (*φίλτατον Ἑρμάδιον*), *Dial. Mort.* 1. 3 (*φίλτατον Πολυδεύκιον*); **Char.**
 3. 1. 8 (*Πλαγγώνιον φιλοδέσποτον*)
 Other variations: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 27. 1 (*Δύσπαρι*)

Patronymics/metronymics (See text, pp. 52–6)

Formed with *παῖ/παῖδες* (50)

- In Plato; spoken by Socrates or Athenian stranger: *Chrm.* 158b (*φίλε παῖ
 Γλαύκωνος*), 169b (*παῖ Καλλαίσχρου*), *Cra.* 384a (*παῖ Ἰππονίκου
 Ἑρμόγενης*), 406b (*παῖ Ἰππονίκου*), *Euthd.* 278e (*παῖ Ἀξιόχου*), 279d (*παῖ
 Ἀξιόχου*), *Hp. Min.* 373a (*παῖ Ἀπημάντου*), *Laws* 752e (*παῖδες Κρητῶν*),
 817d (*παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔκγονοι*), *Lys.* 204b (*παῖ Ἰερωνύμου
 Ἰππόθαλες*), 207b (*παῖ Δημοφώντος*), 209a (*παῖ Δημοκράτους*), *Menex.* 246b
 (*παῖδες ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν*), 248d (*παῖδες καὶ γονῆς τῶν τελευτησάντων*),
Meno 76e (*παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου*), *Phlb.* 19b (*παῖ Καλλίου*), 36d (*παῖ κείνου
 τάνδρος*), *Prot.* 328d (*παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου*), 335d (*παῖ Ἰππονίκου*), *Rep.* 368a
 (*παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός*), 427d (*παῖ Ἀρίστωνος*), *Symp.* 198a (*παῖ
 Ἀκουμενοῦ*), *Theag.* 128c (*παῖ Δημοδόκου*), *Alc. I* 103a (*παῖ Κλεινίου*), 105d
 (*φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ Δεινομάχης*)
 In Plato; other speakers: *Lach.* 180d (*παῖ Σωφρονίσκου*), *Epist.* II. 313a (*παῖ
 Διονυσίου καὶ Δωρίδος*)
 Non-Platonic; respectful/formal contexts: **Hdt.** I. 124. 1 (*παῖ Καμβύσῃ*),
 III. 14. 10 (*παῖ Κύρου*), 34. 5 (*παῖ Κύρου*), IX. 78. 2 (*παῖ Κλεομβρότου*);
Xen. *Mem.* II. 1. 33 (*παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις*); **Dio Chrys.** 4. 82 (*παῖ
 Φιλίππου*), 12. 25 (*παῖδες Ἡλείων*), 64. 10 (*παῖ Μνησαρχίδου*); **Lucian**,
Cont. 1 (*Μαίας παῖ*), *Fug.* 29 (*παῖ Καλλιόπης*), *Gall.* 4 (*Μνησάρχου παῖ*),
Prom. 5 (*Μαίας παῖ*)
 Non-Platonic; negative statements, formal and/or to important people: **Hdt.**
 III. 71. 3 (*παῖ Ὑστάσπεος*), VI. 129. 4 (*παῖ Τεισάνδρου*), VII. 10η (*παῖ
 Γωβρύεω [Μαρδόνιε]*), 14 (*παῖ Δαρείου*); **Plut.** *Sol.* 30. 1 (*παῖ Ἰππο-
 κράτους*)
 Non-Platonic; other: **Hdt.** IX. 58. 2 (*παῖδες Ἀλεύεω*); **Dion. Hal.** XIV. 9. 5
 (*γενναῖοι παῖδες ἀγαθῶν ζηλωταὶ πατέρων*); **Plut.** *Mor.* 705b (*παῖ Λέοντος*);
Joseph. *AJ* 4. 180 (*παῖδες Ἰσραήλου*), 7. 265 (*Σαρουίας παῖδες*); **Lucian**,
Dial. Mort. 26. 2 (*παῖ Νέστορος*)

Listing of Addresses

Formed in other ways (5)

(This listing includes only those names with patronymic endings which form an alternative to FN. Names such as *Ἀλκιβιάδης* and *Μιλτιάδης*, which function as the FN of the person concerned, are counted as FN for our purposes.)

In Plato, spoken by Socrates: *Cra.* 429e (*ξένε Ἀθηναίε, υἱὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενης*)

Non-Platonic, respectful context: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 28. 1 (*σὺ Δήμητρος θυγάτηρ*)

Non-Platonic, negative statements to important people: **Lucian**, *Tim.* 6 (*Κρόνον καὶ Πέας υἱέ*), *Dial. Mort.* 11. 5 (*βέλτιστε Ἀμφιτρυωνιάδη*)

Other: **Ach.** 4. 17. 1 (*γῆς τέκνον, φάρμακον*)

Roman names (26) (See text, pp. 56–61)

Author > dedicatee: **Plut.** *Thes.* 1. 1 (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), *Dem.* 1. 1 (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), *Dion* 1. 1 (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), *Mor.* 14d (*Μάρκε Σηδάτιε*), 75b (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 86b (*Κορνήλιε Πούλχερ*), 409e (*Τερέντιε Πρίσκε*), 612c (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 629c (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 644e (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 659e (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 672d (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 686a (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 697c (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 716d (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 736c (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*), 748d (*Σόσσιε Σενεκίων*)

Other situations: **Dion. Hal.** XI. 4. 7 (*Κόιντε Φάβιε Οὐιβολανέ*), 6. 4 (*Μάρκε Ὀράτιε*), 29. 1 (*Ἀππιε Κλαύδιε*), 56. 6 (*Μάρκε Γενύκιε*); **Plut.** *Aem.* 38. 5 (*Παῦλε . . . Αἰμίλιε*), *Caes.* 44. 10 (*Γάϊε Κρασσίνιε*), *Cam.* 14. 3 (*Μάρκε Καϊδίκιε*), *Pomp.* 22. 8 (*Πομπήϊε Μάγνε*), 80. 6 (*Πομπήϊε Μάγνε*)

KINSHIP AND AGE TERMS (See text, pp. 61–90)

Terms For Younger Addressees (See text, pp. 63–77)

(Not including patronymics formed with *παῖ*, *υἱέ*, or *θυγάτηρ*, for which see p. 264)

Υἱέ 'son' (2) (See text, pp. 64–5)

father > boy: **Xen.** *Symp.* 2. 5

father > young man: **Xen.** *Hell.* V. 4. 26

Θύγατερ 'daughter' (15) (See text, pp. 64–5)

father > girl: **Plut.** *Aem.* 10. 8, *Mor.* 198a

father > adult woman: **Hdt.** III. 69. 2

father > goddess: **Lucian**, *BA.* 4, 7, *DI.* 2, *Fug.* 3, 5 (*bis*)

mother > young woman: **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 3. 3 (*bis*), 6. 1 (*bis*), 6. 4

unrelated man > young woman: **Char.** 1. 13. 8

Appendix B

Θυγάτριον 'little daughter' (1) (See text, p. 65)

father > young woman: **Long.** 4. 35. 1

Παῖ 'child' (181) (See text, pp. 65–76) (Dead/dying children marked *)

father > boy: **Philo.** *Jos.* 9; **Plut.** *Alex.* 6. 8; **Joseph.** *AJ* 1. 228

father > young man: **Plato.** *Lach.* 181a (παῖδες); **Xen.** *Mem.* II. 2. 1, 2. 14;

Dion. Hal. III. 17. 3 (παῖδες), 17. 5 (παῖδες ἀγαθοί); **Plut.** *Phoc.* 30. 7, *Mor.* 583e, 595d; **Dio Chrys.** 2. 3, 2. 17, 2. 34; **Long.** 4. 24. 1 (παῖδες)

father > adult son: **Hdt.** I. 38. 1, 40, III. 52. 3, V. 19. 2; **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 6. 2, 6. 4, 6. 5, 6. 7, 6. 9 (*bis*), 6. 10, 6. 12 (*bis*), 6. 16, 6. 17 (*bis*), 6. 18, 6. 19 (*bis*), 6. 21, 6. 22, 6. 23, 6. 24, 6. 25, 6. 27 (*bis*), 6. 31, 6. 36, 6. 37, 6. 39, 6. 41, 6. 44, 6. 46, VIII. 7. 6 (παῖδες ἐμοί), 7. 8 (παῖδες), 7. 9 (παῖδες), 7. 10 (παῖδες), 7. 17 (παῖδες), 7. 19 (παῖδες), 7. 25 (παῖδες), 7. 26 (παῖδες), 7. 28 (φίλοι παῖδες); **Plut.** *M. Cato* 24. 7, *Fab.* 24. 4, *Pyrrh.* 34. 10 (?), *Demetr.* 19. 6, *Alex.* 48. 4, *Mor.* 196a; **Joseph.** *AJ* 12. 279(?) (παῖδες), *BJ* 1. 465 (παῖδες ἀγαθοί)

father > sons (or children of unspecified sex), age unknown: **Plato** *Menex.* 246d (παῖδες); **Plut.** *Them.* 29. 10 (παῖδες), *Mor.* 185f (παῖδες), 328f (παῖδες)

father > god: **Lucian.** *Iupp. Trag.* 33, *Fug.* 2

mother > boy: **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 3. 11, 3. 16, 3. 18; **Joseph.** *AJ* 8. 7

mother > young man: **Long.** 3. 26. 4

mother > adult son: **Hdt.** VI. 69. 1, 69. 4, 69. 5; **Plato.** *Apol.* 28c; **Plut.** *Cor.* 35. 2, 35. 7, 36. 2, *Ag. & Cl.* 20. 5*, *Mor.* 488f

mother > god: **Lucian.** *Dial. D.* 2. 2

grandfather > boy: **Hdt.** I. 121; **Xen.** *Cyr.* (age 12–16): I. 3. 5 (*bis*), 3. 6 (*bis*), 3. 10, 3. 11, 3. 14, 4. 10 (*bis*), 4. 19

grandfather > young man: **Hdt.** III. 50. 3 (παῖδες); **Plut.** *Cic.* 49. 5

uncle > young man: **Hdt.** VII 1682 (?); **Plut.** *Otho* 16. 4

great-uncle > young man: **Joseph.** *AJ* 18. 219

sister > adult brother: **Hdt.** III. 53. 3

unrelated older man > boy/children: **Plato.** *Grg.* 521c (παῖδες), 522a (παῖδες), *Laws* 772e, *Lys.* 210d, 217a (παῖδες), 219b (παῖδες), 221e (παῖδες), 222d (παῖδες), *Phdr.* 237b, 241c, 243e (—καλέ), 252b (—καλέ), 256e; **Plut.** *Them.* 2. 2, *Cato* 3. 6, *Mor.* 179e; (**Lucian**) *Demon.* 17; **Long.** 2. 3. 2 (παῖδες), 2. 6. 2 (παῖδες), 2. 7. 1 (παῖδες)

unrelated older man > young man: **Plato.** *Euthd.* 289b (καλέ—), *Laws* 888a (?), *Phdr.* 267c(?), *Philb.* 15a, 16b (παῖδες), 53e, *Pol.* 280e, *Soph.* 230c (—φίλε), 232e, 237a, 242b, 244b, *Tht.* 145d, 148b (παῖδες), 151e, 156a, 158a, 162d (φίλε—), 184d, 200c, 209e; **Diod. Sic.** 17. 51. 1; **Plut.** *Alc.* 16. 9, *Mor.* 5c, 135d(?) (παῖδες), 395e (*bis*), 397d, 404b, 530d; **Dio Chrys.** 7. 72; **Lucian.** *Rhet.* 1; **Long.** 3. 7. 3

unrelated man > men, age unknown: **Plato.** *Laws* 904e (παῖ καὶ νεανίσκοι ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν), *Menex.* 246d (παῖδες), *Tht.* 162d (γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες); **Plut.** *Titus* 12. 7 (παῖδες), *Mor.* 842c (παῖδες)

Listing of Addresses

- unrelated older woman > man: **Plut.** *Alex.* 14. 7
- boy > boys: **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 4. 11 (παῖδες); **Plut.** *Alex.* 5. 4 (παῖδες)
- divinity > young man: **Lucian**, *Rhet.* 24, *Somn.* 7 (φίλε —)
- man > servant(s): **Plato**, *Chrm.* 155b, *Meno* 82b, 83c, 85b (παῖ Μένωνος), *Symp.* 175a, 175b (παῖδες), 212c (παῖδες), 213b (παῖδες), 213e, *Tht.* 143c; (**Xen.**) *Cyn.* 6. 18 (text uncertain); **Joseph.** *AJ* 18. 193; **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 39 (παῖ Συλλογισμέ), *Lex.* 2. 13
- Παιδίον 'little child' (6) (See text, pp. 71–2)
 - father > adult son: **Plut.** *Demetr.* 19. 8
 - father > daughter and her fiancé: **Ach.** 8. 17. 1 (παιδία)
 - mother > unborn baby: **Char.** 2. 9. 3, 2. 11. 2
 - unrelated man > young man: **Plut.** *Alex.* 27. 9
 - unrelated woman > young woman: **Char.** 3. 9. 1
- Παιδάριον 'little child' (1) (See text, pp. 71–2)
 - man > servant: **Epict.** II. 20. 29
- Τέκνον 'child' (70) (See text, pp. 65–72) (Dead/dying children marked *)
 - father > baby: **Char.** 5. 10. 2 (—ἄθλιον), 5. 10. 4, 8. 5. 15
 - father > boy: **Philo**, *Abr.* 175(?), *Jos.* 23*; **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 374, 7. 383
 - father > young man: **Lucian**, *Luct.* 13*, 13* (—ἡδιστον), 17* (—ἄθλιον); **Ach.** 1. 13. 2*, 1. 13. 5* (bis), 1. 13. 6*; **Char.** 1. 1. 9*, 3. 5. 4
 - father > adult son: **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 252*; **Lucian**, *Tyr.* 20(?)* (bis), *Abd.* 22
 - father > male god or Cyclops: **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 14, 26, 30 (bis), *Dial. D.* 2. 4, *Dial. Mar.* 2. 3, 2. 4
 - mother > unborn baby: **Char.** 2. 9. 5 (bis)
 - mother > boy: **Philo**, *Fug.* 39; **Plut.** *Mor.* 252d
 - mother > young man: **Char.** 3. 5. 5, 3. 5. 6
 - mother > adult son(s): **Dion. Hal.** VIII 46. 2 (Μάρκιε—), 48. 1 (Μάρκιε—), 48. 5 (Μάρκιε—), 51. 1, 51. 2 (Μάρκιε—), 51. 3; **Plut.** *Ag. & Cl.* 59. 9* (τέκνα), *Mor.* 241e, 241e(?) (bis), 241f(?) (bis)
 - mother > male god: **Lucian**, *Dial. D.* 4. 2, 20. 1 (—Ἐρως), 23. 2 (bis); **Ach.** 8. 12. 4
 - father > young woman: **Dion. Hal.** XI. 37. 6*; **Char.** 8. 6. 8
 - mother > young woman: **Char.** 3. 4. 2*
 - father > children, age and sex unknown: **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 41. 4 (τέκνα φίλτατα)
 - uncle > young man: **Ach.** 8. 4. 3 (—Κλειτοφών)
 - uncle > adult: **Dion. Hal.** XI. 13. 5 (Ἀππιε—)
 - man > son-in-law: **Char.** 8. 7. 4
 - unrelated man > young man: **Epict.** I. 22. 18, II. 17. 37; **Lucian**, *Demon.* 15, *Nec.* 21
 - unrelated woman > young man: (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 4 (bis); **Char.** 3. 6. 4, 3. 6. 5
 - unrelated woman > young woman: **Char.** 1. 1. 14, 2. 2. 1, 2. 8. 6, 2. 11. 6
 - divinity > young man: **Lucian**, *Somn.* 9

- Νεανία* 'young man' (16) (See text, pp. 72–6)
 unrelated older man > boy: **Plut.** *Cato* 2. 3
 unrelated older man > young man: **Plato**, *Phdr.* 257c (?); **Xen.** *Mem.* III. 1. 2; **Plut.** *Mor.* 43b, 592c; **Joseph.** *AJ* 2. 80
 unrelated man > adult or someone acting as an adult: **Joseph.** *AJ* 18. 197, 18. 336; **Plut.** *Ages.* 39. 4, *Pomp.* 15. 2, *Sull.* 34. 8, *Mor.* 201d; **Char.** 7. 2. 5
 unrelated man > man, age unknown: (**Plato**) *Erast.* 132c; **Xen.** *Mem.* III. 3. 1
 Man > young men in general: (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 49 (*νεανίαι*)
- Νεανίσκε* 'young man' (14) (See text, pp. 73–6)
 unrelated older man > young man: **Plato**, *Prot.* 318a; (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 2a; **Epict.** II. 17. 30, III. 1. 7, 1. 24, 1. 36, IV. 11. 26
 unrelated man > adult or someone acting as adult: **Xen.** *An.* II. 1. 13; (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 206c
 unrelated man > man, age unknown: **Plato**, *Laws* 904e (*παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε ἀμελείσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν*)
 young man > young man: **Lucian**, *DI* 7; **Ach.** 2. 33. 2
 young woman > young man: (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 6, 8 [note also *γενναιότατε νεανίσκων Πυθίας*, **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 12. 5, spoken in jest to a woman]
- Μειράκιον* 'young man' (14) (See text, pp. 73–6)
 god > boy: **Lucian**, *Dial. D.* 10. 1
 unrelated older man > young man: **Xen.** *Mem.* I. 2. 42; **Plut.** *Them.* 18. 3, *Mor.* 183d, 185c, 534c; **Lucian**, *Rhet.* 1
 young woman > young man: (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 9
 unrelated man > adult or someone acting as adult: **Plut.** *Caes.* 35. 10, *Lys.* 14. 10, *M. Cato* 9. 11, *Phoc.* 23. 2, 25. 3, *Mor.* 212e(?)
- Νεώτεροι* 'younger men' (1) (See text, p. 77)
 older man > young men: **Thuc.** VI. 38. 5
- Ἄνδρες νέοι* 'young men' (1) (See text, p. 77)
 young man > young men: **Plut.** *Mor.* 965d [note also *κράτιστοι νέων*, **Joseph.** *AJ* 4. 134]
- Παρθένη* 'maiden' (6) (See text, pp. 76–7)
 boy/young man > girl (aged 13–14): **Long.** 1. 16. 1, 1. 16. 5, 1. 27. 2, 3. 34. 2
 older men > young woman: (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 24 (*καλὴ κάγαθὴ σὺ παρθένος*)
 man > statue of a girl: (**Dio Chrys.**) 37. 39 (*—αὐτάγγελε*)
- Κόρη* 'maiden' (1) (See text, pp. 76–7)
 young man > girl (aged 14): **Long.** 3. 23. 1
- Κοράσια* 'girls' (1) (See text, p. 77)
 man > group of castrated men: (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 36
- Βρέφος* 'baby' (1) (See text, p. 77)
 mother > baby: **Joseph.** *BJ* 6. 205 (*—ἄθλιον*)

Listing of Addresses

Terms for older addressees (See text, pp. 77–84)

Πάτερ 'father' (122) (See text, pp. 78–81)

young man > father: **Plato**, *Lach.* 181a, *Theag.* 127b, 128b; **Xen.** *Hell.* V. 4. 30, 4. 31; **Dion. Hal.** III. 17. 4; **Philo**, *Mut.* 227(?); **Plut.** *Mor.* 331b, 583d, 583e; **Dio Chrys.** 2. 3, 2. 7, 2. 9, 2. 13, 2. 16, 2. 18, 2. 19, 2. 25, 2. 29, 2. 34, 2. 54; **Epict.** I. 26. 5; **Lucian**, *Luct.* 18; **Long.** 4. 25. 1; **Ach.** 1. 11. 3 (*bis*)

adult son(s) > father: **Hdt.** I. 37. 2, 39. 1, V. 19. 1; **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 6. 3, 6. 4, 6. 8, 6. 9 (*bis*), 6. 11, 6. 15, 6. 16, 6. 17, 6. 18 (*bis*), 6. 19, 6. 20, 6. 22 (*bis*), 6. 25, 6. 26, 6. 27 (*bis*), 6. 28, 6. 30, 6. 35, 6. 36; **Philo**, *Jos.* 183; **Joseph.** *Bf* 1. 621, 630, 632, 633 (*bis*), 634, 635, 4. 628, *Af* 6. 126, 6. 127, 6. 209, 16. 105, 16. 119; **Plut.** *Demetr.* 40. 3, *Mor.* 252f(?), 534e; **Lucian**, *Abd.* 8, 14, 18, 19, 31 (*bis*), 32, *Dial. Mort.* 12. 1, 12. 3, 12. 5

male god or Cyclops > father: **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 30, 32, *Tim.* 7, *BA* 4, *Fug.* 1, 22, 23, *Dial. D.* 2. 1 (*πάτερ Ἑρμῆ*), 2. 1, 2. 3, 2. 4 (*bis*), *Dial. Mar.* 2. 1, 2. 4

girl > father: **Hdt.** V. 51. 2; **Plut.** *Aem.* 10. 7, *Mor.* 240d(?) (*bis*), 240e(?)

young woman > father: **Ach.** 8. 7. 5; **Char.** 1. 11. 2, 6. 6. 3, 8. 6. 8

adult woman > father: **Dion. Hal.** IV. 66. 2, 66. 3; **Plut.** *Ag. & Cl.* 17. 5

goddess > father: **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 5, *Fug.* 3, 4 (*bis*), 5, 6, 7

young man > uncle: **Ach.** 8. 5. 5, 8. 5. 7, 8. 17. 2

man > unrelated older man: **Lucian**, *VH* 33; **Ach.** 7. 14. 6, 7. 15. 1, 8. 18. 2

woman > unrelated older man: **Char.** 1. 13. 10

man > god: **Plato**, *Laws* 662e; **Diod. Sic.** 17. 51. 2

(For plural *πατέρες* in the sense 'senators', see generic addresses by civil rank, p. 300)

Πατέριον 'little father' (1) (See text, pp. 80–1)

man > unrelated older man: **Lucian**, *Nec.* 21

Μῆτερ 'mother' (39) (See text, pp. 78–81)

baby > mother: **Char.** 5. 10. 5

boy > mother: **Hdt.** III. 3. 3; **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 3. 2 (*bis*), 3. 15 (*bis*), 3. 16, 3. 17, 3. 18

young man > mother: **Polyb.** X. 4. 8; **Plut.** *Mor.* 654c (*bis*)

adult son > mother: **Hdt.** VI. 68. 1; **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 41. 3, 41. 4, 47. 1, 47. 4, 47. 5, 54. 1; **Plut.** *Cor.* 36. 5, *Caes.* 7. 3, *Mor.* 206a

male god > mother: **Lucian**, *Dial. D.* 4. 1, 20. 2 (*bis*), 23. 1, 23. 2

young woman > mother: **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 3. 2 (*bis*), 6. 2, 6. 3, 6. 4, 7. 1, 7. 3; **Char.** 6. 6. 3; **Ach.** 2. 25. 1

man > unrelated older woman: **Diod. Sic.** 17. 37. 6, 17. 114. 2; (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 4

Μαμμίδιον 'little mother' (1) (See text, pp. 80–1)

young woman > mother: **Plut.** *Mor.* 858c

Μαννάριον 'little mother' (2) (See text, pp. 80–1)

Appendix B

- young woman > mother: **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 6. 1, 7. 4
 Θείε 'uncle' (3) (See text, pp. 81–2)
 boy (aged 14) > uncle: **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 4. 9
 man > uncle: **Xen.** *Cyr.* V. 5. 8, 5. 35
 Πάππε 'grandfather' (15) (See text, pp. 81–2)
 boy > grandfather: **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 3. 4 (*bis*), 3. 5, 3. 6, 3. 8, 3. 9, 3. 11 (*bis*), 4. 5, 4. 10, 4. 13, 4. 14, 4. 19 (*bis*), 4. 26
 Γέρον 'old man' (2) (See text, pp. 82–4)
 man > man/men (age unknown): **Plato**, *Tht.* 162d (γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες); **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 22. 9

Terms for same-generation addressees (See text, pp. 84–9)

- ἄνερ 'man, husband' (10) (See text, pp. 85–6)
 woman > husband: **Plut.** *Pomp.* 74. 5, *Mor.* 145b, 256c, 768d (φιλάτατ'—); **Joseph.** *AJ* 2. 55; **Long.** 4. 21. 3 (φιλε—); **Ach.** 6. 10. 2, 6. 16. 3 (—Κλειτοφῶν), 6. 16. 3 (Λευκίππης μόνης—)
 goddess > husband: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 28. 3
 (For plural ἄνδρες see generic addresses, pp. 293–305)
 γυναῖ 'woman, wife' (75) (See text, pp. 86–8)
 man > wife: **Hdt.** I. 111. 2, II. 181. 3, III. 134. 4, 134. 6; **Xen.** *Cyr.* VI. 4. 3, *Oec.* 7. 10, 7. 15, 7. 18, 7. 29, 7. 38, 7. 41, 8. 2, 8. 3, 8. 4, 8. 10, 8. 21 (*bis*), 10. 3, 10. 4, 10. 7; **Plut.** *M. Cato* 8. 5, *Pel.* 20. 2, *Mor.* 258f, 507c, 507e (*bis*), 608b, 608d, 609c, 610d; **Joseph.** *BJ* 1. 596, *AJ* 17. 74; **Lucian**, *Fug.* 31, *Asin.* 39; **Long.** 4. 18. 3; **Ach.** 5. 16. 7; **Char.** 2. 9. 6, 3. 3. 7 (γυνή), 4. 1. 3, 4. 1. 5, 5. 10. 7, 5. 10. 9 (γυνή), 8. 5. 5 (γυνή φιλάττη)
 man > unrelated woman: **Hdt.** III. 119. 3, 119. 5, V. 72. 3, IX. 76. 3; **Xen.** *Cyr.* III. 3. 3, V. 1. 6, VII. 3. 11, *Mem.* II. 1. 26; (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 112a; **Joseph.** *AJ* 1. 252, 6. 305, 8. 269 (—Τεροβοάμου), 8. 272; **Ach.** 6. 6. 4, 6. 7. 9; **Char.** 2. 3. 6, 2. 5. 3, 2. 5. 4, 2. 5. 6, 3. 2. 1, 6. 5. 1, 6. 5. 2 (γυνή), 6. 7. 13, 8. 1. 8
 woman > unrelated woman: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 241c; **Ach.** 5. 17. 4, 5. 17. 7; **Char.** 2. 2. 6, 2. 10. 1, 2. 10. 3, 2. 10. 6, 5. 9. 3
 (For plural γυναῖκες see generic terms, p. 304)
 Ἀδελφε 'brother' (11) (See text, pp. 88–9)
 man > adult brother: **Plut.** *Caes.* 66. 9, *Ag. & Cl.* 49. 6 (φιλάτατ'—); **Epict.** I. 2. 25
 young woman > half-brother: **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 168
 man > unrelated man: **Epict.** I. 25. 15, II. 16. 16, 17. 35, IV. 13. 18; **Char.** 4. 3. 6 (—καὶ φιλε)
 man/men > compatriots: **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 277 (ἀδελφοί), 7. 371 (ἀδελφοὶ καὶ ὁμοεθνεῖς)
 Ἀδελφή 'sister' (1) (See text, pp. 88–9)
 goddess > sister: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mar.* 12. 1

Listing of Addresses

Σύγγενες 'kinsman' (2) (See text, p. 89)

boy (15-16) > older male relative: **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 4. 28

Roman consul > allies: **Dion. Hal.** V. 54. 5 (ἄνδρες φίλοι τε καὶ συγγενεῖς)

Ἄνδρες ὁμόφυλοι 'fellow-tribesmen' (4) (see text, p. 89)

man > compatriots: **Joseph.** *AJ* 6. 251, 8. 227, 15. 382, *Vit.* 141

Ὅμοφυλοι 'fellow-tribesmen' (1) (See text, p. 89)

man > compatriots: **Joseph.** *AJ* 13. 198

Ὅμοεθνεῖς 'people of the same race' (1) (See text, p. 89)

man > compatriots: **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 371 (Ἀδελφοὶ καὶ—)

TITLES (See text, pp. 90-107)

Βασιλεὺς 'king' (188) (See text, pp. 90-5)

man > god: **Lucian.** *Dial. Mort.* 28. 1 (δέσποτα καὶ—καὶ ἡμέτερε Ζεῦ)

relative > oriental monarch: **Hdt.** III. 1. 4, 134. 1, VII. 10a1, 10a3, 10β2, 10η, 16a, 18. 2, 46. 1, 47. 2, 49. 1, 51. 1, 236. 1, IX. 111. 4; **Plut.** *Art.* 14. 9; **Joseph.** *BJ* 1. 595; **Char.** 8. 5. 9

servant/captive > oriental monarch: **Hdt.** I. 87. 3, 88. 2; **Diod. Sic.** 16. 43. 4; **Plut.** *Lyc.* 12. 13

other person > oriental monarch: **Hdt.** I. 27. 3, 27. 4, 30. 3, 32. 9, 35. 3, 36. 2, 42. 1, 71. 2, 108. 5, 114. 5, 117. 3, 117. 5, 120. 5, 155. 3, 155. 4, 207. 1, 210. 2, II. 173. 2, III. 36. 1, 63. 4, 119. 6, 140. 5, 155. 2, IV. 97. 3, 97. 5, 134. 2, V. 23. 2, 106. 3, 106. 4, VII. 9γ, 27. 2, 28. 1, 38. 3, 101. 3, 102. 1, 104. 1, 104. 5, 130. 1, 168. 3, 209. 3, 209. 4, 209. 5, 234. 2, 235. 1, VIII. 68γ, 100. 4, 102. 1; **Plato.** *Phdr.* 274e; **Xen.** *Cyr.* (to Cyrus, who is not actually king) V. 1. 24, VIII. 2. 17 (Κύρε—); **Philo.** *Mos.* I. 277, I. 296; **Plut.** *Mar.* 31. 5, *Art.* 10. 1, *Luc.* 27. 6, *Alex.* 20. 3, 30. 4, *Them.* 28. 1, *Mor.* 220b, 780c; **Joseph.** *AJ* 2. 84, 2. 235, 2. 286, 6. 179, 6. 185, 6. 285, 7. 217, 8. 27, 8. 171, 11. 22, 11. 24, 11. 165, 12. 20, 12. 23, 12. 36, 12. 39, 12. 178, 14. 172, 16. 379, 19. 314, 19. 315, 20. 44, 20. 56, 20. 59; **Lucian.** *Tax.* 45, *Syr. D.* 25, *Nav.* 30, 33 (pretence); **Char.** 5. 6. 1, 5. 6. 4, 5. 6. 8, 5. 6. 10, 5. 7. 1, 6. 3. 7, 6. 3. 8, 7. 3. 4 [note also **Lucian.** *Nav.* 39, θαυμασιώτατε βασιλέων in pretence]

servant/captive > Macedonian/Etruscan/Hellenistic monarch: **Dion. Hal.** V. 29. 3; **Diod. Sic.** 16. 87. 2; **Plut.** *Alex.* 35. 7, 64. 12

other person > Macedonian/Etruscan/Hellenistic monarch: **Hdt.** VIII. 137. 5(?); **Polyb.** XVIII. 22. 8; **Diod. Sic.** 19. 97. 3 (—Δημήτριε); **Dion. Hal.** XIX. 12. 2; **Plut.** *Pyrrh.* 8. 12, 11. 5, 14. 7, 16. 13, 20. 9, *Crass.* 17. 2, *Demetr.* 12. 9, 17. 6 (—Ἀντίγονε), 27. 10, 29. 7, 42. 3, *Alex.* 15. 4, 39. 2, 39. 6, 39. 9, 54. 6, 58. 9, *Pel.* 1. 4, *Mor.* 67f, 178f, 179b, 180c, 182f, 184d, 334d, 335c, 508c, 508e (—Σέλευκε), 509a, 517b, 633b, 634d, 830c(?); (**Lucian.**) *Dem.* 29, 30, 42, 43, 44, 50, *Laps.* 8, *Rhet.* 5

Appendix B

- > Greek or Roman king/tyrant/general: **Hdt.** III. 42. 2, V. 111. 3; **Plut.** *Rom.* 28. 1, *Ages.* 21. 8, *Ag. & Cl.* 52. 3, *Mor.* 212f(?), 237a
 Followed by genitive:
 man > god: **Philo**, *Flacc.* 123 (μέγιστε—θυγατρὶν καὶ ἀθανάτων), 170 (—θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων); **Joseph.** *AJ* 14. 24 (θεὸς—τῶν ὀλῶν); **Lucian**, *Dial. D.* 10. 2 (—τῶν θεῶν)
 > oriental monarch: **Hdt.** I. 206. 1 (—Μήδων), VII. 136. 2 (—Μήδων), VIII. 114. 2 (—Μήδων); **Plut.** *Sol.* 27. 8 (—Λυδῶν)
 > Greek king/tyrant: **Hdt.** VII. 161. 1 (—Συρηκοσίων), IX. 76. 2 (—Σπάρτης); **Plut.** *Ag. & Cl.* 43. 7 (—Λακεδαιμονίων), 45. 3 (—Λακεδαιμονίων), *Ages.* 6. 7 (—Λακεδαιμονίων), *Mor.* 986e (—Κεφαλλήνων)
Δέσποτα 'master' (128) (See text, pp. 95–8)
 man > god: **Philo**, *LA* III. 10, *Plant.* 53, *Heres* 27, *Mos.* II. 239, *Spec.* II. 219, *Flacc.* 121, *Leg.* 208; **Plut.** *Arist.* 11. 5, *Mor.* 403c (—Ἀπολλόν); **Joseph.** *AJ* 1. 272, 2. 270, 4. 40, 4. 46 (—τῶν ὀλῶν), 5. 41, 8. 23, 8. 107, 8. 111, 11. 65, 11. 162, 11. 230, 20. 90 (—κύριε); **Lucian**, *DI* 7 (—Ἑρμῇ), *Icar.* 24, *Sat.* 11 (bis), *Cat.* 27(?) (—Παδάμανθου), *Dial. Mort.* 28. 1, 28. 1 (—καὶ βασιλεὺ καὶ ἡμέτερε Ζεῦ), 28. 2; **Long.** 3. 32. 2 (—Πάν), 4. 8. 4 (—Διόνυσσε); **Ach.** 3. 5. 4 (—Πόσειδον), 8. 13. 4 (—Πάν)
 close relative > monarch: **Hdt.** IX. 111. 3, 111. 5; **Joseph.** *AJ* 11. 240
 servant/captive > monarch: **Hdt.** I. 90. 2, V. 105. 2; **Xen.** *Cyr.* IV. 6. 2, 6. 3, VII. 2. 9, 3. 3; **Char.** 4. 2. 9, 4. 2. 13, 4. 3. 5, 4. 3. 9, 5. 2. 4
 other person > monarch: **Hdt.** I. 8. 3, 115. 2, III. 34. 2, 35. 4, 62. 3, VII. 5. 1, 9. 1, 38. 1, 38. 2, 147. 3, VIII. 68a, 68b2, 100. 2, 102. 2, 118. 3, IX. 116. 3; **Xen.** *Cyr.* IV. 5. 11, V. 3. 28, 4. 42; **Philo**, *Jos.* 104, *Leg.* 276, 290 (Γάιε—), 321, 326, 355; **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 212, 7. 254, 7. 269, 8. 29, 9. 64(?), 11. 22, 12. 212, 12. 213, 18. 187, 18. 296; (**Lucian**) *Syr. D.* 20; **Char.** 5. 4. 9, 5. 7. 5, 6. 3. 1, 6. 3. 4, 6. 3. 8, 6. 4. 7, 6. 6. 6, 6. 7. 4, 7. 5. 13
 free person > non-royal but very important man: **Philo**, *Virt.* 59, *Jos.* 222; **Joseph.** *AJ* 6. 51; **Lucian**, *Alex.* 43 (—Γλύκων); **Long.** 4. 16. 2(?), 4. 17. 3(?); **Char.** 4. 6. 1, 7. 6. 10, 7. 6. 11, 8. 1. 6
 servant > non-royal master: **Hdt.** III. 85. 2; **Lucian**, *Lex.* 3, *Gall.* 1 (Μίκυλλε—), *Asin.* 32; **Long.** 4. 14. 2, 19. 3, 19. 5; **Ach.** 3. 20. 1, 6. 3. 4, 6. 17. 2, 6. 20. 4; **Char.** 2. 1. 3, 2. 1. 8, 2. 3. 1, 2. 3. 6, 2. 4. 6, 2. 4. 8, 2. 4. 9, 2. 5. 6, 2. 6. 2, 3. 1. 3, 3. 9. 7, 3. 9. 8
 free man > free man: **Lucian**, *Tim.* 48
 woman > man she loves: **Ach.** 5. 16. 4, 5. 26. 7 (Κλειτοφῶν—)
Βασίλεια 'queen' (1) (See text, pp. 98–100)
 free woman > queen: **Char.** 8. 3. 6
Βασίλισσα 'queen' (1) (See text, pp. 98–100)
 Hebrew girl > Pharaoh's daughter: **Joseph.** *AJ* 2. 226
Δέσποινα 'mistress' (35) (See text, pp. 98–100)

Listing of Addresses

- human > divinity: **Plut.** *Dem.* 26. 6 (—Πολιάς); **Dio Chrys.** 59. 5 (—Ἀθηνᾶ); **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 15 (—Φιλοσοφία), 17, *Cat.* 8 (—Κλωθοῖ), *Amor.* 19; **Ach.** 6. 21. 2, 7. 14. 5, 8. 5. 8 (—Ἀφροδίτη); **Char.** 1. 1. 7, 3. 2. 12 (—Ἀφροδίτη), 3. 6. 3, 3. 8. 3 (—... Ἀφροδίτη), 3. 8. 4, 3. 8. 7, 3. 8. 9, 5. 10. 1 (—Ἀφροδίτη), 7. 5. 3, 7. 5. 5, 8. 4. 10, 8. 8. 16
- > queen: **Char.** 5. 3. 1, 5. 3. 3, 6. 7. 5, 7. 6. 7
- servant > non-royal mistress: **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 2. 3; **Ach.** 5. 17. 3, 5. 17. 9, 6. 2. 5; **Char.** 5. 5. 6
- man > woman he loves: **Ach.** 2. 6. 1, 2. 6. 2, 5. 20. 5 (—Λευκίππη), 8. 17. 3; **Char.** 3. 3. 7 (—τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς)
- Κύριε* 'lord, master' (15) (See text, pp. 100–1)
- man > god: **Epict.** I. 29. 48, II. 16. 13 (—ὁ θεός); **Joseph.** *AJ* 20. 90 (δέσποτα—)
- men > emperor: **Philo**, *Leg.* 356 (—Γάις)
- servant > master: **Epict.** II. 20. 30, IV. 1. 57; **Char.** 2. 7. 5
- free man > man of ordinary status: **Epict.** II. 7. 9 (*bis*), 7. 13, 15. 15, III. 10. 15, 22. 38 (κύριε ἀγγελε καὶ κατὰσκοπε), 23. 11, 23. 19
- Κυρία* 'mistress, lady' (2) (See text, p. 101)
- female servant > mistress: **Char.** 2. 7. 2
- allegorical: **Philo**, *Congr.* 156 (ὡ καὶ ὑπάρχουσα καὶ πρὸς ἐμοῦ νομιζομένη κυρία)
- Ἄναξ* 'lord' (5) (See text, pp. 101–3)
- man > god: **Hdt.** I. 159. 1, 159. 4, IV. 150. 3, 155. 4, VII. 141. 2
- Στρατηγέ* 'general' (5) (See text, pp. 103–4)
- foreigners > Roman general: **Polyb.** X. 18. 12, XX. 10. 6
- envoys > Joseph in Egypt: **Joseph.** *AJ* 2. 140, 2. 155
- compatriots > Greek general: **Char.** 8. 6. 3
- Προφῆτα* 'prophet' (3) (See text, p. 104)
- author > writer of Bible: **Philo**, *LA* II. 1
- man > prophet or philosopher: **Joseph.** *AJ* 9. 73; **Lucian**, *VA* 9
- Κεκτημένη* 'owner, mistress' (1) (See text, p. 104)
- slave woman > mistress: **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 9. 1
- Αὐτοκράτορ* 'imperator' (14) (See text, p. 105)
- important Roman > Roman emperor: **Philo**, *Leg.* 277, 288, 316, 324, 325; **Joseph.** *AJ* 18. 254; **Lucian**, *Laps.* 18
- author > Roman emperor: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 172b (μέγιστε—Τραϊανὲ Καίσαρ); **Dio Chrys.** 3. 2 (γενναῖε—), 3. 3
- > important Romans, not emperors: **Plut.** *Ant.* 29. 7, 64. 3, *Sull.* 35. 8, *Crass.* 17. 2
- Καίσαρ* 'Caesar' (20) (See text, pp. 105–6)
- > Julius Caesar: **Plut.** *Caes.* 6. 6, 44. 10, 47. 6, 65. 2, *Pomp.* 71. 2
- > Octavian/Augustus: **Plut.** *Ant.* 83. 6, *Brut.* 53. 1, 53. 3, *Mor.* 207c, 207d, 207f, 508b; **Joseph.** *AJ* 16. 347, 16. 349, *BJ* 1. 388

Appendix B

- > later emperors: **Plut.** *Otho* 15. 3, *Mor.* 172b (μέγιστε αὐτόκρατορ Τραϊανὲ Καῖσαρ); **Joseph.** *B* 7 6. 56
 as cry for help: **Epict.** III. 22. 55; (**Lucian.**) *Asin.* 16
 Δίκτατορ 'dictator' (1) (See text, p. 106)
 Roman general > Roman dictator: **Plut.** *Fab.* 13. 7
 Ὑπατε 'consul' (2) (See text, p. 106)
 Roman > Roman consul: **Dion. Hal.** IX. 10. 3 (ὑπατοί); **Plut.** *Publ.* 14. 6
 (For lesser ranks, see generic addresses by civil and military status, pp. 298–303)

FRIENDSHIP TERMS (See text, pp. 107–45)

(For the purpose of this section, 'dominant character' means Socrates, the Athenian, or the Elean, not the character who happens to have the upper hand at a given moment.)

Φίλε 'dear, friend' (300) (See text, pp. 134–5)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Apol.* 26d (–Μέλητε), *Chrm.* 155a (–Κριτία), 155c, 157c (–Χαρμίδη), 158b (–Χαρμίδη), 158b (–παῖ Γλαύκωνος), 160c, 169a, 172b, 173d (–Κριτία), 174c (–Κριτία), *Cra.* 407a, 413c, 425b (–Ἑρμοόγενης), 429d (–Κρατύλε), 431a, 432c, 437d, *Crito* 46b (–Κρίτων), *Crit.* 108b (–Κριτία), *Euth.* 3c (–Εὐθύφρων), 9a (–Εὐθύφρων), 10e (–Εὐθύφρων), 14a, 14d, *Euthd.* 293c, 303b (–Κρίτων), 307a (–Κρίτων), *Grg.* 465d (–Πῶλε), 466c, 471a, 479d (*bis*), 507a (–Καλλίκλεις), *Lach.* 194b, *Laws* 648c, 662b (–Κλεινία), 663a (–νομοθέτα), 677e, 707c, 751c, 809d, 813c, 819d (–Κλεινία), 837d (–Μέγилλε), 837e, 907c (–Κλεινία), 918c (–Κλεινία), *Lys.* 206a, 210a (–Λύσι), 217d, *Meno* 70c (–Μένων), 79c (–Μένων), *Phd.* 72c (–Κέβης), 80b (–Κέβης), 80e (–Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία), 81c, 103b, *Phdr.* 227a (–Φαῖδρε), 229e, 230c (–Φαῖδρε), 238c (–Φαῖδρε), 243a, 257a (–Ἐρως), 271b, 275b, 276e (–Φαῖδρε), 279a, 279b (–Πάν), *Phlb.* 17c, 24b (–Πρώταρχε), 30a (–Πρώταρχε), 58b (–Πρώταρχε), *Pol.* 257a (–Θεόδωρε), 262b, 278d, *Rep.* 332e (–Πολέμαρχε), 333e, 335c, 336e, 346e (–Θρασύμαχε), 352a, 361d (–Γλαύκων), 373e, 375d, 376d (–Ἀδείμαντε), 388d (–Ἀδείμαντε), 392a, 398b, 399a, 399e, 404d, 409a, 416b (–Γλαύκων), 425e, 433b, 435b, 455d, 465c, 467d, 473d (–Γλαύκων), 485c, 503b, 504c, 505b, 517a (–Γλαύκων), 519e, 526a, 533a (–Γλαύκων), 553b, 554d, 562e, 563b, 563e, 573b, 579d (–Γλαύκων), 598c, 599d (–Ὀμηρε), 607c, 608b (–Γλαύκων), 618b (–Γλαύκων), *Soph.* 216c, 230c (παῖ–), *Symp.* 199c (–Ἀγάθων), 204b (–Σώκρατες), 211d (–Σώκρατες), 222d (–Ἀγάθων), *Tht.* 144c, 145b (–Θεαίτητε), 146d, 148e (–Θεαίτητε), 149e, 154b, 154d, 155d, 157c, 162d (–παῖ), 164e, 167b (–Σώκρατες), 171c, 174b, 175b, 176e, 179d (–Θεόδωρε), 187a, 201c, 205c, 210b, *Tim.* 17a (–Τίμαιε), 19a (–Τίμαιε), *Alc.* I 105d (–παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ

Listing of Addresses

Δεινομάχης), 109d (—Ἀλκιβιάδην), 116e, 117b, 133b (—Ἀλκιβιάδην), 134e (—Ἀλκιβιάδην), *Epin.* 973b (—Κλεινία), *Erast.* 137b, *Hr. Maj.* 289c, 291a, 303a, 304b (Ἰππία—), *Halc.* 3 (—Χαιρεφών)

spoken by other Platonic characters: *Critias* 108c (—Ἑρμοκράτες), *Grg.* 486a (—Σώκρατες), *Lach.* 199e (—Νικία), *Laws* 641c, 689c, 969c (—Κλεινία), *Phdr.* 236b, 259e (—Σώκρατες), *Phlb.* 31c (—Σώκρατες), *Rep.* 365a (—Σώκρατες), 366a, *Symp.* 194d (—Ἀγάθων), 218d (—Ἀλκιβιάδην), *Ax.* 369a (—Σώκρατες)

other authors: **Plut.** *Dem.* 29. 6 (—Πόσειδον), *Phoc.* 37. 5 (φίλη ἐστία), *Ant.* 84. 4 (—Ἀντώνιε), *Mor.* 122b (—Μοσχίων), 157b (—Χερσία), 159c, 384d (—Σαραπίων), 396f (—Σαραπίων), 405a (—Διογενιανέ), 413c (—Πλανητιάδην), 424c (—Δημήτριε), 433b (—Δημήτριε), 468e (—Πάκκιε), 581b, 582b, 584e, 585a, 585d (—Σιμμία), 600c, 604b, 648d (—Τρύφων), 651e (—Ἀθρύϊτε), 693a, 719b (—Τυνδάρην), 721d (—Βόηθε), 757e (—Δαφναίε), 794a, 925a (—Ἀπολλωνίδην), 929a (—Ἀριστότελες), 930a (—Μενέλαε), 934c (—Φαρνάκην), 938f (—Θέων), 940a (—Θέων), 959d (—Σώκλαρε), 960c (—Σώκλαρε), 964c, 965d (—Ὀπτάτε), 975c (—Φαίδιμε), 977d, 979d, 984d, 1066d (φίλος), 1070e, 1112d (φίλον Κωλωτάριον); **Dio Chrys.** 36. 28 (—Ἱεροσών); **Epict.** I. 4. 24 (—Κρίτων); **Lucian,** *Alex.* 17 (—Κέλσε), *Amor.* 54 (—Θεόμνηστε), *Somn.* 7 (—παί), *Rhet.* 24 (φίλη Ἀδράστεια), *Pisc.* 47 (Ἀμφιτρίτη φίλη); **Long.** 4. 21. 3 (—ἄνερ); **Ach.** 5. 22. 4 (φίλη); **Char.** 4. 3. 6 (ἄδελφε καὶ—), 8. 3. 8 (Ῥοδογούνη, πρώτη μοι φίλη Περσίδων)

plural (φίλοι): **Plato,** *Laws* 637d (—ἄνδρες), 662b, 663d, 689d, 691c (—ἄνδρες), 700a, 711c, 746b, 758a, 770b (—σωτήρες νόμων), 817d, 823d, 862b, 890a, 894b, 897d, 923a, 931b, 965d, 968e, *Phlb.* 63b (φίλοι), *Rep.* 368a, *Soph.* 244a; **Xen.** *Cyr.* VIII. 7. 6 (πάντες οἱ παρόντες—), 7. 28 (—παῖδες); **Dion. Hal.** III. 28. 1 (. . . ἄλλοι—καὶ σύμμαχοι); **Joseph.** *Bf* 2. 396; **Plut.** *Alex.* 28. 3, *Sull.* 41. 5 (—πολίται), *Pyrrh.* 23. 8, *Mor.* 242b (φίλοι), 724d, 959b; **Lucian,** *Asin.* 25 (bis), *Demon.* 28, *Phil.* 22, *Pisc.* 16 (φίλοι), *Tox.* 46; **Long.** 1. 14. 3 (Νύμφαι φίλοι), 3. 32. 2 (Νύμφαι φίλοι); **Char.** 8. 2. 10 (ἄνδρες συστρατιῶται καὶ—)

plural (ἄνδρες φίλοι): **Hdt.** III. 73. 1; **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 5. 7, II. 1. 11, 2. 27, 3. 2, 4. 22, III. 2. 4, 3. 7, 3. 59, IV. 2. 38, 3. 4, 5. 37 (—τε καὶ σύμμαχοι), V. 2. 23, 3. 2, 5. 44, VI. 3. 15, 4. 13 (—καὶ σύμμαχοι), VII. 1. 29, 5. 20, 5. 39, 5. 42 (—καὶ σύμμαχοι), 5. 72 (—καὶ σύμμαχοι), VIII. 4. 32, 6. 3, *An.* I. 6. 6; **Dion. Hal.** V. 54. 5 (—τε καὶ συγγενεῖς)

[followed by a genitive: **Xen.** *An.* II. 5. 39 (οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι ἦτε Κύρου φίλοι)]

Φίλη κεφαλὴ 'dear head' (3) (See text, p. 135)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Grg.* 513c, *Ion* 531d (—Ἴων)

other authors: **Plut.** *Mor.* 803d (φίλοι κεφαλαί)

Φίλτατε 'dearest' (52) (See text, pp. 135–8)

- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Hp. Min.* 370e
(—*Ἰππία*)
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Cra.* 434e, *Symp.* 173e
- other authors: **Xen.** *Ap.* 28 (—*Ἀπολλόδωρε*); **Plut.** *Ag. & Cl.* 49.6
(—*ἀδελφεί*), *Mor.* 119e (*Ἀπολλώνι*—), 121d (*Ἀπολλώνι*—), 253d
(*φιλάτῃ*), 568c (—*Πείσων*), 768d (—*ἄνερ*); **Lucian**, *Alex.* 1 (—*Κέλσε*), 21
(—*Κέλσε*), *Asin.* 4 (*φιλάτῃ*), 11, 11 (*φιλάτῃ*), 14 (*bis*), 39, *Cont.* 1
(*φίλτατον Ἑρμάδιον*), *Dial. Meret.* 4.4 (*φιλάτῃ*), 12.4, *Dial. Mort.* 1.3
(*φίλτατον Πολυδεύκιον*), *Laps.* 19 (—*Ἀσκληπιέ*), *Merc.* 19, *Psd.* 4
(—*Ἐλεγχέ*), *Tim.* 41 (—*καὶ ἐρασμιώτατε*), 42 (*φιλάτῃ διφθέρα*); **Ach.**
2.7.4 (*φιλάτῃ*), 2.7.6 (*φιλάτῃ*), 2.19.1 (*φιλάτῃ*), 3.11.2 (*φιλάτῃ*),
3.18.5 (—*Μενέλαε*), 4.9.7 (*φιλάτῃ*), 4.10.5 (*φιλάτῃ*), 5.15.6, 5.16.3,
5.16.8 (*φιλάτῃ*), 5.19.5 (*φιλάτῃ*), 5.20.5 (*φιλάτῃ*), 5.21.6 (*φιλάτῃ*),
5.22.3 (*φιλάτῃ*), 5.26.1, 5.26.2, 6.1.3, 6.9.5, 6.10.2, 8.13.2; **Char.**
7.1.7, 8.3.8 (*φιλάτῃ*), 8.5.5 (*γυνὴ φιλάτῃ*)
- plural (*φίλτατοι*): **Dion. Hal.** VIII.41.4 (*τέκνα φίλτατα*); **Epict.** II.1.25
(—*νομοθέται*)
- Φιλότης** 'love' (18) (See text, p. 138)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Phdr.* 228d
- other authors: **Lucian**, *Icar.* 16, *Par.* 44, *Phil.* 40, *Merc.* 1, *Nec.* 14, *Alex.* 61,
Imag. 7, *Salt.* 85, 85, *Amor.* 4, *Pereg.* 45, *Hist.* 3, *Apol.* 3, 8, *Hermot.* 15, 72, 85
- Φιλούμενε** 'beloved' (1)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Symp.* 201c
(—*Ἀγάθων*)
- Ἐταίρε** 'comrade' (162) (See text, pp. 138–9)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Chrm.* 154b, 161e,
167c, 175a, *Cra.* 391b, 408b, 411a, 423c, 429d, 430d, 440e, *Euth.* 6d, 11d, 15e,
Euthd. 293a, *Grg.* 469b, 473a, 491d, 508a, 519d, *Hp. Min.* 369a, *Ion* 532c,
Laws 646b, 655a, 892a, *Lys.* 214d, 216a, *Meno* 71c, 94e (—*Ἄνυτε*), 98a
(*Μένων*—), *Phd.* 67b, 68b, 76d, 82c (—*Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης*), 85e, 98b,
110b, *Phdr.* 227b, 230a, 234d, 242c, 262c, 270c, 273c, *Phlb.* 28b, 31a, 38a,
44a, 47b, *Prot.* 313c, *Rep.* 335c, 348e, 394a, 492e, 504c, 506d, 520e, 537d,
566c, *Symp.* 201a, 205e, *Thl.* 149a, 161d, 168c, 177a, 180e, 181e, 203b, 207c,
208b, *Alc.* 1 124d, 135c, *Erast.* 139a, *Hp. Maj.* 284b, 285b, 290e, 295a, 300d,
Hipp. 227b, *Aret.* 378c
- other authors: **Plut.** *Demetr.* 38.8, *Mor.* 158d, 395a, 418b, 428b, 455b, 612f,
643c, 654f, 655c, 663e, 703e, 751f, 756d, 759e, 759f, 761f, 763b, 789c, 940a,
963a, 966a, 1063e, 1066d, 1072e, 1087d; **Lucian**, *Alex.* 23, *Amor.* 1 (—*μοι*
Θεόμνηστε), *Anach.* 15, *Apol.* 11, 12, 15, *Char.* 4, *Dem.* 5, *Demon.* 26, *Eun.*
6, 13, *Hermot.* 7, 8, 21, 38, 47, 50, 59, 60, 70, 71, *Hist.* 5, 27, *Icar.* 1, 2, 6, 11, 17,
34, *Imag.* 5, 12, 19, *Lex.* 1, *Merc.* 19, *Nec.* 1, 17, *Nigr.* 1, 3, 8, 38, *Pereg.* 38, 39,
Phil. 5, *Salt.* 6, *Symp.* 10, 28

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plural (ἑταῖροι): **Philo**, *Plant.* 65, *Immut.* 146; **Joseph.** *AJ* 12. 302, *BJ* 3. 362, 3. 379; **Plut.** *Mor.* 226e, 1131c, 1147a; **Lucian**, *Amor.* 17 (ἄνδρες—), 50 [followed by a genitive: **Philo**, *LA* III. 22 (σωμάτων καὶ χρωμάτων ἑταῖρε Λάβαν)]

Φίλε ἑταῖρε 'dear comrade' (11) (See text, p. 139)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Crito* 54d (—Κρίτων), *Euth.* 5c, *Lys.* 213b, *Grg.* 482a, *Phd.* 91b, *Rep.* 450d, 459b, 562a, 607e, *Hp. Maj.* 296a

plural (φίλοι ἑταῖροι): **Plato**, *Laws* 969b

Βέλτιστε 'best' (120) (See text, p. 139)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Apol.* 24e, *Chrm.* 162d (—Κριτία), *Cra.* 389d, 435b, *Crito* 48a, *Euth.* 4a, 15e (—Εὐθύφρων), *Euthd.* 297e, *Grg.* 461e, 482b, 491b (—Καλλίκλεις), 494c, 511c, 515a (—ἀνδρῶν), 515d, *Hipp. Min.* 373b (—Ἰππία), *Ion* 532b, 541c (—Ἴων), *Laws* 902a (ἄριστε καὶ—), *Phd.* 117a, *Pol.* 263a (—ἀνδρῶν . . . Σώκρατες), 295b, *Prot.* 358b (—Πρόδικε), *Rep.* 337e, *Alc.* 1 113c, 118b, *Alc.* 2 143b, 147b, *Erast.* 139a, *Hp. Maj.* 288c (—σύ), 301d, *Hipp.* 226e, *Min.* 315d, 318d, 320e, *Theag.* 126d (—ἀνδρῶν)

spoken by other Platonic characters: *Chrm.* 163e, *Euthd.* 300c, *Lach.* 195e, *Phdr.* 227d (—Σώκρατες), *Rep.* 338e, *Symp.* 214a (Ἐρυξίμαχε, βέλτιστε βελτίστου πατρὸς καὶ σωφρονεστάτου)

other authors: **Lys.** 10. 18; **Dem.** 36. 52, 42. 27, 42. 29, 56. 40; **Polyb.** XXXVIII. 7. 8; **Plut.** *Arat.* 18. 6, *Mor.* 43b, 157c (—ἀνδρῶν), 545f, 580c, 627a, 635a, 688f, 739d (—διδασκάλων), 923a, 987f (—Ὀδυσσεύ), 992c (—Ὀδυσσεύ), 1037a, 1073b, 1121d; **Dio Chrys.** 9. 15 (—ἀνδρῶν) (text uncertain), 12. 50 (—καὶ ἄριστε τῶν δημιουργῶν), 15. 11, 21. 2, 28. 5, 30. 7; **Epict.** I. 1. 16, II. 12. 24, II. 24. 23, IV. 1. 9 (—συγκλητικέ); **Lucian**, *Cat.* 7 (βελτίστη Κλωθοῖ), 14 (βελτίστη Μοιρῶν), *Cont.* 14 (βελτίστη), *DC* 10, *Dem.* 13, *Dial. D.* 10. 2, *Dial. Meret.* 9. 4, *Dial. Mort.* 2. 2, 2. 3, 6. 4 (χαλκόπου—), 9. 3, 11. 5 (—Ἀμφιτρυωνιάδη), 20. 5, 22. 9, 25. 7, 27. 1, 29. 2, *Fug.* 27 (βελτίστη), *Gall.* 3, 6 (Μίδα—), 26 (—ἀλεκτρυνών), *Hermol.* 30 (—Λυκίνε), *Hes.* 4, *Icar.* 13 (—Ἐμπεδόκλεις), *Iupp. Trag.* 33 (Ἑρμαγόρα—), *Laps.* 12, *Merc.* 23, *Nav.* 14, *Par.* 39, *Pisc.* 48 (—ἰχθύων), *Pro Imag.* 23 (βελτίστη), *Prom.* 6, *Psd.* 14, *Sacr.* 3 (—Ἀπολλων), *Salt.* 66, *VA* 3, 7, 12, 14, 25; **Ach.** 1. 2. 2, 8. 10. 1 (—Νικόστρατε)

plural (βέλτιστοι): **Plato**, *Laws* 810c (πάντων—νομοφύλακες), 820b (—τῶν Ἑλλήνων), *Tht.* 200b, *Cleit.* 408d; **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 52 (—ἀνδρῶν)

Ἀγαθέ 'good' (105) (See text, p. 139)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Apol.* 24d, 25d, *Cra.* 393a, 401b (—Ἑρμόγενης), 401e, 428d (—Κρατύλε), 436c (—Κρατύλε), *Crito* 48d, *Euth.* 10a, *Euthd.* 297b, *Grg.* 471d, 490c, 491c, 511b (—Καλλίκλεις), 519e, *Laws* 667a, 686d, 708e, 811c (—Κλεινία), 885c, 894b, 922e, *Menex.* 235d, *Phd.* 64c, 95b, *Phdr.* 242b, 243c (—Φαῖδρε), 260d, *Prot.*

Appendix B

- 311a, 314d, 339c, *Rep.* 344e, 345a, 423d (—'Αδείμαντε), *Soph.* 259d, 261c, *Alc.* I 114b, 120a, *Hp. Maj.* 287d, *Theag.* 125b, 128d, *Halc.* 3
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Cra.* 398e, *Euthd.* 287d, *Grg.* 486c, 506c, 507a, *Laws* 903b, *Phlb.* 23d, *Symp.* 189a (—'Αριστόφανες), *Alc.* I 104e, *Hp. Maj.* 285d, 287e
- other authors: **Xen.** *Mem.* I. 4. 17, II. 3. 16, III. 7. 9, *Cyr.* III. 1. 30 (—Κῦρε); **Isae.** *Pyr.* 70; **Plut.** *Arist.* 4. 2, *Mor.* 560b, 764a, 928e, 1132d (—'Ονησίκρατες), 1146d (—διδάσκαλε); **Lucian,** *Adv.* 25, *Anach.* 6, 23, *Asin.* 24 (καλὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ σὺ παρθένος), *Char.* 4, *Dem.* 17, 25, *Dial. Mort.* 6. 3, *Fug.* 32, *Gall.* 4, *Hermot.* 11, 19, 21, 66, *Icar.* 1, *Nav.* 15, *Nec.* 2, *Nigr.* 6, *Phpt.* 5, *Rhet.* 13, *Somn.* 17, *Tim.* 25, 37, 56, 57, *VA* 21, 27; **Ach.** I. 2. 2, 5. 20. 3; **Char.** 5. 1. 7 (δαίμον—), 5. 7. 10 (δαίμον—), 8. 4. 6 (—Διονύσιε) [Note also ἀγαθὴ καὶ πιστὴ ψυχὴ, **Xen.** *Cyr.* VII. 3. 8, and μέγα ἀγαθὸν σὺ τοῖς φίλοις Κῦρε, **Xen.** *Cyr.* V. 3. 20]
- plural (ἀγαθοί): **Plato,** *Laws* 821b; **Joseph.** *Bf* I. 465 (παῖδες ἀγαθοί)
- plural ('Ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί): **Xen.** *Cyr.* III. 3. 59, *Hell.* II. 3. 53 (ἄνδρες καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί), V. 1. 16; **Dion. Hal.** IV. 73. 1 (πάντες ὑμεῖς οἱ παρόντες ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν); **Joseph.** *Bf* 7. 323; **Plut.** *Mor.* 253a, 595b
- 'Ἄριστε 'best' (95) (See text, p. 140)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Apol.* 27b (—ἀνδρῶν), 29d (—ἀνδρῶν), 34d, *Chrm.* 168d, *Cra.* 413a, 438c, *Euth.* 7b, 13e, *Euthd.* 282c (—ἀνδρῶν), *Grg.* 479a, 505b, 526b, *Hp. Min.* 375e, *Lach.* 190c, 197e, 199a, *Laws* 630d, 638a, 677c, 809b (—τῶν παιδῶν ἐπιμελητά), 899d, 902a (—καὶ βέλτιστε), *Lys.* 209c, *Meno* 73d, 77c, 79d, *Phd.* 94e, 115e (—Κρίτων), *Phdr.* 230d, 268e, 269d, *Phlb.* 54c, *Prot.* 313d, *Rep.* 338d, 349e, 351d, 381d, 450d, 477d, 479a, 536e, *Tht.* 151b, 153d, 169a, 176b, *Alc.* I 119c, 120c, 135b (—'Αλκιβιάδη), *Hp. Maj.* 286c, 290a, 297c
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Laws* 673b
- other authors: **Xen.** *Mem.* III. 5. 28; **Din.** *Dem.* 89; **Plut.** *Mor.* 402e (—Σαραπίων), 749a (—Φλαουιανέ), 1059d; **Dio Chrys.** 3. 39, 12. 50 (βέλτιστε καὶ—τῶν δημιουργῶν), 15. 2, 56. 2, 67. 2; **Lucian,** *Anach.* 10, *Cat.* 23, *Dial. Meret.* 13. 4 (χιλιάρχων ἄριστε καὶ φονεὺ ὅπόσων ἂν ἐθέλῃς), *Dial. Mort.* 20. 2 (Μένιππε ἀνδρῶν—), *Fug.* 29 (—καὶ μουσικώτατε Ὀρφεύ), *Imag.* 11, *Iupp. Trag.* 11 ('Ροδίων—), 43, *Merc.* 42 (—Τιμόκλεις), *Nav.* 14 (ναυκλήρων—), 26, *Phil.* 1, 10, *Pro Imag.* 17 (γυναικῶν ἀρίστη), *Psd.* 4 (προλόγων καὶ δαιμόνων ἄριστε 'Ελεγχε), *Sat.* 1 (—Κρόνε), 5 (Τιτάνων—), 19 (—Κρόνε), *Sol.* 10, *Tim.* 11 (—Πλοῦτε), 27, *Tox.* 56, *Verb.* 1
- plural (ἄριστοι): **Plato,** *Laws* 634c (—ξένων), 662c (—τῶν ἀνδρῶν), 684e, 712e, 741a (πάντων ἀνδρῶν—), 817b (—τῶν ξένων), 822a, *Soph.* 248b (πάντων—); **Xen.** *Cyr.* III. 3. 61 (ἄνδρες—); **Lucian,** *Pisc.* 5
- Μακάριε 'blessed, happy' (93) (See text, p. 140)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Chrm.* 157a, 166d,

Listing of Addresses

- Cra.* 391a (—*Ερμόγενης*), 408d, 414c, 433a, *Crito* 44c (—*Κρίτων*), 48e, *Euth.* 12a, *Euthd.* 291b, 293b, *Grg.* 469c, 471e, 495b, 512d, 520a, *Lach.* 197e, *Laws* 658a, 831c (—*Κλεινία*), 886a, 889e, *Phd.* 69a (—*Σιμμία*), *Phdr.* 236d (—*Φαίδρε*), 241d, *Phlb.* 52b, *Pol.* 277d, 283b, *Prot.* 309c, 313e, *Rep.* 341b, 345b, 346a, 354a (—*Θρασύμαχε*), 432d, 499a, 499d, 535b, 557c, 589c, *Soph.* 232e, 236d, 238a, 249e, *Symp.* 198b, *Tht.* 166c, *Alc.* 1 124a, 132b, *Alc.* 2 139d spoken by other Platonic characters: *Euthd.* 304e, *Symp.* 214c, 219a
- other authors: **Xen.** *Cyr.* VIII. 3. 39 (—*σύ*); **Plut.** *Mar.* 2. 3 (*Ξενοκράτες*), *Brut.* 15. 3, *Pyrrh.* 14. 12, *Mor.* 401a, 469b, 484e, 645b, 699b, 732a (—*Φίλων*), 741a, 769e (—*Ζεύξιππε*), 986b (*μακαρία*), 1069e, 1097a, 1117e; **Joseph.** *AJ* 3. 116 (*μακάριος στρατός*), 19. 97; **Dio Chrys.** 55. 10; **Lucian,** *Anach.* 34, *Cont.* 21, *Dial. Mar.* 15. 4 (—*Ζέφυρε της θεάς*), *Eun.* 2, *Hermot.* 10, *Icar.* 19 (—*Μένιππε της παραδόξου θεάς*), *Imag.* 10, *Iupp. Trag.* 2 (*μακαρία*), *Merc.* 13, *Nav.* 35, *Nec.* 1, *VA* 26
- plural (*μακάριοι*): **Plato,** *Euthd.* 303c (—*σφῶ της θαυμαστης φύσεως, οἱ τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐξείργασθον*), *Laws* 722c, *Rep.* 506d; **Dion. Hal.** VI. 9. 6 (*μακάριοι μὲν, οἷς . . . , εὐκλείεις δέ . . .*); **Plut.** *Eum.* 9. 12, *Sull.* 13. 5, *Phoc.* 9. 5, 10. 9, *Mor.* 541d, 812b, 993d (—*καὶ θεοφιλεῖς οἱ νῦν ὄντες ὑμεῖς*)
- Γενναῖε** 'noble' (72) (See text, p. 140)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Cra.* 432d, *Euth.* 7e (—*Εὐθύφρων*), *Grg.* 473d (—*Πῶλε*), 494e, *Rep.* 527b, *Alc.* 1 111a, 121a (—*Ἀλκιβιάδης*), 135e, *Hp. Maj.* 298a
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Euthd.* 285d (—*Διονυσόδωρε*)
- other authors: **Philo,** *Aet.* 54, *Gig.* 40, *Det. Pot.* 150, *LA* III. 75, *Mut.* 177, 187, *Heres* 91, 105, *Spec.* I. 271, II. 84, II. 129, *Virt.* 127, *Somn.* II. 253; **Dion. Hal.** VII. 34. 1, 46. 2; **Plut.** *Caes.* 38. 5, *Mar.* 8. 6, *Cor.* 23. 7, *Cato* 68. 7, *Mor.* 319c, 986a; **Joseph.** *AJ* 19. 92; **Dio Chrys.** 3. 2 (—*αὐτοκράτορ*); **Lucian,** *Anach.* 21, 40, *Dial. Mar.* 4. 2, *Dial. Mort.* 19. 2, 23. 2, *Hermot.* 8, 36, 78, 84, *Merc.* 22, 25, *Nav.* 14, *Par.* 31, 40, 43, 45, *Pisc.* 7, 23, 45, *Salt.* 3, 25, *Tox.* 8, 56; **Ach.** 2. 4. 5
- plural (*γενναῖοι*): **Plato,** *Phdr.* 261a (*θρέμματα γενναῖα*), *Tht.* 162d (—*παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες*); **Lycurg.** *Leocr.* 20. 86 (*ἄνδρες*—); **Dion. Hal.** X. 28. 4 (*καλοὶ καὶ—προστάται της πόλεως*); XIV. 9. 5 (—*παῖδες ἀγαθῶν ζηλωταὶ πατέρων*); **Philo,** *Conf.* 41, *Agr.* 86, 167, *Somn.* I. 93, *Dec.* 73, *Aet.* 132, *Virt.* 133, *Flacc.* 52, *Spec.* II. 247 (—*νομοθέται*); **Joseph.** *AJ* 19. 80
- Γενναϊότατε** 'most noble' (13) (See text, pp. 140–1)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Grg.* 521b
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Phdr.* 235d
- other authors: **Hdt.** III. 140. 4 (—*ἀνδρῶν*); **Lucian,** *Cat.* 8, *Dial. D.* 8. 2 (—*ἀετῶν*), 8. 3 (*γενναϊοτάτη*), *Dial. Meret.* 12. 5 (—*νεανίσκων Πυθίας*), *Dial. Mort.* 29. 3, *Gall.* 19 (*ἀλεκτρυνόνων*—), *Imag.* 7 (*πάντων*—), *Iupp. Trag.* 41 (—*φιλοσόφων Τιμόκλεις*), *Pisc.* 48, *Tim.* 4 (*θεῶν*—)

Γεννάδα 'noble' (3) (See text, p. 141)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Chrm.* 155d

other authors: **Lucian**, *Tim.* 20

plural (γεννάδαι): **Lucian**, *Cont.* 21

Θαυμάσιε 'wonderful, admirable, strange' (62) (See text, p. 141)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Apol.* 26d

(—Μέλητε), *Euth.* 3b, 5a (—Εὐθύφρων), 8a, 8d, *Cra.* 439c (—Κρατύλε),

Crito 48b, *Grg.* 470a, 489d, 512b, *Laws* 626e, 678b, 686c, 792c, 854b, 897c,

963b, *Menex.* 234a, *Phlb.* 26c, 31c, *Rep.* 337b, 351e, 420d, 435c, 453c, 495a,

574b, *Soph.* 238d, *Tht.* 151c, 165d, *Hipp.* 226d, *Hp. Maj.* 288b

spoken by other Platonic characters: *Laws* 891e, 965a, *Phdr.* 230c, 257c, *Phlb.*

28e (—Σώκρατες), *Rep.* 366d, *Symp.* 222e, *Epist.* III. 318b

other authors: **Philo**, *Spec.* I. 295; **Lucian**, *Adv.* 2, *Anach.* 16 (—Σόλων), 28,

Dial. Mort. 19. 3, *Gall.* 16, *Hermot.* 64, 81, *Icar.* 8, *Iupp. Trag.* 30, 39, 49,

Nav. 12, *Nigr.* 8, *Salt.* 23, *Tim.* 4, *Tox.* 5

plural (θαυμάσιοι) **Plato**, *Phd.* 117d, *Phdr.* 260d, *Rep.* 526a; **Philo**, *Migr.*

184; **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 8

Θαυμασιώτατε 'most wonderful' (5) (See text, p. 141)

other authors: **Aeschin.** *Ktes.* 152 (πρὸς μὲν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ σπουδαῖα τῶν

ἔργων πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀχρηστότατε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις

τόλμαν—); **Xen.** *An.* III. 1. 27 (—ἄνθρωπε); **Philo**, *Mut.* 264, *Agr.* 149;

Lucian, *Nav.* 39 (—βασιλέων)

Θαυμαστέ 'wonderful' (3) (See text, p. 141)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Pol.* 265a

other authors: **Dion. Hal.** IV. 82. 3 (θαυμαστή σὺ καὶ πολλῶν ἐπαίνων ἀξία

τῆς εὐγενοῦς προαιρέσεως); **Lucian**, *Hes.* 7 (—Ἡσίοδε)

Θαυμαστότατοι 'most wonderful' (1)

other authors: **Xen.** *An.* VII. 7. 10

Δαιμόνιε 'marvellous' (33) (See text, pp. 141–2)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Cra.* 415a, *Euthd.* 291a

(—Κρίτων), *Grg.* 489d, 513a, 517b, *Lach.* 199d, *Laws* 705d, 965c, *Meno* 92c,

Phdr. 235c, 268a, *Phlb.* 12e, *Pol.* 277d, *Rep.* 344d (—Θρασύμαχε), 522b

(—Γλαύκων), 573c, *Symp.* 223a, *Tht.* 172c, 177b, *Hp. Maj.* 293d

(—Σώκρατες)

spoken by other Platonic characters: *Crito* 44b (—Σώκρατες), *Tht.* 180b,

Epin. 980c

other authors: **Hdt.** IV. 126 (—ἀνδρῶν), VII. 48 (—ἀνδρῶν); **Plut.** *Pel.* 22. 3,

Mor. 398e, 455d (Ἄθω—οὐρανόμηκες), 663c, 926d; **Lucian**, *Dem.* 47

plural (δαιμόνιοι): **Hdt.** VIII. 84. 2; (**Lucian**) *Phpt.* 25 (—ἀνδρῶν)

Καλέ 'beautiful, good' (24) (See text, p. 142)

spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Phlb.* 26b (—Φίληβε),

Phdr. 243e (παῖ—), 252b (παῖ—), *Euthd.* 289b (—παῖ)

other authors: **Lucian**, *Apol.* 1 (—Σαβῖνε), *Asin.* 6 (καλὴ Παλαίστρα), 23

Listing of Addresses

- (—σύ), 24 (καλὴ καγαθὴ σὺ παρθένος), *Dial. Mort.* 29. 2 (—Μαύσωλε), *DI* 13, *Hermot.* 28 (—Ἑρμότιμῃ), *Hist.* 1 (—Φίλων), 22 (—Φίλων), *Merc.* 2 (—Τιμόκλεις), *Pereg.* 37 (—Κρόνιῃ), *Phpt.* 1 (—Κριτία), 9 (—Κριτία), 14 (—Κριτία), 15 (—Κριτία), 26 (—Κριτία), 28 (καλὴ ξυνωρίς), *Symp.* 48 (—Φίλων)
- plural: **Xen.** *Hell.* II. 3. 53 (ἄνδρες καλοὶ καγαθοί); **Dion. Hal.** X. 28. 4 (καλοὶ καὶ γενναῖοι προστάται τῆς πόλεως)
- Κάλλιστε** 'most beautiful' (2) (See text, p. 142)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Euthd.* 290c (—καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία), *Grg.* 461c (—Πῶλε)
- Λῶστε** 'best' (12) (See text, p. 143)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Grg.* 467b (—Πῶλε), *Erast.* 134a
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Laws* 638a, 789a, 968b
- other authors: **Xen.** *Symp.* 4. 1, *Hell.* IV. 1. 38 (—σύ); (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 216f, 218a, 218c; **Dio Chrys.** 15. 21; (**Lucian**) *Salt.* 2
- Σοφέ** 'wise' (2) (See text, p. 143)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Hp. Maj.* 290d (—σύ)
- plural: **Dio Chrys.** 7. 140 (σοφοὶ νομοθέται καὶ . . .)
- Σοφώτατε** 'wisest' (11) (See text, p. 143)
- spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Euthd.* 290c (κάλλιστε καὶ—Κλεινία), *Grg.* 489c (—Καλλίκλεις), *Laws* 690b (Πίνδαρε—), *Rep.* 339e (—Θρασύμαχε), *Symp.* 208b (σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα)
- spoken by other Platonic characters: *Grg.* 495d (—σύ)
- other authors: **Plut.** *Mor.* 986f (—ἀνδρῶν); **Dio Chrys.** 12. 73 (—τῶν ποιητῶν Ὀμηρε); **Lucian**, *Gall.* 7 (—ἀλεκτρυνῶν), *Iupp. Trag.* 49 (—Τιμόκλεις)
- plural (σοφώτατοι): **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 11
- Πάνσοφε** 'omniscient' (2) (See text, p. 143)
- other authors: **Philo**, *Mos.* II. 204, *Fug.* 58
- Μέγιστε** 'greatest' (9) (See text, p. 143)
- other authors: **Xen.** *Cyr.* V. 1. 29 (Ζεῦ—), VI. 3. 11 (Ζεῦ—), 4. 9 (Ζεῦ—), VII. 1. 3 (Ζεῦ—); **Philo**, *Flacc.* 123 (—βασιλεῦ θνητῶν καὶ ἀθανάτων); **Plut.** *Cam.* 5. 7 (Ζεῦ—καὶ θεοὶ χρηστῶν ἐπίσκοποι καὶ πονηρῶν ἔργων), *Mor.* 172b (—αὐτόκρατορ Τραϊανὲ Καίσαρ); **Joseph.** *AJ* 16. 31 (—Ἀγρίππα), 16. 47 (—Ἀγρίππα)
- Χρηστέ** 'useful, good' (6) (See text, p. 143)
- other authors: **Dem.** 18. 318; **Dion. Hal.** VI. 86. 2 (χρηστή); **Plut.** *Mor.* 400a; **Lucian**, *Hermot.* 19, 84; **Ach.** 3. 10. 4 (χρηστή δὲ πρὸς ἐραστὴν δυστυχοῦντα)
- Κράτιστε** 'strongest, mightiest' (4) (See text, p. 143)
- other authors: **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 41. 3 (Οὐολουμνία, κρατίστη γυναικῶν); **Joseph.** *Ap.* 1. 1 (—ἀνδρῶν Ἐπαφρόδιτε), *Vit.* 430 (—ἀνδρῶν Ἐπαφρόδιτε)

Appendix B

- plural: **Joseph.** *AJ* 4. 134 (κράτιστοι νέων)
Προθυμότατε 'most willing, most eager' (3) (See text, p. 144)
 spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Laws* 890e
 (—Κλεινία)
 other authors: **Plut.** *Mor.* 453c (—Σύλλα), 576f (—Θεόκριτε)
Ανδρειότατε 'bravest, most stubborn' (3) (See text, p. 144)
 spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Laws* 905c (πάντων—),
Pol. 263d (πάντων—), *Hipp.* 232a (—πάντων)
Ἡδιστε 'sweetest' (3)
 spoken by other Platonic characters: *Rep.* 348c
 other authors: **Lucian,** *Tim.* 46 (Τίμων εὐμορφότατε καὶ—καὶ συμποτικώτατε), *Luct.* 13 (τέκνον ἡδιστον)
θεῖε 'holy, divine' (1) (See text, p. 144)
 spoken by other Platonic characters: *Laws* 626c
Θειότατε 'most holy, most divine' (2) (See text, p. 144)
 spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Laws* 629b (Τύρταιε, ποιητὰ θειότατε)
 other authors: **Lucian,** *Dial. Mort.* 13. 3
Θεοφιλεῖς 'dear to the gods' (1) (See text, p. 144)
 other authors: **Plut.** *Mor.* 993d (μακάριοι καὶ—οἱ νῦν ὄντες ὑμεῖς)
Θεοφιλέστατε 'most dear to the gods' (2) (See text, p. 144)
 other authors: **Dion. Hal.** IV. 83. 4 (πόλις θεοφιλεστάτη πόλεων, ἐν ἣ γενέσεώς τε καὶ τροφῆς ἐτύχομεν); **Lucian,** *Iupp. Trag.* 47 (—Τιμόκλεις)
Εὐδαιμον 'blessed' (1) (See text, p. 144)
 spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Rep.* 450c
Εὐδαιμονεστάτη 'most blessed' (1) (See text, p. 144)
 other authors: **Lucian,** *Dial. Mar.* 9. 2
Πολυτίμητε 'highly-honoured' (2)
 spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue: *Euthd.* 296d
 (—Εὐθύδημε)
 other authors: **Plut.** *Mor.* 258b (—δαίμον)
Σεμνοί 'reverend' (2)
 other authors: **Philo,** *Spec.* III. 166 (—νομοθέται); (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 23
 (—φιλόσοφοι)
Σεμνότατε 'most reverend' (1)
 other authors: **Ach.** 8. 8. 6 (—καὶ κοσμιώτατε ἱερεῖ)
Πιστέ 'trustworthy' (2)
 other authors: **Ach.** 3. 10. 4 (πιστὴ μὲν πρὸς ἀνάγκην ἔρωτος), 6. 16. 3 (—καὶ βέβαιε)
 Terms occurring only once and not being variants of other terms:
 spoken by dominant character in a Platonic dialogue:
Γλυκύτατε 'sweetest': *Hipp.* 227d
Τεχνικώτατε 'most skillful': *Phdr.* 274e (—Θεύθ)
Φέριστε 'best': *Phdr.* 238d

Listing of Addresses

other authors:

- Βέβαιε 'steadfast': **Ach.** 6. 16. 3 (πιστὲ καὶ—)
 Δεινότετε 'cleverest': **Joseph.** *Vit.* 340 (Ἰοῦστε—συγγραφέων)
 Ἐρασμιώτατε 'beloved, desired': **Lucian,** *Tim.* 41 (φίλτατε καὶ—)
 Εὐμορφότετε 'most handsome': **Lucian,** *Tim.* 46 (Τίμων—καὶ ἡδιστε
 καὶ συμποτικώτατε)
 Ἡμέτερε Ζεῦ 'our Zeus': **Lucian,** *Dial. Mort.* 28. 1 (δέσποτα καὶ βασιλεῦ
 καὶ—)
 Θεσπέσιε 'divinely-sounding': **Lucian,** *Icar.* 2 (—καὶ Ὀλύμπιε Μένιππε)
 Ἱερώτατε 'most holy': (**Lucian**) *Macr.* 29 (—Κυίντιλλε)
 Κοσμιώτατε 'most well-behaved': **Ach.** 8. 8. 6 (σεμνότετε καὶ—ἱερεῦ)
 Λαμπρότατε 'very illustrious': (**Lucian**) *Macr.* 1 (—Κυίντιλλε)
 Μέλημα 'darling': **Lucian,** *Rhet.* 14
 Μνημονικώτατοι 'having the best memory': **Xen.** *An.* VII. 6. 38
 (πάντων—)
 Μουσικώτατε 'most musical': **Lucian,** *Fug.* 29 (ἄριστε καὶ—Ὀρφεῦ)
 Ὀλύμπιε 'Olympian': **Lucian,** *Icar.* 2 (θεσπέσιε καὶ—Μένιππε)
 Οὐράνιε 'heavenly': **Lucian,** *Amor.* 32 (δαίμον—)
 Οὐρανόμηκες 'high as heaven': **Plut.** *Mor.* 455d (Ἄθω δαιμόνιε—)
 Παράδοξε 'paradoxical': **Epict.** II. 18. 22
 Ποθούμενε 'longed-for': **Plut.** *Mor.* 985e (—Ὀδυσσεῦ)
 Πολυμαθέστατε 'most learned': (**Lucian**) *Phpt.* 13 (—Τριεφών)
 Συμποτικώτατε 'most convivial': **Lucian,** *Tim.* 46 (Τίμων εὐμορφότετε
 καὶ ἡδιστε καὶ—)
 Τιμιωτάτη μοι θεῶν 'most honoured of the gods to me': **Lucian,** *Cat.* 16
 Φιλάνθρωπε 'kind to humans': **Char.** 3. 6. 6 (θάλασσα . . .—)
 Φιλοδέσποτον 'loving your master': **Char.** 3. 1. 8 (Πλαγγώνιον—)
 Φιλόδωρε 'fond of giving': **Philo,** *Heres* 31
 Τίμων, τὸ μέγα ὄφελος τοῦ γένους, τὸ ἔρεισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τὸ
 πρόβλημα τῆς Ἑλλάδος 'Timon, the great benefactor of your race, the
 support of Athens, the defence of Greece': **Lucian,** *Tim.* 50
 Πολλῶν ἐπαίνων ἀξία τῆς εὐγενοῦς προαιρέσεως 'worthy of much praise
 for your noble purpose': **Dion. Hal.** IV. 82. 3 (θαυμαστή σὺ καὶ—)

INDEFINITE ADDRESSES (See text, pp. 145–61)

Ξένε/Ξεῖνε 'stranger, foreigner, guest' (237) (See text, pp. 145–9)

Greek > Greek, in speaker's country: **Hdt.** I. 68. 2 (—Λάκων), V. 49. 9
 (—Μιλήσιε), 50. 3 (—Μιλήσιε), 72. 3 (—Λακεδαιμόνιε), VII. 160. 1
 (—Σπαρτιῆτα), 162. 1 (—Ἀθηναῖε); **Plato,** *Euthd.* 283e (—Θούριε), *Laws*
 624a, 625b, 625c, 626d (—Ἀθηναῖε), 626e, 627c, 627d, 628e, 630d, 632d,
 634c (—Ἀθηναῖε), 634e, 637c, 639e, 641a, 642d, 646a, 648a, 648c, 648e, 653c

Appendix B

- (*bis*), 660b, 663e, 664d, 666d, 667a, 669a, 672d, 688d, 702b, 704b (*bis*), 707b, 710c, 715d, 720e, 723d, 747e (—*Ἀθηναίε*), 752a, 753a, 768e, 772e, 777b, 780d, 781d, 782d, 783d, 789a, 790e, 792b, 793a, 796e, 797a, 799e, 805b, 810c, 812a, 814b, 818b, 818e, 818e (*bis*), 819e, 821c, 830c, 831b, 832a, 835d, 857b, 858a, 860c, 860e, 861a, 861c, 861d, 885e, 886b, 886e, 887b, 888d, 890b, 890d, 890e, 891d, 893a, 898c, 899c, 899d, 903a, 922c, 922d, 926a, 960c, 962c, 963a, 963c, 964d, 965c, 965e, 968b, 968e, *Meno* 71a, *Phd.* 92a (—*Θηβαίε*), *Pol.* 257b, 257d, 258c, 262c, 263a, 264b, 271a, 277a, 283b, 293e, 295b, 311c, *Soph.* 217a, 217c, 218a, 222c, 229d, 233a, 235a, 240a, 244c, 249a, 250e, 258e, 261a, *Epin.* 973a, 974c, 979d, 979e, 980b, 986a, *Hp. Maj.* 287c (—*Ἡλείε*), 287d; **Plut.** *Lyc.* 15. 17, 20. 9 (?), *Lys.* 22. 3, *Mor.* 210a (?), 228c, 396b, 405f, 584a, 585e, 592f; **Dio Chrys.** 7. 5, 7. 10, 7. 71, 36. 14, 36. 24; **Lucian,** *Scy.* 10; **Ach.** 8. 4. 2
- non-Greek > Greek, in speaker's country: **Hdt.** I. 30. 2 (—*Ἀθηναίε*), 32. 1 (—*Ἀθηναίε*); **Plut.** *Them.* 27. 3, *Lys.* 6. 6; **Lucian,** *Herc.* 4, *Syr. D.* 8, *Cont.* 10 (—*Ἀθηναίε*); **Ach.** 2. 2. 4 (?)
- non-Greek > non-Greek, in speaker's country: **Hdt.** I. 45. 2
- Greek > Greek, both abroad: **Hdt.** IX. 79. 1 (—*Αἰγινήτα*), 91. 1 (—*Σάμειε*), 91. 2 (—*Σάμειε*); **Plato,** *Laws* 633c (*Λακεδαιμόνιε*—), 634b, 635e (*Λακεδαιμόνιε*—), 636e, 637b (*Λακεδαιμόνιε*—), 642b (—*Ἀθηναίε*), 683b, 696b, 699d, 721e, 776c, 804b, 837d, 842a, 891a
- Greek > non-Greek, both abroad: **Plut.** *Mor.* 150e, 151d (?) (*Ναυκρατῖτα*—)
- non-Greek > Greek, both abroad: **Hdt.** IV. 97. 6 (—*Λέσβιε*), IX. 120. 2 (—*Ἀθηναίε*)
- non-Greek > non-Greek (but compatriots), both abroad: **Lucian,** *Scy.* 4
- Greek > Greek, in addressee's country: **Plato,** *Laws* 626b, 631b, 633d (—*Κνώσιε*), 641d, 712d (?), 820e, *Symp.* 204c (*ξένη*)
- Greek > non-Greek, in addressee's country: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 220c
- non-Greek > Greek, in addressee's country: **Hdt.** IX. 16. 4
- non-Greek > non-Greek, in addressee's country: **Hdt.** V. 18. 2 (—*Μακεδών*), VII. 29. 1 (—*Λυδῆ*)
- Greek > Greek, location doubtful: **Xen.** *Oec.* 8. 15; **Plato,** *Cra.* 429e (—*Ἀθηναίε*, ὑὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενης), *Laws* 885c (—*Ἀθηναίε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε καὶ Κνώσιε*), 893b; **Plut.** *Lyc.* 20. 1, 20. 7, *Mor.* 216a (*bis*), 216f, 223f, 224f, 229c, 231c (*bis*), 789c (—*Ἀθηναίε ἢ Ῥωμαίε*); **Dio Chrys.** 59. 11; **Lucian,** *VA* 4, 14
- plural (*ξένοι*/ *ξείνοι*): **Hdt.** V. 20. 1; **Plato,** *Laws* 624a, 632d, 636a, 674c, 689c, 817a, 832b; **Plut.** *Lyc.* 25. 9, *Mor.* 190c, 219d, 230c, 240c; **Lucian,** *VHI* 11, 33, 34 [Note also **Plato,** *Laws* 634c, ἀριστοὶ ξένων, and 817b, ἀριστοὶ . . . τῶν ξένων]
- Ξενύλλιον 'little stranger' (1) (See text, p. 149)
- Greek > Greek, location doubtful: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 229e

Listing of Addresses

ἄνθρωπε 'human being' (167) (See text, pp. 150-4)

- > unspecified/hypothetical person; positive: **Epict.** II. 17. 33, 17. 35
- > unspecified/hypothetical person; neutral: **Plato**, *Apol.* 28b, *Grg.* 452b, *Meno* 75a, *Prot.* 330d, *Rep.* 337b, *Symp.* 200c, *Hp. Maj.* 289a; **Xen.** *Cyr.* II. 2. 7; **Aeschin.** *Tim.* 29; **Diod. Sic.** 13. 24. 5; **Philo**, *Spec.* II. 82, *Mos.* II. 199; **Plut.** *Alex.* 69. 4, *Ag. & Cl.* 20. 1, *Mor.* 168c, 216d, 500d, 644f; **Dio Chrys.** 7. 100; **Epict.** I. 2. 33, 17. 21, 18. 9, 19. 26, 29. 41, II. 4. 3, 7. 6, 14. 21, 15. 7, 15. 8, 15. 18, 16. 41, 19. 17, 20. 4, 23. 5, 23. 42, III. 1. 23, 12. 10, 14. 2, 15. 9, 22. 81, IV. 4. 20, 8. 35, *Ench.* 29. 5
- > unspecified/hypothetical person; negative: **Plato**, *Rep.* 329c; **Plut.** *M. Cato* 9. 10, *Cato* 19. 8, *Phil.* 17. 5, *Mor.* 69b, 187a, 525a, 615a, 668a, 829f; **Dio Chrys.** 7. 116, 64. 16; **Epict.** I. 1. 23, 4. 10, 21. 2, 22. 20, 25. 27, II. 1. 35, 6. 17, 15. 3, 17. 27, 19. 16, 19. 19, 20. 28, 21. 11, 21. 21, 23. 37, 24. 22, III. 1. 30, 5. 15, 7. 21, 8. 6, 14. 5, 17. 6, 19. 5, 20. 4, 20. 5, 20. 16, 21. 13, 21. 14 (ἀσεβέστατε—), 22. 51, 23. 23, 24. 77, 24. 83, IV. 1. 135, 8. 39, 9. 6, 11. 34, 13. 10, *Frag.* 10; **Lucian**, *Psd.* 1 (κακόδαιμον—)
- > specified but unknown person; positive: **Plut.** *Alex.* 43. 4, *Mor.* 505c
- > specified but unknown person; neutral: **Hdt.** I. 35. 3, 85. 4, III. 63. 1; **Plut.** *Pomp.* 80. 4, *Mor.* 178c; **Lucian**, *El.* 5, *Dial. D.* 10. 1, *Dial. Mar.* 8. 3; **Ach.** 5. 23. 7
- > specified but unknown person; negative: **Diod. Sic.** 26. 18. 1; **Dion. Hal.** XIX. 5. 3 (σπερμολόγε—); **Plut.** *Mar.* 39. 3; **Lucian**, *Dial. Mar.* 8. 3; **Ach.** 7. 14. 4 (?)
- > specified, known person; showing surprise: **Xen.** *An.* III. 1. 27 (θαυμασιώτατε—); **Diod. Sic.** 33. 7. 4; **Plut.** *Mor.* 320a, 553e; (**Lucian**) *Salt.* 63(?)
- > specified, known person; neutral: **Plato**, *Grg.* 518c; **Ach.** 4. 7. 4
- > specified, known person; negative: **Hdt.** VII. 39. 1 (κακέ—), VIII. 125. 2; **Dem.** 21. 179, 32. 15, 34. 15; **Dion. Hal.** III. 21. 5 (μιαρώτατε—); **Plut.** *Mor.* 586d (μοχθηρὲ—); **Lucian**, *Cont.* 12, *Dial. Meret.* 9. 4, *Luct.* 16 (κακόδαιμον—), *Nav.* 21; **Ach.** 6. 13. 1; **Char.** 6. 7. 9
- unspecified/hypothetical person >; neutral or negative: **Plato**, *Hp. Maj.* 292d; **Dem.** 19. 94; **Plut.** *Mor.* 1055a; **Epict.** II. 20. 9
- man > self; not negative: **Dem.** 57. 67
- plural (ἄνθρωποι):
 - > group of unspecified or imaginary people: **Plato**, *Apol.* 23b, *Cleit.* 407a, *Cra.* 408b, *Prot.* 343e, 353a, 353c, 353e, 354a (ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιπαρὰ εἶναι), 354e, 356c, 357a, *Symp.* 192d; **Diod. Sic.** 21. 21. 14; **Plut.** *Pomp.* 67. 5, *Mor.* 4e, 439c, 607d; **Dio Chrys.** 13. 16; **Epict.** I. 9. 16, II. 1. 23, 20. 5, 20. 7, III. 13. 11, 22. 26, IV. 8. 27, 8. 30, 11. 23; **Lucian**, *Tim.* 48, *Amor.* 22 (μάτην ἐπὶ τῷ φρονεῖν εὐλογούμενοι, θηρίον ὡς ἀληθῶς φαῦλον, ἄνθρωποι)
 - > group of specified, unknown people: **Plato**, *Prot.* 314d

Οὗτος 'this one' (57) (See text, pp. 154-8)

Plato, *Symp.* 172a (Φαληρεὺς . . . οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος), **Philo**, *Abr.* 71, *Agr.* 111, *Dec.* 88, *Flacc.* 6 (*bis*), *Immut.* 61 (οὗτοι), 66, *Jos.* 24, 64, 166 (οὗτοι), *LA* III. 179, 192, *Migr.* 9, *Plant.* 108 (οὗτοι), *Sacr.* 22, 32, *Somn.* I. 54, II. 252, *Spec.* I. 259, III. 66, IV. 10, 59, 227; **Joseph.** *Vit.* 209; **Plut.** *Demetr.* 23. 6, *Mor.* 222a, 541c, 568a; **Epict.** II. 12. 18; **Lucian**, *Cat.* 9, 18, 21 (οὗτοι), *Cyn.* 1, *Demon.* 14 (οὗτος, ἔφη προσειπὼν τὸ ὄνομα), *DI* 4, 9 (αὐταί), *Fug.* 28 (text uncertain), *Hermot.* 58 (οὗτοι), *Hes.* 6, *Luct.* 24, *Merc.* 20, *Nec.* 1, 17, *Pro Imag.* 4, *Psd.* 13, *Sat.* 5, 9, 25, *Tim.* 52, *Tyr.* 16, 18, *VA* 11, 13, 14, 24, 27
Tân (no referential meaning) (22) (See text, pp. 158-60)

Plato, *Apol.* 25c, *Epist.* III. 319e; **Dem.** I. 26, 3. 29, 18. 312, 25. 78; **Plut.** *Phoc.* 16. 3, *Art.* 15. 4, 15. 7 (τὰν . . . Μιθριδάτα), *Mor.* 73b (*bis*), 85c, 558b, 646a, 692e, 711d, 922f, 1140e; **Lucian**, *Gall.* 17, *Icar.* 2, *Phpt.* 1, *Tim.* 35
Μέλε (no referential meaning) (1) (See text, p. 160)

Plato, *Tht.* 178e

TERMS OF PITY (See text, pp. 161-5)

* *Τάλας* 'wretched, miserable' (10) (See text, pp. 161-3)

sympathy/encouragement: **Epict.** I. 26. 12, II. 18. 28, IV. 6. 21

ironic sympathy: **Epict.** III. 22. 31, IV. 1. 21

rebukes: **Epict.** II. 8. 13, 16. 32, 17. 34, III. 2. 9, 2. 16

Τάλαινα 'wretched, miserable' (2) (See text, pp. 162-3)

sympathy: **Plut.** *Ant.* 79. 3 (—Κλεοπάτρα); **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 12. 2

Ταλαίπωρε 'suffering, miserable' (13) (See text, p. 163)

sympathy: **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 47. 4

ironic sympathy: (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 24

rebukes: **Dem.** 18. 121; **Epict.** I. 4. 11, III. 26. 3, IV. 6. 18; **Plut.** *Aem.* 26. 10, *Mor.* 166d(?), 525d, 526f

plural (ταλαίπωροι): **Joseph.** *Bf* 6. 349; **Epict.** III. 22. 26, 22. 44

Ἀθλίε 'unhappy, pitiful' (8) (See text, p. 163)

pity/grief: **Joseph.** *Bf* 6. 205 (βρέφος . . . ἄθλιον); **Lucian**, *Luct.* 17 (τέκνον ἄθλιον); **Ach.** 3. 16. 3 (Λευκίππη . . . ἄθλία καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δυστυχεστάτη); **Char.** 2. 8. 7 (ἄθλιον), 3. 7. 5, 5. 10. 2 (τέκνον ἄθλιον)

scorn/pity: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 235e; (**Lucian**) *Asin.* 23

Δύστηνε 'wretched, unfortunate' (4) (See text, pp. 163-4)

sympathy: **Dio Chrys.** 59. 11

rebukes: **Dion. Hal.** III. 21. 5; **Epict.** II. 13. 23, III. 26. 36

Σχέτλιε 'merciless, miserable' (6) (See text, p. 164)

doubtful: **Plato**, *Laws* 903c; (**Lucian**) *Syr. D.* 25

plural (σχέτλιοι): **Dion. Hal.** VI. 72. 5, X. 29. 2 (—ὕμεις καὶ οὐδὲ πολίται ταύτης ἄξιοι λέγεσθαι τῆς γῆς), XI. 41. 5; **Philo**, *Conf.* 116 (—καὶ παμμίαροι)

Listing of Addresses

- Ἐχετλιώτατε** 'most merciless, most miserable' (3) (See text, p. 164)
 insult: **Lys.** 12. 26 (—πάντων); **Plut. Mor.** 987c
 horror: **Hdt.** III. 155. 3 (—ἀνδρῶν)
Τλήμον 'suffering, enduring, bold' (3) (See text, p. 164)
 warning: **Xen. Mem.** I. 3. 11
 anger: **Xen. Mem.** II. 1. 30; **Char.** 6. 2. 5
Τλημονέστατε (superl. of above) (2) (See text, p. 164)
 exhortation: **Joseph. Bf** 4. 174 (τλημονέστατοι)
 pity: **Joseph. Bf** 5. 19 (τλημονεστάτη πόλις)
Δυστυχές 'unfortunate' (2) (See text, pp. 164-5)
 pity: **Ach.** 1. 13. 5 (ἰππεύ δέ—); **Char.** 6. 1. 9 (ὀφθαλμοὶ δυστυχεῖς)
Δυστυχεύσατε 'most unfortunate' (1) (See text, pp. 164-5)
 pity/grief: **Ach.** 3. 16. 3 (Λευκίππη ... ἀθλία καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων
 δυστυχεστάτη)
Δείλαιε 'wretched' (1) (See text, pp. 164-5)
 pity/anger: **Ach.** 2. 24. 2 (δειλαία)

INSULTS (See text, pp. 165-74)

- Ἀβέλτερε** 'silly': **Plut. Mor.** 527e
Ἀγνωμον 'unfeeling': **Ach.** 3. 23. 4 (θάλαττα—)
Ἀγριώτατε 'most savage': **Ach.** 1. 14. 2 (ἵππε πάντων θηρίων—)
Ἄδικε 'unjust' (4)
Dem. 18. 312 (πάντων ἀδικώτατε); **Plut. Art.** 9. 1 (τὸ κάλλιστον ἐν Πέρσαις
 ὄνομα Κύρου καταισχύνων, ἀδικώτατε ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀφρονέστατε); **Char.**
 1. 8. 4 (—Χαιρέα), 3. 10. 6 (—Ἀφροδίτη)
Αἰθήριοι 'with your heads in the clouds': (**Lucian**) **Phpt.** 26
Ἀκαιρε 'importunate': **Char.** 1. 10. 4 (—καὶ ἀνόητε)
Ἀλιτήριε 'guilty, sinning against' (4)
Aeschin. Ktes. 131 (τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριε); **Dion. Hal.** IV. 39. 5; **Joseph.**
Bf 6. 126 (ἀλιτήριοι); **Lucian, Iupp. Trag.** 44 (—Δάμι)
Ἀναιδέστατον 'most shameless': **Joseph. Af** 13. 317 (σῶμα—)
Ἀναισχυντότατε 'most shameless': **Lucian, Iupp. Trag.** 52 (λιχνότατε καὶ—)
Ἀνανδρε 'unmanly': **Ach.** 2. 5. 1
Ἀνδράποδον 'captive, slave' (21)
Plut. Mor. 241b (κακὰ ἀνδράποδα), 241c (κακὸν ἀνδράποδον); **Epict.**
 I. 4. 14, 6. 30, 7. 31, 7. 32, 9. 20, 12. 24, 13. 3, 24. 17, 29. 16, II. 7. 13, 13. 18,
 20. 2, 22. 31, III. 10. 10, 21. 11, 24. 75, 26. 19; **Lucian, Dial. Mort.** 29. 3
 (Καρῶν ἀνδραποδωδέστατε); **Ach.** 6. 20. 1 (κακόδαιμον—)
Ἀνδρόγυνε 'androgynous' (2)
 (**Plut.**) **Mor.** 219e; **Ach.** 5. 25. 8 (εὐνούχε καὶ—καὶ κάλλους βάσκανε)
Ἀνηλεέστατε 'most pitiless': **Philo, Leg.** 87 (σιδήρειε καὶ—)

Ἀνόητε 'fool, silly' (6)

Philo, *Somn.* II. 181; **Plut.** *Mor.* 224e, 329c (βάρβαρε Ξέρξη καὶ ἀνόητε καὶ μάτην πολλὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλησποντίαν πονηθεῖς γέφυραν . . .); **Char.** I. 10. 4 (ἄκαιρε καὶ—), 6. 2. 7, 6. 7. 9 (πασῶν ἀνοητοτάτη γυναικῶν)

Ἀνόσιε 'unholy' (4)

Hdt. I. 159. 3 (ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων); **Plut.** *Brut.* 17. 5 (—Κάσκα), *Mor.* 258c (πάντων ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων); **Long.** 2. 27. 1 (πάντων ἀνοσιώτατοι καὶ ἀσεβέστατοι)

Ἀξυνετώτατοι 'most stupid': **Thuc.** VI. 39. 2 (πάντων—)

Ἀπιστε 'untrustworthy' (3)

Ach. 5. 25. 6 (—καὶ βάρβαρε); **Char.** 4. 3. 10 (—Καλλιρρόη καὶ πασῶν ἀσεβεστάτη γυναικῶν), 7. 1. 5 (—Βαβυλῶν)

Ἀσεβέστατε 'most impious' (5)

Joseph. *Bῆ* 6. 100; **Epict.** III. 21. 14 (—ἄνθρωπε); **Long.** 2. 27. 1 (πάντων ἀνοσιώτατοι καὶ ἀσεβέστατοι); **Char.** 2. 9. 3 (πασῶν ἀσεβεστάτη), 4. 3. 10 (ἄπιστε Καλλιρρόη καὶ πασῶν ἀσεβεστάτη γυναικῶν)

Ἀστοργε 'heartless': **Ach.** I. 14. 3

Ἀταλαίπωρε 'incapable of bearing suffering': **Epict.** II. 17. 26

Ἀφυέστατε 'most witless': **Char.** 7. 6. 10 (πάντων ἀνθρώπων—)

Ἀφρονέστατε 'most senseless': **Plut.** *Art.* 9. 1 (τὸ κάλλιστον ἐν Πέρσῃς ὄνομα Κύρου κατασχύνων, ἀδικώτατε ἀνδρῶν καὶ—)

Ἀχάριστε 'ungracious' (3)

Lucian. *Dial. Meret.* 14. 2, *Psd.* 25; **Ach.** I. 14. 2 (πονηρὲ καὶ—καὶ ἀναίσθητε κάλλους)

Βάρβαρε 'barbarous' (2)

Plut. *Mor.* 329c (—Ξέρξη καὶ ἀνόητε καὶ μάτην πολλὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλησποντίαν πονηθεῖς γέφυραν . . .); **Ach.** 5. 25. 6 (ἄπιστε καὶ—)

Βάσκανε 'sorcerer, slanderer' (3)

Ach. 5. 25. 8 (εὐνοῦχε καὶ ἀνδρόγυνε καὶ κάλλους—); **Char.** 4. 1. 12 (Τύχη—), 5. 1. 4 (Τύχη—καὶ μιᾶς γυναικὸς προσφιλονεικοῦσα πολέμῳ)

Βδελυρὲ 'disgusting': **Dem.** 22. 66

Γαστρίμαργε 'glutton': **Philo**, *Spec.* I. 223

Γελοῖε 'absurd' (2): **Lucian.** *Cat.* 9, *Demon.* 25

Γέμουσα ἀλαζονείας 'full of pretension': **Philo**, *Somn.* II. 296

Γραμματοκύφων 'bent over writings': **Dem.** 18. 209

Δειλέ 'coward': (**Dio Chrys.**) 64. 11

Δεσμῶτα 'prisoner': **Ach.** 8. 1. 3 (—καὶ κατάδικε)

Δοῦλε 'slave': **Epict.** IV. 1. 146

Δραπέτα 'runaway': **Lucian.** *Cat.* 13

Δυσσεβέστατε 'most impious': **Joseph.** *Bῆ* I. 618 (δυσσεβεστάτη κεφαλὴ)

Ἐμβρόντητε 'thunderstruck, stupefied' (2): **Dem.** 18. 243; **Lucian.** *Dial. D.* 15. 1

Ἐπίβουλον 'treacherous' (2): **Char.** 5. 5. 3 (κάλλος—), 6. 6. 4 (κάλλος—)

Listing of Addresses

Ἐπίτριπτε 'damned' (2)

Andoc. *Myst.* 99 (συκοφάντα καὶ ἐπίτριπτον κίναδος); **Lucian**, *Tim.* 46 (Γναθωνίδη, γυπῶν ἀπάντων βορώτατε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιτριπτότατε)

Εὐηθέστατε 'most simple-minded' (2)

Plato, *Rep.* 343d (—Σώκρατες); **Philo**, *Leg.* 141 (πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἵνα μηδὲν ἀναγκασθῶ βλάσφημον εἰπεῖν, εὐηθέστατοι)

Εὐνούχε 'eunuch': **Ach.** 5. 25. 8 (—καὶ ἀνδρόγυνε καὶ κάλλους βάσκανε)

Θεοῖς ἐχθρὲ 'enemy to the gods': **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 43

Θεομάχε 'fighting against the gods': **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 45 (—Δᾶμι)

Θηρίον 'beast' (3)

Din. Dem. 50 (μιαρὸν σὺ—); **Dem.** 58. 49 (μιαρὸν σὺ—); **Ach.** 6. 12. 3 (κακὸν σὺ—)

Θρασύτατε 'boldest, most rash': **Lucian**, *Hermot.* 31

Ἱεροσυλε 'sacrilegious': **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 35 (—Δᾶμι)

Κάθαρμα 'refuse, offscourings' (8)

Dem. 18. 128; **Lucian**, *Cont.* 10, *Dial. Mort.* 6. 2, 20. 9, *Iupp. Trag.* 52 (τυμβωρύχε καὶ μιὰρὲ καὶ κατὰπτυστε καὶ μαστιγία καὶ—), *Merc.* 24, *Symp.* 16 (καθάρματα), 40

Κακέ 'bad' (24)

Hdt. II. 115. 4 (κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν), III. 145. 2 (κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν), VII. 39. 1 (—ἄνθρωπε); **Xen.** *An.* II. 5. 39 (κάκιστε ἀνθρώπων Ἀριαῖε); **Dem.** 24. 166 (κάκιστοι πάντων ἀνθρώπων); **Plut.** *Eum.* 17. 6 (κάκιστοι Μακεδόνων), *Crass.* 22. 3 (κάκιστε ἀνθρώπων), *Mor.* 241b (κακὰ ἀνδράποδα), 241c (κακὸν ἀνδράποδον), 246a (κάκιστοι πάντων ἀνθρώπων), 333a (κάκιστ' ἀνθρώπων); **Dio Chrys.** 58. 5 (κακὸν ... γέννημα καὶ θρασὺ μητρὸς θαλασσίας); **Joseph.** *AJ* 2. 136 (κάκιστοι), 7. 50 (κάκιστοι καὶ παραχρῆμα δίκην ὑφέξοντες), 11. 257 (κάκιστε πάντων ἀνθρώπων), 11. 265 (κάκιστε πάντων), 16. 209 (κάκιστε πάντων); **Lucian**, *Dial. D.* 24. 1 (Τιτάνων κάκιστε), *Dial. Mort.* 3. 2 (κάκιστοι Λυδῶν καὶ Φρυγῶν καὶ Ἀσσυρίων), *Fug.* 32, *Gall.* 1 (κάκιστε ἀλεκτρυῶν), *Pisc.* 4 (κάκιστε); **Ach.** 6. 12. 3 (κακὸν σὺ θηρίον); **Char.** 7. 1. 5 (κακὴ ξενόδοχε)

Κακὴ κεφαλὴ 'bad head' (9)

Hdt. III. 29. 2 (κακαὶ κεφαλαί); **Dem.** 19. 313; **Diod. Sic.** 19. 41. 1 (κακαὶ κεφαλαί); **Plut.** *Alex.* 9. 8, 51. 1, *Eum.* 16. 8 (κακαὶ κεφαλαί), *Mor.* 234e (κακαὶ κεφαλαί); **Epict.** III. 22. 58 (κακαὶ ... κεφαλαί); **Ach.** 5. 17. 8

Κακόδαιμον 'possessed by an evil genius' (13)

Plato, *Rep.* 440a (κακοδαίμονες); **Philo**, *Det. Pot.* 78; **Plut.** *Mor.* 168e, 525c; **Dio Chrys.** 32. 50 (κακοδαίμονες), 66. 27, 80. 5 (κακοδαίμονες); **Epict.** fr. 13; **Lucian**, *Luct.* 16 (—ἄνθρωπε), *Psd.* 1 (—ἄνθρωπε); **Ach.** 2. 5. 2, 2. 24. 3, 6. 20. 1 (—ἀνδράποδον)

Κάνθαρε 'beetle': **Lucian**, *Fug.* 31

Καταγέλαστε 'ridiculous' (6)

Plato, *Lys.* 205d (—Ἰππόθαλες), *Tht.* 149a; **Philo**, *Spec.* I. 223, *Det. Pot.* 158, *Heres* 81 (καταγέλαστοι καὶ λίαν εὐχερεῖς); **Dio Chrys.** 10. 2

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- Κατάδικε* 'condemned': **Ach.** 8. 1. 3 (δεσμῶτα καὶ—)
Κατάπυγον 'lewd person': **Lucian**, *Adv.* 23
Κατάπτυστε 'to be spat upon': **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 52 (τυμβωρύχε καὶ μιὰρὲ καὶ—καὶ μαστιγία καὶ κάθαρμα)
Κατάρατε 'accursed' (15)
Dem. 18. 209, 18. 244, 18. 290, 24. 107, 24. 198; **Plut.** *Luc.* 18. 6 (κατηραμένον ῥάκος), *Mor.* 234c; **Lucian**, *BA* 13, *Dial. D.* 6. 1, *Dial. Mort.* 2. 1, *Iupp. Trag.* 36, 46, *Pisc.* 15, 49, *Tim.* 34 (κατάρατοι)
Κενοὶ φρενῶν 'empty of mind' (3)
Philo, *Mos.* I. 325, *Spec.* IV. 200, *Migr.* 138
Κίναδος 'fox, rogue' (4)
Andoc. *Myst.* 99 (συκοφάντα καὶ ἐπίτριπτον—); **Dem.** 18. 162; **Aeschin.** *Ktes.* 167; **Lucian**, *Psd.* 32 (παιπάλημα καὶ—)
Λιχνότατε 'most greedy': **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 52 (—καὶ ἀναισχυντότατε)
Μαστιγία 'whipped': **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 52 (τυμβωρύχε καὶ μιὰρὲ καὶ κατάπτυστε καὶ—καὶ κάθαρμα)
Μάταιε 'empty, in vain, foolish' (14)
Hdt. III. 155. 3; **Dem.** 25. 46; **Philo**, *Sacr.* 70 (μάταιοι); **Dio Chrys.** 4. 70, 16. 8; **Lucian**, *Cont.* 20 (μάταιοι), 22 (μάταιοι), *Dial. Mort.* 1. 3 (μάταιοι), 11. 4, 13. 4, 20. 11 (μάταιοι), *Luct.* 16, *Merc.* 17 (μάταιοι), *Pereg.* 37 (μάταιοι)
Μιὰρὲ 'foul, defiled' (28)
Plato, *Chrm.* 161b, 174b, *Phdr.* 236e, *Theag.* 124e; **Dem.** 21. 135 (μιὰρὰ κεφαλῇ), 21. 195 (μιὰρὰ κεφαλῇ), 25. 28 (μιὰρώτατε πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων), 58. 49 (μιὰρὸν σὺ θηρίον); **Din.** *Dem.* 50 (μιὰρὸν σὺ θηρίον); **Dion. Hal.** III. 21. 5 (μιὰρώτατε ἄνθρωπε), 21. 6 (μιὰρὰ σὺ), IV. 38. 4 (μιὰρώτατε ἀνθρώπων), V. 28. 4 (μιὰρώτατε πάντων . . . ἀνθρώπων); **Philo**, *Conf.* 116 (σχέτλιοι καὶ παμμίαιοι); **Plut.** *Caes.* 66. 8 (μιὰρώτατε Κάσκα), *Mor.* 180f; **Joseph.** *B7* 6. 124 (μιὰρώτατοι), 6. 347 (μιὰρώτατοι); **Lucian**, *BA* 13, *Cat.* 10, 12 (μιὰρὸν ἀνθρώπιον), 27 (μιὰρὲ σὺ), *Dial. Mort.* 2. 1, *Iupp. Trag.* 35, 52 (τυμβωρύχε καὶ—καὶ κατάπτυστε καὶ μαστιγία καὶ κάθαρμα), *Pisc.* 2, *Tim.* 53; **Char.** 3. 10. 8 (θάλασσα μιὰρά)
Μισθοφόρε 'mercenary': **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 9. 5
Μισοδημότατε 'hating the populace greatly': **Dion. Hal.** IX. 47. 2 (—καὶ τυραννικώτατε)
Μοχθηρὲ 'bad, wretched' (5)
Plato, *Phdr.* 268e; **Plut.** *Them.* 11. 5, *Cato* 12. 6 (μοχθηροί), 61. 6 (μοχθηροί), *Mor.* 586d (—ἄνθρωπε)
Μῶρε/μωρὲ 'dull, stupid' (9)
Xen. *Mem.* I. 3. 13; **Plato**, *Laws* 857d; **Philo**, *Cher.* 75; **Dio Chrys.** 7. 48; **Epict.** II. 16. 13, III. 13. 17, 22. 85, 23. 17, IV. 10. 33
Νήπιοι 'silly, foolish': **Hdt.** VII. 169. 2
Παιπάλημα 'piece of subtlety': **Lucian**, *Psd.* 32 (—καὶ κίναδος)

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- Πενιχροί 'beggars, poor': **Plut. Art.** 11. 4
- Πολιτικέ 'political': (**Plato**) *Ax.* 368d (Ἀξίοχε—)
- Πόνηρε/ πονηρέ 'bad, worthless' (6)
- Dion. Hal.** VII. 45. 4; **Plut. Ant.** 28. 11, *Ag. & Cl.* 52. 8; *Mor.* 525d; **Long.** 1. 14. 3 (πονηρὸν ὕδωρ); **Ach.** 1. 14. 2 (—καὶ ἀχάριστε καὶ ἀναίσθητε κάλλους)
- Ῥαθυμότατε 'most lazy': **Plato, Tht.** 166a (—Σώκρατες)
- Σαννίων 'zany': **Epict.** III. 22. 84
- Σιδήρειε 'made of iron, stubborn' (3)
- Aeschin. Ktes.** 166 (σιδηροί); **Philo, Leg.** 87 (—καὶ ἀνηλεέστατε); **Joseph. Bῆ** 5. 416 (σιδήρειοι)
- Σπερμολόγε 'picking up seeds, babbling': **Dion. Hal.** XIX. 5. 3 (—ἄνθρωπε)
- Συκοφάντα 'informer' (4)
- Andoc. Myst.** 99 (—καὶ ἐπίτριπτον κίναδος); **Dem.** 18. 113; **Philo, Cher.** 35, *Plant.* 72 (συκοφάνται)
- Τετυφωμένε 'deluded, crazy' (2)
- (**Plato**) *Hp. Maj.* 290a (—σύ); **Philo, Det. Pot.** 101
- Τολμηρέ 'audacious' (4)
- Joseph. Bῆ** 2. 116 (τολμηρά); **Lucian, Dial. D.** 20. 1 (τολμηρότατε), *Icar.* 3 (τολμηρότατε πάντων); **Ach.** 2. 5. 2
- Τρισάθλιε 'thrice-wretched': **Char.** 2. 6. 3
- Τριταγωνιστά 'third actor': **Dem.** 18. 209
- Τυμβωρύχε 'grave-robber': **Lucian, Iupp. Trag.** 52 (—καὶ μιὰρὲ καὶ κατὰπτυστε καὶ μαστιγία καὶ κάθαρμα)
- Τυραννικώτατε 'most tyrannical': **Dion. Hal.** IX. 47. 2 (μισοδημότατε καὶ—)
- Φαυλότατε 'cheapest, most ordinary, worst' (3)
- Dem.** 8. 35 (πάντων ἀνθρώπων φαυλότατοι), 37. 30 (φαυλότατ' ἀνθρώπων); **Philo, Spec.** II. 96 (φαυλότατοι πάντων ἀνθρώπων)
- Φιλοτιμώτατ' 'most fond of honour': **Plut. Mor.** 986b (—ἀνθρώπων)
- Χαλεπώτατε 'most harsh': **Dem.** 39. 34 (—Βοιωτέ)
- Ψευδοδοξούσα 'believing falsely': **Philo, LA** II. 46
- Unique phrases:
- Σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ 'you pandar of yourself': **Xen. Symp.** 8. 5
- Ἀπληστε αἵματος Κύρε 'Cyrus, insatiable for blood': **Hdt.** I. 212. 2
- Ὅφεις Ἑλλήν ὁ ποικίλος 'subtle Greek snake': **Plut. Them.** 29. 2
- Γλώσσης ἀληθῶς νόσημα Ταῦ 'Tau, truly a disease of the tongue': **Lucian, Lis** 11
- Λίαν εὐχερεῖς 'exceedingly reckless': **Philo, Heres** 81 (καταγέλαστοι καὶ—)
- Λίαν ὀλίγωροι 'exceedingly careless': **Dem. Epist.** 3. 37
- Ἀναίσθητε κάλλους 'unappreciative of beauty': **Ach.** 1. 14. 2 (πονηρὲ καὶ ἀχάριστε καὶ—)
- Καὶ ληστῶν ἀγριώτερε 'even more savage than bandits': **Ach.** 5. 25. 7
- Μιάς γυναικὸς προσφιλονεικούσα πολέμῳ 'persisting in war against one woman': **Char.** 5. 1. 4 (Τύχη βάσκανε καὶ—)

Appendix B

- Χιλιάρχων ἄριστε καὶ φονεὺ ὅπόσων ἂν ἐθέλῃς 'best of officers and murderer of however many you please': **Lucian**, *Dial. Meret.* 13. 4
- Ψευδοπάρθενε καὶ μισάδελφε καὶ ἀναξία τῶν προγόνων 'you who pretend to be a virgin, hate your brother, and are unworthy of your ancestors': **Dion. Hal.** III. 21. 6
- Πάντων ἀνδρῶν ἥδη μάλιστα ἀπ' ἔργων ἀνοσιωτάτων τὸν βίον κτησάμενε 'of all men the one who has most got his living from extremely unholy deeds': **Hdt.** VIII. 106. 3
- Τὸ κάλλιστον ἐν Πέρσαις ὄνομα Κύρου καταισχύνων 'you who shame the noblest name among the Persians, that of Cyrus': **Plut.** *Art.* 9. 1 (—, ἀδικώτατε ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀφρονέστατε)
- Μάτην πολλὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλησποντίαν πονηθεὶς γέφυραν . . . 'having toiled in vain to build a bridge across the Hellespont': **Plut.** *Mor.* 329e (βάρβαρε Σέρξη καὶ ἀνόητε καὶ—)
- Κυνοπρόσωπε καὶ σινδόσιν ἐσταλμένε Αἰγύπτιε 'dog-faced and linen-clad Egyptian': **Lucian**, *DC* 10
- Γναθωνίδη, γυπῶν ἀπάντων βορώτατε 'Gnathonides, most rapacious of all vultures': **Lucian**, *Tim.* 46 (—καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιτριπτότατε)
- Λέγων εὐχερῶς ὅ τι ἂν βουληθῇς 'saying glibly whatever you wish': **Dem.** 18. 70
- Βλασφημῶν περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ λέγων ὥς . . . 'speaking evil about me and saying that . . .': **Dem.** 18. 82
- Πρὸς μὲν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ σπουδαῖα τῶν ἔργων ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀχρηστότατε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τόλμαν θαυμασιώτατε 'most useless of all men for great and serious deeds, but most wonderfully daring in words': **Aeschin.** *Ktes.* 152
- Μηδενὸς ἀποσχόμενος τῶν χαλεπωτάτων, λόγῳ τε καὶ ἔργῳ πανουργότατε ἀνθρώπων Ὀδυσσεύ 'Odysseus refraining from no atrocity, in word and deed the wickedest of men': **Dio Chrys.** 59. 9
- Μάτην ἐπὶ τῷ φρονεῖν εὐλογούμενοι, θηρίον ὥς ἀληθῶς φαῦλον, ἄνθρωποι 'you humans, who are praised in vain for thought but are really like a vile beast': (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 22
- Παραχρῆμα δίκην ὑφέζοντες 'about to be punished at once': **Joseph.** *AJ* 7. 50 (κάκιστοι καὶ—)
- Γνώμης ἀμαρτάνοντες τῆς ἀρίστης 'missing the best judgement': **Dion. Hal.** VII. 46. 6
- Οὐδὲ πολίται ταύτης ἄξιοι λέγεσθαι τῆς γῆς 'unworthy even to be called citizens of this earth': **Dion. Hal.** X. 29. 2 (σχέτλιοι ὑμεῖς καὶ—)

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SINGULAR ETHNICS (42) (See text, pp. 174-7)

(Not including those combined with *ξένε*, for which see section on *ξένε*, pp. 283-4; for plural ethnics, see generic terms, pp. 293-8)

- > general or ruler, negative and/or by an enemy or superior: **Hdt.** IV. 127. 1 (*Πέρσα*), VII. 12. 2 (*Πέρσα*); **Xen.** *Cyr.* II. 4. 31 (*Ἀρμένιε*), III. 1. 5 (*Ἀρμένιε*), III. 1. 9 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 1. 13 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 1. 31 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 1. 37 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 1. 40 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 2. 19 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 2. 20 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 2. 28 (*Ἀρμένιε*), 2. 29 (*Ἰνδέ*), IV. 5. 23 (*Υρκάνιε*); (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 220b (*Λάκων*); **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 25. 1 (*Λίβυ*), 29. 1 (*Κάρ*) [note also **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 29. 3, *Καρῶν ἀνδραποδωδέστατε*]
- > ordinary citizen, negative and/or by a social superior: **Xen.** *Cyr.* VIII. 3. 40 (*Σάκα*), 3. 42 (*Σάκα*), 3. 44 (*Σάκα*), 3. 47 (*Σάκα*); **Plut.** *Them.* 29. 2(?) (*ὄφισ Ἑλλήν ὁ ποικίλος*), *Mor.* 221e (*Ἡλείε*), 233b (*Λάκων*), 234e (*Λάκων*), 236e (*Λάκων*); **Lucian**, *BA* 34 (*Σύρε*), *Dial. Mort.* 22. 7 (*Ἀκαρνάν*), 29. 1 (*Σινωπεῦ*)
- > ordinary citizen; neutral: **Plato**, *Symp.* 172a (*Φαληρεὺς ... οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος*); **Xen.** *Hell.* VII. 1. 13(?) (*Λακεδαιμόνιε Τιμόκρατες*), **Plut.** *Lyc.* 22. 8 (*Λάκων*), *Mor.* 151c (*Ναυκρατίτα*); **Lucian**, *Herc.* 8 (*Τήϊε ποιητά*)
- social superior > slave or servant: **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 3. 9 (*Σάκα*), *Symp.* 2. 16 (*Συρακόσιε*), 4. 52 (*Συρακόσιε*), 7. 2 (*Συρακόσιε*); **Lucian**, *Lex.* 3 (*Ἀττικίων*)
- man > wife; friendly: **Xen.** *Cyr.* III. 1. 41 (*Ἀρμενία*)
- > god, not respectful: **Lucian**, *DC* 10 (*κυνοπρόσωπε καὶ σινδόσιν ἐσταλμένε Αἰγύπτιε*), *Dial. Mort.* 1. 4 (*Λάκων*) [note also *Iupp. Trag.* 11, *Ῥοδίων ἄριστε*]

GENERIC AND OCCUPATIONAL TERMS (See text, pp. 177-84)

Generic addresses by race or nationality

ἄνδρες 'men' with an ethnic

ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι 'Athenian men' (1038)

Hdt. VIII. 140a 1, IX. 45. 1, 60. 1; **Plato**, *Apol.* 17a, 17b, 17c, 18a, 18c, 18e, 19c, 20c, 20d, 20e, 21c, 22a, 22d, 22e, 24a, 24c, 26a, 26e, 28a, 28d (*bis*), 29d, 30b, 30c, 30d, 31d, 32a, 32e, 33c (*bis*), 34d (*bis*), 35b, 35c, 35d, 35e, 36b, 36d (*bis*), 37a, 37c, 37d, 38b, 38c, 38d; **Thuc.** I. 53. 2; **Xen.** *Hell.* I. 7. 16, 7. 20, 7. 23, 7. 33, III. 5. 8, 5. 10, 5. 15, VI. 5. 37, 5. 38, 5. 45, VII. 1. 2, 1. 12, *Mem.* IV. 2. 4, 2. 5; **Aeschin.** *Tim.* 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41, 51, 69, 70, 82, 83, 85, 89, 93, 109, 110, 111, 112, 120, 121, 141, 153, 156,

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- ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι 'Athenian (men)' (5)
Lycurg. Leocr. 29. 110; **Lys.** 34. 1, 3, 11; **Plut. Mor.** 6d
- ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι 'Lacedaemonian men' (18)
Hdt. VII. 135. 2; **Xen. An.** VII. 6. 40, *Hell.* III. 2. 7, V. 2. 12 (—τε καὶ σύμμαχοι), 2. 14, 2. 18 (—τε καὶ σύμμαχοι), 2. 33, VI. 1. 4, 1. 14, 3. 4, 3. 7, 3. 10, VII. 4. 8; **Polyb.** IX. 28. 1, 32. 3, 38. 2, 39. 6; **Plut. Mor.** 3a
- ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες 'Greek men' (14)
Hdt. IV. 158. 3, VII. 158. 1, 172. 2, IX. 82. 3; **Xen. An.** I. 7. 3, II. 3. 18, 5. 38, III. 3. 2, 5. 5; **Aeschin. Ktes.** 117; **Dio Chrys.** 12. 55; **Plut. Luc.** 41. 2; **Char.** 7. 3, 8. 2, 13
- ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι 'Roman men' (14)
Polyb. VII. 3. 8, XXI. 21. 1, 23. 1, XXX. 31. 12; **Dion. Hal.** III. 8. 2, 24. 6, 28. 1, IV. 9. 4, 60. 2, 61. 2, VI. 9. 3, XIX. 13. 3; **Joseph. BJ** 3. 472; **Plut. Fab.** 3. 5
- ἄνδρες Συρακόσιοι 'Syracusan men' (12)
Diod. Sic. 13. 20. 1, 20. 5, 21. 4, 21. 8, 23. 1, 28. 2, 28. 3, 29. 1, 32. 6; **Char.** (spelled Συρρακούσιοι) 3. 4. 16, 8. 7. 12, 8. 8. 7
- ἄνδρες Πέρσαι 'Persian men' (10)
Hdt. I. 126. 5, VII. 8a 1, 13. 2, VIII. 118. 3; **Xen. Cyr.** II. 1. 15, III. 2. 6, 3. 41, IV. 1. 2, 2. 21 (—καὶ Μῆδοι), VIII. 5. 22
- ἄνδρες Νικομηδεῖς 'Nicomedian men' (9)
Dio Chrys. 38. 1, 5 (*bis*), 7, 21, 29, 30, 38, 44
- ἄνδρες Ἴωνες 'Ionian men' (8)
Hdt. IV. 98. 2, 133. 2, 136. 3, V. 109. 1, VI. 9. 3, 11. 2, VIII. 22. 1, IX. 98. 3
- ἄνδρες Ῥόδιοι 'Rhodian men' (8)
Dio Chrys. 31. 1, 4, 8, 68, 90, 122, 154, 159
- ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι 'Peloponnesian men' (6)
Thuc. I. 53. 4, II. 11. 1 (—καὶ ξύμμαχοι), 87. 1, IV. 126. 1, V. 9. 1; **Plut. Dion.** 43. 2 (—καὶ σύμμαχοι)
- ἄνδρες Αἰγινῆται 'Aeginetan men' (5)
Hdt. VI. 85. 2; **Isoc.** 19. 1, 13, 14, 34
- ἄνδρες Αἰτωλοὶ 'Aetolian men' (3)
Polyb. XI. 4. 1, 4. 6, XX. 10. 4
- ἄνδρες Ἀλβανοί 'Alban men' (3)
Dion. Hal. III. 11. 1 (Φουφέττιε καὶ ὑμεῖς—), 29. 2, 30. 3

Appendix B

ἄνδρες Ταρσεῖς 'men of Tarsus' (3)

Dio Chrys. 33. 57, 34. 1, 7, 37

ἄνδρες Δελφοί 'Delphian men' (2)

Lucian, *Phal.* 2. 1, 10

ἄνδρες Θηβαῖοι 'Theban men' (2)

Hdt. IX. 87. 1; **Plut.** *Mor.* 542c

ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς 'Plataean men' (2)

Thuc. II. 72. 1, 73. 3

ἄνδρες Σκύθαι 'Scythian men' (2)

Hdt. IV. 3. 3, 139. 2

ἄνδρες Σπαρτιῆ(ᾶ)ται 'Spartiate men' (2)

Hdt. IX. 26. 7; **Plut.** *Alc.* 14. 8

ἄνδρες Ταραντῖνοι 'Tarantine men' (2)

Dion. Hal. XIX. 5. 4; **Plut.** *Pyrrh.* 13. 8

Terms occurring only once:

ἄνδρες Ἀλεξανδρεῖς: **Dio Chrys.** 32. 86

ἄνδρες Ἀμφικτύονες: **Aeschin.** *Ktes.* 119

ἄνδρες Ἀργεῖοι: **Hdt.** VII. 150. 2

ἄνδρες Ἀσσύριοι: **Xen.** *Cyr.* III. 3. 44

ἄνδρες Ἀχαιοί: **Plut.** *Tit.* 17. 8

ἄνδρες Βοιωτοί: **Thuc.** IV. 92. 1

ἄνδρες . . . Ἐφέσιοι: **Ach.** 7. 9. 2

ἄνδρες Ἡλείοι: **Lucian**, *Demon.* 58

ἄνδρες Θεσσαλοί: **Hdt.** IX. 89. 3

ἄνδρες Ἰλιεῖς: **Dio Chrys.** 11. 4

ἄνδρες Ἰουδαῖοι: **Joseph.** *AJ* 11. 169

ἄνδρες Κροτωνιῆται: **Hdt.** III. 137. 2

ἄνδρες Μακεδόνες: **Polyb.** XV. 26. 3

ἄνδρες Μεσσήνιοι: **Dem.** 6. 20

ἄνδρες Μοσσύνοικοι: **Xen.** *An.* V. 4. 5

ἄνδρες Μῆδοι: **Xen.** *Cyr.* V. 1. 20 (—τε καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες)

ἄνδρες Παῖονες: **Hdt.** V. 98. 2

ἄνδρες Προυσαεῖς: **Dio Chrys.** 43. 15

ἄνδρες Σαυνίται: **Dion. Hal.** XV. 7. 2

ἄνδρες Σινωπεῖς: **Xen.** *An.* V. 5. 13

ἄνδρες Τυρρηνοί: **Dion. Hal.** V. 5. 1

ἄνδρες Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι εἴθ' ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπη χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι:

Plato, *Euthd.* 288a

Ethnic without ἄνδρες

(Not including singular ethnics, for which see p. 293)

Ἀθηναῖοι 'Athenians' (104)

Hdt. I. 60. 5, VI. 86a 1, 86δ, VIII. 140β 1; **Thuc.** I. 32. 1, 140. 1, IV. 17. 1,

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18. 5, 95. 1, V. 112. 2, VI. 11. 5, 16. 1, 20. 1, VII. 11. 1, 77. 1 (—καὶ ξύμμαχοι); **Xen. Hell.** I. 7. 24, 7. 29, VII. 1. 37; **Aeschin. Ep.** 6; **Andoc. Myst.** 11, 91, 137, **Kath.** 6, 17, 22, 24, **Lac.** 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 17, 21, 25, 28, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41 (*bis*), **Alc.** 36; **Din. Dem.** 1, 2, 3, 14, 22, 28, 40, 53, 66, 67, 72, 76, 77, 78, 84, 85 (*bis*), 88, 92, 93, 99, 105, 110, 113, **Ar.** 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, **Phil.** 3, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22; **Lycurg. Leocr.** 1. 1, 2. 5, 5. 15, 6. 16, 12. 51, 37. 150; **Lys.** 1. 6, 7. 6, 50; **Dem.** 8. 31, 37, 19. 69; **Plut. Alex.** 60. 6, **Mor.** 215c; **Lucian, Demon.** 57 [note also **Thuc.** VII. 61. 1, *ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων*]
- Λακεδαιμόνιοι** 'Lacedaemonians, Spartans' (33)
Hdt. I. 69. 2, V. 92a 1, 92η 4, VI. 106. 2, IX. 11. 1, 26. 6, 27. 6, 48. 1; **Plato, Laws** 682e, 696a; **Thuc.** I. 68. 1, 69. 4, 71. 1, 75. 1, 76. 1, 80. 1, 86. 5, 87. 2, II. 71. 2, III. 9. 1 (—καὶ ξύμμαχοι), 13. 1 (—καὶ ξύμμαχοι), 53. 1, 54. 5, 57. 4, 59. 1, 59. 4, 67. 1, 67. 6, VI. 92. 1, 92. 5; **Xen. An.** VII. 6. 9, **Hell.** IV. 1. 32 (*πάντες οἱ παρόντες*—); **Plut. Mor.** 219b
- Πέρσαι** 'Persians' (16)
Hdt. I. 125. 2, III. 65. 1, 65. 6, 127. 2, 128. 4, 151. 2, IV. 132. 3, V. 18. 3, 20. 4, VII. 53. 1; **Xen. Cyr.** II. 3. 8 (*πάντες οἱ παρόντες*—), III. 3. 20 (*οἱ ἄλλοι*—), IV. 5. 22, VIII. 5. 23, 5. 25; **Plut. Art.** 29. 12
- Ῥωμαῖοι** 'Romans' (9)
Dion. Hal. X. 22. 6, XII. 13. 2; **Joseph. Af** 19. 167; **Plut. Cam.** 17. 4, **Crass.** 26. 6, **Cic.** 44. 4, **Pyrrh.** 19. 1, **Num.** 5. 8, **Sull.** 21. 3
- Μῆδοι** 'Medes' (7)
Xen. Cyr. III. 2. 5, IV. 2. 21, 5. 1, 5. 10, 5. 20, 5. 53, V. 1. 28
- Υρκάνιοι** 'Hyrceanians' (6)
Xen. Cyr. IV. 2. 13, 2. 20, 2. 21, 2. 23, 5. 2, 5. 52
- Δελφοί** 'Delphians' (6)
Lucian, Phal. 1 1 (*bis*), 5, 9, 13, 14
- Σπαρτιάται** 'Spartiates' (4)
Plut. Arist. 12. 2, **Lyc.** 3. 6, **Lys.** 25. 4, **Mor.** 229d
- Θηβαῖοι** 'Thebans' (3)
Xen. Hell. VII. 3. 7; **Dem.** 18. 40; **Plut. Mor.** 221a
- Καμαριναῖοι** 'Camarinians' (3)
Thuc. VI. 76. 1, 78. 4, 87. 1
- Συρακόσιοι** 'Syracusans' (3)
Thuc. VII. 66. 1; **Plato, Epist.** VIII. 355a; **Char.** 3. 4. 9 (*Συρρακούσιοι*)
- Χαλδαῖοι** 'Chaldaeans' (3)
Xen. Cyr. III. 2. 17, 2. 20, 2. 28
- Φωκέες** 'Phocians' (3)
Hdt. VIII. 29. 1, IX. 17. 4, 18. 3
- Ἀρμένιοι** 'Armenians' (2)
Xen. Cyr. III. 2. 5, IV. 5. 1
- Ούολοῦσκοι** 'Volscians' (2)
Dion. Hal. VI. 16. 1, VIII. 10. 1

Terms occurring only once:

- Αἰγύπτιοι: **Dio Chrys.** 37. 45
 Ἀκάνθιοι: **Thuc.** IV. 85. 1
 Ἀργεῖοι: **Xen. Hell.** IV. 4. 10
 Βαβυλώνιοι: **Hdt.** III. 156. 3
 Γαλιλαῖοι: **Joseph. Vit.** 258
 Ἕλληνες: **Xen. An.** I. 5. 16 (οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ παρόντες —)
 Θετταλοὶ: **Dem.** 18. 40
 Καδούσιοι: **Xen. Cyr.** V. 4. 22
 Κορίνθιοι: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 221f
 Λάκωνες: (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 235b
 Λατῖνοι: **Dion. Hal.** V. 54. 5
 Μιλήσιοι: **Xen. Hell.** I. 6. 8
 Ῥόδιοι: **Plut. Mor.** 840e
 Σικελιώται: **Thuc.** IV. 59. 1
 Σινωπεῖς: **Xen. An.** V. 6. 12
 Σκύθαι: **Hdt.** IV. 79. 4
 Ταριχεᾶται: **Joseph. BJ** 2. 606
 Τιβεριεῖς: **Joseph. Vit.** 302
 [Note also **Thuc.** III. 30. 1, Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιάς; **Joseph. AJ** 4. 127, Βαλακέ . . . καὶ Μαδιηνιτῶν οἱ παρόντες; **Lucian, Dial. Mort.** 3. 2, κάκιστοι Λυδῶν καὶ Φρυγῶν καὶ Ἀσσυρίων]

Tribal, gentile, or caste names:

- Ἄνδρες Λεωντίδαι 'men of the tribe of Leontis': **Dem.** 58. 18 (text uncertain)
 Ἄνδρες Ὀράτιοι 'Horatii': **Dion. Hal.** III. 16. 2
 Ἑβραῖοι 'Hebrews': **Joseph. AJ** 3. 84
 Ἄνδρες . . . Ἰσραηλῖται 'Israelite men': **Joseph. AJ** 3. 189
 Μάγοι 'magi': **Hdt.** I. 120. 4

Occupational terms

Terms identifying the addressees by temporary or permanent civil status or office

- Ἄνδρες δικασταί 'jurymen' (801)
Plato, Apol. 26d, 40a, 40e, 41b, 41c, *Symp.* 219c, *Grg.* 522c; **Aeschin. Tim.** 78, 164, *Par.* 24, 54, 102, 129; **Andoc. Myst.** 136; **Antiph. Her.** 84, *Chor.* 1, *Tetr.* 2. 2. 2; **Din. Dem.** 47, 48, 80; **Isae. Pyr.** 1, *Nik.* 30, *Ast.* 16, 37, *Ar.* 25, *Euph.* 1, 3, 5 (*bis*), 6 (*bis*), 8, 9 (*bis*), 10 (*bis*), 11, 12 (*bis*); **Lycurg. Leocr.** 19. 80, 20. 85, 24. 100, 30. 116; **Isoc.** 17. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 21 (*bis*), 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 45, 48, 51, 53, 18. 21; **Lys.** 5. 1, 6. 33, 9. 3, 10. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 15, 20, 21, 28, 29, 30 (*bis*), 12. 1, 3, 11, 24, 34, 37, 49, 71, 74, 13. 1, 3, 31, 39, 44,

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<ἄνδρες> δικάσται 'jury(men)' (4)

Lys. 19. 34, 32. 24, 26, 28

Δικάσται 'jurors': **Lucian**, *Lis* 5, 11

[Δικάζοντες] 'jurors': **Antiph.** *Pharm.* 7

Φωνήεντα δικάσται 'vowels of the jury': **Lucian**, *Lis* 2, 10

ἄνδρες πολῖται 'citizens' (14)

Xen. *Hell.* II. 4. 13, 4. 20, VII. 1. 30, 3. 6; **Antiph.** *Tetr.* 2. 1. 1; **Dion.** *Hal.*

IV. 9. 1, 77. 1, 79. 1, XI. 52. 1, XIX. 8. 2; **Dio Chrys.** 40. 1, 44. 1, 45. 1; **Plut.**

Crass. 12. 5

[ἄνδρες] πολῖται 'citizens': **Dion. Hal.** V. 10. 2

Πολῖται 'citizens' (20)

Xen. Cyr. VIII. 5. 24; **Dion. Hal.** V. 10. 7, VI. 9. 1, 40. 1, 43. 3, 71. 3, IX. 10. 3 (—τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοὶ τύχης), 29. 1, 29. 3, X. 7. 2, 9. 4, 29. 2, 37. 4; **Joseph. Vit.** 135, 278; **Plut. M. Cato** 8. 1, **Pomp.** 23. 2, **Sull.** 41. 5 (φίλοι—), **Mor.** 225f, 226a

ἄνδρες βουλευταί 'men of the council/senate' (5)

Xen. Hell. II. 3. 24; **Andoc. Kath.** 14; **Lys.** 26. 21; **Dion. Hal.** IV. 30. 7, XI. 6. 3

Βουλευταί 'senators': **Dion. Hal.** VII. 55. 1

Βουλὴ 'council/senate' (106)

Xen. Hell. II. 3. 51; **Lys.** 3. 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, 28, 35, 40, 4. 1, 12, 18, 19, 7. 1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 27, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 16. 1, 3, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24. 1, 3 (bis), 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 21, 22, 23, 26, 31. 1, 8, 33; **Dem.** 21. 116, 51. 1; **Dion. Hal.** IV. 33. 1, 35. 3, 36. 1, V. 72. 1, VI. 35. 1, 37. 2, 38. 1, 49. 3, 61. 2, 66. 1, 68. 1, 86. 4, VII. 22. 1, 22. 4, 40. 1, 41. 1, 41. 4, 43. 1, 45. 2 (bis), 48. 1, 48. 4, 51. 1, 52. 5, 52. 8, 55. 5, 57. 1, IX. 53. 3, 53. 7, X. 10. 1, 10. 7, 11. 2, 11. 5, 12. 4, 13. 1, 13. 4, 51. 1, 51. 2, 51. 4, XI. 7. 1, 8. 1, 14. 4, 15. 3, 15. 5, 16. 2, 21. 4; **Dio Chrys.** 41. 1; **Joseph. AJ** 19. 242

ἄνδρες δημόται 'common people': **Xen. Cyr.** II. 3. 15

Δημόται 'plebeians' (36)

Dion. Hal. IV. 11. 5, 78. 1, 79. 3, 81. 2, 82. 2, 82. 4, 83. 4, VI. 71. 1, 71. 3, 71. 4, 72. 3, 79. 1, 83. 3, 83. 5, 85. 2, 85. 3, 86. 5, 88. 1, VII. 16. 5, 28. 1, 29. 3, 30. 2, 31. 3, 32. 2, 36. 3, 52. 7, 63. 1, 63. 2, IX. 32. 2, 32. 5, X. 7. 6, 36. 3, 37. 1, 37. 4, 39. 2, XI. 32. 3

ἄνδρες . . . δημοτικοί 'plebeian men': **Dion. Hal.** XII. 2. 7

ἄνδρες πατέρες 'fathers, senators': **Dion. Hal.** V. 27. 1

Πατέρες 'fathers, senators' (11)

Dion. Hal. VII. 22. 1, 41. 5, 43. 2, 44. 2, 44. 4, 46. 3, X. 11. 1, 29. 3, XI. 18. 3, 19. 2, 20. 6

Συγκλητικέ 'senator': **Epict.** IV. 1. 9 (βέλτιστε—)

Ἐφοροί 'overseers' (Spartan elders) (2)

Hdt. IX. 9. 2 (ἄνδρες ἔφοροι); (**Plut.**) **Mor.** 215c

Πρύτανι 'chairman': **Thuc.** VI. 14

Πρόεδρε 'chairman': **Ach.** 8. 8. 7, 8. 9. 9

Δήμαρχοι 'tribunes of the plebs' (5)

Dion. Hal. VII. 16. 5, 38. 3, 61. 2, X. 4. 2, 39. 3

ἄνδρες πρέσβεις 'ambassadors': **Dem.** 19. 22

Πρέσβεις 'ambassadors': **Dion. Hal.** VI. 32. 2, 82. 3

Ὑμεῖς τε οἱ συμπρέσβεις 'and you, fellow-ambassadors': **Joseph. Vit.** 256 (Ἰωνάθη—)

ἄνδρες σύνεδροι 'senators': **Joseph. AJ** 14. 172

Σύνεδροι 'senators': **Dion. Hal.** IV. 47. 3, 47. 5

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- Πατρίκιοι 'patricians': **Dion. Hal.** VI. 45. 3, 77. 3, 79. 1
 Ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ἄνδρες 'men from the city': **Xen. Hell.** II. 4. 40
 Προστάται τῆς πόλεως 'leaders of the city': **Dion. Hal.** X. 28. 4 (καλοὶ καὶ γενναῖοι—)
 Ὑμεῖς οἱ προεστηκότες τῆς πόλεως 'you, the leaders of the city': **Dion. Hal.** XI. 14. 4 (βούλη καὶ—)
 Ἄρχοντες οἱ παραδεξάμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπ' ἀρχῆς 'rulers who accepted such things from the beginning': **Dio Chrys.** 7. 140 (σοφοὶ νομοθέται καὶ—)
 (For high civil ranks such as βασιλεῦ, see titles, pp. 271-4)

Terms identifying the addressees by military position

- Ἄνδρες σ(ξ)ύμμαχοι 'allied men' (20)
Hdt. V. 91. 2, VIII. 24. 2, IX. 21. 2; **Thuc.** I. 120. 1, 124. 2, V. 9. 9; **Xen. Cyr.** V. 3. 30, 4. 19, VI. 1. 6, 1. 7, 1. 11, 2. 14, 2. 25, VII. 5. 7, **Hell.** IV. 2. 3, 2. 11; **Philo, Prob.** 139; **Plut. Sert.** 16. 9, **Pel.** 33. 7; **Char.** 7. 3. 2
 Σ(Ξ)ύμμαχοι 'allies' (13)
Thuc. II. 11. 1 (ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ—), III. 9. 1 (Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ—), 13. 1 (Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ—), VII. 66. 1 (Συρακόσιοι καὶ—), 77. 1 (Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ—); **Xen. Cyr.** IV. 5. 37 (ἄνδρες φίλοι τε καὶ—), VI. 4. 13 (ἄνδρες φίλοι καὶ—), VII. 5. 42 (ἄνδρες φίλοι καὶ—), 5. 72 (ἄνδρες φίλοι καὶ—), **Hell.** V. 2. 12 (ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι τε καὶ—), 2. 18 (ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι τε καὶ—); **Dion. Hal.** III. 28. 1 (ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι τε καὶ ἄλλοι φίλοι καὶ—); **Plut. Dion.** 43. 2 (ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ—) [note also **Thuc.** VII. 61. 1, ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων]
 Ἄνδρες στρατιῶται 'soldiers' (15)
Thuc. II. 89. 1, VII. 61. 1 (—Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων), 77. 7; **Xen. An.** I. 3. 3, 3. 9, III. 2. 2, V. 4. 19, 5. 8, VI. 3. 12, 4. 12, 6. 12, VII. 1. 25, **Hell.** V. 1. 14, 1. 16; **Dion. Hal.** IX. 9. 1 (—τε καὶ ἡγεμόνες)
 Στρατιῶται 'soldiers' (4)
Dion. Hal. VI. 6. 3 (ἄνδρες λοχαγοὶ τε καὶ—), IX. 9. 5 (ταξίαρχοι τε καὶ λοχαγοὶ καὶ—); **Plut. Fab.** 12. 3; **Lucian, Zeux.** 11
 Ἄνδρες συστρατιῶται 'fellow-soldiers' (4)
Joseph. AJ 4. 177 (—καὶ τῆς μακρᾶς κοινωνοὶ ταλαιπωρίας), **BJ** 2. 211; **Plut. Fab.** 13. 2; **Char.** 8. 2. 10 (—καὶ φίλοι)
 Συστρατιῶται 'fellow-soldiers' (11)
Dion. Hal. X. 45. 5; **Joseph. BJ** 3. 494, 6. 34; **Plut. Luc.** 28. 4, **Cor.** 11. 1, **Brut.** 50. 7, **Gal.** 22. 6, 27. 5, **Oth.** 15. 4, **Mor.** 203b; **Char.** 1. 10. 2
 Ἄνδρες στρατηγοὶ 'generals' (3)
Xen. An. II. 1. 9, III. 1. 34 (—καὶ λοχαγοί), VI. 5. 9
 Ἡγεμόνες 'leaders': **Dion. Hal.** IX. 9. 1 (ἄνδρες στρατιῶταί τε καὶ—)
 Ἱππεῖς 'cavalry': **Xen. Cyr.** III. 2. 5; **Lucian, Nav.** 31
 Ἄνδρες λοχαγοὶ 'company-commanders, centurions' (2)
Xen. An. III. 1. 15; **Dion. Hal.** VI. 6. 3 (—τε καὶ στρατιῶται)

Appendix B

Λοχαγοί 'company-commanders, centurions' (3)

Xen. An. III. 1. 34 (ἄνδρες στρατηγοὶ καὶ—); **Dion. Hal.** III. 23. 6 (ἄνδρες ταξίαρχοι καὶ—), IX. 9. 5 (ταξίαρχοί τε καὶ—καὶ στρατιῶται)

Ταξίαρχε 'squadron-commander': **Xen. Cyr.** II. 2. 16

Ἄνδρες ταξίαρχοι 'squadron-commanders': **Dion. Hal.** III. 23. 6 (—καὶ λοχαγοί)

Ταξίαρχοι 'squadron-commanders': **Dion. Hal.** IX. 9. 5 (—τε καὶ λοχαγοὶ καὶ στρατιῶται)

Ξεναγέ 'commander of mercenaries': **Lucian, Dial. Meret.** 9. 4

Ἄνδρες . . . οἱ φύλακές μου καὶ προπομποί 'my guards and escorts': **Philo, Flacc.** 157

Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι παρέσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατίας 'as many of us Peloponnesians as are present as leaders of the army': **Thuc.** III. 30. 1

[Note also **Lucian, Dial. Meret.** 13. 4, χιλίαρχων ἄριστε καὶ φονεὺ ὁπόσων ἂν ἐθέλῃς]

(For high military ranks such as στρατηγέ, see titles, pp. 271–4)

Other occupational terms

Ἄγγελε 'messenger' (3)

Xen. Cyr. IV. 5. 20 (—τε καὶ Μῆδοι), 5. 22; **Epict.** III. 22. 38 (κύριε ἄγγελε καὶ κατάσκοπε)

Βουκόλε 'cowherd': **Lucian, DI** 7

Γραμματεὺ 'scribe, clerk' (7)

orator > clerk of the court: **Dem.** 19. 270, 42. 29; **Lycurg. Leocr.** 11. 36, 18. 77, 30. 114, 30. 118, 30. 120

Δανειστά 'money-lender': **Philo, Spec.** II. 75

Διδάσκαλε 'teacher' (4)

Plut. Mor. 1146d (ἀγαθέ—); **Lucian, Gall.** 10, *Asin.* 10 (*bis*) [note also **Plut. Mor.** 739d, βέλτιστε διδασκάλων]

Τέρεια 'priestess': **Lucian, Pisc.** 47

Τερεὺ 'priest' (4)

Ach. 8. 5. 9, 8. 8. 6 (σεμνότατε καὶ κοσμιώτατε—), 8. 8. 7, 8. 8. 11

Ἱππεὺ 'rider': **Ach.** 1. 13. 5 (—καὶ νυμφίε), 1. 13. 5 (—δὲ δυστυχές)

Καμινεὺ 'furnace-worker, potter': **Diod. Sic.** 20. 63. 5 (κεραμεὺ καὶ—)

Κατάσκοπε 'scout': **Epict.** III. 22. 38 (κύριε ἄγγελε καὶ—)

Κεραμεὺ 'potter' (3)

Diod. Sic. 20. 63. 5 (—καὶ καμινεὺ); **Plut. Mor.** 176e, 458e

Μάρτυρες 'witnesses' (9)

Isae. Ast. 28; **Isoc.** 17. 41; **Lys.** 1. 29, 42, 7. 10, 13. 64, 16. 17, 32. 18, 27

Νομοθέτα 'lawgiver' (11)

Plato, Laws 648a, 649a, 663a (φίλε—), 690d, 719a, 719c; **Philo, Spec.** II. 247 (γενναῖοι νομοθέται), III. 166 (σεμνοὶ νομοθέται); **Dio Chrys.** 7. 140 (σοφοὶ νομοθέται καὶ ἄρχοντες οἱ παραδεξάμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπ' ἀρχῆς . . .);

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- Epict.** II. 1. 25 (φίλτατοι νομοθέται); (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 28 (νεώτερε χρόνε καὶ τῶν ξένων ἡδονῶν—)
- Νομοφύλακες 'guardians of the laws': **Plato**, *Laws* 810c (πάντων βέλτιστοι—)
- Νυμφίε 'bridegroom': **Ach.** 1. 13. 5 (ἵππευ καὶ—), 1. 13. 5 (—μὲν ἀτελής)
- Παιδαγωγέ 'pedagogue': **Char.** 5. 10. 5
- Ποιητά 'poet': **Lucian**, *Herc.* 8 (Τῆϊε—) [note also **Dio Chrys.** 12. 73, σοφώτατε τῶν ποιητῶν Ὅμηρε]
- Πορθμεύ 'ferryman' (11)
- Lucian**, *Cat.* 5, 13, *Cont.* 1, 2, 5, 16, 22, 23 (*bis*), *Dial. Mort.* 14. 1, 20. 10
- Σοφιστά 'sophist': **Xen.** *Symp.* 4. 5
- Σωτῆρες νόμων 'guardians of the laws': **Plato**, *Laws* 770b (φίλοι—)
- Τεχνίτα 'craftsman': **Philo**, *Cher.* 53
- Τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελητά 'person in charge of children': **Plato**, *Laws* 809b (ἄριστε—)
- Φιλόσοφε 'philosopher' (11)
- Plut.** *Mor.* 503b; **Epict.** I. 29. 22, II. 9. 17, II. 19. 18, 20. 22, 20. 24, 20. 26, III. 23. 9, IV. 1. 132, 1. 142; (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 23 (σεμνοὶ φιλόσοφοι) [note also **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 41, γενναιότατε φιλοσόφων Τιμόκλεις]
- Χοραγέ 'chorus-leader': (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 219e
- [Note also **Joseph.** *Vit.* 340, Ὑοῦστε δεινότατε συγγραφέων; **Dio Chrys.** 12. 50, βέλτιστε καὶ ἄριστε τῶν δημιουργῶν; **Lucian**, *Nav.* 14, ναυκλήρων ἄριστε]

Other descriptive addresses for humans

Ἄνδρες 'men' alone (524)

Plato, *Apol.* 17c, 18b, 19e, 21a, 22b, 23a, 27a, 27b, 29a, 29b, 31a, 34a, 34b, 35b, 38a, 39a, 39e, 41e, *Phd.* 60b, 107c, 115c, *Symp.* 176a, 212e, 213e, 214a, 215a, 215d, 217b, 218b, 220e, 222a, *Lach.* 187b, 201a, *Prot.* 358b, *Laws* 715e; **Thuc.** VI. 68. 1; **Xen.** *Cyr.* I. 5. 11, II. 2. 1, 2. 18, 2. 23, 2. 30, 3. 12, 4. 20, III. 3. 30, 3. 34, IV. 1. 10, 2. 37, 2. 41, 4. 10, 5. 15, 5. 44, V. 3. 31, 4. 49, VI. 1. 12, 2. 20, 2. 23, 3. 16, 3. 21, 4. 16, VII. 1. 10 (*bis*), 1. 11, 1. 12, 1. 13, 1. 14, 4. 5, 5. 40, 5. 85, VIII. 1. 1, 4. 36, *An.* I. 4. 14, 4. 16, 7. 6, II. 2. 3, III. 1. 29, 1. 43, 1. 46, 2. 4, 2. 9, 2. 26, 2. 34, 4. 46, 5. 8, IV. 8. 14, V. 1. 2, 1. 3, 6. 20, 6. 22, 6. 28, 7. 5, 8. 13, VI. 1. 26, 1. 31, 1. 32, 2. 4, 4. 17, 5. 14, 5. 21, 5. 23, 6. 17, VII. 3. 3, 3. 10, 3. 35, 3. 43, 6. 20, 6. 41, *Symp.* 1. 12, 2. 9, 2. 23, 2. 24, 3. 1, 3. 2, 4. 8, 4. 25, 4. 34, 8. 1, 9. 2, *Ap.* 11, 15, 24, *Hell.* II. 3. 35, 3. 52, 4. 9, 4. 17, 4. 42, III. 1. 28, IV. 6. 2, 8. 4, 8. 38, V. 1. 18, 2. 30, VI. 5. 35, VII. 3. 11, 4. 25, *Mem.* I. 5. 1, III. 1. 4, 11. 2, 14. 2, IV. 2. 3; **Aeschin.** *Tim.* 130, *Par.* 152; **Andoc.** *Myst.* 1 (*bis*), 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 19, 22, 25, 27, 29, 37, 39, 43, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 67, 69 (*bis*), 85, 88, 89, 92, 101, 102, 103 (*bis*), 105, 106, 109, 113, 117, 120, 123, 124, 127, 128, 130 (*bis*), 132, 139, 140, 142, 146, *Kath.* 1, 5; **Antiph.** *Pharm.* 1, 3, 13, 19, 26, 30, *Tetr.* 1. 2. 13, *Her.* 1, 4, 7, 17, 20, 45, 49, 52, 72, 85, 86 (*bis*), 92, *Chor.* 7, 9, 14, 16,

- 20, 25, 28, 29, 33, 41; **Din. Dem.** 5, 26, 37, 43, 46, 50, 55, 57, 68, 83, 91, *Phil.* 5, 10; **Isae.** *Kln.* 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 17, 20, 24 (*bis*), 25, 27, 29, 33, 41, 43, 47, 51, *Men.* 1, 3, 6, 13, 14, 17, 20, 27, 35, 38, 44, 47, *Pyr.* 33, 36, 65, 72, *Nik.* 1, 2, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 22, 27, *Dik.* 1 (*bis*), 5, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25 (*bis*), 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35 (*ter*), 37, 38, 41, *Phil.* 1, 9, 10, 12, 17, 19, 21, 23, 28, 39, 49, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 62, *Apol.* 1, 4, 5, 13, 18, 29, 37, 45, *Kir.* 1, 5 (*bis*), 7, 12, 21, 22, 35, 40, *Ast.* 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 17, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34 (*bis*), 36, *Ar.* 1 (*bis*), 2 (*bis*), 4, 5, 6 (*bis*), 8 (*bis*), 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18 (*bis*), 21, 22, 24, 25, *Hag.* 8, 12, 15, 24, 37, 38; **Lycurg.** *Leocr.* 2, 3, 3, 9 (*bis*), 3, 10, 4, 10, 4, 12, 5, 14, 7, 20, 8, 21, 8, 25, 8, 27, 9, 28, 9, 29, 9, 30, 10, 36, 11, 37 (*bis*), 11, 39, 11, 43, 12, 46, 12, 50, 13, 52 (*bis*), 14, 55, 16, 64 (*bis*), 16, 66, 17, 68, 17, 74, 18, 77, 19, 79, 19, 82, 20, 83, 22, 94, 24, 98, 25, 101, 27, 104, 28, 108, 30, 111, 30, 115, 30, 119, 30, 121, 30, 122, 30, 123, 30, 126, 31, 127, 32, 128, 32, 130, 34, 134, 35, 137 (*bis*), 36, 141, 37, 146, 37, 147; **Lys.** 1, 1, 2, 4, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32 (*bis*), 34, 37 (*bis*), 39, 40, 41, 43, 47, 32, 21, 33, 1; **Polyb.** III. 109, 5, 109, 9, IX. 36, 6, XI. 29, 7, XVIII. 23, 3, 23, 6, XXI. 19, 11, 23, 11, XXX. 31, 16, XXXVIII. 20, 1; **Diod. Sic.** 9, 30, 14, 65, 3, 69, 4; **Joseph.** *AJ* 11, 38, 15, 127, 18, 320, *BJ* 6, 328; **Dio Chrys.** 7, 27, 34, 42, 54, 60, 12, 1, 29, 1, 21, 32, 1, 33, 17, 35, 1, 44, 11, 45, 12, 46, 1, 5, 47, 1, 48, 1, 50, 1, 51, 1; **Plut.** *Cic.* 50, 6, *Cato* 21, 9, *Alex.* 9, 10, *Demetr.* 3, 2, *Ages.* 15, 6, 26, 9, *Mor.* 151a, 193e, 214b, 215e, 595b, 596c, 714a, 956b; **Epict.** I. 24, 5, II. 21, 22, III. 23, 30, IV. 6, 23; **Lucian.** *Demon.* 16, *Fug.* 27, *Pereg.* 8, 30, *Somm.* 5, *Tyr.* 14, 19; **Ach.** 8, 3, 1
- Γυναῖκες 'women' (7)
 man > group of women: **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 47, 3
 woman > group of women: **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 40, 1, 41, 5, 42, 1, 42, 2; **Plut.** *Cor.* 33, 7
 divinity > group of women: **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 56, 3 (—γαμεταί)
 Ἄνδρες οἱ παρ(ε)όντες 'men who are present' (2)
Hdt. III. 71, 4; **Plato,** *Prot.* 337c
 Οἱ παρόντες 'those present': **Joseph.** *AJ* 4, 127 (Βαλακὲ ... καὶ Μαδινητιῶν—)
 Πάντες οἱ παρόντες 'all who are present' (5)
Xen. *Cyr.* II. 2, 18 (Κῦρε καὶ—), 3, 8 (Κῦρε καὶ—Πέρσαι), V. 1, 20 (ἄνδρες Μῆδοι καὶ—), VIII. 7, 6 (παῖδες ἐμοὶ καὶ—φίλοι), *Hell.* IV. 1, 32 (Ἀγησίλαε καὶ—Λακεδαιμόνιοι)
 Πάντες ὑμεῖς οἱ παρόντες ἄνδρες 'all you men who are present': **Dion. Hal.** IV. 73, 1 (—ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν)
 Ὑμεῖς οἱ σὺν τούτῳ παρόντες 'you who are present with him': **Dion. Hal.** XI. 36, 2 (Οὐεργίνιε καὶ—)
 Παρόντες ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ τάφῳ 'those present at this tomb': **Lys.** 2, 1
 Ὅσοι πάρεστε Ῥωμαίων ἄρχοντες 'however many rulers of the Romans are present': **Plut.** *Crass.* 30, 5 (Ὀκτάβιε καὶ Πετρώνιε καὶ—)
 Τῶν ἄλλων οἱ παρόντες οἱ μετριώτατοι 'the most moderate other men present': **Dio Chrys.** 41, 1 (βουλῇ καὶ—)

Listing of Addresses

Οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ παρόντες 'the others who are present': **Xen.** *An.* I. 5. 16 (Κλέαρχε καὶ Πρόξενε καὶ—Ἕλληνες)

Οἱ ἄλλοι 'the others' (4)

Plato, *Euthd.* 283b (Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς—), *Phd.* 115a (Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ—), *Symp.* 212b (Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ—); **Xen.** *Cyr.* III. 3. 20 (Κῦρε καὶ—Πέρσαι)

Οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι ἦτε Κύρου φίλοι 'the others, as many as were friends of Cyrus': **Xen.** *An.* II. 5. 39

Οἱ λοιποὶ 'the rest': **Lucian**, *Tim.* 33 (Πόνε καὶ Σοφία καὶ—)

Ξυνωρίς 'pair': **Lucian**, *Phrt.* 28 (καλῇ—)

Ἄνδρες στασιῶται 'conspirators': **Hdt.** III. 83. 2

Ἄνδρες ἱεροὶ 'holy men': **Hdt.** VI. 97. 2

Ἄνδρες Ἐπικούρειοι 'Epicureans': **Plut.** *Mor.* 674a

Ἄνδρες συμπόται 'fellow-drinkers': **Plato**, *Symp.* 216d

Πλούσιοι 'the rich': **Lucian**, *Sat.* 10

Γινόμενοι καὶ ἀπογινόμενοι 'those being born and those who are dying': **Plut.** *Mor.* 363f

Ἄνδρες . . . θεαταὶ 'spectators': **Diod. Sic.** 37. 12. 3

Θεαταὶ καὶ ἀθλοθέται 'spectators and judges of the games': **Philo**, *Agr.* 112

Ἄνδρες παιδὸς τῆς ἐμῆς μνηστήρες 'suitors of my daughter': **Hdt.** VI. 130. 1

Ἄνδρες οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε 'men who caused my death': **Plato**, *Ap.* 39c

Καταψηφισάμενοί μου 'those who condemned me': **Plato**, *Ap.* 39c

Ἄνδρες ἀνοσίων ἔργων τιμωροὶ 'avengers of unholy deeds': **Antiph.** *Tetr.* 2. 3. 3

Πάντες οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτῳ μετέχοντες 'all those having a share with him in this sort of thing': **Dem.** 58. 25 (Θεοκρίνη καὶ—)

Πάντες ὑμεῖς οἱ τῇ γυναικὶ προσήκοντες 'all of you who were close to the woman': **Dion. Hal.** IV. 70. 3 (Λουκρήτιε καὶ Κολλατίνε καὶ—)

Ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου 'men sharing this danger': **Thuc.** IV. 10. 1

Ἄνδρες . . . οἷς ἔτι νῦν βαρεῖς μὲν πολέμιοι Παλαιστῖνοι, θεὸς δ' εὐμενὴς ἄρχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ φίλος 'men . . . to whom the Philistines are now still oppressive enemies, but towards whom God is beginning to be kind and friendly': **Joseph.** *AJ* 6. 20

Μύσται 'initiates' (3)

Philo, *Spec.* I. 320, *LA* III. 219, *Cher.* 48 (—κεκαθαρμένοι τὰ ὦτα)

Μύσται καὶ ἱεροφάνται θεῶν ὁργίων 'initiates and hierophants of divine rites': **Philo**, *Fug.* 85

Μουσικῆς θιασῶται 'devotees of music': **Plut.** *Mor.* 1131e

GENERIC TERMS FOR NON-HUMANS (See text, pp. 184-9)

Terms for animal species, used to animals

- Ἀλεκτρυών 'cock': **Lucian**, *Gall.* 1 (κάκιστε—), 4, 6, 7 (σοφώτατε—), 11, 14 (bis), 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 26 (bis) (βέλτιστε—), 28 (ter), 33 [note also **Lucian**, *Gall.* 19, ἀλεκτρυόνων γενναιότατε]
- Κύνες 'dogs': **Xen.** *Cyn.* 6. 17, 6. 19 (bis), 6. 20, 6. 21
- Δελφίν 'dolphin': **Lucian**, *Dial. Mar.* 5. 1
- Δελφῖνες 'dolphins': **Lucian**, *Dial. Mar.* 5. 1
- Ἴππε 'horse': **Ach.** 1. 14. 2 (—πάντων θηρίων ἀγριώτατε)
- Ὀρνι θρήνων μελωδέ 'melodious bird of dirges': (**Plato**) *Halc.* 8
- [Note also Φιλομήλα to a swallow, **Plut.** *Mor.* 727e]

Terms for animal species, used to humans

These occur only as insults (q.v.) and occasionally in the genitive plural

- Ἀετῶν 'eagles': **Lucian**, *Dial. D.* 8. 2 (γενναιότατε ἀετῶν)
- Ἰχθύων 'fish': **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 48 (βέλτιστε ἰχθύων)

Terms for inanimate objects

- Ἄθω 'mount Athos': **Plut.** *Mor.* 455d (—δαιμόνιε οὐρανόμηκες)
- Βαβυλῶν 'Babylon': **Char.** 7. 1. 5 (ἄπιστε—, κακὴ ξενοδόχε, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐρήμη), 8. 5. 15
- Δίκελλα 'mattock': **Lucian**, *Tim.* 41, 42
- Διφθέρα 'skin cloak': **Lucian**, *Tim.* 42 (φιλάττη—)
- Δῶρον Ἀσκληπιοῦ 'gift of Asclepius': **Ach.** 4. 17. 1
- Ἑστία 'hearth': **Dion. Hal.** VIII. 41. 3 (—πατρώα); **Plut.** *Phoc.* 37. 5 (φίλη—)
- Εὐφράτα 'Euphrates': **Char.** 5. 1. 7, 6. 6. 3
- Θάλασσα 'sea': **Ach.** 3. 10. 6, 3. 23. 4 (θάλαττα ἄγνωμον), 5. 26. 5; **Char.** 3. 5. 9, 3. 6. 6 (—... φιλάνθρωπε), 3. 10. 8 (—μιαρά)
- Θρέμματα 'creatures': **Plato**, *Phdr.* 261a (—γενναῖα)
- Λόγων ἐμῶν σιγηλὸν εἶδωλον 'mute image of my words': (**Dio Chrys.**) 37. 46
- Μάστιξ 'whip': (**Plut.**) *Mor.* 842d (Κερκυραία—)
- Νῆσε 'island': **Lucian**, *Dial. Mar.* 9. 2
- Νινύα 'Nineveh': **Joseph.** *AJ* 9. 241
- Ξίφος 'sword': **Lucian**, *Tyr.* 19 (—κοινωνὸν καὶ διάδοχον τῶν ἐμῶν κατορθωμάτων)
- Ὀφθαλμοί 'eyes': **Ach.** 5. 1. 5, **Char.** 6. 1. 9 (—δυστυχεῖς)
- Πόλις 'city': **Dion. Hal.** IV. 83. 4 (θεοὶ πατῶσι, φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ τῆσδε τῆς

Listing of Addresses

- γῆς, καὶ δαίμονες, οἱ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν λελόγγατε, καὶ πόλις θεοφιλεστάτη πόλεων, ἐν ᾗ γενέσεώς τε καὶ τροφῆς ἐτύχομεν); **Joseph. B7** 5. 19 (τλημονεστάτη—)
- Στρατός 'army': **Joseph. AJ** 4. 116 (μακάριος—)
- Σύμπασα Ἑλλάς 'all Greece': **Dio Chrys.** 12. 85 (text uncertain)
- Συρράκουσαι πατρίς 'Syracuse, my fatherland': **Char.** 6. 6. 3
- Σῶμα 'body': **Joseph. AJ** 13. 317 (—ἀναιδέστατον)
- Τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναθήματα 'the treasures dedicated in Delphi': **Lucian, Tim.** 42 (Μίδα καὶ Κροίσε καὶ—)
- Ὑδωρ 'water': **Hdt.** VII. 35. 2 (πικρὸν—); **Long.** 1. 14. 3 (πονηρὸν—)
- Φάρμακον 'drug': **Ach.** 4. 17. 1 (γῆς τέκνον,—)

Terms for abstract concepts

(Omitting Lucian's personifications, which are counted as names)

Ψυχὴ 'soul' (22)

Xen. *Cyr.* VII. 3. 8 (ἀγαθὴ καὶ πιστὴ—); **Philo,** *Cher.* 52, *Fug.* 213 (—προκόπτουσα καὶ τῇ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων ἐπιστήμῃ προπαιδευμάτων ἐμβαθύνουσα), *Gig.* 44, *Immut.* 114, *LA* I. 51, III. 11, 31, 52, 74, 158, 165, *Migr.* 169, *Mut.* 255, *Post.* 135, *Sacr.* 20, 64, 101, *Somn.* I. 149, II. 68 (—πειθαρχοῦσα τῷ διδάσκοντι); **Char.** 3. 2. 9, 6. 1. 9

Διάνοια 'thought' (18)

Philo, *Cher.* 29, *Det. Pot.* 13, *Heres* 71, *Immut.* 4, *LA* I. 49, II. 91, 106, III. 17, 36, 47, 116, *Migr.* 222, *Post.* 83, *Somn.* II. 76, 176, 179, *Spec.* I. 210, 299

Κάλλος 'beauty': **Char.** 5. 5. 3 (—ἐπίβουλον), 6. 6. 4 (—ἐπίβουλον)

Τύχη 'fortune' (14)

Plut. *Mor.* 87a, 105b, 177c, 341c, 467d, 476c, 603d; **Dio Chrys.** 64. 14; **Char.** 1. 14. 9, 2. 8. 6, 4. 1. 12 (—βάσκανε), 5. 1. 4 (—βάσκανε καὶ μιᾶς γυναικὸς προσφιλονεικοῦσα πολέμῳ), 5. 5. 2, 8. 3. 5

Φαντασία 'imagination': **Epict.** II. 18. 24

Νεώτερε χρόνε 'future time': (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 28 (—καὶ τῶν ξένων ἡδονῶν νομοθέτα)

Terms for superhuman beings

Δαίμον 'divinity' (4) (see also *Terms for gods used to humans*)

Diod. Sic. 17. 51. 2; **Plut.** *Mor.* 105a, 258b (πολυτίμητε—); (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 32 (—οὐράνιε)

Δαίμονες 'divinities' (6)

Dion. Hal. IV. 83. 4 (θεοὶ πατῶσι, φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς, καὶ δαίμονες, οἱ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν λελόγγατε, καὶ πόλις θεοφιλεστάτη πόλεων, ἐν ᾗ γενέσεώς τε καὶ τροφῆς ἐτύχομεν), VIII. 41. 3 (θεοὶ κτήσιοι καὶ ἐστία πατῶσι καὶ δαίμονες οἱ κατέχοντες τοῦτον τὸν τόπον), XIII. 5. 2 (θεοὶ

καὶ δαίμονες, ἔφοροι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων), 6. 3 (θεοὶ τε καὶ δαίμονες, ὅσοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐποπτεύετε βίον); **Lucian**, *Pereg.* 36 (δαίμονες μητρῷοι καὶ πατρῷοι); **Ach.** 3. 10. 1 (θεοὶ καὶ—) [note also **Lucian**, *Psd.* 4, προλόγων καὶ δαιμόνων ἄριστε "Ελεγχε]

Ἐρινύ 'Fury': **Lucian**, *Cat.* 23

Ἡρώες 'heroes': **Thuc.** II. 74. 2 (θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες)

Θεὸς 'god': **Joseph.** *AJ* 14. 24 (—βασιλεὺ τῶν ὄλων)

Θεός 'god': **Epict.** II. 16. 13 (κύριε ὁ θεός)

Θεοὶ 'gods' (36)

Thuc. II. 74. 2 (θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες); **Plato**, *Phdr.* 279b (ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοὶ), *Tim.* 41a (θεοὶ θεῶν); **Xen.** *Cyr.* VIII. 7. 3 (πάντες θεοὶ); **Dem.** 6. 37 (πάντες θεοὶ), 9. 76 (πάντες θεοὶ), 25. 31; **Dion. Hal.** IV. 83. 4 (θεοὶ πατρῷοι, φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς, καὶ δαίμονες, οἱ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν λελόγγατε, καὶ πόλεις θεοφιλεστάτη πόλεων, ἐν ᾗ γενέσεώς τε καὶ τροφῆς ἐτύχομεν), VIII. 41. 3 (θεοὶ κτήσιοι καὶ ἐστία πατρῷα καὶ δαίμονες οἱ κατέχοντες τοῦτον τὸν τόπον), 53. 3 (θεοὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων φύλακες ἡγεμονίας), XIII. 5. 2 (θεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες, ἔφοροι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων), 6. 3 (θεοὶ τε καὶ δαίμονες, ὅσοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐποπτεύετε βίον); **Diod. Sic.** 30. 10. 2; **Plut.** *Alex.* 30. 12 (θεοὶ γενέθλιοι καὶ βασιλῆιοι), *Cam.* 5. 7 (θεοὶ χρηστῶν ἐπίσκοποι καὶ πονηρῶν ἔργων); **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 15, 15 (ἄνδρες θεοὶ), 18, 19, 23, 33, 41, 42, 43, 53, *Icar.* 25, 32, *Fug.* 22, *DC* 1, 5, 10 (*bis*), *Harm.* 4, *Herc.* 8; **Ach.** 3. 10. 1 (—καὶ δαίμονες); **Char.** 5. 7. 10 (—... βασιλῆιοι ἐπουράνιοί τε καὶ ὑποχθόνιοι) [note also **Lucian**, *Cat.* 16, τιμιωτάτη μοι θεῶν, and *Tim.* 4, θεῶν γενναιότατε]

Ἱεροφάντα 'hierophant' (2)

Philo, *Somn.* I. 164; (**Lucian**) *Amor.* 32 (—μυστηρίων Ἐρως)

Μοῖρα 'Fate' (3)

Lucian, *Cat.* 8, 11, 13 [note also βελτίστη Μοιρῶν, **Lucian**, *Cat.* 14]

Νύμφαι 'nymphs' (2)

Long. I. 14. 3 (—φίλαι), 3. 32. 2 (—φίλαι)

Τιτάν 'Titan': **Lucian**, *Prom.* 21 [note also **Lucian**, *Sat.* 5, Τιτάνων ἄριστε, and *Dial. D.* 24. 1, Τιτάνων κάκιστε]

Divine epithets (not discussed in text):

Ἀιδωνεύ: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 28. 1

Ἀπολλων χρηστήριε: **Hdt.** VI. 80. 1

Ἀργειφόντα: **Lucian**, *Tim.* 32

Βασιλῆιοι ἐπουράνιοί τε καὶ ὑποχθόνιοι: **Char.** 5. 7. 10 (θεοὶ ...—)

Ἐννοσίγαιε: **Lucian**, *Iupp. Trag.* 9

Ἐστία τῆς Ῥωμαίων πόλεως φύλαξ: **Dion. Hal.** II. 68. 4

Εὐφορβε ἢ Ἀπολλων ἢ ὁ τι ἂν θέλῃς: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 6. 3

Ἡρακλῆς ἀλεξίκακε: **Lucian**, *Fug.* 32

Listing of Addresses

Καλλίνικε: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 11. 1

Κυλλήνιε: **Lucian**, *Cont.* 1

Μεγάλα στρατηγῶν καὶ ἡγεμόνων ἔργα καὶ πράξεις [καὶ] ἐπιβλέπων ἐν πολέμοις καὶ μάχαις, φερέτριάς σε Ζεῦ: **Plut.** *Marc.* 7. 4

Μέγιστε: see section on FTs, p. 281

Πολιάς: **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 21

Πόσειδον ἀγρεῦ: **Lucian**, *Pisc.* 47

Πύθι' Ἀπολλόν: **Plut.** *Sull.* 29. 12

Χαλκόπου βέλτιστε: **Lucian**, *Dial. Mort.* 6. 4

Χρυσόκομη: **Lucian**, *Gall.* 13

Ζεῦ πατρώε: **Xen.** *Cyr.* VIII. 7. 3

Ζεῦ φίλιε καὶ ξένιε καὶ ἑταιρεῖε καὶ ἐφέστιε καὶ ἀστεροπητὰ καὶ ὄρκιε καὶ νεφεληγερέτα καὶ ἐρίγδονπε καὶ εἴ τί σε ἄλλο οἱ ἐμβρόντητοι ποιηταὶ καλοῦσι—καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπορώσι πρὸς τὰ μέτρα: **Lucian**, *Tim.* 1

Terms for gods used to humans

θεοὶ σωτῆρες 'saviour gods': **Polyb.** XXX. 18. 5; **Diod. Sic.** 31. 15. 3

Δαίμον ἀγαθέ: 'friendly spirit': **Char.** 5. 1. 7, 5. 7. 10

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- (1) Proper names of people, places, or races are omitted unless some special property of that name, as opposed to other names, is discussed in the text.
- (2) Vocatives composed of several words are omitted (but normally listed under the separate words of which they are composed) unless discussed as a unit in the text.
- (3) Feminine and plural forms are not listed separately from the masculine singular unless discussed in different places in the text.
- (4) Addresses consisting of *ἄνδρες* and another word are listed under the other word.
- (5) For references to Appendix B, only main entries are listed.

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